EN BANC

[G.R. No. 159357. April 28, 2004]

Brother MARIANO MIKE Z. VELARDE, petitioner, vs. SOCIAL JUSTICE

SOCIETY, respondent.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

A decision that does not conform to the form and substance required by the
Constitution and the law is void and deemed legally inexistent. To be valid,
decisions should comply with the form, the procedure and the substantive
requirements laid out in the Constitution, the Rules of Court and relevant
circulars/orders of the Supreme Court. For the guidance of the bench and the
bar, the Court hereby discusses these forms, procedures and requirements.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,

[1]

assailing the June 12, 2003 Decision and July 29, 2003 Order of the Regional
[2] [3]

Trial Court (RTC) of Manila (Branch 49). [4]

The challenged Decision was the offshoot of a Petition for Declaratory

Relief filed before the RTC-Manila by herein Respondent Social Justice
[5]

Society (SJS) against herein Petitioner Mariano Mike Z. Velarde, together with
His Eminence, Jaime Cardinal Sin, Executive Minister Erao Manalo, Brother
Eddie Villanueva and Brother Eliseo F. Soriano as co-respondents. The Petition
prayed for the resolution of the question whether or not the act of a religious
leader like any of herein respondents, in endorsing the candidacy of a candidate
for elective office or in urging or requiring the members of his flock to vote for a
specified candidate, is violative of the letter or spirit of the constitutional
provisions x x x. [6]

Alleging that the questioned Decision did not contain a statement of facts
and a dispositive portion, herein petitioner filed a Clarificatory Motion and
Motion for Reconsideration before the trial court. Soriano, his co-respondent,
similarly filed a separate Motion for Reconsideration. In response, the trial court
issued the assailed Order, which held as follows:

x x x [T]his Court cannot reconsider, because what it was asked to do, was only to
clarify a Constitutional provision and to declare whether acts are violative thereof.
The Decision did not make a dispositive portion because a dispositive portion is
required only in coercive reliefs, where a redress from wrong suffered and the benefit
that the prevailing party wronged should get. The step that these movants have to take,
is direct appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, for a conclusive interpretation of
the Constitutional provision to the Supreme Court. [7]

The Antecedent Proceedings

 On January 28, 2003, SJS filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief (SJS
Petition) before the RTC-Manila against Velarde and his aforesaid co-
respondents. SJS, a registered political party, sought the interpretation of
several constitutional provisions, specifically on the separation of church and
[8]

state; and a declaratory judgment on the constitutionality of the acts of religious

leaders endorsing a candidate for an elective office, or urging or requiring the
members of their flock to vote for a specified candidate.
The subsequent proceedings were recounted in the challenged Decision in
these words:

x x x. Bro. Eddie Villanueva submitted, within the original period [to file an Answer],
a Motion to Dismiss. Subsequently, Executive Minister Erao Manalo and Bro. Mike
Velarde, filed their Motions to Dismiss. While His Eminence Jaime Cardinal L. Sin,
filed a Comment and Bro. Eli Soriano, filed an Answer within the extended period
and similarly prayed for the dismissal of the Petition. All sought the dismissal of the
Petition on the common grounds that it does not state a cause of action and that there
is no justiciable controversy. They were ordered to submit a pleading by way of
advisement, which was closely followed by another Order denying all the Motions to
Dismiss. Bro. Mike Velarde, Bro. Eddie Villanueva and Executive Minister Erao
Manalo moved to reconsider the denial. His Eminence Jaime Cardinal L. Sin, asked
for extension to file memorandum. Only Bro. Eli Soriano complied with the first
Order by submitting his Memorandum. x x x.

x x x the Court denied the Motions to Dismiss, and the Motions for Reconsideration
filed by Bro. Mike Velarde, Bro. Eddie Villanueva and Executive Minister Erao
Manalo, which raised no new arguments other than those already considered in the
motions to dismiss x x x.[9]

After narrating the above incidents, the trial court said that it had jurisdiction
over the Petition, because in praying for a determination as to whether the
actions imputed to the respondents are violative of Article II, Section 6 of the
Fundamental Law, [the Petition] has raised only a question of law. It then [10]

proceeded to a lengthy discussion of the issue raised in the Petition the

separation of church and state even tracing, to some extent, the historical
background of the principle. Through its discourse, the court a quo opined at
some point that the [e]ndorsement of specific candidates in an election to any
public office is a clear violation of the separation clause. [11]

After its essay on the legal issue, however, the trial court failed to include a
dispositive portion in its assailed Decision. Thus, Velarde and Soriano filed
separate Motions for Reconsideration which, as mentioned earlier, were denied
by the lower court.
Hence, this Petition for Review. [12]

This Court, in a Resolution dated September 2, 2003, required SJS and

[13]

the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to submit their respective

comments. In the same Resolution, the Court gave the other parties --
impleaded as respondents in the original case below --the opportunity to
comment, if they so desired.
On April 13, 2004, the Court en banc conducted an Oral Argument. [14]

The Issues
 In his Petition, Brother Mike Velarde submits the following issues for this
Courts resolution:
1. Whether or not the Decision dated 12 June 2003 rendered by the court a quo was
proper and valid;
2. Whether or not there exists justiceable controversy in herein respondents Petition for
declaratory relief;
3. Whether or not herein respondent has legal interest in filing the Petition for declaratory
relief;
4. Whether or not the constitutional question sought to be resolved by herein respondent
is ripe for judicial determination;
5. Whether or not there is adequate remedy other than the declaratory relief; and,
6. Whether or not the court a quo has jurisdiction over the Petition for declaratory relief
of herein respondent.[15]

During the Oral Argument, the issues were narrowed down and classified
as follows:

A. Procedural Issues

Did the Petition for Declaratory Relief raise a justiciable

controversy? Did it state a cause of action? Did respondent have any
legal standing to file the Petition for Declaratory Relief?

B. Substantive Issues

1. Did the RTC Decision conform to the form and substance required by
the Constitution, the law and the Rules of Court?

2. May religious leaders like herein petitioner, Bro. Mike Velarde, be

prohibited from endorsing candidates for public
office? Corollarily, may they be banned from campaigning against
said candidates?

The Courts Ruling

The Petition of Brother Mike Velarde is meritorious.

Procedural Issues:
Requisites of Petitions
for Declaratory Relief

Section 1 of Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, which deals with petitions for
declaratory relief, provides in part:

Section 1. Who may file petition.- Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or
other written instrument, whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or
regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental regulation may, before breach or
violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine
any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or
duties thereunder.

Based on the foregoing, an action for declaratory relief should be filed by a

person interested under a deed, a will, a contract or other written instrument,
and whose rights are affected by a statute, an executive order, a regulation or
an ordinance. The purpose of the remedy is to interpret or to determine the
validity of the written instrument and to seek a judicial declaration of the parties
rights or duties thereunder. The essential requisites of the action are as
[16]

follows: (1) there is a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy is between

persons whose interests are adverse; (3) the party seeking the relief has a legal
interest in the controversy; and (4) the issue is ripe for judicial determination. [17]

Justiciable Controversy

Brother Mike Velarde contends that the SJS Petition failed to allege, much
less establish before the trial court, that there existed a justiciable controversy
or an adverse legal interest between them; and that SJS had a legal right that
was being violated or threatened to be violated by petitioner. On the contrary,
Velarde alleges that SJS premised its action on mere speculations, contingent
events, and hypothetical issues that had not yet ripened into an actual
controversy. Thus, its Petition for Declaratory Relief must fail.
A justiciable controversy refers to an existing case or controversy that is
appropriate or ripe for judicial determination, not one that is conjectural or
merely anticipatory.[18] The SJS Petition for Declaratory Relief fell short of this
test. It miserably failed to allege an existing controversy or dispute between the
petitioner and the named respondents therein. Further, the Petition did not
sufficiently state what specific legal right of the petitioner was violated by the
respondents therein; and what particular act or acts of the latter were in breach
of its rights, the law or the Constitution.
As pointed out by Brother Eliseo F. Soriano in his Comment, what exactly
[19]

has he done that merited the attention of SJS? He confesses that he does not
know the answer, because the SJS Petition (as well as the assailed Decision
of the RTC) yields nothing in this respect. His Eminence, Jaime Cardinal Sin,
adds that, at the time SJS filed its Petition on January 28, 2003, the election
season had not even started yet; and that, in any event, he has not been actively
involved in partisan politics.
An initiatory complaint or petition filed with the trial court should contain a
plain, concise and direct statement of the ultimate facts on which the party
pleading relies for his claim x x x. Yet, the SJS Petition stated no ultimate facts.
[20]

Indeed, SJS merely speculated or anticipated without factual moorings that,

as religious leaders, the petitioner and his co-respondents below had endorsed
or threatened to endorse a candidate or candidates for elective offices; and that
such actual or threatened endorsement will enable [them] to elect men to public
office who [would] in turn be forever beholden to their leaders, enabling them to
control the government[;] and pos[ing] a clear and present danger of serious
[21]

erosion of the peoples faith in the electoral process[;] and reinforc[ing] their
belief that religious leaders determine the ultimate result of elections, which
[22]

would then be violative of the separation clause.

Such premise is highly speculative and merely theoretical, to say the
least. Clearly, it does not suffice to constitute a justiciable controversy. The
Petition does not even allege any indication or manifest intent on the part of any
of the respondents below to champion an electoral candidate, or to urge their
so-called flock to vote for, or not to vote for, a particular candidate. It is a time-
honored rule that sheer speculation does not give rise to an actionable right.
 Obviously, there is no factual allegation that SJS rights are being subjected
to any threatened, imminent and inevitable violation that should be prevented
by the declaratory relief sought. The judicial power and duty of the courts to
settle actual controversies involving rights that are legally demandable and
enforceable cannot be exercised when there is no actual or threatened
[23]

violation of a legal right.

All that the 5-page SJS Petition prayed for was that the question raised in
paragraph 9 hereof be resolved. In other words, it merely sought an opinion
[24]

of the trial court on whether the speculated acts of religious leaders endorsing
elective candidates for political offices violated the constitutional principle on
the separation of church and state. SJS did not ask for a declaration of its rights
and duties; neither did it pray for the stoppage of any threatened violation of its
declared rights. Courts, however, are proscribed from rendering an advisory
opinion. [25]

Cause of Action

Respondent SJS asserts that in order to maintain a petition for declaratory

relief, a cause of action need not be alleged or proven. Supposedly, for such
petition to prosper, there need not be any violation of a right, breach of duty or
actual wrong committed by one party against the other.
Petitioner, on the other hand, argues that the subject matter of an action for
declaratory relief should be a deed, a will, a contract (or other written
instrument), a statute, an executive order, a regulation or an ordinance. But the
subject matter of the SJS Petition is the constitutionality of an act of a religious
leader to endorse the candidacy of a candidate for elective office or to urge or
require the members of the flock to vote for a specified candidate. According
[26]

to petitioner, this subject matter is beyond the realm of an action for declaratory
relief. Petitioner avers that in the absence of a valid subject matter, the Petition
[27]

fails to state a cause of action and, hence, should have been dismissed outright
by the court a quo.
A cause of action is an act or an omission of one party in violation of the
legal right or rights of another, causing injury to the latter. Its essential
[28]

elements are the following: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff; (2) an obligation
on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and
(3) such defendants act or omission that is violative of the right of the plaintiff or
constituting a breach of the obligation of the former to the latter. [29]

The failure of a complaint to state a cause of action is a ground for its

outright dismissal. However, in special civil actions for declaratory relief, the
[30]

concept of a cause of action under ordinary civil actions does not strictly
apply. The reason for this exception is that an action for declaratory relief
presupposes that there has been no actual breach of the instruments involved
or of rights arising thereunder. Nevertheless, a breach or violation should be
[31]

impending, imminent or at least threatened.

A perusal of the Petition filed by SJS before the RTC discloses no explicit
allegation that the former had any legal right in its favor that it sought to
protect. We can only infer the interest, supposedly in its favor, from its bare
allegation that it has thousands of members who are citizens-taxpayers-
registered voters and who are keenly interested in a judicial clarification of the
constitutionality of the partisan participation of religious leaders in Philippine
politics and in the process to insure adherence to the Constitution by everyone
x x x.
[32]
 Such general averment does not, however, suffice to constitute a legal right
or interest. Not only is the presumed interest not personal in character; it is
likewise too vague, highly speculative and uncertain. The Rules require that
[33]

the interest must be material to the issue and affected by the questioned act or
instrument, as distinguished from simple curiosity or incidental interest in the
question raised. [34]

To bolster its stance, SJS cites the Corpus Juris Secundum and submits
that the [p]laintiff in a declaratory judgment action does not seek to enforce a
claim against [the] defendant, but seeks a judicial declaration of [the] rights of
the parties for the purpose of guiding [their] future conduct, and the essential
distinction between a declaratory judgment action and the usual action is that
no actual wrong need have been committed or loss have occurred in order to
sustain the declaratory judgment action, although there must be no uncertainty
that the loss will occur or that the asserted rights will be invaded. [35]

SJS has, however, ignored the crucial point of its own reference that there
must be no uncertainty that the loss will occur or that the asserted rights will be
invaded. Precisely, as discussed earlier, it merely conjectures that herein
petitioner (and his co-respondents below) might actively participate in partisan
politics, use the awesome voting strength of its faithful flock [to] enable it to elect
men to public office x x x, enabling [it] to control the government. [36]

During the Oral Argument, though, Petitioner Velarde and his co-
respondents below all strongly asserted that they had not in any way engaged
or intended to participate in partisan politics. They all firmly assured this Court
that they had not done anything to trigger the issue raised and to entitle SJS to
the relief sought.
Indeed, the Court finds in the Petition for Declaratory Relief no single
allegation of fact upon which SJS could base a right of relief from the named
respondents. In any event, even granting that it sufficiently asserted a legal right
it sought to protect, there was nevertheless no certainty that such right would
be invaded by the said respondents. Not even the alleged proximity of the
elections to the time the Petition was filed below (January 28, 2003) would have
provided the certainty that it had a legal right that would be jeopardized or
violated by any of those respondents.

Legal Standing

Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal and

substantial interest in the case, such that the party has sustained or will sustain
direct injury as a result of the challenged act. Interest means a material
[37]

interest in issue that is affected by the questioned act or instrument, as

distinguished from a mere incidental interest in the question involved. [38]

Petitioner alleges that [i]n seeking declaratory relief as to the

constitutionality of an act of a religious leader to endorse, or require the
members of the religious flock to vote for a specific candidate, herein
Respondent SJS has no legal interest in the controversy; it has failed to
[39]

establish how the resolution of the proffered question would benefit or injure it.
Parties bringing suits challenging the constitutionality of a law, an act or a
statute must show not only that the law [or act] is invalid, but also that [they
have] sustained or [are] in immediate or imminent danger of sustaining some
direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that [they] suffer
thereby in some indefinite way. They must demonstrate that they have been,
[40]
or are about to be, denied some right or privilege to which they are lawfully
entitled, or that they are about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by
reason of the statute or act complained of. [41]

First, parties suing as taxpayers must specifically prove that they have
sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by
taxation. A taxpayers action may be properly brought only when there is an
[42]

exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power. In the present case,

[43]

there is no allegation, whether express or implied, that taxpayers money is

being illegally disbursed.
Second, there was no showing in the Petition for Declaratory Relief that SJS
as a political party or its members as registered voters would be adversely
affected by the alleged acts of the respondents below, if the question at issue
was not resolved. There was no allegation that SJS had suffered or would be
deprived of votes due to the acts imputed to the said respondents. Neither did
it allege that any of its members would be denied the right of suffrage or the
privilege to be voted for a public office they are seeking.
Finally, the allegedly keen interest of its thousands of members who are
citizens-taxpayers-registered voters is too general and beyond the
[44]

contemplation of the standards set by our jurisprudence. Not only is the

presumed interest impersonal in character; it is likewise too vague, highly
speculative and uncertain to satisfy the requirement of standing. [45]

Transcendental Importance

In any event, SJS urges the Court to take cognizance of the Petition, even
sans legal standing, considering that the issues raised are of paramount public
interest.
In not a few cases, the Court has liberalized the locus standi requirement
when a petition raises an issue of transcendental significance or paramount
importance to the people. Recently, after holding that the IBP had no locus
[46]

standi to bring the suit, the Court in IBP v. Zamora nevertheless entertained
[47]

the Petition therein. It noted that the IBP has advanced constitutional issues
which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty
and weight as precedents. [48]

Similarly in the instant case, the Court deemed the constitutional issue
raised in the SJS Petition to be of paramount interest to the Filipino people. The
issue did not simply concern a delineation of the separation between church
and state, but ran smack into the governance of our country. The issue was
both transcendental in importance and novel in nature, since it had never been
decided before.
The Court, thus, called for Oral Argument to determine with certainty
whether it could resolve the constitutional issue despite the barren allegations
in the SJS Petition as well as the abbreviated proceedings in the court
below. Much to its chagrin, however, counsels for the parties -- particularly for
Respondent SJS -- made no satisfactory allegations or clarifications that would
supply the deficiencies hereinabove discussed. Hence, even if the Court would
exempt this case from the stringent locus standi requirement, such heroic effort
would be futile because the transcendental issue cannot be resolved anyway.

Proper Proceedings Before

the Trial Court

To prevent a repetition of this waste of precious judicial time and effort, and
for the guidance of the bench and the bar, the Court reiterates
the elementary procedure that must be followed by trial courts in the conduct
[49]

of civil cases. [50]

Prefatorily, the trial court may -- motu proprio or upon motion of the
defendant -- dismiss a complaint (or petition, in a special civil action) that does
[51]

not allege the plaintiffs (or petitioners) cause or causes of action. A complaint [52]

or petition should contain a plain, concise and direct statement of the ultimate
facts on which the party pleading relies for his claim or defense. It should [53]

likewise clearly specify the relief sought. [54]

Upon the filing of the complaint/petition and the payment of the requisite
legal fees, the clerk of court shall forthwith issue the corresponding summons
to the defendants or the respondents, with a directive that the defendant
answer within 15 days, unless a different period is fixed by the court. The
[55] [56]

summons shall also contain a notice that if such answer is not filed, the
plaintiffs/petitioners shall take a judgment by default and may be granted the
relief applied for. The court, however, may -- upon such terms as may be just
[57]

-- allow an answer to be filed after the time fixed by the Rules. [58]

If the answer sets forth a counterclaim or cross-claim, it must be answered

within ten (10) days from service. A reply may be filed within ten (10) days
[59]

from service of the pleading responded to. [60]

When an answer fails to tender an issue or admits the material allegations

of the adverse partys pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct
judgment on such pleading (except in actions for declaration of nullity or
annulment of marriage or for legal separation). Meanwhile, a party seeking to
[61]

recover upon a claim, a counterclaim or crossclaim -- or to obtain a declaratory

relief -- may, at any time after the answer thereto has been served, move for a
summary judgment in its favor. Similarly, a party against whom a claim, a
[62]

counterclaim or crossclaim is asserted -- or a declaratory relief sought -- may,

at any time, move for a summary judgment in its favor. After the motion is [63]

heard, the judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if there is a showing

that, except as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact; and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law.[64]

Within the time for -- but before -- filing the answer to the complaint or
petition, the defendant may file a motion to dismiss based on any of the grounds
stated in Section 1 of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court. During the hearing of the
motion, the parties shall submit their arguments on the questions of law, and
their evidence on the questions of fact. After the hearing, the court may
[65]

dismiss the action or claim, deny the motion, or order the amendment of the
pleadings. It shall not defer the resolution of the motion for the reason that the
ground relied upon is not indubitable. In every case, the resolution shall state
clearly and distinctly the reasons therefor. [66]

If the motion is denied, the movant may file an answer within the balance of
the period originally prescribed to file an answer, but not less than five (5) days
in any event, computed from the receipt of the notice of the denial. If the
pleading is ordered to be amended, the defendant shall file an answer within
fifteen (15) days, counted from the service of the amended pleading, unless the
court provides a longer period. [67]
 After the last pleading has been served and filed, the case shall be set for
pretrial, which is a mandatory proceeding. A plaintiffs/ petitioners (or its duly
[68] [69]

authorized representatives) non-appearance at the pretrial, if without valid

cause, shall result in the dismissal of the action with prejudice, unless the court
orders otherwise. A similar failure on the part of the defendant shall be a cause
for allowing the plaintiff/petitioner to present evidence ex parte, and the court to
render judgment on the basis thereof. [70]

The parties are required to file their pretrial briefs; failure to do so shall have
the same effect as failure to appear at the pretrial. Upon the termination
[71]

thereof, the court shall issue an order reciting in detail the matters taken up at
the conference; the action taken on them, the amendments allowed to the
pleadings; and the agreements or admissions, if any, made by the parties
regarding any of the matters considered. The parties may further avail
[72]

themselves of any of the modes of discovery, if they so wish.

