CASE DOCTRINES

CIVIL LIABILITY ARISING FROM A CRIME

Barredo v. Garcia

Facts

A head-on collision between a taxicab owned by Barredo and a carretela occurred. The carretela
was overturned and one of its passengers, a 16-year old boy, the son of Garcia and Almario, died
as a result of the injuries which he received. The driver of the taxicab, an employee of Barredo,
was prosecuted for the crime and was convicted. When the criminal case was instituted, Garcia
and Almario reserved their right to institute a separate civil action for damages. Subsequently,
Garcia and Almario instituted a civil action for damages against Barredo, the employer of the
taxicab driver.

Held:

A head-on collision between a taxi and a carretela resulted in the death of a 16-year-old boy, one
of the passengers of the carretela. A criminal action was filed against the taxi driver and he was
convicted and sentenced accordingly. The court in the criminal case granted the petition that the
right to bring a separate civil action be reserved. Thereafter the parents of the deceased brought
suit for damages against the proprietor of the taxi, the employer of the taxi driver, under article
1903 of the Civil Code. Defendant contended that his liability was governed by the Revised
Penal Code, according to which his responsibility was only secondary, but no civil action had
been brought against the taxi driver. Held: That this separate civil action lies, the employer being
primarily and directly responsible in damages under articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code

Elcano vs Hill

Facts

Respondent Reginald Hill killed the son of the plaintiffs named AgapitoElcano. A criminal
complaint was instituted against him but he was acquitted on the ground that his act was not
criminal, because of lack of intent to kill, couple with mistake. Subsequently, plaintiffs filed a
complaint for recovery of damages against defendant Reginald Hill, a minor, married at the time
of the occurrence, and his father, the defendant Marvin Hill, with who he was living and getting
subsistence, for the same killing. A motion to dismiss was filed by the defendants. The Court of
First Instance of Quezon City denied the motion. Nevertheless, the civil case was finally
dismissed upon motion for reconsideration.

Held

The present civil action for damages is not barred by the acquittal of Reginald in the criminal
case. Firstly, there is a distinction as regards the proof required in a criminal case and a civil
case. To find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is
required, while in a civil case, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make the defendant pay
in damages. Furthermore, a civil case for damages on the basis of quasi-delict does is
independently instituted from a criminal act. As such the acquittal of Reginald Hill in the
criminal case has not extinguished his liability for quasi-delict, hence that acquittal is not a bar to
the instant action against him.

Virata vs. Ochoa

Facts:

In September 1975, Borilla was driving a jeep when he hit Arsenio Virata thereby causing the
latter’s death. The heirs of Virata sued Borilla through an action for homicide through reckless
imprudence in the CFI of Rizal. Virata’s lawyer reserved their right to file a separate civil action
the he later withdrew said motion. But in June 1976, pending the criminal case, the Viratas again
reserved their right to file a separate civil action. Borilla was eventually acquitted as it was ruled
that what happened was a mere accident. The heirs of Virata then sued Borilla and Ochoa (the
owner of the jeep and employer of Borilla) for damages based on quasi delict. Ochoa assailed the
civil suit alleging that Borilla was already acquitted and that the Virata’s were merely trying to
recover damages twice. The lower court agreed with Ochoa and dismissed the civil suit.

Held:

In negligence cases the aggrieved parties may choose between an action under the Revised Penal
Code or for quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. What is
prohibited by Article 2177 of the Civil Code is to recover twice for the same negligent act

The acquittal of the accused of the crime of homicide through reckless imprudence is not a bar to
the prosecution of a civil case for damages based on quasi-delict. The source of obligation sought
to be enforced in the civil action is quasi-delict, not an act or omission punishable by law. Under
Article 1157 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, quasi-delict and an act or omission punishable
by law are two different sources of obligation. Moreover, to prevail in the action for damages,
plaintiff have only be establish its cause of action by preponderance of evidence.
Banal vs Tadeo

Facts:

Fifteen informations for violation of BP 22 were filed against Rosario Claudio before the RTC of
Quezon City assigned to Branch 84. · The judge of said branch inhibited himself, and was re-
raffled to Branch 105 presided by Judge Serquina. Judge Tadeo then replaced Judge Serquina. ·
On 08 January 1987, the RTC issued an order rejecting the appearance of Atty. Nicolito Bustos
as private prosecutor on the ground that the charge does not provide for any civil liability or
indemnity. · Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the order. Respondent Claudio
filed her opposition to the motion. The court denied petitioners ‘motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this petition for certiorari.

Held:

Petitioner contends that every man criminally liable is also civilly liable, and hence indemnity
may be recovered from the offender regardless of whether or not BP 22 so provides. On the other
hand, respondents argue that BP 22 is an offense against public order and hence, it is the State
and the public that are the principal complainants; hence, there is no civil liability. Civil liability
arises not so much because the act or omission is a crime, but because it caused damage to
another. What give rise to the civil liability is really the obligation and the moral duty of
everyone to repair or make whole the damage caused to another by reason of his own act or
omission, done intentionally or negligently, whether or not the same be punishable by law.
Damage or injury to another is evidently the foundation of the civil action. Such is not the case
in criminal actions for, to be criminally liable, it is enough that the act or omission complained of
is punishable, regardless of whether or not it also causes material damage to another. Regardless,
therefore, of whether or not a special law so provides, indemnification of the offended party may
be had on account of the damage, loss or injury directly suffered as a consequence of the
wrongful act of another. The payee of the check is entitled to receive the payment of money for
which the worthless check was issued. Having been caused the damage, she is entitled to
recompense. The framers of the law could not have intended to leave the offended private
party defrauded and empty-handed by excluding the civil liability of the offender.
Occena vs. Icamina

Facts:

Petitioner Occena filed a criminal complaint for Grave Oral Defamation against private
respondent Cristina Vegrafia for allegedly openly, publicly and maliciously uttering the
following insulting words and statements: "Gagoikawnga Barangay Captain, montisco, traidor,
malugus, Hudas." Private respondent as accused therein entered a plea of not guilty. After trial,
private respondent was convicted of the offense of Slight Oral Defamation and was sentenced to
pay a fine of Fifty Pesos (P50.00) with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay
the costs. No damages were awarded to petitioner.

Held:

Article 2219, par. (7) of the Civil Code allows the recovery of moral damages in case of libel,
slander or any other form of defamation. This provision of law establishes the right of an
offended party in a case for oral defamation to recover from the guilty party damages for injury
to his feelings and reputation. The offended party is likewise allowed to recover punitive or
exemplary damages. It must be remembered that every defamatory imputation is presumed to be
malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown.
And malice may be inferred from the style and tone of publication subject to certain exceptions
which are not present in the case at bar.

Pacis vs. Morales

Facts:

Alfredo Pacis and Cleopatra Pacis filed a civil case for damages against Jerome Jovanne
Morales. Spouses Paceis are the parents of Alfred, 17 y.o. who died in a shooting incident inside
the Top Gun Firearms and Ammunitions Store (gun store) in Baguio City. Morales is the owner.

Alfred died due to a gunshot wound in the head which he sustained while he was at gun store.
The bullet which killed Alfred was fired from a gun brought in by a customer of the gun store for
repair. The gun, was left by Morales in a drawer of a table located inside the gun store.

Morales as in Manila at the time. His employee Armando Jarnague, who was the regular
caretaker of the gun store was also not around. Jarnague entrusted to Matibag and Herbolario a
bunch of keys which included the key to the drawer where the gun was kept. It appears that
Matibag and Herbolario later brought out the gun from the drawer and placed it in top of the
table. Attached by it, Alfred got hold of it. Matibag asked Alfred to return the gun. Alfred
followed but it went off the bullet hitting Alfred.

The trial court held Morales civilly liable for the death of Alftred under A2180 in relation to
A2176, ruling that the accidental shooting of Alfred which caused his death was partyl due to the
negligence of Morales’ employee – Matibag. CA reversed, ruling that there was no employee-
employer relationship because Matibag was not under the control of Morales with respect to the
means and methods in the performance of his worK, thus A2180 cannot apply. And even if
Matibag was an employee, Morales still cannot be held civilly liable because there is no
negligence can be attributed to Morales because he kept the gun.

Held:

Respondent was clearly negligent when he accepted the gun for repair and placed it inside the
drawer without ensuring first that it was not loaded. For failing to insure that the gun was not
loaded, Morales himself was negligent.

Under PNP Circular No. 9, entitled the “Policy on Firearms and Ammunition
Dealership/Repair,” a person who is in the business of purchasing and selling of firearms and
ammunition must maintain basic security and safety requirements of a gun dealer, otherwise his
License to Operate Dealership will be suspended or canceled.

As a gun store owner, Morales is presumed to be knowledgeable about firearms safety and
should have known never to keep a loaded weapon in his store to avoid unreasonable risk of
harm or injury to others. Morales has the duty to ensure that all the guns in his store are not
loaded. Firearms should be stored unloaded and separate from ammunition when the firearms are
not needed for ready access defensive use.

In the first place, the defective gun should have been stored in a vault. Before accepting the
defective gun for repair, Morales should have made sure that it was not loaded to prevent any
untoward accident. Indeed, Morales should never accept a firearm from another person, until the
cylinder or action is open and he has personally checked that the weapon is completely unloaded

Clearly, Morales did not exercise the degree of care and diligence required of a good father of a
family, much less the The bullet which killed Alfred was fired from a gun brought in by a
customer of the gun store for repair.

Casupanan vs Laroya

Facts:
As a result of a vehicular accident between two vehicles, one driven by Mario LlavoreLaroya
and the other owned by Roberto Capitulo and driven by AvelinoCasupanan, two cases were filed
before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Capas, Tarlac. Laroya filed a criminal case
against Casupanan for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property. This case was on its
preliminary investigation stage when Casupanan and Capitulo filed a civil case against Laroya
for quasi-delict. However, upon motion of Laroya on the ground of forum-shopping, the MCTC
dismissed the civil case. Casupanan and Capitulo then filed a petition for certiorari before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Capas, Tarlac. But the RTC ruled that the order of dismissal
issued by the MCTC is a final order which disposes of the case and therefore, the proper remedy
should have been an appeal. Hence, Casupanan and Capitulo filed this petition.

