EXECUTIVE​ ​DEPARTMENT

CASE​ ​POOL

Bernardo​ ​(1)​ ​David​ ​v.​ ​Arroyo

Petition#1:​ ​G.R.​ ​No.​ ​171396​,​ ​May​ ​3,​ ​2006

Petitioners:​ ​David​ ​Et​ ​Al.​​ ​-​ ​Prof.​ ​Randolf​ ​S.​ ​David,​ ​Lorenzo​ ​Tañada​ ​Iii,​ ​Ronald​ ​Llamas,​ ​H.​ ​Harry​ ​L.
Roque,​ ​Jr.,​ ​Joel​ ​Ruiz​ ​Butuyan,​ ​Roger​ ​R.​ ​Rayel,​ ​Gary​ ​S.​ ​Mallari,​ ​Romel​ ​Regalado​ ​Bagares,​ ​Christopher
F.C.​ ​Bolastig,​ ​Petitioners,

Respondents​:
● Gloria​ ​Macapagal-Arroyo​ ​(PGMA)​​ ​-​ ​As​ ​President​ ​And​ ​Commander-In-Chief
● Eduardo​ ​Ermita​ ​-​ ​Executive​ ​Secretary
● Hon.​ ​Avelino​ ​Cruz​ ​Ii​ ​-​ ​Secretary​ ​Of​ ​National​ ​Defense
● General​ ​Generoso​ ​Senga​ ​-​ ​Chief​ ​Of​ ​Staff,​ ​Armed​ ​Forces​ ​Of​ ​The​ ​Philippines
● Director​ ​General​ ​Arturo​ ​Lomibao​ ​-​ ​Chief,​ ​Philippine​ ​National​ ​Police

Petition#2:​ ​G.R.​ ​No.​ ​171409​,​ ​May​ ​3,​ ​2006

Petitioner:​ ​Cacho-Olivares​ ​Et​ ​Al​ ​-​ ​Niñez​ ​Cacho-Olivares​ ​And​ ​Tribune​ ​Publishing​ ​Co.,​ ​Inc.

Respondent:
● Honorable​ ​Secretary​ ​Eduardo​ ​Ermita
● Honorable​ ​Director​ ​General​ ​Arturo​ ​C.​ ​Lomibao

Petition#3:​ ​G.R.​ ​No.​ ​171485,​​ ​May​ ​3,​ ​2006

Petitioner:​ ​Escudero​ ​Et​ ​Al​ ​-​ ​Francis​ ​Joseph​ ​G.​ ​Escudero,​ ​Joseph​ ​A.​ ​Santiago,​ ​Teodoro​ ​A.​ ​Casino,
Agapito​ ​A.​ ​Aquino,​ ​Mario​ ​J.​ ​Aguja,​ ​Satur​ ​C.​ ​Ocampo,​ ​Mujiv​ ​S.​ ​Hataman,​ ​Juan​ ​Edgardo​ ​Angara,​ ​Teofisto
Dl.​ ​Guingona​ ​Iii,​ ​Emmanuel​ ​Josel​ ​J.​ ​Villanueva,​ ​Liza​ ​L.​ ​Maza,​ ​Imee​ ​R.​ ​Marcos,​ ​Renato​ ​B.​ ​Magtubo,
Justin​ ​Marc​ ​Sb.​ ​Chipeco,​ ​Roilo​ ​Golez,​ ​Darlene​ ​Antonino-Custodio,​ ​Loretta​ ​Ann​ ​P.​ ​Rosales,​ ​Josel​ ​G.
Virador,​ ​Rafael​ ​V.​ ​Mariano,​ ​Gilbert​ ​C.​ ​Remulla,​ ​Florencio​ ​G.​ ​Noel,​ ​Ana​ ​Theresia​ ​Hontiveros-Baraquel,
Imelda​ ​C.​ ​Nicolas,​ ​Marvic​ ​M.V.F.​ ​Leonen,​ ​Neri​ ​Javier​ ​Colmenares,​ ​Movement​ ​Of​ ​Concerned​ ​Citizens​ ​For
Civil​ ​Liberties​ ​Represented​ ​By​ ​Amado​ ​Gat​ ​Inciong

Respondent:
● Eduardo​ ​R.​ ​Ermita​ ​-​ ​Executive​ ​Secretary
● Avelino​ ​J.​ ​Cruz,​ ​Jr.​ ​-​ ​Secretary,​ ​Dnd
● Ronaldo​ ​V.​ ​Puno​​ ​-​ ​Secretary,​ ​Dilg
 ● Generoso​ ​Senga​​ ​-​ ​Afp​ ​Chief​ ​Of​ ​Staff
● Arturo​ ​Lomibao​​ ​-​ ​Chief​ ​Pnp,​ ​Respondents.

Petition#4:​ ​G.R.​ ​No.​ ​171483​,​ ​May​ ​3,​ ​2006

Petitioner:​ ​KMU​ ​Et​ ​Al​ ​-​ ​Kilusang​ ​Mayo​ ​Uno,​ ​Represented​ ​By​ ​Its​ ​Chairperson​ ​Elmer​ ​C.​ ​Labog​ ​And
Secretary​ ​General​ ​Joel​ ​Maglunsod,​ ​National​ ​Federation​ ​Of​ ​Labor​ ​Unions​ ​–​ ​Kilusang​ ​Mayo​ ​Uno
(Naflu-Kmu),​ ​Represented​ ​By​ ​Its​ ​National​ ​President,​ ​Joselito​ ​V.​ ​Ustarez,​ ​Antonio​ ​C.​ ​Pascual,​ ​Salvador​ ​T.
Carranza,​ ​Emilia​ ​P.​ ​Dapulang,​ ​Martin​ ​Custodio,​ ​Jr.,​ ​And​ ​Roque​ ​M.​ ​Tan

Respondents:
● Gloria​ ​Macapagal-Arroyo​ ​-​ ​As​ ​President​ ​And​ ​Commander-In-Chief
● Eduardo​ ​Ermita​​ ​-​ ​Executive​ ​Secretary
● General​ ​Generoso​ ​Senga​​ ​-​ ​Chief​ ​Of​ ​Staff,​ ​Armed​ ​Forces​ ​Of​ ​The​ ​Philippines
● Director​ ​General​ ​Arturo​ ​Lomibao​ ​-​ ​Chief,​ ​Philippine​ ​National​ ​Police

​ ​Petition#5:​ ​G.R.​ ​No.​ ​17140​0,​ ​May​ ​3,​ ​2006

Petitioner:​ ​Alternative​ ​Law​ ​Groups,​ ​Inc.​ ​(Alg)

Respondents:
● Eduardo​ ​Ermita​ ​-​ ​Executive​ ​Secretary
● General​ ​Generoso​ ​Senga​ ​-​ ​Chief​ ​Of​ ​Staff,​ ​Armed​ ​Forces​ ​Of​ ​The​ ​Philippines
● Director​ ​General​ ​Arturo​ ​Lomibao​ ​-​ ​Chief,​ ​Philippine​ ​National​ ​Police

Petition#6:​ ​G.R.​ ​No.​ ​171489​,​ ​May​ ​3,​ ​200​6

Petitioner:​ ​Cadiz​ ​Et​ ​Al​ ​-​ ​Jose​ ​Anselmo​ ​I.​ ​Cadiz,​ ​Feliciano​ ​M.​ ​Bautista,​ ​Romulo​ ​R.​ ​Rivera,​ ​Jose​ ​Amor​ ​M.
Amorado,​ ​Alicia​ ​A.​ ​Risos-Vidal,​ ​Felimon​ ​C.​ ​Abelita​ ​Iii,​ ​Manuel​ ​P.​ ​Legaspi,​ ​J.B.​ ​Jovy​ ​C.​ ​Bernabe,​ ​Bernard
L.​ ​Dagcuta,​ ​Rogelio​ ​V.​ ​Garcia​ ​And​ ​Integrated​ ​Bar​ ​Of​ ​The​ ​Philippines​ ​(Ibp),​ ​Petitioners,

Respondents​:
● Eduardo​ ​Ermita​ ​-​ ​Executive​ ​Secretary
● Director​ ​General​ ​Arturo​ ​Lomibao​ ​-​ ​Director​ ​-​ ​General,​ ​Philippine​ ​National​ ​Police
● General​ ​Generoso​ ​Senga​​ ​-​ ​Chief​ ​Of​ ​Staff,​ ​Armed​ ​Forces​ ​Of​ ​The​ ​Philippines

Petition#7:​G.R.​ ​No.​ ​171424​,​ ​May​ ​3,​ ​2006

Petitioner​:​ ​Loren​ ​B.​ ​Legarda

Respondents:
● Gloria​ ​Macapagal-Arroyo​​ ​-​ ​As​ ​President​ ​And​ ​Commander-In-Chief
● Director​ ​General​ ​Arturo​ ​Lomibao​​ ​-​ ​Director​ ​-​ ​General,​ ​Philippine​ ​National​ ​Police
● General​ ​Generoso​ ​Senga​​ ​-​ ​Chief​ ​Of​ ​Staff,​ ​Armed​ ​Forces​ ​Of​ ​The​ ​Philippines
● Eduardo​ ​Ermita​​ ​-​ ​Executive​ ​Secretary

Facts:

PGMA​ ​Proclamations​ ​and​ ​Orders:

● PP​ ​1017​ ​-​ ​declaring​ ​a​ ​state​ ​of​ ​emergency​ ​on​ ​Feb.​ ​24,​ ​2006
○ Commanding AFP to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines and to prevent
or suppress all forms of lawlessness violence as well as any act of insurrection or
rebellion and to enforce obedience to all laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations
promulgated​ ​by​ ​PGMA
○ Whereas​ ​clauses
■ Political opposition have conspired with authoritarians of the extreme left
(NDF-CPP-NPA)​ ​and​ ​extreme​ ​Right​ ​(Military​ ​adventurist​ ​-​ ​the​ ​Historical​ ​enemies)
■ Conspirators​ ​repeatedly​ ​tried​ ​to​ ​bring​ ​down​ ​the​ ​President
■ Claims​ ​of​ ​these​ ​elements​ ​magnified​ ​by​ ​media
■ Hindering the growth of the economy and sabotaging the people’s confidence in
government​ ​and​ ​their​ ​faith​ ​in​ ​the​ ​future​ ​of​ ​this​ ​country
■ Actions​ ​are​ ​adversely​ ​affecting​ ​the​ ​economy
■ Activities give totalitarian forces of both extreme left and right the opening to
intensify​ ​their​ ​avowed​ ​aims​ ​to​ ​bring​ ​down​ ​the​ ​Government
■ Sec. 4, Art 2 of Constitution - makes the defense and preservation of the
democratic​ ​institutions​ ​and​ ​State​ ​the​ ​primary​ ​duty​ ​of​ ​Government
■ Activities, their consequences, ramnifications and collateral effects constitutes a
clear​ ​and​ ​present​ ​danger​ ​to​ ​the​ ​safety​ ​and​ ​the​ ​integrity​ ​of​ ​PH​ ​state​ ​and​ ​people

● GO​ ​5​ ​-​ ​implementing​ ​PP​ ​1017

○ PGMA do call opn AFP and PNP to prevent and suppress acts of terrorism and lawless
violence​ ​in​ ​the​ ​country
○ Whereas​ ​Clause​ ​-​ ​same​ ​with​ ​PP​ ​1017
● March​ ​3,​ ​2006​ ​-​ ​PGMA​ ​lifted​ ​PP​ ​1017​ ​and​ ​issued​ ​PP1021

● PP​ ​1021​ ​-​ ​Declaring​ ​that​ ​the​ ​state​ ​of​ ​national​ ​emergency​ ​has​ ​ceased​ ​to​ ​exist
○ Whereas​ ​Clause
■ Sec.​ ​18,​ ​Art.​ ​7​ ​and​ ​Sec​ ​17,​ ​Art​ ​12​ ​of​ ​Constition,​ ​PP​ ​1017​ ​was​ ​issued
■ GO 5 and 6 which were issued on the basis of PP 1017, AFP and PNP were
directed​ ​to​ ​such
 ■ AFP and PNP have effectively prevented, suppressed and quelled the acts
lawless​ ​violence​ ​and​ ​rebellion

Facts​ ​from​ ​the​ ​Respondents​:

● Respondents - ​stated that the proximate cause behind the executive issuances was the
conspiracy among some military officers, leftist insurgents of the New People’s Army (NPA), and
some​ ​members​ ​of​ ​the​ ​political​ ​opposition​ ​in​ ​a​ ​plot​ ​to​ ​unseat​ ​or​ ​assassinate​ ​PGMA
○ To​ ​take-over​ ​the​ ​reigns​ ​of​ ​government​ ​as​ ​a​ ​clear​ ​and​ ​present​ ​danger

● Solicitor General (OSG) - ​specified the facts leading to the issuance of PP 1017 and GO 5 and
significantly,​ ​there​ ​was​ ​no​ ​refutation​ ​from​ ​petitioner’s​ ​counsels
○ OSG argued that the intent of the Constitution is to give full discretionary powers to the
President​ ​in​ ​determining​ ​the​ ​necessity​ ​of​ ​calling​ ​out​ ​Armed​ ​forces
○ None​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Petitioners​ ​have​ ​shown​ ​that​ ​PP​ ​1017​ ​was​ ​without​ ​factual​ ​bases
○ It​ ​is​ ​not​ ​respondent’s​ ​task​ ​to​ ​state​ ​the​ ​facts​ ​behind​ ​the​ ​questioned​ ​Proclamation
○ Respondent​ ​narrated​ ​the​ ​facts:
■ January 17, 2006 - ​Members of the Magdalo Group indicted in Oakwood Mutiny,
escaped their detention cell, they vowed to remain defiant and to elucidate arrest
at all cost and called upon the poeple to show and proclaim our displeasure at
the​ ​sham​ ​regime
■ February 17, 2006 - “OPLAN HACKLE I” - ​detailed plans for bombings and
attacks during the Philippine Military Academy (PMA) Alumni Homecoming (PMA
Homecoming). THe plot was to assassinate targets including some cabinet
members and PGMA. Upon advice of the security, PGMA had not attend PMA
Homecoming.​ ​Next​ ​day,​ ​a​ ​bomb​ ​was​ ​found​ ​at​ ​PMA​ ​parade​ ​ground.
■ February 21, 2006 - ​Lt. San Juan was recaptured in Communist safehouse and
found in his possession were 2 flash disks containing the minutes of the
meetings​ ​between​ ​members​ ​of​ ​Magdalo​ ​group​ ​and​ ​NPA
■ February 23, 2006 - ​PNP Chief Lomibao inercepted information that members of
PNP-Special​ ​Action​ ​Force​ ​(SAF)​ ​were​ ​planning​ ​to​ ​deflect.
● Congressman Cojuanco and mid-level government officials plotted
moves​ ​to​ ​bring​ ​down​ ​the​ ​PGMA’s​ ​Administration
■ B/Gen Lim and Brigade Commander Querubin confided to Gen. Senga (AFP)
that a huge number of soldiers would join the rallies to provide a critical mass
and​ ​armed​ ​component​ ​to​ ​the​ ​Anti-Arroyo​ ​protests

● Respondents - ​claimed that the bombing of telecommunication towers and cell sited in Bulacan
and​ ​Bataan​ ​was​ ​also​ ​considered​ ​as​ ​additional​ ​factual​ ​basis​ ​for​ ​such​ ​proclamations​ ​and​ ​orders
○ So​ ​is​ ​the​ ​raid​ ​of​ ​an​ ​army​ ​outpost​ ​in​ ​benguet
○ Also directive of the Communist Party of PH (CPP) ordering its front organizations to join
5,000​ ​Metro​ ​Manila​ ​radicals​ ​and​ ​25,000​ ​from​ ​provinces

Facts​ ​from​ ​the​ ​Petitioners

● Petitioners​ ​cited​ ​-​ ​the​ ​events​ ​that​ ​followed​ ​after​ ​the​ ​issuance​ ​of​ ​PP​ ​1017​ ​and​ ​GO​ ​5
 ○ Office of President (OP) - announced cancellation of all programs and activities related to
the​ ​20th​ ​anniversary​ ​celebration​ ​of​ ​EDSA​ ​People​ ​Power​ ​1;
○ OP​ ​revoked​ ​the​ ​permits​ ​to​ ​hold​ ​rallies​ ​issued​ ​by​ ​Local​ ​Governments
○ OP announces that warrantless arrests and take-over of facilities, including media, can
already​ ​implemented
○ KMU et al ​marched from various parts of Metro Manila with the intention of converging at
the​ ​EDSA​ ​Shrine
○ Those​ ​already​ ​near​ ​EDSA​ ​site​ ​were​ ​violently​ ​dispersed​ ​by​ ​huge​ ​clusters​ ​of​ ​anti-riot​ ​police
○ Well trained policemen used truncheons, big fiberglass shields, water cannons and tear
gas​ ​to​ ​stop​ ​and​ ​break.
○ Petitioner​ ​David​ ​(Professor​ ​of​ ​UP​ ​and​ ​Newspaper​ ​Columnist)​ ​et​ ​al​ ​was​ ​arrested.
○ Raiding team confiscated news stories by reporters, documents, pictures, and mock-ups
of​ ​the​ ​Saturday​ ​issue.
○ Policement were stationed inside the editorial and business offices of the Newspaper and
also​ ​outside​ ​the​ ​building​ ​Search​ ​and​ ​Seizure​ ​at​ ​the​ ​Daily​ ​Tribune​ ​Offices​ ​and​ ​Malaya
○ National Communications Commissioner Solis (Solis) urged television and radio
networks to cooperate with the government for the duration of the state of national
emergency
○ Solis asks for balancing reporting from broadcasters when covering the events
surrounding​ ​the​ ​coup​ ​attempt​ ​foiled​ ​by​ ​the​ ​government
○ Cong. Beltran (Anak Pawis Party and Chair of KMU) was arrested while leaving his farm
house​ ​and​ ​was​ ​shown​ ​his​ ​warrant​ ​of​ ​arrest​ ​since​ ​1985.
○ Two​ ​Members​ ​of​ ​KMU,​ ​went​ ​to​ ​see​ ​Beltran,​ ​were​ ​arrested​ ​and​ ​detained.
○ Bayan​ ​Muna​ ​Representative​ ​Ocampo​ ​was​ ​arrested​ ​during​ ​a​ ​public​ ​forum
○ Retired​ ​Major​ ​Gen.​ ​Montano​ ​was​ ​arrested​ ​while​ ​his​ ​wife​ ​and​ ​golfmates
○ Attempts​ ​were​ ​made​ ​to​ ​Arrest​ ​representative​ ​of​ ​a​ ​partylist​ ​for​ ​HOR
○ Bayan​ ​Muna​ ​Representative​ ​Virador​ ​was​ ​arrested​ ​at​ ​the​ ​PAL​ ​ticket​ ​office

7​ ​Petitions​ ​before​ ​the​ ​Supreme​ ​Court

● 7 consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition - ​allege that PGMA issuing PP 1017
and​ ​GO​ ​5​ ​committed​ ​grave​ ​abuse​ ​of​ ​discretion
○ Petitioners contend that respondents, in their professed efforts to defend and preserve
democratic institutions, are actually trampling upon very freedom guaranteed and
protected​ ​by​ ​the​ ​Constitution
○ Hence​ ​Void​ ​for​ ​being​ ​unconstitutional
● David​ ​Et​ ​al​ ​-​ ​assailed​ ​PP​ ​1017
○ It​ ​encroaches​ ​on​ ​the​ ​emergency​ ​powers​ ​of​ ​Congress
○ It​ ​is​ ​a​ ​subterfuge​ ​to​ ​avoid​ ​the​ ​constitutional​ ​requirements​ ​for​ ​the​ ​imposition​ ​of​ ​Martial​ ​Law
○ It violates the Constitutional Guarantees of freedom of the Pres. of speech and of
assemby
● Cacho-Olivares and Tribune Publishing Co., Inc. - ​challenged CIDG’s act of raiding Daily
Tribune​ ​as​ ​a​ ​clear​ ​Censorship​ ​or​ ​prior​ ​restraint
○ The​ ​Term
Mañalac​(2)​ ​Marcos​ ​v.​ ​Manglapus
[G.R.​ ​No.​ ​88211.​ ​September​ ​15,​ ​1989.]
FERDINAND E. MARCOS, IMELDA R. MARCOS,
FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR., IRENE M. ARANETA, IMEE
M. MANOTOC, TOMAS MANOTOC, GREGORIO ARANETA,
PACIFICO E. MARCOS, NICANOR YÑIGUEZ and
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA),
represented by its President, CONRADO F. ESTRELLA,
petitioners​, ​vs. HONORABLE RAUL MANGLAPUS,
CATALINO MACARAIG, SEDFREY ORDOÑEZ, MIRIAM
DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, FIDEL RAMOS, RENATO DE
VILLA, in their capacity as Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
Executive Secretary, Secretary of Justice, Immigration
Commissioner, Secretary of National Defense and Chief of
Staff,​ ​respectively,​​ ​respondents​.

DOCTRINE:
Although​ ​the​ ​1987​ ​Constitution​​ ​imposes​ ​limitations​ ​on​ ​the​ ​exercise​ ​of​ ​specific​ ​powers​ ​of
the​ ​President,​ ​it​ ​maintains​ ​intact​ ​what​ ​is​ ​traditionally​ ​considered​ ​as​ ​within​ ​the​ ​scope​ ​of
"executive​ ​power."​ ​Corollarily,​ ​the​ ​powers​ ​of​ ​the​ ​President​ ​cannot​ ​be​ ​said​ ​to​ ​be​ ​limited
only​ ​to​ ​the​ ​specific​ ​powers​ ​enumerated​ ​in​ ​the​ ​Constitution​.​ ​In​ ​other​ ​words,​ ​executive
power​ ​is​ ​more​ ​than​ ​the​ ​sum​ ​of​ ​specific​ ​powers​ ​so​ ​enumerated.

BACKGROUND​ ​OF​ ​THE​ ​CASE:

February​ ​1986,​ ​Ferdinand​ ​E.​ ​Marcos​ ​was​ ​deposed​ ​from​ ​the​ ​presidency​ ​via​ ​the
non-violent​ ​"people​ ​power"​ ​revolution​ ​and​ ​forced​ ​into​ ​exile.​ ​In​ ​his​ ​stead,​ ​Corazon​ ​C.
Aquino​ ​was​ ​declared​ ​President​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Republic​ ​under​ ​a​ ​revolutionary​ ​government.

​ ​Mr.​ ​Marcos,​ ​in​ ​his​ ​deathbed,​ ​has​ ​signified​ ​his​ ​wish​ ​to​ ​return​ ​to​ ​the​ ​Philippines​ ​to
die.​ ​But​ ​Mrs.​ ​Aquino,​ ​considering​ ​the​ ​dire​ ​consequences​ ​to​ ​the​ ​nation​ ​of​ ​his
return​ ​at​ ​a​ ​time​ ​when​ ​the​ ​stability​ ​of​ ​government​ ​is​ ​threatened​ ​from​ ​various
directions,​ ​has​ ​stood​ ​firmly​ ​on​ ​the​ ​decision​ ​to​ ​bar​ ​the​ ​return​ ​of​ ​Mr.​ ​Marcos​ ​and​ ​his
family.

FACTS:
A​ ​petition​ ​for​ ​mandamus​ ​and​ ​prohibition​ ​asks​ ​the​ ​Court​ ​to​ ​order​ ​the​ ​respondents​ ​to​ ​issue
travel​ ​documents​ ​to​ ​Mr.​ ​Marcos​ ​and​ ​the​ ​immediate​ ​members​ ​of​ ​his​ ​family​ ​and​ ​to​ ​enjoin
the​ ​implementation​ ​of​ ​the​ ​President's​ ​decision​ ​to​ ​bar​ ​their​ ​return​ ​to​ ​the​ ​Philippines
The case for petitioners is founded on the assertion that the right of the Marcoses to return
to​ ​the​ ​Philippines​ ​is​ ​guaranteed​ ​under​ ​the​ ​following​ ​provisions​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Bill​ ​of​ ​Rights,​ ​to​ ​wit:

Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or

property without due process of law, nor shall any person be
denied​ ​the​ ​equal​ ​protection​ ​of​ ​the​ ​laws.

xxx​ ​xxx​ ​xxx

Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same

within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired
except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right
to travel be impaired except in the interest of national
security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided
by​ ​law.

The petitioners contend that the President is without power to impair the liberty of abode
of the Marcoses because only a court may do so "within the limits prescribed by law." Nor
may the President impair their right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so.
They advance the view that before the right to travel may be impaired by any authority or
agency​ ​of​ ​the​ ​government,​ ​there​ ​must​ ​be​ ​legislation​ ​to​ ​that​ ​effect.​​ ​llcd

The petitioners further assert that under international law, the right of Mr. Marcos and his
family​ ​to​ ​return​ ​to​ ​the​ ​Philippines​ ​is​ ​guaranteed.

The​ ​Universal​ ​Declaration​ ​of​ ​Human​ ​Rights​ ​provides:

Article 13. (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of

movement​ ​and​ ​residence​ ​within​ ​the​ ​borders​ ​of​ ​each​ ​state.

(2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his
own,​ ​and​ ​to​ ​return​ ​to​ ​his​ ​country.

Likewise, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which had been ratified
by​ ​the​ ​Philippines,​ ​provides:

Article​ ​12
1) Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall,
within that territory, have the right to liberty of movement
and​ ​freedom​ ​to​ ​choose​ ​his​ ​residence.

2) Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his

own.

3) The above-mentioned rights shall not be subject to any

restrictions except those which are provided by law, are
necessary to protect national security, public order (order
public), public health or morals or the rights and freedoms
 of others, and are consistent with the other rights
recognized​ ​in​ ​the​ ​present​ ​Covenant.

4) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter

his​ ​own​ ​country.

The​ ​petitioners​ ​finally​ ​contend​ ​that​ ​the​ ​President​ ​is​ ​without​ ​power​ ​to​ ​impair​ ​the
liberty​ ​of​ ​abode​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Marcoses​ ​because​ ​only​ ​a​ ​court​ ​may​ ​do​ ​so​ ​"within​ ​the​ ​limits
prescribed​ ​by​ ​law."​ ​Nor​ ​may​ ​the​ ​President​ ​impair​ ​their​ ​right​ ​to​ ​travel​ ​because​ ​no​ ​law
has​ ​authorized​ ​her​ ​to​ ​do​ ​so.​ ​They​ ​advance​ ​the​ ​view​ ​that​ ​before​ ​the​ ​right​ ​to​ ​travel
may​ ​be​ ​impaired​ ​by​ ​any​ ​authority​ ​or​ ​agency​ ​of​ ​the​ ​government,​ ​there​ ​must​ ​be
legislation​ ​to​ ​that​ ​effect.

