America’s role

From Day One, Pakistan has always had problems with India in the east and Afghanistan
in the west. Kabul doesn’t accept the Durand Line as a legitimate border with Islamabad
and Islamabad doesn’t accept the LoC as a permanent border with New Delhi. If
Pakistan were to yield to Kabul’s position it would mean relinquishing parts of FATA
and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa. If India were to yield to Pakistan’s position it would mean
letting go of Jammu and Kashmir. But modern states do not yield territory easily. So
each regional player has been trying to change the status quo in its favour by launching
terrorist proxies to inflict pain on the other.

Enter the United States. Throughout the Cold War period, it was allied to Pakistan and
propped it up with economic and military aid. But tensions erupted after the collapse of
the Soviet Union when Pakistan lost its utility for the US. The US reneged on its
commitments and turned the screws on Pakistan’s nuclear program, sowing the seeds
of virulent anti-Americanism in state and society. Islamabad responded to the
impending state of regional isolation by installing a “friendly” Taliban regime in
Afghanistan.

But 9/11 created a new ball game. The US went after the Taliban and installed a pro-
India, anti-Pakistan regime in Kabul, warning Pakistan: If you’re not with us you’re
against us. Faced with Hobson’s Choice, Pakistan fashioned a “double-game” to protect
its short and long term interests. It allied with the US against Al-Qaeda’s terrorism but
provided sanctuary to the Afghan Taliban in FATA in order to retain “friendly” leverage
on Kabul in the future. In consequence, the US spent tens of billions of dollars in trying
to “stabilize” Afghanistan with anti-Pakistan regimes but failed because of a slow and
steady resurgence of the Taliban who now control nearly half of Afghanistan and carry
out attacks at will against the government of President Ashraf Ghani.

US Afghan policy has meandered confusingly from one President to another. Under
George W Bush, the US poured in men and materials into the Afghan game, exhorting
Pakistan to “do more” to help. Under Obama, it all but pulled out, allowing the Taliban to
dig in for the long haul and consolidate their gains. Under Trump, the US is in a
“holding” frame but once again leaning on Pakistan to “do more”. Pakistan is not
opposed to a “grand reconciliation” in Afghanistan that brings the bloody civil war to an
end but wants to make sure that the end result is not unfavourable to its interests and
security. But Kabul, New Delhi and Washington are not in any mood to concede
Pakistan’s concerns.

Meanwhile, the regional situation is getting worse. Kabul is under attack from the
Taliban. The Taliban are under attack from Islamic State in Afghanistan. The IS is anti-
Kabul, anti-Islamabad and anti-US. Pakistan and India are warring through proxies.
Islamabad and Kabul are hosting terrorist sanctuaries against each other – the Pakistani
Taliban in Afghanistan and the Afghan Taliban in Pakistan. And the US is railing against
Pakistan and supporting India in a bigger game to challenge China and disrupt CPEC.

Pakistan is in a bind. It has the most to lose in this situation. The state has already
collapsed in Afghanistan and a continuation of the civil war won’t much hurt Kabul as
long as the US continues to prop it up. But if the US were to actively gang up with New
Delhi and Kabul to hurt Pakistan for not “doing more”, the consequences of weakening
the Pakistani state would only benefit the IS and Taliban.

US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson is the latest emissary from Washington in search of a
“solution” to the regional mess. But he has no fresh ideas or initiatives to offer Pakistan
or Afghanistan except a repetition of the “do more” mantra that Pakistan has rejected
time and again. What’s the way out?

America must acknowledge that it has played a majorly critical role in creating and
sustaining this mess. It has two options now. It can empower and support Pakistan to be
the lead player in finding a “solution” in Afghanistan that both Kabul and Islamabad can
live with without destabilizing the other. In this case, its pressure tactics must be
directed at Kabul and New Delhi to work with Pakistan and assuage its security
concerns. Or it can turn its guns on Pakistan for not “doing more” against its own
interests. In this case, it will merely pave the way for extremist anti-American populism
to overwhelm state and society and plunge the region into an existential crisis as in the
Middle East, creating even more problems for everyone in and beyond the region.

Kabul and Islamabad must establish mutual trust by progressively uprooting Pakistani
Taliban sanctuaries in Afghanistan and Afghan Taliban sanctuaries in Pakistan.
Simultaneously Pakistan and India must normalize relations by ending their proxy wars.
America must play a leading role in bringing this about instead of exacerbating
problems by playing anti-Pakistan favourites.

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