Held:

Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, what is "deemed instituted" with the criminal action is
only the action to recover civil liability arising from the crime or ex-delicto. All the other civil
actions under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code are no longer "deemed instituted,"
and may be filed separately and prosecuted independently even without any reservation in the
criminal action. The failure to make a reservation in the criminal action is not a waiver of the
right to file a separate and independent civil action based on these articles of the Civil Code. The
prescriptive period on the civil actions based on these articles of the Civil Code continues to run
even with the filing of the criminal action. Verily, the civil actions based on these articles of the
Civil Code are separate, distinct and independent of the civil action "deemed instituted" in the
criminal action.

RESERVATION OF CIVIL ACTION

People vs Amistad

Facts:

Before the court a quo, the accused Itong Amistad was charged of the crime of estafa for
conveying a parcel of land by sale in favor of Ben Palispis and Teodoro Mat-an, effeccing the
issuance of two separate titles in favor of said vendees when he knew fully well he had
previously entered into a similar agreement with complainant Mercedes L. Javellana who had
already paid him half of the purchase price. A decision was rendered acquitting the accused, the
trial court holding that "the case of the prosecution is civil in nature" and that "the guilt of the
accused has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt." From this judgment, the complainant
appealed "insofar as the civil liability of the accused is concerned." The Court of Appeals
dismissed the appeal on the ground that an appeal from a judgment of acquittal should be
disallowed.

Held:

Article 29 of the Civil Code clearly requires the institution of a separate action by the filing of
the proper complaint. To such complaint, the accused as the defendant therein, may file the
appropriate responsive pleading, which may be an answer or a motion to dismiss. In a criminal
action, notwithstanding that the action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted
therewith, if not reserved or waived, the accused is not afforded the same remedy. Neither is the
mandatory pre-trial held as is required of all civil actions. The obvious reason is that the civil
liability recoverable in the criminal action is one solely dependent upon conviction, because said
liability arises from the offense, with respect to which pre-trial is never held to obtain admission
as to the commission thereof, except on the occasion of arraignment. This is the kind of civil
liability involved in the civil action deemed filed simultaneously wish the filing of criminal
action, unless it is reserved or waived, as so expressly provided in Section 1, Rule III of the
Rules of Court and as held in People vs. Herrera, 74 Phil. 21 or if the ground of acquittal is
reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused, a separate civil action may be filed, the
complainant alleging a cause of action independent of, and not based on, the commission of an
offense. Only preponderance of evidence would then be required.

Jarantilla vs Court of Appeals

Facts:

The records show that private respondent Jose Kuan Sing was "sideswiped by a vehicle in the
evening of July 7, 1971 in Iznart Street, Iloilo City".[1] The respondent Court of Appeals
concurred in the findings of the court a quo that the said vehicle which figured in the mishap, a
Volkswagen (Beetle type) car, was then driven by petitioner Edgar Jarantilla along said street
toward the direction of the provincial capitol, and that private respondent sustained physical
injuries as a consequence.

Held:

The settled rule that the same act or omission (in this case, the negligent sideswiping of private
respondent) can create two kinds of liability on the part of the offender, that is, civil liability ex
delicto and civil liability ex quasi delicto. Since the same negligence can give rise either to a
delict or crime or to a quasi-delict or tort, either of these two types of civil liability may be
enforced against the culprit, subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the
offended party cannot recover damages under both types of liability.

We have ruled in the relatively recent case of Lontoc vs. MD Transit & Taxi Co., Inc., et al. "In
view of the fact that the defendant-appellee de la Cruz was acquitted on the ground that 'his guilt
was not proven beyond reasonable doubt' the plaintiff-appellant has the right to institute a
separate civil action to recover damages from the defendants-appellants (See Mendoza vs.
Arrieta, 91 SCRA 113). The well-settled doctrine is that a person, while not criminally liable
may still be civilly liable. 'The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the civil liability of the
accused only when it includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil liability might
arise did not exist'

Hun Hyung Park vs Eung Won Choi

Facts:

Hun Hyung Park, assails the Court of Appeals (CA) Resolutions dated May 20, 2004 1 and
September 28, 2004 2 in CA G.R. CR No. 28344 dismissing his petition and denying
reconsideration thereof, respectively.

In an Information 3 dated August 31, 2000, respondent, Eung Won Choi, was charged for
violation of Batas PambansaBlg. 22, otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law, for issuing
Philippine National Bank Check No. 0077133 postdated which was dishonored for having been
drawn against insufficient funds. Upon arraignment, respondent, with the assistance of counsel,
pleaded "not guilty" to the offense charged. After the prosecution rested its case, respondent filed
a Motion for Leave of Court to File Demurrer to Evidence to which he attached his Demurrer,
asserting that the prosecution failed to prove that he received the notice of dishonor, hence, the
presumption of the element of knowledge of insufficiency of funds did not arise.

By Order 5 of February 27, 2003, the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Makati, Branch 65
granted the Demurrer and dismissed the case. The prosecution's Motion for Reconsideration was
denied. 6

Petitioner appealed the civil aspect 7 of the case to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati,
contending that the dismissal of the criminal case should not include its civil aspect.

Held:

For, in case of acquittal, the accused may still be adjudged civilly liable. The extinction of the
penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil action where (a) the acquittal is
based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required; (b) the court declares
that the liability of the accused is only civil; and (c) the civil liability of the accused does not
arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused was acquitted.

The civil action based on delict may, however, be deemed extinguished if there is a finding on
the final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability
may arise did not exist.

Salazar vs. People

Facts:

Petitioner Anamer Salazar was charged with estafa. After the prosecution rested its case, the
petitioner filed a Demurrer to Evidence with Leave of Court. The trial court granted the
demurrer. However, on the civil aspect of the case, it ordered the petitioner to remit to the private
complainant the amount of the check as payment for her purchase. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration on the civil aspect of the decision with a plea that she be allowed to present
evidence pursuant to Rule 33 of the Rules of Court. This was denied by the trial court. In this
petition, the petitioner claimed that she was denied due process as she was not given the
opportunity to adduce evidence to prove that she was not civilly liable to the private respondent.

Held:

Unless the offended party waives the civil action or reserves the right to institute it separately or
institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action, there are two actions involved in a criminal
case. The first is the criminal action for the punishment of the offender. The parties are the
People of the Philippines as the plaintiff and the accused. In a criminal action, the private
complainant is merely a witness for the State on the criminal aspect of the action. The second is
the civil action arising from the delict. The private complainant is the plaintiff and the accused is
the defendant. There is a merger of the trial of the two cases to avoid multiplicity of suits.

Safeguard Security Agency vs. Tangco

Facts:

On November 3, 1997 Evangeline Tangco were approaching the Ecology bank branch at
Katipunan , Quezon City. She was a registered Firearms holder, with rights to carry arms, and
were to surrender her gun to the guard, AdmerPajarillo. The documents state Pajarillo opened
fire on the Tangco, just as she were surrendering her firearm to him, thus killing her with a shot
to the abdomen. Consequently claims against Parajillo were filed, and he was found guilty of
Homicide. The plaintiffs, Tangcos husband on behalf of himself and family, also filed a claim for
damages against Safeguard Security Agency (SSA), a claim that was denied by SSA. The case
therefore went to trial at RTC. The decision of the RTC rendered in favor of the plaintiff, Tancgo
et al, a ruling that was appealed to the C.A. at this level, the C.A affirmed the RTC decision, and
later denied request for reconsideration. Thus, the case was elevated to the SC, to be tried. The
SC ruled against trying the case in court, on basis of the use of law, and on the facts of the use of
law.

Held:

The civil codes applied in this case relates to the areas of liability in terms of ³ the good father´
.the quasi-delict and obligations therein, in where they hired but insufficiently trained Parajillo.
The Supreme court make a big issue out of this fact, where they comment the lack of training
which could have prevented Parajillos over reaction, leading to Tangco’s death. In failing to
supply Parajillo with the necessary training to handle bank security, and people psychology, the
Supreme Court raises the issue of whether or not Parajillo should have been chosen for this type
of assignment at all, taking his background into consideration. The Supreme Court decides, with
base in the provisions mentioned above, that SSA in no clear way can claim they have shown ³
the diligence of a good father´ as described in articles 2180, linking to 2176 of the civil code. As
such, also with reference with the penal code, they deem SSA has a primary and solidarily
responsible for the acts and negligence of all their employees.

One can ask the question on whether or not there exists a employer ± employee relationship
between SSA and Ecology Bank. And if so- if liability can be placed on Ecology Banks part as
well. Considering there IS a employer -employee relationship between Ecology bank and SSA,
in which one can expect Ecology bank to have a major say in how SSA execute their work in and
around the bank, it would also be prudent to establish Ecology bank having a responsibility in
the routines of the guards from SSA. Just as with a Hospital who chooses their resident
consultant doctors, and whom have to conform with the rules, regulations and directives of the
hospital, one would presume Ecology bank to exert the same lever of governance on the guards
routines and behavior.

EXTINCTION/SURVIVAL OF CIVIL LIABILITY EX DELICTO

People vs Navoa

Facts:
Held:

It appears that the accused, Mario Navoa, died on June 14, 1984 due to a cerebro-vascular attack
as shown by the Death Certificate attached to the Motion for Reconsideration. When counsel for
the accused manifested that fact before the Appellate Court on June 20, 1984, he was unaware
that the latter had already certified the case to this Court, which, in turn, promulgated its
Decision on July 31, 1984 unaware of appellant Mario Navoa's death. The judgment of
conviction will thus have to be set aside as against him. However, the plea for extinguishment of
the deceased's civil and criminal liability is without merit. Only his criminal liability is
extinguished by his death but the civil liability remains.

People vs Badeo

Facts:

Held:

Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code provides that criminal liability is totally extinguished "by
the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability
therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment." In
People vs. Alison (44 SCRA 523), the Court, upon the recommendation of the then Solicitor
General who was required to comment on the information that appellant Alison had died at the
prison hospital, resolved that, there being no final judgment as yet, "the criminal and civil
liability of Alison was extinguished by his death.

