Picart vs Smith swerving at the last minute.

He therefore had the last

clear chance to avoid the unfortunate incident. When
On December 12, 1912, on the Carlatan Bridge, at San Smith’s car has approached the horse at such proximity
Fernando, La Union. The plaintiff was riding on his pony it left no chance for Picart extricate himself and
over said bridge. Before he had gotten half way across,
vigilance on his part will not avert injury. Picart can
the defendant approached from the opposite direction therefore recover damages from Smith but such should
in an automobile, going at the rate of about ten or be proportioned by reason of his contributory
twelve miles per hour. As the defendant neared the
negligence.
bridge he saw a horseman on it and blew his horn to
give warning of his approach. In the case of Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co.,
this Court there held that while contributory negligence
He continued his course and after he had taken the on the part of the person injured did not constitute a
bridge he gave two more successive blasts, as it bar to recovery, it could be received in evidence to
appeared to him that the man on horseback before him reduce the damages which would otherwise have been
was not observing the rule of the road. Picart and his assessed wholly against the other party.
horse were on Smith’s lane. But Picart did not move his
horse to the other lane, instead he moved his horse
closer to the railing. Smith continued driving towards
Picart without slowing down and when he was already
so near the horse he swerved to the other lane. But the
horse got scared so it turned its body across the bridge;
the horse struck the car and its limb got broken. Picart
suffered injuries which required several days of medical
attention while the horse eventually died.

Issue: Whether or not Smith is negligent.

Held: Yes and so was Picart for being on the wrong side
of the road.

The test by which to determine the existence of

negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows:
Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use
that person would have used in the same situation? If
not, then he is guilty of negligence. The law here in
effect adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by
the imaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of
the Roman law. The existence of negligence in a given
case is not determined by reference to the personal
judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The
law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or
negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and
prudence and determines liability by that.

Smith’s negligence succeeded that of Picart. Smith saw

at a distance when he blew his horn that Picart and his
horse did not move to the other lane so he should have
steered his car to the other lane at that point instead of
Smith Bell vs. Borja
(G.R. No. 143008, June 10, 2002)
SMITH BELL DODWELL SHIPPING AGENCY
CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. CATALINO BORJA and
INTERNATIONAL TO WAGE AND TRANSPORT
CORPORATION, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
FACTS:
 On September 23, 1987, Smith Bell (petitioner)
requested the Bureau of Customs to inspect vessel
M/T King Family which was due to arrive at the port
of Manila on September 24, 1987.
 Customs Inspector Borja was instructed to inspect
said vessel.
 At about 11 o'clock in the morning on September
24, while M/T King Family was unloading chemicals
unto two (2) barges owned by ITTC (respondent), a
sudden explosion occurred setting the vessels afire.
Seeing the fire and fearing for his life, Borja
hurriedly jumped over board to save himself.
 Borja survived but he became permanently disabled
due to the incident. He made demands against
Smith Bell and ITTC for the damages caused by the
explosion but both denied liabilities and attributed
to each other negligence.
 RTC ruled in Borja’s favor and held Smith Bell liable
for damages and loss of income, and ordered the
latter to pay actual damages for loss of earning
capacity, moral damages and attorney’s fees.
 CA affirmed.
cargo. While knowing that their vessel was carrying
dangerous inflammable chemicals, its officers and crew
failed to take all the necessary precautions to prevent
an accident. Smith Bell was, therefore, negligent.
The three elements of quasi-delict are:
(a) damages suffered by the plaintiff,
(b) fault or negligence of the defendant, and
(c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault
or negligence of the defendant and the damages
inflicted on the plaintiff.
All these elements were established in this case.
Knowing fully well that it was carrying dangerous
chemicals, Smith Bell was negligent in not taking all the
necessary precautions in transporting the cargo.
As a result of the fire and the explosion during the
unloading of the chemicals from the vessel, Borja
suffered damages and injuries. Hence, the owner or the
person in possession and control of a vessel and the
vessel are liable for all natural and proximate damage
caused to persons and property by reason of negligent
management or navigation.
SC awarded: loss of earning capacity; moral damages
and attorney’s fees under the Civil Code’s Article 2219,
par. 2, and Article 2208, par. 11, respectively.

ISSUE: Who, if any, is liable for Borja’s injuries? SMITH

BELL

HELD:
Smith Bell is liable. Both RTC and CA ruled that the fire
and explosion originated from Smith Bell’s vessel. (As
supported by the testimonies of the eyewitnesses and
the investigation conducted by the Special Board of
Marine Inquiry and affirmed by the secretary of the
Dept. of National Defense.)

Negligence is conduct that creates undue risk of harm

to another. It is the failure to observe that degree of
care, precaution and vigilance that the circumstances
justly demand, whereby that other person suffers
injury. Smith Bell's vessel was carrying chemical
DELSAN TRANSPORT LINES, INC., vs. C &
Construction
G.R. No. 156034. October 1, 2003
FACTS:
 Respondent C & A Construction, Inc. was engaged
by the National Housing Authority (NHA) to
construct a deflector wall at the Vitas Reclamation
Area in Vitas, Tondo, Manila. The project was
completed in 1994 but it was not formally turned
over to NHA.
 October 9, 1994: M/V Delsan Express, a ship owned
and operated by petitioner Delsan Transport Lines,
Inc., anchored at the Navotas Fish Port for the
purpose of installing a cargo pump and clearing the
cargo oil tank.
 October 20, 1994, 12:00 mn: Captain Demetrio T.
Jusep of M/V Delsan Express received a report from
his radio head operator in Japan that a typhoon was
going to hit Manila in about eight (8) hours.
 October 21, 1994, 8:35 am: Capt. Jusep tried to seek
shelter at the North Harbor but could not enter the
area because it was already congested.
 October 21, 1994, 10:00 a.m: Capt. Jusep decided to
drop anchor at the vicinity of Vitas mouth, 4 miles
away from a Napocor power barge. At that time,
the waves were already reaching 8 to 10 feet high.
 Capt. Jusep ordered his crew to go full ahead to
counter the wind which was dragging the ship
towards the Napocor power barge.
 To avoid collision, Capt. Jusep ordered a full stop of
the vessel. He succeeded in avoiding the power
barge, but when the engine was re-started and the
ship was maneuvered full astern, it hit the deflector
wall constructed by respondent. The damage
caused by the incident amounted to P456,198.24.
 Respondent demanded payment of the damage
from petitioner but the latter refused to pay.
 Consequently, respondent filed a complaint for
damages with the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
 In its answer, petitioner claimed that the damage
was caused by a fortuitous event.
 The trial court dismissed the complaint. It ruled that
petitioner was not guilty of negligence because it
had taken all the necessary precautions to avoid the
accident. Applying the "emergency rule", it
absolved petitioner of liability because the latter
had no opportunity to adequately weigh the best
solution to a threatening situation. It further held
that even if the maneuver chosen by petitioner was
a wrong move, it cannot be held liable as the cause
A of the damage sustained by respondent was
typhoon "Katring", which is an act of God.
 The Court of Appeals, reversed and set aside the
decision of the trial court. It found Capt. Jusep guilty
of negligence in deciding to transfer the vessel to
the North Harbor only at 8:35 a.m. of October 21,
1994 and thus held petitioner liable for damages.
Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition contending
that Capt. Jusep was not negligent in waiting until 8:35
in the morning of October 21, 1994 before transferring
the vessel to the North Harbor inasmuch as it was not
shown that had the transfer been made earlier, the
vessel could have sought shelter.
ISSUE(S): Whether Capt. Jusep was negligent.
HELD: Yes! Petition denied.
Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides that whoever by
act or omission causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage
done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is called a
quasi-delict. The test for determining the existence of
negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows:
Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use
the reasonable care and caution which an ordinary
prudent person would have used in the same situation?
If not, then he is guilty of negligence.
The Court of Appeals was correct in holding that Capt.
Jusep was negligent in deciding to transfer the vessel
only at 8:35 in the morning of October 21, 1994. As
early as 12:00 midnight of October 20, 1994, he
received a report from his radio head operator in Japan
that a typhoon was going to hit Manila after 8 hours.
This, notwithstanding, he did nothing, until 8:35 in the
morning of October 21, 1994, when he decided to seek
shelter at the North Harbor, which unfortunately was
already congested. The finding of negligence cannot be
rebutted upon proof that the ship could not have
sought refuge at the North Harbor even if the transfer
was done earlier. It is not the speculative success or
failure of a decision that determines the existence of
negligence in the present case, but the failure to take
immediate and appropriate action under the
circumstances. Capt. Jusep, despite knowledge that the
typhoon was to hit Manila in 8 hours, complacently
waited for the lapse of more than 8 hours thinking that
the typhoon might change direction. He cannot claim
that he waited for the sun to rise instead of moving the
vessel at midnight immediately after receiving the
report because of the difficulty of traveling at night. The
hour of 8:35 a.m. is way past sunrise. Furthermore, he
did not transfer as soon as the sun rose because,
according to him, it was not very cloudy and there was
no weather disturbance yet.

When he ignored the weather report notwithstanding

reasonable foresight of harm, Capt. Jusep showed an
inexcusable lack of care and caution which an ordinary
prudent person would have observed in the same
situation. Had he moved the vessel earlier, he could
have had greater chances of finding a space at the
North Harbor considering that the Navotas Port where
they docked was very near North Harbor. Even if the
latter was already congested, he would still have time
to seek refuge in other ports.

The trial court erred in applying the emergency rule.