[73]

Thereafter, the case shall be set for trial, in which the parties shall adduce
[74]

their respective evidence in support of their claims and/or defenses. By their

written consent or upon the application of either party, or on its own motion, the
court may also order any or all of the issues to be referred to a commissioner,
who is to be appointed by it or to be agreed upon by the parties. The trial or
[75]

hearing before the commissioner shall proceed in all respects as it would if held
before the court. [76]

Upon the completion of such proceedings, the commissioner shall file with
the court a written report on the matters referred by the parties. The report
[77]

shall be set for hearing, after which the court shall issue an order adopting,
modifying or rejecting it in whole or in part; or recommitting it with instructions;
or requiring the parties to present further evidence before the commissioner or
the court. [78]

Finally, a judgment or final order determining the merits of the case shall be
rendered. The decision shall be in writing, personally and directly prepared by
the judge, stating clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based,
signed by the issuing magistrate, and filed with the clerk of court. [79]

Based on these elementary guidelines, let us examine the proceedings

before the trial court in the instant case.
First, with respect to the initiatory pleading of the SJS. Even a cursory
perusal of the Petition immediately reveals its gross inadequacy. It contained
no statement of ultimate facts upon which the petitioner relied for its
claim. Furthermore, it did not specify the relief it sought from the court, but
merely asked it to answer a hypothetical question.
Relief, as contemplated in a legal action, refers to a specific coercive
measure prayed for as a result of a violation of the rights of a plaintiff or a
petitioner. As already discussed earlier, the Petition before the trial court had
[80]

no allegations of fact or of any specific violation of the petitioners rights, which

[81]

the respondents had a duty to respect. Such deficiency amounted to a failure

to state a cause of action; hence, no coercive relief could be sought and
adjudicated. The Petition evidently lacked substantive requirements and, we
repeat, should have been dismissed at the outset.
Second, with respect to the trial court proceedings. Within the period set to
file their respective answers to the SJS Petition, Velarde, Villanueva and
Manalo filed Motions to Dismiss; Cardinal Sin, a Comment; and Soriano, within
a priorly granted extended period, an Answer in which he likewise prayed for
the dismissal of the Petition. SJS filed a Rejoinder to the Motion of Velarde,
[82]
who subsequently filed a Sur-Rejoinder. Supposedly, there were several
scheduled settings, in which the [c]ourt was apprised of the respective positions
of the parties. The nature of such settings -- whether pretrial or trial hearings -
[83]

- was not disclosed in the records. Before ruling on the Motions to Dismiss, the
trial court issued an Order dated May 8, 2003, directing the parties to submit
[84]

their memoranda. Issued shortly thereafter was another Order dated May 14,
[85]

2003, denying all the Motions to Dismiss.

In the latter Order, the trial court perfunctorily ruled:

The Court now resolves to deny the Motions to Dismiss, and after all the memoranda
are submitted, then, the case shall be deemed as submitted for resolution. [86]

Apparently, contrary to the requirement of Section 2 of Rule 16 of the Rules

of Court, the Motions were not heard. Worse, the Order purportedly resolving
the Motions to Dismiss did not state any reason at all for their denial, in
contravention of Section 3 of the said Rule 16. There was not even any
statement of the grounds relied upon by the Motions; much less, of the legal
findings and conclusions of the trial court.
Thus, Velarde, Villanueva and Manalo moved for reconsideration. Pending
the resolution of these Motions for Reconsideration, Villanueva filed a Motion
to suspend the filing of the parties memoranda. But instead of separately
resolving the pending Motions fairly and squarely, the trial court again
transgressed the Rules of Court when it immediately proceeded to issue its
Decision, even before tackling the issues raised in those Motions.
Furthermore, the RTC issued its Decision without allowing the parties to file
their answers. For this reason, there was no joinder of the issues. If only it had
allowed the filing of those answers, the trial court would have known, as the
Oral Argument revealed, that the petitioner and his co-respondents below had
not committed or threatened to commit the act attributed to them (endorsing
candidates) -- the act that was supposedly the factual basis of the suit.
Parenthetically, the court a quo further failed to give a notice of the Petition
to the OSG, which was entitled to be heard upon questions involving the
constitutionality or validity of statutes and other measures. [87]

Moreover, as will be discussed in more detail, the questioned Decision of

the trial court was utterly wanting in the requirements prescribed by the
Constitution and the Rules of Court.
All in all, during the loosely abbreviated proceedings of the case, the trial
court indeed acted with inexplicable haste, with total ignorance of the law -- or,
worse, in cavalier disregard of the rules of procedure -- and with grave abuse
of discretion.
Contrary to the contentions of the trial judge and of SJS, proceedings for
declaratory relief must still follow the process described above -- the petition
must state a cause of action; the proceedings must undergo the procedure
outlined in the Rules of Court; and the decision must adhere to constitutional
and legal requirements.

First Substantive Issue:

Fundamental Requirements
of a Decision
 The Constitution commands that [n]o decision shall be rendered by any
court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on
which it is based. No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a
decision of the court shall be refused due course or denied without stating the
basis therefor. [88]

Consistent with this constitutional mandate, Section 1 of Rule 36 of the

Rules on Civil Procedure similarly provides:

Sec. 1. Rendition of judgments and final orders. A judgment or final order

determining the merits of the case shall be in writing personally and directly prepared
by the judge, stating clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based,
signed by him and filed with the clerk of court.

In the same vein, Section 2 of Rule 120 of the Rules of Court on Criminal
Procedure reads as follows:

Sec. 2. Form and contents of judgments. -- The judgment must be written in the
official language, personally and directly prepared by the judge and signed by him and
shall contain clearly and distinctly a statement of the facts proved or admitted by the
accused and the law upon which the judgment is based.

x x x x x x x x x.

Pursuant to the Constitution, this Court also issued on January 28, 1988,
Administrative Circular No. 1, prompting all judges to make complete findings
of facts in their decisions, and scrutinize closely the legal aspects of the case in
the light of the evidence presented. They should avoid the tendency to
generalize and form conclusions without detailing the facts from which such
conclusions are deduced.
In many cases, this Court has time and time again reminded magistrates
[89]

to heed the demand of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution. The Court,
through Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. in Yao v. Court of
Appeals, discussed at length the implications of this provision and strongly
[90]

exhorted thus:

Faithful adherence to the requirements of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution
is indisputably a paramount component of due process and fair play. It is likewise
demanded by the due process clause of the Constitution. The parties to a litigation
should be informed of how it was decided, with an explanation of the factual and legal
reasons that led to the conclusions of the court. The court cannot simply say that
judgment is rendered in favor of X and against Y and just leave it at that without any
justification whatsoever for its action. The losing party is entitled to know why he
lost, so he may appeal to the higher court, if permitted, should he believe that the
decision should be reversed. A decision that does not clearly and distinctly state the
facts and the law on which it is based leaves the parties in the dark as to how it was
reached and is precisely prejudicial to the losing party, who is unable to pinpoint the
possible errors of the court for review by a higher tribunal. More than that, the
requirement is an assurance to the parties that, in reaching judgment, the judge did so
through the processes of legal reasoning. It is, thus, a safeguard against the
impetuosity of the judge, preventing him from deciding ipse dixit. Vouchsafed neither
the sword nor the purse by the Constitution but nonetheless vested with the sovereign
prerogative of passing judgment on the life, liberty or property of his fellowmen, the
judge must ultimately depend on the power of reason for sustained public confidence
in the justness of his decision.
 In People v. Bugarin, the Court also explained:
[91]

The requirement that the decisions of courts must be in writing and that they must set
forth clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which they are based serves many
functions. It is intended, among other things, to inform the parties of the reason or
reasons for the decision so that if any of them appeals, he can point out to the
appellate court the finding of facts or the rulings on points of law with which he
disagrees. More than that, the requirement is an assurance to the parties that, in
reaching judgment, the judge did so through the processes of legal reasoning. x x x.

Indeed, elementary due process demands that the parties to a litigation be

given information on how the case was decided, as well as an explanation of
the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the court. [92]

In Madrid v. Court of Appeals, this Court had instructed magistrates to

[93]

exert effort to ensure that their decisions would present a comprehensive

analysis or account of the factual and legal findings that would substantially
address the issues raised by the parties.
In the present case, it is starkly obvious that the assailed Decision contains
no statement of facts -- much less an assessment or analysis thereof -- or of
the courts findings as to the probable facts. The assailed Decision begins with
a statement of the nature of the action and the question or issue
presented. Then follows a brief explanation of the constitutional provisions
involved, and what the Petition sought to achieve. Thereafter, the ensuing
procedural incidents before the trial court are tracked. The Decision proceeds
to a full-length opinion on the nature and the extent of the separation of church
and state. Without expressly stating the final conclusion she has reached or
specifying the relief granted or denied, the trial judge ends her Decision with the
clause SO ORDERED.
What were the antecedents that necessitated the filing of the Petition? What
exactly were the distinct facts that gave rise to the question sought to be
resolved by SJS? More important, what were the factual findings and analysis
on which the trial court based its legal findings and conclusions? None were
stated or implied. Indeed, the RTCs Decision cannot be upheld for its failure to
express clearly and distinctly the facts on which it was based. Thus, the trial
court clearly transgressed the constitutional directive.
The significance of factual findings lies in the value of the decision as a
precedent. How can it be so if one cannot apply the ruling to similar
circumstances, simply because such circumstances are unknown? Otherwise
stated, how will the ruling be applied in the future, if there is no point of factual
comparison?
Moreover, the court a quo did not include a resolutory or dispositive portion
in its so-called Decision. The importance of such portion was explained in the
early case Manalang v. Tuason de Rickards, from which we quote:
[94]

The resolution of the Court on a given issue as embodied in the dispositive part of the
decision or order is the investitive or controlling factor that determines and settles the
rights of the parties and the questions presented therein, notwithstanding the existence
of statements or declaration in the body of said order that may be confusing.

The assailed Decision in the present case leaves us in the dark as to its final
resolution of the Petition. To recall, the original Petition was for declaratory
relief. So, what relief did the trial court grant or deny? What rights of the parties
did it conclusively declare? Its final statement says, SO ORDERED. But what
exactly did the court order? It had the temerity to label its issuance a Decision,
when nothing was in fact decided.
Respondent SJS insists that the dispositive portion can be found in the body
of the assailed Decision. It claims that the issue is disposed of and the Petition
finally resolved by the statement of the trial court found on page 10 of its 14-
page Decision, which reads: Endorsement of specific candidates in an election
to any public office is a clear violation of the separation clause. [95]

We cannot agree.
In Magdalena Estate, Inc. v. Caluag, the obligation of the party imposed
[96]

by the Court was allegedly contained in the text of the original Decision. The
Court, however, held:

x x x The quoted finding of the lower court cannot supply deficiencies in the
dispositive portion. It is a mere opinion of the court and the rule is settled that where
there is a conflict between the dispositive part and the opinion, the former must
prevail over the latter on the theory that the dispositive portion is the final order while
the opinion is merely a statement ordering nothing. (Italics in the original)

Thus, the dispositive portion cannot be deemed to be the statement quoted

by SJS and embedded in the last paragraph of page 10 of the assailed 14-page
Decision. If at all, that statement is merely an answer to a hypothetical legal
question and just a part of the opinion of the trial court. It does not conclusively
declare the rights (or obligations) of the parties to the Petition. Neither does it
grant any -- much less, the proper -- relief under the circumstances, as required
of a dispositive portion.
Failure to comply with the constitutional injunction is a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Decisions or orders
issued in careless disregard of the constitutional mandate are a patent nullity
and must be struck down as void. [97]

Parts of a Decision

In general, the essential parts of a good decision consist of the following:

(1) statement of the case; (2) statement of facts; (3) issues or assignment of
errors; (4) court ruling, in which each issue is, as a rule, separately considered
and resolved; and, finally, (5) dispositive portion. The ponente may also opt to
include an introduction or a prologue as well as an epilogue, especially in cases
in which controversial or novel issues are involved. [98]

An introduction may consist of a concise but comprehensive statement of

the principal factual or legal issue/s of the case. In some cases -- particularly
those concerning public interest; or involving complicated commercial,
scientific, technical or otherwise rare subject matters -- a longer introduction or
prologue may serve to acquaint readers with the specific nature of the
controversy and the issues involved. An epilogue may be a summation of the
important principles applied to the resolution of the issues of paramount public
interest or significance. It may also lay down an enduring philosophy of law or
guiding principle.
Let us now, again for the guidance of the bench and the bar, discuss the
essential parts of a good decision.
1. Statement of the Case
 The Statement of the Case consists of a legal definition of the nature of the
action. At the first instance, this part states whether the action is a civil case for
collection, ejectment, quieting of title, foreclosure of mortgage, and so on; or, if
it is a criminal case, this part describes the specific charge -- quoted usually
from the accusatory portion of the information -- and the plea of the
accused. Also mentioned here are whether the case is being decided on appeal
or on a petition for certiorari, the court of origin, the case number in the trial
court, and the dispositive portion of the assailed decision.
In a criminal case, the verbatim reproduction of the criminal information
serves as a guide in determining the nature and the gravity of the offense for
which the accused may be found culpable. As a rule, the accused cannot be
convicted of a crime different from or graver than that charged.
Also, quoting verbatim the text of the information is especially important
when there is a question on the sufficiency of the charge, or on whether
qualifying and modifying circumstances have been adequately alleged therein.
To ensure that due process is accorded, it is important to give a short
description of the proceedings regarding the plea of the accused. Absence of
an arraignment, or a serious irregularity therein, may render the judgment void,
and further consideration by the appellate court would be futile. In some
instances, especially in appealed cases, it would also be useful to mention the
fact of the appellants detention, in order to dispose of the preliminary query --
whether or not they have abandoned their appeal by absconding or jumping
bail.
Mentioning the court of origin and the case number originally assigned helps
in facilitating the consolidation of the records of the case in both the trial and
the appellate courts, after entry of final judgment.
Finally, the reproduction of the decretal portion of the assailed decision
informs the reader of how the appealed case was decided by the court a quo.
2. Statement of Facts
There are different ways of relating the facts of the case. First, under the
objective or reportorial method, the judge summarizes -- without comment -- the
testimony of each witness and the contents of each exhibit. Second, under the
synthesis method, the factual theory of the plaintiff or prosecution and then that
of the defendant or defense is summarized according to the judges best
light. Third, in the subjective method, the version of the facts accepted by the
judge is simply narrated without explaining what the parties versions
are. Finally, through a combination of objective and subjective means, the
testimony of each witness is reported and the judge then formulates his or her
own version of the facts.
In criminal cases, it is better to present both the version of the prosecution
and that of the defense, in the interest of fairness and due process. A detailed
evaluation of the contentions of the parties must follow. The resolution of most
criminal cases, unlike civil and other cases, depends to a large extent on the
factual issues and the appreciation of the evidence. The plausibility or the
implausibility of each version can sometimes be initially drawn from a reading
of the facts. Thereafter, the bases of the court in arriving at its findings and
conclusions should be explained.
On appeal, the fact that the assailed decision of the lower court fully,
intelligently and correctly resolved all factual and legal issues involved may
partly explain why the reviewing court finds no reason to reverse the findings
and conclusions of the former. Conversely, the lower courts patent
misappreciation of the facts or misapplication of the law would aid in a better
understanding of why its ruling is reversed or modified.
In appealed civil cases, the opposing sets of facts no longer need to be
presented. Issues for resolution usually involve questions of law, grave abuse
of discretion, or want of jurisdiction; hence, the facts of the case are often
undisputed by the parties. With few exceptions, factual issues are not
entertained in non-criminal cases. Consequently, the narration of facts by the
lower court, if exhaustive and clear, may be reproduced; otherwise, the material
factual antecedents should be restated in the words of the reviewing magistrate.
In addition, the reasoning of the lower court or body whose decision is under
review should be laid out, in order that the parties may clearly understand why
the lower court ruled in a certain way, and why the reviewing court either finds
no reason to reverse it or concludes otherwise.
3. Issues or Assignment of Errors
Both factual and legal issues should be stated. On appeal, the assignment
of errors, as mentioned in the appellants brief, may be reproduced in toto and
tackled seriatim, so as to avoid motions for reconsideration of the final decision
on the ground that the court failed to consider all assigned errors that could
affect the outcome of the case. But when the appellant presents repetitive
issues or when the assigned errors do not strike at the main issue, these may
be restated in clearer and more coherent terms.
Though not specifically questioned by the parties, additional issues may
also be included, if deemed important for substantial justice to be
rendered. Note that appealed criminal cases are given de novo review, in
contrast to noncriminal cases in which the reviewing court is generally limited
to issues specifically raised in the appeal. The few exceptions are errors of
jurisdiction; questions not raised but necessary in arriving at a just decision on
the case; or unassigned errors that are closely related to those properly
assigned, or upon which depends the determination of the question properly
raised.
4. The Courts Ruling
This part contains a full discussion of the specific errors or issues raised in
the complaint, petition or appeal, as the case may be; as well as of other issues
the court deems essential to a just disposition of the case. Where there are
several issues, each one of them should be separately addressed, as much as
practicable. The respective contentions of the parties should also be mentioned
here. When procedural questions are raised in addition to substantive ones, it
is better to resolve the former preliminarily.
5. The Disposition or Dispositive Portion
In a criminal case, the disposition should include a finding of innocence or
guilt, the specific crime committed, the penalty imposed, the participation of the
accused, the modifying circumstances if any, and the civil liability and costs. In
case an acquittal is decreed, the court must order the immediate release of the
accused, if detained, (unless they are being held for another cause) and order
the director of the Bureau of Corrections (or wherever the accused is detained)
to report, within a maximum of ten (10) days from notice, the exact date when
the accused were set free.
In a civil case as well as in a special civil action, the disposition should state
whether the complaint or petition is granted or denied, the specific relief
granted, and the costs. The following test of completeness may be
applied. First, the parties should know their rights and obligations. Second, they
should know how to execute the decision under alternative
contingencies. Third, there should be no need for further proceedings to
dispose of the issues. Fourth, the case should be terminated by according the
proper relief. The proper relief usually depends upon what the parties seek in
their pleadings. It may declare their rights and duties, command the
performance of positive prestations, or order them to abstain from specific
acts.The disposition must also adjudicate costs.
The foregoing parts need not always be discussed in sequence. But they
should all be present and plainly identifiable in the decision. Depending on the
writers character, genre and style, the language should be fresh and free-
flowing, not necessarily stereotyped or in a fixed form; much less highfalutin,
hackneyed and pretentious. At all times, however, the decision must be clear,
concise, complete and correct.

Second Substantive Issue:

Religious Leaders Endorsement
of Candidates for Public Office

The basic question posed in the SJS Petition -- WHETHER

ENDORSEMENTS OF CANDIDACIES BY RELIGIOUS LEADERS IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL -- undoubtedly deserves serious consideration. As
stated earlier, the Court deems this constitutional issue to be of paramount
interest to the Filipino citizenry, for it concerns the governance of our country
and its people. Thus, despite the obvious procedural transgressions by both
SJS and the trial court, this Court still called for Oral Argument, so as not to
leave any doubt that there might be room to entertain and dispose of the SJS
Petition on the merits.
Counsel for SJS has utterly failed, however, to convince the Court that there
are enough factual and legal bases to resolve the paramount issue. On the
other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General has sided with petitioner insofar
as there are no facts supporting the SJS Petition and the assailed Decision.
We reiterate that the said Petition failed to state directly the ultimate facts
that it relied upon for its claim. During the Oral Argument, counsel for SJS
candidly admitted that there were no factual allegations in its Petition for
Declaratory Relief. Neither were there factual findings in the assailed
Decision. At best, SJS merely asked the trial court to answer a hypothetical
question. In effect, it merely sought an advisory opinion, the rendition of which
was beyond the courts constitutional mandate and jurisdiction. [99]

Indeed, the assailed Decision was rendered in clear violation of the

Constitution, because it made no findings of facts and final disposition. Hence,
it is void and deemed legally inexistent. Consequently, there is nothing for this
Court to review, affirm, reverse or even just modify.
Regrettably, it is not legally possible for the Court to take up, on the merits,
the paramount question involving a constitutional principle. It is a time-honored
rule that the constitutionality of a statute [or act] will be passed upon only if, and
to the extent that, it is directly and necessarily involved in a justiciable
controversy and is essential to the protection of the rights of the parties
concerned. [100]

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review of Brother Mike Velarde

is GRANTED. The assailed June 12, 2003 Decision and July 29, 2003 Order of
the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch 49) are hereby DECLARED NULL
AND VOID and thus SET ASIDE. The SJS Petition for Declaratory Relief
is DISMISSED for failure to state a cause of action.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Court Administrator
to evaluate and recommend whether the trial judge may, after observing due
process, be held administratively liable for rendering a decision violative of the
Constitution, the Rules of Court and relevant circulars of this Court. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Quisumbing, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-
Martinez, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Vitug, J., in the result.
Ynares-Santiago, J., no part.
Corona, J., on leave.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 157870 November 3, 2008

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS), petitioner

vs.
DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD and PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENT
AGENCY (PDEA),respondents.

x-----------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 158633 November 3, 2008

ATTY. MANUEL J. LASERNA, JR., petitioner

vs.
DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD and PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENT
AGENCY, respondents.

x-----------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 161658 November 3, 2008

AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., petitioner
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

In these kindred petitions, the constitutionality of Section 36 of Republic Act

No. (RA) 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act
of 2002, insofar as it requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for public
office, students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of
public and private offices, and persons charged before the prosecutor's office
with certain offenses, among other personalities, is put in issue.

As far as pertinent, the challenged section reads as follows:

SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing. - Authorized drug testing shall be

done by any government forensic laboratories or by any of the drug
testing laboratories accredited and monitored by the DOH to safeguard
the quality of the test results. x x x The drug testing shall employ,
among others, two (2) testing methods, the screening test which will
determine the positive result as well as the type of drug used and the
confirmatory test which will confirm a positive screening test. x x x The
following shall be subjected to undergo drug testing:

xxxx

(c) Students of secondary and tertiary schools. - Students of secondary

and tertiary schools shall, pursuant to the related rules and regulations
as contained in the school's student handbook and with notice to the
parents, undergo a random drug testing x x x;

(d) Officers and employees of public and private offices. - Officers and
employees of public and private offices, whether domestic or overseas,
shall be subjected to undergo a random drug test as contained in the
company's work rules and regulations, x x x for purposes of reducing
the risk in the workplace. Any officer or employee found positive for use
of dangerous drugs shall be dealt with administratively which shall be a
ground for suspension or termination, subject to the provisions of Article
282 of the Labor Code and pertinent provisions of the Civil Service Law;

xxxx

(f) All persons charged before the prosecutor's office with a criminal
offense having an imposable penalty of imprisonment of not less than
six (6) years and one (1) day shall undergo a mandatory drug test;

(g) All candidates for public office whether appointed or elected both in
the national or local government shall undergo a mandatory drug test.