Respondents​ ​on​ ​the​ ​other​ ​hand​ ​argue​ ​for​ ​the​ ​primacy​ ​of​ ​the​ ​right​ ​of​ ​the​ ​State​ ​to
national​ ​security​ ​over​ ​individual​ ​rights.​ ​In​ ​support​ ​thereof,​ ​they​ ​cite​ ​Article​ ​II​ ​of​ ​the
Constitution,​ ​to​ ​wit:

Section​ ​4.
The​ ​prime​ ​duty​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Government​ ​is​ ​to​ ​serve​ ​and​ ​protect​ ​the​ ​people.​ ​The
Government​ ​may​ ​call​ ​upon​ ​the​ ​people​ ​to​ ​defend​ ​the​ ​State​ ​and,​ ​in​ ​the​ ​fulfillment
thereof,​ ​all​ ​citizens​ ​may​ ​be​ ​required,​ ​under​ ​conditions​ ​provided​ ​by​ ​law,​ ​to​ ​render
personal,​ ​military,​ ​or​ ​civil​ ​service.
Section​ ​5.
The​ ​maintenance​ ​of​ ​peace​ ​and​ ​order,​ ​the​ ​protection​ ​of​ ​life,​ ​liberty,​ ​and​ ​property,​ ​and
the​ ​promotion​ ​of​ ​the​ ​general​ ​welfare​ ​are​ ​essential​ ​for​ ​the​ ​enjoyment​ ​by​ ​all​ ​the
people​ ​of​ ​the​ ​blessings​ ​of​ ​democracy.
Respondents​ ​also​ ​point​ ​out​ ​that​ ​the​ ​decision​ ​to​ ​ban​ ​Mr.​ ​Marcos​ ​and​ ​family​ ​from
returning​ ​to​ ​the​ ​Philippines​ ​for​ ​reasons​ ​of​ ​national​ ​security​ ​and​ ​public​ ​safety​ ​has
international​ ​precedents.​ ​Other​ ​dictators​ ​such​ ​as​ ​Rafael​ ​Trujillo​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Dominican
Republic,​ ​Anastacio​ ​Somoza​ ​Jr.​ ​of​ ​Nicaragua,​ ​Jorge​ ​Ubico​ ​of​ ​Guatemala,​ ​etc.
Finally,​ ​the​ ​respondents​ ​believe​ ​that​ ​the​ ​right​ ​to​ ​return​ ​to​ ​one's​ ​country​ ​is​ ​not
among​ ​the​ ​rights​ ​specifically​ ​guaranteed​ ​in​ ​the​ ​Bill​ ​of​ ​Rights,​ ​which​ ​treats​ ​only​ ​of
the​ ​liberty​ ​of​ ​abode​ ​and​ ​the​ ​right​ ​to​ ​travel,​ ​but​ ​it​ ​is​ ​our​ ​well-considered​ ​view​ ​that​ ​the
right​ ​to​ ​return​ ​may​ ​be​ ​considered,​ ​as​ ​a​ ​generally​ ​accepted​ ​principle​ ​of​ ​international
law​ ​and,​ ​under​ ​our​ ​Constitution,​ ​is​ ​part​ ​of​ ​the​ ​law​ ​of​ ​the​ ​land​ ​[Art.​ ​II,​ ​Sec.​ ​2​ ​of​ ​the
Constitution.]​ ​However,​ ​it​ ​is​ ​distinct​ ​and​ ​separate​ ​from​ ​the​ ​right​ ​to​ ​travel​ ​and​ ​enjoys
a​ ​different​ ​protection​ ​under​ ​the​ ​International
ISSUE:​ ​whether​ ​or​ ​not,​ ​in​ ​the​ ​exercise​ ​of​ ​the​ ​powers​ ​granted​ ​by​ t​ he​ ​Constitution​,​ ​the
President​ ​may​ ​prohibit​ ​the​ ​Marcoses​ ​from​ ​returning​ ​to​ ​the​ ​Philippines.

HELD:
​ ot​ ​the​ ​right​ ​to​ ​travel​ ​from
Yes.​ ​It​ ​must​ ​be​ ​emphasized​ ​that​ ​the​ ​individual​ ​right​ ​involved​ ​is​ n
the​ ​Philippines​ ​to​ ​other​ ​countries​ ​or​ ​within​ ​the​ ​Philippines.​ ​These​ ​are​ ​what​ ​the​ ​right​ ​to
travel​ ​would​ ​normally​ ​connote.​ ​Essentially,​ ​the​ ​right​ ​involved​ ​is​ ​the​ ​right​ ​to​ ​return​ ​to​ ​one's
country,​ ​a​ ​totally​ ​distinct​ ​right​ ​under​ ​international​ ​law,​ ​independent​ ​from​ ​although
related​ ​to​ ​the​ ​right​ ​to​ ​travel
The right to return to one's country is not among the rights specifically guaranteed in the
Bill of Rights, which treats only of the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is our
well-considered view that the right to return may be considered, as a generally accepted
principle of international law and, under our Constitution,is part of the law of the land
[Art. II, Sec. 2 of ​the Constitution​.] However, it is distinct and separate from the right to
travel and enjoys a different protection under the International Covenant of Civil and
Political​ ​Rights,​ ​i.e.​,​ ​against​ ​being​ ​"arbitrarily​ ​deprived"​ ​thereof​ ​[Art.​ ​12​ ​(4).]

The ​1987 Constitution has fully restored the separation of powers of the three great
branches of government​. As stated above, ​the Constitution provides that "[t]​he executive
power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines." [​Art. VII, Sec. 1]. However​, it
does not define what is meant by "executive power" although in the same article it touches
on the exercise of certain powers by the President, i.e., the power of control over all
executive departments, bureaus and offices, the power to execute the laws, the appointing
power, the powers under the commander-in-chief clause, the power to grant reprieves,
commutations and pardons, the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of Congress,
the power to contract or guarantee foreign loans, the power to enter into treaties or
international agreements, the power to submit the budget to Congress, and the power to
address​ ​Congress​ ​[Art.​ ​VII,​ ​Secs.​ ​14-23].​​ ​LLphil

inevitable​ ​question​ ​then​ ​arises:​ ​by​ ​enumerating​ ​certain​ ​powers​ ​of​ ​the​ ​President​ ​did​ ​the
framers​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Constitution​​ ​intend​ ​that​ ​the​ ​President​ ​shall​ ​exercise​ ​those​ ​specific​ ​powers
and​ ​no​ ​other?​ ​Are​ ​these​ ​enumerated​ ​powers​ ​the​ ​breadth​ ​and​ ​scope​ ​of​ ​"executive​ ​power"?
Petitioners​ ​advance​ ​the​ ​view​ ​that​ ​the​ ​President's​ ​powers​ ​are​ ​limited​ ​to​ ​those​ ​specifically
enumerated​ ​in​ ​the​ ​1987​ ​Constitution​.​ ​Thus,​ ​they​ ​assert:​ ​"The​ ​President​ ​has​ ​enumerated
powers,​ ​and​ ​what​ ​is​ ​not​ ​enumerated​ ​is​ ​impliedly​ ​denied​ ​to​ ​her.​ ​Inclusio​ ​unius​ ​est​ ​exclusio
alterius​."
. The ​1987 Constitution​, however, brought back the presidential system of government and
restored the separation of legislative, executive and judicial powers by their actual
distribution among three distinct branches of government with provision for checks and
balances.​​ ​LexLib
It would not be accurate, however, to state that "executive power" is the ​power to enforce
the laws, for the President is head of state as well as ​head of government and whatever
powers inhere in such positions pertain to the office unless ​the Constitution itself
withholds it. Furthermore, ​the Constitution itself provides that the execution of the laws is
only one of the powers of the President​. It also grants the President other powers that do
not involve the execution of any provision of law, ​e.g.​, his power over the country's foreign
relations.

On these premises, we hold the view that although the ​1987 Constitution imposes
limitations on the exercise of​specific powers of the President, it maintains intact what is
traditionally considered as within the scope of "executive power." Corollarily, the powers
of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in ​the
Constitution​. In other words, executive power is more than the sum of specific powers so
enumerated.

The Constitution declares among the guiding principles that "[t]he prime duty of the
Government is to serve and protect the people" and that "[t]he maintenance of peace and
order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and the promotion of the general
welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy."
[Art.​ ​II,​​ ​Secs.​ ​4​ ​and​ ​5.]

.​ ​The​ ​power​ ​involved​ ​is​ ​the​ ​President's​ ​residual​ ​power​ ​to​ ​protect​ ​the​ ​general​ ​welfare​ ​of​ ​the
people.​ ​It​ ​is​ ​founded​ ​on​ ​the​ ​duty​ ​of​ ​the​ ​President,​ ​as​ ​steward​ ​of​ ​the​ ​people.​ ​To​ ​paraphrase
Theodore​ ​Roosevelt,​ ​it​ ​is​ ​not​ ​only​ ​the​ ​power​ ​of​ ​the​ ​President​ ​but​ ​also​ ​his​ ​duty​ ​to​ ​do
anything​ ​not​ ​forbidden​ ​by​ ​the​ ​Constitution​​ ​or​ ​the​ ​laws​ ​that​ ​the​ ​needs​ ​of​ ​the​ ​nation​ ​demand
[​See​ ​Corwin,​ ​supra​,​ ​at​ ​153].​ ​It​ ​is​ ​a​ ​power​ ​borne​ ​by​ ​the​ ​President's​ ​duty​ ​to​ ​preserve​ ​and
defend​ ​the​ ​Constitution​.​ ​It​ ​also​ ​may​ ​be​ ​viewed​ ​as​ ​a​ ​power​ ​implicit​ ​in​ ​the​ ​President's​ ​duty​ ​to
take​ ​care​ ​that​ ​the​ ​laws​ ​are​ ​faithfully​ ​executed
The power of the President to keep the peace is not limited merely to exercising the
commander-in-chief powers in times of emergency or to leading the State against external
and internal threats to its existence. The President is not only clothed with extraordinary
powers in times of emergency, but is also tasked with attending to the day-to-day problems
of maintaining peace and order and ensuring domestic tranquillity in times when no
foreign foe appears on the horizon. Wide discretion, within the bounds of law, in fulfilling
presidential duties in times of peace is not in any way diminished by the relative want of an
emergency specified in the commander-in-chief provision. For in making the President
commander-in-chief the enumeration of powers that follow cannot be said to exclude the
President's exercising as Commander-in-Chief powers short of the calling of the armed
forces, or suspending the privilege of the writ of ​habeas corpus or declaring martial law, in
order​ ​to​ ​keep​ ​the​ ​peace,​ ​and​ ​maintain​ ​public​ ​order​ ​and​ ​security.

That the ​President has the power under ​the Constitution to bar the Marcoses from
returning has been recognized by members of the Legislature, and is manifested by the
Resolution proposed in the House of Representatives and signed by 103 of its members
urging the President to allow Mr. Marcos to return to the Philippines "as a genuine
unselfish gesture for true national reconciliation and as irrevocable proof of our collective
adherence to uncompromising respect for human rights under the ​Constitution and our
laws." [House Resolution No. 1342, Rollo, p. 321.] The Resolution does not question the
President's power to bar the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines, rather, it appea​ls
to​ ​the​ ​President's​ ​sense​ ​of​ ​compassion​ ​to​ ​allow​ ​a​ ​man​ ​to​ ​come​ ​home​ ​to​ ​die​ ​in​ ​his​ ​country.

What we are saying in effect is that the request or demand of the Marcoses to be allowed to
return to the Philippines cannot be considered in the light solely of the constitutional
provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode and the right to travel, subject to certain
exceptions, or of case law which clearly never contemplated situations even remotely
similar to the present one. It must be treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed to
those residual unstated powers of the President which are implicit in and correlative to the
paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard and protect general welfare. In that
context, such request or demand should submit to the exercise of a broader discretion on
the​ ​part​ ​of​ ​the​ ​President​ ​to​ ​determine​ ​whether​ ​it​ ​must​ ​be​ ​granted​ ​or​ ​denied.​​ ​Llcd

Note:

The​ ​President​ ​is​ ​granted​ ​residual​ ​powers​ ​because​ ​there​ ​has​ ​been​ ​no​ ​clearly​ ​defined
limitation​ ​on​ ​his​ ​authority.​ ​Also,​ ​as​ ​the​ ​President,​ ​she​ ​has​ ​the​ ​duty​ ​to​ ​do​ ​everything​ ​within
her​ ​power,​ ​granted​ ​by​ ​the​ ​law,​ ​to​ ​protect​ ​the​ ​people.​ ​Within​ ​the​ ​context​ ​of​ ​an​ ​impending
threat​ ​to​ ​national​ ​security​ ​and​ ​Philippines’​ ​vulnerable​ ​economic​ ​situation,​ ​it​ ​is​ ​to​ ​the
President’s​ ​power​ ​to​ ​prevent​ ​anything​ ​that​ ​will​ ​harm​ ​the​ ​country,​ ​especially​ ​the​ ​return​ ​of
the​ ​Marcoses.

Uy​​ ​(3)​ ​Lansang​ ​v.​ ​Garcia

G.R.​ ​No.​ ​L-33964​ ​December​ ​11,​ ​1971
IN​ ​THE​ ​MATTER​ ​OF​ ​THE​ ​PETITION​ ​FOR​ ​HABEAS​ ​CORPUS​ ​OF​ ​TEODOSIO​ ​LANSANG​ ​RODOLFO
DEL​ ​ROSARIO,​ ​and​ ​BAYANI​ ​ALCALA vs. BRIGADIER-GENERAL​ ​EDUARDO​ ​M.
GARCIA,​ ​Chief,​ ​Philippine​ ​Constabulary
DOCTRINE
In case of invasion, insurrection or rebellion or imminent danger thereof, the President has, under
the Constitution, three (3) courses of action open to him, namely: (a) to call out the armed forces; (b) to
suspend the privilege of the writ of ​habeas corpus​; and (c) to place the Philippines or any part thereof
under​ ​martial​ ​law.
 Two conditions must concur for the valid exercise of the authority to suspend the privilege to the
writ, to wit: (A.) ​There must be "invasion, insurrection, or rebellion" or — pursuant to Par. 2, Section 10 of
Art. VII of the Constitution — "imminent danger thereof," and (B.) ​"Public safety" must require the
suspension​ ​of​ ​the​ ​privilege.

FACTS
In the evening of August 21, 1971, at about 9 p.m., while the Liberal Party of the Philippines was
holding a public meeting at Plaza Miranda, Manila, for the presentation of its candidates in the general
elections scheduled for November 8, 1971, two hand grenades were thrown at the platform where said
candidates​ ​and​ ​other​ ​persons​ ​were.​ ​Eight​ ​persons​ ​were​ ​killed​ ​and​ ​many​ ​more​ ​injured.
Two days thereafter, Proc. 889 was issued by the President suspending privilege of writ of
habeas corpus stating that "lawless elements" had "entered into a conspiracy and have in fact joined and
banded their forces together for the avowed purpose of actually staging, undertaking and waging an
armed insurrection and rebellion". Petitions for writ of habeas corpus were filed by persons (13) who have
been​ ​arrested​ ​without​ ​a​ ​warrant.
Proc. 889-A was issued as an amendment to the original proclamation by postulating the said
lawless elements "​have entered into a conspiracy and have in fact joined and banded their forces
together for the avowed purpose of staging, undertaking, waging and are actually engaged in an armed
insurrection and rebellion in order to forcibly seize political power in this country, overthrow the duly
constituted government, and supplant our existing political, social, economic and legal order with an
entirely new one ....​" Moreover, the third ‘whereas clause’ in the original proclamation was, likewise,
amended by alleging therein that said lawless elements, "by their acts of rebellion and insurrection," have
created​ ​a​ ​state​ ​of​ ​lawlessness​ ​and​ ​disorder​ ​affecting​ ​public​ ​safety​ ​and​ ​the​ ​security​ ​of​ ​the​ ​State.
In other words, apart from adverting to the existence of actual conspiracy and of the intent to rise in arms
to overthrow the government, Proclamation No. 889-A asserts that the lawless elements "are actually
engaged​ ​in​ ​an​ ​armed​ ​insurrection​ ​and​ ​rebellion"​ ​to​ ​accomplish​ ​their​ ​purpose.
Proc. 889-B was also issued lifting the suspension of privilege in 27 provinces, 3 sub-provinces
and 26 cities. Proc. 889-C was issued restoring the suspension in 13 provinces and cities (mostly in
Mindanao). Proc. 889-D further lifted the suspension in 7 provinces and 4 cities. Only 18 provinces and
sub-provinces and 2 cities whose privilege was suspended. Petitioners maintained that Proclamation No.
889 did not declare the existence of actual "invasion insurrection or rebellion or imminent danger thereof,
however​ ​it​ ​became​ ​moot​ ​and​ ​academic​ ​since​ ​it​ ​was​ ​amended.
Petitioners however contend that public safety did not require the issuance of proclamations
stating: (a) that there is no rebellion; (b) that, prior to and at the time of the suspension of the privilege, the
Government was functioning normally, as were the courts; (c) that no untoward incident, confirmatory of
an alleged July-August Plan, has actually taken place after August 21, 1971; (d) that the President's
alleged apprehension, because of said plan, is non-existent and unjustified; and (e) that the Communist
forces in the Philippines are too small and weak to jeopardize public safety to such extent as to require
the​ ​suspension​ ​of​ ​the​ ​privilege​ ​of​ ​the​ ​writ​ ​of​ ​habeas​ ​corpus.

ISSUE
(1.)​​ ​ ​ ​Does​ ​the​ ​authority​ ​to​ ​decide​ ​whether​ ​the​ ​exigency​ ​has​ ​arisen​ ​requiring​ ​suspension​ ​of​ ​the​ ​privilege​ ​of
the​ ​writ​ ​of​ ​habeas​ ​corpus​ ​belong​ ​to​ ​the​ ​President,​ ​and​ ​is​ ​his​ ​decision​ ​final​ ​and​ ​conclusive​ ​upon​ ​the​ ​courts
and​ ​upon​ ​all​ ​other​ ​persons,​ ​pursuant​ ​to​ ​the​ ​view​ ​taken​ ​in​ ​Barcelon​ ​v.​ ​Baker,​ ​and​ ​reiterated​ ​in​ ​Montenegro
v.​ ​Castañeda
(2.)​​ ​ ​ ​Whether​ ​or​ ​not​ ​Proc.​ ​889​ ​is​ ​substantively​ ​valid

HELD
​ ​(1.) ​Article​ ​VII​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Constitution​ ​vests​ ​in​ ​the​ ​Executive​ ​the​ ​power​ ​to​ ​suspend​ ​the​ ​privilege​ ​of​ ​the​ ​writ
of​ ​habeas​ ​corpus​ ​under​ ​specified​ ​conditions.​ ​Pursuant​ ​to​ ​the​ ​principle​ ​of​ ​separation​ ​of​ ​powers​ ​underlying
our​ ​system​ ​of​ ​government,​ ​the​ ​Executive​ ​is​ ​supreme​ ​within​ ​his​ ​own​ ​sphere.​ ​However,​ ​the​ ​separation​ ​of
powers,​ ​under​ ​the​ ​Constitution,​ ​is​ ​not​ ​absolute.​ ​What​ ​is​ ​more,​ ​it​ ​goes​ ​hand​ ​in​ ​hand​ ​with​ ​the​ ​system​ ​of
checks​ ​and​ ​balances,​ ​under​ ​which​ ​the​ ​Executive​ ​is​ ​supreme​,​ ​as​ ​regards​ ​the​ ​suspension​ ​of​ ​the​ ​privilege,
but​ ​only​ ​if​ ​and​ ​when​ ​he​ ​acts​ ​within​ ​the​ ​sphere​ ​allotted​ ​to​ ​him​ ​by​ ​the​ ​Basic​ ​Law,​ ​and​ ​the​ ​authority​ ​to
determine​ ​whether​ ​or​ ​not​ ​he​ ​has​ ​so​ ​acted​ ​is​ ​vested​ ​in​ ​the​ ​Judicial​ ​Department,​ ​which,​ ​in​ ​this​ ​respect,​ ​is,
in​ ​turn,​ ​constitutionally​ ​supreme.
The President has authority to suspend the privilege of writ of habeas corpus, subject to judicial
review. ​The Court has the authority to inquire into the existence of said factual bases in order to
determine the constitutional sufficiency thereof. Indeed, the grant of power to suspend the privilege is
neither absolute nor unqualified. The authority conferred by the Constitution, both under the Bill of Rights
and under the Executive Department, is limited and conditional. The precept in the Bill of Rights
establishes​ ​a​ ​general​ ​rule,​ ​as​ ​well​ ​as​ ​an​ ​exception​ ​thereto.
It is only by way of exception that it permits the suspension of the privilege "in cases of invasion,
insurrection, or rebellion" — or, under Art VII of the Constitution, "imminent danger thereof" — "when the
public safety requires it, in any of which events the same may be suspended wherever during such period
the​ ​necessity​ ​for​ ​such​ ​suspension​ ​shall​ ​exist."
For from being full and plenary, the authority to suspend the privilege of the writ is thus
circumscribed, confined and restricted, not only by the prescribed setting or the conditions essential to its
existence, but, also, as regards the time when and the place where it may be exercised. These factors
and the aforementioned setting or conditions mark, establish and define the extent, the confines and the
limits of said power, beyond which it does not exist. And, like the limitations and restrictions imposed by
the Fundamental Law upon the legislative department, adherence thereto and compliance therewith may,
within proper bounds, be inquired into by courts of justice. Otherwise, the explicit constitutional provisions
thereon would be meaningless. Surely, the framers of our Constitution could not have intended to engage
in​ ​such​ ​a​ ​wasteful​ ​exercise​ ​in​ ​futility.

​ ​NOTE:​ ​Barcel​ ​vs.​ ​Baker​ ​ruling​ ​has​ ​been​ ​abandoned.

The​ ​weight​ ​of​ ​Barcelon​ ​v.​ ​Baker,​ ​as​ ​a​ ​precedent,​ ​is​ ​diluted​ ​by​ ​two​ ​(2)​ ​factors:
(1.) It relied heavily upon Martin v. Mott involving the U.S. President's power to call out the militia​,
which — he being the commander-in-chief of all the armed forces — may be exercised to
suppress or prevent any lawless violence, even without invasion, insurrection or rebellion, or
imminent danger thereof, and is, accordingly, much broader than his authority to suspend
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, jeopardizing as the latter does individual liberty;
and
(2.) The ​privilege had been suspended by the American Governor-General, whose act, as
representative of the Sovereign, affecting the freedom of its subjects, can hardly be equated
 with that of the President of the Philippines dealing with the freedom of the Filipino people, in
whom​ ​sovereignty​ ​resides,​ ​and​ ​from​ ​whom​ ​all​ ​government​ ​authority​ ​emanates.
● The​ ​pertinent​ ​ruling​ ​in​ ​the​ ​Montenegro​ ​case​ ​was​ ​based​ ​mainly​ ​upon​ ​the​ ​Barcelon​ ​case,​ ​and
hence,​ ​cannot​ ​have​ ​more​ ​weight​ ​than​ ​the​ ​same.
● ​ ​Moreover,​ ​in​ ​the​ ​Barcelon​ ​case,​ ​the​ ​Court​ ​held​ ​that​ ​it​ ​could​ ​determine​ ​whether​ ​or​ ​not​ ​the​ ​Chief

Executive​ ​had​ ​acted​ ​in​ ​accordance​ ​with​ ​law.

● In​ ​the​ ​Montenegro​ ​case,​ ​the​ ​Court​ ​held​ ​that​ ​petitioner​ ​therein​ ​had​ ​"failed​ ​to​ ​overcome​ ​the
presumption​ ​of​ ​correctness​ ​which​ ​the​ ​judiciary​ ​accords​ ​to​ ​acts​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Executive​ ​...."​ ​In​ ​short,​ ​the
Court​ ​considered​ ​the​ ​question​ ​whether​ ​or​ ​not​ ​there​ ​really​ ​was​ ​are​ ​rebellion,​ ​as​ ​stated​ ​in​ ​the
proclamation​ ​therein​ ​contested.