Under this rule, one who suddenly finds himself in a
place of danger, and is required to act without time to
consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid
the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he
fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection
may appear to have been a better method, unless the
danger in which he finds himself is brought about by his
own negligence. Clearly, the emergency rule is not
applicable to the instant case because the danger
where Capt. Jusep found himself was caused by his own
negligence.
Mr. and Mrs. Ong vs Metropolitan Water District
104 Phil 397 – Civil Law – Torts and Damages – Due
Diligence as a Defense – Last Clear Chance; when not
applied
On July 5, 1952, Dominador Ong (14 years old) and his
two brothers went to the swimming pool operated by
Metropolitan Water District (MWD). After paying the
entrance fee, the three proceeded to the small pool.
 The swimming pools of MWD are provided with
a ring buoy, toy roof, towing line, oxygen
resuscitator and a first aid medicine kit.
 The bottom of the pools is painted with black
colors so as to insure clear visibility.
 There is on display in a conspicuous place within
the area certain rules and regulations governing the
use of the pools.
 MWD employs six lifeguards who are all trained
as they had taken a course for that purpose and
were issued certificates of proficiency. These
lifeguards work on schedule prepared by their chief
and arranged in such a way as to have two guards at
a time on duty to look after the safety of the
bathers.
 There is a male nurse and a sanitary inspector
with a clinic provided with oxygen resuscitator.
 And there are security guards who are available
always in case of emergency.
Later, Dominador told his brothers that he’ll just be
going to the locker room to drink a bottle of Coke. No
one saw him returned. Later, the elder Ong noticed
someone at the bottom of the big pool and notified the
lifeguard in attendant (Manuel Abaño), who
immediately dove into the water. The body was later
identified as Dominador’s. He was attempted to be
revived multiple times but of no avail.
The parents of Ong sued MWD averring that MWD was
negligent in selecting its employees.
During trial, the elder brother of Ong and one other
testified that Abaño was reading a magazine and was
chatting with a security guard when the incident
happened and that he was called a third time before he
responded. Plaintiff further alleged that even assuming
that there was no negligence on the part of MWD, it is
still liable under the doctrine of “Last Clear Chance” for
having the last opportunity to save Dominador, its
employees failed to do so.
ISSUE: Whether or not MWD is liable for the death of
Dominador Ong.
HELD: No. As established by the facts,
 MWD was not negligent in selecting its
employees as all of them were duly certified.
 MWD was not negligent in managing the pools
as there were proper safety measures and
precautions/regulations that were placed all over
the pools.
Hence, due diligence is appreciated as a complete and
proper defense in this case. Further, the testimony in
court by the elder Ong and the other witness was belied
by the statements they have given to the investigators
when they said that the lifeguard immediately dove into
the water when he was called about the boy at the
bottom of the pool.
The doctrine of “Last Clear Chance” is of no application
here. It was not established as to how Dominador was
able to go to the big pool. He went to the locker and
thereafter no one saw him returned not until his body
was retrieved from the bottom of the big pool. The last
clear chance doctrine can never apply where the party
charged is required to act instantaneously (how can
the lifeguard act instantaneously in dissuading
Dominador from going to the big pool if he did not see
him go there), and if the injury cannot be avoided by
the application of all means at hand after the peril is or
should have been discovered; at least in cases in which
any previous negligence of the party charged cannot be
said to have contributed to the injury.
MR. & MRS. ONG vs. METROPOLITAN WATER
DISTRICT (gov’t-owned corp.)
No. L-7664. 29 August 1958.
Appeal from a judgment of the CFI, Rizal QC
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Facts: Plaintiff spouses seek to recover from defendant,
damages, funeral expenses and attorney’s fees for the
death of their son, Dominador Ong, in one of the
swimming pools of the latter. After trial, the CFI
dismissed the complaint for it found the action of the
plaintiffs-appellants untenable.
Issues: (1) WON plaintiffs have clearly established the
fault/negligence of the defendants so as to make it liable
for the damages sought; (2) WON the Doctrine of Last
Clear Chance applies in the case at bench.
Ruling: Judgment affirmed.

(1) The person/s claiming damages has/have the burden

of proving that the damages is caused by the
fault/negligence of the person from whom the damages
is claimed. Plaintiffs failed to overcome the burden.
Defendant employed 6 well-trained lifeguards, male
nurse, sanitary inspector and security guards to avoid
danger to the lives of their patrons. The swimming pools
are provided with ring buoy, tag roof and towing line.
Also, conspicuously displayed in the pool area the rules
and regulations for pool use. In that, it appears that
defendant has taken all the necessary precautions to
avoid/prevent danger/accidents which may cause injury
to or even death of its patrons.
(2) The Doctrine of last Clear Chance means that, “a
person who has the last clear chance to avoid the
accident, notwithstanding the negligent acts of his
opponent, is considered in law solely responsible for the
consequences of the accident.” Since minor Ong has
went to the big swimming pool w/o any companion in
violation of the rules and regulations of the defendant as
regards the use of pools, and it appearing that the
lifeguard responded to the call for help as soon as his
attention was called to it, applying all efforts into play in
order to bring minor Ong back to life, it is clear that
there is no room for the application of the Doctrine to
impute liability to appellee. Minor Ong’s
fault/negligence is the proximate and only cause of his
death.
MARIKINA AUTO LINE TRANSPORT CORPORATION and
FREDDIE L. SUELTO vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and ERLINDA V.
VALDELLON
[G.R. No. 152040 March 31, 2006]
FACTS:
Erlinda V. Valdellon is the owner of a two-door
commercial apartment located at No. 31 Kamias Road,
Quezon City.
The Marikina Auto Line Transport Corporation (MALTC)
is the owner-operator of a passenger bus with Plate
Number NCV-849.
Suelto, its employee, was assigned as the regular driver
of the bus.
At around 2:00 p.m. on October 3, 1992, Suelto was
driving the aforementioned passenger bus along Kamias
Road, Kamuning, Quezon City, going towards Epifanio
de los Santos Avenue (EDSA). The bus suddenly swerved
to the right and struck the terrace of the commercial
apartment owned by Valdellon located along Kamuning
Road. Valdellon demanded payment of P148,440.00 to
cover the cost of the damage to the terrace. The bus
company and Suelto offered a P30,000.00 settlement
which Valdellon refused.Valdellon filed a criminal
complaint for reckless imprudence resulting in damage
to property against Suelto.
Valdellon also filed a separate civil complaint against
Suelto and the bus company for damages. Suelto
maintained that, in an emergency case, he was not, in
law, negligent.
Both the trial court and the CA ruled in against herein
petitioners.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the sudden emergency rule applies in
the case at bar.
HELD:
No. It was the burden of petitioners herein to prove
petitioner Suelto’s defense that he acted on an
emergency, that is, he had to swerve the bus to the
right to avoid colliding with a passenger jeep coming
from EDSA that had overtaken another vehicle and
intruded into the lane of the bus. The sudden
emergency rule was enunciated by this Court in Gan v.
Court of Appeals,23 thus:
[O]ne who suddenly finds himself in a place of
danger, and is required to act without time to
consider the best means that may be adopted
to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of
negligence if he fails to adopt what
subsequently and upon reflection may appear
to have been a better method unless the
emergency in which he finds himself is brought
about by his own negligence.
Under Section 37 of Republic Act No. 4136, as amended,
otherwise known as the Land Transportation and Traffic
Code, motorists are mandated to drive and operate
vehicles on the right side of the road or highway.
Moreover Section 35 of the law provides for the
restriction as to speed.
In relation thereto, Article 2185 of the New Civil Code
provides that "unless there is proof to the contrary, it is
presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has
been negligent, if at the time of mishap, he was
violating any traffic regulation." By his own admission,
petitioner Suelto violated the Land Transportation and
Traffic Code when he suddenly swerved the bus to the
right, thereby causing damage to the property of
private respondent.
As already maintained and concluded, the severe
damages sustained could not have resulted had the
accused acted as a reasonable and prudent man would.
The accused was not diligent as he claims to be. What is
more probable is that the accused had to swerve to the
right and hit the commercial apartment of the plaintiff
because he could not make a full stop as he was driving
too fast in a usually crowded street.
Petitioner Suelto’s reliance on the sudden emergency
rule to escape conviction for the crime charged and his
civil liabilities based thereon is, thus, futile.
 THE SPOUSES BERNABE AFRICA and SOLEDAD C.
AFRICA, and the HEIRS OF DOMINGA ONG, petitioners
and appellants, vs. CALTEX (PHIL.), INC., MATEO
BOQUIREN and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents
and appellees.
No. L-12986. March 31, 1966. 16 SCRA 448
MAKALINTAL, J.

Facts: Fire broke out on March 18, 1948 at the

Caltex service station at the corner of Antipolo, St. and
Rizal Avenue, Manila while gasoline was being hosed
from a tank truck into the underground storage, right at
the opening of the receiving tank where the nozzle of
the hose was inserted. The fire spread burning several
houses nearby among which was the house of the Africa
spouses. The Caltex firm and Boquiren, the gas station
operator were sued for damages.

The trial court and the Court of Appeals found

that petitioners failed to prove negligence and that
respondents had exercised due care in the premises and
with respect to the supervision of their employees.

Issue/s: Without proof as to the cause and

origin of the fire, may the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
apply.