In addition to the above stated penalties in this Section, those found to be

positive for dangerous drugs use shall be subject to the provisions of Section
15 of this Act.

G.R. No. 161658 (Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. v. Commission on Elections)

On December 23, 2003, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) issued
Resolution No. 6486, prescribing the rules and regulations on the mandatory
drug testing of candidates for public office in connection with the May 10,
2004 synchronized national and local elections. The pertinent portions of the
said resolution read as follows:

WHEREAS, Section 36 (g) of Republic Act No. 9165 provides:

SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing. - x x x

xxxx

(g) All candidates for public office x x x both in the national or local
government shall undergo a mandatory drug test.

WHEREAS, Section 1, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides that

public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the
people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and
efficiency;

WHEREAS, by requiring candidates to undergo mandatory drug test,

the public will know the quality of candidates they are electing and they
will be assured that only those who can serve with utmost responsibility,
integrity, loyalty, and efficiency would be elected x x x.

NOW THEREFORE, The [COMELEC], pursuant to the authority vested

in it under the Constitution, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (Omnibus
Election Code), [RA] 9165 and other election laws, RESOLVED to
promulgate, as it hereby promulgates, the following rules and
regulations on the conduct of mandatory drug testing to candidates for
public office[:]

SECTION 1. Coverage. - All candidates for public office, both

national and local, in the May 10, 2004 Synchronized National and
Local Elections shall undergo mandatory drug test in government
forensic laboratories or any drug testing laboratories monitored and
accredited by the Department of Health.

SEC. 3. x x x

On March 25, 2004, in addition to the drug certificates filed with their
respective offices, the Comelec Offices and employees concerned shall
submit to the Law Department two (2) separate lists of candidates. The
first list shall consist of those candidates who complied with the
mandatory drug test while the second list shall consist of those
candidates who failed to comply x x x.

SEC. 4. Preparation and publication of names of candidates. - Before

the start of the campaign period, the [COMELEC] shall prepare two
separate lists of candidates. The first list shall consist of those
candidates who complied with the mandatory drug test while the second
list shall consist of those candidates who failed to comply with said drug
test. x x x

SEC. 5. Effect of failure to undergo mandatory drug test and file drug
test certificate. - No person elected to any public office shall enter upon
 the duties of his office until he has undergone mandatory drug test and
filed with the offices enumerated under Section 2 hereof the drug test
certificate herein required. (Emphasis supplied.)

Petitioner Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., a senator of the Republic and a candidate

for re - election in the May 10, 2004 elections,1 filed a Petition for Certiorari
and Prohibition under Rule 65. In it, he seeks (1) to nullify Sec. 36(g) of RA
9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 dated December 23, 2003 for
being unconstitutional in that they impose a qualification for candidates for
senators in addition to those already provided for in the 1987 Constitution; and
(2) to enjoin the COMELEC from implementing Resolution No. 6486.

Pimentel invokes as legal basis for his petition Sec. 3, Article VI of the
Constitution, which states:

SECTION 3. No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural - born

citizen of the Philippines, and, on the day of the election, is at least thirty
- five years of age, able to read and write, a registered voter, and a
resident of the Philippines for not less than two years immediately
preceding the day of the election.

According to Pimentel, the Constitution only prescribes a maximum of five (5)

qualifications for one to be a candidate for, elected to, and be a member of the
Senate. He says that both the Congress and COMELEC, by requiring, via RA
9165 and Resolution No. 6486, a senatorial aspirant, among other candidates,
to undergo a mandatory drug test, create an additional qualification that all
candidates for senator must first be certified as drug free. He adds that there
is no provision in the Constitution authorizing the Congress or COMELEC to
expand the qualification requirements of candidates for senator.

G.R. No. 157870 (Social Justice Society v. Dangerous

Drugs Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency)

In its Petition for Prohibition under Rule 65, petitioner Social Justice Society
(SJS), a registered political party, seeks to prohibit the Dangerous Drugs
Board (DDB) and the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) from
enforcing paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36 of RA 9165 on the ground
that they are constitutionally infirm. For one, the provisions constitute undue
delegation of legislative power when they give unbridled discretion to schools
and employers to determine the manner of drug testing. For another, the
provisions trench in the equal protection clause inasmuch as they can be used
to harass a student or an employee deemed undesirable. And for a third, a
person's constitutional right against unreasonable searches is also breached
by said provisions.

G.R. No. 158633 (Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr. v. Dangerous

Drugs Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency)

Petitioner Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr., as citizen and taxpayer, also seeks in
his Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 that Sec. 36(c), (d), (f),
and (g) of RA 9165 be struck down as unconstitutional for infringing on the
constitutional right to privacy, the right against unreasonable search and
seizure, and the right against self - incrimination, and for being contrary to the
due process and equal protection guarantees.

The Issue on Locus Standi

First off, we shall address the justiciability of the cases at bench and the
matter of the standing of petitioners SJS and Laserna to sue. As respondents
DDB and PDEA assert, SJS and Laserna failed to allege any incident
amounting to a violation of the constitutional rights mentioned in their separate
petitions.2

It is basic that the power of judicial review can only be exercised in connection
with a bona fidecontroversy which involves the statute sought to be
reviewed.3 But even with the presence of an actual case or controversy, the
Court may refuse to exercise judicial review unless the constitutional question
is brought before it by a party having the requisite standing to challenge it.4 To
have standing, one must establish that he or she has suffered some actual or
threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government;
the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to
be redressed by a favorable action.5

The rule on standing, however, is a matter of procedure; hence, it can be

relaxed for non - traditional plaintiffs, like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and
legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of
transcendental importance, of overarching significance to society, or of
paramount public interest.6 There is no doubt that Pimentel, as senator of the
Philippines and candidate for the May 10, 2004 elections, possesses the
requisite standing since he has substantial interests in the subject matter of
the petition, among other preliminary considerations. Regarding SJS and
Laserna, this Court is wont to relax the rule on locus standi owing primarily to
the transcendental importance and the paramount public interest involved in
the enforcement of Sec. 36 of RA 9165.

The Consolidated Issues

The principal issues before us are as follows:

(1) Do Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 impose an
additional qualification for candidates for senator? Corollarily, can Congress
enact a law prescribing qualifications for candidates for senator in addition to
those laid down by the Constitution? and

(2) Are paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36, RA 9165 unconstitutional?
Specifically, do these paragraphs violate the right to privacy, the right against
unreasonable searches and seizure, and the equal protection clause? Or do
they constitute undue delegation of legislative power?

Pimentel Petition
(Constitutionality of Sec. 36[g] of RA 9165 and
COMELEC Resolution No. 6486)

In essence, Pimentel claims that Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC

Resolution No. 6486 illegally impose an additional qualification on candidates
for senator. He points out that, subject to the provisions on nuisance
candidates, a candidate for senator needs only to meet the qualifications laid
down in Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution, to wit: (1) citizenship, (2) voter
registration, (3) literacy, (4) age, and (5) residency. Beyond these stated
qualification requirements, candidates for senator need not possess any other
qualification to run for senator and be voted upon and elected as member of
the Senate. The Congress cannot validly amend or otherwise modify these
qualification standards, as it cannot disregard, evade, or weaken the force of a
constitutional mandate,7 or alter or enlarge the Constitution.

Pimentel's contention is well - taken. Accordingly, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165

should be, as it is hereby declared as, unconstitutional. It is basic that if a law
or an administrative rule violates any norm of the Constitution, that issuance is
null and void and has no effect. The Constitution is the basic law to which all
laws must conform; no act shall be valid if it conflicts with the Constitution.8 In
the discharge of their defined functions, the three departments of government
have no choice but to yield obedience to the commands of the Constitution.
Whatever limits it imposes must be observed.9

Congress' inherent legislative powers, broad as they may be, are subject to
certain limitations. As early as 1927, in Government v. Springer, the Court has
defined, in the abstract, the limits on legislative power in the following wise:

Someone has said that the powers of the legislative department of the
Government, like the boundaries of the ocean, are unlimited. In
constitutional governments, however, as well as governments acting
under delegated authority, the powers of each of the departments x x x
are limited and confined within the four walls of the constitution or the
charter, and each department can only exercise such powers as are
necessarily implied from the given powers. The Constitution is the shore
of legislative authority against which the waves of legislative enactment
may dash, but over which it cannot leap.10

Thus, legislative power remains limited in the sense that it is subject to

substantive and constitutional limitations which circumscribe both the exercise
of the power itself and the allowable subjects of legislation.11 The substantive
constitutional limitations are chiefly found in the Bill of Rights12 and other
provisions, such as Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution prescribing the
qualifications of candidates for senators.

In the same vein, the COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and
administering election laws or promulgating rules and regulations to
implement Sec. 36(g), validly impose qualifications on candidates for senator
in addition to what the Constitution prescribes. If Congress cannot require a
candidate for senator to meet such additional qualification, the COMELEC, to
be sure, is also without such power. The right of a citizen in the democratic
process of election should not be defeated by unwarranted impositions of
requirement not otherwise specified in the Constitution.13

Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, as sought to be implemented by the assailed

COMELEC resolution, effectively enlarges the qualification requirements
enumerated in the Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution. As couched, said Sec.
36(g) unmistakably requires a candidate for senator to be certified illegal -
drug clean, obviously as a pre - condition to the validity of a certificate of
candidacy for senator or, with like effect, a condition sine qua non to be voted
upon and, if proper, be proclaimed as senator - elect. The COMELEC
resolution completes the chain with the proviso that "[n]o person elected to
any public office shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has
undergone mandatory drug test." Viewed, therefore, in its proper context, Sec.
36(g) of RA 9165 and the implementing COMELEC Resolution add another
qualification layer to what the 1987 Constitution, at the minimum, requires for
membership in the Senate. Whether or not the drug - free bar set up under the
challenged provision is to be hurdled before or after election is really of no
moment, as getting elected would be of little value if one cannot assume office
for non - compliance with the drug - testing requirement.

It may of course be argued, in defense of the validity of Sec. 36(g) of RA

9165, that the provision does not expressly state that non - compliance with
the drug test imposition is a disqualifying factor or would work to nullify a
certificate of candidacy. This argument may be accorded plausibility if the
drug test requirement is optional. But the particular section of the law, without
exception, made drug - testing on those covered mandatory, necessarily
suggesting that the obstinate ones shall have to suffer the adverse
consequences for not adhering to the statutory command. And since the
provision deals with candidates for public office, it stands to reason that the
adverse consequence adverted to can only refer to and revolve around the
election and the assumption of public office of the candidates. Any other
construal would reduce the mandatory nature of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 into a
pure jargon without meaning and effect whatsoever.

While it is anti - climactic to state it at this juncture, COMELEC Resolution No.

6486 is no longer enforceable, for by its terms, it was intended to cover only
the May 10, 2004 synchronized elections and the candidates running in that
electoral event. Nonetheless, to obviate repetition, the Court deems it
appropriate to review and rule, as it hereby rules, on its validity as an
implementing issuance.

It ought to be made abundantly clear, however, that the unconstitutionality of

Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 is rooted on its having infringed the constitutional
provision defining the qualification or eligibility requirements for one aspiring to
run for and serve as senator.

SJS Petition
(Constitutionality of Sec. 36[c], [d], [f], and [g] of RA 9165)

The drug test prescribed under Sec. 36(c), (d), and (f) of RA 9165 for
secondary and tertiary level students and public and private employees, while
mandatory, is a random and suspicionless arrangement. The objective is to
stamp out illegal drug and safeguard in the process "the well being of [the]
citizenry, particularly the youth, from the harmful effects of dangerous drugs."
This statutory purpose, per the policy - declaration portion of the law, can be
achieved via the pursuit by the state of "an intensive and unrelenting
campaign against the trafficking and use of dangerous drugs x x x through an
integrated system of planning, implementation and enforcement of anti - drug
abuse policies, programs and projects."14 The primary legislative intent is not
criminal prosecution, as those found positive for illegal drug use as a result of
this random testing are not necessarily treated as criminals. They may even
be exempt from criminal liability should the illegal drug user consent to
undergo rehabilitation. Secs. 54 and 55 of RA 9165 are clear on this point:

Sec. 54. Voluntary Submission of a Drug Dependent to Confinement,

Treatment and Rehabilitation. - A drug dependent or any person who
violates Section 15 of this Act may, by himself/herself or through his/her
parent, [close relatives] x x x apply to the Board x x x for treatment and
rehabilitation of the drug dependency. Upon such application, the Board
shall bring forth the matter to the Court which shall order that the
applicant be examined for drug dependency. If the examination x x x
results in the certification that the applicant is a drug dependent, he/she
 shall be ordered by the Court to undergo treatment and rehabilitation in
a Center designated by the Board x x x.

xxxx

Sec. 55. Exemption from the Criminal Liability Under the Voluntary
Submission Program. - A drug dependent under the voluntary
submission program, who is finally discharged from confinement, shall
be exempt from the criminal liability under Section 15 of this Act subject
to the following conditions:

xxxx

School children, the US Supreme Court noted, are most vulnerable to the
physical, psychological, and addictive effects of drugs. Maturing nervous
systems of the young are more critically impaired by intoxicants and are more
inclined to drug dependency. Their recovery is also at a depressingly low
rate.15

The right to privacy has been accorded recognition in this jurisdiction as a

facet of the right protected by the guarantee against unreasonable search and
seizure16 under Sec. 2, Art. III17 of the Constitution. But while the right to
privacy has long come into its own, this case appears to be the first time that
the validity of a state - decreed search or intrusion through the medium of
mandatory random drug testing among students and employees is, in this
jurisdiction, made the focal point. Thus, the issue tendered in these
proceedings is veritably one of first impression.

US jurisprudence is, however, a rich source of persuasive jurisprudence. With

respect to random drug testing among school children, we turn to the
teachings of Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton (Vernonia) and Board of
Education of Independent School District No. 92 of Pottawatomie County, et
al. v. Earls, et al. (Board of Education),18 both fairly pertinent US Supreme
Court - decided cases involving the constitutionality of governmental search.

In Vernonia, school administrators in Vernonia, Oregon wanted to address the

drug menace in their respective institutions following the discovery of frequent
drug use by school athletes. After consultation with the parents, they required
random urinalysis drug testing for the school's athletes. James Acton, a high
school student, was denied participation in the football program after he
refused to undertake the urinalysis drug testing. Acton forthwith sued, claiming
that the school's drug testing policy violated, inter alia, the Fourth
Amendment19 of the US Constitution.

The US Supreme Court, in fashioning a solution to the issues raised

in Vernonia, considered the following: (1) schools stand in loco parentis over
their students; (2) school children, while not shedding their constitutional rights
at the school gate, have less privacy rights; (3) athletes have less privacy
rights than non - athletes since the former observe communal undress before
and after sports events; (4) by joining the sports activity, the athletes
voluntarily subjected themselves to a higher degree of school supervision and
regulation; (5) requiring urine samples does not invade a student's privacy
since a student need not undress for this kind of drug testing; and (6) there is
need for the drug testing because of the dangerous effects of illegal drugs on
the young. The US Supreme Court held that the policy constituted reasonable
search under the Fourth20 and 14th Amendments and declared the random
drug - testing policy constitutional.

In Board of Education, the Board of Education of a school in Tecumseh,

Oklahoma required a drug test for high school students desiring to join extra -
curricular activities. Lindsay Earls, a member of the show choir, marching
band, and academic team declined to undergo a drug test and averred that
the drug - testing policy made to apply to non - athletes violated the Fourth
and 14th Amendments. As Earls argued, unlike athletes who routinely
undergo physical examinations and undress before their peers in locker
rooms, non - athletes are entitled to more privacy.

The US Supreme Court, citing Vernonia, upheld the constitutionality of drug

testing even among non - athletes on the basis of the school's custodial
responsibility and authority. In so ruling, said court made no distinction
between a non - athlete and an athlete. It ratiocinated that schools and
teachers act in place of the parents with a similar interest and duty of
safeguarding the health of the students. And in holding that the school could
implement its random drug - testing policy, the Court hinted that such a test
was a kind of search in which even a reasonable parent might need to
engage.

In sum, what can reasonably be deduced from the above two cases and
applied to this jurisdiction are: (1) schools and their administrators stand in
loco parentis with respect to their students; (2) minor students have
contextually fewer rights than an adult, and are subject to the custody and
supervision of their parents, guardians, and schools; (3) schools, acting in
loco parentis, have a duty to safeguard the health and well - being of their
students and may adopt such measures as may reasonably be necessary to
discharge such duty; and (4) schools have the right to impose conditions on
applicants for admission that are fair, just, and non-discriminatory.

Guided by Vernonia and Board of Education, the Court is of the view and so
holds that the provisions of RA 9165 requiring mandatory, random, and
suspicionless drug testing of students are constitutional. Indeed, it is within the
prerogative of educational institutions to require, as a condition for admission,
compliance with reasonable school rules and regulations and policies. To be
sure, the right to enroll is not absolute; it is subject to fair, reasonable, and
equitable requirements.

The Court can take judicial notice of the proliferation of prohibited drugs in the
country that threatens the well - being of the people,21 particularly the youth
and school children who usually end up as victims. Accordingly, and until a
more effective method is conceptualized and put in motion, a random drug
testing of students in secondary and tertiary schools is not only acceptable but
may even be necessary if the safety and interest of the student population,
doubtless a legitimate concern of the government, are to be promoted and
protected. To borrow from Vernonia, "[d]eterring drug use by our Nation's
schoolchildren is as important as enhancing efficient enforcement of the
Nation's laws against the importation of drugs"; the necessity for the State to
act is magnified by the fact that the effects of a drug - infested school are
visited not just upon the users, but upon the entire student body and
faculty.22 Needless to stress, the random testing scheme provided under the
law argues against the idea that the testing aims to incriminate unsuspecting
individual students.
Just as in the case of secondary and tertiary level students, the mandatory but
random drug test prescribed by Sec. 36 of RA 9165 for officers and
employees of public and private offices is justifiable, albeit not exactly for the
same reason. The Court notes in this regard that petitioner SJS, other than
saying that "subjecting almost everybody to drug testing, without probable
cause, is unreasonable, an unwarranted intrusion of the individual right to
privacy,"23 has failed to show how the mandatory, random, and suspicionless
drug testing under Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165 violates the right to privacy
and constitutes unlawful and/or unconsented search under Art. III, Secs. 1
and 2 of the Constitution.24 Petitioner Laserna's lament is just as simplistic,
sweeping, and gratuitous and does not merit serious consideration. Consider
what he wrote without elaboration:

The US Supreme Court and US Circuit Courts of Appeals have made

various rulings on the constitutionality of mandatory drug tests in the
school and the workplaces. The US courts have been consistent in their
rulings that the mandatory drug tests violate a citizen's constitutional
right to privacy and right against unreasonable search and seizure.
They are quoted extensively hereinbelow.25

The essence of privacy is the right to be left alone.26 In context, the right to
privacy means the right to be free from unwarranted exploitation of one's
person or from intrusion into one's private activities in such a way as to cause
humiliation to a person's ordinary sensibilities. 27 And while there has been
general agreement as to the basic function of the guarantee against
unwarranted search, "translation of the abstract prohibition against
‘unreasonable searches and seizures' into workable broad guidelines for the
decision of particular cases is a difficult task," to borrow from C. Camara v.
Municipal Court.28 Authorities are agreed though that the right to privacy yields
to certain paramount rights of the public and defers to the state's exercise of
police power.29

As the warrantless clause of Sec. 2, Art III of the Constitution is couched and
as has been held, "reasonableness" is the touchstone of the validity of a
government search or intrusion.30 And whether a search at issue hews to the
reasonableness standard is judged by the balancing of the government -
mandated intrusion on the individual's privacy interest against the promotion
of some compelling state interest.31 In the criminal context, reasonableness
requires showing of probable cause to be personally determined by a judge.
Given that the drug - testing policy for employees--and students for that
matter--under RA 9165 is in the nature of administrative search needing what
was referred to in Vernonia as "swift and informal disciplinary procedures," the
probable - cause standard is not required or even practicable. Be that as it
may, the review should focus on the reasonableness of the challenged
administrative search in question.

The first factor to consider in the matter of reasonableness is the nature of the
privacy interest upon which the drug testing, which effects a search within the
meaning of Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution, intrudes. In this case, the office
or workplace serves as the backdrop for the analysis of the privacy
expectation of the employees and the reasonableness of drug testing
requirement. The employees' privacy interest in an office is to a large extent
circumscribed by the company's work policies, the collective bargaining
agreement, if any, entered into by management and the bargaining unit, and
the inherent right of the employer to maintain discipline and efficiency in the
workplace. Their privacy expectation in a regulated office environment is, in
fine, reduced; and a degree of impingement upon such privacy has been
upheld.