(2.)
Yes. Pursuant to the above-quoted provisions of the Constitution, two conditions must concur for
the​ ​valid​ ​exercise​ ​of​ ​the​ ​authority​ ​to​ ​suspend​ ​the​ ​privilege​ ​to​ ​the​ ​writ,​ ​to​ ​wit:
(A.) ​There must be "invasion, insurrection, or rebellion" or — pursuant to Par. 2, Section 10 of Art. VII of
the​ ​Constitution​ ​—​ ​"imminent​ ​danger​ ​thereof,"​ ​and
(B.)​​ ​ ​"Public​ ​safety"​ ​must​ ​require​ ​the​ ​suspension​ ​of​ ​the​ ​privilege.
The Presidential Proclamation under consideration declares that there has been and there is
actually a state of rebellion and that "public safety requires that immediate and effective action be taken in
order to maintain peace and order, secure the safety of the people and preserve the authority of the
State."
As regards the first condition, our jurisprudence attests abundantly to the Communist activities in
the Philippines, especially in Manila, from the late twenties to the early thirties, then aimed principally at
incitement​ ​to​ ​sedition​ ​or​ ​rebellion,​ ​as​ ​the​ ​immediate​ ​objective.
As per said information and reports — ​the CPP has managed to infiltrate or establish and control
nine (9) major labor organizations; that it has exploited the youth movement and succeeded in making
Communist fronts of eleven (11) major student or youth organizations; that there are, accordingly, about
thirty (30) mass organizations actively advancing the CPP interests, among which are the Malayang
Samahan ng Magsasaka (MASAKA), the Kabataang Makabayan (KM), the Movement for the
Advancement of Nationalism (MAN), the Samahang Demokratiko ng Kabataan (SDK), the Samahang
Molave (SM) and the Malayang Pagkakaisa ng Kabataang Pilipino(MPKP); that, as of August, 1971, the
KM had two hundred forty-five (245) operational chapters throughout the Philippines, of which
seventy-three (73) were in the Greater Manila Area, sixty (60) in Northern Luzon, forty-nine (49) in Central
Luzon, forty-two (42) in the Visayas and twenty-one (21) in Mindanao and Sulu; that in 1970, the Party
had recorded two hundred fifty-eight (258) major demonstrations, of which about thirty-three (33) ended in
violence, resulting in fifteen (15) killed and over five hundred (500) injured; that most of these actions
were organized, coordinated or led by the aforementioned front organizations; that the violent
demonstrations were generally instigated by a small, but well-trained group of armed agitators; that the
number of demonstrations heretofore staged in 1971 has already exceeded those of 1970; and that
twenty-four (24) of these demonstrations were violent, and resulted in the death of fifteen (15) persons
and the injury of many more. ​(Please see full text for more information as to the casualties/event caused
by​ ​CPP)
 The Court is not prepared to hold that the Executive had acted arbitrarily or gravely abused his
discretion when he then concluded that public safety and national security required the suspension of the
privilege of the writ, particularly if the NPA were to strike simultaneously with violent demonstrations
staged by the two hundred forty-five (245) KM chapters, all over the Philippines, with the assistance and
cooperation of the dozens of CPP front organizations, and the bombing or water mains and conduits, as
well as electric power plants and installations — a possibility which, no matter how remote, he was bound
to​ ​forestall,​ ​and​ ​a​ ​danger​ ​he​ ​was​ ​under​ ​obligation​ ​to​ ​anticipate​ ​and​ ​arrest.
Lingahan​​ ​(4)​ ​Qua​ ​Chee​ ​Gan​ ​v.​ ​Deportation​ ​Board,​ ​9​ ​SCRA​ ​27

G.R.​ ​No.​ ​L-10280​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​September​ ​30,​ ​1963

QUA​ ​CHEE​ ​GAN,​ ​JAMES​ ​UY,​ ​DANIEL​ ​DY​ ​alias​ ​DEE​ ​PAC,​ ​CHAN​ ​TIONG​ ​YU,​ ​CUA​ ​CHU​ ​TIAN,​ ​CHUA
LIM​ ​PAO​ ​alias​ ​JOSE​ ​CHUA​ ​and​ ​BASILIO​ ​KING
vs.
THE​ ​DEPORTATION​ ​BOARD
Ponente:​ ​Justice​ ​Jesus​ ​Barrera
Doctrine:
While​ ​it​ ​may​ ​be​ ​contended​ ​that​ ​the​ ​provision​ ​(Section​ ​69​ ​of​ ​Act​ ​No.​ ​2711,​ ​Revised​ ​Administrative​ ​Code)
did​ ​not​ ​expressly​ ​confer​ ​on​ ​the​ ​President​ ​the​ ​authority​ ​to​ ​deport​ ​undesirable​ ​aliens,​ ​unlike​ ​the​ ​express
grant​ ​to​ ​the​ ​Commissioner​ ​of​ ​Immigration​ ​under​ ​Commonwealth​ ​Act​ ​No.​ ​613,​ ​but​ ​merely​ ​lays​ ​down​ ​the
procedure​ ​to​ ​be​ ​observed​ ​should​ ​there​ ​be​ ​deportation​ ​proceedings,​ ​the​ ​fact​ ​that​ ​such​ ​a​ ​procedure​ ​was
provided​ ​for​ ​before​ ​the​ ​President​ ​can​ ​deport​ ​an​ ​alien-which​ ​provision​ ​was​ ​expressly​ ​declared​ ​exempted
from​ ​the​ ​repealing​ ​effect​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Immigration​ ​Act​ ​of​ ​1940-is​ ​a​ ​clear​ ​indication​ ​of​ ​the​ ​recognition,​ ​and
inferentially​ ​a​ ​ratification,​ ​by​ ​the​ ​legislature​ ​of​ ​the​ ​existence​ ​of​ ​such​ ​power​ ​in​ ​the​ ​Executive.
FACTS:
On​ ​May​ ​12,​ ​1952,​ ​Special​ ​Prosecutor​ ​Emilio​ ​Galang​ ​charged​​ ​Qua​ ​Chee​ ​Gan,​ ​James​ ​Uy,​ ​Daniel​ ​Dy​ ​alias
Dee​ ​Pac,​ ​Chan​ ​Tiong​ ​Yu,​ ​Chua​ ​Chu​ ​Tian,​ ​Chua​ ​Lim​ ​Pao​ ​alias​ ​Jose​ ​Chua,​ ​and​ ​Basilio​ ​King​ ​before​ ​the
Deportation​ ​Board,​ ​for​ ​purchasing​ ​U.S.​ ​dollars​ ​in​ ​the​ ​total​ ​sum​ ​of​ ​$130,000.00,​ ​without​ ​the​ ​necessary
license​ ​from​ ​the​ ​Central​ ​Bank​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Philippines,​ ​and​ ​of​ ​having​ ​clandestinely​ ​remitting​ ​the​ ​same​ ​to
Hongkong.
Additionally,​ ​petitioners,​ ​Qua​ ​Chee​ ​Gan,​ ​Chua​ ​Lim​ ​Pao​ ​alias​ ​Jose​ ​Chua,​ ​and​ ​Basilio​ ​King,​ ​were​ ​also
charged​ ​for​ ​attempting​ ​to​ ​bribe​ ​officers​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Philippine​ ​and​ ​United​ ​States​ ​Governments​ ​(Antonio
Laforteza,​ ​Chief​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Intelligence​ ​Division​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Central​ ​Bank,​ ​and​ ​Capt.​ ​A.​ ​P.​ ​Charak​ ​of​ ​the​ ​OSI,​ ​U.S.
Air​ ​Force).
A​ ​warrant​ ​of​ ​arrest​ ​of​ ​said​ ​aliens​ ​was​ ​issued​.​ ​Upon​ ​their​ ​filing​ ​surety​ ​bond​ ​for​ ​P10,000.00​ ​and​ ​cash​ ​bond
for​ ​P10,000.00,​ ​herein​ ​petitioners​ ​were​ ​provisionally​ ​set​ ​at​ ​liberty.
Petitioners​ ​filed​ ​a​ ​joint​ ​motion​ ​to​ ​dismiss​ ​the​ ​charges​ ​presented​ ​against​ ​them​ ​in​ ​the​ ​Deportation​ ​Board​ ​for
the​ ​reason,​ ​among​ ​others,​ ​that​ ​the​ ​same​ ​do​ ​not​ ​constitute​ ​legal​ ​ground​ ​for​ ​deportation​ ​of​ ​aliens​ ​from​ ​this
country,​ ​and​ ​that​ ​said​ ​Board​ ​has​ ​no​ ​jurisdiction​ ​to​ ​entertain​ ​such​ ​charges.​ ​The​ ​motion​ ​was​ ​denied.
Petitioners​ ​then,​ ​filed​ ​in​ ​this​ ​Court​ ​a​ ​petition​ ​for​ ​habeas​ ​corpus​ ​and/or​ ​prohibition.
A​ ​writ​ ​of​ ​preliminary​ ​injunction​ ​was​ ​issued​ ​by​ ​the​ ​lower​ ​court,​ ​restraining​ ​the​ ​respondent​ ​Deportation
Board​ ​from​ ​hearing​ ​Deportation​ ​charges​ ​No.​ ​R-425​ ​against​ ​petitioners,​ ​pending​ ​final​ ​termination​ ​of​ ​the
habeas​ ​corpus​ ​and/or​ ​prohibition​ ​proceedings
The​ ​respondent​ ​Board​ ​filed​ ​its​ ​answer​ ​to​ ​the​ ​original​ ​petition​ ​stating​ ​that​ ​the​ ​Deportation​ ​Board,​ ​as​ ​an
agent​ ​of​ ​the​ ​President,​ ​has​ ​jurisdiction​ ​over​ ​the​ ​charges​ ​filed​ ​against​ ​petitioners​ ​and​ ​the​ ​authority​ ​to​ ​order
their​ ​arrest
The​ ​Trial​ ​Court’s​ ​decision:
1. It​ ​upheld​ ​the​ ​validity​ ​of​ ​the​ ​delegation​ ​by​ ​the​ ​president​ ​to​ ​the​ ​Deportation​ ​Board​ ​of​ ​his​ ​power​ ​to
conduct​ ​investigations​ ​for​ ​the​ ​purpose​ ​of​ ​determining​ ​whether​ ​the​ ​stay​ ​of​ ​an​ ​alien​ ​in​ ​this​ ​country​ ​would​ ​be
injurious​ ​to​ ​the​ ​security,​ ​welfare​ ​and​ ​interest​ ​of​ ​the​ ​State.

2. The​ ​court,​ ​likewise,​ ​sustained​ ​the​ ​power​ ​of​ ​the​ ​deportation​ ​Board​ ​to​ ​issue​ ​warrant​ ​of​ ​arrest​ ​and
fix​ ​bonds​ ​for​ ​the​ ​alien's​ ​temporary​ ​release​ ​pending​ ​investigation​ ​of​ ​charges​ ​against​ ​him,​ ​on​ ​the​ ​theory
that​ ​the​ ​power​ ​to​ ​arrest​ ​and​ ​fix​ ​the​ ​amount​ ​of​ ​the​ ​bond​ ​of​ ​the​ ​arrested​ ​alien​ ​is​ ​essential​ ​to​ ​and
complement​ ​the​ ​power​ ​to​ ​deport​ ​aliens​ ​pursuant​ ​to​ ​Section​ ​69​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Revised​ ​Administrative​ ​Code.
Consequently

​ ​The​ ​petitioners​ ​instituted​ ​the​ ​present​ ​appeal.

ISSUE/s:
[1]​ ​WoN​ ​the​ ​President​ ​has​ ​the​ ​power​ ​to​ ​deport​ ​aliens​ ​and​ ​if​ ​such​ ​power​ ​is​ ​validly​ ​delegated​ ​to​ ​the
Deportation​ ​Board.​ ​–YES.
​ ​[2]​ ​WoN​ ​the​ ​authority​ ​to​ ​deport​ ​aliens​ ​includes​ ​the​ ​power​ ​to​ ​order​ ​the​ ​arrest​ ​of​ ​such​ ​aliens.​ ​–​YES.​ ​BUT
only​ ​when​ ​there​ ​is​ ​already​ ​an​ ​ORDER​ ​OF​ ​DEPORTATION
RULING:
[1]
● Although​ ​CA​ ​No.​ ​613​ ​expressly​ ​grants​ ​the​ ​Commissioner​ ​of​ ​Immigration​ ​the​ ​power​ ​to​ ​effect​ ​the
arrest​ ​and​ ​expulsion​ ​of​ ​an​ ​alien,​ ​after​ ​previous​ ​determination​ ​by​ ​the​ ​Board​ ​of​ ​Commissioners,​ ​but
such​ ​power​ ​was​ ​not​ ​intended​ ​to​ ​be​ ​delimited​ ​to​ ​the​ ​Immigration​ ​Commissioner​ ​as​ ​Sec.​ ​69​ ​of​ ​the
Administrative​ ​Code,​ ​although​ ​not​ ​expressly​ ​conferring​ ​such​ ​power,​ ​lays​ ​down​ ​the​ ​procedure​ ​for
such​ ​deportation​ ​proceedings​ ​for​ ​the​ ​President.
● Therefore,​ ​the​ ​deportation​ ​of​ ​an​ ​undesirable​ ​alien​ ​may​ ​be​ ​effected​ ​in​ ​2​ ​ways:
○ By​ ​order​ ​of​ ​the​ ​President,​ ​after​ ​due​ ​investigation,​ ​pursuant​ ​to​ ​Section​ ​69​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Revised
Administrative​ ​Code,​ ​and
○ By​ ​the​ ​Commissioner​ ​of​ ​Immigration,​ ​upon​ ​recommendation​ ​by​ ​the​ ​Board​ ​of
Commissioners,​ ​under​ ​Section​ ​37​ ​of​ ​Commonwealth​ ​Act​ ​No.​ ​613.
● And​ ​although​ ​the​ ​charges​ ​against​ ​Qua​ ​Chee​ ​Gan​ ​are​ ​not​ ​enumerated​ ​in​ ​CA​ ​No.​ ​613,​ ​the​ ​act​ ​of
profiteering,​ ​hoarding​ ​or​ ​blackmarketing​ ​of​ ​U.S.​ ​dollars,​ ​in​ ​violation​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Central​ ​Bank
regulations,​ ​which​ ​is​ ​tantamount​ ​to​ ​economic​ ​sabotage,​ ​is​ ​a​ ​ground​ ​for​ ​deportation​ ​under​ ​the
provisions​ ​of​ ​Republic​ ​Act​ ​503​ ​amending​ ​Section​ ​37​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Philippine​ ​Immigration​ ​Act​ ​of​ ​1940.
[2]
● Under​ ​EO​ ​No.​ ​69,​ ​it​ ​is​ ​required​ ​that​ ​the​ ​alien​ ​charged​ ​in​ ​deportation​ ​proceedings​ ​shall​ ​file​ ​a​ ​bond
with​ ​the​ ​Commissioner​ ​of​ ​Immigration​ ​in​ ​order​ ​to​ ​secure​ ​their​ ​appearance.
○ However,​ ​the​ ​same​ ​did​ ​not​ ​authorize​ ​the​ ​arrest​ ​of​ ​the​ ​alien​ ​pending​ ​investigation.
● It​ ​was​ ​in​ ​EO​ ​No.​ ​398,​ ​that​ ​the​ ​Board​ ​was​ ​authorized​ ​motu​ ​proprio​ ​or​ ​upon​ ​the​ ​filing​ ​of​ ​formal
charges​ ​by​ ​the​ ​Special​ ​Prosecutor​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Board,​ ​to​ ​issue​ ​the​ ​warrant​ ​for​ ​the​ ​arrest​ ​of​ ​the​ ​alien
complained​ ​of​ ​and​ ​to​ ​hold​ ​him​ ​under​ ​detention​ ​during​ ​the​ ​investigation​ ​unless​ ​he​ ​files​ ​a​ ​bond​ ​for
his​ ​provisional​ ​release​ ​in​ ​such​ ​amount​ ​and​ ​under​ ​such​ ​conditions​ ​as​ ​may​ ​be​ ​prescribed​ ​by​ ​the
Chairman​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Board.
 ● However,​ ​Section​ ​69​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Revised​ ​Administrative​ ​Code,​ ​upon​ ​whose​ ​authority​ ​the​ ​President's
power​ ​to​ ​deport​ ​is​ ​predicated,​ ​does​ ​NOT​ ​provide​ ​for​ ​the​ ​exercise​ ​of​ ​the​ ​power​ ​to​ ​arrest.
● Moreover,​ ​the​ ​right​ ​of​ ​an​ ​individual​ ​to​ ​be​ ​secure​ ​in​ ​his​ ​person​ ​is​ ​guaranteed​ ​by​ ​Sec.​ ​1​ ​Art​ ​III​ ​of
the​ ​Constitution:​ ​“...no​ ​warrants​ ​shall​ ​issue​ ​but​ ​upon​ ​probable​ ​cause,​ ​to​ ​be​ ​determined​ ​by​ ​the
judge​ ​after​ ​examination​ ​under​ ​oath​ ​or​ ​affirmation​ ​of​ ​the​ ​complainant​ ​and​ ​the​ ​witnesses​ ​he​ ​may
produce...”
● Rodriguez,​ ​et​ ​al.​ ​v.​ ​Villamiel,​ ​et​ ​al.​ ​expands​ ​the​ ​requirement​ ​—​ ​"to​ ​be​ ​determined​ ​by​ ​the​ ​judge"​ ​—
to​ ​any​ ​public​ ​officer​ ​who​ ​may​ ​be​ ​authorized​ ​by​ ​the​ ​Legislature​ ​to​ ​make​ ​such​ ​determination,​ ​and
thereafter​ ​issue​ ​the​ ​warrant​ ​of​ ​arrest.
● Therefore,​ ​the​ ​arrest​ ​of​ ​a​ ​foreigner,​ ​which​ ​is​ ​necessary​ ​to​ ​carry​ ​into​ ​effect​ ​the​ ​power​ ​of
deportation​ ​is​ ​valid​ ​only​ ​when​ ​there​ ​is​ ​already​ ​an​ ​order​ ​of​ ​deportation.
○ However,​ ​during​ ​the​ ​investigation,​ ​it​ ​is​ ​not​ ​indispensable​ ​that​ ​the​ ​alien​ ​be​ ​arrested.
○ It​ ​is​ ​enough​ ​that​ ​a​ ​bond​ ​be​ ​required​ ​to​ ​insure​ ​the​ ​appearance​ ​of​ ​the​ ​alien​ ​during​ ​the
investigation,​ ​as​ ​was​ ​authorized​ ​in​ ​EO69.

DISPOSITIVE
● ​ rder​ ​No.​ ​398​ ​insofar​ ​as​ ​it​ ​empowers​ ​the​ ​Deportation​ ​Board​ ​to​ ​issue​ ​warrant​ ​of
​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​Executive​
O
arrest​ ​upon​ ​the​ ​filing​ ​of​ ​formal​ ​charges​ ​against​ ​an​ ​alien​ ​or​ ​aliens​ ​and​ ​to​ ​fix​ ​bond​ ​and​ ​prescribe
the​ ​conditions​ ​for​ ​the​ ​temporary​ ​release​ ​of​ ​said​ ​aliens,​ ​is​ ​declared​ ​illegal.

● ​ rder​ ​of​ ​arrest​ ​issued​ ​by​ ​the​ ​respondent​ ​Deportation​ ​Board​ ​is​ ​declared​ ​null​ ​and​ ​void​ ​and
​ ​ ​ ​The​
o
the​ ​bonds​ ​filed​ ​pursuant​ ​to​ ​such​ ​order​ ​of​ ​arrest,​ ​decreed​ ​cancelled.
Rafael​​ ​(5)​ ​Go​ ​Tek​ ​v.​ ​Deportation​ ​Board,​ ​79​ ​SCRA​ ​17
G.R.​ ​No.​ ​L-23846 September​ ​9,​ ​1977
Ponente:​ ​J.​ ​Aquino

Doctrine: Conviction of a crime is not necessary to warrant deportation. The State has the
inherent power to deport undesirable aliens. That power may be exercised by the Chief Executive
in his full discretion "when he deems such action necessary for the peace and domestic
tranquility​ ​of​ ​the​ ​nation.”
Facts: On March 3, 1964 the chief prosecutor of the Deportation Board filed a complaint for deportation
against Chinese national Go Tek. It was alleged that certain agents of the NBI searched an office located
at 1439 O' Donnel Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila believed to be the headquarters of a guerilla unit of the
"Emergency Intelligence Section, Army of the United States" and that among those arrested thereat was
Go Tek, an alleged sector commander and intelligence and record officer of that guerilla unit. It was
further alleged that fake dollar checks were found in Go Tek's possession and that, therefore, he had
violated Article 168 of the Revised Penal Code (illegal possession and use of false treasury or bank
notes) and rendered himself an undesirable alien. The prosecutor prayed that after trial the Board should
recommend to the President of the Philippines the immediate deportation of Go Tek as an undesirable
alien.
Go Tek filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the filing of the case was premature
because a conviction is necessary in order that he may be lawfully deported; and that the President may
deport aliens only on the grounds specified in the law. The Deportation Board denied Go Tek’s motion,
ruling that a criminal conviction is not a prerequisite before the State may exercise its right to deport an
undesirable alien and that the Board is only a fact-finding body whose function is to make a report and
recommendation to the President in whom is lodged the exclusive power to deport an alien or dismiss a
deportation​ ​proceeding.
Go Tek then filed in the CFI of Manila a petition for prohibition against the Board. The court
granted the writ of prohibition and ordered the Board to desist from taking cognizance of the complaint
against Go Tek. The court, citing the obiter dictum in the Qua Chee Gan case, held that mere possession
of forged dollar checks is not a ground for deportation under the Immigration Law; that before an alien
may be deported, a conviction (for a crime involving moral turpitude and a sentence of imprisonment for a
term of one year or more) is necessary; and that since Go Tek had not been convicted of the offense
punished in Article 168, the deportation proceeding was premature. IAC affirmed. Hence, this appeal by
the​ ​Deportation​ ​Board​ ​to​ ​the​ ​Supreme​ ​Court.

Issue/s:
1. ​Whether the Deportation Board can entertain a deportation proceeding although the alien has
not​ ​yet​ ​been​ ​convicted​ ​of​ ​the​ ​offense​ ​imputed​ ​to​ ​him.
2. ​Whether the Deportation Board can entertain a deportation proceeding based on a ground
which​ ​is​ ​not​ ​specified​ ​in​ ​Section​ ​37​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Immigration​ ​Law

Ruling:
1.​​ ​ ​ ​ ​Yes.
The right of a country to expel or deport aliens because their continued presence is detrimental to
public welfare is absolute and unqualified. There is no legal or constitutional provision defining the power
to deport aliens because the intention of the law is ​to grant the Chief Executive "full discretion to
determine whether an alien’s residence in the country is so undesirable as to affect or injure the security,
welfare or interest of the state. The adjudication of facts upon which deportation is predicated also
devolves on the Chief Executive whose decision is final and executory." Thus, an executive order for
deportation is not dependent on a prior judicial conviction in a criminal case. An acquittal, for example, of
an alien in a criminal proceeding does not constitute res judicata in the deportation proceedings.
Conviction of a crime is not necessary to warrant deportation. Otherwise, the power of the President will
be​ ​unduly​ ​limited.
2.​​ ​ ​ ​ ​Yes.
Under existing laws, the deportation of an undesirable alien may be effected not only (1) by the
Commissioner of Immigration, upon recommendation of the Board of Commissioners under Section 37 of
the Immigration Law, but also (2) by order of the President, after due investigation, pursuant to Section 69
of​ ​the​ ​Revised​ ​Administrative​ ​Code.
This is because the State has the ​inherent power ​to deport undesirable aliens, and such power
may be exercised by the Chief Executive "when he deems such action necessary for the peace and
domestic​ ​tranquility​ ​of​ ​the​ ​nation."

Note:
The​ ​Deportation​ ​Board​ ​is​ ​composed​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Undersecretary​ ​of​ ​Justice​ ​as​ ​chairman,​ ​the​ ​Solicitor​ ​General,
and​ ​a​ ​representative​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Secretary​ ​of​ ​National​ ​Defense.​ ​The​ ​decision​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Deportation​ ​Board​ ​is
merely​ ​recommendatory.​ ​The​ ​Chief​ ​Executive​ ​has​ ​to​ ​approve​ ​the​ ​board’s​ ​recommendation.​ ​Abuses​ ​or
harassments​ ​committed​ ​by​ ​the​ ​prosecutor​ ​or​ ​by​ ​the​ ​Board​ ​should​ ​first​ ​be​ ​brought​ ​to​ ​his​ ​attention.
Rafael​​ ​(6)​ ​Philippine​ ​Bar​ ​Association​ ​v.​ ​Comelec,​ ​140​ ​SCRA​ ​455​ ​(Qualifications​ ​of​ ​the​ ​President)
G.R.​ ​No.​ ​72915.​ ​December​ ​19,​ ​1985.
Ponente:​ ​Clerk​ ​of​ ​Court​ ​Gloria​ ​C.​ ​Paras​ ​(En​ ​Banc​ ​Resolution)

Doctrine: ​Section 9 of Article VII provides that a special election is called for only when a vacancy
is created by death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation. The Constitution
does not prohibit the President from tendering a (conditional) resignation that is ​not immediately
effective​.
Facts: PBA, Liberal Party and several other petitioners respectively filed their petitions for prohibition
against the enforcement of Batas Pambansa Blg. 883 which calls for special national elections on
February 7, 1986 (Snap Elections) for the offices of President and Vice President of the Philippines. The
11 petitions were consolidated by the court. The law was enacted following the letter of Pres. Marcos to
the Batasang Pambansa that he was "irrevocably vacating the position of Pres. effective ​only when the
election is held and after the winner is proclaimed and qualified as Pres. by taking his oath of office ten
days​ ​after​ ​his​ ​proclamation."
It is alleged that BP 883 is in conflict with the Constitution because it allows the President to
continue holding office after the calling of the special election. The principal ground for the challenge to
the validity of the statute was that the conditional resignation of the President did not create a vacancy
required​ ​by​ ​Art.​ ​VII,​ ​Sec.​ ​9​ ​(now​ ​Art.​ ​VII,​ ​Sec.​ ​8)​ ​which​ ​authorized​ ​the​ ​calling​ ​of​ ​a​ ​special​ ​election.

Issue/s:
1.​​ ​ ​ ​ ​Whether​ ​BP​ ​883​ ​is​ ​constitutional.
2.​​ ​ ​ ​ ​Whether​ ​the​ ​Court​ ​should​ ​restrain​ ​the​ ​holding​ ​of​ ​the​ ​SNAP​ ​Elections.