Ruling: Yes. The station was under the control

and management of Caltex and Boquiren who gave no
explanation why the fire occurred. It is fair and
reasonable to infer that the fire occurred for want of
due care on the part of the gas station employees.
Moreover, Boquiren was an employee of Caltex and not
an independent contractor. The employee’s negligence
was the proximate cause of the fire which in the
ordinary course of things does not happen. The owner
of the burned houses were awarded the value of their
properties.
RODRIGUEZ et al vs.CA et al
G.R. No. 121964
June 17, 1997
DAVIDE, JR. J.:
FACTS: A a fire broke out which razed two apartment
buildings, owned by plaintiffs-appellants Rodriguezes
and partially destroying a commercial building. They
filed a case for damages against defendants-appellees
Vilorias and Young. The complaint alleged that by
reason of the gross negligence and want of care of the
construction workers and employees of the defendants-
appellees, the bunkhouse or workers’ quarters in the
construction site caught fire spreading rapidly, burning
the adjacent buildings owned by plaintiffs-appellants.
Defendant-appellee Young, the building contractor,
contended that he can not be held responsible even if
there was negligence on the part of the employees for
he had exercised the diligence of a good father of a
family in the selection and supervision of his workers.
As counterclaim, defendant-appellee Young sought for
moral damages, exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.
The Vilorias also alleged that plaintiffs-appellants had
no cause of action against them. The fire court not have
been caused by gross negligence of their workers for
they did not have any worker in the construction of
their building. The said construction was being
undertaken by the independent contractor, Young, who
hired and supervised his own workers. As counterclaim,
they prayed for moral damages, exemplary damages
and attorney’s fees.
After trial and reception of evidence, the court a quo
resolved that the fire was not caused by an
instrumentality within the exclusive control of the
defendants-appellants. The decision stated that
plaintiffs-appellants failed to establish that the fire was
the result of defendants-appellees’ or their workers’
negligence.
The CA affirmed the trial court’s decision but the award
of damages in favor of defendants-appellees including
the award of attorney’s fees are DELETED and SET ASIDE.
ISSUE:
1. WON SECTION 44, RULE 130 OF THE RULES OF COURT
IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR, therefore
making the Fire Investigation Report inadmissible in
evidence
HELD: the instant petition is DENIED and the challenged
decision of CA is AFFIRMED in toto.
1. NO, the rule is applicable; the Report admissible
Section 44 of Rule 130, which reads as follows:
Sec. 44. Entries in official records. — Entries in official
records made in the performance of his duty by a public
officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the
performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are
prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.
Petitioners assert that the Fire Investigation Report by
an official of the Cebu City Fire Station should have
been admitted in evidence as an exception to the
hearsay rule [as stated in #2 above].] The trial and
appellate courts rejected this applying Africa v. Caltex
(Phil.) Inc., wherein this Court laid down the three
requisites for admissibility under the aforesaid section,
viz.:
(1) that the entry was made by a police officer, or by
another person especially enjoined by law to do so;
(2) that it was made by the police officer in the
performance of his duties, or by such other person in
the performance of a duty especially enjoined by law;
and
(3) that the public officer or other person had sufficient
knowledge of the facts by him stated, which must have
been acquired by him personally or through official
information.
Elaborating on the third requisite, this Court further
stated that for the statements acquired by the public
officer under the third requisite to qualify as “official
information,” it is necessary that the persons who gave
the statements “not only must have personal
knowledge of the facts stated but must have the duty to
give such statements for record.”
Some confusion surrounds the issue of admissibility of
the Fire Investigation Report. The record discloses that
the officer who signed the report, Fire Major Eduardo P.
Enriquez, was subpoenaed at the request of and
testified in open court for petitioners.Private
respondents objected said report, for being “hearsay
and incompetent evidence.” The trial court then denied
their admission “for being hearsay.
In light of the purposes for which the exhibits in
question were offered, the trial court erred in rejecting
all of them as hearsay. Since Major Enriquez himself
took the witness stand and was available for cross-
examination, the portions of the report which were of
his personal knowledge or which consisted of his
perceptions and conclusions were not hearsay. The rest
of the report, such as the summary of the statements of
the parties based on their sworn statements (which
were annexed to the Report) as well as the latter,
having been included in the first purpose of the offer,
may then be considered as independently relevant
statements which were gathered in the course of the
investigation and may thus be admitted as such, but not
necessarily to prove the truth thereof. It has been said
that:
Where, regardless of the truth or falsity of a statement,
the fact that it has been made is relevant, the hearsay
rule does not apply, but the statement may be shown.
Evidence as to the making of such statement is not
secondary but primary, for the statement itself may
constitute a fact in issue, or be circumstantially relevant
as to the existence of such a fact.
When Major Enriquez took the witness stand, testified
for petitioners on his Report and made himself available
for cross-examination by the adverse party, the Report,
insofar as it proved that certain utterances were made
(but not their truth), was effectively removed from the
ambit of the aforementioned Section 44 of Rule 130.
Properly understood, this section does away with the
testimony in open court of the officer who made the
official record, considers the matter as an exception to
the hearsay rule and makes the entries in said official
record admissible in evidence as prima facie evidence of
the facts therein stated. The underlying reasons for this
exceptionary rule are necessity and trustworthiness, as
explained in Antillon v. Barcelon. 29
The litigation is unlimited in which testimony by officials
is daily needed; the occasions in which the officials
would be summoned from his ordinary duties to declare
as a witness are numberless. The public officers are few
in whose daily work something is not done in which
testimony is not needed from official sources. Were
there no exception for official statements, hosts of
officials would be found devoting the greater part of
their time to attending as witnesses in court or
delivering their deposition before an officer. The work
of administration of government and the interest of the
public having business with officials would alike suffer in
consequence. For these reasons, and for many others, a
certain verity is accorded such documents, which is not
extended to private documents. (3 Wigmore on
Evidence, sec. 1631).
The law reposes a particular confidence in public
officers that it presumes they will discharge their
several trusts with accuracy and fidelity; and, therefore,
whatever acts they do in discharge of their duty may be
given in evidence and shall be taken to be true under
such a degree of caution as the nature and
circumstances of each case may appear to require.
It would have been an entirely different matter if Major
Enriquez was not presented to testify on his report. In
that case the applicability of Section 44 of Rule 130
would have been ripe for determination, and this Court
would have agreed with the CA that said report was
inadmissible since the aforementioned third requisite
was not satisfied. The statements given by the sources
of information of Major Enriquez failed to qualify as
“official information,” there being no showing that, at
the very least, they were under a duty to give the
statements for record.
xxxxxxxxxxxx
What appears to us to be the underlying purpose of
petitioners in soliciting affirmance of their thesis that
the Report of Major Enriquez should be admitted as an
exception to the hearsay rule, is to shift the burden of
evidence to private respondents under the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur in negligence cases. They claim, as
stated in their offer of Exhibits, that “the fire started at
the generator. . . within the construction site.” This
quotation is based on the penultimate paragraph of
page 4 of the Report of Major Enriquez and is obviously
misleading as there is nothing in said paragraph that
unequivocally asserts that the generator was located
within the construction site. The paragraph reads:
After analyzing the evidences [sic] and the
circumstances underlying the situation, one can easily
came [sic] to the conclusion that the fire started at the
generator and extended to the bunkhouse and spread
among the combustible stored materials within the
construction site. Among the combustible materials
were the plastic (PVC) pipes and plywoods [sic].
Clearly, the phrase within the construction site could
only refer to the immediately preceding term
“combustible stored materials.”
The trial court itself concluded that the fire could not convincing arguments to accommodate their case
have started at the generator and that the bunkhouse within the exception; they did not even dare to refute
was not burned, thus: the above observations and findings of the trial court.

It then declared that “the fire was not caused by an

instrumentality within the exclusive control of
defendants,” which is one of the requisites for the
application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in the law
of negligence. It may further be emphasized that this
doctrine is not intended to and does not dispense with
the requirement of proof of culpable negligence on the
party charged. It merely determines and regulates what
shall be prima facie evidence thereof and facilitates the
burden of plaintiff of proving a breach of the duty of
due care. The doctrine can be invoked when and only
when, under the circumstances involved, direct
evidence is absent or not readily available.

To summarize, the Fire investigation Report was not

used as evidence against respondents not because it is
considered hearsay but because it was inaccurately
relied upon and used by the petitioners.

NOTES: Additional issues

THE CA ERRED IN MISAPPLYING FACTS OF WEIGHT AND

SUBSTANCE AFFECTING THE CASE AT BAR.

NO; Under the first assigned error petitioners want us

to give full credit to the testimony of Noel Villarin, their
principal witness. The trial court, however, refused to
believe Villarin, not only because he had an ulterior
motive to testify against private respondent Young (his
tools were burned, and Young neither had replenished
those tools nor had visited him in the hospital) but also
on the impossibility of his statements [he said he saw
Paner pour gasoline to the generator (which caused the
fire) through a hole in the wall which is located high
above him, when the generator was under the floor of
the bunkhouse he was in and it was noted that said
bunkhouse is intact and did not burn] as rebuffed by the
defendants’ witness.