Just as defining as the first factor is the character of the intrusion authorized
by the challenged law. Reduced to a question form, is the scope of the search
or intrusion clearly set forth, or, as formulated in Ople v. Torres, is the
enabling law authorizing a search "narrowly drawn" or "narrowly focused"?32

The poser should be answered in the affirmative. For one, Sec. 36 of RA 9165
and its implementing rules and regulations (IRR), as couched, contain
provisions specifically directed towards preventing a situation that would
unduly embarrass the employees or place them under a humiliating
experience. While every officer and employee in a private establishment is
under the law deemed forewarned that he or she may be a possible subject of
a drug test, nobody is really singled out in advance for drug testing. The goal
is to discourage drug use by not telling in advance anyone when and who is to
be tested. And as may be observed, Sec. 36(d) of RA 9165 itself prescribes
what, in Ople, is a narrowing ingredient by providing that the employees
concerned shall be subjected to "random drug test as contained in the
company's work rules and regulations x x x for purposes of reducing the risk in
the work place."

For another, the random drug testing shall be undertaken under conditions
calculated to protect as much as possible the employee's privacy and dignity.
As to the mechanics of the test, the law specifies that the procedure shall
employ two testing methods, i.e., the screening test and the confirmatory test,
doubtless to ensure as much as possible the trustworthiness of the results.
But the more important consideration lies in the fact that the test shall be
conducted by trained professionals in access - controlled laboratories
monitored by the Department of Health (DOH) to safeguard against results
tampering and to ensure an accurate chain of custody.33 In addition, the IRR
issued by the DOH provides that access to the drug results shall be on the
"need to know" basis;34 that the "drug test result and the records shall be
[kept] confidential subject to the usual accepted practices to protect the
confidentiality of the test results."35 Notably, RA 9165 does not oblige the
employer concerned to report to the prosecuting agencies any information or
evidence relating to the violation of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act received as a result of the operation of the drug testing. All told, therefore,
the intrusion into the employees' privacy, under RA 9165, is accompanied by
proper safeguards, particularly against embarrassing leakages of test results,
and is relatively minimal.

To reiterate, RA 9165 was enacted as a measure to stamp out illegal drug in

the country and thus protect the well - being of the citizens, especially the
youth, from the deleterious effects of dangerous drugs. The law intends to
achieve this through the medium, among others, of promoting and resolutely
pursuing a national drug abuse policy in the workplace via a mandatory
random drug test.36 To the Court, the need for drug testing to at least minimize
illegal drug use is substantial enough to override the individual's privacy
interest under the premises. The Court can consider that the illegal drug
menace cuts across gender, age group, and social - economic lines. And it
may not be amiss to state that the sale, manufacture, or trafficking of illegal
drugs, with their ready market, would be an investor's dream were it not for
the illegal and immoral components of any of such activities. The drug
problem has hardly abated since the martial law public execution of a
notorious drug trafficker. The state can no longer assume a laid back stance
with respect to this modern - day scourge. Drug enforcement agencies
perceive a mandatory random drug test to be an effective way of preventing
and deterring drug use among employees in private offices, the threat of
detection by random testing being higher than other modes. The Court holds
that the chosen method is a reasonable and enough means to lick the
problem.

Taking into account the foregoing factors, i.e., the reduced expectation of
privacy on the part of the employees, the compelling state concern likely to be
met by the search, and the well - defined limits set forth in the law to properly
guide authorities in the conduct of the random testing, we hold that the
challenged drug test requirement is, under the limited context of the case,
reasonable and, ergo, constitutional.

Like their counterparts in the private sector, government officials and

employees also labor under reasonable supervision and restrictions imposed
by the Civil Service law and other laws on public officers, all enacted to
promote a high standard of ethics in the public service.37 And if RA 9165
passes the norm of reasonableness for private employees, the more reason
that it should pass the test for civil servants, who, by constitutional command,
are required to be accountable at all times to the people and to serve them
with utmost responsibility and efficiency.38

Petitioner SJS' next posture that Sec. 36 of RA 9165 is objectionable on the

ground of undue delegation of power hardly commends itself for concurrence.
Contrary to its position, the provision in question is not so extensively drawn
as to give unbridled options to schools and employers to determine the
manner of drug testing. Sec. 36 expressly provides how drug testing for
students of secondary and tertiary schools and officers/employees of
public/private offices should be conducted. It enumerates the persons who
shall undergo drug testing. In the case of students, the testing shall be in
accordance with the school rules as contained in the student handbook and
with notice to parents. On the part of officers/employees, the testing shall take
into account the company's work rules. In either case, the random procedure
shall be observed, meaning that the persons to be subjected to drug test shall
be picked by chance or in an unplanned way. And in all cases, safeguards
against misusing and compromising the confidentiality of the test results are
established.

Lest it be overlooked, Sec. 94 of RA 9165 charges the DDB to issue, in

consultation with the DOH, Department of the Interior and Local Government,
Department of Education, and Department of Labor and Employment, among
other agencies, the IRR necessary to enforce the law. In net effect then, the
participation of schools and offices in the drug testing scheme shall always be
subject to the IRR of RA 9165. It is, therefore, incorrect to say that schools
and employers have unchecked discretion to determine how often, under what
conditions, and where the drug tests shall be conducted.

The validity of delegating legislative power is now a quiet area in the

constitutional landscape.39 In the face of the increasing complexity of the task
of the government and the increasing inability of the legislature to cope
directly with the many problems demanding its attention, resort to delegation
of power, or entrusting to administrative agencies the power of subordinate
legislation, has become imperative, as here.
 Laserna Petition (Constitutionality of Sec. 36[c], [d],
[f], and [g] of RA 9165)

Unlike the situation covered by Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165, the Court finds
no valid justification for mandatory drug testing for persons accused of crimes.
In the case of students, the constitutional viability of the mandatory, random,
and suspicionless drug testing for students emanates primarily from the
waiver by the students of their right to privacy when they seek entry to the
school, and from their voluntarily submitting their persons to the parental
authority of school authorities. In the case of private and public employees,
the constitutional soundness of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless
drug testing proceeds from the reasonableness of the drug test policy and
requirement.

We find the situation entirely different in the case of persons charged before
the public prosecutor's office with criminal offenses punishable with six (6)
years and one (1) day imprisonment. The operative concepts in the
mandatory drug testing are "randomness" and "suspicionless." In the case of
persons charged with a crime before the prosecutor's office, a mandatory drug
testing can never be random or suspicionless. The ideas of randomness and
being suspicionless are antithetical to their being made defendants in a
criminal complaint. They are not randomly picked; neither are they beyond
suspicion. When persons suspected of committing a crime are charged, they
are singled out and are impleaded against their will. The persons thus
charged, by the bare fact of being haled before the prosecutor's office and
peaceably submitting themselves to drug testing, if that be the case, do not
necessarily consent to the procedure, let alone waive their right to
privacy.40 To impose mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant
attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary
to the stated objectives of RA 9165. Drug testing in this case would violate a
persons' right to privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution.
Worse still, the accused persons are veritably forced to incriminate
themselves.

WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to GRANT the petition in G.R. No. 161658
and declares Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No.
6486 as UNCONSTITUTIONAL; and to PARTIALLY GRANT the petition in
G.R. Nos. 157870 and 158633 by declaring Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165
CONSTITUTIONAL, but declaring its Sec. 36(f) UNCONSTITUTIONAL. All
concerned agencies are, accordingly, permanently enjoined from
implementing Sec. 36(f) and (g) of RA 9165. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
 LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING CONSUELO YNARES - SANTIAGO
Associate Justice Associate Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA - MARTINEZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

RENATO C. CORONA CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA DANTE O. TINGA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO - NAZARIO ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

RUBEN T. REYES TERESITA J. LEONARDO - DE CASTRO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified

that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 200748 July 23, 2014

JAIME D. DELA CRUZ, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

SERENO, CJ:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, filed by petitioner Jaime D. dela Cruz, from the
Decision1 dated 22 June 2011 issued by the Twentieth Division of the Court of Appeals (CA) and
Resolution2 dated 2 February 2012 issued by the Former Twentieth Division of the CA in CA-G.R.
C.R. No. 00670.

THE ANTECEDENT FACTS

Petitioner Jaime D. dela Cruz was charged with violation of Section 15, Article II of Republic Act No.
(R.A.) 9165, or The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, by the Graft Investigation and
Prosecution Officer of the Office of the Ombudsman - Visayas, in an Information3 dated 14 February
2006, which reads:

That on or about the 31st day of January 2006, at Cebu City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, JAIME D. DE LA CRUZ, a public officer, having
been duly appointed and qualified to such public position as Police Officer 2 of the Philippine
National Police (PNP) assigned in the Security Service Group of the Cebu City Police Office, after
having beenarrested by agents of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in an entrapment
operation, was found positive for use of METHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDEcommonly
known as "Shabu", the dangerous drug after a confirmatory test conducted on said accused.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

When arraigned, petitioner, assisted by counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty to the charge. The
records do not reveal whether De la Cruz was likewise charged for extortion.

VERSION OF THE PROSECUTION

The evidence of the prosecution reveals that at 8:00 a.m. of 31 January 2006, the agents and
special investigators of the National Bureau of Investigation, Central Visayas Regional Office (NBI-
CEVRO) or simply NBI, received a Complaint from Corazon Absin (Corazon) and Charito Escobido
(Charito). The complainants claimed that at 1:00 a.m. of that same day, Ariel Escobido (Ariel), the
live-in partner of Corazon and son of Charito, was picked up by several unknown male persons
believed to be police officers for allegedly selling drugs. An errand boy gave a number to the
complainants, and when the latter gave the number a ring, they were instructed to proceed to the
Gorordo Police Office located along Gorordo Avenue, Cebu City. In the said police office, they met
"James" who demanded from them ₱100,000, later lowered to ₱40,000, in exchange for the release
of Ariel. After the meeting, the complainants proceeded to the NBI-CEVRO to file a complaint and
narrate the circumstances of the meeting to the authorities. While at the NBI-CEVRO, Charitoeven
received calls supposedly from "James" instructing her to bring the money as soon as possible.

The special investigators at the NBI-CEVRO verified the text messages received by the
complainants. A team was immediately formed to implement an entrapment operation, which took
1âwphi 1

place inside a Jollibee branch at the corner of Gen. Maxilom and Gorordo Avenues, Cebu City. The
officers were able to nab Jaime dela Cruz by using a pre-marked 500 bill dusted with fluorescent
powder, which was made part of the amount demanded by "James" and handed by Corazon.
Petitioner was later brought to the forensic laboratory of the NBI-CEVRO where forensic examination
was done by forensic chemist Rommel Paglinawan. Petitioner was required to submit his urine for
drug testing. It later yielded a positive result for presence of dangerous drugs as indicated in the
confirmatory test result labeled as Toxicology (DangerousDrugs) Report No. 2006-TDD-2402 dated
16 February 2006.

VERSION OF THE DEFENSE

The defense presented petitioner as the lone witness. He denied the charges and testified that while
eating at the said Jollibee branch, he was arrested allegedly for extortion by NBI agents. When he
was at the NBI Office, he was required to extract urine for drug examination, but he refused saying
he wanted it to be done by the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory and not by the
NBI. His request was, however, denied. He also requested to be allowed to call his lawyer prior to
the taking of his urine sample, to no avail.

THE RULING OF THE RTC

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 58 of Cebu City, in its Decision4 dated 6 June 2007, found
the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 15, Article II of R.A. 9165 and
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of compulsory rehabilitation for a period of not less than six (6)
months at the Cebu Center for the Ultimate Rehabilitation of Drug Dependents located at Salinas,
Lahug, Cebu City.5

Petitioner filed an appeal assigning as error the RTC’s validation of the result of the urine test
despite its dubiousness having been admitted in spite of the lack of legal basis for itsadmission.
First, he alleges that the forensic laboratory examination was conducted despite the fact that he was
not assisted by counsel, in clear violation of his constitutional right. Secondly, he was allegedly held
guilty beyond reasonable doubt notwithstanding the lack of sufficient basis to convict him.

THE RULING OF THE CA

The CA found the appeal devoid of merit and affirmed the ruling of the RTC.

Petitioner filed a timely Motion for Reconsideration. He argued that the CA overlooked prevailing
jurisprudence, which states that drug testing conducted under circumstancessimilar to his would
violate a person’s right to privacy. The appellate court nevertheless denied the motion.

Petitioner thus filed the present Petition for Review on certiorari. He assigns as errors the use of
hearsay evidence as basis for his conviction and the questionable circumstances surrounding his
arrest and drug test.

Respondent, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed its Comment,6 saying that "petitioner’s
arguments cannot be the subject of a petition for review on certiorariunder Rule 45, as they involve
questions of facts which may not be the subject thereof; after his arraignment, he can no longer
contest the validity of his arrest, less so at this stage of the proceedings; his guilt has been
adequately established by direct evidence; and the manner in which the laboratory examination was
conducted was grounded on a valid and existing law.

THE ISSUE

We deem it proper to give due course to this Petition by confronting head-on the issue of whether or
not the drug test conducted upon the petitioner is legal.

OUR RULING

We declare that the drug testconducted upon petitioner is not grounded upon any existing law or
jurisprudence.

We gloss over petitioner’s non-compliance with the Resolution7 ordering him to submit clearly legible
duplicate originals or certified true copies of the assailed Decision and Resolution. Petitioner was
charged with use of dangerous drugs in violation of the law, the pertinent provision of which reads:

Section 15. Use of Dangerous Drugs. – A person apprehended or arrested, who is found to be
positive for use of any dangerous drug, after a confirmatory test, shall be imposed a penalty of a
minimum of six (6) months rehabilitation in a government center for the first offense, subject to the
provisions of Article VIII of this Act. If apprehended using any dangerous drug for the second time,
he/she shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve
(12) years and a fine ranging from Fifty thousand pesos (₱50,000.00) to Two hundred thousand
pesos (₱200,000.00): Provided,That this Section shall not be applicable where the person tested is
also found to have in his/her possession such quantity of any dangerous drug provided for under
Section 11 of this Act, in which case the provisions stated therein shall apply.8
The RTC subsequently convicted petitioner, ruling that the following elements of Section 15 were
established: (1) the accused was arrested; (2) the accused was subjected to drug test; and (3) the
confirmatory test shows that he used a dangerous drug.

Disregarding petitioner’s objection regarding the admissibility of the evidence, the lower court also
reasoned that "a suspect cannot invoke his right to counsel when he is required to extract urine
because, while he is already in custody, he is not compelled to make a statement or testimony
against himself. Extracting urine from one’s body is merely a mechanical act, hence, falling outside
the concept of a custodial investigation."

We find the ruling and reasoning of the trial court, as well as the subsequent affirmation by the CA,
erroneous on three counts.

The drug test in Section 15 does not cover persons apprehended or arrested for any unlawful act,
but only for unlawful acts listed under Article II of R.A. 9165.

First, "[a] person apprehended orarrested" cannot literally mean any person apprehended or
arrested for any crime.The phrase must be read in context and understood in consonance with R.A.
9165. Section 15 comprehends persons arrested or apprehended for unlawful acts listed under
Article II of the law.

Hence, a drug test can be made upon persons who are apprehended or arrested for, among others,
the "importation,"9 "sale, trading, administration, dispensation, delivery, distribution and
transportation",10"manufacture"11 and "possession"12 of dangerous drugs and/or controlled precursors
and essential chemicals; possession thereof "during parties, social gatherings or meetings"13 ; being
"employees and visitors of a den, dive or resort";14 "maintenance of a den, dive or resort";15 "illegal
chemical diversion of controlled precursors and essential chemicals"16 ; "manufacture or delivery"17 or
"possession"18 of equipment, instrument, apparatus, and other paraphernalia for dangerous drugs
and/or controlled precursors and essential chemicals; possession of dangerous drugs "during
parties, social gatherings or meetings"19 ; "unnecessary"20 or "unlawful"21 prescription thereof;
"cultivation or culture of plantsclassified as dangerous drugs or are sources thereof";22 and
"maintenance and keeping of original records of transactions on dangerous drugs and/orcontrolled
precursors and essential chemicals."23 To make the provision applicable to all persons arrested or
apprehended for any crime not listed under Article II is tantamount to unduly expanding its meaning.
Note thataccused appellant here was arrested in the alleged act of extortion.

A charge for violation of Section 15 of R.A. 9165 is seen as expressive of the intent of the law to
rehabilitate persons apprehended or arrested for the unlawful acts enumerated above instead of
charging and convicting them of other crimes with heavier penalties. The essence of the provision is
more clearly illustrated in People v. Martinez24 as follows:

On a final note, this Court takes the opportunity to be instructive on Sec. 11 (Possession of
Dangerous Drugs) and Sec. 15 (Use of Dangerous Drugs) of R.A. No. 9165, withregard to the
charges that are filed by law enforcers. This Court notes the practice of law enforcers of filing
charges under Sec. 11 in cases where the presence of dangerous drugs as basis for possession is
only and solely in the form of residue, being subsumed under the last paragraph of Sec. 11.
Although not incorrect, it would be more in keeping withthe intent of the law to file charges under
Sec. 15 instead in order to rehabilitate first time offenders of drug use, provided thatthere is a
positive confirmatory test result as required under Sec. 15.The minimum penalty under the last
paragraph of Sec. 11 for the possession of residue isimprisonment of twelve years and one day,
while the penalty under Sec. 15 for first time offenders of drug use is a minimum of six months
rehabilitation in a government center. To file charges under Sec. 11 on the basis of residue alone
would frustrate the objective of the law to rehabilitate drug users and provide them with an
opportunity to recover for a second chance at life.

In the case at bench, the presence of dangerous drugs was only in the form of residue on the drug
paraphernalia, and the accused were found positive for use of dangerous drugs. Granting that the
arrest was legal, the evidence obtained admissible, and the chain of custody intact, the law
enforcers should have filed charges under Sec. 15, R.A. No. 9165 or for use of dangerous drugs
and, if there was no residue at all, they should have been charged under Sec. 14 (Possession of
Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs During Parties,
Social Gatherings or Meetings). Sec. 14 provides that the maximum penalty under Sec.
12(Possession of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs)
shall be imposed on any person who shall possess any equipment, instrument, apparatus and other
paraphernalia for dangerous drugs. Under Sec. 12, the maximum penalty is imprisonment of four
years and a fine of ₱50,000.00. In fact, under the same section, the possession of such equipment,
apparatus or other paraphernalia is prima facieevidence that the possessor has used a dangerous
drug and shall be presumed to have violated Sec. 15.
In order to effectively fulfill the intent of the law to rehabilitate drug users, this Court thus calls on law
enforcers and prosecutors in dangerous drugs cases to exercise proper discretion in filing charges
when the presence of dangerous drugs isonly and solely in the form of residue and the confirmatory
test required under Sec. 15 is positive for use of dangerous drugs.In such cases, to afford the
accused a chance to be rehabilitated, the filing of charges for or involving possession of dangerous
drugs should only be done when another separate quantity of dangerous drugs, other than mere
residue, is found in the possession of the accused as provided for in Sec. 15. (Emphasis supplied)

Furthermore, making the phrase "a person apprehended or arrested" in Section 15 applicable to all
persons arrested or apprehended for unlawful acts, not only under R.A. 9165 but for all other crimes,
is tantamount to a mandatory drug testing of all persons apprehended or arrested for any crime. To
overextend the application of thisprovision would run counter to our pronouncement in Social Justice
Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency,25 to wit:

x x x [M]andatory drug testing can never be random and suspicionless. The ideas of randomness
and being suspicionless are antithetical to their being made defendants in a criminal complaint. They
are not randomly picked; neither are they beyond suspicion. When persons suspected of committing
a crime are charged, they are singled out and are impleaded against their will. The persons thus
charged, by the bare fact of being haled before the prosecutor’s office and peaceably submitting
themselves to drug testing, if that be the case, do not necessarily consent to the procedure, let alone
waive their right to privacy. To impose mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to
harness a medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of RA
6195. Drug testing in this case would violate a person’s right to privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2,
Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still, the accused persons are veritably forced to incriminate
themselves. (Emphasis supplied)

The drug test is not covered by allowable non-testimonial compulsion.

We find that petitioner never raisedthe alleged irregularity of his arrest before his arraignment and
raises the issue only now before this tribunal; hence, he is deemed to have waived his right to
question the validity of his arrest curing whatever defect may have attended his arrest.26 However, "a
waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence
seized during an illegal warrantless arrest."27

We are aware of the prohibition against testimonial compulsion and the allowable exceptions to such
proscription. Cases where non-testimonial compulsion has been allowed reveal, however, that the
pieces of evidence obtained were all material to the principal cause of the arrest.

The constitutional right of an accused against self-incrimination proscribes the use of physical or
moral compulsion to extort communications from the accused and not the inclusion of his body in
evidence when it may be material. Purely mechanical acts are not included in the prohibition as the
accused does not thereby speak his guilt, hence the assistance and guiding hand ofcounsel is not
required. (People vs. Olvis, 238 Phil. 513 [1987]) The essence of the right against selfincrimination is
testimonial compulsion, that is, the giving of evidence against himself through a testimonial act.
(People vs. Casinillo, 213 SCRA 777 [1992]; People vs. Tranca, 235 SCRA 455 [1994]; People vs.
Rondero, 378 Phil. 123 [1999]) Hence,it has been held that a woman charged with adultery may be
compelled to submit to physical examination to determine her pregnancy; (Villaflor vs. Summers, 41
Phil. 62 [1920]) and an accused may be compelled to submit to physical examination and to have a
substance taken from his body for medical determination as to whether he was suffering from
gonorrhea which was contracted by his victim;(U.S. vs. Tan Teng, 23 Phil. 145 [1912]) to expel
morphine from his mouth; (U.S. vs. Ong Siu Hong, 36 Phil. 735 [1917]) to have the outline of his foot
traced todetermine its identity with bloody footprints; (U.S. vs. Salas, 25 Phil. 337 [1913]; U.S. vs.
Zara, 42 Phil. 308 [1921]) and to be photographed or measured, or his garments or shoes removed
or replaced, or to move his body to enable the foregoing things to be done.(People vs. Otadora, 86
Phil. 244 [1950])28(Emphasis supplied)

In the instant case, we fail to see howa urine sample could be material to the charge of
extortion. The RTC and the CA, therefore, both erred when they held that the extraction of
1âwphi 1

petitioner’s urine for purposes of drug testing was "merely a mechanical act, hence, falling outside
the concept of a custodial investigation."