People vs Bayotas

Facts: n Criminal Case No. C-3217 filed before Branch 16, RTC Roxas City, Rogelio Bayotas y
Cordova was charged with Rape and eventually convicted thereof on June 19, 1991 in a decision
penned by Judge Manuel E. Autajay. Pending appeal of his conviction, Bayotas died on February
4, 1992 at the National Bilibid Hospital due to cardio respiratory arrest secondary to hepatic
encephalopathy secondary to hipato carcinoma gastric malingering. Consequently, the Supreme
Court in its Resolution of May 20, 1992 dismissed the criminal aspect of the appeal. However, it
required the Solicitor General to file its comment with regard to Bayotas' civil liability arising
from his commission of the offense charged.

Held:

Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well
as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the
death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil
liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex
delicto in sensostrictiore."

2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the
same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. 19 Article 1157 of the
Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise
as a result of the same act or omission:

a) Law 20

b) Contracts

c) Quasi-contracts

d) . . .

e) Quasi-delicts

3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery
therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1,
Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be
enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the
source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained above.

4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate
civil action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and
prior to its extinction, the private-offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In
such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the
pendency of the criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 21 of the Civil
Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of right by
prescription.

Calang and Philtranco vs People

Facts:

Calang is a bus driver of Philtranco who was convicted of multiple homicide with multiple
serious physical injuries and damage to property thru reckless imprudence. In the same criminal
case, Philtranco was ordered to pay jointly and severally with Calang death indemnity and actual
damages.

Held:

Philtranco was not a direct party in this case. Since the cause of action against Calang was based
on delict, both the RTC and the CA erred in holding Philtranco jointly and severally liable with
Calang, based on quasi-delict under Articles 2176[1] and 2180[2] of the Civil Code. Articles
2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code pertain to the vicarious liability of an employer for quasi-delicts
that an employee has committed. Such provision of law does not apply to civil liability arising
from delict.

If at all, Philtranco liability may only be subsidiary. Article 102 of the Revised Penal Code states
the subsidiary civil liabilities of innkeepers, tavern keepers and proprietors of establishments.
The provisions of the Revised Penal Code on subsidiary liability Articles 102 and 103 are
deemed written into the judgments in cases to which they are applicable. Thus, in the dispositive
portion of its decision, the trial court need not expressly pronounce the subsidiary liability of the
employer. Nonetheless, before the employer's subsidiary liability is enforced, adequate evidence
must exist establishing that (1) they are indeed the employers of the convicted employees; (2)
they are engaged in some kind of industry; (3) the crime was committed by the employees in the
discharge of their duties; and (4) the execution against the latter has not been satisfied due to
insolvency. The determination of these conditions may be done in the same criminal action in
which the employee liability, criminal and civil, has been pronounced, in a hearing set for that
precise purpose, with due notice to the employer, as part of the proceedings for the execution of
the judgment.

DISTUINGUISHED FROM A CONTRACT

Cangco vs. Manila Railroad Co.

Facts:

Jose Cangco was an employee of Manila Railroad Company as clerk. He lived in San Mateo
which is located upon the line of the defendant railroad company. He used to travel by trade to
the office located in Manila for free. On January 21, 1915, on his way home by rail and when the
train drew up to the station in San Mateo, he rose from his seat, making his exit through the door.
When he stepped off from the train, one or both of his feet came in contact with a sack of
watermelons causing him to slip off from under him and he fell violently on the platform. He
rolled and was drawn under the moving car. He was badly crushed and lacerated. He was
hospitalized which resulted to amputation of his hand. He filed the civil suit for damages against
defendant in CFI of Manila founding his action upon the negligence of the employees of
defendant in placing the watermelons upon the platform and in leaving them so placed as to be a
menace to the security of passengers alighting from the train. The trial court after having found
negligence on the part of defendant, adjudged saying that plaintiff failed to use due caution in
alighting from the coach and was therefore precluded from recovering, hence this appeal.

Held:

Failure to perform a contract cannot be excused upon the ground that the breach was due to the
negligence of a servant of the obligor, and that the latter exercised due diligence in the selection
and control of the servant.

The distinction between negligence as the source of an obligation (culpa aquiliana) and
negligence in the performance of a contract (culpa contractual ) pointed out.

It is not negligence per se for a traveler to alight from a slowly moving train

Airfrance vs Carracoso

Facts:

Plaintiff, a civil engineer, was a member of a group of 48 Filipino pilgrims that left Manila for
Lourdes on March 30, 1958.

On March 28, 1958, the defendant, Air France, through its authorized agent, Philippine Air
Lines, Inc., issued to plaintiff a "first class" round trip airplane ticket from Manila to Rome.
From Manila to Bangkok, plaintiff travelled in "first class", but at Bangkok, the Manager of the
defendant airline forced plaintiff to vacate the "first class" seat that he was occupying because, in
the words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, there was a "white man", who, the Manager alleged,
had a "better right" to the seat. When asked to vacate his "first class" seat, the plaintiff, as was to
be expected, refused, and told defendant's Manager that his seat would be taken over his dead
body. After some commotion, plaintiff reluctantly gave his "first class" seat in the plane.
Held:

Neglect or malfeasance of the carrier's employees could give ground for an action for damages.
Damages here are proper because the stress of respondent's action is placed upon his wrongful
expulsion, which is a violation of a public duty by petitioner-air carrier — a case of quasi-delict.

The responsibility of an employer for the tortious act of his employees is well settled in law.
(Art. 2130, Civil Code). Petitioner-aircarrier must answer for the willful, malevolent act of its
manager.

Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be treated by the
carrier's employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled to
be protected against personal misconduct, injurious language, indignities and abuses from such
employees. So, any rude or discourteous conduct on the part of employees towards a passenger
gives the latter an action for damages against the carrier.

Although the relation of passenger and carrier is contractual both in origin and nature,
nevertheless, the act that breaks the contract may also be a tort.

Singson vs BPI

Facts:

Singson, was one of the defendants in a civil case, in which judgment had been rendered
sentencing him and his co-defendants therein Lobregat and Villa-Abrille& Co., to pay a sum of
money to the plaintiff therein. Said judgment became final and executory as only against Ville-
Abrille for its failure to file an appeal. A writ of garnishment was subsequently served upon BPI
— in which the Singsons had a current account — insofar as Villa-Abrille’s credits against the
Bank were concerned.

Upon receipt of the said Writ of Garnishment, a clerk of the bank, upon reading the name of the
Singson in the title of the Writ of Garnishment as a party defendants, without further reading the
body and informing himself that said garnishment was merely intended for the deposits of
defendant Villa-Abrille& Co., et al, prepared a letter informing Singson of the garnishment of his
deposits by the plaintiff in that case.

Subsequently, two checks issued by the plaintiff Julian C. Singson, one in favor of B. M. Glass
Service and another in favor of the Lega Corporation, were dishonored by the bank. B. M. Glass
Service then wrote to Singson that the check was not honored by BPI because his account therein
had already been garnished and that they are now constrained to close his credit account with
them.
Singson wrote to BPI, claiming that his name was not included in the Writ of Execution and
Notice of Garnishment, which was served upon the bank. The defendants lost no time to rectify
the mistake that had been inadvertently committed.

Thus this action for damages.

Held:

The existence of a contract between the parties does not bar the commission of a tort by the one
against the other and the consequent recovery of damages. Where the act that breaks the contract
may also be a tort, the contractual relation of the parties does not bar the recovery of damages. |||
(Singson v. Bank of the Philippine Islands, G.R. No. L-24837, [June 27, 1968], 132 PHIL 597-
600)

LRTA vs. Natividad

Facts:

Navidad was drunk when he entered the boarding platform of the LRT. He got into an altercation
with the SG Escartin. They had a fistfight and Navidad fell onto the tracks and was killed when a
train came and ran over him.

The Heirs of Navidad filed a complaint for damages against Escartin, the train driver, (Roman)
the LRTA, the Metro Transit Organization and Prudent Security Agency (Prudent). The trial
court found Prudent and Escartin jointly and severally liable for damages to the heirs. The CA
exonerated Prudent and instead held the LRTA and the train driver Romero jointly and severally
liable as well as removing the award for compensatory damages and replacing it with nominal
damages.

The reasoning of the CA was that a contract of carriage already existed between Navidad and
LRTA (by virtue of his havAing purchased train tickets and the liability was caused by the mere
fact of Navidad's death after being hit by the train being managed by the LRTA and operated by
Roman. The CA also blamed LRTA for not having presented expert evidence showing that the
emergency brakes could not have stopped the train on time.
Held:

he foundation of LRTA's liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation to indemnify the
victim arises from the breach of that contract by reason of its failure to exercise the high
diligence required of the common carrier. In the discharge of its commitment to ensure the safety
of passengers, a carrier may choose to hire its own employees or avail itself of the services of an
outsider or an independent firm to undertake the task. In either case, the common carrier is not
relieved of its responsibilities under the contract of carriage. Should Prudent be made likewise
liable? If at all, that liability could only be for tort under the provisions of Article 2176 and
related provisions, in conjunction with Article 2180, of the Civil Code. The premise, however,
for the employer's liability is negligence or fault on the part of the employee. Once such fault is
established, the employer can then be made liable on the basis of the presumption juristantum
that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimipatrisfamilias in the selection and supervision
of its employees. The liability is primary and can only be negated by showing due diligence in
the selection and supervision of the employee, a factual matter that has not been shown. Absent
such a showing, one might ask further, how then must the liability of the common carrier, on the
one hand, and an independent contractor, on the other hand, be described? It would be solidary.
A contractual obligation can be breached by tort and when the same act or omission causes the
injury, one resulting in culpa contractual and the other in culpa aquiliana, Article 2194 of the
Civil Code can well apply. In fine, a liability for tort may arise even under a contract, where tort
is that which breaches the contract. Stated differently, when an act which constitutes a breach of
contract would have itself constituted the source of a quasi-delictual liability had no contract
existed between the parties, the contract can be said to have been breached by tort, thereby
allowing the rules on tort to apply. Regrettably for LRT, as well as perhaps the surviving spouse
and heirs of the late NicanorNavidad, this Court is concluded by the factual finding of the Court
of Appeals that "there is nothing to link (Prudent) to the death of Nicanor (Navidad), for the
reason that the negligence of its employee, Escartin, has not been duly proven . . . ." This finding
of the appellate court is not without substantial justification in our own review of the records of
the case. There being, similarly, no showing that petitioner Rodolfo Roman himself is guilty of
any culpable act or omission, he must also be absolved from liability. Needless to say, the
contractual tie between the LRT and Navidad is not itself a juridical relation between the latter
and Roman; thus, Roman can be made liable only for his own fault or negligence

American Express vs. Cordero

Facts:

American Express International was a foreign corporation that issued charge cards used to
purchase goods and services at accredited merchants worldwide to its customers. Nilda Cordero,
wife of respondent Noel Cordero, was issued an American Express charge card. An extension
charge card, was likewise issued to respondent Noel Cordero which he also signed. Respondent,
together with his family went on a three-day holiday trip to Hong Kong. The group went to the
Watson’s Chemist Shop. While there, Noel picked up chocolate candies and handed his
American Express extension charge card to the sales clerk to pay for his purchases. Susan
Chong, the store manager, informed respondent that she had to confiscate the card. Thereupon,
she cut respondent’s American Express card in half with a pair of scissors. This, according to
respondent, caused him embarrassment and humiliation. Hence, Nilda had to pay for the
purchases using her own American Express charge card.