One of the highly revered dicta in our jurisprudence is

that this Court will not interfere with the judgment of
the trial court in passing on the credibility of opposing
witnesses unless there appears in the record some facts
or circumstances of weight and influence which have
been overlooked, which, if considered, could affect the
result of the case. The trial judge is in a better position
to decide the question of credibility since he personally
heard the witnesses and observed their deportment
and manner of testifying. Petitioners have offered no
FGU INSURANCE CORP. VS. G.P. SARMIENTO
TRUCKING CORP. (GPS)G.R. No. 141910. August 6,
2002
Facts:
GPS is an exclusive contractor and hauler of Concepcion
Industries, Inc. One day, it wasto deliver certaingoods of
Concepcion Industries, Inc. aboard one of its trucks. On
its way, thetruck collided with an unidentified truck,
resulting in damage to the cargoes.FGU, insurer ofthe
shipment paid to Concepcion Industries, Inc. the
amount of the damage and filed a suitagainstGPS. GPS
filed a motion to dismiss for failure to prove that it was
a common carrier.
Issue:
Whether or not GPS falls under the category of a
common carrier.
Held:
Note that GPS is an exclusive contractor and hauler of
Concepcion Industries, Inc.offering its service to
noother individual or entity. A common carrier is one
which offers itsservices whether to the public in general
or to a limited clientele in particular but never on
anexclusive basis. Therefore, GPS does not fit the
category of a common carrier although it is
notfreedfrom its liability based on culpa contractual
Culpa Aquiliana vs. Culpa Contractual
Culpa Aquiliana:
1. Only private concern.
2. Repairs the damage by indemnification.
3. Covers all acts that are faulty or negligent.
4. Preponderance of evidence.
5. No reservation – it’s independent from crime.
(Andamo vs IAC, 191 SCRA 203)
6. Employer’s liability is solidary (Fabre Jr. vs CA, 259
SCRA 426, ‘ 96) Culpa
Contractual
(i) Pre-existing obligation between the parties
(ii) Fault or negligence is incidental to the performance
of the obligation
(iii) Defense of having exercised diligence of a good
father of a family is not available, just like in criminal
action. Applied doctrine of Respondent Superior, or
Master and Servant Rule
GU INSURANCE CORPORATION vs. G.P.S TRUCKING
CORPORATION and LAMBERT M. EROLES
G.R.No. 141910 06August2002
FACTS OF THE CASE:
G.P. Sarmiento Trucking Corporation (GPS) undertook
to deliver on 18 June 1994 thirty (30) units of Condura
S.D. white refrigerators aboard one of its Isuzu truck,
driven by Lambert Eroles. While the truck was
traversing the north diversion road along McArthur
highway in Barangay Anupol, Bamban, Tarlac, it collided
with an unidentified truck, causing it to fall into a deep
canal, resulting in damage to the cargoes.
FGU Insurance Corporation (FGU), an insurer of the
shipment, paid to Concepcion Industries, Inc., the value
of the covered cargoes: P204, 450.00. FGU, in turn,
being the subrogee of the rights and interests of the
insured sought reimbursement of the amount, from
GPS. Since GPS failed to heed the claim, FGU filed a
complaint for damages and breach of contract of
carriage against GPS and its driver with the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 66, of Makati City. In its answer,
respondents asserted that GPS was the exclusive hauler
only of Concepcion Industries, Inc., since 1988, and it
was not so engaged in business as a common carrier.
Respondents further claimed that the cause of damage
was purely accidental. GPS, instead of submitting its
evidence, filed with leave of court a motion to dismiss
the complaint by way of demurrer to evidence on the
ground that petitioner had failed to prove that it was a
common carrier. The RTC and CA both ruled in favor of
the Respondent.
ISSUES OF THE CASE:
WHETHER RESPONDENT GPS, EITHER AS A COMMON
CARRIER OR A PRIVATE CARRIER, MAY BE PRESUMED
TO HAVE BEEN NEGLIGENT WHEN THE GOODS IT
UNDERTOOK TO TRANSPORT SAFELY WERE
SUBSEQUENTLY DAMAGED WHILE IN ITS PROTECTIVE
CUSTODY AND POSSESSION.
- In culpa contractual, upon which the action of
petitioner rests as being the subrogee of Concepcion
Industries, Inc., the mere proof of the existence of the
contract and the failure of its compliance justify, prima
facie, a corresponding right of relief. Thus, FGU has a
claim for the amount paid out.
- The law, recognizing the obligatory force of contracts,
will not permit a party to be set free from liability for
any kind of misperformance of the contractual
undertaking or a contravention of the tenor thereof
- GPS recognizes the existence of a contract of carriage
between it and petitioner’s assured, and admits that
the cargoes it has assumed to deliver have been lost or
damaged while in its custody. In such a situation, a
default on, or failure of compliance with, the obligation
in this case, the delivery of the goods in its custody to
the place of destination - gives rise to a presumption of
lack of care and corresponding liability on the part of
the contractual obligor the burden being on him to
establish otherwise. GPS has failed to do so.

HELD:
The decision of the lower courts insofar as Lambert M.
Eroles is concerned is affirmed but assailed decision
with regard to GPS trucking is reversed. It, is hereby
ordered to pay FGU Insurance Corporation the value of
the damaged and lost cargoes in the amount of P204,
450.00

Obligations and Contracts Terms:

• expectation interest- the interest in having the benefit

of his bargain by being put in as good a position as he
would have been in had the contract been performed
• reliance interest- the interest in being reimbursed for
loss caused by reliance on the contract by being put in
as good a position as he would have been in had the
contract not been made
• Restitution interest- which is his interest in having
restored to him any benefit that he has conferred on
the other party.
• Subrogee- the person or entity that assumes the legal
right to attempt to collect a claim of another (subrogor)
in return for paying the other's expenses or debts which
the other claims against a third party. A subrogee is
usually the insurance company which has insured the
party whose expenses were paid.
Perla Compania De Seguros, Inc., Et Al. V. Sps.
Gaudencio And Primitiva Sarangaya (2005)
FACTS:
 1986: Spouses Gaudencio Sarangaya III and
Primitiva Sarangaya erected Super A Building,
a semi-concrete, semi-narra, one-storey
commercial building fronting the provincial road of
Santiago, Isabela
 It has three doors which were leased out
 The two-storey residence of the Sarangayas was
behind the second and third doors of the building
 On the left side of the commercial building stood
the office of the Matsushita Electric Philippine
Corporation (Matsushita)
 1988: Perla Compania de Seguros, Inc. through its
branch manager Bienvenido Pascual, entered into a
contract of lease of the first door beside the
Matsushita office
 It was converted into a two door so he had a garage
where he parked a company car 1981 model 4-door
Ford Cortina which he used to supervise different
towns
 July 7, 1988: Pascual went to San Fernando,
Pampanga leaving the car
 3 days later: When he returned and warmed up the
car, it made an odd sound. On the second try,
there was again an odd sound and a small flames
came out of its engine so he was startled, stopped
the car, went out and pushed it out of the garage
 Soon, fire spewed out of its rear compartment and
burned the whole garage where he was trapped so
he suffered burns in the face, legs and arms
 The spouses were busy atching TV when they heard
2 loud explosions, smelt of gasoline and fire burned
all their belongings
 city fire marshall investigated and concluded that
the fire was accidental
 Spouses filed a complaint against Pascual for gross
negligence and Perla for lacking the required
diligence in the selection and supervision of its
employee.
 RTC: Pascual and Perla liable jointly and solidarily
 Pascual was held liable under the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur
 CA: affirmed but modified the amount of damages
ISSUE:
1. W/N the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable -
YES
2. W/N Perla lacked the required diligence in the
selection and supervision of its employee. - NO
HELD: DENIED
1. YES.
 Res ipsa loquitur
 Latin phrase which literally means “the thing or the
transaction speaks for itself.
 It relates to the fact of an injury that sets out an
inference to the cause thereof or establishes the
plaintiff’s prima facie case
 The doctrine rests on inference and not on
presumption
 facts of the occurrence warrant the supposition of
negligence and they furnish circumstantial evidence
of negligence when direct evidence is lacking
 based on the theory that the defendant either
knows the cause of the accident or has the best
opportunity of ascertaining it and the plaintiff,
having no knowledge thereof, is compelled to allege
negligence in general terms
 plaintiff relies on proof of the happening of the
accident alone to establish negligence
 provides a means by which a plaintiff can pin
liability on a defendant who, if innocent, should be
able to explain the care he exercised to prevent the
incident complained of
 defendant’s responsibility to show that there was
no negligence on his part
 Requisites of Res Ipsa Loquitur
 1) the accident is of a kind which does not ordinarily
occur unless someone is negligent
 “Ordinary” refers to the usual course of events
 Flames spewing out of a car engine, when it is
switched on, is obviously not a normal event.
Neither does an explosion usually occur when a car
engine is revved.
 Pascual, as the caretaker of the car, failed to submit
any proof that he had it periodically checked -
negligence
 2) the cause of the injury was under the exclusive
control of the person in charge and
 3) the injury suffered must not have been due to
any voluntary action or contribution on the part of
the person injured.
 When there is caso fortuito:
 (a) the cause of the unforeseen and
unexpected occurrence was independent of the
human will
 human agency must be entirely excluded as the
proximate cause or contributory cause of the injury
or loss -Not because car not maintained
 (b) it was impossible to foresee the event which
constituted the caso fortuito or, if it could be
 foreseen, it was impossible to avoid - NOT under
the control of pascual
 (c) the occurrence must be such as to render it
impossible to perform an obligation in a normal
manner - Spouses had no access nor obligation for
the maintenance
 (d) the person tasked to perform the obligation
must not have participated in any course of conduct
that aggravated the accident
2. YES.
 Perla did not include any rule or regulation that
Pascual should have observed in performing his
functions
 There was no guidelines for the maintenance and
upkeep of company property like the vehicle that
caught fire
 Did not require periodic reports on or inventories of
its properties
 Article 2180 of the Civil Code states that employers
shall be liable for the damage caused by their
employees. The liability is imposed on all those who
by their industry, profession or other enterprise
have other persons in their service or supervision
 Nowhere does it state that the liability is limited to
employers in the transportation business.
PLACIDO C. RAMOS and AUGUSTO L. RAMOS vs. PEPSI-
COLA BOTTLING CO. OF THE P.I. and ANDRES
BONIFACIO,
G.R. No. L-22533 February 9, 1967
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
FACTS: On June 30, 1958, Placido and Augusto
Ramos sued Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of the P.I. and
Andres Bonifacio in the Court of First Instance of Manila
as a consequence of a collision, on May 10, 1958,
involving the car of Placido Ramos and a tractor-truck
and trailer of PEPSI-COLA. Said car was at the time of
the collision driven by Augusto Ramos, son and co-
plaintiff of Placido. PEPSI-COLA's tractor-truck was then
driven by its driver and co-defendant Andres Bonifacio.
The CFI rendered judgment finding Bonifacio negligent
and declaring that PEPSI-COLA had not sufficiently
proved its having exercised the due diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent the damage. PEPSI-COLA
and Bonifacio, solidarily, were ordered to pay the
plaintiffs the damages. CA affirmed the trial court's
judgment insofar as it found defendant Bonifacio
negligent, but modified it by absolving defendant PEPSI-
COLA from liability, finding that, contrary to the
plaintiffs' contention, PEPSI-COLA sufficiently proved
due diligence in the selection of its driver Bonifacio. The
uncontradicted testimony of Juan T. Anasco, personnel
manager of PEPSI-COLA, was to the effect that Bonifacio
was first hired as a member of the bottle crop in the
production department; that when he was hired as a
driver, 'we had size [sic] him by looking into his
background, asking him to submit clearances, previous
experience, physical examination and later on, he was
sent to the pool house to take the usual driver's
examination, consisting of: First, theoretical
examination and second, the practical driving
examination, all of which he had undergone, and that
PEPSI-COLA was a member of the Safety Council.’ Thus,
PEPSI-COLA had exercised the diligence of a good father
of a family in the choice or selection of defendant driver.
ISSUE: Whether or not PEPSI-COLA exercised due
diligence in the selection of its employee.
HELD: YES. From all this it follows that for the
purposes of this appeal, it must be taken as established
that, as testified to by Añasco, PEPSI-COLA did in fact
carefully examine the driver-applicant Bonifacio as to
his qualifications, experiences and record of service,
taking all steps mentioned by the Court of Appeals in
its decision.
Such being the case, there can be no doubt that PEPSI-
COLA exercised the required due diligence in the
selection of its driver. As ruled by this Court in Campo vs.
Camarote: "In order that the defendant may be
considered as having exercised all diligence of a good
father of a family, he should not be satisfied with the
mere possession of a professional driver's license; he
should have carefully examined the applicant for
employment as to his qualifications, his experience and
record of service."
It should perhaps be stated that in the instant case no
question is raised as to due diligence in the supervision
by PEPSI-COLA of its driver. Article 2180 of the Civil
Code provides inter alia:
... The owners and managers of an establishment or
enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused
by their employees in the service of the branches in
which the latter are employed or on the occasion of
their functions.
The responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease
when the persons herein mentioned prove that they
observed all the diligence of a good father of a family
to prevent damage.
And construing a similar provision of the old Civil Code,
this Court said in Bahia vs. Litonjua,:
From this article two things are apparent: (1) That when
an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or
employee there instantly arises a presumption of law
that there was negligence on the part of the master or
employer either in the selection of the servant or
employee, or in supervision over him after the selection,
or both; and (2) that the presumption is juris
tantum and not juris et de jure, and consequently may
be rebutted.
It follows necessarily that if the employer shows to the
satisfaction of the court that in selection and
supervision he has exercised the care and diligence of a
good father of a family, the presumption is overcome
and he is relieved from liability.
Defenses: Due Diligence
Art. 2180: ….The owners and managers of an
establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible
for damages caused by their employees in the service
of the branches in which the latter are employed or on
the occasion of their functions. The responsibility
treated of in this article shall cease when the persons
herein mentioned prove that they observed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent
damage.