We note a case where a urine sample was considered as admissible. In Gutang v. People,29 the
petitioner therein and his companions were arrested in connection with the enforcement of a search
warrant in his residence. A PNP-NARCOM team found and confiscated shabu materials and
paraphernalias. The petitioner and his companions in that case were also asked to give urine
samples, which yielded positive results. Later, the petitioner therein was found guilty of the crime of
illegal possession and use of prohibited drugs. Gutang claimed that the latter’s urine sample was
inadmissible in evidence, since it was derived in effect from an uncounselled extrajudicial
confession.
In the Gutang et al.case, the Court clarified that "what the Constitution prohibits is the use of physical
or moral compulsion to extort communication from the accused, but not an inclusion of his body in
evidence, when it may be material." The situation in Gutangwas categorized as falling among the
exemptions under the freedom from testimonial compulsion since what was sought tobe examined
came from the body of the accused. The Court said:

This was a mechanical act the accused was made to undergo which was not meant to unearth
undisclosedfacts but to ascertain physical attributes determinable by simple observation. In fact, the
record shows that petitioner and his co-accused were not compelled to give samples of their urine
but they in fact voluntarily gave the same when they were requested to undergo a drug test.

Assuming arguendothat the urine samples taken from the petitioner are inadmissible in evidence, we
agree with the trial court that the record is replete with other pieces of credible evidence including
the testimonial evidence of the prosecution which point to the culpability of the petitioner for the
crimes charged.

We emphasize that the circumstances in Gutangare clearly different from the circumstances of
petitioner in the instant case. First, Gutang was arrested in relation to a drug case. Second, he
1aw p++i1

volunteered to give his urine. Third, there were other pieces of evidence that point to his culpability
for the crimes charged. In the present case, though, petitioner was arrested for extortion; he resisted
having his urine sample taken; and finally, his urine sample was the only available evidencethat was
used as basis for his conviction for the use of illegal drugs.

The drug test was a violation of petitioner’s right to privacy and right against self-incrimination.

It is incontrovertible that petitioner refused to have his urine extracted and tested for drugs. He also
asked for a lawyer prior to his urine test. He was adamant in exercising his rights, but all of his
efforts proved futile, because he was still compelled to submit his urine for drug testing under those
circumstances.

The pertinent provisions in Article III of the Constitution are clear:

Section 2. The right of the people to be securein their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.

Section 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.

In the face of these constitutional guarantees, we cannot condone drug testing of all arrested
persons regardless of the crime or offense for which the arrest is being made.

While we express our commendation of law enforcement agents as they vigorously track down
offenders intheir laudable effort to curb the pervasive and deleterious effects of dangerous drugs on
our society, they must, however, be constantly mindful of the reasonable limits of their authority,
because it is not unlikely that in their clear intent to purge society of its lawless elements, they may
be knowingly or unknowingly transgressing the protected rights of its citizens including even
members of its own police force.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision dated 22 June 2011 issued by the
Twentieth Division, and the Resolution dated 2 February 2012 issued by the former Twentieth
Division of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. C.R. No. 00670 are SET ASIDE. Petitioner is hereby
ACQUITTED.

SO ORDERED.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice, Chairperson

WE CONCUR:

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice
 BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 200748 July 23, 2014

JAIME D. DELA CRUZ, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

SERENO, CJ:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, filed by petitioner Jaime D. dela Cruz, from the
Decision1 dated 22 June 2011 issued by the Twentieth Division of the Court of Appeals (CA) and
Resolution2 dated 2 February 2012 issued by the Former Twentieth Division of the CA in CA-G.R.
C.R. No. 00670.

THE ANTECEDENT FACTS

Petitioner Jaime D. dela Cruz was charged with violation of Section 15, Article II of Republic Act No.
(R.A.) 9165, or The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, by the Graft Investigation and
Prosecution Officer of the Office of the Ombudsman - Visayas, in an Information3 dated 14 February
2006, which reads:

That on or about the 31st day of January 2006, at Cebu City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, JAIME D. DE LA CRUZ, a public officer, having
been duly appointed and qualified to such public position as Police Officer 2 of the Philippine
National Police (PNP) assigned in the Security Service Group of the Cebu City Police Office, after
having beenarrested by agents of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in an entrapment
operation, was found positive for use of METHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDEcommonly
known as "Shabu", the dangerous drug after a confirmatory test conducted on said accused.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

When arraigned, petitioner, assisted by counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty to the charge. The
records do not reveal whether De la Cruz was likewise charged for extortion.

VERSION OF THE PROSECUTION

The evidence of the prosecution reveals that at 8:00 a.m. of 31 January 2006, the agents and
special investigators of the National Bureau of Investigation, Central Visayas Regional Office (NBI-
CEVRO) or simply NBI, received a Complaint from Corazon Absin (Corazon) and Charito Escobido
(Charito). The complainants claimed that at 1:00 a.m. of that same day, Ariel Escobido (Ariel), the
live-in partner of Corazon and son of Charito, was picked up by several unknown male persons
believed to be police officers for allegedly selling drugs. An errand boy gave a number to the
complainants, and when the latter gave the number a ring, they were instructed to proceed to the
Gorordo Police Office located along Gorordo Avenue, Cebu City. In the said police office, they met
"James" who demanded from them ₱100,000, later lowered to ₱40,000, in exchange for the release
of Ariel. After the meeting, the complainants proceeded to the NBI-CEVRO to file a complaint and
narrate the circumstances of the meeting to the authorities. While at the NBI-CEVRO, Charitoeven
received calls supposedly from "James" instructing her to bring the money as soon as possible.

The special investigators at the NBI-CEVRO verified the text messages received by the
complainants. A team was immediately formed to implement an entrapment operation, which took
1âwphi 1

place inside a Jollibee branch at the corner of Gen. Maxilom and Gorordo Avenues, Cebu City. The
officers were able to nab Jaime dela Cruz by using a pre-marked 500 bill dusted with fluorescent
powder, which was made part of the amount demanded by "James" and handed by Corazon.
Petitioner was later brought to the forensic laboratory of the NBI-CEVRO where forensic examination
was done by forensic chemist Rommel Paglinawan. Petitioner was required to submit his urine for
drug testing. It later yielded a positive result for presence of dangerous drugs as indicated in the
confirmatory test result labeled as Toxicology (DangerousDrugs) Report No. 2006-TDD-2402 dated
16 February 2006.

VERSION OF THE DEFENSE

The defense presented petitioner as the lone witness. He denied the charges and testified that while
eating at the said Jollibee branch, he was arrested allegedly for extortion by NBI agents. When he
was at the NBI Office, he was required to extract urine for drug examination, but he refused saying
he wanted it to be done by the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory and not by the
NBI. His request was, however, denied. He also requested to be allowed to call his lawyer prior to
the taking of his urine sample, to no avail.

THE RULING OF THE RTC

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 58 of Cebu City, in its Decision4 dated 6 June 2007, found
the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 15, Article II of R.A. 9165 and
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of compulsory rehabilitation for a period of not less than six (6)
months at the Cebu Center for the Ultimate Rehabilitation of Drug Dependents located at Salinas,
Lahug, Cebu City.5

Petitioner filed an appeal assigning as error the RTC’s validation of the result of the urine test
despite its dubiousness having been admitted in spite of the lack of legal basis for itsadmission.
First, he alleges that the forensic laboratory examination was conducted despite the fact that he was
not assisted by counsel, in clear violation of his constitutional right. Secondly, he was allegedly held
guilty beyond reasonable doubt notwithstanding the lack of sufficient basis to convict him.

THE RULING OF THE CA

The CA found the appeal devoid of merit and affirmed the ruling of the RTC.

Petitioner filed a timely Motion for Reconsideration. He argued that the CA overlooked prevailing
jurisprudence, which states that drug testing conducted under circumstancessimilar to his would
violate a person’s right to privacy. The appellate court nevertheless denied the motion.

Petitioner thus filed the present Petition for Review on certiorari. He assigns as errors the use of
hearsay evidence as basis for his conviction and the questionable circumstances surrounding his
arrest and drug test.

Respondent, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed its Comment,6 saying that "petitioner’s
arguments cannot be the subject of a petition for review on certiorariunder Rule 45, as they involve
questions of facts which may not be the subject thereof; after his arraignment, he can no longer
contest the validity of his arrest, less so at this stage of the proceedings; his guilt has been
adequately established by direct evidence; and the manner in which the laboratory examination was
conducted was grounded on a valid and existing law.

THE ISSUE

We deem it proper to give due course to this Petition by confronting head-on the issue of whether or
not the drug test conducted upon the petitioner is legal.

OUR RULING
We declare that the drug testconducted upon petitioner is not grounded upon any existing law or
jurisprudence.

We gloss over petitioner’s non-compliance with the Resolution7 ordering him to submit clearly legible
duplicate originals or certified true copies of the assailed Decision and Resolution. Petitioner was
charged with use of dangerous drugs in violation of the law, the pertinent provision of which reads:

Section 15. Use of Dangerous Drugs. – A person apprehended or arrested, who is found to be
positive for use of any dangerous drug, after a confirmatory test, shall be imposed a penalty of a
minimum of six (6) months rehabilitation in a government center for the first offense, subject to the
provisions of Article VIII of this Act. If apprehended using any dangerous drug for the second time,
he/she shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve
(12) years and a fine ranging from Fifty thousand pesos (₱50,000.00) to Two hundred thousand
pesos (₱200,000.00): Provided,That this Section shall not be applicable where the person tested is
also found to have in his/her possession such quantity of any dangerous drug provided for under
Section 11 of this Act, in which case the provisions stated therein shall apply.8

The RTC subsequently convicted petitioner, ruling that the following elements of Section 15 were
established: (1) the accused was arrested; (2) the accused was subjected to drug test; and (3) the
confirmatory test shows that he used a dangerous drug.

Disregarding petitioner’s objection regarding the admissibility of the evidence, the lower court also
reasoned that "a suspect cannot invoke his right to counsel when he is required to extract urine
because, while he is already in custody, he is not compelled to make a statement or testimony
against himself. Extracting urine from one’s body is merely a mechanical act, hence, falling outside
the concept of a custodial investigation."

We find the ruling and reasoning of the trial court, as well as the subsequent affirmation by the CA,
erroneous on three counts.

The drug test in Section 15 does not cover persons apprehended or arrested for any unlawful act,
but only for unlawful acts listed under Article II of R.A. 9165.

First, "[a] person apprehended orarrested" cannot literally mean any person apprehended or
arrested for any crime.The phrase must be read in context and understood in consonance with R.A.
9165. Section 15 comprehends persons arrested or apprehended for unlawful acts listed under
Article II of the law.

Hence, a drug test can be made upon persons who are apprehended or arrested for, among others,
the "importation,"9 "sale, trading, administration, dispensation, delivery, distribution and
transportation",10"manufacture"11 and "possession"12 of dangerous drugs and/or controlled precursors
and essential chemicals; possession thereof "during parties, social gatherings or meetings"13 ; being
"employees and visitors of a den, dive or resort";14 "maintenance of a den, dive or resort";15 "illegal
chemical diversion of controlled precursors and essential chemicals"16 ; "manufacture or delivery"17 or
"possession"18 of equipment, instrument, apparatus, and other paraphernalia for dangerous drugs
and/or controlled precursors and essential chemicals; possession of dangerous drugs "during
parties, social gatherings or meetings"19 ; "unnecessary"20 or "unlawful"21 prescription thereof;
"cultivation or culture of plantsclassified as dangerous drugs or are sources thereof";22 and
"maintenance and keeping of original records of transactions on dangerous drugs and/orcontrolled
precursors and essential chemicals."23 To make the provision applicable to all persons arrested or
apprehended for any crime not listed under Article II is tantamount to unduly expanding its meaning.
Note thataccused appellant here was arrested in the alleged act of extortion.

A charge for violation of Section 15 of R.A. 9165 is seen as expressive of the intent of the law to
rehabilitate persons apprehended or arrested for the unlawful acts enumerated above instead of
charging and convicting them of other crimes with heavier penalties. The essence of the provision is
more clearly illustrated in People v. Martinez24 as follows:

On a final note, this Court takes the opportunity to be instructive on Sec. 11 (Possession of
Dangerous Drugs) and Sec. 15 (Use of Dangerous Drugs) of R.A. No. 9165, withregard to the
charges that are filed by law enforcers. This Court notes the practice of law enforcers of filing
charges under Sec. 11 in cases where the presence of dangerous drugs as basis for possession is
only and solely in the form of residue, being subsumed under the last paragraph of Sec. 11.
Although not incorrect, it would be more in keeping withthe intent of the law to file charges under
Sec. 15 instead in order to rehabilitate first time offenders of drug use, provided thatthere is a
positive confirmatory test result as required under Sec. 15.The minimum penalty under the last
paragraph of Sec. 11 for the possession of residue isimprisonment of twelve years and one day,
while the penalty under Sec. 15 for first time offenders of drug use is a minimum of six months
rehabilitation in a government center. To file charges under Sec. 11 on the basis of residue alone
would frustrate the objective of the law to rehabilitate drug users and provide them with an
opportunity to recover for a second chance at life.

In the case at bench, the presence of dangerous drugs was only in the form of residue on the drug
paraphernalia, and the accused were found positive for use of dangerous drugs. Granting that the
arrest was legal, the evidence obtained admissible, and the chain of custody intact, the law
enforcers should have filed charges under Sec. 15, R.A. No. 9165 or for use of dangerous drugs
and, if there was no residue at all, they should have been charged under Sec. 14 (Possession of
Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs During Parties,
Social Gatherings or Meetings). Sec. 14 provides that the maximum penalty under Sec.
12(Possession of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs)
shall be imposed on any person who shall possess any equipment, instrument, apparatus and other
paraphernalia for dangerous drugs. Under Sec. 12, the maximum penalty is imprisonment of four
years and a fine of ₱50,000.00. In fact, under the same section, the possession of such equipment,
apparatus or other paraphernalia is prima facieevidence that the possessor has used a dangerous
drug and shall be presumed to have violated Sec. 15.

In order to effectively fulfill the intent of the law to rehabilitate drug users, this Court thus calls on law
enforcers and prosecutors in dangerous drugs cases to exercise proper discretion in filing charges
when the presence of dangerous drugs isonly and solely in the form of residue and the confirmatory
test required under Sec. 15 is positive for use of dangerous drugs.In such cases, to afford the
accused a chance to be rehabilitated, the filing of charges for or involving possession of dangerous
drugs should only be done when another separate quantity of dangerous drugs, other than mere
residue, is found in the possession of the accused as provided for in Sec. 15. (Emphasis supplied)

Furthermore, making the phrase "a person apprehended or arrested" in Section 15 applicable to all
persons arrested or apprehended for unlawful acts, not only under R.A. 9165 but for all other crimes,
is tantamount to a mandatory drug testing of all persons apprehended or arrested for any crime. To
overextend the application of thisprovision would run counter to our pronouncement in Social Justice
Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency,25 to wit:

x x x [M]andatory drug testing can never be random and suspicionless. The ideas of randomness
and being suspicionless are antithetical to their being made defendants in a criminal complaint. They
are not randomly picked; neither are they beyond suspicion. When persons suspected of committing
a crime are charged, they are singled out and are impleaded against their will. The persons thus
charged, by the bare fact of being haled before the prosecutor’s office and peaceably submitting
themselves to drug testing, if that be the case, do not necessarily consent to the procedure, let alone
waive their right to privacy. To impose mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to
harness a medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of RA
6195. Drug testing in this case would violate a person’s right to privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2,
Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still, the accused persons are veritably forced to incriminate
themselves. (Emphasis supplied)

The drug test is not covered by allowable non-testimonial compulsion.

We find that petitioner never raisedthe alleged irregularity of his arrest before his arraignment and
raises the issue only now before this tribunal; hence, he is deemed to have waived his right to
question the validity of his arrest curing whatever defect may have attended his arrest.26 However, "a
waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence
seized during an illegal warrantless arrest."27

We are aware of the prohibition against testimonial compulsion and the allowable exceptions to such
proscription. Cases where non-testimonial compulsion has been allowed reveal, however, that the
pieces of evidence obtained were all material to the principal cause of the arrest.

The constitutional right of an accused against self-incrimination proscribes the use of physical or
moral compulsion to extort communications from the accused and not the inclusion of his body in
evidence when it may be material. Purely mechanical acts are not included in the prohibition as the
accused does not thereby speak his guilt, hence the assistance and guiding hand ofcounsel is not
required. (People vs. Olvis, 238 Phil. 513 [1987]) The essence of the right against selfincrimination is
testimonial compulsion, that is, the giving of evidence against himself through a testimonial act.
(People vs. Casinillo, 213 SCRA 777 [1992]; People vs. Tranca, 235 SCRA 455 [1994]; People vs.
Rondero, 378 Phil. 123 [1999]) Hence,it has been held that a woman charged with adultery may be
compelled to submit to physical examination to determine her pregnancy; (Villaflor vs. Summers, 41
Phil. 62 [1920]) and an accused may be compelled to submit to physical examination and to have a
substance taken from his body for medical determination as to whether he was suffering from
gonorrhea which was contracted by his victim;(U.S. vs. Tan Teng, 23 Phil. 145 [1912]) to expel
morphine from his mouth; (U.S. vs. Ong Siu Hong, 36 Phil. 735 [1917]) to have the outline of his foot
traced todetermine its identity with bloody footprints; (U.S. vs. Salas, 25 Phil. 337 [1913]; U.S. vs.
Zara, 42 Phil. 308 [1921]) and to be photographed or measured, or his garments or shoes removed
or replaced, or to move his body to enable the foregoing things to be done.(People vs. Otadora, 86
Phil. 244 [1950])28(Emphasis supplied)

In the instant case, we fail to see howa urine sample could be material to the charge of
extortion. The RTC and the CA, therefore, both erred when they held that the extraction of
1âwphi 1

petitioner’s urine for purposes of drug testing was "merely a mechanical act, hence, falling outside
the concept of a custodial investigation."

We note a case where a urine sample was considered as admissible. In Gutang v. People,29 the
petitioner therein and his companions were arrested in connection with the enforcement of a search
warrant in his residence. A PNP-NARCOM team found and confiscated shabu materials and
paraphernalias. The petitioner and his companions in that case were also asked to give urine
samples, which yielded positive results. Later, the petitioner therein was found guilty of the crime of
illegal possession and use of prohibited drugs. Gutang claimed that the latter’s urine sample was
inadmissible in evidence, since it was derived in effect from an uncounselled extrajudicial
confession.

In the Gutang et al.case, the Court clarified that "what the Constitution prohibits is the use of physical
or moral compulsion to extort communication from the accused, but not an inclusion of his body in
evidence, when it may be material." The situation in Gutangwas categorized as falling among the
exemptions under the freedom from testimonial compulsion since what was sought tobe examined
came from the body of the accused. The Court said:

This was a mechanical act the accused was made to undergo which was not meant to unearth
undisclosedfacts but to ascertain physical attributes determinable by simple observation. In fact, the
record shows that petitioner and his co-accused were not compelled to give samples of their urine
but they in fact voluntarily gave the same when they were requested to undergo a drug test.

Assuming arguendothat the urine samples taken from the petitioner are inadmissible in evidence, we
agree with the trial court that the record is replete with other pieces of credible evidence including
the testimonial evidence of the prosecution which point to the culpability of the petitioner for the
crimes charged.

We emphasize that the circumstances in Gutangare clearly different from the circumstances of
petitioner in the instant case. First, Gutang was arrested in relation to a drug case. Second, he
1aw p++i1

volunteered to give his urine. Third, there were other pieces of evidence that point to his culpability
for the crimes charged. In the present case, though, petitioner was arrested for extortion; he resisted
having his urine sample taken; and finally, his urine sample was the only available evidencethat was
used as basis for his conviction for the use of illegal drugs.

The drug test was a violation of petitioner’s right to privacy and right against self-incrimination.

It is incontrovertible that petitioner refused to have his urine extracted and tested for drugs. He also
asked for a lawyer prior to his urine test. He was adamant in exercising his rights, but all of his
efforts proved futile, because he was still compelled to submit his urine for drug testing under those
circumstances.

The pertinent provisions in Article III of the Constitution are clear:

Section 2. The right of the people to be securein their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.

Section 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.

In the face of these constitutional guarantees, we cannot condone drug testing of all arrested
persons regardless of the crime or offense for which the arrest is being made.

While we express our commendation of law enforcement agents as they vigorously track down
offenders intheir laudable effort to curb the pervasive and deleterious effects of dangerous drugs on
our society, they must, however, be constantly mindful of the reasonable limits of their authority,
because it is not unlikely that in their clear intent to purge society of its lawless elements, they may
be knowingly or unknowingly transgressing the protected rights of its citizens including even
members of its own police force.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision dated 22 June 2011 issued by the
Twentieth Division, and the Resolution dated 2 February 2012 issued by the former Twentieth
Division of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. C.R. No. 00670 are SET ASIDE. Petitioner is hereby
ACQUITTED.