Held:

"Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-
existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter."

In order that an obligation based on quasi-delict may arise, there must be no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties. But there are exceptions. There may be an action for
quasi-delict notwithstanding that there is a subsisting contract between the parties. A liability for
tort may arise even under a contract, where tort is that which breaches the contract. Stated
differently, when an act which constitutes a breach of contract would have itself constituted the
source of a quasi-delictual liability, the contract can be said to have been breached by tort,
thereby allowing the rules on tort to apply.

Furthermore, to constitute quasi-delict, the fault or negligence must be the proximate cause of the
damage or injury suffered by the plaintiff. Proximate cause is that cause which, in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury and
without which the result would not have occurred. Proximate cause is determined by the facts of
each case upon mixed considerations of logic, common sense, policy and precedent.

So Ping Bun vs CA

Facts:

In 1963, Tek Hua Trading Co. entered into lease agreements with lessor Dee C. Chuan and Sons,
Inc. involving four (4) premises in Binondo, which the former used to store textiles. The
agreements were for one (1) year, with provisions for month-to-month rental should the lessee
continue to occupy the properties after the term. In 1976, Tek Hua Trading Co. was dissolved,
and the former members formed Tek Hua Enterprises Corp., herein respondent. So PekGiok,
managing partner of the defunct company, died in 1986. Petitioner So Ping Bun, his grandson,
occupied the warehouse for his own textile business, Trendsetter Marketing. On March 1, 1991,
private respondent Tiong sent a letter to petitioner, demanding that the latter vacate the premises.
Petitioner refused, and on March 4, 1992, he requested formal contracts of lease with DCCSI.
The contracts were executed. Private respondents moved for the nullification of the contract and
claimed damages. The petition was granted by the trial court, and eventually by the Court of
Appeals.

Held:

Damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from injury, and damages are the recompense or
compensation awarded for the damage suffered. One becomes liable in an action for damages for
a nontrespassory invasion of another's interest in the private use and enjoyment of asset if (a) the
other has property rights and privileges with respect to the use or enjoyment interfered with, (b)
the invasion is substantial, (c) the defendant's conduct is a legal cause of the invasion, and (d) the
invasion is either intentional and unreasonable or unintentional and actionable under general
negligence rules.

Consolidated Bank vs CA

Facts:

In March 1976, L.C. Diaz opened a savings account with Solidbank. On 14 August 1991, L.C.
Diaz through its cashier, Mercedes Macaraya, filled up a savings (cash) deposit slip for P990 and
a savings (checks) deposit slip for P50. Macaraya instructed the messenger of L.C. Diaz, Ismael
Calapre, to deposit the money with Solidbank. Macaraya also gave Calapre the Solidbank
passbook.

Calapre went to Solidbank and presented to Teller No. 6 the two deposit slips and the passbook.
The teller acknowledged the receipt of the deposit by returning to Calapre the duplicate copies of
the two deposit slips. Teller No. 6 stamped the deposit slips with the words “DUPLICATE” and
“SAVING TELLER 6 SOLIDBANK HEAD OFFICE.” Since the transaction took time and
Calapre had to make another deposit for L.C. Diaz with Allied Bank, he left the passbook with
Solidbank. Calapre then went to Allied Bank. When Calapre returned to Solidbank to retrieve the
passbook, Teller No. 6 informed him that “somebody got the passbook.” Calapre went back to
L.C. Diaz and reported the incident to Macaraya.

Macaraya immediately prepared a deposit slip in duplicate copies with a check of P200,000.
Macaraya and Calapre went to Solidbank and presented to Teller No. 6 the deposit slip and
check. The teller stamped the words “DUPLICATE” and “SAVING TELLER 6 SOLIDBANK
HEAD OFFICE” on the duplicate copy of the deposit slip. When Macaraya asked for the
passbook, Teller No. 6 told Macaraya that someone got the passbook but she could not
remember to whom she gave the passbook. When Macaraya asked Teller No. 6 if Calapre got the
passbook, Teller No. 6 answered that someone shorter than Calapre got the passbook. Calapre
was then standing beside Macaraya.

The following day L.C. Diaz learned of the unauthorized withdrawal the day before (14 August
1991) of P300,000 from itssavings account. The withdrawal slip for the P300,000 bore the
signatures of the authorized signatories of L.C. Diaz, namely Diaz and Rustico L. Murillo. The
signatories, however, denied signing the withdrawal slip. A certain Noel Tamayo received the
P300,000.

L.C. Diaz demanded from Solidbank the return of its money. Solidbank refused. L.C. Diaz filed
a Complaint for Recovery of a Sum of Money against Solidbank. The trial court absolved
Solidbank. L.C. Diaz appealed to the CA. CA reversed the ecision of the trial court. CA denied
the motion for reconsideration of Solidbank. But it modified its decision by deleting the award of
exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. Hence this petition.

Held:

The contract between the bank and its depositor is governed by the provisions of the Civil Code
on simple loan. 17 Article 1980 of the Civil Code expressly provides that ". . . savings . . .
deposits of money in banks and similar institutions shall be governed by the provisions
concerning simple loan." There is a debtor-creditor relationship between the bank and its
depositor. The bank is the debtor and the depositor is the creditor. The depositor lends the bank
money and the bank agrees to pay the depositor on demand. The savings deposit agreement
between the bank and the depositor is the contract that determines the rights and obligations of
the parties.

The law imposes on banks high standards in view of the fiduciary nature of banking. Section 2 of
Republic Act No. 8791 ("RA 8791"), 18 which took effect on 13 June 2000, declares that the
State recognizes the "fiduciary nature of banking that requires high standards of integrity and
performance." 19 This new provision in the general banking law, "the bank is under obligation to
treat the accounts of its depositors with meticulous care, always having in mind the fiduciary
nature of their relationship.

However, the fiduciary nature of a bank-depositor relationship does not convert the contract
between the bank and its depositors from a simple loan to a trust agreement, whether express or
implied. Failure by the bank to pay the depositor is failure to pay a simple loan, and not a breach
of trust. 24 The law simply imposes on the bank a higher standard of integrity and performance
in complying with its obligations under the contract of simple loan, beyond those required of
non-bank debtors under a similar contract of simple loan.

The fiduciary nature of banking does not convert a simple loan into a trust agreement because
banks do not accept deposits to enrich depositors but to earn money for themselves. The law
allows banks to offer the lowest possible interest rate to depositors while charging the highest
possible interest rate on their own borrowers. The interest spread or differential belongs to the
bank and not to the depositors who are not cestuique trust of banks. If depositors are cestuique
trust of banks, then the interest spread or income belongs to the depositors, a situation that
Congress certainly did not intend in enacting Section 2 of RA 8791.

Crisostomo vs CA

Facts:

Petitioner Estela L. Crisostomo contracted the services of respondent Caravan Travel and Tours
International, Inc. to facilitate her tour known as "Jewels of Europe." On June 12, 1991,
MeriamMenor, respondent's ticketing manager as well as petitioner's niece, delivered petitioner's
travel documents and plane tickets and informed her to be at the airport on June 15, 1991, two
hours before departure. On the stated date when the petitioner went to the airport, the flight that
she was supposed to take had departed the previous day. She complained to Menor, but the latter
prevailed upon her to take another tour known as "British Pageant." Upon petitioner's return
from Europe, she demanded from respondent the reimbursement of P61,421.70 representing the
difference between the sum she paid for "Jewels of Europe" and the amount she owed respondent
for the "British Pageant" tour, but despite several demands, respondent company refused to
reimburse the amount, contending that the same was non-refundable. Thus, she filed a complaint
against respondent for breach of contract of carriage and damages. In its answer, respondent
denied the responsibility and insisted that petitioner was duly informed of the correct departure
as legibly printed on the plane ticket two days ahead of the scheduled trip. After trial, the lower
court awarded damages to the petitioner on the basis that the respondent was negligent, but it
deducted 10% from the amount for the contributory negligence of petitioner. On appeal, the
Court of Appeals found petitioner to be more negligent, hence, it directed her to pay the balance
of the price for the "British Pageant." Hence, this petition

Held:

OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS; CONTRACT BETWEEN THE TRAVEL AGENCY

AND ITS CLIENT IS ONE FOR SERVICES AND NOT ONE OF CARRIAGE. —
Respondent's obligation to petitioner in this regard was simply to see to it that petitioner was
properly booked with the airline for the appointed date and time. Her transport to the place of
destination, meanwhile, pertained directly to the airline. The object of petitioner's contractual
relation with respondent is the latter's service of arranging and facilitating petitioner's booking,
ticketing and accommodation in the package tour. In contrast, the object of a contract of carriage
is the transportation of passengers or goods. It is in this sense that the contract between the
parties in this case was an ordinary one for services and not one of carriage. Petitioner's
submission is premised on a wrong assumption.

II. Quasi Delicts

NEGLIGENCE

Picart vs. Smith

Facts:

On the Carlatan Bridge in La Union.Picart was riding on his pony over said bridge. Before he
had gotten half way across, Smith approached from the opposite direction in an automobile. As
the defendant neared the bridge he saw a horseman on it and blew his horn to give warning of his
approach. He continued his course and after he had taken the bridge he gave two more
successive blasts, as it appeared to him that the man on horseback before him was not observing
the rule of the road.