MR
DR. VICTORIA L. BATIQUIN v. CA, GR No. 118231, 1996-
07-05
Facts:
Dr. Batiquin was a Resident Physician at the Negros
Oriental Provincial Hospital, Dumaguete City... she was
also the Actg. Head of the Department of Obstetrics and
Gynecology at the said Hospital.
Mrs. Villegas... submitted to Dr. Batiquin for prenatal
care as the latter's private patient
Dr. Batiquin... with the assistance of Dr. Doris Teresita
Sy... and O.R. Nurse Arlene Diones and some student
nurses
Villegas... after 45 minutes Mrs. Villegas delivered her
first child
Plaintiff remained confined at the Hospital... during
which period of confinement she was regularly visited...
by Dr. Batiquin.
Soon after leaving the Hospital Mrs. Villegas began to
suffer abdominal pains and complained of being
feverish... consulted Dr. Batiquin at the latter's
polyclinic who prescribed for her certain medicines
Mrs. Villegas was given a Medical Certificate by Dr.
Batiquin on October 31, 1988 . . . certifying to her
physical fitness to return to her work
The abdominal pains and fever kept on recurring
When the pains become unbearable and she was
rapidly losing weight she consulted Dr. Ma. Salud Kho at
the Holy Child's Hospital in Dumaguete City
Upon examination she felt an abdominal mass one
finger below the umbilicus... which she suspected to be
either a tumor of the uterus or an ovarian cyst, either of
which could be cancerous.
A blood count showed that Mrs. Villegas had [an]
infection... inside her abdominal cavity. The result of all
those examinations impelled Dr. Kho to suggest that
Mrs. Villegas submit to another surgery to which the
latter agreed.
When Dr. Kho opened the abdomen of Mrs. Villegas she
found whitish-yellow discharge inside, an ovarian cyst
on each of the left and right ovaries which gave out pus,
dirt and pus behind the uterus, and a piece of rubber
materials on the right side of the uterus
This piece of rubber material which Dr. Kho described as
a "foreign body" looked like a piece of a "rubber glove"...
this foreign body was the cause of the infection of the
ovaries
The piece of rubber allegedly found near private
respondent Flotilde Villegas' uterus was not presented
in court, and although Dr. Ma. Salud Kho testified that
she sent it to a pathologist in Cebu City for
examination,[8] it was not mentioned in the...
pathologist's Surgical Pathology Report.
unluckily I don't know where the rubber was.
Dr. Victoria Batiquin's testimony that when she
confronted Dr. Kho regarding the piece of rubber, "Dr.
Kho answered that there was rubber indeed but that
she threw it away."... the trial court held in favor of the
petitioners herein.
the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial
court
The petitioners prefer the trial court's interpretation of
the above testimony, i.e., that Dr. Kho's knowledge of
the piece of rubber was based on hearsay.
Issues:
we find that the focal point of the instant appeal is the
appreciation of Dr. Kho's testimony.
Ruling:
The phrase relied upon by the trial court does not
negate the fact that Dr. Kho saw a piece of rubber in
private respondent Villegas' abdomen, and that she
sent it to a laboratory and then to Cebu City for
examination by a... pathologist.
Although hearsay, Dr. Batiquin's claim was not objected
to, and hence, the same is admissible[27] but it carries
no probative value.
Nevertheless, assuming otherwise, Dr. Batiquin's
statement cannot belie the fact that Dr. Kho found a
piece of rubber near private respondent Villegas' uterus.
whether she threw it away or sent it to Cebu City, we
are not justified in distrusting her as to her recovery of a
piece of... rubber from private respondent Villegas'
abdomen... he trial court failed to recognize that the
assertions of Drs. Batiquin and Sy were denials or
negative testimonies. Well-settled is the rule that
positive testimony is stronger than negative
testimony.[33] Of course, as the petitioners... advocate,
such positive testimony must come from a credible
source, which leads us to the second assigned error.
Dr. Kho as a credible witness. Dr. Kho was frank
throughout her turn on the witness stand. Furthermore,
no... motive to state any untruth was ever imputed
against Dr. Kho, leaving her trustworthiness unimpaired.
her positive testimony [that a piece of rubber was
indeed found in private respondent Villegas' abdomen]
prevails over the negative testimony in favor of the
petitioners.
the rule of res ipsa loquitur comes to fore.
The thing speaks for itself. Rebuttable presumption or
inference that defendant was negligent, which arises
upon proof that [the] instrumentality causing injury was
in defendant's exclusive control, and that the accident
was one which ordinary does... not happen in absence
of negligence.
[a] rule of evidence whereby negligence of [the] alleged
wrongdoer may be inferred from [the] mere fact that
[the] accident happened provided [the] character of
[the] accident and circumstances attending it...
reasonably to belief... absence of negligence it would
not have occurred and that thing which caused injury is
shown to have been under [the] management and
control of [the] alleged wrongdoer... the happening of
an injury permits an... inference of negligence where
plaintiff produces substantial evidence that [the] injury
was caused by an agency or instrumentality under [the]
exclusive control and management of defendant, and
that the occurrence [sic] was such that in the ordinary
course of things would not... happen if reasonable care
had been used.
peculiar to the law of negligence which recognizes that
prima facie negligence may be established without
direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof
of negligence.
not a rule of... substantive law, but merely a mode of
proof or a mere procedural convenience.
not intended to and does not dispense with the
requirement of proof of culpable negligence on the
party charged. It... merely determines and regulates
what shall be prima facie evidence thereof and
facilitates the burden of plaintiff of proving a breach of
the duty of due care.
can be invoked when and only when, under the
circumstances involved, direct evidence is absent and
not... readily available.
all the requisites for recourse to the doctrine are
present... entire proceedings of the cesarean section
were under the exclusive control of Dr. Batiquin. In this
light, the private respondents were bereft of direct
evidence... since aside from the cesarean section,
private respondent Villegas underwent no... other
operation which could have caused the offending piece
of rubber to appear in her uterus, it stands to reason
that such could only have been a by-product of the
cesarean section... petitioners, in this regard, failed to
overcome the presumption... of negligence arising from
resort to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
the vital role the medical profession plays in the lives of
the people,[37] and State's compelling interest to enact
measures to protect the public from "the potentially
deadly effects of... incompetence and ignorance in
those who would undertake to treat our bodies and
minds for disease or trauma."
Through her tortious conduct, the petitioner
endangered the life of Flotilde Villegas, in violation of
her profession's rigid ethical code and in contravention
of the legal standards set forth for professionals, in the
general,[40] and members of the medical profession,[41]
in particular.
 LEONILA GARCIA-RUEDA, petitioner, vs. WILFREDO L.
PASCASIO, RAUL R. ARNAU, ABELARDO L.
APORTADERA JR., Honorable CONDRADO M. VASQUEZ,
all of the Office of the Ombudsman; JESUS F.
GUERRERO, PORFIRIO MACARAEG, and GREGORIO A.
ARIZALA, all of the Office of the City Prosecutor,
Manila, respondents. [G.R. No. 118141. September 5,
1997]
Topic: Elements of Medical Malpractice
Facts: Florencio V. Rueda, husband of petitioner Leonila
Garcia-Rueda, underwent surgical operation at the UST
hospital for the removal of a stone blocking his ureter.
He was attended by Dr. Domingo Antonio, Jr. who was
the surgeon, while Dr. Erlinda Balatbat Reyes was the
anesthesiologist. Six hours after the surgery, Florencio
died of complications of “unknown cause,” according to
officials of the UST Hospital. Leonila requested that the
NBI perform an autopsy on her husband’s body. The NBI
found that he had died because of “lack of care by the
attending physician in administering anesthesia” and
recommended that Dr. Antonio and Dr. Reyes be
charged for Homicide through Reckless Imprudence
before the Office of the City Prosecutor.
A series of nine prosecutors tossed the responsibility of
conducting a preliminary investigation to each other
with contradictory recommendations (investigative
pingpong). Prosecutor Eudoxia T. Gualberto
recommended that Dr. Reyes be included in the
criminal information of Homicide through Reckless
Imprudence. While the recommendation of Prosecutor
Gualberto was pending, the case was transferred to
Senior State Prosecutor Gregorio A. Arizala, who
resolved to exonerate Dr. Reyes from any wrongdoing,
a resolution which was approved by both City
Prosecutor Porfirio G. Macaraeg and City Prosecutor
Jesus F. Guerrero. Frustrated, Leonila filed graft charges
specifically for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act
No. 3019 against Prosecutors Guerrero, Macaraeg, and
Arizala for manifest partiality in favor of Dr. Reyes
before the Office of the Ombudsman. On July 11, 1994,
the Ombudsman issued the assailed resolution
dismissing the complaint for lack of evidence. In fine,
petitioner assails the exercise of the discretionary
power of the Ombudsman to review the
recommendations of the government prosecutors and
to approve and disapprove the same.
Issue: Whether the Ombudsman committed grave
abuse of discretion in refusing to file an information for
graft against the respondent City Prosecutors.
Ruling:
The Ombudsman did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing the plaintiff’s complaint for
lack of evidence.
The powers and functions of the Ombudsman have
generally been categorized into the following:
investigatory powers, prosecutory power, public
assistance function, authority to inquire and obtain
information, and function to adopt, institute and
implement preventive measures.
The Ombudsman then may dismiss the complaint if he
finds it to be insufficient in form and substance or if he
otherwise finds no ground to continue with the inquiry;
or he may proceed with the investigation of the
complaint if, in his view, it is in due and proper form.
While the Ombudsman has the full discretion to
determine whether or not a criminal case should be
filed, this Court is not precluded from reviewing the
Ombudsman’s action when there is an abuse of
discretion, in which case Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
may exceptionally be invoked.
From a procedural standpoint, it is certainly odd why
the successive transfers from one prosecutor to another
were not sufficiently explained in the Resolution of the
Ombudsman. Being the proper investigating authority
with respect to misfeasance, non-feasance and
malfeasance of public officials, the Ombudsman should
have been more vigilant and assiduous in determining
the reasons behind the buckpassing to ensure that no
irregularity took place.
The NBI pronounced after conducting an autopsy that
there was indeed negligence on the part of the
attending physicians in administering the
anaesthesia. The fact of want of competence or
diligence is evidentiary in nature, which can be best
determined on a full-blown trial for it is virtually
impossible to ascertain the merits of a medical
negligence case without extensive investigation,
research, evaluation and consultations with medical
experts. Clearly, the City Prosecutors are not in a
competent position to pass judgment on such a
technical matter, especially when there are conflicting
evidence and findings.
actions against anaesthesiologists to hold the defendant
liable for the death or injury of a patient under
excessive or improper anaesthesia. Essentially, it
requires two-pronged evidence: evidence as to the
recognized standards of the medical community in the
particular kind of case, and a showing that the physician
in question negligently departed from this standard in
his treatment.