SO ORDERED.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice, Chairperson

WE CONCUR:

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATIO

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS), G.R. No. 157870

Petitioner,
- versus -

DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD and

PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENT
AGENCY (PDEA),
Respondents.
x-----------------------------------------------x
ATTY. MANUEL J. LASERNA, JR., G.R. No. 158633
Petitioner,

- versus -

DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD and

PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENT
AGENCY,
Respondents.
x-----------------------------------------------x
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., G.R. No. 161658
Petitioner,
Present:
PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
- versus - CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
REYES,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
BRION, JJ.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Promulgated:

Respondent.
November 3, 2008
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

In these kindred petitions, the constitutionality of Section 36 of Republic Act No.
(RA) 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002, insofar as it requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office,
students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and
private offices, and persons charged before the prosecutors office with certain
offenses, among other personalities, is put in issue.

As far as pertinent, the challenged section reads as follows:

SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing.Authorized drug testing shall be
done by any government forensic laboratories or by any of the drug testing
laboratories accredited and monitored by the DOH to safeguard the quality
of the test results. x x x The drug testing shall employ, among others, two
(2) testing methods, the screening test which will determine the positive
result as well as the type of drug used and the confirmatory test which will
confirm a positive screening test. x x x The following shall be subjected
to undergo drug testing:

xxxx

(c) Students of secondary and tertiary schools.Students of

secondary and tertiary schools shall, pursuant to the related rules and
regulations as contained in the schools student handbook and with notice
to the parents, undergo a random drug testing x x x;
 (d) Officers and employees of public and private offices.Officers
and employees of public and private offices, whether domestic or
overseas, shall be subjected to undergo a random drug test as contained in
the companys work rules and regulations, x x x for purposes of reducing
the risk in the workplace. Any officer or employee found positive for use
of dangerous drugs shall be dealt with administratively which shall be a
ground for suspension or termination, subject to the provisions of Article
282 of the Labor Code and pertinent provisions of the Civil Service Law;

xxxx

(f) All persons charged before the prosecutors office with a criminal
offense having an imposable penalty of imprisonment of not less than six
(6) years and one (1) day shall undergo a mandatory drug test;

(g) All candidates for public office whether appointed or elected both in the
national or local government shall undergo a mandatory drug test.

In addition to the above stated penalties in this Section, those found to be

positive for dangerous drugs use shall be subject to the provisions of
Section 15 of this Act.

G.R. No. 161658 (Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. v. Commission on Elections)

On December 23, 2003, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) issued

Resolution No. 6486, prescribing the rules and regulations on the mandatory drug
testing of candidates for public office in connection with the May 10,
2004 synchronized national and local elections. The pertinent portions of the said
resolution read as follows:

WHEREAS, Section 36 (g) of Republic Act No. 9165 provides:

SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing.x x x

xxxx

(g) All candidates for public office x x x both in the national or local
government shall undergo a mandatory drug test.
WHEREAS, Section 1, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides that
public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the
people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and
efficiency;

WHEREAS, by requiring candidates to undergo mandatory drug test, the

public will know the quality of candidates they are electing and they will
be assured that only those who can serve with utmost responsibility,
integrity, loyalty, and efficiency would be elected x x x.

NOW THEREFORE, The [COMELEC], pursuant to the authority vested

in it under the Constitution, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election
Code), [RA] 9165 and other election laws, RESOLVED to promulgate, as
 it hereby promulgates, the following rules and regulations on the conduct
of mandatory drug testing to candidates for public office[:]

SECTION 1. Coverage.All candidates for public office, both national

and local, in the May 10, 2004 Synchronized National and Local
Elections shall undergo mandatory drug test in government forensic
laboratories or any drug testing laboratories monitored and accredited by
the Department of Health.

SEC. 3. x x x

On March 25, 2004, in addition to the drug certificates filed with their
respective offices, the Comelec Offices and employees concerned shall
submit to the Law Department two (2) separate lists of candidates. The
first list shall consist of those candidates who complied with the
mandatory drug test while the second list shall consist of those candidates
who failed to comply x x x.

SEC. 4. Preparation and publication of names of candidates.Before the

start of the campaign period, the [COMELEC] shall prepare two separate
lists of candidates. The first list shall consist of those candidates who
complied with the mandatory drug test while the second list shall consist
of those candidates who failed to comply with said drug test. x x x

SEC. 5. Effect of failure to undergo mandatory drug test and file drug test
certificate.No person elected to any public office shall enter upon the
duties of his office until he has undergone mandatory drug test and filed
with the offices enumerated under Section 2 hereof the drug test certificate
herein required. (Emphasis supplied.)

Petitioner Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., a senator of the Republic and a candidate for
re-election in the May 10, 2004 elections,[1] filed a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition under Rule 65. In it, he seeks (1) to nullify Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and
COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 dated December 23, 2003 for being
unconstitutional in that they impose a qualification for candidates for senators in
addition to those already provided for in the 1987 Constitution; and (2) to enjoin the
COMELEC from implementing Resolution No. 6486.

Pimentel invokes as legal basis for his petition Sec. 3, Article VI of the Constitution,
which states:

SECTION 3. No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural-

born citizen of the Philippines, and, on the day of the election, is at least
thirty-five years of age, able to read and write, a registered voter, and a
resident of the Philippines for not less than two years immediately
preceding the day of the election.

According to Pimentel, the Constitution only prescribes a maximum of five (5)

qualifications for one to be a candidate for, elected to, and be a member of the
Senate. He says that both the Congress and COMELEC, by requiring, via RA 9165
and Resolution No. 6486, a senatorial aspirant, among other candidates, to undergo
a mandatory drug test, create an additional qualification that all candidates for
senator must first be certified as drug free. He adds that there is no provision in the
Constitution authorizing the Congress or COMELEC to expand the qualification
requirements of candidates for senator.

G.R. No. 157870 (Social Justice Society v. Dangerous

Drugs Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency)

In its Petition for Prohibition under Rule 65, petitioner Social Justice Society (SJS),
a registered political party, seeks to prohibit the Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB) and
the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) from enforcing paragraphs (c),
(d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36 of RA 9165 on the ground that they are constitutionally
infirm. For one, the provisions constitute undue delegation of legislative power when
they give unbridled discretion to schools and employers to determine the manner of
drug testing. For another, the provisions trench in the equal protection clause
inasmuch as they can be used to harass a student or an employee deemed
undesirable. And for a third, a persons constitutional right against unreasonable
searches is also breached by said provisions.

G.R. No. 158633 (Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr. v. Dangerous

Drugs Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency)

Petitioner Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr., as citizen and taxpayer, also seeks in his
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 that Sec. 36(c), (d), (f), and (g)
of RA 9165 be struck down as unconstitutional for infringing on the constitutional
right to privacy, the right against unreasonable search and seizure, and the right
against self-incrimination, and for being contrary to the due process and equal
protection guarantees.

The Issue on Locus Standi

First off, we shall address the justiciability of the cases at bench and the matter
of the standing of petitioners SJS and Laserna to sue. As respondents DDB and
PDEA assert, SJS and Laserna failed to allege any incident amounting to a violation
of the constitutional rights mentioned in their separate petitions.[2]

It is basic that the power of judicial review can only be exercised in connection
with a bona fide controversy which involves the statute sought to be reviewed.[3] But
even with the presence of an actual case or controversy, the Court may refuse to
exercise judicial review unless the constitutional question is brought before it by a
party having the requisite standing to challenge it.[4] To have standing, one must
establish that he or she has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of
the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the
challenged action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.[5]

The rule on standing, however, is a matter of procedure; hence, it can be relaxed for
non-traditional plaintiffs, like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the
public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of transcendental importance,
of overarching significance to society, or of paramount public interest.[6] There is no
doubt that Pimentel, as senator of the Philippines and candidate for the May 10,
2004 elections, possesses the requisite standing since he has substantial interests in
the subject matter of the petition, among other preliminary
considerations. Regarding SJS and Laserna, this Court is wont to relax the rule
on locus standi owing primarily to the transcendental importance and the paramount
public interest involved in the enforcement of Sec. 36 of RA 9165.
The Consolidated Issues

The principal issues before us are as follows:

(1) Do Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 impose an
additional qualification for candidates for senator? Corollarily, can Congress enact
a law prescribing qualifications for candidates for senator in addition to those laid
down by the Constitution? and
(2) Are paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36, RA 9165 unconstitutional?
Specifically, do these paragraphs violate the right to privacy, the right against
unreasonable searches and seizure, and the equal protection clause? Or do they
constitute undue delegation of legislative power?

Pimentel Petition
(Constitutionality of Sec. 36[g] of RA 9165 and
COMELEC Resolution No. 6486)

In essence, Pimentel claims that Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC

Resolution No. 6486 illegally impose an additional qualification on candidates for
senator. He points out that, subject to the provisions on nuisance candidates, a
candidate for senator needs only to meet the qualifications laid down in Sec. 3, Art.
VI of the Constitution, to wit: (1) citizenship, (2) voter registration, (3) literacy, (4)
age, and (5) residency. Beyond these stated qualification requirements, candidates
for senator need not possess any other qualification to run for senator and be voted
upon and elected as member of the Senate. The Congress cannot validly amend or
otherwise modify these qualification standards, as it cannot disregard, evade, or
weaken the force of a constitutional mandate,[7] or alter or enlarge the Constitution.

Pimentels contention is well-taken. Accordingly, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165

should be, as it is hereby declared as, unconstitutional. It is basic that if a law or an
administrative rule violates any norm of the Constitution, that issuance is null and
void and has no effect. The Constitution is the basic law to which all laws must
conform; no act shall be valid if it conflicts with the Constitution.[8] In the discharge
of their defined functions, the three departments of government have no choice but
to yield obedience to the commands of the Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes
must be observed.[9]

Congress inherent legislative powers, broad as they may be, are subject to
certain limitations. As early as 1927, in Government v. Springer, the Court has
defined, in the abstract, the limits on legislative power in the following wise:

Someone has said that the powers of the legislative department of the
Government, like the boundaries of the ocean, are unlimited. In
constitutional governments, however, as well as governments acting under
delegated authority, the powers of each of the departments x x x are
limited and confined within the four walls of the constitution or the
charter, and each department can only exercise such powers as are
necessarily implied from the given powers. The Constitution is the shore
of legislative authority against which the waves of legislative enactment
may dash, but over which it cannot leap.[10]

Thus, legislative power remains limited in the sense that it is subject to

substantive and constitutional limitations which circumscribe both the exercise of
the power itself and the allowable subjects of legislation.[11] The substantive
constitutional limitations are chiefly found in the Bill of Rights[12] and other
provisions, such as Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution prescribing the qualifications
of candidates for senators.

In the same vein, the COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and
administering election laws or promulgating rules and regulations to implement Sec.
36(g), validly impose qualifications on candidates for senator in addition to what the
Constitution prescribes. If Congress cannot require a candidate for senator to meet
such additional qualification, the COMELEC, to be sure, is also without such power.
The right of a citizen in the democratic process of election should not be defeated by
unwarranted impositions of requirement not otherwise specified in the
Constitution.[13]
Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, as sought to be implemented by the assailed
COMELEC resolution, effectively enlarges the qualification requirements
enumerated in the Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution. As couched, said Sec. 36(g)
unmistakably requires a candidate for senator to be certified illegal-drug clean,
obviously as a pre-condition to the validity of a certificate of candidacy for senator
or, with like effect, a condition sine qua non to be voted upon and, if proper, be
proclaimed as senator-elect. The COMELEC resolution completes the chain with
the proviso that [n]o person elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties
of his office until he has undergone mandatory drug test. Viewed, therefore, in its
proper context, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and the implementing COMELEC Resolution
add another qualification layer to what the 1987 Constitution, at the minimum,
requires for membership in the Senate. Whether or not the drug-free bar set up under
the challenged provision is to be hurdled before or after election is really of no
moment, as getting elected would be of little value if one cannot assume office for
non-compliance with the drug-testing requirement.
 It may of course be argued, in defense of the validity of Sec. 36(g) of RA
9165, that the provision does not expressly state that non-compliance with the drug
test imposition is a disqualifying factor or would work to nullify a certificate of
candidacy. This argument may be accorded plausibility if the drug test requirement
is optional. But the particular section of the law, without exception, made drug-
testing on those covered mandatory, necessarily suggesting that the obstinate ones
shall have to suffer the adverse consequences for not adhering to the statutory
command. And since the provision deals with candidates for public office, it stands
to reason that the adverse consequence adverted to can only refer to and revolve
around the election and the assumption of public office of the candidates. Any other
construal would reduce the mandatory nature of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 into a pure
jargon without meaning and effect whatsoever.
While it is anti-climactic to state it at this juncture, COMELEC Resolution
No. 6486 is no longer enforceable, for by its terms, it was intended to cover only the
May 10, 2004 synchronized elections and the candidates running in that electoral
event. Nonetheless, to obviate repetition, the Court deems it appropriate to review
and rule, as it hereby rules, on its validity as an implementing issuance.

It ought to be made abundantly clear, however, that the unconstitutionality of

Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 is rooted on its having infringed the constitutional provision
defining the qualification or eligibility requirements for one aspiring to run for and
serve as senator.

SJS Petition
(Constitutionality of Sec. 36[c], [d], [f], and [g] of RA 9165)

The drug test prescribed under Sec. 36(c), (d), and (f) of RA 9165 for
secondary and tertiary level students and public and private employees, while
mandatory, is a random and suspicionless arrangement. The objective is to stamp
out illegal drug and safeguard in the process the well being of [the] citizenry,
particularly the youth, from the harmful effects of dangerous drugs. This statutory
purpose, per the policy-declaration portion of the law, can be achieved via the pursuit
by the state of an intensive and unrelenting campaign against the trafficking and use
of dangerous drugs x x x through an integrated system of planning, implementation
and enforcement of anti-drug abuse policies, programs and projects.[14] The primary
legislative intent is not criminal prosecution, as those found positive for illegal drug
use as a result of this random testing are not necessarily treated as criminals. They
may even be exempt from criminal liability should the illegal drug user consent to
undergo rehabilitation. Secs. 54 and 55 of RA 9165 are clear on this point:

Sec. 54. Voluntary Submission of a Drug Dependent to

Confinement, Treatment and Rehabilitation.A drug dependent or any
person who violates Section 15 of this Act may, by himself/herself or
through his/her parent, [close relatives] x x x apply to the Board x x x for
treatment and rehabilitation of the drug dependency. Upon such
application, the Board shall bring forth the matter to the Court which shall
order that the applicant be examined for drug dependency. If the
examination x x x results in the certification that the applicant is a drug
 dependent, he/she shall be ordered by the Court to undergo treatment and
rehabilitation in a Center designated by the Board x x x.

xxxx

Sec. 55. Exemption from the Criminal Liability Under the

Voluntary Submission Program.A drug dependent under the voluntary
submission program, who is finally discharged from confinement, shall be
exempt from the criminal liability under Section 15 of this Act subject to
the following conditions:

xxxx

School children, the US Supreme Court noted, are most vulnerable to the
physical, psychological, and addictive effects of drugs. Maturing nervous systems
of the young are more critically impaired by intoxicants and are more inclined to
drug dependency. Their recovery is also at a depressingly low rate.[15]

The right to privacy has been accorded recognition in this jurisdiction as a

facet of the right protected by the guarantee against unreasonable search and
seizure[16] under Sec. 2, Art. III[17] of the Constitution. But while the right to privacy
has long come into its own, this case appears to be the first time that the validity of
a state-decreed search or intrusion through the medium of mandatory random drug
testing among students and employees is, in this jurisdiction, made the focal point.
Thus, the issue tendered in these proceedings is veritably one of first impression.

US jurisprudence is, however, a rich source of persuasive jurisprudence. With

respect to random drug testing among school children, we turn to the teachings
of VernoniaSchool District 47J v. Acton (Vernonia) and Board of Education of
Independent School District No. 92 of Pottawatomie County, et al. v. Earls, et
al. (Board of Education),[18]both fairly pertinent US Supreme Court-decided cases
involving the constitutionality of governmental search.

In Vernonia, school administrators in Vernonia, Oregon wanted to address

the drug menace in their respective institutions following the discovery of frequent
drug use by school athletes. After consultation with the parents, they required
random urinalysis drug testing for the schools athletes. James Acton, a high school
student, was denied participation in the football program after he refused to
undertake the urinalysis drug testing. Acton forthwith sued, claiming that the
schools drug testing policy violated, inter alia, the Fourth Amendment[19] of the US
Constitution.

The US Supreme Court, in fashioning a solution to the issues raised

in Vernonia, considered the following: (1) schools stand in loco parentis over their
students; (2) school children, while not shedding their constitutional rights at the
school gate, have less privacy rights; (3) athletes have less privacy rights than non-
athletes since the former observe communal undress before and after sports events;
(4) by joining the sports activity, the athletes voluntarily subjected themselves to a
higher degree of school supervision and regulation; (5) requiring urine samples does
not invade a students privacy since a student need not undress for this kind of drug
testing; and (6) there is need for the drug testing because of the dangerous effects of
illegal drugs on the young. The US Supreme Court held that the policy
constituted reasonable search under the Fourth[20] and 14th Amendments and
declared the random drug-testing policy constitutional.

In Board of Education, the Board of Education of a school

in Tecumseh, Oklahoma required a drug test for high school students desiring to join
extra-curricular activities.Lindsay Earls, a member of the show choir, marching
band, and academic team declined to undergo a drug test and averred that the drug-
testing policy made to apply to non-athletes violated the Fourth and 14th
Amendments. As Earls argued, unlike athletes who routinely undergo physical
examinations and undress before their peers in locker rooms, non-athletes are
entitled to more privacy.

The US Supreme Court, citing Vernonia, upheld the constitutionality of drug

testing even among non-athletes on the basis of the schools custodial responsibility
and authority. In so ruling, said court made no distinction between a non-athlete and
an athlete. It ratiocinated that schools and teachers act in place of the parents with a
similar interest and duty of safeguarding the health of the students. And in holding
that the school could implement its random drug-testing policy, the Court hinted that
such a test was a kind of search in which even a reasonable parent might need to
engage.

In sum, what can reasonably be deduced from the above two cases and applied to
this jurisdiction are: (1) schools and their administrators stand in loco parentis with
respect to their students; (2) minor students have contextually fewer rights than an
adult, and are subject to the custody and supervision of their parents, guardians, and
schools; (3) schools, acting in loco parentis, have a duty to safeguard the health and
well-being of their students and may adopt such measures as may reasonably be
necessary to discharge such duty; and (4) schools have the right to impose conditions
on applicants for admission that are fair, just, and non-discriminatory.
Guided by Vernonia and Board of Education, the Court is of the view and so holds
that the provisions of RA 9165 requiring mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug
testing of students are constitutional. Indeed, it is within the prerogative of
educational institutions to require, as a condition for admission, compliance with
reasonable school rules and regulations and policies. To be sure, the right to enroll
is not absolute; it is subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable requirements.

The Court can take judicial notice of the proliferation of prohibited drugs in
the country that threatens the well-being of the people,[21] particularly the youth and
school children who usually end up as victims. Accordingly, and until a more
effective method is conceptualized and put in motion, a random drug testing of
students in secondary and tertiary schools is not only acceptable but may even be
necessary if the safety and interest of the student population, doubtless a legitimate
concern of the government, are to be promoted and protected. To borrow
from Vernonia, [d]eterring drug use by our Nations schoolchildren is as important
as enhancing efficient enforcement of the Nations laws against the importation of
drugs; the necessity for the State to act is magnified by the fact that the effects of a
drug-infested school are visited not just upon the users, but upon the entire student
body and faculty.[22] Needless to stress, the random testing scheme provided under
the law argues against the idea that the testing aims to incriminate unsuspecting
individual students.

Just as in the case of secondary and tertiary level students, the mandatory but
random drug test prescribed by Sec. 36 of RA 9165 for officers and employees of
public and private offices is justifiable, albeit not exactly for the same reason. The
Court notes in this regard that petitioner SJS, other than saying that subjecting almost
everybody to drug testing, without probable cause, is unreasonable, an unwarranted
intrusion of the individual right to privacy,[23] has failed to show how the mandatory,
random, and suspicionless drug testing under Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165 violates
the right to privacy and constitutes unlawful and/or unconsented search under Art.
III, Secs. 1 and 2 of the Constitution.[24] Petitioner Lasernas lament is just as
simplistic, sweeping, and gratuitous and does not merit serious consideration.
Consider what he wrote without elaboration:

The US Supreme Court and US Circuit Courts of Appeals have

made various rulings on the constitutionality of mandatory drug tests in
the school and the workplaces. The US courts have been consistent in
their rulings that the mandatory drug tests violate a citizens constitutional
right to privacy and right against unreasonable search and seizure. They
are quoted extensively hereinbelow.[25]

The essence of privacy is the right to be left alone.[26] In context, the right to
privacy means the right to be free from unwarranted exploitation of ones person or
from intrusion into ones private activities in such a way as to cause humiliation to a
persons ordinary sensibilities. [27] And while there has been general agreement as to
the basic function of the guarantee against unwarranted search, translation of the
abstract prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures into workable broad
guidelines for the decision of particular cases is a difficult task, to borrow from C.
Camara v. Municipal Court.[28] Authorities are agreed though that the right to
privacy yields to certain paramount rights of the public and defers to the states
exercise of police power.[29]

As the warrantless clause of Sec. 2, Art III of the Constitution is couched and
as has been held, reasonableness is the touchstone of the validity of a government
search or intrusion.[30] And whether a search at issue hews to the reasonableness
standard is judged by the balancing of the government-mandated intrusion on the
individuals privacy interest against the promotion of some compelling state
interest.[31] In the criminal context, reasonableness requires showing of probable
cause to be personally determined by a judge. Given that the drug-testing policy for
employeesand students for that matterunder RA 9165 is in the nature of
administrative search needing what was referred to in Vernonia as swift and
informal disciplinary procedures, the probable-cause standard is not required or even
practicable. Be that as it may, the review should focus on the reasonableness of the
challenged administrative search in question.