Ruling​ ​plus​ ​Concurring​ ​Opinions:

1.​​ ​ ​ ​ ​Yes.
Inasmuch as there are less than the required 10 votes to declare BP 883 unconstitutional, the
petitions in these cases are dismissed. This is in accordance with the opinion in Gonzales v. COMELEC
and Javellana v. Executive Secretary that there must be a majority vote of the members of Supreme
Court​ ​to​ ​declare​ ​an​ ​act​ ​or​ ​a​ ​law​ ​as​ ​unconstitutional.
J. Teehankee: BP 883 is a reproduction of Cabinet Bill No. 7. The President’s offer to cut his term short is
valid. The trouble is that he does not go far enough – he should actually vacate the office forthwith. The
conditional resignation was obviously done to circumvent the constitutional provision which would in effect
require the President to actually vacate his office in favor of the Batasan Speaker until a new President
shall​ ​have​ ​been​ ​elected​ ​and​ ​qualified.
J. Plana: An examination of the Constitution, particularly Article VII, Section 9, does not yield the
conclusion that BP 883 is offensive to its provisions. The Constitution does not prohibit the President from
tendering a resignation that is ​not immediately effective​. There is no provision regarding the form of
resignation. Not being prohibited, a Presidential resignation ​in futuro (in the future) is allowed. In such a
case, the Batasang Pambansa is not obliged to sit and wait for the actual vacancy to arise before
enacting the necessary legislation for the calling of special elections. That would be an absurd and
unreasonable​ ​interpretation​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Constitution,​ ​which​ ​is​ ​to​ ​be​ ​eschewed.
Quite apart from the foregoing, there is a strong presumption of constitutionality of the law.
Hence, in assessing the constitutionality of a law, “to doubt is to sustain.” The principle is doubly
applicable as regards BP 883 which is the product of the joint action of the executive and legislative
departments.
J. Relova - In Gamboa v. CA, the Court ruled that to constitute a complete and operative resignation of
public office, there must be intention to relinquish a part of the term, accompanied by the act of
relinquishment, and acceptance of such resignation is necessary. When the Batasang Pambansa,
representing the people, enacted BP 883, on Dec. 2, 1985 and the President approved it the following
day calling for the elections on February 7, 1986, it in effect accepted the resignation tendered by the
incumbent.
2.​​ ​ ​ ​ ​No.
Inasmuch as there are less than the required 10 votes to declare BP 883 unconstitutional, the
writs prayed for the issuance of an injunction restraining respondents from holding the election on
February 7, 1986, are denied. This is in accordance with the opinion in Gonzales v. COMELEC and
Javellana v. Executive Secretary that there must be a majority vote of the members of Supreme Court to
grant​ ​the​ ​prayer​ ​for​ ​the​ ​issuance​ ​of​ ​the​ ​writs.
J. Teehankee: The events that have transpired since December 3, as the Court did not issue any
restraining order, have turned the issue into a political question (from the purely justiciable issue of the
questioned constitutionality of the act due to the lack of the actual vacancy of the President’s office) which
can be truly decided only by the people in their sovereign capacity at the scheduled election, since there
is no issue more political than the election. The Court cannot stand in the way of letting the people decide
through​ ​their​ ​ballot,​ ​either​ ​to​ ​give​ ​the​ ​incumbent​ ​president​ ​a​ ​new​ ​mandate​ ​or​ ​to​ ​elect​ ​a​ ​new​ ​president.
J. Escolin – The issue posed by these petitions is essentially political in character. Thus, the Court has no
jurisdiction​ ​over​ ​the​ ​petition​ ​for​ ​prohibition.
J. Relova - Since there is a complete and operative resignation of public office, the term of office of
President Marcos was cut short by 16 months. As a consequence, there is justification for the holding of
an​ ​election​ ​before​ ​May​ ​1987.

Dissenting​ ​Opinions:
J. Gutierrez, J. Alampay – BP 883 is unconstitutional. A special election may not be called for just any
purpose or on any occasion. It becomes necessary only when a vacancy is created by death, permanent
disability, removal from office, or resignation. The vacancy must be real and ​in esse (in actual existence),
not a parody or shadow of the real thing. It must be actual and permanent. I find Section 9 of Article VII
clear and intelligibly simple. Any layman reading it can easily grasp its meaning and understand the
contingencies​ ​for​ ​which​ ​it​ ​was​ ​intended.
J. Dela Fuente, J. Patajo - BP 883 is unconstitutional for it contravenes the intent, letter and spirit of the
succession provision – Section 9 of Article VII of the Constitution. Resignation must be one resulting in a
permanent vacancy – actual or ​in esse​, not merely prospective or inchoate or contingent – as of the time
of the special election, whereupon the Batasan Speaker shall take over the vacated office until a new
President​ ​shall​ ​have​ ​been​ ​elected,​ ​proclaimed​ ​and​ ​qualified​ ​by​ ​taking​ ​his​ ​oath​ ​of​ ​office.
 While a President or an elective office is allowed by the Constitution or law to submit himself for
re-election to the same office ​without vacating it​, this generally refers to a ​regular election​, not a special
election called precisely to fill up an existing permanent vacancy in the elective office, The adequate
vehicle for the so-called snap elections is a referendum. The other option is a constitutional amendment
incorporating​ ​the​ ​features​ ​of​ ​BP​ ​883,​ ​to​ ​be​ ​submitted​ ​to​ ​the​ ​people​ ​for​ ​ratification.
Monzon​​ ​(7)​ ​Free​ ​Telephone​ ​Workers’​ ​Union​ ​v.Minister​ ​of​ ​Labor​ ​and​ ​Employment.​ ​108​ ​SCRA​ ​757
(Control​ ​Power)
G.R.​ ​No.​ ​L-58184​ ​October​ ​30,​ ​1981
FREE​ ​TELEPHONE​ ​WORKERS​ ​UNION,​ ​petitioner,
vs.
THE​ ​HONORABLE​ ​MINISTER​ ​OF​ ​LABOR​ ​AND​ ​EMPLOYMENT,​ ​THE​ ​NATIONAL​ ​LABOR
RELATIONS​ ​COMMISSION,​ ​and​ ​THE​ ​PHILIPPINE​ ​LONG​ ​DISTANCE​ ​TELEPHONE​ ​COMPANY,
respondents.

Ponente​ ​:​ ​FERNANDO,​ ​C.J.

Doctrine​ ​:​ ​"All​ ​powers​ ​vested​ ​in​ ​the​ ​President​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Philippines​ ​under​ ​the​ ​1935​ ​Constitution​ ​and
the​ ​laws​ ​of​ ​the​ ​land​ ​which​ ​are​ ​not​ ​herein​ ​provided​ ​for​ ​or​ ​conferred​ ​upon​ ​any​ ​official​ ​shall​ ​be
deemed​ ​and​ ​are​ ​hereby​ ​vested​ ​in​ ​the​ ​President​ ​unless​ ​the​ ​Batasang​ ​Pambansa​ ​provides
otherwise.​ ​There​ ​is​ ​a​ ​provision,​ ​of​ ​course,​ ​on​ ​the​ ​Prime​ ​Minister,​ ​but​ ​the​ ​Constitution​ ​is​ ​explicit
that​ ​while​ ​he​ ​shall​ ​be​ ​the​ ​head​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Cabinet,​ ​it​ ​is​ ​the​ ​President​ ​who​ ​nominates​ ​him​ ​from​ ​among
the​ ​members​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Batasang​ ​Pambansa,​ ​thereafter​ ​being​ ​"elected​ ​by​ ​a​ ​majority​ ​of​ ​all​ ​the
members​ ​thereof.​ ​ ​He​ ​is​ ​primarily,​ ​therefore,​ ​a​ ​Presidential​ ​choice.​ ​He​ ​need​ ​not​ ​even​ ​come​ ​from
its​ ​elected​ ​members.​ ​He​ ​is​ ​responsible,​ ​along​ ​with​ ​the​ ​Cabinet,​ ​to​ ​the​ ​Batasang​ ​Pambansa​ ​for​ ​the
program​ ​of​ ​government​ ​but​ ​as​ ​"approved​ ​by​ ​the​ ​President.​ ​Any​ ​other​ ​member​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Cabinet​ ​or
the​ ​Executive​ ​Committee​ ​may​ ​be​ ​removed​ ​at​ ​the​ ​discretion​ ​of​ ​the​ ​President.​ ​ ​Even​ ​the​ ​duration​ ​of
his​ ​term​ ​then​ ​depends​ ​on​ ​the​ ​Presidential​ ​pleasure.

Facts​ ​:​ ​ ​On​ ​September​ ​14,​ ​1981,​ ​there​ ​was​ ​a​ ​notice​ ​of​ ​strike​ ​with​ ​the​ ​Ministry​ ​of​ ​Labor​ ​for​ ​unfair
labor​ ​practices​ ​which​ ​are​ ​:​ ​Unilateral​ ​and​ ​arbitrary​ ​implementation​ ​of​ ​a​ ​Code​ ​of​ ​Conduct;​ ​Illegal
terminations​ ​and​ ​suspensions​ ​of​ ​our​ ​officers​ ​and​ ​members​ ​as​ ​a​ ​result​ ​of​ ​the​ ​implementation​ ​of
said​ ​Code​ ​of​ ​Conduct;​ ​and​ ​unconfirmation​ ​of​ ​call​ ​sick​ ​leaves​ ​and​ ​its​ ​automatic​ ​treatment​ ​as
Absence​ ​Without​ ​Official​ ​Leave​ ​of​ ​Absence​ ​(AWOL)​ ​with​ ​corresponding​ ​suspensions,​ ​in​ ​violation
of​ ​our​ ​Collective​ ​Bargaining​ ​Agreement.
After​ ​which​ ​came​ ​the​ ​notification​ ​to​ ​the​ ​Ministry​ ​that​ ​there​ ​was​ ​compliance​ ​with​ ​the
two-thirds​ ​strike​ ​vote​ ​and​ ​other​ ​formal​ ​requirements​ ​of​ ​the​ ​law​ ​and​ ​Implementing​ ​Rules.​ ​Several
conciliation​ ​meetings​ ​called​ ​by​ ​the​ ​Ministry​ ​followed,​ ​with​ ​petitioner​ ​manifesting​ ​its​ ​willingness​ ​to
have​ ​a​ ​revised​ ​Code​ ​of​ ​Conduct​ ​that​ ​would​ ​be​ ​fair​ ​to​ ​all​ ​concerned​ ​but​ ​with​ ​a​ ​plea​ ​that​ ​in​ ​the
meanwhile​ ​the​ ​Code​ ​of​ ​Conduct​ ​being​ ​imposed​ ​be​ ​suspended​ ​a​ ​position​ ​that​ ​failed​ ​to​ ​meet​ ​the
approval​ ​of​ ​private​ ​respondent.
Respondent​ ​certified​ ​the​ ​labor​ ​dispute​ ​to​ ​the​ ​National​ ​Labor​ ​Relations​ ​Commission​ ​for
compulsory​ ​arbitration​ ​and​ ​enjoined​ ​any​ ​strike​ ​at​ ​the​ ​private​ ​respondent's​ ​establishment.
Private​ ​respondent,​ ​following​ ​the​ ​lead​ ​of​ ​petitioner​ ​labor​ ​union,​ ​explained​ ​its​ ​side​ ​on​ ​the
controversy​ ​regarding​ ​the​ ​Code​ ​of​ ​Conduct,​ ​the​ ​provisions​ ​of​ ​which​ ​as​ ​alleged​ ​in​ ​the​ ​petition
were​ ​quite​ ​harsh,​ ​resulting​ ​in​ ​what​ ​it​ ​deemed​ ​indefinite​ ​preventive​ ​suspension​ ​apparently​ ​the
principal​ ​cause​ ​of​ ​the​ ​labor​ ​dispute.​ ​At​ ​this​ ​stage,​ ​as​ ​mentioned,​ ​it​ ​would​ ​be​ ​premature​ ​to​ ​discuss
the​ ​merits,​ ​or​ ​lack​ ​of​ ​it,​ ​of​ ​such​ ​claim,​ ​the​ ​matter​ ​being​ ​properly​ ​for​ ​the​ ​Ministry​ ​of​ ​Labor​ ​to
determine.

Issue​ ​:​ ​W/N​ ​there​ ​is​ ​an​ ​undue​ ​delegation​ ​of​ ​legislative​ ​power

Held​ ​:​ ​NO

The​ ​allegation​ ​that​ ​there​ ​is​ ​undue​ ​delegation​ ​of​ ​legislative​ ​powers​ ​cannot​ ​stand​ ​the​ ​test​ ​of
scrutiny.​ ​It​ ​is​ ​the​ ​president​ ​who​ ​“shall​ ​have​ ​the​ ​control​ ​of​ ​the​ ​ministries.”​ ​The​ ​minister​ ​is​ ​an
official​ ​of​ ​the​ ​executive​ ​branch​ ​of​ ​the​ ​government.​ ​The​ ​adoption​ ​of​ ​certain​ ​aspects​ ​of​ ​a
parliamentary​ ​system​ ​in​ ​the​ ​amended​ ​constitution​ ​does​ ​not​ ​alter​ ​its​ ​essentially​ ​presidential
character.
There​ ​is​ ​a​ ​provision,​ ​of​ ​course,​ ​on​ ​the​ ​Prime​ ​Minister,​ ​but​ ​the​ ​constitution​ ​is​ ​explicit​ ​that
while​ ​he​ ​shall​ ​be​ ​the​ ​head​ ​of​ ​the​ ​cabinet,​ ​it​ ​is​ ​the​ ​president​ ​who​ ​nominates​ ​him​ ​from​ ​among​ ​the
members​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Batasang​ ​Pambansa.​ ​He​ ​is​ ​primarily,​ ​therefore,​ ​a​ ​presidential​ ​choice.
During​ ​his​ ​incumbency,​ ​he​ ​exercises​ ​supervision​ ​of​ ​all​ ​ministries,​ ​a​ ​recognition​ ​of​ ​the
important​ ​role​ ​he​ ​plays​ ​in​ ​the​ ​implementation​ ​of​ ​the​ ​policy​ ​of​ ​the​ ​government,​ ​the​ ​legislation​ ​duly
enacted​ ​in​ ​pursuance​ ​thereof,​ ​and​ ​the​ ​decrees​ ​and​ ​orders​ ​of​ ​the​ ​president.​ ​To​ ​the​ ​prime​ ​minister
can​ ​thus​ ​be​ ​delegated​ ​the​ ​performance​ ​of​ ​the​ ​administrative​ ​functions​ ​of​ ​the​ ​president.
In​ ​the​ ​case​ ​of​ ​Villena​ ​v.​ ​Secretary​ ​of​ ​Interior,​ ​the​ ​court​ ​held​ ​that:​ ​under​ ​the​ ​presidential
systems​ ​“​ ​all​ ​executive​ ​and​ ​administrative​ ​organization​ ​are​ ​adjuncts​ ​of​ ​the​ ​executive​ ​department,
the​ ​heads​ ​of​ ​the​ ​various​ ​departments​ ​are​ ​assistants​ ​and​ ​agents​ ​of​ ​the​ ​chief​ ​executive,​ ​and,​ ​except
in​ ​cases​ ​where​ ​the​ ​chief​ ​executive​ ​is​ ​required​ ​by​ ​the​ ​constitution​ ​or​ ​the​ ​law​ ​to​ ​act​ ​in​ ​person​ ​or​ ​the
exigencies​ ​of​ ​the​ ​situation​ ​demand​ ​that​ ​he​ ​act​ ​personally,​ ​the​ ​multifarious​ ​executive​ ​and
administrative​ ​functions​ ​of​ ​the​ ​chief​ ​executive​ ​are​ ​performed​ ​by​ ​and​ ​through​ ​the​ ​executive
departments,​ ​and​ ​the​ ​acts​ ​of​ ​the​ ​secretaries​ ​of​ ​such​ ​departments,​ ​performed​ ​and​ ​promulgated​ ​in
the​ ​regular​ ​course​ ​of​ ​business,​ ​are,​ ​unless​ ​disapproved​ ​or​ ​reprobated​ ​by​ ​the​ ​Chief​ ​Executive,
presumptively​ ​the​ ​acts​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Chief​ ​Executive.
If​ ​the​ ​President,​ ​then,​ ​is​ ​the​ ​authority​ ​in​ ​the​ ​executive​ ​department,​ ​he​ ​assumes​ ​the
corresponding​ ​responsibility.​ ​The​ ​head​ ​of​ ​a​ ​department​ ​is​ ​a​ ​man​ ​of​ ​his​ ​confidence;​ ​he​ ​controls
and​ ​directs​ ​his​ ​acts;​ ​he​ ​appoints​ ​him​ ​and​ ​can​ ​remove​ ​him​ ​at​ ​pleasure;​ ​he​ ​is​ ​the​ ​executive,​ ​not​ ​any
of​ ​his​ ​secretaries.​ ​It​ ​is​ ​therefore​ ​logical​ ​that​ ​he,​ ​the​ ​President,​ ​should​ ​be​ ​answerable​ ​for​ ​the​ ​acts
of​ ​administration​ ​of​ ​the​ ​entire​ ​executive​ ​department​ ​before​ ​his​ ​own​ ​conscience​ ​no​ ​less​ ​than
before​ ​that​ ​undefined​ ​power​ ​of​ ​public​ ​opinion​ ​which,​ ​in​ ​the​ ​language​ ​of​ ​Daniel​ ​Webster,​ ​is​ ​the​ ​last
repository​ ​of​ ​popular​ ​government.
Even​ ​on​ ​the​ ​assumption​ ​that​ ​the​ ​authority​ ​conferred​ ​to​ ​the​ ​Minister​ ​of​ ​Labor​ ​partakes​ ​of​ ​a
legislative​ ​character,​ ​still​ ​no​ ​case​ ​of​ ​an​ ​unlawful​ ​delegation​ ​of​ ​such​ ​power​ ​may​ ​be​ ​discerned.
In​ ​the​ ​case​ ​of​ ​Edu​ ​v.​ ​Ericta,​ ​the​ ​court​ ​held​ ​that:​ ​“What​ ​cannot​ ​be​ ​delegated​ ​is​ ​the​ ​authority
under​ ​the​ ​constitution​ ​to​ ​make​ ​laws​ ​and​ ​to​ ​alter​ ​and​ ​repeal​ ​them;​ ​the​ ​test​ ​is​ ​the​ ​completeness​ ​of
the​ ​statute​ ​in​ ​all​ ​its​ ​term​ ​and​ ​provisions​ ​when​ ​it​ ​leaves​ ​the​ ​hands​ ​of​ ​the​ ​legislature.”​ ​ ​To
determine​ ​whether​ ​or​ ​not​ ​there​ ​is​ ​an​ ​undue​ ​delegation​ ​of​ ​legislative​ ​power,​ ​the​ ​inquiry​ ​must​ ​be
directed​ ​to​ ​the​ ​scope​ ​and​ ​definiteness​ ​of​ ​the​ ​measure​ ​enacted.​ ​The​ ​legislature​ ​does​ ​not​ ​abdicate
its​ ​functions​ ​when​ ​it​ ​describes​ ​what​ ​job​ ​must​ ​be​ ​done,​ ​who​ ​is​ ​it​ ​to​ ​do​ ​it,​ ​and​ ​what​ ​is​ ​the​ ​scope​ ​of
the​ ​authority.​ ​A​ ​distinction​ ​has​ ​rightfully​ ​been​ ​made​ ​between​ ​delegation​ ​of​ ​power​ ​to​ ​make​ ​the
laws​ ​and​ ​delegation​ ​of​ ​authority​ ​or​ ​discretion​ ​as​ ​to​ ​its​ ​execution.
 A​ ​rigid​ ​application​ ​of​ ​the​ ​non-delegation​ ​doctrine,​ ​therefore,​ ​would​ ​be​ ​an​ ​obstacle​ ​to
national​ ​efforts​ ​at​ ​development​ ​and​ ​progress.​ ​There​ ​is​ ​accordingly​ ​more​ ​receptivity​ ​to​ ​laws
leaving​ ​to​ ​administrative​ ​and​ ​executive​ ​agencies​ ​the​ ​adoption​ ​of​ ​such​ ​means​ ​as​ ​may​ ​be
necessary​ ​to​ ​effectuate​ ​a​ ​valid​ ​legislative​ ​purpose.

POWER​ ​OF​ ​APPOINTMENT

Padilla​​ ​(8)​ ​Sarmiento​ ​v.​ ​Mison,​ ​GR​ ​79974,​ ​December​ ​17,​ ​1987

G.R.​ ​No.​ ​L-79974​|||

PONENTE:​ ​J.​ ​PADILLA

Doctrine:​ ​ ​The​ ​position​ ​of​ ​Commissioner​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Bureau​ ​of​ ​Customs​ ​(a​ ​bureau​ ​head)​ ​is
not​ ​one​ ​of​ ​those​ ​within​ ​the​ ​first​ ​group​ ​of​ ​appointments​ ​where​ ​the​ ​consent​ ​of​ ​the
Commission​ ​on​ ​Appointments​ ​is​ ​required.​ ​The​ ​1987​ ​Constitution​ ​deliberately​ ​excluded
the​ ​position​ ​of​ ​"heads​ ​of​ ​bureaus"​ ​from​ ​appointments​ ​that​ ​need​ ​the​ ​consent
(confirmation)​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Commission​ ​on​ ​Appointments.

FACTS:

Respondent Salvador Mison was appointed as the Commissioner of the

Bureau of Customs by then President (Corazon) Aquino. The said
appointment made by the President is being questioned by petitioner
Ulpiano Sarmiento III and Juanito Arcilla who are both taxpayers,
members of the bar, and both Constitutional law professors, stating
that the said appointment is not valid since the appointment was
not submitted to the Commission On Appointment (COA) for approval.
Under the Constitution, the appointments made for the "Heads of
Bureau"​ ​requires​ ​the​ ​confirmation​ ​from​ ​COA.

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT the appointment made by the President without the

confirmation​ ​from​ ​COA​ ​is​ ​valid.

HELD:
Yes, under the 1987 Constitution, Heads of Bureau are removed from
the list of officers that needed confirmation from the Commission
On Appointment. It enumerated the four (4) groups whom the
President​ ​shall​ ​appoint:

● Heads​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Executive​ ​Departments,​ ​Ambassadors,​ ​other​ ​public

minister​ ​or​ ​consuls,​ ​Officers​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Armed​ ​Forces​ ​from​ ​the
rank​ ​of​ ​Colonel​ ​or​ ​Naval​ ​Captain,​ ​and​ ​Other​ ​officers​ ​whose
appointments​ ​are​ ​vested​ ​in​ ​him​ ​in​ ​him​ ​in​ ​this​ ​Constitution;

The​ ​above-mentioned​ ​circumstance​ ​is​ ​the​ ​only​ ​instance​ ​where​ ​the

appointment​ ​made​ ​by​ ​the​ ​President​ ​that​ ​requires​ ​approval​ ​from​ ​the
COA​ ​and​ ​the​ ​following​ ​instances​ ​are​ ​those​ ​which​ ​does​ ​not​ ​require
approval​ ​from​ ​COA:
● All​ ​other​ ​Officers​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Government​ ​whose​ ​appointments​ ​are
not​ ​otherwise​ ​provided​ ​by​ ​law;
● Those​ ​whom​ ​the​ ​President​ ​may​ ​be​ ​authorized​ ​by​ ​law​ ​to​ ​appoint;
and
● Officers​ ​lower​ ​in​ ​rank​ ​whose​ ​appointments​ ​the​ ​Congress​ ​may​ ​by
law​ ​vest​ ​in​ ​the​ ​President​ ​alone.

Dissenting:
​ ​Gutierrez,​ ​JR:​ ​I​ ​agree​ ​with​ ​the​ ​intervenor​ ​that​ ​all​ ​provisions​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Constitution​​ ​on
appointments​ ​must​ ​be​ ​read​ ​together.​ ​In​ ​providing​ ​for​ ​the​ ​appointment​ ​of
members​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Supreme​ ​Court​ ​and​ ​judges​ ​of​ ​lower​ ​courts​ ​(Section​ ​9,​ ​Article
VIII),​ ​the​ ​Ombudsman​ ​and​ ​his​ ​deputies​ ​(Section​ ​9,​ ​Article​ ​XI),​ ​the​ ​Vice​ ​President
as​ ​a​ ​member​ ​of​ ​cabinet​ ​(Section​ ​3,​ ​Article​ ​VII)​ ​and,​ ​of​ ​course,​ ​those​ ​who​ ​by​ ​law
the​ ​President​ ​alone​ ​may​ ​appoint,​ ​the​ ​Constitution​​ ​clearly​ ​provides​ ​no​ ​need​ ​for
confirmation.​ ​This​ ​can​ ​only​ ​mean​ ​that​ ​all​ ​other​ ​appointments​ ​need​ ​confirmation.
Where​ ​there​ ​is​ ​no​ ​need​ ​for​ ​confirmation​ ​or​ ​where​ ​there​ ​is​ ​an​ ​alternative​ ​process
to​ ​confirmation,​ ​the​ ​Constitution​​ ​expressly​ ​so​ ​declares.​ ​Without​ ​such​ ​a
declaration,​ ​there​ ​must​ ​be​ ​confirmation.
The​ ​1973​ ​Constitution​​ ​dispensed​ ​with​ ​confirmation​ ​by​ ​a​ ​Commission​ ​on
Appointments​ ​because​ ​the​ ​government​ ​it​ ​set​ ​up​ ​was​ ​supposed​ ​to​ ​be​ ​a
parliamentary​ ​one.​ ​The​ ​Prime​ ​Minister,​ ​as​ ​head​ ​of​ ​government,​ ​was​ ​constantly
accountable​ ​to​ ​the​ ​legislature

​ ​(Sarmiento​ ​III​ ​v.​ ​Mison,​ ​G.R.​ ​No.​ ​L-79974,​ ​[December​ ​17,​ ​1987],​ ​240​ ​PHIL
|||​

505-546)
Carido​​ ​(9)​ ​Bautista​ ​v.​ ​Salonga,​ ​G.R.​ ​No.​ ​86439,​ ​April​ ​13,​ ​1989
G.R.​ ​No.​ ​86439​ ​April​ ​13,​ ​1989

PONENTE:​ ​J.​ ​PADILLA

DOCTRINE:​ ​The​ ​appointment​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Chairman​ ​and​ ​Members​ ​of​ ​the​ ​CHR​ ​is​ ​not​ ​specifically
provided​ ​for​ ​in​ ​the​ ​Constitution​ ​itself,​ ​unlike​ ​the​ ​Chairmen​ ​and​ ​Members​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Civil​ ​Service
Commission,​ ​the​ ​Commission​ ​on​ ​Elections​ ​and​ ​the​ ​Commission​ ​on​ ​Audit,​ ​whose​ ​appointments
are​ ​expressly​ ​vested​ ​by​ ​the​ ​Constitution​ ​in​ ​the​ ​President​ ​with​ ​the​ ​consent​ ​of​ ​the​ ​COA.​ ​The
President​ ​appoints​ ​the​ ​Chairman​ ​and​ ​Members​ ​of​ ​the​ ​CHR​ ​pursuant​ ​to​ ​the​ ​second​ ​sentence​ ​in
Sec​ ​16,​ ​Art.​ ​7,​ ​that​ ​is,​ ​without​ ​the​ ​confirmation​ ​of​ ​the​ ​COA​ ​because​ ​they​ ​are​ ​among​ ​the​ ​officers​ ​of
government​ ​“whom​ ​he​ ​(the​ ​President)​ ​may​ ​be​ ​authorized​ ​by​ ​law​ ​to​ ​appoint.”