As to Medical Malpractice Another element in medical negligence cases is

Medical malpractice or medical negligence is that type
of claim which a victim has available to him or her to
redress a wrong committed by a medical professional
which has caused bodily harm.
In order to successfully pursue such a claim, a patient
must prove that a health care provider, in most cases a
physician, either failed to do something which a
reasonably prudent health care provider would have
done, or that he or she did something that a reasonably
prudent provider would not have done; and that that
failure or action caused injury to the patient.
There are four elements involved in medical
negligence cases: duty, breach, injury and proximate
causation.
causation which is divided into two inquiries: whether
the doctors’ actions in fact caused the harm to the
patient and whether these were the proximate cause of
the patient’s injury. Indeed here, a causal connection is
discernible from the occurrence of the victim’s death
after the negligent act of the anaesthesiologist in
administering the anesthesia, a fact which, if confirmed,
should warrant the filing of the appropriate criminal
case. To be sure, the allegation of negligence is not
entirely baseless. Moreover, the NBI deduced that the
attending surgeons did not conduct the necessary
interview of the patient prior to the operation. It
appears that the cause of the death of the victim could
have been averted had the proper drug been applied to
cope with the symptoms of malignant hyperthermia.

When the victim employed the services of Dr. Antonio

and Dr. Reyes, a physician-patient relationship was
created. In accepting the case, said doctors in effect
represented that they will employ such training, care
and skill in the treatment of their patients. They have a
duty to use at least the same level of care that any
other reasonably competent doctor would use to treat
a condition under the same circumstances. The breach
of these professional duties of skill and care, or their
improper performance, by a physician surgeon whereby
the patient is injured in body or in health, constitutes
actionable malpractice. Consequently, in the event that
any injury results to the patient from want of due care
or skill during the operation, the surgeons may be held
answerable in damages for negligence.