Picart saw the automobile coming and heard the warning signals. However, being perturbed by
the novelty of the apparition or the rapidity of the approach, he pulled the pony closely up
against the railing on the right side of the bridge instead of going to the left. He says that the
reason he did this was that he thought he did not have sufficient time to get over to the other side.
As the automobile approached, Smith guided it toward his left, that being the proper side of the
road for the machine. In so doing the defendant assumed that the horseman would move to the
other side. Seeing that the pony was apparently quiet, the defendant, instead of veering to the
right while yet some distance away or slowing down, continued to approach directly toward the
horse without diminution of speed. When he had gotten quite near, there being then no
possibility of the horse getting across to the other side, the defendant quickly turned his car
sufficiently to the right to escape hitting the horse; but in so doing the automobile passed in such
close proximity to the animal that it became frightened and turned its body across the bridge, got
hit by the car and the limb was broken. The horse fell and its rider was thrown off with some
violenceAs a result of its injuries the horse died. The plaintiff received contusions which caused
temporary unconsciousness and required medical attention for several days.
From a judgment of the CFI of La Union absolving Smith from liability Picart has appealed.

Held:

The test for determining whether a person is negligent in doing an act whereby injury or damage
results to the person or property of another is this: Would a prudent man, in the position of the
person to whom negligence is attributed, foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable
consequence of the course about to be pursued. If so, the law imposes a duty on the actor to
refrain from that course or to take precaution against its mischievous results, and the failure to do
so constitutes negligence. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring of the
admonition born of this prevision, is the constitutive fact in negligence.

2. ID.; CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE; SUCCESSIVE NEGLIGENT ACTS. — Where both

parties are guilty of negligence, but the negligent act of one succeeds that of the other by an
appreciable interval of time, the one who has the last reasonable opportunity to avoid the
impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences, without reference to the
prior negligence of the other party.

The plaintiff was riding a pony on a bridge. Seeing an automobile ahead he improperly pulled his
horse over to the railing on the right. The driver of the automobile, however, guided his car
toward the plaintiff without diminution of speed until he was only a few feet away. He then
turned to the right but passed so closely to the horse that the latter being frightened, jumped
around and was killed by the passing car. Held: That although the plaintiff was guilty of
negligence in being on the wrong side of the bridge, the defendant was nevertheless civilly liable
for the legal damages resulting from the collision, as he had a fair opportunity to avoid the
accident after he realized the situation created by the negligence of the plaintiff and failed to
avail himself of that opportunity; while the plaintiff could by no means then place himself in a
position of greater safety.

Smith Bell vs Borja

Facts:

Respondent CatalinoBorja, customs inspector of the Bureau of Customs, was assigned to inspect
petitioner's vessel, M/T King Family, which was due to arrive at the port of Manila on
September 24, 1987. At about 11 o'clock in the morning on September 24, 1987, while the vessel
was unloading chemicals unto the two barges owned by respondent ITTC, a sudden explosion
occurred setting the vessels afire. Respondent Borja was at that time inside the cabin preparing
reports. As a result of the fire and explosion, respondent Borja suffered damages and injuries.
His attending physician diagnosed respondent Borja to be permanently disabled. Hence, for
injuries suffered, respondent Borja asked for damages. However, both petitioner and respondent
ITTC denied liabilities and attributed to each other negligence. Thereafter, the Regional Trial
Court found that the fire and the explosion had originated from petitioner's vessel. It, therefore,
held petitioner liable for damages and loss of income. The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the
decision of the trial court. Petitioner elevated the matter before the Supreme Court via a petition
for review on certiorari.

Held:

Negligence is conduct that creates undue risk of harm to another. It is the failure to observe that
degree of care, precaution and vigilance that the circumstances justly demand, whereby that
other person suffers injury. Petitioner's vessel was carrying chemical cargo — alkyl benzene and
methyl methacrylate monomer. While knowing that their vessel was carrying dangerous
inflammable chemicals, its officers and crew failed to take all the necessary precautions to
prevent an accident. Petitioner was, therefore, negligent.

3. ID.; ID.; ELEMENTS; ESTABLISHED IN CASE AT BAR. — The three elements of quasi
delict are: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff, (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, and (c)
the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the
damages inflicted on the plaintiff. All these elements were established in this case. Knowing
fully well that it was carrying dangerous chemicals, petitioner was negligent in not taking all the
necessary precautions in transporting the cargo.

4. ID.; ID.; OWNER OR PERSON IN CONTROL OF A VESSEL AND THE VESSEL ARE
LIABLE FOR ALL NATURAL AND PROXIMATE DAMAGE CAUSED TO PERSONS
AND PROPERTY BY REASON OF NEGLIGENT MANAGEMENT OR NAVIGATION;
CASE AT BAR. — As a result of the fire and the explosion during the unloading of the
chemicals from petitioner's vessel, Respondent Borja suffered the following damage and injuries:
"(1) chemical burns of the face and arms; (2) inhalation of fumes from burning chemicals; (3)
exposure to the elements [while] floating in sea water for about three (3) hours; (4) homonymous
hemianopsia or blurring of the right eye [which was of] possible toxic origin; and (5) [c]erebral
infract with neo-vascularization, left occipital region with right sided headache and the blurring
of vision of right eye." Hence, the owner or the person in possession and control of a vessel and
the vessel are liable for all natural and proximate damage caused to persons and property by
reason of negligent management or navigation.

DELSAN TRANSPORT v C and A Construction

(1) Whether or not Capt. Jusep was negligent;

(2) If yes, whether or not petitioner is solidarily liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code for
the quasi-delict committed by Capt. Jusep?

Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides that whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-
delict. The test for determining the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as
follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use the reasonable care and caution
which an ordinary prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty
of negligence.

The trial court erred in applying the emergency rule. Under this rule, one who suddenly finds
himself in a place of danger, and is required to act without time to consider the best means that
may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt
what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better method, unless the
danger in which he finds himself is brought about by his own negligence. 27 Clearly, the
emergency rule is not applicable to the instant case because the danger where Capt. Jusep found
himself was caused by his own negligence

Art. 2180.The obligation imposed in Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers
acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any
business or industry.

The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove
that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.

Whenever an employee's negligence causes damage or injury to another, there instantly arises a
presumption juristantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimipatrisfamilias in the
selection (culpa in eligiendo) or supervision (culpa in vigilando) of its employees. To avoid
liability or a quasi-delict committed by his employee, an employer must overcome the
presumption by presenting convincing proof that he exercised the care and diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employee.

There is no question that petitioner, who is the owner/operator of M/V Delsan Express, is also
the employer of Capt. Jusep who at the time of the incident acted within the scope of his duty.
The defense raised by petitioner was that it exercised due diligence in the selection of Capt.
Jusep because the latter is a licensed and competent Master Mariner. It should be stressed,
however, that the required diligence of a good father of a family pertains not only to the
selection, but also to the supervision of employees. It is not enough that the employees chosen be
competent and qualified, inasmuch as the employer is still required to exercise due diligence in
supervising its employees.

BURDEN OF PROOF

Ong vs Metropolitan Water District

Facts:

Dominador Ong, a 14-year old high school student and a boy scout, and his brothers Ruben and
Eusebio, went to defendant's swimming pools. This was not the first time that the three brothers
had gone to said natatorium for they had already been there four or five times before. They
arrived at the natatorium at about 1:45 p.m. After paying the requisite admission fee, they
immediately went to one of the small pools where the water was shallow. At about 4:35 p.m.,
Dominador Ong told his brothers that he was going to the locker room in an adjoining building
to drink a bottle of coke. Upon hearing this, Ruben and Eusebio went to the bigger pool leaving
Dominador in the small pool and so they did not see the latter when he left the pool to get a
bottle of coke. In that afternoon, there were two lifeguards on duty in the pool compound,
namely, Manuel Abaño and Mario Villanueva. The tour of duty of Abaño was from 8:00 to
12:00 in the morning and from 2:00 to 6:00 in the afternoon, and of Villanueva from 7:30 to
11:30 a.m. and from 12:30 to 4:30 p.m. Between 4:00 to 5:00 that afternoon, there were about
twenty bathers inside the pool area and Manuel Abaño was going around the pools to observe the
bathers in compliance with the instructions of his chief.

Between 4:40 to 4:45 p.m., some boys who were in the pool area informed a bather by the name
of Andres Hagad, Jr., that somebody was swimming under water for quite a long time.

Held:

DAMAGES; FAULT OR NEGLIGENCE; CLAIMANT HAS BURDEN TO PROVE. — The

person claiming damages has the burden of proving that the damages is caused by the fault or
negligence of the person from whom the damage is claimed, or of one of his employees (Walter
A. Smith & Co. vs. Cadwallader Gibson Lumber Co., 55 Phil., 517).
2. ID.; ABSENCE OF NEGLIGENCE OF OPERATOR OF SWIMMING POOLS;
DROWNING OR DEATH OF PATRON. — The operator of swimming pools will not be held
liable for the drowning or death of 3 patron, if said operator had exercised due diligence in the
election of, and supervision over, its employees and that it had observed the diligence required
by law under the circumstances — in that it has taken all necessary precautions to avoid danger
to the lives of its patrons or prevent accident. which may cause their death.

3. WORDS AND PHRASES; "DOCTRINE OF LAST CLEAR CHANCE." — The doctrine of

last clear chance simply means that the negligence of a claimant does not preclude a recovery for
the negligence of defendant where it appears that the latter, by exercising reasonable care and
prudence, might have avoided injurious consequences to claimant notwithstanding his
negligence. Or "As the doctrine usually is stated, a person who has the last clear chance or
opportunity of avoiding an accident, notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent or the
negligence of a third person which is imputed to his opponent, is considered in law solely
responsible for the consequences of the accident."

Marikina Autoline and Suelto vs People

Facts:

Erlinda V. Valdellon is the owner of a two-door commercial apartment located at No. 31 Kamias
Road, Quezon City. The Marikina Auto Line Transport Corporation (MALTC) isthe owner-
operator of a passenger bus with Plate Number NCV-849.Suelto, itsemployee, was assigned as
the regular driver of the bus. At around 2:00 p.m. on October3, 1992, Suelto was driving the
aforementioned passenger bus along KamiasRoad,Kamuning, Quezon City, going towards
Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA). The bussuddenly swerved to the right and struck the
terrace of the commercial apartment ownedbyValdellon located along Kamuning Road.
Valdellon demanded payment ofP148,440.00 to cover the cost of the damage to the terrace. The
bus company andSuelto offered a P30,000.00 settlement which Valdellonrefused.Valdellon filed
a criminalcomplaint for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property against Suelto.