FACTS:

On​ ​August​ ​27,​ ​1987,​ ​President​ ​Cory​ ​Aquino​ ​appointed​ ​petitioner​ ​Bautista​ ​as​ ​permanent​ ​Chairman​ ​of​ ​the
Commission​ ​on​ ​Human​ ​Rights​ ​(CHR)​ ​ ​pursuant​ ​to​ ​the​ ​second​ ​sentence​ ​in​ ​Section​ ​16,​ ​Art.​ ​VII,​ ​without​ ​the
confirmation​ ​of​ ​the​ ​CoA​ ​because​ ​they​ ​are​ ​among​ ​the​ ​officers​ ​of​ ​government​ ​"whom​ ​he​ ​(the​ ​President)
may​ ​be​ ​authorized​ ​by​ ​law​ ​to​ ​appoint."​ ​.​ ​Bautista​ ​took​ ​her​ ​oath​ ​of​ ​office​ ​on​ ​December​ ​22,​ ​1988​ ​to​ ​Chief
Justice​ ​Marcelo​ ​Fernan​ ​and​ ​immediately​ ​acted​ ​as​ ​such.

On​ ​January​ ​9,​ ​1989,​ ​the​ ​Secretary​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Commission​ ​on​ ​Appointments​ ​(CoA)​ ​wrote​ ​a​ ​letter​ ​to​ ​Bautista
requesting​ ​for​ ​her​ ​presence​ ​along​ ​with​ ​several​ ​documents​ ​at​ ​the​ ​office​ ​of​ ​CoA​ ​on​ ​January​ ​19.​ ​Bautista
then​ ​wrote​ ​a​ ​letter​ ​to​ ​the​ ​COA​ ​Chairman,​ ​Senate​ ​President​ ​Jovito​ ​Salonga,​ ​and​ ​she​ ​explained​ ​that​ ​her
position​ ​as​ ​chairwoman​ ​of​ ​the​ ​CHR​ ​does​ ​not​ ​require​ ​confirmation​ ​by​ ​the​ ​COA​ ​as​ ​laid​ ​down​ ​in​ ​the​ ​case​ ​of
Sarmiento​ ​vs​ ​Mison.

While waiting for the progress of the case, President Aquino appointed Hesiquio R. Mallillin as "Acting
Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights" but he was not able to sit in his appointive office because
of Bautista's refusal to surrender her post. In 1989, the COA finally disapproved the appointment of
Bautista.​ ​COA​ ​considered​ ​Bautista’s​ ​appointment​ ​as​ ​“ad​ ​interim”.

Bautista went to the Supreme Court and questioned COA’s actions. She impleaded Mallillin. Mallillin
invoked EO 163-A which provides that the tenure of the Chairman and the Commissioners of the CHR
should be at the pleasure of the President thus stating that Bautista shall be subsequently removed as
well. Section 2(c), Executive Order No. 163, authorizes the President to appoint the Chairman and
Members of the Commission on Human Rights. Hence, since Cory left the issue with the COA and the
latter​ ​decided​ ​not​ ​to​ ​confirm​ ​Bautista,​ ​Mallillin​ ​should​ ​be​ ​allowed​ ​to​ ​take​ ​his​ ​seat​ ​as​ ​chairman​ ​of​ ​the​ ​CHR.
​ ​ISSUES:

1.​ ​Whether​ ​or​ ​not​ ​Bautista's​ ​appointment​ ​is​ ​subject​ ​to​ ​CoA's​ ​confirmation.
2.​ ​Whether​ ​or​ ​not​ ​Bautista's​ ​appointment​ ​is​ ​an​ ​ad​ ​interim​ ​appointment.

RULING:
1. No. The appointment of the Chairman and Members of the CHR is not specifically provided for in the
Constitution itself, unlike the Chairmen and Members of the Civil Service Commission, the Commission
on Elections and the Commission on Audit, whose appointments are expressly vested by the Constitution
in the President with the consent of the COA. The President appoints the Chairman and Members of the
CHR pursuant to the second sentence in Sec 16, Art. 7, that is, without the confirmation of the COA
because they are among the officers of government “whom he (the President) may be authorized by law
to appoint.” The law which authorizes the president to make appointments to the CHR is Executive Order
No.​ ​163.

The act of Cory submitting Bautista’s appointment to the COA for confirmation is merely political in nature
and it has no basis in law or in the constitution. Appointment to the CHR should be made without the
participation of the COA. Thus, Cory’s act of submitting the appointment of Bautista to the CHR is done
without​ ​or​ ​in​ ​excess​ ​of​ ​jurisdiction.

Even assuming ​arguendo that the President can submit such appointment to the COA for the latter’s
approval or rejection, such submission is not valid because at the time of submission, the office of the
chairman (chairwoman) of the CHR is not vacant – as at that time, Bautista already took her oath and was
the​ ​incumbent​ ​CHR​ ​chairperson.

There is also no basis for the COA to consider Bautista’s appointment as “ad interim”. Since the position
of chairman and members of the CHR are not subject to COA confirmation, all appointments to the CHR
are​ ​always​ ​permanent​ ​and​ ​cannot​ ​be​ ​ad​ ​interim.

Anent the argument of Mallillin that EO 163-A provides that the chairman and members of the CHR may
be removed at the pleasure of the president, the same is not valid. Thus, EO 163-A is unconstitutional.
Note that the earlier EO 163 provides that the chairman and the members of the CHR shall have a term of
7 years. The Chairman and the Commissioners of the CHR cannot be removed at the pleasure of the
president for it is guaranteed that they must have a term of office. They can only be removed upon cause
and​ ​with​ ​the​ ​observance​ ​of​ ​due​ ​process.
2. Under the Constitutional design, ad interim appointments do not apply to appointments solely for the
President to make. Ad interim appointments, by their very nature under the 1987 Constitution, extend only
to appointments where the review of the Commission on Appointments is needed. That is why ad interim
appointments are to remain valid until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next
adjournment of Congress; but appointments that are for the President solely to make, that is, without the
participation​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Commission​ ​on​ ​Appointments,​ ​cannot​ ​be​ ​ad​ ​interim​ ​appointments.
Betguen​​ ​(10)​ ​Aytona​ ​v.​ ​Castillo,​ ​4​ ​SCRA​ ​1

Aytona​ ​vs.​ ​Castillo

Doctrine: ​The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the
Congress, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission
on​ ​Appointments​ ​or​ ​until​ ​the​ ​next​ ​adjournment​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Congress.
Under these constitutional provisions there seems to be no doubt that the President may make
the appointment, and if approved by the Commission on Appointments, it would
unquestionably be lawful, valid and effective, but if disapproved or not acted upon by the
Commission on Appointments then the appointment becomes ineffectual and the appointee
ceases​ ​and​ ​can​ ​no​ ​longer​ ​perform​ ​the​ ​duties​ ​of​ ​the​ ​office​ ​to​ ​which​ ​he​ ​had​ ​been​ ​appointed.

● Facts: ​On December 29, 1961, then President Carlos P. Garcia appointed Dominador R.
Aytona as ​ad interim Governor of the Central Bank. On the same day, the latter took the
corresponding oath. On December 30, 1961, at noon, President-elect Diosdado
Macapagal assumed office​, and on December 31, 1961, he issued A. O. No. 2 recalling,
withdrawing, and cancelling all ​ad interim ​appointment made by President Garcia after December
13, 1961. On January 1, 1962, President Macapagal appointed Andres V. Castillo as ​ad interim
Governor of the Central Bank, and the latter qualified immediately. On January 2, 1962, both
appointed exercised the powers of their office, although Castillo informed Aytona of his title
thereto. However, the next day and thereafter, Aytona was definitely prevented from holding
office​ ​in​ ​the​ ​Central​ ​Bank.
● Aytona then filed a ​quo warranto proceeding,​ challenging Castillo’s right to exercise the powers
of Governor of the Central Bank. He claims that he was validly appointed and had qualified for the
post, and therefore, the subsequent appointment and qualification of Castillo was void, because
the position was then occupied by him. Castillo replies that the appointment of Aytona had been
revoked​ ​by​ ​A.​ ​O.​ ​No.​ ​2​ ​of​ ​Macapagal.
●
● Issue: The issue is whether the new President had power to issue the order of
cancellation of the ​ad interim appointments made by the past President, even after the
appointees​ ​had​ ​already​ ​qualified.
●
Held: No, it is not valid. The record shows that President Garcia sent to the Commission on
Appointments​, which was not then in session, submitting “for confirmation” ​ad interim appointments for
several positions. Another communication of President Garcia bearing the same date, submitted a list of
ad interim appointments of another several appointments. A third communication likewise dated
December 29, 1961, addressed to the Commission on Appointments another list of ad interim
appointments for several positions. There were other appointments thus submitted by President Garcia
on​ ​that​ ​date,​ ​December​ ​29,​ ​1961.​ ​All​ ​in​ ​all,​ ​about​ ​350​ ​“midnight”​ ​or​ ​“last​ ​minute”​ ​appointments.

The filling up vacancies in important positions, if few, and so spaced to afford some
assurance of deliberate action and careful consideration of the need for the appointment and the
appointee’s qualifications may undoubtedly be permitted. But the issuance of 350 appointments
in one night and planned induction of almost all of them a few hours before the inauguration of
the new President may, with some reason, be regarded by the latter as an abuse Presidential
prerogatives, the steps taken being apparently a mere partisan effort to fill all vacant positions
irrespective of fitness and other conditions, and thereby deprive the new administration of an
opportunity​ ​to​ ​make​ ​the​ ​corresponding​ ​appointments.
After the proclamation of then Pres. Macapagal, precedent President Garcia administration was
no more than a “care-taker” administration. He was duty bound to prepare for the orderly transfer of
authority to the incoming President, and he should not do acts which ought to know, would embarrass or
obstruct the policies of his successor. An ad interim appointment is exercised by the president as he’s
special prerogative and is bound to be prudent to insure approval of his selection either previous
consultation with the members of the Commission on Appointments or by thereafter explaining to them
the reason such selection. It is expected that the President should exercise double care in extending
such appointments. In the case at bar, it is hard to believe that in signing 350 appointments in one night,
President Garcia exercised double care; and therefore, such appointments fall beyond the intent and spirit
of​ ​the​ ​constitutional​ ​provision​ ​granting​ ​the​ ​Executive​ ​authority​ ​to​ ​issue​​ ​ad​ ​interim​ ​appointments
Garcia’s appointments are hurried maneuvers to subvert the upcoming administration and is set
to obstruct the policies of the next president. As a general rule, once a person is qualified his
appointment should not be revoked but in here it may be since his appointment was grounded on
bad faith, immorality and impropriety. In public service, it is not only legality that is considered
but​ ​also​ ​justice,​ ​fairness​ ​and​ ​righteousness

Barrera,​ ​J​.,​ ​dissenting:

Precedents are to the effect that when once an appointment has been extended by the
Chief Executive who, as is provided in our Constitution, has the sole power of appointment
subject only to the consent of the Commission on Appointments, and the appointee has accepted
the appointment, the same becomes complete and the appointing power cannot withdraw it
except in cases where the tenure of the appointee is at the Chief Executive’s pleasure or upon
grounds justifying removal and after due process. This is not because the appointment constitutes
a contract (for truly a public office cannot be subject of any contract), but because of the
provisions of the Constitution itself to the effect that “no officer or employee in the Civil Service
shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law.” If, therefore, the recall or
the withdrawal of the appointment of Aytona was not authorized by law, then his assumption of
the functions of his office on January 2, 1962 was clearly within his legal right and the
interference of Castillo, aggravated by the assistance or at least the presence of members of the
Armed​ ​Forces,​ ​was​ ​clearly​ ​unlawful.
I would say that all the circumstances cited by the respondents that have surrounded the issuance
of the appointments in question, have to do with the mode or manner of the exercise of the
authority to make the appointment, quite apart from the existence of the authority itself. The
observance of good faith, morality and propriety by the other two co-equal coordinate
departments in the performance of their functions must be secured by their sense of duty and
official​ ​oath​ ​hand​ ​not​ ​by​ ​any​ ​supervisory​ ​power​ ​of​ ​the​ ​courts.
The role of courts in our scheme of government is to interpret the law and render justice under it.
This simply means that whatever may be our own personal feelings as to the propriety, morality,
or wisdom of any official act or actuation of a public officer or any agency of the government
within their respective competence brought to the attention of the Court for adjudication, they
should not be permitted to prevail over clear legal considerations, for ours is a regime under the
Rule​ ​of​ ​Law.
Fullante​​ ​(11)​ ​Jorge​ ​v.​ ​Mayor,​ ​10​ ​SCRA​ ​331
G.R.​ ​No.​ ​L-21776,​ ​February​ ​28,​ ​1964
NICANOR​ ​G.​ ​JORGE,​ ​petitioner,
vs.​ ​JOVENCIO​ ​Q.​ ​MAYOR,​ ​respondent.
Ponente:​ ​REYES,​ ​J.B.L.

DOCTRINE​ ​:​ ​In​ ​the​ ​absence​ ​of​ ​competent​ ​evidence​ ​to​ ​the​ ​contrary,​ ​it​ ​is​ ​to​ ​be​ ​presumed​ ​that​ ​the
appointment​ ​of​ ​Jorge​ ​was​ ​made​ ​before​ ​the​ ​close​ ​of​ ​office​ ​hours,​ ​that​ ​being​ ​the​ ​regular​ ​course​ ​of
business.​ ​The​ ​appointment,​ ​therefore,​ ​was​ ​not​ ​included​ ​in,​ ​nor​ ​intended​ ​to​ ​be​ ​covered​ ​by,
Administrative​ ​Order​ ​No.​ ​2,​ ​and​ ​the​ ​same​ ​stands​ ​unrevoked.

FACTS:​ ​Nicanor​ ​G.​ ​Jorge,​ ​is​ ​a​ ​career​ ​official​ ​in​ ​the​ ​Bureau​ ​of​ ​Lands.​ ​He​ ​started​ ​working​ ​there​ ​as​ ​a
Junior​ ​Computer​ ​in​ ​the​ ​course​ ​of​ ​38​ ​years​ ​service,​ ​from​ ​February​ ​1,​ ​1922​ ​to​ ​October​ ​31,​ ​1960,​ ​and
attained​ ​the​ ​position​ ​of​ ​Acting​ ​Director,​ ​through​ ​regular​ ​and​ ​successive​ ​promotions,​ ​in
accordance​ ​with​ ​civil​ ​service​ ​rules.​ ​On​ ​June​ ​17,​ ​1961,​ ​he​ ​was​ ​designated​ ​Acting​ ​Director​ ​of​ ​the
same​ ​Bureau,​ ​and​ ​on​ ​December​ ​13,​ ​1961​ ​was​ ​appointed​ ​by​ ​President​ ​Carlos​ ​Garcia​ ​ad​ ​interim
Director.​ ​He​ ​qualified​ ​by​ ​taking​ ​the​ ​oath​ ​of​ ​office​ ​on​ ​the​ ​December​ ​23,​ ​1961.​ ​His​ ​appointment​ ​was
on​ ​December​ ​26,​ ​1961,​ ​transmitted​ ​to​ ​the​ ​Commission​ ​on​ ​Appointments,​ ​and​ ​on​ ​May​ ​14,​ ​1962,
petitioner's​ ​ad​ ​interim​ ​appointment​ ​as​ ​Director​ ​of​ ​Lands​ ​was​ ​confirmed​ ​by​ ​the​ ​Commission.​ ​On
November​ ​14,​ ​1962​ ​he​ ​received​ ​a​ ​letter​ ​from​ ​Benjamin​ ​Gozon,​ ​then​ ​Secretary​ ​of​ ​Agriculture​ ​and
Natural​ ​Resources​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Macapagal​ ​administration,​ ​informing​ ​him​ ​that​ ​pursuant​ ​to​ ​a​ ​letter​ ​from
the​ ​Assistant​ ​Executive​ ​Secretary​ ​Bernal,​ ​served​ ​on​ ​Jorge​ ​on​ ​November​ ​13,​ ​his​ ​appointment​ ​was
among​ ​those​ ​revoked​ ​by​ ​Administrative​ ​Order​ ​No.​ ​2​ ​of​ ​President​ ​Diosdado​ ​Macapagal;​ ​that​ ​the
position​ ​of​ ​Director​ ​of​ ​Lands​ ​was​ ​considered​ ​vacant;​ ​and​ ​that​ ​Jorge​ ​was​ ​designated​ ​Acting
Director​ ​of​ ​Lands,​ ​effective​ ​November​ ​13,​ ​1962.​ ​Upon​ ​learning​ ​that​ ​Mayor,​ ​an​ ​outsider,​ ​had​ ​been
designate​ ​by​ ​the​ ​President​ ​to​ ​be​ ​Acting​ ​Director​ ​of​ ​Lands​ ​Jorge​ ​protested​ ​(in​ ​a​ ​letter​ ​of​ ​November
16,​ ​1962)​ ​to​ ​the​ ​Secretary​ ​of​ ​Agriculture​ ​informing​ ​the​ ​latter​ ​that​ ​he​ ​would​ ​stand​ ​on​ ​his​ ​rights,​ ​and
issued​ ​office​ ​circulars​ ​claiming​ ​to​ ​be​ ​the​ ​legally​ ​appointed​ ​Director​ ​of​ ​Lands.​ ​Finally,​ ​on
September​ ​2,​ ​1963,​ ​he​ ​instituted​ ​the​ ​present​ ​proceedings.

ISSUE:​ ​Whether​ ​or​ ​not​ ​Administrative​ ​Order​ ​No.​ ​2​ ​of​ ​President​ ​Macapaga​ ​operated​ ​as​ ​a​ ​valid
revocation​ ​of​ ​Jorge's​ ​ad​ ​interim​ ​appointment.

HELD:​ ​No.​ ​The​ ​SC​ ​ruled​ ​that​ ​Nicanor​ ​G.​ ​Jorge​ ​is​ ​declared​ ​to​ ​be​ ​the​ ​duly​ ​appointed,​ ​confirmed,
and​ ​qualified​ ​Director​ ​of​ ​Lands.
Petitioner​ ​Jorge's​ ​ad​ ​interim​ ​appointment​ ​is​ ​dated​ ​December​ ​13,​ ​1961,​ ​but​ ​there​ ​is​ ​no​ ​evidence​ ​on
record​ ​that​ ​it​ ​was​ ​made​ ​and​ ​released​ ​after​ ​the​ ​joint​ ​session​ ​of​ ​Congress​ ​that​ ​ended​ ​on​ ​the​ ​same
day.​ ​It​ ​is​ ​a​ ​matter​ ​of​ ​contemporary​ ​history,​ ​of​ ​which​ ​SC​ ​may​ ​take​ ​judicial​ ​cognizance,​ ​that​ ​the
session​ ​ended​ ​late​ ​in​ ​the​ ​night​ ​of​ ​December​ ​13,​ ​1961,​ ​and,​ ​therefore,​ ​after​ ​regular​ ​office​ ​hours.​ ​In
the​ ​absence​ ​of​ ​competent​ ​evidence​ ​to​ ​the​ ​contrary,​ ​it​ ​is​ ​to​ ​be​ ​presumed​ ​that​ ​the​ ​appointment​ ​of
Jorge​ ​was​ ​made​ ​before​ ​the​ ​close​ ​of​ ​office​ ​hours,​ ​that​ ​being​ ​the​ ​regular​ ​course​ ​of​ ​business.​ ​The
appointment,​ ​therefore,​ ​was​ ​not​ ​included​ ​in,​ ​nor​ ​intended​ ​to​ ​be​ ​covered​ ​by,​ ​Administrative​ ​Order
No.​ ​2,​ ​and​ ​the​ ​same​ ​stands​ ​unrevoked.​ ​Consequently,​ ​it​ ​was​ ​validly​ ​confirmed​ ​by​ ​the​ ​Commission
on​ ​Appointments,​ ​and​ ​thereafter,​ ​the​ ​office​ ​never​ ​became​ ​vacant.
In​ ​common​ ​with​ ​the​ ​Gillera​ ​appointment​ ​sustained​ ​by​ ​the​ ​SC,​ ​Jorge's​ ​appointment​ ​is​ ​featured​ ​by
a​ ​recognition​ ​of​ ​his​ ​tenure​ ​by​ ​the​ ​Macapagal​ ​administration​ ​itself,​ ​since​ ​he​ ​was​ ​allowed​ ​to​ ​hold
and​ ​discharge​ ​undisturbed​ ​his​ ​duties​ ​as​ ​de​ ​jure​ ​Director​ ​of​ ​Lands​ ​for​ ​nearly​ ​eleven​ ​months​ ​and​ ​it
was​ ​only​ ​in​ ​mid-November​ ​of​ ​1962​ ​that​ ​the​ ​attempt​ ​was​ ​actually​ ​made​ ​to​ ​demote​ ​him​ ​and​ ​appoint
a​ ​rank​ ​outsider​ ​in​ ​his​ ​place​ ​in​ ​the​ ​person​ ​of​ ​respondent​ ​Mayor.
If​ ​anyone​ ​is​ ​entitled​ ​to​ ​the​ ​protection​ ​of​ ​the​ ​civil​ ​service​ ​provisions​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Constitution,
particularly​ ​those​ ​against​ ​removals​ ​without​ ​lawful​ ​cause,​ ​it​ ​must​ ​be​ ​the​ ​officers​ ​who,​ ​like​ ​Jorge,
entered​ ​the​ ​Civil​ ​Service​ ​in​ ​their​ ​youth,​ ​bent​ ​on​ ​making​ ​a​ ​career​ ​out​ ​of​ ​it,​ ​gave​ ​it​ ​the​ ​best​ ​years​ ​of
their​ ​lives​ ​and​ ​grew​ ​gray​ ​therein​ ​in​ ​the​ ​hope​ ​and​ ​expectation​ ​that​ ​they​ ​would​ ​eventually​ ​attain​ ​the
upper​ ​reaches​ ​and​ ​levels​ ​of​ ​the​ ​official​ ​hierarchy,​ ​not​ ​through​ ​political​ ​patronage,​ ​but​ ​through
loyalty,​ ​merit,​ ​and​ ​faithful​ ​and​ ​unremitting​ ​toil.
WHEREFORE,​ ​the​ ​writs​ ​applied​ ​for​ ​are​ ​granted,​ ​the​ ​petitioner​ ​Nicanor​ ​G.​ ​Jorge​ ​is​ ​declared​ ​to​ ​be
the​ ​duly​ ​appointed,​ ​confirmed,​ ​and​ ​qualified​ ​Director​ ​of​ ​Lands,​ ​the​ ​respondent,​ ​Jovencio​ ​Q.
Mayor,​ ​is​ ​required​ ​to​ ​turn​ ​over​ ​said​ ​office​ ​to​ ​the​ ​petitioner​ ​and​ ​to​ ​desist​ ​from​ ​holding​ ​self​ ​out​ ​as
"Acting​ ​Director​ ​of​ ​Lands".
Gutierrez​​ ​(12)​ ​Quimsing​ ​v.​ ​Tajanglangit,​ ​10​ ​SCRA​ ​446
DOCTRINE:
Any motion to reconsider the vote on any appointment may be laid on the table, and this shall be a final
disposition of such a motion. Notice of confirmation or disapproval of an appointment shall not be sent to
the President of the Philippines before the expiration of the period for its reconsideration, or while a
motion​ ​for​ ​reconsideration​ ​is​ ​pending.
FACTS:
On May 20, 1960, Godofredo Quimsing was designated Acting Chief of Police of Iloilo City. On December
20, 1961, and while such incumbent of the office, he was extended by then President Garcia an
ad-interim appointment to the same position. Quimsing took his oath of office before the City Mayor of
Iloilo​ ​on​ ​December​ ​28,​ ​1961,​ ​and​ ​continued​ ​discharging​ ​the​ ​functions​ ​of​ ​Chief​ ​of​ ​Police​ ​of​ ​said​ ​city.
At the session of the Commission on Appointments on May 16, 1962, the appointment of Quimsing,
among others was confirmed. On the following day, however, at the session of said body , Senator Puyat
moved for the reconsideration of all appointments previously confirmed, manifesting at the same time that
said "motion for reconsideration be laid on the table." Furthermore, he moved for the adjournment of the
session of the Commission ​sine die​. There being no objection, said motion was approved and the session
was​ ​adjourn.
On June 11, 1962, President Macapagal designated Eduardo Tajanglangit as Acting Chief of Police of
Iloilo City and the latter took his oath and tried to discharge the functions of the office on June 13, 1962.
On​ ​July​ ​12,​ ​1962,​ ​the​ ​present​ ​petition​ ​was​ ​filed​ ​for​ ​the​ ​reason​ ​already​ ​stated​ ​above.
Respondent Tajanglangit, in his answer, claimed among others, that petitioner's ​ad-interim appointment
was a nullity in view of the President's Administrative Order No. 2, withdrawing, cancelling, or recalling
ad-interim appointments extended after December 13, 1961; and that the alleged confirmation of
petitioner's ​ad-interim appointment by the Commission on Appointments did not also produce any effect,
because the same had been the subject of a motion for reconsideration and no further action has been
taken​ ​on​ ​said​ ​appointment​ ​until​ ​the​ ​present​ ​time.
It is evident that respondent's designation as Acting Chief of Police of the City of Iloilo was made on the
assumption that petitioner's occupancy thereof was illegal. This brings us to the question of the validity
and effect of the ​ad-interim appointment extended to petitioner Quimsing on December 20, 1961 and the
confirmation​ ​thereof​ ​and​ ​subsequent​ ​action​ ​taken​ ​by​ ​the​ ​Commission​ ​on​ ​Appointments.
Respondent Tajanglangit, in resisting the claim of petitioner Quimsing, invokes the President's
Administrative Order No. 2, series of 1962 and the ruling of this Court on the ​Aytona v. Castillo case. In
the various cases decided by this Court after the ​Aytona v. Castillo case, the matter of the validity of
appointments made after December 13, 1961 by former Administrative Order No. 2 (which was never
upheld by this Court) but, on the basis of the nature, character and merit of the individual appointments
and the particular circumstances surrounding the same. In other words, this Court did not declare that all
the ​ad-interim appointments made by the mere fact that the same were extended after said date nor that
they automatically come within the category of the "midnight" appointments, the validity of which were
doubted​ ​and​ ​which​ ​gave​ ​rise​ ​to​ ​the​ ​ruling​ ​in​ ​the​ ​Aytona​ ​case​ ​cited​ ​by​ ​respondent.
In the present case, petitioner Quimsing admittedly had been occupying the position in controversy, in an
acting capacity since May 20, 1960, and discharging the functions thereof. Clearly, it cannot be said that
the ad-interim appointment extended to him on December 20, 1961, by virtue of which he took his oath of
office on December 28, 1961 was one of those hurried designations that brought about the "scramble" on
the 29th and 30th of December, 1961, where the outgoing Chief Executive perhaps did not have the
opportunity to consider the merits and qualifications of the hundreds of nominees to the positions to which
they were respectively being appointed. The ​ad-interim appointment of petitioner, whose qualification is
not questioned except for the fact that it was made only December 20, 1961, cannot be considered as
among those "midnight" appointments the validity of which this Court declared to be, at least, doubtful to
entitle​ ​the​ ​appointees​ ​to​ ​the​ ​equitable​ ​relief​ ​of​ ​quo​ ​warranto​.
Respondent, however, contends that petitioner's appointment was not lawfully confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments in view of the motion for reconsideration of such confirmation, which has,
to​ ​the​ ​present,​ ​remained​ ​unacted​ ​upon.
ISSUE:
Whether​ ​or​ ​not​ ​Quimsing’s​ ​appointment​ ​was​ ​not​ ​lawfully​ ​confirmed,​ ​because​ ​of​ ​the​ ​motion​ ​for
reconsideration​ ​of​ ​his​ ​confirmation,​ ​which​ ​has,​ ​to​ ​the​ ​present,​ ​remained​ ​unacted​ ​upon
HELD:
The appointment of respondent Eduardo Tajanglangit to the position of Chief of Police of Iloilo City, which
was​ ​not​ ​vacant,​ ​was​ ​null​ ​and​ ​void.
The revised rules of the Commission on Appointments, insofar as pertinent to the issue thus raised,
provide:
SEC. 21. Resolution of the Commission on any appointment may be reconsidered on motion by a
member presented not more than one (1) day after their approval. If a majority of the members
present concur to grant a reconsideration, the appointment shall be reopened and submitted
anew to the Commission. ​Any motion to reconsider the vote on any appointment may be laid on
the​ ​table,​ ​and​ ​this​ ​shall​ ​be​ ​a​ ​final​ ​disposition​ ​of​ ​such​ ​a​ ​motion.
SEC. 22. ​Notice of confirmation or disapproval of an appointment shall not be sent to the
President of the Philippines before the expiration of the period for its reconsideration, or ​while a
motion​ ​for​ ​reconsideration​ ​is​ ​pending​.
As stated before, the motion of Senator Puyat, for reconsideration of the confirmations made the day
before, among which was herein petitioner's, was coupled with prayer, not for a resubmission of said
appointments anew, but for the laying of the motion (for reconsideration) on the table. Under the
aforequoted Section 21 of the rules of said body the "laying on the table" of the motion shall be the final
disposition thereof. In other words, no further action need be taken by the Commission thereon. It is as if
no​ ​motion​ ​for​ ​reconsideration​ ​was​ ​filed​ ​at​ ​all.
From Section 22 of the said rules, the Commission on Appointments may either confirm or disapprove an
appointment, and notice of such action shall not be conveyed to the President while a motion for
reconsideration is pending. It has been established here that on July 19, 1962, notice of the confirmation
of Quimsing's appointment was delivered to Malacañang. This action by the Commission on
Appointments supports the conclusion that the laying of a motion for reconsideration on the table does not
have the effect of withholding the effectivity of the confirmation, nor is it synonymous with disapproval of
the​ ​appointment.​ ​In​ ​fact,​ ​it​ ​is​ ​recognition​ ​that​ ​the​ ​appointment​ ​was​ ​confirmed.
Estrella​​ ​(13)​ ​People​ ​v.​ ​Vera,​ ​65​ ​Phil.​ ​56
People​ ​v.​ ​Vera
G.R.​ ​No.​ ​L-45685​ ​November​ ​16,​ ​1937

Ponente:​ ​Laurel,​ ​J.