The first factor to consider in the matter of reasonableness is the nature of the
privacy interest upon which the drug testing, which effects a search within the
meaning of Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution, intrudes. In this case, the office or
workplace serves as the backdrop for the analysis of the privacy expectation of the
employees and the reasonableness of drug testing requirement. The employees
privacy interest in an office is to a large extent circumscribed by the companys work
policies, the collective bargaining agreement, if any, entered into by management
and the bargaining unit, and the inherent right of the employer to maintain discipline
and efficiency in the workplace. Their privacy expectation in a regulated office
environment is, in fine, reduced; and a degree of impingement upon such privacy
has been upheld.

Just as defining as the first factor is the character of the intrusion authorized
by the challenged law. Reduced to a question form, is the scope of the search or
intrusion clearly set forth, or, as formulated in Ople v. Torres, is the enabling law
authorizing a search narrowly drawn or narrowly focused?[32]

The poser should be answered in the affirmative. For one, Sec. 36 of RA 9165
and its implementing rules and regulations (IRR), as couched, contain provisions
specifically directed towards preventing a situation that would unduly embarrass the
employees or place them under a humiliating experience. While every officer and
employee in a private establishment is under the law deemed forewarned that he or
she may be a possible subject of a drug test, nobody is really singled out in advance
for drug testing. The goal is to discourage drug use by not telling in advance anyone
when and who is to be tested. And as may be observed, Sec. 36(d) of RA 9165 itself
prescribes what, in Ople, is a narrowing ingredient by providing that the employees
concerned shall be subjected to random drug test as contained in the companys work
rules and regulations x x x for purposes of reducing the risk in the work place.

For another, the random drug testing shall be undertaken under conditions
calculated to protect as much as possible the employees privacy and dignity. As to
the mechanics of the test, the law specifies that the procedure shall employ two
testing methods, i.e., the screening test and the confirmatory test, doubtless to ensure
as much as possible the trustworthiness of the results. But the more important
consideration lies in the fact that the test shall be conducted by trained professionals
in access-controlled laboratories monitored by the Department of Health (DOH) to
safeguard against results tampering and to ensure an accurate chain of custody.[33] In
addition, the IRR issued by the DOH provides that access to the drug results shall be
on the need to know basis;[34] that the drug test result and the records shall be [kept]
confidential subject to the usual accepted practices to protect the confidentiality of
the test results.[35] Notably, RA 9165 does not oblige the employer concerned to
report to the prosecuting agencies any information or evidence relating to the
violation of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act received as a result of the
operation of the drug testing. All told, therefore, the intrusion into the employees
privacy, under RA 9165, is accompanied by proper safeguards, particularly against
embarrassing leakages of test results, and is relatively minimal.

To reiterate, RA 9165 was enacted as a measure to stamp out illegal drug in

the country and thus protect the well-being of the citizens, especially the youth, from
the deleterious effects of dangerous drugs. The law intends to achieve this through
the medium, among others, of promoting and resolutely pursuing a national drug
abuse policy in the workplace via a mandatory random drug test.[36] To the Court,
the need for drug testing to at least minimize illegal drug use is substantial enough
to override the individuals privacy interest under the premises. The Court can
consider that the illegal drug menace cuts across gender, age group, and social-
economic lines. And it may not be amiss to state that the sale, manufacture, or
trafficking of illegal drugs, with their ready market, would be an investors dream
were it not for the illegal and immoral components of any of such activities. The
drug problem has hardly abated since the martial law public execution of a notorious
drug trafficker. The state can no longer assume a laid back stance with respect to this
modern-day scourge. Drug enforcement agencies perceive a mandatory random
drug test to be an effective way of preventing and deterring drug use among
employees in private offices, the threat of detection by random testing being higher
than other modes. The Court holds that the chosen method is a reasonable and
enough means to lick the problem.

Taking into account the foregoing factors, i.e., the reduced expectation of
privacy on the part of the employees, the compelling state concern likely to be met
by the search, and the well-defined limits set forth in the law to properly guide
authorities in the conduct of the random testing, we hold that the challenged drug
test requirement is, under the limited context of the case, reasonable and, ergo,
constitutional.
Like their counterparts in the private sector, government officials and
employees also labor under reasonable supervision and restrictions imposed by the
Civil Service law and other laws on public officers, all enacted to promote a high
standard of ethics in the public service.[37] And if RA 9165 passes the norm of
reasonableness for private employees, the more reason that it should pass the test for
civil servants, who, by constitutional command, are required to be accountable at all
times to the people and to serve them with utmost responsibility and efficiency. [38]

Petitioner SJS next posture that Sec. 36 of RA 9165 is objectionable on the

ground of undue delegation of power hardly commends itself for
concurrence. Contrary to its position, the provision in question is not so extensively
drawn as to give unbridled options to schools and employers to determine the
manner of drug testing. Sec. 36 expressly provides how drug testing for students of
secondary and tertiary schools and officers/employees of public/private offices
should be conducted. It enumerates the persons who shall undergo drug testing. In
the case of students, the testing shall be in accordance with the school rules as
contained in the student handbook and with notice to parents. On the part of
officers/employees, the testing shall take into account the companys work rules. In
either case, the random procedure shall be observed, meaning that the persons to be
subjected to drug test shall be picked by chance or in an unplanned way. And in all
cases, safeguards against misusing and compromising the confidentiality of the test
results are established.

Lest it be overlooked, Sec. 94 of RA 9165 charges the DDB to issue, in

consultation with the DOH, Department of the Interior and Local Government,
Department of Education, and Department of Labor and Employment, among other
agencies, the IRR necessary to enforce the law. In net effect then, the participation
of schools and offices in the drug testing scheme shall always be subject to the IRR
of RA 9165. It is, therefore, incorrect to say that schools and employers have
unchecked discretion to determine how often, under what conditions, and where the
drug tests shall be conducted.

The validity of delegating legislative power is now a quiet area in the

constitutional landscape.[39] In the face of the increasing complexity of the task of
the government and the increasing inability of the legislature to cope directly with
the many problems demanding its attention, resort to delegation of power, or
entrusting to administrative agencies the power of subordinate legislation, has
become imperative, as here.

Laserna Petition (Constitutionality of Sec. 36[c], [d],

[f], and [g] of RA 9165)

Unlike the situation covered by Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165, the Court finds
no valid justification for mandatory drug testing for persons accused of crimes. In
the case of students, the constitutional viability of the mandatory, random, and
suspicionless drug testing for students emanates primarily from the waiver by the
students of their right to privacy when they seek entry to the school, and from their
voluntarily submitting their persons to the parental authority of school authorities.
In the case of private and public employees, the constitutional soundness of the
mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing proceeds from the
reasonableness of the drug test policy and requirement.

We find the situation entirely different in the case of persons charged before
the public prosecutors office with criminal offenses punishable with six (6) years
and one (1) day imprisonment. The operative concepts in the mandatory drug testing
are randomness and suspicionless. In the case of persons charged with a crime before
the prosecutors office, a mandatory drug testing can never be random or
suspicionless. The ideas of randomness and being suspicionless are antithetical to
their being made defendants in a criminal complaint. They are not randomly picked;
neither are they beyond suspicion. When persons suspected of committing a crime
are charged, they are singled out and are impleaded against their will. The persons
thus charged, by the bare fact of being haled before the prosecutors office and
peaceably submitting themselves to drug testing, if that be the case, do not
necessarily consent to the procedure, let alone waive their right to privacy. [40] To
impose mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to harness a
medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of
RA 9165. Drug testing in this case would violate a persons right to privacy
guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still, the accused persons
are veritably forced to incriminate themselves.

WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to GRANT the petition in G.R. No.

161658 and declares Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No.
6486 as UNCONSTITUTIONAL; and to PARTIALLY GRANT the petition in
G.R. Nos. 157870 and 158633 by declaring Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA
9165 CONSTITUTIONAL, but declaring its Sec.
36(f) UNCONSTITUTIONAL. All concerned agencies are, accordingly,
permanently enjoined from implementing Sec. 36(f) and (g) of RA 9165. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

\
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 157870 November 3, 2008

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS), petitioner

vs.
DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD and PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENT
AGENCY (PDEA),respondents.

x-----------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 158633 November 3, 2008

ATTY. MANUEL J. LASERNA, JR., petitioner

vs.
DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD and PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENT
AGENCY, respondents.

x-----------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 161658 November 3, 2008

AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., petitioner

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

In these kindred petitions, the constitutionality of Section 36 of Republic Act

No. (RA) 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act
of 2002, insofar as it requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for public
office, students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of
public and private offices, and persons charged before the prosecutor's office
with certain offenses, among other personalities, is put in issue.

As far as pertinent, the challenged section reads as follows:

SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing. - Authorized drug testing shall be

done by any government forensic laboratories or by any of the drug
testing laboratories accredited and monitored by the DOH to safeguard
 the quality of the test results. x x x The drug testing shall employ,
among others, two (2) testing methods, the screening test which will
determine the positive result as well as the type of drug used and the
confirmatory test which will confirm a positive screening test. x x x The
following shall be subjected to undergo drug testing:

xxxx

(c) Students of secondary and tertiary schools. - Students of secondary

and tertiary schools shall, pursuant to the related rules and regulations
as contained in the school's student handbook and with notice to the
parents, undergo a random drug testing x x x;

(d) Officers and employees of public and private offices. - Officers and
employees of public and private offices, whether domestic or overseas,
shall be subjected to undergo a random drug test as contained in the
company's work rules and regulations, x x x for purposes of reducing
the risk in the workplace. Any officer or employee found positive for use
of dangerous drugs shall be dealt with administratively which shall be a
ground for suspension or termination, subject to the provisions of Article
282 of the Labor Code and pertinent provisions of the Civil Service Law;

xxxx

(f) All persons charged before the prosecutor's office with a criminal
offense having an imposable penalty of imprisonment of not less than
six (6) years and one (1) day shall undergo a mandatory drug test;

(g) All candidates for public office whether appointed or elected both in
the national or local government shall undergo a mandatory drug test.

In addition to the above stated penalties in this Section, those found to be

positive for dangerous drugs use shall be subject to the provisions of Section
15 of this Act.

G.R. No. 161658 (Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. v. Commission on Elections)

On December 23, 2003, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) issued

Resolution No. 6486, prescribing the rules and regulations on the mandatory
drug testing of candidates for public office in connection with the May 10,
2004 synchronized national and local elections. The pertinent portions of the
said resolution read as follows:

WHEREAS, Section 36 (g) of Republic Act No. 9165 provides:

SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing. - x x x

xxxx

(g) All candidates for public office x x x both in the national or local
government shall undergo a mandatory drug test.

WHEREAS, Section 1, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides that

public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the
people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and
efficiency;
 WHEREAS, by requiring candidates to undergo mandatory drug test,
the public will know the quality of candidates they are electing and they
will be assured that only those who can serve with utmost responsibility,
integrity, loyalty, and efficiency would be elected x x x.

NOW THEREFORE, The [COMELEC], pursuant to the authority vested

in it under the Constitution, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (Omnibus
Election Code), [RA] 9165 and other election laws, RESOLVED to
promulgate, as it hereby promulgates, the following rules and
regulations on the conduct of mandatory drug testing to candidates for
public office[:]

SECTION 1. Coverage. - All candidates for public office, both

national and local, in the May 10, 2004 Synchronized National and
Local Elections shall undergo mandatory drug test in government
forensic laboratories or any drug testing laboratories monitored and
accredited by the Department of Health.

SEC. 3. x x x

On March 25, 2004, in addition to the drug certificates filed with their
respective offices, the Comelec Offices and employees concerned shall
submit to the Law Department two (2) separate lists of candidates. The
first list shall consist of those candidates who complied with the
mandatory drug test while the second list shall consist of those
candidates who failed to comply x x x.

SEC. 4. Preparation and publication of names of candidates. - Before

the start of the campaign period, the [COMELEC] shall prepare two
separate lists of candidates. The first list shall consist of those
candidates who complied with the mandatory drug test while the second
list shall consist of those candidates who failed to comply with said drug
test. x x x

SEC. 5. Effect of failure to undergo mandatory drug test and file drug
test certificate. - No person elected to any public office shall enter upon
the duties of his office until he has undergone mandatory drug test and
filed with the offices enumerated under Section 2 hereof the drug test
certificate herein required. (Emphasis supplied.)

Petitioner Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., a senator of the Republic and a candidate

for re - election in the May 10, 2004 elections,1 filed a Petition for Certiorari
and Prohibition under Rule 65. In it, he seeks (1) to nullify Sec. 36(g) of RA
9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 dated December 23, 2003 for
being unconstitutional in that they impose a qualification for candidates for
senators in addition to those already provided for in the 1987 Constitution; and
(2) to enjoin the COMELEC from implementing Resolution No. 6486.

Pimentel invokes as legal basis for his petition Sec. 3, Article VI of the
Constitution, which states:

SECTION 3. No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural - born

citizen of the Philippines, and, on the day of the election, is at least thirty
- five years of age, able to read and write, a registered voter, and a
resident of the Philippines for not less than two years immediately
preceding the day of the election.
According to Pimentel, the Constitution only prescribes a maximum of five (5)
qualifications for one to be a candidate for, elected to, and be a member of the
Senate. He says that both the Congress and COMELEC, by requiring, via RA
9165 and Resolution No. 6486, a senatorial aspirant, among other candidates,
to undergo a mandatory drug test, create an additional qualification that all
candidates for senator must first be certified as drug free. He adds that there
is no provision in the Constitution authorizing the Congress or COMELEC to
expand the qualification requirements of candidates for senator.

G.R. No. 157870 (Social Justice Society v. Dangerous

Drugs Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency)

In its Petition for Prohibition under Rule 65, petitioner Social Justice Society
(SJS), a registered political party, seeks to prohibit the Dangerous Drugs
Board (DDB) and the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) from
enforcing paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36 of RA 9165 on the ground
that they are constitutionally infirm. For one, the provisions constitute undue
delegation of legislative power when they give unbridled discretion to schools
and employers to determine the manner of drug testing. For another, the
provisions trench in the equal protection clause inasmuch as they can be used
to harass a student or an employee deemed undesirable. And for a third, a
person's constitutional right against unreasonable searches is also breached
by said provisions.

G.R. No. 158633 (Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr. v. Dangerous

Drugs Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency)

Petitioner Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr., as citizen and taxpayer, also seeks in
his Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 that Sec. 36(c), (d), (f),
and (g) of RA 9165 be struck down as unconstitutional for infringing on the
constitutional right to privacy, the right against unreasonable search and
seizure, and the right against self - incrimination, and for being contrary to the
due process and equal protection guarantees.

The Issue on Locus Standi

First off, we shall address the justiciability of the cases at bench and the
matter of the standing of petitioners SJS and Laserna to sue. As respondents
DDB and PDEA assert, SJS and Laserna failed to allege any incident
amounting to a violation of the constitutional rights mentioned in their separate
petitions.2

It is basic that the power of judicial review can only be exercised in connection
with a bona fidecontroversy which involves the statute sought to be
reviewed.3 But even with the presence of an actual case or controversy, the
Court may refuse to exercise judicial review unless the constitutional question
is brought before it by a party having the requisite standing to challenge it.4 To
have standing, one must establish that he or she has suffered some actual or
threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government;
the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to
be redressed by a favorable action.5

The rule on standing, however, is a matter of procedure; hence, it can be

relaxed for non - traditional plaintiffs, like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and
legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of
transcendental importance, of overarching significance to society, or of
paramount public interest.6 There is no doubt that Pimentel, as senator of the
Philippines and candidate for the May 10, 2004 elections, possesses the
requisite standing since he has substantial interests in the subject matter of
the petition, among other preliminary considerations. Regarding SJS and
Laserna, this Court is wont to relax the rule on locus standi owing primarily to
the transcendental importance and the paramount public interest involved in
the enforcement of Sec. 36 of RA 9165.

The Consolidated Issues

The principal issues before us are as follows:

(1) Do Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 impose an
additional qualification for candidates for senator? Corollarily, can Congress
enact a law prescribing qualifications for candidates for senator in addition to
those laid down by the Constitution? and

(2) Are paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36, RA 9165 unconstitutional?
Specifically, do these paragraphs violate the right to privacy, the right against
unreasonable searches and seizure, and the equal protection clause? Or do
they constitute undue delegation of legislative power?

Pimentel Petition
(Constitutionality of Sec. 36[g] of RA 9165 and
COMELEC Resolution No. 6486)

In essence, Pimentel claims that Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC

Resolution No. 6486 illegally impose an additional qualification on candidates
for senator. He points out that, subject to the provisions on nuisance
candidates, a candidate for senator needs only to meet the qualifications laid
down in Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution, to wit: (1) citizenship, (2) voter
registration, (3) literacy, (4) age, and (5) residency. Beyond these stated
qualification requirements, candidates for senator need not possess any other
qualification to run for senator and be voted upon and elected as member of
the Senate. The Congress cannot validly amend or otherwise modify these
qualification standards, as it cannot disregard, evade, or weaken the force of a
constitutional mandate,7 or alter or enlarge the Constitution.

Pimentel's contention is well - taken. Accordingly, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165

should be, as it is hereby declared as, unconstitutional. It is basic that if a law
or an administrative rule violates any norm of the Constitution, that issuance is
null and void and has no effect. The Constitution is the basic law to which all
laws must conform; no act shall be valid if it conflicts with the Constitution.8 In
the discharge of their defined functions, the three departments of government
have no choice but to yield obedience to the commands of the Constitution.
Whatever limits it imposes must be observed.9

Congress' inherent legislative powers, broad as they may be, are subject to
certain limitations. As early as 1927, in Government v. Springer, the Court has
defined, in the abstract, the limits on legislative power in the following wise:

Someone has said that the powers of the legislative department of the
Government, like the boundaries of the ocean, are unlimited. In
constitutional governments, however, as well as governments acting
under delegated authority, the powers of each of the departments x x x
are limited and confined within the four walls of the constitution or the
 charter, and each department can only exercise such powers as are
necessarily implied from the given powers. The Constitution is the shore
of legislative authority against which the waves of legislative enactment
may dash, but over which it cannot leap.10

Thus, legislative power remains limited in the sense that it is subject to

substantive and constitutional limitations which circumscribe both the exercise
of the power itself and the allowable subjects of legislation.11 The substantive
constitutional limitations are chiefly found in the Bill of Rights12 and other
provisions, such as Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution prescribing the
qualifications of candidates for senators.

In the same vein, the COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and
administering election laws or promulgating rules and regulations to
implement Sec. 36(g), validly impose qualifications on candidates for senator
in addition to what the Constitution prescribes. If Congress cannot require a
candidate for senator to meet such additional qualification, the COMELEC, to
be sure, is also without such power. The right of a citizen in the democratic
process of election should not be defeated by unwarranted impositions of
requirement not otherwise specified in the Constitution.13

Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, as sought to be implemented by the assailed

COMELEC resolution, effectively enlarges the qualification requirements
enumerated in the Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution. As couched, said Sec.
36(g) unmistakably requires a candidate for senator to be certified illegal -
drug clean, obviously as a pre - condition to the validity of a certificate of
candidacy for senator or, with like effect, a condition sine qua non to be voted
upon and, if proper, be proclaimed as senator - elect. The COMELEC
resolution completes the chain with the proviso that "[n]o person elected to
any public office shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has
undergone mandatory drug test." Viewed, therefore, in its proper context, Sec.
36(g) of RA 9165 and the implementing COMELEC Resolution add another
qualification layer to what the 1987 Constitution, at the minimum, requires for
membership in the Senate. Whether or not the drug - free bar set up under the
challenged provision is to be hurdled before or after election is really of no
moment, as getting elected would be of little value if one cannot assume office
for non - compliance with the drug - testing requirement.

It may of course be argued, in defense of the validity of Sec. 36(g) of RA

9165, that the provision does not expressly state that non - compliance with
the drug test imposition is a disqualifying factor or would work to nullify a
certificate of candidacy. This argument may be accorded plausibility if the
drug test requirement is optional. But the particular section of the law, without
exception, made drug - testing on those covered mandatory, necessarily
suggesting that the obstinate ones shall have to suffer the adverse
consequences for not adhering to the statutory command. And since the
provision deals with candidates for public office, it stands to reason that the
adverse consequence adverted to can only refer to and revolve around the
election and the assumption of public office of the candidates. Any other
construal would reduce the mandatory nature of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 into a
pure jargon without meaning and effect whatsoever.

While it is anti - climactic to state it at this juncture, COMELEC Resolution No.

6486 is no longer enforceable, for by its terms, it was intended to cover only
the May 10, 2004 synchronized elections and the candidates running in that
electoral event. Nonetheless, to obviate repetition, the Court deems it
appropriate to review and rule, as it hereby rules, on its validity as an
implementing issuance.

It ought to be made abundantly clear, however, that the unconstitutionality of

Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 is rooted on its having infringed the constitutional
provision defining the qualification or eligibility requirements for one aspiring to
run for and serve as senator.