Held:

Valdello failed to prove that the damages to the terrace caused by the incident amounted to
P100,000. The only evidence adduced to prove actual damages claimed were the summary
computation of damage made by the engineer and the receipt representing cost for carpentry etc.
Valdello failed to present the engineer to testify on his estimation. In the lower court’s decision,
the TC awarded actual damages but failed to state the factual basis for such award. The burden of
proof is on the party who would be defeated if no evidence would be presented on either side.
The burden is to establish one’s case by a preponderance of evidence which means that the
evidence, as a whole, adduced by one side, is superior to that of the other.

RES IPSA LOQUITUR

Spouses Africa vs Caltex

Facts:

In the afternoon of March 18, 1948, a fire broke out at the Caltex service station at the corner of
Antipolo St. and Rizal Avenue, Manila. It started while gasoline was being hosed from a tank
truck into the underground storage, right at the opening of the receiving tank where the nozzle of
the hose was inserted. The fire spread to and burned several houses. The owners, among them
petitioner spouses Africa and heirs of Ong, sued respondents Caltex Phil., Inc., the alleged owner
of the station, and Mateo Boquiren, the agent in charge of its operation, for damages. The CFI
and CA found that the petitioners failed to prove negligence of the respondents, and that there
was due care in the premises and with respect to the supervision of their employees.

Held:

Where the thing which caused the injury complained of is shown to be under the management
defendant or his servants and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not
happen if those who have its management or control use proper care, it affords reasonable
evidence, in absence of explanation by defendant, that the accident arose from want of care. (45
C. J. 768, p. 1193.)

5. ID.; ID.; APPLICATION OF PRINCIPLE TO THE CASE AT BAR. — The gasoline station,
with all its appliances, equipment and employees, was under the control of appellees. A fire
occurred therein and spread to and burned the neighboring houses. The persons who knew or
could have known how the fire started were appellees and their employees, but they gave no
explanation thereof whatsoever. It is a fair and reasonable inference that the incident happened
because of want of care.
Rodriguez vs CA

Facts:

Aa fire broke out which razed two apartment buildings, owned by plaintiffs-appellants
Rodriguezes and partially destroying a commercial building. They filed a case for damages
against defendants-appellees Vilorias and Young. The complaint alleged that by reason of the
gross negligence and want of care of the construction workers and employees of the defendants-
appellees, the bunkhouse or workers’ quarters in the construction site caught fire spreading
rapidly, burning the adjacent buildings owned by plaintiffs-appellants.

Held:

The trial court declared that "the fire was not caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive
control of defendants," which is one of the requisites for the application of the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur in the law of negligence. It may further be emphasized that this doctrine is not
intended to and does not dispense with the requirement of proof of culpable negligence on the
party charged. It merely determines and regulates what shall be prima facie evidence thereof and
facilitates the burden of plaintiff of proving a breach of the duty of due care. The doctrine can be
invoked when and only when, under the circumstances involved, direct evidence is absent or not
readily available.

FGU Insurance vs. GP Sarmiento Trucking

Facts:

Respondent G.P. Sarmiento trucking company (GTS) undertook to transport cargoes for
Concepcion Industries, Inc. when it collided with an unidentified truck, causing damage to the
cargoes. Petitioner, FGU, insurer of the shipment, paid to Concepcion Industries the value of the
covered cargoes. Then, as subrogee of Concepcion Industries, Inc., petitioner FGU sued GPS for
breach of contract of carriage for reimbursement. Instead of filing an answer, GPS filed a
demurrer to evidence, claiming that it cannot be held liable as a common carrier because it was
only a private carrier, being the exclusive hauler only of Concepcion Industries, Inc. since 1988.

The lower court granted the motion, ruling that plaintiff FGU failed to prove that GPS is a
common carrier. The CA affirmed the trial court's order.

Held:
RES IPSA LOQUITOR; RELIEVES THE PLAINTIFF OF THE BURDEN OF PRODUCING
SPECIFIC PROOF OF NEGLIGENCE; CASE AT BAR. — Res ipsa loquitur, a doctrine being
invoked by petitioner, holds a defendant liable where the thing which caused the injury
complained of is shown to be under the latter's management and the accident is such that, in the
ordinary course of things, cannot be expected to happen if those who have its management or
control use proper care. It affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the
defendant, that the accident arose from want of care. It is not a rule of substantive law and, as
such, it does not create an independent ground of liability. Instead, it is regarded as a mode of
proof, or a mere procedural convenience since it furnishes a substitute for, and relieves the
plaintiff of, the burden of producing specific proof of negligence. The maxim simply places on
the defendant the burden of going forward with the proof. Resort to the doctrine, however, may
be allowed only when (a) the event is of a kind which does not ordinarily occur in the absence of
negligence; (b) other responsible causes, including the conduct of the plaintiff and third persons,
are sufficiently eliminated by the evidence; and (c) the indicated negligence is within the scope
of the defendant's duty to the plaintiff. Thus, it is not applicable when an unexplained accident
may be attributable to one of several causes, for some of which the defendant could not be
responsible. Res ipsa loquitur generally finds relevance whether or not a contractual relationship
exists between the plaintiff and the defendant, for the inference of negligence arises from the
circumstances and nature of the occurrence and not from the nature of the relation of the parties.
Nevertheless, the requirement that responsible causes other than those due to defendant's conduct
must first be eliminated, for the doctrine to apply, should be understood as being confined only
to cases of pure (non-contractual) tort since obviously the presumption of negligence in culpa
contractual, as previously so pointed out, immediately attaches by a failure of the covenant or its
tenor. In the case of the truck driver, whose liability in a civil action is predicated on culpa
acquiliana, while he admittedly can be said to have been in control and management of the
vehicle which figured in the accident, it is not equally shown, however, that the accident could
have been exclusively due to his negligence, a matter that can allow, forthwith, res ipsa loquitur
to work against him.

Perla Compania de Seguros vs Sarangaya III

Facts:

Spouses GaudencioSarangaya III and PrimitivaSarangaya erected Super A Building, a semi-

concrete, semi-narra, one-storey commercial building fronting the provincial road of Santiago,
Isabela

It has three doors which were leased out. The two-storey residence of the Sarangayas was behind
the second and third doors of the building
On the left side of the commercial building stood the office of the Matsushita Electric Philippine
Corporation (Matsushita)

1988: PerlaCompania de Seguros, Inc. through its branch manager BienvenidoPascual, entered
into a contract of lease of the first door beside the Matsushita office

It was converted into a two door so he had a garage where he parked a company car 1981 model
4-door Ford Cortina which he used to supervise different towns

July 7, 1988: Pascual went to San Fernando, Pampanga leaving the car

3 days later: When he returned and warmed up the car, it made an odd sound. On the second try,
there was again an odd sound and a small flames came out of its engine so he was startled,
stopped the car, went out and pushed it out of the garage

Soon, fire spewed out of its rear compartment and burned the whole garage where he was
trapped so he suffered burns in the face, legs and arms

The spouses were busy atching TV when they heard 2 loud explosions, smelt of gasoline and fire
burned all their belongings

Spouses filed a complaint against Pascual for gross negligence and Perla for lacking the required
diligence in the selection and supervision of its employee.

RTC: Pascual and Perla liable jointly and solidarily

Pascual was held liable under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur

CA: affirmed but modified the amount of damages

Held:

Res ipsa loquitur

Latin phrase which literally means “the thing or the transaction speaks for itself.

It relates to the fact of an injury that sets out an inference to the cause thereof or establishes the
plaintiff’s prima facie case

The doctrine rests on inference and not on presumption

Facts of the occurrence warrant the supposition of negligence and they furnish circumstantial
evidence of negligence when direct evidence is lacking
Based on the theory that the defendant either knows the cause of the accident or has the best
opportunity of ascertaining it and the plaintiff, having no knowledge thereof, is compelled to
allege negligence in general terms

plaintiff relies on proof of the happening of the accident alone to establish negligence

provides a means by which a plaintiff can pin liability on a defendant who, if innocent, should be
able to explain the care he exercised to prevent the incident complained of

defendant’s responsibility to show that there was no negligence on his part

RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR

Ramos vs. Pepsi Cola

Facts

Placido and Augusto Ramos sued Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of the P.I. 1 and Andres Bonifacio in
the Court of First Instance of Manila as a consequence of a collision, on May 10, 1958, involving
the car of Placido Ramos and a tractor-truck and trailer of PEPSI-COLA. Said car was at the
time of the collision driven by Augusto Ramos, son and co-plaintiff of Placido. PEPSI-COLA's
tractor- truck was then driven by its driver and co-defendant Andres Bonifacio.
After trial, the Court of First Instance rendered judgment on April 15, 1961, finding Bonifacio
negligent and declaring that PEPSI- COLA had not sufficiently proved its having exercised the
due diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage. The trial court found Bonifacio
negligent and declared that PEPSI-COLA had not sufficiently proved that it exercised the due
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage.PEPSI-COLA and Bonifacio,
solidarily, were ordered to pay the plaintiffs damages. The defendants appealed to the Court of
Appeals. CA affirmed the decision of the trial court, butabsolved PEPSI-COLA from liability,
finding that it sufficiently proved due diligence in the selection of its driver Bonifacio.
|||

Held

The uncontradicted testimony of (the) personnel manager of defendant company, was to the
effect that defendant driver was first hired as a member of the bottle crop in the production
department: that when he was hired as a driver, defendant company had size him by looking into
his background, asking him to submit clearances, and later on, he was sent to the pool house to
take the usual driver's examination, consisting of, first, theoretical examination and second, the
practical driving examination, all of which he had undergone, and that the defendant company
was a member of the Safety Council. In view therefore, we are of sense that defendant company
had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the choice or selection of defendant
driver.

4. ID.; DUE DILIGENCE IN THE SUPERVISION OF EMPLOYEE DISCUSSED; ARTICLE

2180 OF THE CIVIL CODE CONSTRUED. — From Article 2180, two things are apparent; (1)
That when an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or employee there instantly arises a
presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the
selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after the selection; or both; and
(2) that the presumption is juristantum and not juris et de jure, and consequently may be rebutted.
It follows necessarily that if the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that in selection
and supervision he has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family, the
presumption is overcome and he is relieved from liability.