Moreover, in malpractice or negligence cases involving

the administration of anaesthesia, the necessity of
expert testimony and the availability of the charge
of res ipsa loquitur to the plaintiff, have been applied in
G.R. No. 124354, December 29, 1999
Rogelio Ramos and Erlinda Ramos (as guardians)
vs. Court of Appeals
Ponente: Kapunan
Issue:
The court is called upon to rule whether a surgeon, an
anesthesiologist and a hospital should be made liable
for the unfortunate comatose condition of a patient
scheduled for cholecystectomy.
Facts:
Erlinda Ramos experiencing a discomfort allegedly
caused by the stone in her gall bladder sought
professional advice. She was advised to undergo an
operation for the removal of a stone in her gall bladder.
She underwent series of examination and was declared
fit for surgery. Through the intercession Dr. Buenviaje,
Erlinda and her husband met Dr. Hosaka and agreed to
have the operation on June 17, 1985.
On the day of the operation, (according to Dr. Hosaka)
something went wrong during the intubation. Rogelio,
the husband reminded the doctor that the condition of
his wife would not have happened, had he looked for a
good anesthesiologist. Due to such, Erlinda stayed at
the ICU for a month.
The petitioners filed a civil case for damages with the
RTC of Quezon City against the respondents alleging
negligence in the management and care of Erlinda
Ramos. During the trial, the plaintiff presented the
testimonies of Dean Herminda Cruz and dr. Gavino
(present during the operation) to prove that the
sustained by Erlinda was due to lack of oxygen in her
brain caused by the faulty management of her airway
by the respondent during the anesthesia phase.
Respondent relied on the expert testimony of Dr.
Jamora, a pulmonologist, to the effect that the cause of
brain damage was Erlinda’s allergic reaction to the
anesthetic agent.
After considering the evidences, RTC rendered
judgment in favor of petitioners. Private respondents
interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals. CA
rendered a decision reversing the findings of the RTC.
The decision of the CA was mistakenly received and has
caused for the expiration of the reglementary period for
the petitioners. The petitioners then filed for a motion
for extension of time to file a motion for
reconsideration, however the CA denied the motion for
extension.
In aid of a new counsel, the petitioners were granted
extension of 30 days. The petitioners alleged the
following issues: (a) CA erred in putting much reliance
on the testimonies of respondents DR. Guttierrez, Dr.
Calderon and Dr. Jamora; (b) in finding that the
negligence of the respondents did not cause the
unfortunate comatose condition of the petitioner; (c) in
not applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor [the thing
speaks for itself]
Held:
(1) The denial of reglementary period is erroneous,
because the delay is attributable to the fact that the
decision was not sent to the counsel on records of the
petitioners. It is elementary that when a party is
represented by counsel, all notices should be sent to
the party’s lawyer at his given address.
(2) Res ipsa loquitor is a maxim for the rule that the
fact of the occurrence of an injury, taken with the
surrounding circumstances, may permit an inference or
raise a presumption of negligence, or make out a
plaintiff’s prima facie case and present a question of
fact for defendant to meet an explanation. This maxim
is not applicable for substantive law thus mere
invocation and application of the doctrine does not
dispense with the requirement of proof of negligence.
Before the doctrine may be applied, the following
requisites must be present: (a) the accident is a kind
which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of
someone’s negligence; (b) it is caused by an
instrumentality within the exclusive control of the
defendant of defendants; (c) the possibility of
contributing conduct which would make the plaintiff
responsible is eliminated. [The control must be shown
especially]. Medical malpractice does not escape from
the application of this doctrine. Applying the maxim, we
find that the damage caused by Erlinda is attributable to
the negligence of her doctors.
(3) As to the testimonies relied by the CA, we disagree.
We hold that private respondents were unable to
disprove the presumption of negligence on their part in
the care of Erlinda and their negligence was the
proximate cause of her piteous condition. Dr. Jamora
does not qualify as an expert witness based on the
standard set by the rules of evidence [Sec. 49. Opinion
of expert witness – the opinion of a witness on a matter
requiring special knowledge, skill, experience or training
which he is shown to possess, may be received in
evidence.]. The alleged allergic reaction has no proof as
well.
(4) The court believes that the faulty intubation is the
proximate cause of the comatose condition of the
patient. Proximate cause is a natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces injury, and without which the result would not
have occurred.
The doctors as well as the hospital was held liable for
the injury incurred by Erlinda, due to their negligence in
the operation and management for the hospital.
2002 Decision
ROGELIO E. RAMOS and ERLINDA RAMOS, in their own
behalf and as natural guardians of the minors,
ROMMEL RAMOS, ROY RODERICK RAMOS, and RON
RAYMOND RAMOS, petitioners, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, DE LOS SANTOS MEDICAL CENTER, DR.
ORLINO HOSAKA and DR. PERFECTA GUTIERREZ,
respondents (2002)
FACTS:
Erlinda Ramos underwent a surgical procedure to
remove stone from her gall bladder (cholecystectomy).
They hired Dr. Hosaka, a surgeon, to conduct the
surgery at the De Los Santos Medical Center (DLSMC).
Hosaka assured them that he would find a good
anesthesiologist. But the operation did not go as
planned, Dr. Hosaka arrived 3 hours late for the
operation, Dra. Gutierrez, the anesthesiologist
“botched” the administration of the anesthesia causing
Erlinda to go into a coma and suffer brain damage. The
botched operation was witnessed by Herminda Cruz,
sister in law of Erlinda and Dean of College of Nursing of
Capitol Medical Center.
The family of Ramos (petitioners) sued the hospital, the
surgeon and the anesthesiologist for damages. The
petitioners showed expert testimony showing that
Erlinda's condition was caused by the anesthesiologist
in not exercising reasonable care in “intubating” Erlinda.
Eyewitnesses heard the anesthesiologist saying “Ang
hirap ma-intubate nito, mali yata ang pagkakapasok. O
lumalaki ang tiyan.”
Diagnostic tests prior to surgery showed that Erlinda
was robust and fit to undergo surgery.
The RTC held that the anesthesiologist failed to exercise
due care in intubating the patient, the surgeon was
remiss in his obligation to provide a “good
anesthesiologist” and for arriving 3 hours late and the
hospital is liable for the negligence of the doctors and
for not cancelling the operation after the surgeon failed
to arrive on time. The surgeon, anesthesiologist and the
DLSMC were all held jointly and severally liable for
damages to petitioners. The CA reversed the decision of
the Trial Court.
ISSUES: Whether the private respondents were
negligent and thereby caused the comatose condition
of Ramos.
HELD:
Yes, private respondents were all negligent and are
solidarily liable for the damages.
Res ipsa loquitur – a procedural or evidentiary rule
which means “the thing or the transaction speaks for
itself.” It is a maxim for the rule that the fact of the
occurrence of an injury, taken with the surrounding
circumstances, may permit an inference or raise a
presumption of negligence, or make out a plaintiff’s
prima facie case, and present a question of fact for
defendant to meet with an explanation, where
ordinarily in a medical malpractice case, the
complaining party must present expert testimony to
prove that the attending physician was negligent.
This doctrine finds application in this case. On the day of
the operation, Erlinda Ramos already surrendered her
person to the private respondents who had complete
and exclusive control over her. Apart from the gallstone
problem, she was neurologically sound and fit. Then,
after the procedure, she was comatose and brain
damaged—res ipsa loquitur!—the thing speaks for
itself!
Liability of the Anesthesiologist
The anesthesiologist was not able to disprove the
presumption of negligence on their part in the care of
Erlinda and her negligence was the proximate cause of
her condition. One need not be an anesthesiologist to
tell whether the intubation was a success. [res ipsa
loquitur applies here]. The Supreme Court also found
that the anesthesiologist only saw Erlinda for the first
time on the day of the operation which indicates
unfamiliarity with the patient and which is an act of
negligence and irresponsibility. The anesthesiologist
omitted to perform a thorough preoperative evaluation
on Erlinda.
The injury incurred by petitioner Erlinda does not
normally happen absent any negligence in the
administration of anesthesia and in the use of an
endotracheal tube. As was noted in our Decision, the
instruments used in the administration of anesthesia,
including the endotracheal tube, were all under the
exclusive control of private respondents Dr. Gutierrez
and Dr. Hosaka.
Captain of Ship Doctrine – Liability of the Surgeon
The head surgeon, Dr. Hosaka was also negligent. He
failed to exercise the proper authority as the “captain of
the ship” in determining if the anesthesiologist
observed the proper protocols. Also, because he was
late, he did not have time to confer with the
anesthesiologist regarding the anesthesia delivery.
From the facts on record it can be logically inferred that
Dr. Hosaka exercised a certain degree of, at the very
least, supervision over the procedure then being
performed on Erlinda.
First, it was Dr. Hosaka who recommended to
petitioners the services of Dr. Gutierrez. In effect, he
represented to petitioners that Dr. Gutierrez possessed
the necessary competence and skills. Drs. Hosaka and
Gutierrez had worked together since 1977. Whenever
Dr. Hosaka performed a surgery, he would always
engage the services of Dr. Gutierrez to administer the
anesthesia on his patient.
Second, Dr. Hosaka himself admitted that he was the
attending physician of Erlinda. Thus, when Erlinda
showed signs of cyanosis, it was Dr. Hosaka who gave
instructions to call for another anesthesiologist and
cardiologist to help resuscitate Erlinda.
Third, it is conceded that in performing their
responsibilities to the patient, Drs. Hosaka and
Gutierrez worked as a team. Their work cannot be
placed in separate watertight compartments because
their duties intersect with each other.
While the professional services of Dr. Hosaka and Dr.
Gutierrez were secured primarily for their performance
of acts within their respective fields of expertise for the
treatment of petitioner Erlinda, and that one does not
exercise control over the other, they were certainly not
completely independent of each other to absolve one
from the negligent acts of the other physician.
It is quite apparent that they have a common
responsibility to treat the patient, which responsibility
necessitates that they call each other’s attention to the
condition of the patient while the other physician is
performing the necessary medical procedures.
It is equally important to point out that Dr. Hosaka was
remiss in his duty of attending to petitioner Erlinda
promptly, for he arrived more than three (3) hours late
for the scheduled operation. In reckless disregard for his
patients well being, Dr. Hosaka scheduled two
procedures on the same day, just thirty minutes apart
from each other, at different hospitals. Thus, when the
first procedure (protoscopy) at the Sta. Teresita Hospital
did not proceed on time, Erlinda was kept in a state of
uncertainty at the DLSMC. The unreasonable delay in
petitioner Erlinda’s scheduled operation subjected her
to continued starvation and consequently, to the risk of
acidosis, or the condition of decreased alkalinity of the
blood and tissues, marked by sickly sweet breath,
headache, nausea and vomiting, and visual
disturbances. The long period that Dr. Hosaka made
Erlinda wait for him certainly aggravated the anxiety
that she must have been feeling at the time. It could be
safely said that her anxiety adversely affected the
administration of anesthesia on her. As explained by Dr.
Camagay, the patients anxiety usually causes the
outpouring of adrenaline which in turn results in high
blood pressure or disturbances in the heart rhythm.
Dr. Hosaka's irresponsible conduct of arriving very late
for the scheduled operation of petitioner Erlinda is
violative, not only of his duty as a physician to serve the
interest of his patients with the greatest solicitude,
giving them always his best talent and skill, but also of
Article 19 of the Civil Code which requires a person, in
the performance of his duties, to act with justice and
give everyone his due.
Liability of the Hospital
No ER-EE relationship between the respondent doctors
and the hospital. As such, the Hospital is not liable.
Nogales v. Capitol Medical Center, et al., G.R. No.
142625, 19 December 2006
[CARPIO, J.]
FACTS:
Pregnant with her fourth child, Corazon Nogales
(“Corazon”), who was then 37 years old, was under the
exclusive prenatal care of Dr. Oscar Estrada (“Dr.
Estrada”) beginning on her fourth month of pregnancy
or as early as December 1975. While Corazon was on
her last trimester of pregnancy, Dr. Estrada noted an
increase in her blood pressure and development of leg
edema indicating preeclampsia, which is a dangerous
complication of pregnancy. Around midnight of 25 May
1976, Corazon started to experience mild labor pains
prompting Corazon and Rogelio Nogales (“Spouses
Nogales”) to see Dr. Estrada at his home. After
examining Corazon, Dr. Estrada advised her immediate
admission to the Capitol Medical Center (“CMC”). The
following day, Corazon was admitted at 2:30 a.m. at the
CMC after the staff nurse noted the written admission
request of Dr. Estrada. Upon Corazon’s admission at the
CMC, Rogelio Nogales (“Rogelio”) executed and signed
the “Consent on Admission and Agreement” and
“Admission Agreement.” Corazon was then brought to
the labor room of the CMC. Corazon died at 9:15 a.m.
The cause of death was “hemorrhage, post partum.”
Petitioners filed a complaint for damages with the
Regional Trial Court of Manila against CMC, Dr. Estrada,
and the rest of CMC medical staff for the death of
Corazon. In their defense, CMC pointed out that Dr.
Estrada was a consultant to be considered as an
independent-contractor, and that no employer-
employee relationship existed between the former and
the latter.
After more than 11 years of trial, the trial court
rendered judgment on 22 November 1993 finding Dr.
Estrada solely liable for damages. Petitioners appealed
the trial court’s decision. Petitioners claimed that aside
from Dr. Estrada, the remaining respondents should be
held equally liable for negligence. Petitioners pointed
out the extent of each respondent’s alleged liability.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court’s ruling and applied the “borrowed servant
doctrine” to release the liability of other medical staff.
This doctrine provides that once the surgeon enters the
operating room and takes charge of the proceedings,
the acts or omissions of operating room personnel, and
any negligence associated with such acts or omissions,
are imputable to the surgeon. While the assisting
physicians and nurses may be employed by the hospital,
or engaged by the patient, they normally become the
temporary servants or agents of the surgeon in charge
while the operation is in progress, and liability may be
imposed upon the surgeon for their negligent acts
under the doctrine of respondeat superior.
ISSUE: Whether CMC is vicariously liable for the
negligence of Dr. Estrada as its attending independent-
contractor physician considering that facts of the
instant case.
HELD: YES.
In general, a hospital is not liable for the negligence of
an independent contractor-physician. There is, however,
an exception to this principle. The hospital may be liable
if the physician is the “ostensible” agent of the hospital.
This exception is also known as the “doctrine of
apparent authority.”xxx The doctrine of apparent
authority essentially involves two factors to determine
the liability of an independent-contractor physician. The
first factor focuses on the hospital’s manifestations and
is sometimes described as an inquiry whether the
hospital acted in a manner which would lead a
reasonable person to conclude that the individual who
was alleged to be negligent was an employee or agent
of the hospital. In this regard, the hospital need not
make express representations to the patient that the
treating physician is an employee of the hospital; rather
a representation may be general and implied. xxx The
second factor focuses on the patient’s reliance. It is
sometimes characterized as an inquiry on whether the
plaintiff acted in reliance upon the conduct of the
hospital or its agent, consistent with ordinary care and
prudence.
xxx
In the instant case, CMC impliedly held out Dr. Estrada
as a member of its medical staff. Through CMC’s acts,
CMC clothed Dr. Estrada with apparent authority
thereby leading the Spouses Nogales to believe that Dr.
Estrada was an employee or agent of CMC. CMC cannot
now repudiate such authority. The records show that
the Spouses Nogales relied upon a perceived
employment relationship with CMC in accepting Dr.
Estrada’s services. Rogelio testified that he and his wife
specifically chose Dr. Estrada to handle Corazon’s
delivery not only because of their friend’s
recommendation, but more importantly because of Dr.
Estrada’s “connection with a reputable hospital, the
[CMC].” In other words, Dr. Estrada’s relationship with
CMC played a significant role in the Spouses Nogales’
decision in accepting Dr. Estrada’s services as the
obstetrician-gynecologist for Corazon’s delivery.
Moreover, as earlier stated, there is no showing that
before and during Corazon’s confinement at CMC, the
Spouses Nogales knew or should have known that Dr.
Estrada was not an employee of CMC. xxx CMC’s
defense that all it did was “to extend to [Corazon] its
facilities” is untenable. The Court cannot close its eyes
to the reality that hospitals, such as CMC, are in the
business of treatment.