Doctrine: The Probation Act does not conflict with the pardoning power of the Executive. The
pardoning power, in respect to those serving their probationary sentences, remains as full and
complete as if the Probation Law had never been enacted. The President may yet pardon the
probationer and thus place it beyond the power of the court to order his rearrest and
imprisonment.
As a rule, an act of the legislature is incomplete and hence invalid if it does not lay down any rule
or definite standard by which the administrative officer or board may be guided in the exercise of
the​ ​discretionary​ ​powers​ ​delegated​ ​to​ ​it.
Facts:

The instant proceedings have to do with the application for probation filed by the
herein respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng on November 27, 1936, before the trial court, under the
provisions of Act No. 4221 of the defunct Philippine Legislature. Herein respondent Mariano Cu
Unjieng states in his petition, inter alia, that he is innocent of the crime of which he was convicted,
that he has no criminal record and that he would observe good conduct in the future. The Court of
First Instance of Manila, Judge Pedro Tuason presiding, referred the application for probation of
the Insular Probation Office which recommended denial of the same June 18, 1937. Thereafter, the
Court of First Instance of Manila, seventh branch, Judge Jose O. Vera presiding, set the petition
for​ ​hearing​ ​on​ ​April​ ​5,​ ​1937.

On April 2, 1937, the Fiscal of the City of Manila filed an opposition to the granting of probation to
the herein respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng. The private prosecution also filed an opposition on
April 5, 1937, alleging, among other things, that Act No. 4221, assuming that it has not been
repealed by section 2 of Article XV of the Constitution, is nevertheless violative of section 1,
subsection (1), Article III of the Constitution guaranteeing equal protection of the laws for the
reason that its applicability is not uniform throughout the Islands and because section 11 of the
said Act endows the provincial boards with the power to make said law effective or otherwise in
their respective or otherwise in their respective provinces. The private prosecution also filed a
supplementary opposition on April 19, 1937, elaborating on the alleged unconstitutionality on Act
No. 4221, as an undue delegation of legislative power to the provincial boards of several
provinces (sec. 1, Art. VI, Constitution). The City Fiscal concurred in the opposition of the private
prosecution except with respect to the questions raised concerning the constitutionality of Act
No.​ ​4221.

Issue:
1)​ ​Whether​ ​Act​ ​No.​ ​442​ ​encroaches​ ​upon​ ​the​ ​pardoning​ ​power​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Executive
2) Whether Act No. 442 (Probation Law) is unconstitutional on the ground that it constitutes an
undue​ ​delegation​ ​of​ ​legislative​ ​power

Held:
1) ​No. Section 21 of the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, commonly known as the Jones Law,
in force at the time of the approval of Act No. 4221, otherwise known as the Probation Act, vests in
the Governor-General of the Philippines "the exclusive power to grant pardons and reprieves and
remit fines and forfeitures". This power is now vested in the President of the Philippines. (Art. VII,
sec.​ ​11,​ ​subsec.​ ​6.)
Probation​ ​and​ ​pardon​ ​are​ ​not​ ​coterminous;​ ​nor​ ​are​ ​they​ ​the​ ​same.
In probation, the probationer is in no true sense, as in pardon, a free man. He is not finally and
completely exonerated. He is not exempt from the entire punishment which the law inflicts. Under
the Probation Act, the probationer's case is not terminated by the mere fact that he is placed on
probation. Section 4 of the Act provides that the probation may be definitely terminated and the
probationer finally discharged from supervision only after the period of probation shall have been
terminated and the probation officer shall have submitted a report, and the court shall have found
that the probationer has complied with the conditions of probation. The probationer, then, during
the period of probation, remains in legal custody — subject to the control of the probation officer
and of the court; and, he may be rearrested upon the non-fulfillment of the conditions of probation
and, when rearrested, may be committed to prison to serve the sentence originally imposed upon
him.
We conclude that the Probation Act does not conflict with the pardoning power of the Executive.
The pardoning power, in respect to those serving their probationary sentences, remains as full
and complete as if the Probation Law had never been enacted. The President may yet pardon the
probationer and thus place it beyond the power of the court to order his rearrest and
imprisonment.

2) Yes. The power to make laws — the legislative power — is vested in a bicameral Legislature by
the Jones Law and in a unicamiral National Assembly by the Constitution. The Philippine
Legislature or the National Assembly may not escape its duties and responsibilities by delegating
that power to any other body or authority. Any attempt to abdicate the power is unconstitutional
and void, on the principle that potestas delegata non delegare potest​. The rule, however, which
forbids the delegation of legislative power is not absolute and inflexible. It admits of exceptions.
An exceptions sanctioned by immemorial practice permits the central legislative body to delegate
legislative powers to local authorities. On quite the same principle, Congress is powered to
delegate legislative power to such agencies in the territories of the United States as it may select.
Courts have also sustained the delegation of legislative power to the people at large. Doubtless,
also, legislative power may be delegated by the Constitution itself. Section 14, paragraph 2, of
article VI of the Constitution of the Philippines provides that “The National Assembly may by law
authorize the President, subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, to fix within
specified limits, tariff rates, import or export quotas, and tonnage and wharfage dues.” And
section 16 of the same article of the Constitution provides that “In times of war or other national
emergency, the National Assembly may by law authorize the President, for a limited period and
subject to such restrictions as it may prescribed, to promulgate rules and regulations to carry out
a​ ​declared​ ​national​ ​policy.”
The case before us does not fall under any of the exceptions hereinabove mentioned. The
challenged​ ​section​ ​of​ ​Act​ ​No.​ ​4221​ ​in​ ​section​ ​11​ ​which​ ​reads​ ​as​ ​follows:

This Act shall apply only in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have
provided for the salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than those now provided for
provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall
be​ ​subject​ ​to​ ​the​ ​direction​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Probation​ ​Office.​ ​(Emphasis​ ​ours.)

In testing whether a statute constitute an undue delegation of legislative power or not, it is usual
to inquire whether the statute was complete in all its terms and provisions when it left the hands
of the legislature so that nothing was left to the judgment of any other appointee or delegate of
the​ ​legislature.
The general rule, however, is limited by another rule that to a certain extent matters of detail may
be left to be filled in by rules and regulations to be adopted or promulgated by executive officers
and​ ​administrative​ ​boards.

As a rule, an act of the legislature is incomplete and hence invalid if it does not lay down
any rule or definite standard by which the administrative officer or board may be guided in the
exercise of the discretionary powers delegated to it. In the case at bar, what rules are to guide the
provincial boards in the exercise of their discretionary power to determine whether or not the
Probation Act shall apply in their respective provinces? What standards are fixed by the Act? We
do not find any and none has been pointed to us by the respondents. The probation Act does not,
by the force of any of its provisions, fix and impose upon the provincial boards any standard or
guide in the exercise of their discretionary power. What is granted is a“roving commission” which
enables the provincial boards to exercise arbitrary discretion. By section 11 if the Act, the
legislature does not seemingly on its own authority extend the benefits of the Probation Act to the
provinces but in reality leaves the entire matter for the various provincial boards to determine. In
other words, the provincial boards of the various provinces are to determine for themselves,
whether the Probation Law shall apply to their provinces or not at all. The applicability and
application of the Probation Act are entirely placed in the hands of the provincial boards. If the
provincial board does not wish to have the Act applied in its province, all that it has to do is to
decline​ ​to​ ​appropriate​ ​the​ ​needed​ ​amount​ ​for​ ​the​ ​salary​ ​of​ ​a​ ​probation​ ​officer.
Abon​​ ​(14)​ ​Barrioquinto​ ​v.​ ​Fernandez,​ ​82​ ​Phil.​ ​642
LORETO​ ​BARRIOQUINTO​ ​and​ ​NORBERTO​ ​JIMENEZ
vs.
ENRIQUE​ ​A.​ ​FERNANDEZ,​ ​ANTONIO​ ​BELMONTE​ ​and​ ​FELICISIMO​ ​OCAMPO,​ ​as​ ​Commissioners
of​ ​the​ ​Fourteenth​ ​Guerrilla​ ​Amnesty​ ​Commission

DOCTRINE:​ ​There​ ​is​ ​no​ ​necessity​ ​for​ ​an​ ​accused​ ​to​ ​admit​ ​his​ ​responsibility​ ​for​ ​the​ ​commission​ ​of
a​ ​criminal​ ​act​ ​before​ ​a​ ​court​ ​of​ ​Amnesty​ ​Commission​ ​may​ ​investigate​ ​and​ ​extend​ ​or​ ​not​ ​to​ ​him
the​ ​benefits​ ​of​ ​amnesty;​ ​it​ ​is​ ​sufficient​ ​that​ ​the​ ​evidence​ ​either​ ​of​ ​the​ ​complainant​ ​or​ ​the​ ​accused,
shows​ ​that​ ​the​ ​offense​ ​committed​ ​comes​ ​within​ ​the​ ​terms​ ​of​ ​said​ ​Amnesty​ ​Proclamation.
FACTS:
This​ ​is​ ​a​ ​special​ ​action​ ​of​ ​mandamus​ ​instituted​ ​by​ ​the​ ​petitioners​ ​against​ ​the​ ​respondents​ ​who
composed​ ​the​ ​14th​ ​Guerrilla​ ​Amnesty​ ​Commission,​ ​to​ ​compel​ ​the​ ​latter​ ​to​ ​act​ ​and​ ​decide​ ​whether
or​ ​not​ ​the​ ​petitioners​ ​are​ ​entitled​ ​to​ ​the​ ​benefits​ ​of​ ​amnesty.
An​ ​information​ ​for​ ​the​ ​crime​ ​of​ ​murder​ ​was​ ​filed​ ​against​ ​petitioners​ ​with​ ​the​ ​Court​ ​of​ ​First
Instance​ ​of​ ​Zamboanga.​ ​Because​ ​Barrioquinto​ ​was​ ​then​ ​at​ ​large,​ ​the​ ​information​ ​was​ ​dismissed
and​ ​a​ ​separate​ ​criminal​ ​case​ ​was​ ​instituted​ ​against​ ​him.​ ​Jimenez​ ​was​ ​tried​ ​with​ ​other​ ​accused
and​ ​sentenced​ ​to​ ​life​ ​imprisonment.​ ​Within​ ​the​ ​time​ ​for​ ​appeal,​ ​Jimenez​ ​became​ ​aware​ ​of
Proclamation​ ​No.​ ​8,​ ​date​ ​September​ ​7,​ ​1946,​ ​granting​ ​amnesty​ ​to​ ​all​ ​persons​ ​who​ ​have​ ​committed
offenses​ ​in​ ​furtherance​ ​of​ ​the​ ​resistance​ ​against​ ​the​ ​Japanese,​ ​and​ ​decided​ ​to​ ​submit​ ​his​ ​case​ ​to
the​ ​14th​ ​Guerrilla​ ​Amnesty​ ​Commission.​ ​Barrioquinto,​ ​having​ ​been​ ​apprehended,​ ​did​ ​the​ ​same.
Meanwhile,​ ​after​ ​the​ ​preliminary​ ​hearing​ ​had​ ​started,​ ​the​ ​Commission​ ​issued​ ​on​ ​January​ ​9,​ ​1947,
an​ ​order​ ​for​ ​the​ ​return​ ​of​ ​the​ ​cases​ ​of​ ​petitioners​ ​to​ ​the​ ​Court​ ​of​ ​First​ ​Instance​ ​of​ ​Zamboanga,
without​ ​deciding​ ​whether​ ​or​ ​not​ ​they​ ​are​ ​entitled​ ​to​ ​amnesty,​ ​because​ ​Barrioquinto​ ​stated​ ​in​ ​his
testimony​ ​that​ ​it​ ​was​ ​Hipolito​ ​Tolentino​ ​who​ ​fired​ ​at​ ​and​ ​killed​ ​the​ ​offended​ ​party.
The​ ​Commission,then,​ ​issued​ ​the​ ​order​ ​upon​ ​the​ ​thesis​ ​that,​ ​for​ ​any​ ​person​ ​to​ ​invoke​ ​the​ ​benefits
of​ ​the​ ​Amnesty​ ​Proclamation,​ ​it​ ​is​ ​required​ ​that​ ​he​ ​should​ ​first​ ​admit​ ​having​ ​committed​ ​the
offensive​ ​act​ ​for​ ​which​ ​he​ ​is​ ​prosecuted.
ISSUE:​ ​Whether​ ​or​ ​not​ ​the​ ​petitioners​ ​are​ ​entitled​ ​to​ ​have​ ​their​ ​applications​ ​heared​ ​and​ ​decided
by​ ​the​ ​Amnesty​ ​Commission​ ​without​ ​having​ ​first​ ​admitted​ ​that​ ​they​ ​have​ ​committed​ ​the​ ​crime
charged​ ​against​ ​them.​ ​(YES)
HELD:
Wherefore,​ ​the​ ​respondents​ ​are​ ​hereby​ ​ordered​ ​to​ ​immediately​ ​proceed​ ​to​ ​hear​ ​and​ ​decide​ ​the
application​ ​for​ ​amnesty​ ​of​ ​petitioners​ ​Barrioquinto​ ​and​ ​Jimenez,​ ​unless​ ​amnesty​ ​of​ ​petitioners
Barrioquinto​ ​and​ ​Jimenez,​ ​unless​ ​the​ ​courts​ ​have​ ​in​ ​the​ ​meantime​ ​already​ ​decided,​ ​expressly​ ​and
finally,​ ​the​ ​question​ ​whether​ ​or​ ​not​ ​they​ ​are​ ​entitled​ ​to​ ​the​ ​benefits​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Amnesty​ ​Proclamation
No.​ ​8​ ​of​ ​September​ ​7,​ ​1946.​ ​So​ ​ordered.

In​ ​order​ ​to​ ​entitle​ ​a​ ​person​ ​to​ ​the​ ​benefits​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Amnesty​ ​Proclamation​ ​of​ ​September​ ​7,​ ​1946,​ ​it​ ​is
not​ ​necessary​ ​that​ ​he​ ​should,​ ​as​ ​a​ ​condition​ ​precedent​ ​or​ ​sine​ ​qua​ ​non,​ ​admit​ ​having​ ​committed
the​ ​criminal​ ​act​ ​or​ ​offense​ ​with​ ​which​ ​he​ ​is​ ​charged​ ​and​ ​allege​ ​the​ ​amnesty​ ​as​ ​a​ ​defense;​ ​it​ ​is
sufficient​ ​that​ ​the​ ​evidence​ ​either​ ​of​ ​the​ ​complainant​ ​or​ ​the​ ​accused,​ ​shows​ ​that​ ​the​ ​offense
committed​ ​comes​ ​within​ ​the​ ​terms​ ​of​ ​said​ ​Amnesty​ ​Proclamation.
Hence,​ ​it​ ​is​ ​not​ ​correct​ ​to​ ​say​ ​that​ ​"invocation​ ​of​ ​the​ ​benefits​ ​of​ ​amnesty​ ​is​ ​in​ ​the​ ​nature​ ​of​ ​a​ ​plea
of​ ​confession​ ​and​ ​avoidance."​ ​Although​ ​the​ ​accused​ ​does​ ​not​ ​confess​ ​the​ ​imputation​ ​against
him,​ ​he​ ​may​ ​be​ ​declared​ ​by​ ​the​ ​courts​ ​or​ ​the​ ​Amnesty​ ​Commissions​ ​entitled​ ​to​ ​the​ ​benefits.​ ​For,
whether​ ​or​ ​not​ ​he​ ​admits​ ​or​ ​confesses​ ​having​ ​committed​ ​the​ ​offense​ ​with​ ​which​ ​he​ ​is​ ​charged,
the​ ​Commissions​ ​should,​ ​if​ ​necessary​ ​or​ ​requested​ ​by​ ​the​ ​interested​ ​party,​ ​conduct​ ​summary
hearing​ ​of​ ​the​ ​witnesses​ ​both​ ​for​ ​the​ ​complainants​ ​and​ ​the​ ​accused,​ ​on​ ​whether​ ​he​ ​has
committed​ ​the​ ​offense​ ​in​ ​furtherance​ ​of​ ​the​ ​resistance​ ​to​ ​the​ ​enemy,​ ​or​ ​against​ ​persons​ ​aiding​ ​in
the​ ​war​ ​efforts​ ​of​ ​the​ ​enemy,​ ​and​ ​decide​ ​whether​ ​he​ ​is​ ​entitled​ ​to​ ​the​ ​benefits​ ​of​ ​amnesty​ ​and​ ​to
be​ ​"regarded​ ​as​ ​a​ ​patriot​ ​or​ ​hero​ ​who​ ​have​ ​rendered​ ​invaluable​ ​services​ ​to​ ​the​ ​nation,,"​ ​or​ ​not,​ ​in
accordance​ ​with​ ​the​ ​terms​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Amnesty​ ​Proclamation.​ ​since​ ​the​ ​Amnesty​ ​Proclamation​ ​is​ ​a
public​ ​act,​ ​the​ ​courts​ ​as​ ​well​ ​as​ ​the​ ​Amnesty​ ​Commissions​ ​created​ ​thereby​ ​should​ ​take​ ​notice​ ​of
the​ ​terms​ ​of​ ​said​ ​Proclamation​ ​and​ ​apply​ ​the​ ​benefits​ ​granted​ ​therein​ ​to​ ​cases​ ​coming​ ​within​ ​their
province​ ​or​ ​jurisdiction,​ ​whether​ ​pleaded​ ​or​ ​claimed​ ​by​ ​the​ ​person​ ​charged​ ​with​ ​such​ ​offenses​ ​or
not,​ ​if​ ​the​ ​evidence​ ​presented​ ​show​ ​that​ ​the​ ​accused​ ​is​ ​entitled​ ​to​ ​said​ ​benefits.