NEGLIGENCE OF PROFESSIONALS

Batiquin vs CA

Facts:

Mrs. Villegas submitted to Dr. Batiquin for prenatal care as the latter's private patient sometime
before September 21,1988. In the morning of September 21, 1988 Dr. Batiquin, along with other
physicians and nurses, performed a caesarean operation on Mrs. Villegas and successfully
delivered the latter’s baby. After leaving the hospital, Mrs. Villegas began tosuffer abdominal
pains and complained of being feverish. She also gradually lost her appetite, soshe consulted Dr.
Batiquin at the latter's polyclinic who prescribed for her certain medicines.However, the pains
still kept recurring. She then consulted Dr.Ma. Salud Kho. After examining her, Dr Kho
suggested that Mrs.Villegas submit to another surgery.- When Dr. Kho opened the abdomen of
Mrs. Villegas she found whitish-yellow discharge inside, an ovarian cyst on each of the left and
right ovaries which gave out pus, dirt and pus behind the uterus, and a piece of rubber material
on the right side of the uterus, embedded on the ovarian cyst. The piece of rubber appeared to be
a part of a rubber glove. This was the cause of all of the infection of the ovaries and consequently
of all the discomfort suffered by Mrs. Villegas. The piece of rubber allegedly found was not
presented in court, and Dr. Kho testified that she sent it to a pathologist in CebuCity for
examination. Aside from Dr. Kho's testimony, the evidence which mentioned the pieceof rubber
are a Medical Certificate, a Progress Record, an Anaesthesia Record, a Nurse's Record,and a
Physician's Discharge Summary. The trial court, however, regarded these documentary evidence
as mere hearsay, "there being no showing that the person or persons who prepared themare
deceased or unable to testify on the facts therein stated- There was also doubts as to the
whereabouts of the piece of rubber, as 2 versions arose from Dr. Kho’s testimony: 1) that it was
sent to the Pathologist in Cebu as testified to in Court by Dr. Kho and (2) that Dr. Kho threw it
away as told by her to Defendant. The failure of the Plaintiffs to reconcile these two
differentversions served only to weaken their claim against Defendant Batiquin. The trial court
ruled infavor of the defendants. The CA reversed the decision

Held:

All the requisites for recourse to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur are present. First, the entire
proceedings of the cesarean section were under the exclusive control of Dr. Batiquin. In this
light, the private respondents were bereft of direct evidence as to the actual culprit or the exact
cause of the foreign object finding its way into private respondent Villegas's body, which,
needless to say, does not occur unless through the intervention of negligence. Second, since aside
from the cesarean section, private respondent Villegas underwent no other operation which could
have caused the offending piece of rubber to appear in her uterus, it stands to reason that such
could only have been a by-product of the cesarean section performed by Dr. Batiquin. The
petitioners, in this regard, failed to overcome the presumption of negligence arising from resort
to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Dr. Batiquin is therefore liable for negligently leaving behind
a piece of rubber in private respondent Villegas' abdomen and for all the adverse effects thereof.

Garcia-Rueda vs Pascasio

Facts:

This is a special civil action case under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed by petitioner
Leonila Rueda against public respondent Office of the Ombudsman for its failure to uphold the
existence of probable cause to hold public respondents City Prosecutors liable for violation of
Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. The records reveal that Florencio V. Rueda, husband of herein
petitioner, underwent surgical operation at the UST Hospital for the removal of a stone blocking
his ureter. He was attended by a surgeon, Dr. Domingo Antonio, Jr. and an anesthesiologist, Dr.
Erlinda Balatbat-Reyes. However, six hours after the surgery, Florencio died of complications of
unknown cause. Petitioner sought the help of the NBI to conduct an autopsy on her husband's
body and its finding was that Florencio's death was due to lack of care by the attending physician
in administering anaesthesia. A formal complaint for Homicide through Reckless Imprudence
was then filed before the Manila City Prosecutors Office. In said office, petitioner's case was
transferred from one prosecutor to another who came out with contradictory recommendations.
When the case was transferred to Senior State Prosecutor Arizala, the latter resolved to exonerate
Dr. Reyes from any wrongdoing. Aggrieved petitioner filed graft charges against Prosecutors
Guerrero, Macaraeg and Arizala for manifest partiality in favor of Dr. Reyes in the Office of the
Ombudsman. The Ombudsman, however, dismissed the complaint for lack of evidence

Held:

"In its simplest terms, the type of lawsuit which has been called medical malpractice or, more
appropriately, medical negligence, is that type of claim which a victim has available to him or
her to redress a wrong committed by a medical professional which has caused bodily harm. In
order to successfully pursue such a claim, a patient must prove that a health care provider, in
most cases a physician, either failed to do something which a reasonably prudent health care
provider would have done, or that he or she did something that a reasonably prudent provider
would not have done; and that that failure or action caused injury to the patient." Hence, there are
four elements involved in medical negligence cases: duty, breach, injury and proximate
causation.
ID.; SECTION 3(E) OF THE ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT; FACTS
REQUIRED. — The City Prosecutors were charged with violating Section 3(e) of R.A. No.
3019 which requires the following facts: "1. The accused is a public officer discharging
administrative or official functions or private persons charged in conspiracy with them; 2. The
public officer committed the prohibited act during the performance of his official duty or in
relation to his public position; 3. The public officer acted with manifest partiality, evident bad
faith or gross, inexcusable negligence; and 4. His action caused undue injury to the Government
or any private party, or gave any party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference to such
parties."

Ramos vs CA

Facts:

In the morning of June 17, 1985, Erlinda Ramos was brought into the operating room of the
Delos Santos Medical Center for a cholecystectomy. She was then a robust woman, normal as
any other except for occasional complaints of discomfort due to pains allegedly caused by the
presence of stones in her gall bladder. At around 3:00 p.m. of that day, Erlinda was taken to the
Intensive Care unit of the hospital, comatose. On January 8, 1986, Erlinda's husband filed a civil
case for damages against said hospital and Drs. Orlino Hosaka and Perfecta Gutierrez. The
Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs. The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the
decision of the lower court and ordered the dismissal of the complaint. Hence, this petition.|||
Held:

Medical malpractice cases do not escape the application of this doctrine. Thus, res ipsa
loquitur has been applied when the circumstances attendant upon the harm are
themselves of such a character as to justify an inference of negligence as the cause of that harm.
The application of res ipsa loquitur in medical negligence cases presents a question of law since
it is a judicial function to determine whether a certain set of circumstances does, as a
matter of law, permit a given inference. Although generally, expert medical testimony is relied
upon in malpractice suits to prove that a physician has done a negligent act or that he has
deviated from the standard medical procedure, when the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is availed
by the plaintiff, the need for expert medical testimony is dispensed with because the injury itself
provides the proof of negligence. The reason is that the general rule on the necessity of expert
testimony applies only to such matters clearly within the domain of medical science, and not to
matters that are within the common knowledge of mankind which may be testified to by anyone
familiar with the facts. Ordinarily, only physicians and surgeons of skill and experience are
competent to testify as to whether a patient has been treated or operated upon with a reasonable
degree of skill and care. However, testimony as to the statements and acts of physicians and
surgeons, external appearances, and manifest conditions which are observable by any one may
be given by non-expert witnesses. Hence, in cases where theres ipsa loquitur is applicable,
the court is permitted to find a physician negligent upon proper proof of injury to the patient,
without the aid of expert testimony, where the court from its fund ofcommon knowledge can
determine the proper standard of care. Where common knowledge and experience teach that a
resulting injury would not have occurred to the patient if due care had been exercised, an
inference of negligence may be drawn giving rise to an application of the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur without medical evidence, which is ordinarily required to show not only what occurred
but how and why it occurred. When the doctrine is appropriate, all that the patient must do is
prove a nexus between the particular act or omission complained of and the injury sustained
while under the custody and management of the defendant without need to produce expert
medical testimony to establish the standard of care. Resort to res ipsa loquitur is allowed because
there is no other way, under usual and ordinary conditions, by which the patient can obtain
redress for injury suffered by him. Thus, courts of other jurisdictions have applied the doctrine in
the following situations: leaving of a foreign object in the body of the patient after an operation,
injuries sustained on a healthy part of the body which was not under, or in the area, of treatment,
removal of the wrong part of the body when another part was intended, knocking out a tooth
while a patient's jaw was under anesthetic for the removal of his tonsils, and loss of an eye while
the patient plaintiff was under the influence of anesthetic, during or following an operation for
appendicitis, among others. Nevertheless, despite the fact that the scope of res ipsa loquitur has
been measurably enlarged, it does not automatically apply to all cases of medical negligence as
to mechanically shift the burden of proof to the defendant to show that he is not guilty of the
ascribed negligence. Res ipsa loquitur is not a rigid or ordinary doctrine to be perfunctorily used
but a rule to be cautiously applied, depending upon the circumstances of each case. It is generally
restricted to situations in malpractice cases where a layman is able to say, as a matter of common
knowledge and observation, that the consequences of professional care were not as such as
would ordinarily have followed if due care had been exercised. A distinction must be made
between the failure to secure results, and the occurrence of something more unusual and not
ordinarily found if the service or treatment rendered followed the usual procedure of those
skilled in that particular practice. It must be conceded that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur can
have no application in a suit against a physician or surgeon which involves the merits of a
diagnosis or of a scientific treatment. The physician or surgeon is not required at his peril to
explain why any particular diagnosis was not correct, or why any particular scientific treatment
did not produce the desired result. Thus, res ipsa loquitur is not available in a malpractice suit if
the only showing is that the desired result of an operation or treatment was not accomplished.
The real question, therefore, is whether or not in the process of the operation any extraordinary
incident or unusual event outside of the routine performance occurred which is beyond the
regular scope of customary professional activity in such operations, which, if unexplained would
themselves reasonably speak to the average man as the negligent cause or causes of the untoward
consequence. If there was such extraneous interventions, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur may be
utilized and the defendant is called upon to explain the matter, by evidence of exculpation, if he
could.