xxx

The Court finds respondent Capitol Medical Center

vicariously liable for the negligence of Dr. Oscar Estrada.
The amounts of P105,000 as actual damages and
P700,000 as moral damages should each earn legal
interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum
computed from the date of the judgment of the trial
court. The Court affirms the rest of the Decision dated 6
February 1998 and Resolution dated 21 March 2000 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 45641.
Professional Services Inc. (PSI) v. Natividad and
Enrique Agana
Natividad and Enrique Agana v. Juan Fuentes
Miguel Ampil v. Natividad and Enrique Agana
2007 / Sandoval-Gutierrez / Petition for review on
certiorari of CA decisions
Standard of conduct > Experts > Medical professionals
FACTS
Natividad Agana was rushed to Medical City because of
difficulty of bowel movement and bloody anal discharge.
Dr. Ampil diagnosed her to be suffering from cancer of
the sigmoid. Dr. Ampil performed an anterior resection
surgery on her, and finding that the malignancy spread
on her left ovary, he obtained the consent of her
husband, Enrique, to permit Dr. Fuentes to
perform hysterectomy on her. After the hysterectomy,
Dr. Fuentes showed his work to Dr. Ampil, who
examined it and found it in order, so he allowed Dr.
Fuentes to leave the operating room. Dr. Ampil was
about to complete the procedure when the attending
nurses made some remarks on the Record of Operation:
“sponge count lacking 2; announced to surgeon search
done but to no avail continue for closure” (two pieces
of gauze were missing). A “diligent search” was
conducted but they could not be found. Dr. Ampil
then directed that the incision be closed.
A couple of days after, she complained of pain in
her anal region, but the doctors told her that it was just
a natural consequence of the surgery. Dr. Ampil
recommended that she consult an oncologist to
examine the cancerous nodes which were not removed
during the operation. After months of consultations and
examinations in the US, she was told that she was free
of cancer. Weeks after coming back, her daughter found
a piece of gauze (1.5 in) protruding from her vagina, so
Dr. Ampil manually extracted this, assuring Natividad
that the pains will go away. However, the pain
worsened, so she sought treatment at a hospital, where
another 1.5 in piece of gauze was found in her vagina.
She underwent another surgery.
Sps. Agana filed a complaint for damages against
PSI (owner of Medical City), Dr. Ampil, and Dr. Fuentes,
alleging that the latter are liable for negligence for
leaving 2 pieces of gauze in Natividad’s body,
and malpractice for concealing their acts of negligence.
Enrique Agana also filed an administrative
complaint for gross negligence and malpractice against
the two doctors with the PRC (although only the case
against Dr. Fuentes was heard since Dr. Ampil was
abroad). Pending the outcome of the cases, Natividad
died (now substituted by her children). RTC found PSI
and the two doctors liable for negligence and
malpractice. PRC dismissed the case against Dr.
Fuentes. CA dismissed only the case against Fuentes.
ISSUE AND HOLDING
1. WON CA erred in holding Dr. Ampil liable for
negligence and malpractice. NO; DR. AMPIL IS
GUILTY
2. WON CA erred in absolving Dr. Fuentes of any
liability. NO
3. WON PSI may be held solidarily liable for Dr.
Ampil’s negligence. YES
RATIO
DR. AMPIL IS LIABLE FOR NEGLIGENCE AND
MALPRACTICE
His arguments are without basis [did not prove that the
American doctors were the ones who put / left the
gauzes; did not submit evidence to rebut the
correctness of the operation record (re: number of
gauzes used); re: Dr. Fuentes’ alleged negligence, Dr.
Ampil examined his work and found it in order].
Leaving foreign substances in the wound after
incision has been closed is at least prima
facie negligence by the operating surgeon. Even if it
has been shown that a surgeon was required to leave a
sponge in his patient’s abdomen because of the dangers
attendant upon delay, still, it is his legal duty to inform
his patient within a reasonable time by advising her of
what he had been compelled to do, so she can seek
relief from the effects of the foreign object left in her
body as her condition might permit. What’s worse in
this case is that he misled her by saying that the pain
was an ordinary consequence of her operation.
Medical negligence; standard of diligence
To successfully pursue this case of medical negligence, a
patient must only prove that a health care provider
either failed to do something [or did something] which
a reasonably prudent health care provider would have
done [or wouldn’t have done], and that the failure or
action caused injury to the patient.
 Duty – to remove all foreign objects from the body
before closure of the incision; if he fails to do so, it
was his duty to inform the patient about it
 Breach – failed to remove foreign objects; failed to
inform patient
 Injury – suffered pain that necessitated examination
and another surgery
 Proximate Causation – breach caused this
injury; could be traced from his act of closing the
incision despite information given by the attendant
 nurses that 2 pieces of gauze were still missing; what
established causal link: gauze pieces later extracted
from patient’s vagina
DR. FUENTES NOT LIABLE
The res ipsa loquitur [thing speaks for itself] argument
of the Aganas’ does not convince the court. Mere
invocation and application of this doctrine does not
dispense with the requirement of proof of negligence.
Requisites for the applicability of res ipsa loquitur
1. Occurrence of injury
2. Thing which caused injury was under the control
and management of the defendant [DR.
FUENTES] — LACKING SINCE CTRL+MGT WAS
WITH DR. AMPIL
3. Occurrence was such that in the ordinary course of
things, would not have happened if those who had
control or management used proper care
4. Absence of explanation by defendant
Under the Captain of the Ship rule, the operating
surgeon is the person in complete charge of the surgery
room and all personnel connected with the operation.
That Dr. Ampil discharged such role is evident from the
following:
 He called Dr. Fuentes to perform a hysterectomy
 He examined Dr. Fuentes’ work and found it in order
 He granted Dr. Fuentes permission to leave
 He ordered the closure of the incision
HOSPITAL OWNER PSI SOLIDARILY LIABLE WITH DR.
AMPIL [NCC 2180], AND DIRECTLY LIABLE TO SPS.
AGANAS [NCC 2176]
Previously, employers cannot be held liable for the fault
or negligence of its professionals. However, this
doctrine has weakened since courts came to realize that
modern hospitals are taking a more active role in
supplying and regulating medical care to its patients, by
employing staff of physicians, among others.
Hence, there is no reason to exempt hospitals from the
universal rule of respondeat superior. Here are the
Court’s bases for sustaining PSI’s liability:
 Ramos v. CA doctrine on E-E relationship
 negligence committed
o For purposes of apportioning responsibility in
medical negligence cases, an employer-employee
relationship in effect exists between hospitals and
their attending and visiting physicians. [LABOR
LESSON: power to hire, fire, power of control]
 Agency principle of apparent authority / agency by
estoppel

o Imposes liability because of the actions of a
principal or employer in somehow misleading the
public into believing that the relationship or the
authority exists [see NCC 1869]
o PSI publicly displays in the Medical City lobby the
names and specializations of their physicians.
Hence, PSI is now estopped from passing all the
blame to the physicians whose names it proudly
paraded in the public directory, leading the public
to believe that it vouched for their skill and
competence.
o
 If doctors do well, hospital profits financially, so
when negligence mars the quality of its services,
the hospital should not be allowed to escape
liability for its agents’ acts.
 Doctrine of corporate negligence / corporate
responsibility

o This is the judicial answer to the problem of
allocating hospital’s liability for the negligent acts
of health practitioners, absent facts to support the
application of respondeat superior.
o This provides for the duties expected [from
hospitals]. In this case, PSI failed to perform the
duty of exercising reasonable care to protect from
harm all patients admitted into its facility for
medical treatment. PSI failed to conduct an
investigation of the matter reported in the note
of the count nurse, and this established PSI’s part
in the dark conspiracy of silence and concealment
about the gauzes.
o

PSI has actual / constructive knowledge of the
matter, through the report of the attending
nurses + the fact that the operation was carried
on with the assistance of various hospital staff
o It also breached its duties to oversee or supervise
all persons who practice medicine within its
walls and take an active step in fixing the
 PSI also liable under NCC 2180

o It failed to adduce evidence to show that it
exercised the diligence of a good father of the
family in the accreditation and supervision of Dr.
Ampil