The​ ​right​ ​to​ ​the​ ​benefits​ ​of​ ​amnesty,​ ​once​ ​established​ ​by​ ​the​ ​evidence​ ​presented​ ​either​ ​by​ ​the
complainant​ ​or​ ​prosecution,​ ​or​ ​by​ ​the​ ​defense,​ ​can​ ​not​ ​be​ ​waived,​ ​because​ ​it​ ​is​ ​of​ ​public​ ​interest
that​ ​a​ ​person​ ​who​ ​is​ ​regarded​ ​by​ ​the​ ​Amnesty​ ​Proclamation​ ​which​ ​has​ ​the​ ​force​ ​of​ ​a​ ​law,​ ​not​ ​only
as​ ​innocent,​ ​for​ ​he​ ​stands​ ​in​ ​the​ ​eyes​ ​of​ ​the​ ​law​ ​as​ ​if​ ​he​ ​had​ ​never​ ​committed​ ​any​ ​punishable
offense​ ​because​ ​of​ ​the​ ​amnesty,​ ​but​ ​as​ ​a​ ​patriot​ ​or​ ​hero,​ ​can​ ​not​ ​be​ ​punishment​ ​as​ ​a​ ​criminal.
Just​ ​as​ ​the​ ​courts​ ​of​ ​justice​ ​can​ ​not​ ​convict​ ​a​ ​person​ ​who,​ ​according​ ​to​ ​the​ ​evidence,​ ​has
committed​ ​an​ ​act​ ​not​ ​punishable​ ​by​ ​law,​ ​although​ ​he​ ​confesses​ ​being​ ​guilty​ ​thereof,​ ​so​ ​also​ ​and​ ​a
fortiori​ ​they​ ​can​ ​not​ ​convict​ ​a​ ​person​ ​considered​ ​by​ ​law​ ​not​ ​a​ ​criminal,​ ​but​ ​as​ ​a​ ​patriot​ ​and​ ​hero,
for​ ​having​ ​rendered​ ​invaluable​ ​services​ ​to​ ​the​ ​nation​ ​inn​ ​committing​ ​such​ ​an​ ​act.
There​ ​is​ ​no​ ​necessity​ ​for​ ​an​ ​accused​ ​to​ ​admit​ ​his​ ​responsibility​ ​for​ ​the​ ​commission​ ​of​ ​a​ ​criminal
act​ ​before​ ​a​ ​court​ ​of​ ​Amnesty​ ​Commission​ ​may​ ​investigate​ ​and​ ​extend​ ​or​ ​not​ ​to​ ​him​ ​the​ ​benefits
of​ ​amnesty.​ ​The​ ​fact​ ​that​ ​he​ ​pleads​ ​not​ ​guilty​ ​or​ ​that​ ​he​ ​has​ ​not​ ​committed​ ​the​ ​act​ ​with​ ​which​ ​he
is​ ​charged,​ ​does​ ​not​ ​necessarily​ ​prove​ ​that​ ​he​ ​is​ ​not​ ​guilty​ ​thereof.​ ​Notwithstanding​ ​his​ ​denial,
the​ ​evidence​ ​for​ ​the​ ​prosecution​ ​or​ ​complainant​ ​may​ ​show​ ​the​ ​contrary,​ ​as​ ​it​ ​is​ ​generally​ ​the​ ​case
in​ ​criminal​ ​proceedings,​ ​and​ ​what​ ​should​ ​in​ ​such​ ​a​ ​case​ ​be​ ​determined​ ​is​ ​whether​ ​or​ ​not​ ​the
offense​ ​committed​ ​is​ ​of​ ​political​ ​character.​ ​The​ ​plea​ ​of​ ​not​ ​having​ ​committed​ ​the​ ​offense​ ​made​ ​by
an​ ​accused​ ​simply​ ​means​ ​that​ ​he​ ​can​ ​not​ ​be​ ​convicted​ ​of​ ​the​ ​offense​ ​charged​ ​because​ ​he​ ​is​ ​not
guilty​ ​thereof,​ ​and,​ ​even​ ​if​ ​the​ ​evidence​ ​would​ ​show​ ​that​ ​he​ ​is,​ ​because​ ​he​ ​has​ ​committed​ ​it​ ​in
furtherance​ ​of​ ​the​ ​resistance​ ​to​ ​the​ ​enemy​ ​or​ ​against​ ​persons​ ​a​ ​ding​ ​in​ ​the​ ​war​ ​efforts​ ​of​ ​the
enemy,​ ​and​ ​not​ ​for​ ​purely​ ​political​ ​motives.
Besides,​ ​in​ ​the​ ​present​ ​case,​ ​the​ ​allegation​ ​of​ ​Loreto​ ​Barrioquinto​ ​that​ ​the​ ​offended​ ​party​ ​or
victim​ ​was​ ​shot​ ​and​ ​killed​ ​by​ ​Agapito​ ​Hipolito​ ​,​ ​does​ ​not​ ​necessarily​ ​bar​ ​the​ ​respondents​ ​from
finding,​ ​after​ ​the​ ​summary​ ​hearing​ ​of​ ​the​ ​witnesses​ ​for​ ​the​ ​complaints​ ​and​ ​the​ ​accused,​ ​directed
in​ ​the​ ​said​ ​Amnesty​ ​Proclamation​ ​and​ ​Administrative​ ​Order​ ​No.​ ​11,​ ​that​ ​the​ ​petitioners​ ​are
responsible​ ​for​ ​the​ ​killing​ ​of​ ​the​ ​victim,​ ​either​ ​as​ ​principals​ ​by​ ​cooperation,​ ​inducement​ ​or
conspiration,​ ​or​ ​as​ ​accessories​ ​before​ ​as​ ​well​ ​as​ ​after​ ​the​ ​fact,​ ​but​ ​that​ ​they​ ​are​ ​entitled​ ​to​ ​the
benefits​ ​of​ ​amnesty,​ ​because​ ​they​ ​were​ ​members​ ​of​ ​the​ ​same​ ​group​ ​of​ ​guerrilleros​ ​who​ ​killed​ ​the
victim​ ​in​ ​furtherance​ ​of​ ​the​ ​resistance​ ​to​ ​the​ ​enemy​ ​or​ ​against​ ​persons​ ​aiding​ ​in​ ​the​ ​war​ ​efforts​ ​of
the​ ​enemy.
The​ ​theory​ ​of​ ​the​ ​respondents,​ ​supported​ ​by​ ​the​ ​dissenting​ ​opinion,​ ​is​ ​predicated​ ​on​ ​a​ ​wrong
conception​ ​of​ ​the​ ​nature​ ​or​ ​character​ ​of​ ​an​ ​amnesty.​ ​Amnesty​ ​must​ ​be​ ​distinguished​ ​from
pardon.
Pardon​ ​is​ ​granted​ ​by​ ​the​ ​Chief​ ​Executive​ ​and​ ​as​ ​such​ ​it​ ​is​ ​a​ ​private​ ​act​ ​which​ ​must​ ​be​ ​pleaded
and​ ​proved​ ​by​ ​the​ ​person​ ​pardoned,​ ​because​ ​the​ ​courts​ ​take​ ​no​ ​notice​ ​thereof;​ ​while​ ​amnesty​ ​by
Proclamation​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Chief​ ​Executive​ ​with​ ​the​ ​concurrence​ ​of​ ​Congress,​ ​and​ ​it​ ​is​ ​a​ ​public​ ​act​ ​of
which​ ​the​ ​courts​ ​should​ ​take​ ​judicial​ ​notice.​ ​Pardon​ ​is​ ​granted​ ​to​ ​one​ ​after​ ​conviction;​ ​while
amnesty​ ​is​ ​granted​ ​to​ ​classes​ ​of​ ​persons​ ​or​ ​communities​ ​who​ ​may​ ​be​ ​guilty​ ​of​ ​political​ ​offenses,
generally​ ​before​ ​or​ ​after​ ​the​ ​institution​ ​of​ ​the​ ​criminal​ ​prosecution​ ​and​ ​sometimes​ ​after
conviction.​ ​Pardon​ ​looks​ ​forward​ ​and​ ​relieves​ ​the​ ​offender​ ​from​ ​the​ ​consequences​ ​of​ ​an​ ​offense
of​ ​which​ ​he​ ​has​ ​been​ ​convicted,​ ​that​ ​is,​ ​it​ ​abolished​ ​or​ ​forgives​ ​the​ ​punishment,​ ​and​ ​for​ ​that
reason​ ​it​ ​does​ ​""nor​ ​work​ ​the​ ​restoration​ ​of​ ​the​ ​rights​ ​to​ ​hold​ ​public​ ​office,​ ​or​ ​the​ ​right​ ​of
suffrage,​ ​unless​ ​such​ ​rights​ ​be​ ​expressly​ ​restored​ ​by​ ​the​ ​terms​ ​of​ ​the​ ​pardon,"​ ​and​ ​it​ ​"in​ ​no​ ​case
exempts​ ​the​ ​culprit​ ​from​ ​the​ ​payment​ ​of​ ​the​ ​civil​ ​indemnity​ ​imposed​ ​upon​ ​him​ ​by​ ​the​ ​sentence"
article​ ​36,​ ​Revised​ ​Penal​ ​Code).​ ​while​ ​amnesty​ ​looks​ ​backward​ ​and​ ​abolishes​ ​and​ ​puts​ ​into
oblivion​ ​the​ ​offense​ ​itself,​ ​it​ ​so​ ​overlooks​ ​and​ ​obliterates​ ​the​ ​offense​ ​with​ ​which​ ​he​ ​is​ ​charged
that​ ​the​ ​person​ ​released​ ​by​ ​amnesty​ ​stands​ ​before​ ​the​ ​law​ ​precisely​ ​as​ ​though​ ​he​ ​had​ ​committed
no​ ​offense.
SEPARATE​ ​OPINIONS:
1. J.​ ​Perfecto
Concurring:
Petitioners​ ​are​ ​entitled​ ​to​ ​have​ ​their​ ​applications​ ​for​ ​amnesty​ ​heard​ ​and​ ​decided​ ​by​ ​respondent
14th​ ​Guerrilla​ ​Amnesty​ ​Commission.
To​ ​entitle​ ​a​ ​person​ ​to​ ​have​ ​his​ ​case​ ​heard​ ​and​ ​decided​ ​by​ ​a​ ​Guerrilla​ ​Amnesty​ ​Commission​ ​only
the​ ​following​ ​elements​ ​are​ ​essential:​ ​First,​ ​that​ ​he​ ​is​ ​charged​ ​or​ ​may​ ​be​ ​charged​ ​with​ ​ab​ ​offense
penalized​ ​under​ ​the​ ​Revised​ ​Penal​ ​Code,​ ​except​ ​those​ ​against​ ​chastity​ ​or​ ​for​ ​purely​ ​personal
motives;​ ​second,​ ​that​ ​he​ ​committed​ ​the​ ​offense​ ​in​ ​furtherance​ ​of​ ​the​ ​resistance​ ​to​ ​the​ ​enemy;​ ​and
third,​ ​that​ ​it​ ​was​ ​committed​ ​during​ ​the​ ​period​ ​from​ ​December​ ​8,​ ​1941,​ ​to​ ​the​ ​date​ ​when​ ​the​ ​area
where​ ​the​ ​offense​ ​was​ ​committed​ ​was​ ​actually​ ​liberated​ ​from​ ​enemy​ ​control​ ​and​ ​occupation.

If​ ​these​ ​three​ ​elements​ ​are​ ​present​ ​in​ ​a​ ​case​ ​brought​ ​before​ ​a​ ​Guerrillas​ ​Amnesty​ ​Commission,
the​ ​latter​ ​cannot​ ​refuse​ ​to​ ​hear​ ​and​ ​decide​ ​it​ ​under​ ​the​ ​proclamation.​ ​There​ ​is​ ​nothing​ ​in​ ​the
proclamation​ ​to​ ​even​ ​hint​ ​that​ ​the​ ​applicant​ ​for​ ​amnesty​ ​must​ ​first​ ​admit​ ​having​ ​executed​ ​the​ ​acts
constituting​ ​the​ ​offense​ ​with​ ​which​ ​he​ ​is​ ​charged​ ​or​ ​be​ ​charged.
2.​ ​J.​ ​Tuason
Dissenting:
The​ ​decision​ ​proceeds​ ​on​ ​the​ ​assumption​ ​that​ ​the​ ​Guerrilla​ ​Amnesty​ ​Commission​ ​refused​ ​to​ ​hear
and​ ​decide​ ​the​ ​application​ ​for​ ​amnesty​ ​of​ ​the​ ​present​ ​petitioners.​ ​I​ ​think​ ​this​ ​is​ ​a​ ​mistake.​ ​There
are​ ​examinations​ ​of​ ​records,​ ​hearing​ ​and​ ​decisions.

The​ ​pleadings​ ​and​ ​annexes​ ​show​ ​that​ ​hearing​ ​was​ ​held​ ​on​ ​the​ ​9th​ ​of​ ​January,​ ​19947​ ​in​ ​which​ ​the
two​ ​petitioners​ ​and​ ​their​ ​counsel​ ​were​ ​present,​ ​and​ ​one​ ​of​ ​them,​ ​Barrioquinto,​ ​testified​ ​and​ ​that​ ​it
was​ ​after​ ​that​ ​hearing,​ ​on​ ​the​ ​same​ ​date,​ ​that​ ​the​ ​Commission​ ​denied​ ​their​ ​petition​ ​in​ ​a​ ​written
order​ ​and​ ​directed​ ​the​ ​clerk​ ​to​ ​return​ ​the​ ​"expedientes"​ ​to​ ​the​ ​Court​ ​of​ ​First​ ​Instance​ ​of
Zamboanga​ ​for​ ​its​ ​final​ ​action.
Commission​ ​acted​ ​in​ ​the​ ​manner​ ​contemplated​ ​by​ ​Proclamation​ ​No.​ ​8​ ​of​ ​the​ ​President.​ ​The​ ​return
of​ ​the​ ​papers​ ​to​ ​the​ ​court​ ​merely​ ​follow​ ​the​ ​procedure​ ​provided​ ​in​ ​the​ ​proclamation,​ ​which
stipulates​ ​"that​ ​any​ ​case​ ​now​ ​pending​ ​on​ ​which​ ​may​ ​be​ ​filed​ ​in​ ​the​ ​future​ ​a​ ​Guerrilla​ ​Amnesty
Commission​ ​decides​ ​as​ ​not​ ​within​ ​the​ ​terms​ ​of​ ​the​ ​amnesty​ ​shall​ ​proceed​ ​in​ ​accordance​ ​with​ ​the
usual​ ​legal​ ​procedure​ ​in​ ​the​ ​courts​ ​without​ ​regard​ ​to​ ​this​ ​proclamation."

The​ ​proclamation​ ​does​ ​not​ ​prescribe​ ​any​ ​specific​ ​mode​ ​of​ ​hearing.​ ​That​ ​the​ ​Commission​ ​shall
examine​ ​the​ ​facts​ ​and​ ​circumstance​ ​surrounding​ ​each​ ​case​ ​is​ ​all​ ​that​ ​is​ ​provided​ ​for.​ ​In​ ​its
discretion,​ ​the​ ​Commission​ ​may,​ ​if​ ​it​ ​deems​ ​necessary,​ ​hear​ ​the​ ​witnesses​ ​both​ ​for​ ​the
complainant​ ​and​ ​the​ ​accused.​ ​The​ ​hearing​ ​does​ ​not​ ​have​ ​to​ ​be​ ​formal;​ ​it​ ​may​ ​be​ ​summary,
according​ ​tot​ ​he​ ​proclamation.​ ​This​ ​privilege,​ ​discretionary​ ​with​ ​the​ ​Commission,​ ​was​ ​afforded
the​ ​accused​ ​as​ ​far​ ​as​ ​the​ ​nature​ ​of​ ​their​ ​defense​ ​permitted.
The​ ​Amnesty​ ​Commissions​ ​are​ ​executive​ ​instrumentalities​ ​acting​ ​for​ ​and​ ​in​ ​behalf​ ​of​ ​the
President.​ ​They​ ​are​ ​not​ ​courts;​ ​they​ ​are​ ​not​ ​performing​ ​judicial​ ​function,​ ​and​ ​this​ ​Court​ ​has​ ​no
appellate​ ​jurisdiction​ ​over​ ​their​ ​actuations,​ ​orders​ ​or​ ​decisions.
Rakim​​ ​(15)​ ​Araneta​ ​v.​ ​Dinglasan,​ ​84​ ​Phil.​ ​368
FACTS:

Antonio Araneta is being charged for allegedly violating of Executive Order 62 which
regulates rentals for houses and lots for residential buildings. Judge Rafael
Dinglasan was the judge hearing the case. Araneta appealed seeking to prohibit
Dinglasan and the Fiscal from proceeding with the case. He averred that EO 62 was
issued by virtue of Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 671 which he claimed ceased to
exist,​ ​hence,​ ​the​ ​EO​ ​has​ ​no​ ​legal​ ​basis.
Three other cases were consolidated with this one. L-3055 which is an appeal by
Leon Ma. Guerrero, a shoe exporter, against EO 192 which controls exports in the
Philippines;​ ​he​ ​is​ ​seeking​ ​to​ ​have​ ​permit​ ​issued​ ​to​ ​him.
L-3054 is filed by Eulogio Rodriguez to prohibit the treasury from disbursing funds
[from​ ​’49-‘50]​ ​pursuant​ ​to​ ​EO​ ​225.
L-3056 filed by Antonio Barredo is attacking EO 226 which was appropriating funds
to​ ​hold​ ​the​ ​national​ ​elections.
They all aver that CA 671, otherwise known as AN ACT DECLARING A STATE OF
TOTAL EMERGENCY AS A RESULT OF WAR INVOLVING THE PHILIPPINES AND
AUTHORIZING THE PRESIDENT TO PROMULGATE RULES AND REGULATIONS TO
MEET SUCH EMERGENCY or simply the Emergency Powers Act, is already
inoperative​ ​and​ ​that​ ​all​ ​EOs​ ​issued​ ​pursuant​ ​to​ ​said​ ​CA​ ​had​ ​likewise​ ​ceased.
ISSUE:​ ​Whether​ ​or​ ​not​ ​CA​ ​671​ ​has​ ​ceased.
HELD: Yes. CA 671, which granted emergency powers to the president, became
inoperative ​ex proprio vigore when Congress met in regular session on May 25, 1946,
and that Executive Orders Nos. 62, 192, 225 and 226 were issued without authority of
law. In setting the first regular session of Congress instead of the first special
session which preceded it as the point of expiration of the Act, the SC is giving effect
to the purpose and intention of the National Assembly. In a special session, the
Congress may “consider general legislation or only such subjects as he (President)
may designate.” Such acts were to be good only up to the corresponding dates of
adjournment of the following sessions of the Legislature, “unless sooner amended or
repealed by the National Assembly.” Even if war continues to rage on, new
legislation must be made and approved in order to continue the EPAs, otherwise it is
lifted​ ​upon​ ​reconvening​ ​or​ ​upon​ ​early​ ​repeal.
Sanchez​​ ​(16)​ ​Commissioner​ ​of​ ​Customs​ ​v.​ ​Eastern​ ​Sea​ ​Trading,​ ​3​ ​SCRA​ ​351
Commissioner of Customs v. Eastern Sea Trading, G.R. No. L-14279, (October 31, 1961), 113 PHIL
333-340
Ponente:​ ​J.​ ​Concepcion

Case​ ​doctrine:​ ​Distinctions​ ​between​ ​Treaties​ ​and​ ​Executive​ ​Agreements

International agreements involving political International agreements embodying

issues or changes of national policy and adjustments of detail carrying out
those involving international arrangements well-established national policies and
of a permanent character usually take the traditions and those involving arrangements
form​ ​of​ ​TREATIES. of a more or less temporary nature usually
take​ ​the​ ​form​ ​of​ ​EXECUTIVE​ ​AGREEMENTS​.

Treaties are formal documents which Executive agreements become binding

require ratification ​with the approval of through executive action ​without the need
two-thirds​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Senate​. of​ ​a​ ​vote​ ​by​ ​the​ ​Senate​ ​or​ ​by​ ​Congress​.

Facts

​Respondent Eastern Sea Trading was the consignee of several shipments of onion and garlic
imported from Japan and Hong Kong which were seized by the Bureau of Customs and subjected to
forfeiture proceedings as none of the shipments had the certificate required by Central Bank Circular Nos.
44 and 45 for its release, thus a violation of section 1363(f) of the Revised Administrative Code. Executive
Order No. 328 was the implementing law of the Trades and Financial Agreements, an executive
agreement, entered into between the Philippines and Japan. The said executive agreement states,
among others, that all import transactions between Japan and the Philippines should be invoiced in dollar.
In​ ​this​ ​case,​ ​the​ ​said​ ​items​ ​imported​ ​by​ ​Eastern​ ​Sea​ ​Trading​ ​from​ ​Japan​ ​were​ ​not​ ​invoiced​ ​in​ ​dollar.

Issue/​ ​Contention
​Eastern Sea Trading contended among others that the seizure and forfeiture of the goods
imported from Japan cannot be justified under Executive Order No. 328, not only because the same
seeks to implement an executive agreement — extending the effectivity of our Trade and Financial
Agreements with Japan — which (executive agreement), it believed, is of dubious validity (the Senate had
not​ ​concurred​ ​in​ ​the​ ​making​ ​of​ ​said​ ​such).

​ he Collector of Customs rendered a decision declaring the goods forfeited to the Government.
T
Upon seeking review before the Court of Tax Appeals by Respondent, the said court reversed the
decision. Hence, the present petition of the Commissioner of Customs for review of the decision of the
Court​ ​of​ ​Tax​ ​Appeals.

Ruling

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby ​reversed and another one shall be entered
affirming that of the Commissioner of Customs, with costs against respondent-appellee, Eastern
Sea​ ​Trading.

The Court of Tax Appeals entertained doubts on the legality of the executive agreement sought to
be implemented by Executive Order No. 328, owing to the fact that our Senate had not concurred in the
making​ ​of​ ​said​ ​executive​ ​agreement.

The concurrence of said House of Congress is required by our fundamental law in the
making of "treaties" (Constitution of the Philippines, Article VII, Section 10[7]), which are,
however, distinct and different from "executive agreements", which may be validly entered into
without​ ​such​ ​concurrence.

"Treaties are formal documents which require ratification with the approval of two-thirds of the
Senate. Executive agreements become binding through executive action without the need of a
vote​ ​by​ ​the​ ​Senate​ ​or​ ​by​ ​Congress.
xxx​ ​xxx​ ​xxx

". . . the right of the Executive to enter into binding agreements without the necessity of
subsequent Congressional approval has been confirmed by long usage. From the earliest days of
our history we have entered into executive agreements covering such subjects as commercial
and consular relations, most-favored-nation rights, patent rights, trademark and copyright
protection, postal and navigation arrangements and the settlement of claims. The validity of these
has​ ​never​ ​been​ ​seriously​ ​questioned​ ​by​ ​our​ ​courts.
xxx​ ​xxx​ ​xxx

"International agreements involving political issues or changes of national policy and those
involving international arrangements of a permanent character usually take the form of treaties.
But international agreements embodying adjustments of detail carrying out well-established
national policies and traditions and those involving arrangements of a more or less temporary
nature​ ​usually​ ​take​ ​the​ ​form​ ​of​ ​executive​ ​agreements.
xxx​ ​xxx​ ​xxx

"Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court has expressly recognized the validity and
constitutionality​ ​of​ ​executive​ ​agreements​ ​entered​ ​into​ ​without​ ​Senate​ ​approval."

In this connection, Francis B. Sayre, former U. S. High Commissioner to the Philippines, said in his work
on​ ​"The​ ​Constitutionality​ ​of​ ​Trade​ ​Agreement​ ​Acts":
 "Agreements concluded by the President which fall short of treaties are commonly referred to as
executive agreements and are no less common in our scheme of government than are the more
formal​ ​instruments​ ​—​ ​treaties​ ​and​ ​conventions.

They sometimes take the form of exchanges of notes and at other times that of more formal
documents​ ​denominated​ ​'agreements'​ ​or​ ​'protocols'.

The point where ordinary correspondence between this and other governments ends and
agreements — whether denominated executive agreements or exchanges of notes or otherwise
— begin, may sometimes be difficult of ready ascertainment. It would be useless to undertake to
discuss​ ​here​ ​the​ ​large​ ​variety​ ​of​ ​executive​ ​agreements​ ​as​ ​such,​ ​concluded​ ​from​ ​time​ ​to​ ​time.

Hundreds of executive agreements, other than those entered into under the trade-agreements
act, have been negotiated with foreign governments. . . . It would seem to be sufficient, in order to
show that the trade agreements under the act of 1934 are not anomalous in character, that they
are not treaties, and that they have abundant precedent in our history, to refer to certain classes
of​ ​agreements​ ​heretofore​ ​entered​ ​into​ ​by​ ​the​ ​Executive​ ​without​ ​the​ ​approval​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Senate.

They cover such subjects as the inspection of vessels, navigation dues, income tax on shipping
profits, the admission of civil aircraft, customs matters, and commercial relations generally,
international claims, postal matters, the registration of trade-marks and copyrights, etc. Some of
them were concluded not by specific congressional authorization but in conformity with policies
declared in acts of Congress with respect to the general subject matter, such as tariff acts; while
still others, particularly those with respect to the settlement of claims against foreign
governments, were concluded independently of any legislation." (39 Columbia Law Review, pp.
651,​ ​755.)

The validity of the executive agreement in question is thus patent. In fact, the so-called Parity Rights
provided for in the Ordinance Appended to our Constitution were, prior thereto, the subject of an
executive agreement, made without the concurrence of two-thirds (2/3) of the Senate of the United
States.
Fernando​​ ​(17)​ ​In​ ​re​ ​Bermudez,​ ​SC​ ​GR​ ​76180,​ ​October​ ​24,​ ​1986

SATURNINO​ ​V.​ ​BERMUDEZ,​ ​Petitioner

[G.R.​ ​No.​ ​76180.​ ​October​ ​24,​ ​1986.]

DOCTRINE:​​ ​Lack​ ​of​ ​jurisdiction​ ​and​ ​lack​ ​of​ ​cause​ ​of​ ​action​ ​are​ ​valid​ ​grounds​ ​for​ ​the
dismissal​ ​of​ ​petition.​ ​It​ ​is​ ​proper​ ​in​ ​case​ ​at​ ​bar.​ ​The​ ​Supreme​ ​Court​ ​has​ ​no​ ​original
jurisdiction​ ​over​ ​petitions​ ​for​ ​declaratory​ ​relief.

FACTS:
Saturnino Bermudez, as a lawyer, questioned the validity of the first paragraph of
Section 5 of Article XVIII of the proposed 1986 Constitution, which provides in full as
follows:

Sec.​ ​5.​ ​The​ ​six-year​ ​term​ ​of​ ​the​ ​incumbent​ ​President​ ​and​ ​Vice-President​ ​elected​ ​in​ ​the
February​ ​7,​ ​1986​ ​election​ ​is,​ ​for​ ​purposes​ ​of​ ​synchronization​ ​of​ ​elections,​ ​hereby
extended​ ​to​ ​noon​ ​of​ ​June​ ​30,​ ​1992.
The​ ​first​ ​regular​ ​elections​ ​for​ ​the​ ​President​ ​and​ ​Vice-President​ ​under​ ​this​ ​Constitution
shall​ ​be​ ​held​ ​on​ ​the​ ​second​ ​Monday​ ​of​ ​May,​ ​1992.

Bermudez claims that the said provision “is not clear” as to whom it refers, he then asks
the Court “to declare and answer the question of the construction and definiteness as to
who, among the present incumbent President Corazon Aquino and Vice President
Salvador Laurel and the elected President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Vice President
Arturo​ ​M.​ ​Tolentino​ ​being​ ​referred​ ​to​ ​as​ ​the​ ​“incumbent​ ​president”.

ISSUE:
Whether​ ​or​ ​not​ ​said​ ​provision​ ​is​ ​ambiguous.

HELD:
No. Bermudez’s allegation of ambiguity or vagueness of the aforequoted provision is
manifestly gratuitous, it being a matter of public record and common public knowledge
that the Constitutional Commission refers therein to incumbent President Aquino and
Vice-President Laurel, and to no other persons, and provides for the extension of their
term to noon of June 30, 1992 for purposes of synchronization of elections. Hence, the
second paragraph of the cited section provides for the holding on the second Monday of
May, 1992 of the first regular elections for the President and Vice-President under said
1986 Constitution. In previous cases, the legitimacy of the government of President
Aquino was likewise sought to be questioned with the claim that it was not established
pursuant to the 1973 Constitution. The said cases were dismissed outright by the
Supreme Court which held that: “Petitioners have no personality to sue and their
petitions state no cause of action. For the legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a
justiciable matter. It belongs to the realm of politics where only the people of the
Philippines are the judge. And the people have made the judgment; they have accepted
the government of President Corazon C. Aquino which is in effective control of the
entire country so that it is not merely a de facto government but in fact and in law a de
jure government. Moreover, the community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of
the​ ​present​ ​government.

Separate​ ​Opinions

MELENCIO-HERRERA,​ ​J.​,​ ​concurring:

We agree that the petition deserves outright dismissal as this Court has no original
jurisdiction​ ​over​ ​petitions​ ​for​ ​declaratory​ ​relief.

As to lack of cause of action, the petitioner’s prayer for a declaration as to who were
elected President and Vice President in the February 7, 1986 elections should be
addressed not to this Court but to other departments of government constitutionally
burdened​ ​with​ ​the​ ​task​ ​of​ ​making​ ​that​ ​declaration.

Gutierrez,​ ​Jr.​ ​and​ ​Feliciano,​ ​JJ.​,​ ​concur.

CRUZ,​ ​J.​,​ ​concurring:

I vote to dismiss this petition on the ground that the Constitution we are asked to
interpret has not yet been ratified and is therefore not yet effective. I see here no actual
conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination at this time. (Aetna Life
Insurance​ ​Co.​ ​v.​ ​Haworth,​ ​300​ ​U.S.​ ​227;​ ​PACU​ ​v.​ ​Secretary​ ​of​ ​Education,​ ​97​ ​Phil.​ ​806.)
Tmpi​ ​Tmpi​​ ​(18)​ ​Montenegro​ ​v.​ ​Castaneda

MARCELO​ ​D.​ ​MONTENEGRO

vs.
GEN.​ ​MARIANO​ ​CASTAÑEDA,
and
COLONEL​ ​EULOGIO​ ​BALAO
​ ​ ​G.R.​ ​No.​ ​L-4221
​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​August​ ​30,​ ​1952

BENGZON,​ ​J.:

DOCTRINE:
The stay of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, ordered in Proclamation No. 210, is in accordance
with the powers expressly vested in the President by the Constitution. However, the word "sedition" in
Proclamation No. 210 should be deemed a mistake or surplusage that does not taint the decree as a
whole.
The president has power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, when public safety
requires it, in cases of (1) invasion, (2) insurrection, (3) rebellion, or (4) imminent danger thereof. The
official declaration that "there is actual danger of rebellion which may extend throughout the country"
amply​ ​justifies​ ​the​ ​suspension​ ​of​ ​the​ ​writ.