4. ID.; ID.; APPLICABLE IN CASE AT BAR. — We find the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur appropriate in the case at bar. Brain damage, which Erlinda sustained, is an injury which
does not normally occur in the process of a gall bladder operation. In fact, this kind of situation
does not happen in the absence of negligence of someone in the administration of anesthesia and
in the use ofendotracheal tube. Normally, a person being put under anesthesia is not rendered
decerebrate as a consequence of administering such anesthesia if the proper procedure was
followed. Furthermore, the instruments used in the administration of anesthesia, including the
endotracheal tube, were all under the exclusive control of private respondents, who are the
physicians-in-charge. C

Nogales vs Capitol Medical Center

Facts:

Pregnant with her fourth child, Corazon Nogales, who was then 37 y/o was under the exclusive
prenatal care of Dr. Oscar Estrada beginning on her fourth month of pregnancy or as early as
December 1975. While Corazon was on her last trimester of pregnancy, Dr. Estrada noted an
increase in her blood pressure and development of leg edemas indicating preeclampsia which is a
dangerous complication of pregnancy. Around midnight of May 26, 1976, Corazon started to
experience mild labor pains prompting Corazon and Rogelio Nogales to see Dr. Estrada at his
home. After examining Corazon, Dr. Estrada advised her immediate admission to Capitol
Medical Center (CMC). Upon her admission, an internal examination was conducted upon her
by a resident-physician. Based on the doctor’s sheet, around 3am, Dr. Estrada advised for 10mg
valium to be administered immediately by intramuscular injection, he later ordered the start of
intravenous administration of syntociron admixed with dextrose, 5% in lactated ringer’s solution,
at the rate of 8-10 micro-drops per minute. When asked if he needed the services of
anesthesiologist, he refused. Corazon’s bag of water ruptured spontaneously and her cervix was
fully dilated and she experienced convulsions. Dr. Estrada ordered the injection of 10g of
magnesium sulfate but his assisting Doctor, Dr. Villaflor, only administered 2.5g. She also
applied low forceps to extract Corazon’s baby. In the process, a 10 x 2.5cm piece of cervical
tissue was allegedly torn. The baby came out in an apric, cyanatic weak and injured condition.
Consequently the baby had to be intubated and resuscitated. Corazon had professed vaginal
bleeding where a blood typing was ordered and she was supposed to undergo hysterectomy,
however, upon the arrival of the doctor, she was already pronounced dead due to hemorrhage.

Held:

A hospital is not liable for the negligence of an independent contractor-physician. There is,
however an exception to this principle. The hospital may be liable if the physician is the
ostensible agent of the hospital. This exception is also known as the doctrine of apparent
authority.

Under the doctrine of apparent authority a hospital can be held vicariously liable for the
negligent acts of a physician providing care at the hospital, regardless of whether the physician is
an independent contractor, unless the patient knows, or should have known, that the physician is
an independent contractor.

For a hospital to be liable under the doctrine of apparent authority, a plaintiff must show that 1.)
the hospital, or its agent, acted in a manner that would lead a reasonable person to conclude that
the individual who was alleged to be negligent was an employee or agent of the hospital; 2.)
Where the acts of the agent create the appearance of authority, the plaintiff must also prove that
the hospital had knowledge of and acquired in them; and 3.) the plaintiff acted in reliance upon
the conduct of the hospital or its agent, consistent with ordinary care and prudence.

Borrowed servant doctrine provides that once a surgeon enters the operating room and takes
charge of the acts or omissions of operating room personnel and any negligence associated with
each acts or omissions are imputable to the surgeon, while the assisting physicians and nurses
may be employed by the hospital, or engaged by the patient, they normally become the
temporary servants or agents of the surgeon in charge while the operation is in progress, and
liability may be imposed upon the surgeon for their negligent acts under the doctrine
of respondeat superior.

Professional Services INC vs Natividad

Facts:

On April 4, 1984, Natividad Agana was rushed to the Medical City General Hospital because of
difficulty of bowel movement and bloody anal discharge. After a series of medical examinations,
Dr. Miguel Ampil diagnosed her to be suffering from Cancer of the sigmoid. On April 11, 1984,
Dr. Ampil assisted by the medical staff of the Medical City Hospital performed an Anterior
resection surgery on Natividad. He found that the malignancy on her sigmoid area had spread on
her left ovary, necessitating the removal of certain portions of it. Thus, Dr. Ampil obtained the
consent of Natividad’s husband, Enrique Agana, to permit Dr. Juan Fuentes to perform
hysterectomy on her. After Dr. Fuentes had completed the hysterectomy, Dr. Ampil took over,
completed the operation and closed the incision after searching for the missing 2 gauzes as
indicated by the assisting nurses but failed to locate it. After a couple of days, Natividad
complained of excruciating pains in her anal region but Dr. Ampil said it is a natural
consequence of the operation/surgery and recommended that she consult an oncologist to
examine the cancerous nodes which were not removed during the operation. Natividad and her
husband went to the US to seek further treatment and she was declared free from cancer. A piece
of gauze portruding from Natividad’s vagina was found by her daughter which was then
removed by hand by Dr. Ampil and assured that the pains will vanished. However, it didn’t. The
pains intensified prompting Natividad to seek treatment at the Polymedic General Hospital.
While confined there, Dr. Ramon Guttierez detected the presence of another foreign object in her
vagina – a foul smelling gauze measuring 1.5 inches in width which badly infected her vagina. A
recto-vaginal fistula had forced stool to excrete through her vagina. Another surgical operation
was needed to remedy the damage

Held:

Yes. An operation requiring the placing of sponges in the incision is not complete until the
sponges are properly removed and it is settled that the leaving of sponges or other foreign
substances in the wound after the incision has been closed is at least prima facie negligence by
the operating surgeon. To put it simply, such act is considered so inconsistent with due care as to
raise inference of negligence. There are even legions of authorities to the effect that such act is
negligence per se.

This is a clear case of medical malpractice or more appropriately, medical negligence. To

successfully pursue this kind of case, a patient must only prove that a health care provider either
failed to do something which a reasonably prudent health care provider would have done, or that
he did something that a reasonably prudent provider would not have done; and that failure or
action caused injury to the patient. Simply puts the elements are duty, breach, injury, and
proximate causation. Dr. Ampil, as the lead surgeon, had the duty to remove all foreign objects,
such as gauzes, from Natividad’s body before closure of the incision. When he failed to do so, it
was his duty to inform Natividad about it. Dr. Ampil breached both duties. Such breach caused
injury to Natividad, necessitating her further examination by American doctors and another
surgery. That Dr. Ampil’s negligence is the proximate cause of Natividad’s injury could be
traced from his act of closing the incision despite the information given by the attending nurses
that 2 pieces of gauze were still missing. That they were later on extracted from Natividad’s
vagina established the causal link between Dr. Ampil’s negligence and the injury. And what
further aggravated such injury was his deliberate concealment of this missing gauzes from the
knowledge of Natividad and her family.

The requisites for the applicability of the doctrine of res ipsa liquitor are:

1. Occurrence of an injury;
2. The thing which caused the injury was under the control and management of the
defendant;
3. The occurrence was such that in the ordinary course of things would not have happened if
those who had control or management used proper care, and;
4. The absence of explanation by the defendant

Of the foregoing, the most instrumental is the “Control and management of the thing which
caused the injury.”

Under the “Captain of the ship” rule, the operating surgeon is the person in complete charge of
the surgery room and all personnel connected with the operation.

The knowledge of any of the staff of Medical City constitutes knowledge of PSI.

The doctrine of corporate responsibility, has the duty to see that it meets the standards of
responsibilities for the care of patients. Such duty includes the proper supervision of the
members of its medical staff. The hospital accordingly has the duty to make a reasonable effort
to monitor and over see the treatment prescribed and administered by the physician practicing in
its premises.

NEGLIGENCE OF ATTORNEYS

Del Mar vs CA

Facts

Private respondent and her sister, Florence, inherited three (3) parcels of land situated in Mabini,
Santiago City. Florence executed a general power of attorney naming and constituting private
respondent as her attorney-in-fact with regard to the subject properties. Private respondent,
acting for herself and as attorney-in-fact of Florence, executed Deeds of Absolute Sale in favor
of petitioner covering the aforementioned parcels of land, which was confirmed and ratified by
Florence. Consequently, petitioner obtained certificates of title in his name. A complaint for
reconveyance was filed by private respondent against petitioner alleging that petitioner obtained
the aforementioned certificates of title through fraud. During the pre-trial conference, neither
petitioner nor his counsel appeared, by reason of which the trial court issued an order declaring
petitioner as in default and rendered a decision in favor of private respondent. Petitioner filed a
notice of appeal with the Court of Appeals, but the counsel for private respondent moved to
dismiss the appeal on the ground that petitioner failed to file the required brief within the
reglementary period. The CA granted the motion to dismiss and denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.

Held:

LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS; ATTORNEYS; NEGLIGENCE OF COUNSEL BINDS

THE CLIENT; EXCEPTIONS. — It is well-settled that the negligence of counsel binds the
client. Exceptions to this rule arise when (1) such negligence is so gross, palpable, reckless and
inexcusable that the client is deprived of the due process of law; and (2) the application of such
due process results in the outright deprivation of one's property through a technicality. THEDCA
The negligence of Atty. Abuan does not fall under these exceptions. His negligence in this case
was his inexcusable failure to file the required appellant's Brief, thus causing the dismissal of the
appeal of petitioner. But the latter was not without fault. He was aware of Atty. Abuan's failure
to appear at the pretrial conference, a failure that had placed him in default. Because petitioner
was in default, private respondent's evidence was received ex parte by the RTC. No wonder, the
trial court decided against him.

6. ID.; ID.; NEGLIGENCE OF ATTORNEY; A PARTY'S COUNSEL CANNOT BE BLAMED

FOR NEGLIGENCE IF THE PARTY WAS LIKEWISE GUILTY OF THE SAME; CASE AT
BAR. — In effect, petitioner consented to the shabby and negligent treatment of his case by his
counsel. Hence, he should not complain now of the negligence or "fraud" done to him by his
lawyer. A party's counsel cannot be blamed for negligence, if the party was likewise guilty of the
same. Clients should suffer the consequences of the negligence, mistake or lack of competence
of the counsel whom they themselves hired, and whom they had full authority to fire at any time
and replace with another.