SJS Petition
(Constitutionality of Sec. 36[c], [d], [f], and [g] of RA 9165)

The drug test prescribed under Sec. 36(c), (d), and (f) of RA 9165 for
secondary and tertiary level students and public and private employees, while
mandatory, is a random and suspicionless arrangement. The objective is to
stamp out illegal drug and safeguard in the process "the well being of [the]
citizenry, particularly the youth, from the harmful effects of dangerous drugs."
This statutory purpose, per the policy - declaration portion of the law, can be
achieved via the pursuit by the state of "an intensive and unrelenting
campaign against the trafficking and use of dangerous drugs x x x through an
integrated system of planning, implementation and enforcement of anti - drug
abuse policies, programs and projects."14 The primary legislative intent is not
criminal prosecution, as those found positive for illegal drug use as a result of
this random testing are not necessarily treated as criminals. They may even
be exempt from criminal liability should the illegal drug user consent to
undergo rehabilitation. Secs. 54 and 55 of RA 9165 are clear on this point:

Sec. 54. Voluntary Submission of a Drug Dependent to Confinement,

Treatment and Rehabilitation. - A drug dependent or any person who
violates Section 15 of this Act may, by himself/herself or through his/her
parent, [close relatives] x x x apply to the Board x x x for treatment and
rehabilitation of the drug dependency. Upon such application, the Board
shall bring forth the matter to the Court which shall order that the
applicant be examined for drug dependency. If the examination x x x
results in the certification that the applicant is a drug dependent, he/she
shall be ordered by the Court to undergo treatment and rehabilitation in
a Center designated by the Board x x x.

xxxx

Sec. 55. Exemption from the Criminal Liability Under the Voluntary
Submission Program. - A drug dependent under the voluntary
submission program, who is finally discharged from confinement, shall
be exempt from the criminal liability under Section 15 of this Act subject
to the following conditions:

xxxx

School children, the US Supreme Court noted, are most vulnerable to the
physical, psychological, and addictive effects of drugs. Maturing nervous
systems of the young are more critically impaired by intoxicants and are more
inclined to drug dependency. Their recovery is also at a depressingly low
rate.15

The right to privacy has been accorded recognition in this jurisdiction as a

facet of the right protected by the guarantee against unreasonable search and
seizure16 under Sec. 2, Art. III17 of the Constitution. But while the right to
privacy has long come into its own, this case appears to be the first time that
the validity of a state - decreed search or intrusion through the medium of
mandatory random drug testing among students and employees is, in this
jurisdiction, made the focal point. Thus, the issue tendered in these
proceedings is veritably one of first impression.

US jurisprudence is, however, a rich source of persuasive jurisprudence. With

respect to random drug testing among school children, we turn to the
teachings of Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton (Vernonia) and Board of
Education of Independent School District No. 92 of Pottawatomie County, et
al. v. Earls, et al. (Board of Education),18 both fairly pertinent US Supreme
Court - decided cases involving the constitutionality of governmental search.

In Vernonia, school administrators in Vernonia, Oregon wanted to address the

drug menace in their respective institutions following the discovery of frequent
drug use by school athletes. After consultation with the parents, they required
random urinalysis drug testing for the school's athletes. James Acton, a high
school student, was denied participation in the football program after he
refused to undertake the urinalysis drug testing. Acton forthwith sued, claiming
that the school's drug testing policy violated, inter alia, the Fourth
Amendment19 of the US Constitution.

The US Supreme Court, in fashioning a solution to the issues raised

in Vernonia, considered the following: (1) schools stand in loco parentis over
their students; (2) school children, while not shedding their constitutional rights
at the school gate, have less privacy rights; (3) athletes have less privacy
rights than non - athletes since the former observe communal undress before
and after sports events; (4) by joining the sports activity, the athletes
voluntarily subjected themselves to a higher degree of school supervision and
regulation; (5) requiring urine samples does not invade a student's privacy
since a student need not undress for this kind of drug testing; and (6) there is
need for the drug testing because of the dangerous effects of illegal drugs on
the young. The US Supreme Court held that the policy constituted reasonable
search under the Fourth20 and 14th Amendments and declared the random
drug - testing policy constitutional.

In Board of Education, the Board of Education of a school in Tecumseh,

Oklahoma required a drug test for high school students desiring to join extra -
curricular activities. Lindsay Earls, a member of the show choir, marching
band, and academic team declined to undergo a drug test and averred that
the drug - testing policy made to apply to non - athletes violated the Fourth
and 14th Amendments. As Earls argued, unlike athletes who routinely
undergo physical examinations and undress before their peers in locker
rooms, non - athletes are entitled to more privacy.

The US Supreme Court, citing Vernonia, upheld the constitutionality of drug

testing even among non - athletes on the basis of the school's custodial
responsibility and authority. In so ruling, said court made no distinction
between a non - athlete and an athlete. It ratiocinated that schools and
teachers act in place of the parents with a similar interest and duty of
safeguarding the health of the students. And in holding that the school could
implement its random drug - testing policy, the Court hinted that such a test
was a kind of search in which even a reasonable parent might need to
engage.
In sum, what can reasonably be deduced from the above two cases and
applied to this jurisdiction are: (1) schools and their administrators stand in
loco parentis with respect to their students; (2) minor students have
contextually fewer rights than an adult, and are subject to the custody and
supervision of their parents, guardians, and schools; (3) schools, acting in
loco parentis, have a duty to safeguard the health and well - being of their
students and may adopt such measures as may reasonably be necessary to
discharge such duty; and (4) schools have the right to impose conditions on
applicants for admission that are fair, just, and non-discriminatory.

Guided by Vernonia and Board of Education, the Court is of the view and so
holds that the provisions of RA 9165 requiring mandatory, random, and
suspicionless drug testing of students are constitutional. Indeed, it is within the
prerogative of educational institutions to require, as a condition for admission,
compliance with reasonable school rules and regulations and policies. To be
sure, the right to enroll is not absolute; it is subject to fair, reasonable, and
equitable requirements.

The Court can take judicial notice of the proliferation of prohibited drugs in the
country that threatens the well - being of the people,21 particularly the youth
and school children who usually end up as victims. Accordingly, and until a
more effective method is conceptualized and put in motion, a random drug
testing of students in secondary and tertiary schools is not only acceptable but
may even be necessary if the safety and interest of the student population,
doubtless a legitimate concern of the government, are to be promoted and
protected. To borrow from Vernonia, "[d]eterring drug use by our Nation's
schoolchildren is as important as enhancing efficient enforcement of the
Nation's laws against the importation of drugs"; the necessity for the State to
act is magnified by the fact that the effects of a drug - infested school are
visited not just upon the users, but upon the entire student body and
faculty.22 Needless to stress, the random testing scheme provided under the
law argues against the idea that the testing aims to incriminate unsuspecting
individual students.

Just as in the case of secondary and tertiary level students, the mandatory but
random drug test prescribed by Sec. 36 of RA 9165 for officers and
employees of public and private offices is justifiable, albeit not exactly for the
same reason. The Court notes in this regard that petitioner SJS, other than
saying that "subjecting almost everybody to drug testing, without probable
cause, is unreasonable, an unwarranted intrusion of the individual right to
privacy,"23 has failed to show how the mandatory, random, and suspicionless
drug testing under Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165 violates the right to privacy
and constitutes unlawful and/or unconsented search under Art. III, Secs. 1
and 2 of the Constitution.24 Petitioner Laserna's lament is just as simplistic,
sweeping, and gratuitous and does not merit serious consideration. Consider
what he wrote without elaboration:

The US Supreme Court and US Circuit Courts of Appeals have made

various rulings on the constitutionality of mandatory drug tests in the
school and the workplaces. The US courts have been consistent in their
rulings that the mandatory drug tests violate a citizen's constitutional
right to privacy and right against unreasonable search and seizure.
They are quoted extensively hereinbelow.25

The essence of privacy is the right to be left alone.26 In context, the right to
privacy means the right to be free from unwarranted exploitation of one's
person or from intrusion into one's private activities in such a way as to cause
humiliation to a person's ordinary sensibilities. 27 And while there has been
general agreement as to the basic function of the guarantee against
unwarranted search, "translation of the abstract prohibition against
‘unreasonable searches and seizures' into workable broad guidelines for the
decision of particular cases is a difficult task," to borrow from C. Camara v.
Municipal Court.28 Authorities are agreed though that the right to privacy yields
to certain paramount rights of the public and defers to the state's exercise of
police power.29

As the warrantless clause of Sec. 2, Art III of the Constitution is couched and
as has been held, "reasonableness" is the touchstone of the validity of a
government search or intrusion.30 And whether a search at issue hews to the
reasonableness standard is judged by the balancing of the government -
mandated intrusion on the individual's privacy interest against the promotion
of some compelling state interest.31 In the criminal context, reasonableness
requires showing of probable cause to be personally determined by a judge.
Given that the drug - testing policy for employees--and students for that
matter--under RA 9165 is in the nature of administrative search needing what
was referred to in Vernonia as "swift and informal disciplinary procedures," the
probable - cause standard is not required or even practicable. Be that as it
may, the review should focus on the reasonableness of the challenged
administrative search in question.

The first factor to consider in the matter of reasonableness is the nature of the
privacy interest upon which the drug testing, which effects a search within the
meaning of Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution, intrudes. In this case, the office
or workplace serves as the backdrop for the analysis of the privacy
expectation of the employees and the reasonableness of drug testing
requirement. The employees' privacy interest in an office is to a large extent
circumscribed by the company's work policies, the collective bargaining
agreement, if any, entered into by management and the bargaining unit, and
the inherent right of the employer to maintain discipline and efficiency in the
workplace. Their privacy expectation in a regulated office environment is, in
fine, reduced; and a degree of impingement upon such privacy has been
upheld.

Just as defining as the first factor is the character of the intrusion authorized
by the challenged law. Reduced to a question form, is the scope of the search
or intrusion clearly set forth, or, as formulated in Ople v. Torres, is the
enabling law authorizing a search "narrowly drawn" or "narrowly focused"?32

The poser should be answered in the affirmative. For one, Sec. 36 of RA 9165
and its implementing rules and regulations (IRR), as couched, contain
provisions specifically directed towards preventing a situation that would
unduly embarrass the employees or place them under a humiliating
experience. While every officer and employee in a private establishment is
under the law deemed forewarned that he or she may be a possible subject of
a drug test, nobody is really singled out in advance for drug testing. The goal
is to discourage drug use by not telling in advance anyone when and who is to
be tested. And as may be observed, Sec. 36(d) of RA 9165 itself prescribes
what, in Ople, is a narrowing ingredient by providing that the employees
concerned shall be subjected to "random drug test as contained in the
company's work rules and regulations x x x for purposes of reducing the risk in
the work place."
For another, the random drug testing shall be undertaken under conditions
calculated to protect as much as possible the employee's privacy and dignity.
As to the mechanics of the test, the law specifies that the procedure shall
employ two testing methods, i.e., the screening test and the confirmatory test,
doubtless to ensure as much as possible the trustworthiness of the results.
But the more important consideration lies in the fact that the test shall be
conducted by trained professionals in access - controlled laboratories
monitored by the Department of Health (DOH) to safeguard against results
tampering and to ensure an accurate chain of custody.33 In addition, the IRR
issued by the DOH provides that access to the drug results shall be on the
"need to know" basis;34 that the "drug test result and the records shall be
[kept] confidential subject to the usual accepted practices to protect the
confidentiality of the test results."35 Notably, RA 9165 does not oblige the
employer concerned to report to the prosecuting agencies any information or
evidence relating to the violation of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act received as a result of the operation of the drug testing. All told, therefore,
the intrusion into the employees' privacy, under RA 9165, is accompanied by
proper safeguards, particularly against embarrassing leakages of test results,
and is relatively minimal.

To reiterate, RA 9165 was enacted as a measure to stamp out illegal drug in

the country and thus protect the well - being of the citizens, especially the
youth, from the deleterious effects of dangerous drugs. The law intends to
achieve this through the medium, among others, of promoting and resolutely
pursuing a national drug abuse policy in the workplace via a mandatory
random drug test.36 To the Court, the need for drug testing to at least minimize
illegal drug use is substantial enough to override the individual's privacy
interest under the premises. The Court can consider that the illegal drug
menace cuts across gender, age group, and social - economic lines. And it
may not be amiss to state that the sale, manufacture, or trafficking of illegal
drugs, with their ready market, would be an investor's dream were it not for
the illegal and immoral components of any of such activities. The drug
problem has hardly abated since the martial law public execution of a
notorious drug trafficker. The state can no longer assume a laid back stance
with respect to this modern - day scourge. Drug enforcement agencies
perceive a mandatory random drug test to be an effective way of preventing
and deterring drug use among employees in private offices, the threat of
detection by random testing being higher than other modes. The Court holds
that the chosen method is a reasonable and enough means to lick the
problem.

Taking into account the foregoing factors, i.e., the reduced expectation of
privacy on the part of the employees, the compelling state concern likely to be
met by the search, and the well - defined limits set forth in the law to properly
guide authorities in the conduct of the random testing, we hold that the
challenged drug test requirement is, under the limited context of the case,
reasonable and, ergo, constitutional.

Like their counterparts in the private sector, government officials and

employees also labor under reasonable supervision and restrictions imposed
by the Civil Service law and other laws on public officers, all enacted to
promote a high standard of ethics in the public service.37 And if RA 9165
passes the norm of reasonableness for private employees, the more reason
that it should pass the test for civil servants, who, by constitutional command,
are required to be accountable at all times to the people and to serve them
with utmost responsibility and efficiency.38

Petitioner SJS' next posture that Sec. 36 of RA 9165 is objectionable on the

ground of undue delegation of power hardly commends itself for concurrence.
Contrary to its position, the provision in question is not so extensively drawn
as to give unbridled options to schools and employers to determine the
manner of drug testing. Sec. 36 expressly provides how drug testing for
students of secondary and tertiary schools and officers/employees of
public/private offices should be conducted. It enumerates the persons who
shall undergo drug testing. In the case of students, the testing shall be in
accordance with the school rules as contained in the student handbook and
with notice to parents. On the part of officers/employees, the testing shall take
into account the company's work rules. In either case, the random procedure
shall be observed, meaning that the persons to be subjected to drug test shall
be picked by chance or in an unplanned way. And in all cases, safeguards
against misusing and compromising the confidentiality of the test results are
established.

Lest it be overlooked, Sec. 94 of RA 9165 charges the DDB to issue, in

consultation with the DOH, Department of the Interior and Local Government,
Department of Education, and Department of Labor and Employment, among
other agencies, the IRR necessary to enforce the law. In net effect then, the
participation of schools and offices in the drug testing scheme shall always be
subject to the IRR of RA 9165. It is, therefore, incorrect to say that schools
and employers have unchecked discretion to determine how often, under what
conditions, and where the drug tests shall be conducted.

The validity of delegating legislative power is now a quiet area in the

constitutional landscape.39 In the face of the increasing complexity of the task
of the government and the increasing inability of the legislature to cope
directly with the many problems demanding its attention, resort to delegation
of power, or entrusting to administrative agencies the power of subordinate
legislation, has become imperative, as here.

Laserna Petition (Constitutionality of Sec. 36[c], [d],

[f], and [g] of RA 9165)

Unlike the situation covered by Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165, the Court finds
no valid justification for mandatory drug testing for persons accused of crimes.
In the case of students, the constitutional viability of the mandatory, random,
and suspicionless drug testing for students emanates primarily from the
waiver by the students of their right to privacy when they seek entry to the
school, and from their voluntarily submitting their persons to the parental
authority of school authorities. In the case of private and public employees,
the constitutional soundness of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless
drug testing proceeds from the reasonableness of the drug test policy and
requirement.

We find the situation entirely different in the case of persons charged before
the public prosecutor's office with criminal offenses punishable with six (6)
years and one (1) day imprisonment. The operative concepts in the
mandatory drug testing are "randomness" and "suspicionless." In the case of
persons charged with a crime before the prosecutor's office, a mandatory drug
testing can never be random or suspicionless. The ideas of randomness and
being suspicionless are antithetical to their being made defendants in a
criminal complaint. They are not randomly picked; neither are they beyond
suspicion. When persons suspected of committing a crime are charged, they
are singled out and are impleaded against their will. The persons thus
charged, by the bare fact of being haled before the prosecutor's office and
peaceably submitting themselves to drug testing, if that be the case, do not
necessarily consent to the procedure, let alone waive their right to
privacy.40 To impose mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant
attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary
to the stated objectives of RA 9165. Drug testing in this case would violate a
persons' right to privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution.
Worse still, the accused persons are veritably forced to incriminate
themselves.

WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to GRANT the petition in G.R. No. 161658
and declares Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No.
6486 as UNCONSTITUTIONAL; and to PARTIALLY GRANT the petition in
G.R. Nos. 157870 and 158633 by declaring Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165
CONSTITUTIONAL, but declaring its Sec. 36(f) UNCONSTITUTIONAL. All
concerned agencies are, accordingly, permanently enjoined from
implementing Sec. 36(f) and (g) of RA 9165. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING CONSUELO YNARES - SANTIAGO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA - MARTINEZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

RENATO C. CORONA CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA DANTE O. TINGA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO - NAZARIO ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

RUBEN T. REYES TERESITA J. LEONARDO - DE CASTRO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
Drug Testing in the Workplace
Louie John D. Lood
March 06, 2014

Drug abuse is a widespread and serious problem in society today, and there is a very good likelihood that in a
workplace, one or more workers are into drug abuse. This is tough for employers as drug abuse in the
workplace may cause significant physical, mental or social dysfunction that affects not only the user but also
the other people around the drug user including his co-employees. Thus, it is in the best interest of the
employer to create and maintain a drug-free workplace.

The governing law on dangerous drugs in the Philippines is Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the
“Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002”. This law laid down an extensive legal framework for
drug enforcement and imposes stiffer penalties for drug related crimes. This law also mandates, among others,
the development of drug free workplace policies and programs in the private sector, in accord with the policy
of the State, which is the promotion of drug-free workplaces.

In accordance with the mandate of RA 9165, the Department of Labor and Employment formulated and issued
Department Order No. 53-03, which provides for the Guidelines for the Implementation of a Drug-Free
Workplace Policies and Programs for the Private Sector. DO 53-03 provides that workplace policies and
programs on drug abuse prevention and control to be adopted by companies shall include, among others, the
component of random drug testing for officers and employees.

This mandatory but random drug testing prescribed for officers and employees in the private sector is valid and
constitutional as declared by the Supreme Court in the case of Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Dangerous
Drugs Board, G.R. No. 157870, 3 November 2008 wherein it declared that while every officer and
employee in a private establishment is under the law deemed forewarned that he or she may be a possible
subject of a drug test, nobody is really singled out in advance for drug testing. The goal is to discourage drug
use by not telling anyone in advance when and who is to be tested.

This random drug testing is an important component in ensuring a safe working environment, as it is beyond
question that any employee under the influence of drugs cannot possibly continue doing his duties without
posing a serious threat to the lives and property of his co-workers and even his employer. The Supreme Court,
in fact, has taken judicial notice of scientific findings that drug abuse can damage the mental faculties of the
user. Employees who are into dangerous drugs pose serious problems to the health, well being and
productivity of everyone around them in the workplace.

As to the mechanics of the test, the law specifies that the procedure shall employ two testing methods, i.e., the
screening test and the confirmatory test, doubtless to ensure as much as possible the trustworthiness of the
results. Screening test is defined under RA 9165 as a rapid test performed to establish potential/presumptive
positive result while confirmatory test is defined as an analytical test using a device, tool or equipment with a
different chemical or physical principle that is more specific which will validate and confirm the result of the
screening test.
In the case of Nacague v. Sulpicio Lines, Inc., G.R. No. 172589, 9 August 2010, the Supreme Court
declared that both tests should be conducted and the employee must be informed of the results of the tests. If
only a screening test was conducted but no confirmatory test was made, the drug test cannot be given
credence. Moreover, the random drug testing should be performed only by drug testing centers which are
authorized and accredited by the Department of Health, otherwise, the results cannot be given
credence. In Automotive Engine Rebuilders, Inc. (AER) v. Progresibong Unyon ng mga Manggagawa
sa AER, G.R. Nos. 160138, 13 July 2011, the employer therein failed to show proof that the drug tests
conducted on its employees were performed by an authorized drug testing center. The employer also failed to
prove as to how the tests were conducted and whether the proper procedure was employed. Consequently, the
drug test made was not given credence by the Supreme Court.
In Plantation Bay Resort and Spa v. Dubrico, G.R. No. 182216, 4 December 2009 the Supreme Court
emphasized that it is the employer’s responsibility to ensure that drug tests are properly administered, the
results thereof being the bases in terminating the employee’s services. The employer cannot pass the blame to
the drug testing center for any irregularity that may occur in the conduct of the tests.
Notably, the charge of drug use in the workplace against an employee constitutes serious misconduct, which is
one of the just causes for termination, as declared by the Supreme Court in the case of Bughaw, Jr. v.
Treasure Island Industrial Corporation, G.R. No. 173151, 28 March 2008 and of Jose, Jr. v.
Michaelmar Phils., Inc., G.R. No. 169606, 27 November 2009. Moreover, if a worker/officer refuses to
undergo random drug testing, he may also be guilty of insubordination and may be dealt with administratively
by the company. This is the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in the case of KAKAMPI v. Kingspoint
Express and Logistic, G.R. No. 194813, 25 April 2012, wherein it declared that the unjustified refusal of
employees to comply with the directive of the employer to submit themselves to a drug test is willful
disobedience which is a just cause for termination of employment under the Labor Code.

While the employer has no intention of unduly interfering with the private affairs of an employee, the latter’s
drug abuse problem, if any, can have adverse and far reaching effects on the employer, like, reduced
productivity, customer relation mishaps and physically dangerous situations. Thus, it is in the best interest of
the employer to create and maintain a drug-free workplace. Notably, RA 9165 does not, however, oblige the
employer concerned to report to the prosecuting agencies any information or evidence relating to the violation
of RA 9165 received as a result of the operation of the drug testing.

(Louie John D. Lood is a Senior Associate at the Cebu Branch of the Angara Abello Concepcion
Regala & Cruz Law Offices (ACCRALAW). He may be reached at ldlood@accralaw.com or 830-
8000)