FACTS:
· About five o'clock in the morning of October 18, 1950, Maximino Montenegro was arrested with otherat
the Samanillo Bldg. Manila, by agents of the Military Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, for complicity with a communistic organization in the commission of acts of rebellion,
insurrection​ ​or​ ​sedition.
·​ ​ ​So​ ​far​ ​as​ ​the​ ​record​ ​discloses,​ ​he​ ​is​ ​still​ ​under​ ​arrest​ ​in​ ​the​ ​custody​ ​by​ ​respondents.
· October 22, 1950, The President issued Proclamation No. 210 suspending the privilege of the writ of
habeas​ ​corpus.
· On October 21, 1950, Maximino's father, the petitioner, submitted this application for a writ of habeas
corpus​ ​seeking​ ​the​ ​release​ ​of​ ​his​ ​son.
· Opposing the writ, respondents admitted having the body of Maximino, but questioned judicial authority
to​ ​go​ ​further​ ​in​ ​the​ ​matter,​ ​invoking​ ​the​ ​above-mentioned​ ​proclamation.
· Petitioner replied that such proclamation was void, and that, anyway, it did not apply to his son, who
had​ ​been​ ​arrested​ ​before​ ​its​ ​promulgation.
·​ ​ ​CFI​ ​denied​ ​the​ ​release​ ​prayed​ ​for.
·​ ​ ​Hence​ ​this​ ​appeal

ISSUE:
1.) The proclamation is unconstitutional "because it partakes of a bill of attainder, or an ex post facto law;
and​ ​unlawfully​ ​includes​ ​sedition​ ​which​ ​under​ ​the​ ​Constitution​ ​is​ ​not​ ​a​ ​ground​ ​for​ ​suspension";
2.)​ ​Whether​ ​the​ ​petition​ ​must​ ​be​ ​granted
RULING:
1.)​ ​NO.​ ​The​ ​argument​ ​is​ ​devoid​ ​of​ ​merit.​ ​The​ ​prohibition​ ​applies​ ​only​ ​to​ ​statutes.
· The stay of the writ was ordered in accordance with the powers expressly vested in the
President by the Constitution, such order must be deemed an exception to the general
prohibition against ex post facto laws and bills of attainder — supposing there is a conflict
between​ ​the​ ​prohibition​ ​and​ ​the​ ​suspension.
· ​It was erroneous to include those accused of sedition among the persons as to whom
suspension​ ​of​ ​the​ ​writ​ ​is​ ​decreed.
· Under the Constitution the only grounds for suspension of the privilege of the writ are "invasion,
insurrection,​ ​rebellion​ ​or​ ​imminent​ ​danger​ ​thereof.
· ​The inclusion of sedition does not invalidate the entire proclamation​; and it is immaterial in this
case, inasmuch as the petitioner's descendant is confined in jail not only for sedition, but for the
graver​ ​offense​ ​of​ ​rebellion​ ​and​ ​insurrection.
· ​Without doing violence to the presidential directive, but in obedience to the supreme law of
the land, the word "sedition" in Proclamation No. 210 should be deemed a mistake or
surplusage​ ​that​ ​does​ ​not​ ​taint​ ​the​ ​decree​ ​as​ ​a​ ​whole.

2.) NO. The authority to decide whenever the exigency has arisen requiring the suspension
belongs to the President and "his decision is final and conclusive" upon the courts and
upon​ ​all​ ​other​ ​persons​​ ​(Barcelon​ ​vs.​ ​Baker).
· Whereas the Executive branch of the Government is enabled thru its civil and military branches to
obtain information about peace and order from every quarter and corner of the nation, the judicial
department, with its very limited machinery can not be in better position to ascertain or evaluate the
conditions​ ​prevailing​ ​in​ ​the​ ​Archipelago​ ​(Justice​ ​Johnson,​ ​Barcelon​ ​vs.​ ​Baker).
· But even supposing the President's appraisal of the situation is merely prima facie, we see
that petitioner in this litigation has failed to overcome the presumption of correctness which
the​ ​judiciary​ ​accords​ ​to​ ​acts​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Executive​ ​and​ ​Legislative​ ​Departments​ ​of​ ​our​ ​Government.
· The Bill of Rights prohibits suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus except when the
public​ ​safety​ ​requires​ ​it,​ ​in​ ​cases​ ​of​ ​(1)​ ​invasion​ ​(2)​ ​insurrection​ ​or​ ​(3)​ ​rebellion.
· Article VII Section 10 authorizes the President to suspend the privilege, when public safety requires it,
in​ ​cases​ ​of​ ​(1)​ ​invasion​ ​(2)​ ​insurrection​ ​or​ ​(3)​ ​rebellion​ ​or​ ​(4)​ ​imminent​ ​danger​ ​thereof.
· "Imminent​ ​danger,"​ ​is​ ​no​ ​cause​ ​for​ ​suspension​ ​under​ ​the​ ​Bill​ ​of​ ​Rights.​ ​It​ ​is​ ​under​ ​Article​ ​VII.
· Is the prohibition of suspension in the bill of rights to be interpreted as limiting Legislative
powers only — not executive measures under section VII? Has article VII (sec. 10) pro tanto
modified the bill of rights in the same manner that a subsequent section of a statue modifies a
previous​ ​one?
· The difference between the two constitutional provisions would seem to be: whereas the bill
of rights impliedly denies suspension in case of imminent dangers of invasion etc., article VII
sec. 10 expressly authorizes the President to suspend when there is imminent danger of
invasion​ ​etc.
· xxx it was said that if two provisions of a written constitutions are irreconcilably repugnant, that which
is​ ​last​ ​in​ ​order​ ​of​ ​time​ ​and​ ​in​ ​local​ ​position​ ​is​ ​to​ ​be​ ​preferred​ ​xxx
· xxx​ ​So,​ ​even​ ​assuming​ ​the​ ​two​ ​clauses​ ​discuss​ ​are​ ​repugnant,​ ​the​ ​latter​ ​must​ ​prevail.​ ​Xxx
· The constitutional authority of the President to suspend in case of imminent danger of
invasion,​ ​insurrection​ ​or​ ​rebellion​ ​under​ ​article​ ​VII​ ​may​ ​not​ ​correctly​ ​be​ ​placed​ ​in​ ​doubt.
· The order of suspension affects the power of the court's and operates immediately on all
petitions​ ​therein​ ​pending​ ​at​ ​the​ ​time​ ​of​ ​its​ ​promulgation.
· A proclamation of the President suspending the writ of habeas corpus was held valid and
efficient in law to suspend all proceedings pending upon habeas corpus, which was issued
and​ ​served​ ​prior​ ​to​ ​the​ ​date​ ​of​ ​the​ ​proclamation.
Hernandez​​ ​(19)​ ​(Barcelona​ ​v.​ ​Baker,​ ​Jr.,​ ​G.R.​ ​No.​ ​2808,​ ​[September​ ​30,​ ​1905],​ ​5​ ​PHIL​ ​87-120

Ponente:​ ​J.​ ​Johnson

Doctrine:​ ​Whenever​ ​the​ ​Constitution​ ​or​ ​a​ ​statute​ ​gives​ ​a​ ​discretionary​ ​power​ ​to​ ​any​ ​person,​ ​to​ ​be
exercised​ ​by​ ​him​ ​upon​ ​his​ ​own​ ​opinion​ ​of​ ​certain​ ​facts,​ ​such​ ​person​ ​is​ ​to​ ​be​ ​considered​ ​the​ ​sole​ ​and
exclusive​ ​judge​ ​of​ ​the​ ​existence​ ​of​ ​those​ ​facts,​ ​has​ ​been​ ​recognized,​ ​not​ ​only​ ​by​ ​the​ ​Supreme​ ​Court​ ​of
the​ ​United​ ​States​ ​but​ ​by​ ​practically​ ​all​ ​of​ ​the​ ​supreme​ ​courts​ ​of​ ​the​ ​different​ ​States,​ ​and​ ​has​ ​never​ ​been
disputed​ ​by​ ​any​ ​respectable​ ​authority.
FACTS: ​This case is an application on behalf of Felix Barcelona, for a writ of habeas corpus alleging that
the said applicant is detained and restrained of his liberty at the town of Batangas, by John Doe
Thompson, captain of the Philippines Constabulary, acting under and in pursuance of the orders of David
J. Baker, jr., colonel of the Philippines Constabulary and the detention and restraint of the said applicant
is wholly without legal authority therefor; that the detention and restraint of the said applicant is not under
or by virtue of any process issued by any court or magistrate, nor by virtue of any judgment or order of
any court of record, nor of any court nor of any magistrate whatsoever; and there has not existed during
any of the times in this petition mentioned, and there does not now exist, in said Province of Batangas,
Philippine Islands, nor in any part thereof, rebellion, insurrection, or invasion, nor any of them, in any form
of degree; and that all the courts of law, organized and provided by law for the Province of Batangas,
have been at all of the times hereinbefore mentioned in the full and complete exercise of their functions,
without​ ​interruption​ ​of​ ​any​ ​nature​ ​or​ ​kind.
Thereafter, the court made an order directing David Baker, Jr., and John Doe Thompson to appear before
the​ ​court​ ​to​ ​show​ ​cause​ ​why​ ​the​ ​writ​ ​habeas​ ​corpus​ ​should​ ​not​ ​be​ ​granted.
Through their amended answer, the respondents admit that they are detaining the body of the said Felix
Barcelon, and deny the right of this court to inquire into the reasons therefor by virtue of the said
resolution of the Philippine Commission and the executive order of the Governor-General, issued by
authority of the same, suspending the privilege of the writ of ​habeas corpus in the said Provinces of
Cavite​ ​and​ ​Batangas.
ISSUE: ​Whether or not the judicial department of the Government may investigate the facts upon which
the legislative and executive branches of the Government acted in providing for the suspension and in
actually suspending the privilege of the writ of ​habeas corpus ​in said provinces. Has the
Governor-General, with the consent of the Commission, the right to suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus​? If so, did the Governor-General suspend the writ of ​habeas corpus in the Provinces of
Cavite​ ​and​ ​Batangas​ ​in​ ​accordance​ ​with​ ​such​ ​authority?
HELD:​​ ​No.
The same general question presented here was presented to the Supreme Court of the United States in
the​ ​case​ ​of​ ​Martin​ ​vs.​ ​Mott,​ ​in​ ​January,​ ​1827.​ ​An​ ​act​ ​of​ ​Congress​ ​of​ ​1795​ ​provided​ ​—
"That whenever the United States shall be invaded or be in imminent danger of invasion from any
foreign nation or Indian tribe, it shall be lawful for the President of the United States to call forth such
number of the militia of the State or States most convenient to the place of danger or scene of action, as
he may judge necessary to repel such invasion, and to issue his orders for that purpose to such officer or
officers​ ​of​ ​the​ ​militia​ ​as​ ​he​ ​shall​ ​think​ ​proper."
In this case (Martin vs. Mott) the question was presented to the court whether or not the President's
action in calling out the militia was conclusive against the courts. The Supreme Court of the United
States,​ ​in​ ​answering​ ​this​ ​question,​ ​said:
 " We are all of the opinion that the authority to decide whether the exigency has arisen belongs
exclusively to the President and his decision is conclusive upon all other persons​. We think that
this construction necessarily results from the nature of the power itself and from the manifest
object contemplated by the act of Congress. The power itself is to be exercised upon sudden
emergencies, upon great occasions of state and under circumstances which may be vital to the
existence of the Union. . . . If a superior officer has a right to contest the orders of the President,
upon his own doubts as to the exigency having arisen, it must be equally the right of every
inferior officer and soldier. . . . Such a course would be subversive of all discipline and expose
the best disposed officer to the chances of erroneous litigation. Besides, in many instances, the
evidence upon which the President might decide, that there is imminent danger of invasion
might be of a nature not constituting strict technical proof, or the disclosure of the evidence
might reveal important secrets of state which the public interest and even safety might
imperiously​ ​demand​ ​to​ ​be​ ​kept​ ​in​ ​concealment.
"Whenever the statute gives a discretionary power to any person, to be exercised by him upon
his own opinion of certain facts, it is a sound rule of construction that the statute constitutes him
the sole and exclusive judge of the existence of those facts. And in the present case we are all
of that opinion that such is the true construction of the act of 1795. It is no answer that such
power may be abused, for there is no power which is not susceptible of abuse." (Martin vs.
Mott,​ ​12​ ​Wheat.,​ ​19​ ​(25​ ​U.S.);​ ​Vanderheyden​ ​vs.​ ​Young,​ ​11​ ​Johns.,​ ​N.Y.,​ ​150.)
"Under the authority given to the President by the statute of 1795, calling forth the militia under
certain circumstances, the power is exclusively vested in him to determine whether those
circumstances exist; ​and when he has determined by issuing his call, no court can question his
decision​."​ ​(Pomeroy's​ ​Constitutional​ ​Law,​ ​sec.​ ​476.)
The doctrine that whenever the Constitution or a statute gives a discretionary power to any person, to
be exercised by him upon his own opinion of certain facts, such person is to be considered the sole
and exclusive judge of the existence of those facts, has been recognized, not only by the Supreme
Court of the United States but by practically all of the supreme courts of the different States, and has
never​ ​been​ ​disputed​ ​by​ ​any​ ​respectable​ ​authority.
The status of the country as to peace or war is legally determined by the political (department of the
Government) and not by the judicial department. When the decision is made the courts are concluded
thereby, and bound to apply the legal rules which belong to that condition. The same power which
determines the existence of war or insurrection must also decide when hostilities have ceased — that
is, when peace is restored. In a legal sense the state of war or peace is not a question ​in pais for
courts​ ​to​ ​determine.​ ​It​ ​is​ ​a​ ​legal​ ​fact,​ ​ascertainable​ ​only​ ​from​ ​the​ ​decision​ ​of​ ​the​ ​political​ ​department.
Not only has it been decided in numerous cases that the power to call out the militia and to suspend
the writ of ​habeas corpus is entirely within the discretion of the legislative and executive branches of
the Government, but, when the executive and legislative departments have decided that the
conditions exist justifying these acts, the courts will presume that such conditions continue to exist
until​ ​the​ ​same​ ​authority​ ​(legislative,​ ​etc.)​ ​has​ ​decided​ ​that​ ​such​ ​conditions​ ​no​ ​longer​ ​exist.

TORRES,​​ ​J.,​ ​concurring​:

The writ was suspended with a view to averting the commission of crimes, particularly those affecting public peace, by
depriving​ ​criminals​ ​of​ ​the​ ​privilege​ ​of​ ​the​ ​writ.
 It would not be lawful, however, to violate the provisions of the Penal Code under the pretext that the writ has been suspended.
It would not be lawful to rob or commit any other trespass upon the person, rights, or property of citizens. The detention of Felix
Barcelon is not due to the commission of any crime. It is an actual trespass upon his liberty and personal safety, committed by
the police authorities, which under no circumstances can be excused or justified by the temporary suspension of the writ of
habeas​ ​corpus​.

The fundamental laws of Spain, a monarchy, the spirit and principles of which are the basis of our Penal Code, and the
provisional law for its application, do not contain any provision in regard to the privilege of ​habeas corpus​, but they contain
provisions which guarantee to the citizen his individual rights. The supreme court of Spain has held that not even where
constitutional guaranties are suspended can the executive authority order that a person be detained, except for crime or for
branch​ ​of​ ​the​ ​public​ ​peace.​ ​(Judgment​ ​of​ ​the​ ​15th​ ​of​ ​March,​ ​1877.)

Barcelon,​ ​the​ ​petitioner​ ​in​ ​this​ ​case,​ ​is​ ​neither​ ​a​ ​rebel​ ​nor​ ​a​ ​criminal;​ ​therefore​ ​his​ ​detention​ ​is​ ​illegal.

For the foregoing reasons I am of the opinions that the petition for ​habeas corpus should be denied, and that criminal
proceedings should be instituted for the crime of illegal detention, defined and punished in article 200 of the Penal Code, and
that it is the duty of the judge of the Court of First Instance of the Province of Batangas to proceed against those responsible
for​ ​said​ ​crime.

WILLARD,​​ ​J.,​ ​dissenting​:

"This nation, as experience has proved, can not always remain at peace, and has no right to expect that it will always have
wise humane rulers, sincerely attached to the principles of the Constitution. Wicked men, ambitious of power, with hatred of
liberty​ ​and​ ​contempt​ ​of​ ​law,​ ​may​ ​fill​ ​the​ ​place​ ​once​ ​occupied​ ​by​ ​Washington​ ​and​ ​Lincoln."

The effect of the suspension of the writ of ​habeas corpus​, and as it seems to me its manifest purpose, is to allow the
Government to commit an illegal act. It allows it to imprison a person who has committed no offense, and for whose arrest and
detention no warrant has been issued by any competent court, and it leaves that person without redress at the time for this
unlawful act. In the case at bar it appears from the return of the respondents that Barcelon is deprived of his liberty without due
process​ ​of​ ​law​ ​in​ ​violation​ ​of​ ​a​ ​provision​ ​of​ ​this​ ​same​ ​act​ ​of​ ​Congress.

The privilege of the writ of ​habeas corpus was given to protect the citizen from such arbitrary and illegal acts of either the
executive or the legislative power; the latter, that department which according to Madison in No. 47 of The Federalist, "is
everywhere​ ​extending​ ​the​ ​sphere​ ​of​ ​its​ ​activity​ ​and​ ​drawing​ ​all​ ​power​ ​into​ ​its​ ​impetuous​ ​vortex."

Is it probable that the people, in adopting the Constitution, intended to give up to these departments of the Government against
which​ ​they​ ​needed​ ​protection​ ​perhaps​ ​the​ ​most​ ​important​ ​right​ ​which​ ​could​ ​furnish​ ​that​ ​protection?

I do not think that the authors of the Constitution or the authors of the act of Congress intended to so place this right in the
hands of these two departments that whether it should or should not be enjoyed by the citizens would depend exclusively upon
their​ ​will​ ​and​ ​pleasure.
Garingo​​ ​(20)​ ​Drilon​ ​v.​ ​Senate,​ ​GR​ ​169777,​ ​April​ ​20,​ ​2006
Lazaro​​ ​(21)​ ​Tecson​ ​v.​ ​Comelec,​ ​SC​ ​GR​ ​161434,​ ​March​ ​3,​ ​2004

Tecson​ ​vs​ ​COMELEC

VITUG,​ ​J​.:
FACTS:

On 31 December 2003, respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr.
(hereinafter "FPJ"), filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of President of the Republic
of the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the forthcoming
national elections. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of
birth​ ​to​ ​be​ ​20​ ​August​ ​1939​ ​and​ ​his​ ​place​ ​of​ ​birth​ ​to​ ​be​ ​Manila.
Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner in G.R. No. 161824, entitled "Victorino X. Fornier, Petitioner, versus
Hon. Commission on Elections and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr.,
Respondents," initiated, on 09 January 2004, a petition docketed SPA No. 04-003 before the
Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his
certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his
certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, according
to Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his
father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject.
Granting, petitioner asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not have
transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of an alien mother.
Petitioner based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of respondent on two assertions - ​first​,
Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie
Kelley and, ​second​, even if no such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly
only​ ​a​ ​year​ ​after​ ​the​ ​birth​ ​of​ ​respondent.

ISSUE:

a.​ ​Whether​ ​or​ ​not​ ​FPJ​ ​is​ ​a​ ​natural-born​ ​citizen​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Philippines.
b. Whether or not FPJ is guilty of material misrepresentation in stating that he is a natural-born
citizen​ ​in​ ​his​ ​COC.
HELD:
· ​Whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which, in turn,
depended on whether or not the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have
himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not the alleged
illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from taking after the Filipino citizenship
of his putative father. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou
could only be drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years
old, Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the year 1870, when the
Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place
of residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any other evidence,
 could have well been his place of residence before death, such that Lorenzo
Pou would have benefited from the ​en masse Filipinization that the Philippine
Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would
thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935
Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers
citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of
whether​ ​such​ ​children​ ​are​ ​legitimate​ ​or​ ​illegitimate.
· ​But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that
respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on
hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be
held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of
candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus
Election Code. Petitioner has utterly failed to substantiate his case before the
Court, notwithstanding the ample opportunity given to the parties to present
their position and evidence, and to prove whether or not there has been material
misrepresentation, which, as so ruled in ​Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC​,[48] ​
must​ ​not​ ​only​ ​be​ ​material,​ ​but​ ​also​ ​deliberate​ ​and​ ​willful.
WHEREFORE,​ ​the​ ​Court​ ​RESOLVES​ ​to​ ​DISMISS

Bucoy​​ ​(22)​ ​Orosa​ ​v.​ ​Roa,​ ​SC​ ​GR​ ​No.​ ​140423,​ ​July​ ​14,​ ​2006
Jose​ ​Luis​ ​Angel​ ​Orosa​ ​VS​ ​Alberto​ ​Roa
G.R.​ ​No.​ ​140423
July​ ​14,​ ​2006
Ponente:​ ​J.​ ​Garcia

Doctrine:​ ​Being​ ​thus​ ​under​ ​the​ ​control​ ​of​ ​the​ ​President,​ ​the​ ​Secretary​ ​of​ ​Justice,​ ​or,​ ​to​ ​be​ ​precise,
his​ ​decision​ ​is​ ​subject​ ​to​ ​review​ ​of​ ​the​ ​former.​ ​In​ ​fine,​ ​recourse​ ​from​ ​the​ ​decision​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Secretary
of​ ​Justice​ ​should​ ​be​ ​to​ ​the​ ​President.

Facts: >​Petitioner Orosa filed a complaint against herein Respondent Roa with the crime of libel. Both
petitioner​ ​and​ ​respondent​ ​are​ ​dentist​ ​by​ ​profession.
>​The complaint, stemmed from an article entitled "Truth vs. Rumors: Questions against Dr. Orosa" written
by respondent and published in the March-April 1996 issue of the Dental Trading Post, a bi-monthly
publication​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Dental​ ​Exchange​ ​Co.,​ ​Inc.
>​In gist, the article delved into the possibility of a father, who happened to be an examiner in a licensure
examination for dentistry where his sons were examinees, manipulating the examinations or the results
thereof​ ​to​ ​enable​ ​his​ ​children​ ​to​ ​top​ ​the​ ​same.
>​In his complaint-affidavit, petitioner alleged that the article in question is defamatory as it besmirched his
honor and reputation as a dentist and as the topnotcher in the dental board examinations held in May
1994.
>Respondent denied the accusation, claiming that the article constitutes a "fair and accurate report on a
matter of both public and social concern." He averred that the article in question was not written with
malice but with a sincere desire to contribute to the improvement of the integrity of professional
examinations.
>After preliminary investigation, ​Pasig City Prosecutor Noel Paz issued a Resolution, ​dismissing
petitioner's​ ​complain​t.​ ​(that​ ​it​ ​was​ ​a​ ​bona​ ​fide​ ​communication​ ​and​ ​made​ ​without​ ​malice)
> ​Petitioner ​appealed to the Department of Justice (DOJ)​: ​set aside the findings of the City Prosecutor
of​ ​Pasig​ ​and​ ​directing​ ​the​ ​latter​ ​to​ ​file​ ​an​ ​information​ ​for​ ​libel​ ​against​ ​respondent.
> ​Responden​t appealed to the Secretary of Justice: ​Reversed the resolution of the DOJ and directed
the​ ​city​ ​prosecutor​ ​of​ ​pasig​ ​to​ ​withdraw​ ​the​ ​information​ ​filed​ ​with​ ​RTC.
>​Petitioner f​iled his motion for reconsideration but was ​denied​. Hence, petitioner went to CA on a
petition​ ​for​ ​review​ ​under​ ​Rule​ ​43.
>​ ​CA​ ​dismissed​ ​petitioner’s​ ​Petition​ ​for​ ​review.

Issue: ​Whether or not a petition for review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is a proper
mode of appeal from a resolution of the Secretary of Justice directing the prosecutor to withdraw an
information​ ​in​ ​a​ ​criminal​ ​case?

Held:​ ​NO.
>As may be noted, the DOJ is not among the agencies expressly enumerated under Section 1 of
Rule 43. T​here is compelling reason to believe, however, that the exclusion of the DOJ from the list is
deliberate, ​being in consonance with the constitutional power of control ​lodged in the President over
executive departments, bureaus and offices. This power of control, which even Congress cannot limit, let
alone withdraw, means the power of the Chief Executive to review, alter, modify, nullify, or set aside what
a subordinate, e.g., members of the Cabinet and heads of line agencies, had done in the performance of
their​ ​duties​ ​and​ ​to​ ​substitute​ ​the​ ​judgment​ ​of​ ​the​ ​former​ ​for​ ​that​ ​of​ ​the​ ​latter.
>​Being thus under the control of the President, the Secretary of Justice, or, to be precise, his decision is
subject to review of the former. In fine, ​recourse from the decision of the Secretary of Justice should
be to the President​, instead of the CA, under the established principle of exhaustion of administrative
remedies.
>​The thrust of the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies is that if an appeal or remedy obtains or
is available within the administrative machinery, this should be resorted to before resort can be made to
the courts. ​Immediate recourse to the court would be premature and precipitate; subject to defined
exception, a case is susceptible of dismissal for lack of cause of action should a party fail to exhaust
administrative​ ​remedies.

baka​ ​lang​ ​tanungin​ ​din​ ​nya:

Issue: ​Whether or not a preliminary investigation is a quasi-judicial proceeding, as petitioner posits, or
whether or not the Secretary of Justice performs quasi-judicial functions when he reviews the findings of a
state​ ​or​ ​city​ ​prosecutor​ ​is​ ​of​ ​little​ ​moment?
Held: ​No. The prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does not determine the guilt or innocence of the
accused. He does not exercise adjudication nor rule-making functions. Preliminary investigation is merely
inquisitorial, and is often the only means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with
a crime and to enable the fiscal [prosecutor] to prepare his complaint or information. It is not a trial of the
case on the merits and has no purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been committed
and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof. While the fiscal
prosecutor makes that determination, he cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-court, for it is the courts,
ultimately​ ​that​ ​pass​ ​judgment​ ​on​ ​the​ ​accused,​ ​not​ ​the​ ​fiscal​ ​prosecutor.