TOPIC: POWER OF INVESTIGATION; ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES

REFERENCE:
CITIZEN J. ANTONIO M. CARPIO vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE
SECRETARY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL
DEFENSE and THE NATIONAL TREASURER
G.R. No. 96409 February 14, 1992
FACTS:
Congress passed Republic Act No. 6975 entitled "AN ACT ESTABLISHING THE
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE UNDER A REORGANIZED DEPARTMENT OF THE
INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES" as the
consolidated version of House Bill No. 23614 and Senate Bill No. 463.
Following the said Act's approval by President Corazon C. Aquino on December 13, 1990,
it was published on December 17, 1990.
Presently, however, petitioner as citizen, taxpayer and member of the Philippine Bar
sworn to defend the Constitution, filed the petition now at bar on December 20, 1990,
seeking this Court's declaration of unconstitutionality of RA 6975 with prayer for
temporary restraining order.
But in an en banc resolution dated December 27, 1990, We simply required the public
respondents to file their Comment, without however giving due course to the petition and
the prayer therein. Hence, the Act took effect after fifteen days following its publication,
or on January 1, 1991.
Before we settle down on the merits of the petition, it would likewise be well to discuss
albeit briefly the history of our police force and the reasons for the ordination of Section
6, Article XVI in our present Constitution.
During the Commonwealth period, we had the Philippine Constabulary as the nucleus of
the Philippine Ground Force (PGF), now the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). The
PC was made part of the PGF but its administrative, supervisory and directional control
was handled by the then Department of the Interior. After the war, it remained as the
"National Police" under the Department of National Defense, as a major service
component of the AFP.
Later, the Integration Act of 1975 5 created the Integrated National Police (INP) under the
Office of the President, with the PC as the nucleus, and the local police forces as the
civilian components. The PC-INP was headed by the PC Chief who, as concurrent
Director-General of the INP, exercised command functions over the INP.
The National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) exercised administrative control and
supervision while the local executives exercised operational supervision and direction
over the INP units assigned within their respective localities.
The set-up whereby the INP was placed under the command of the military component,
which is the PC, severely eroded the INP's civilian character and the multiplicity in the
governance of the PC-INP resulted in inefficient police service. 9 Moreover, the
integration of the national police forces with the PC also resulted in inequities since the
military component had superior benefits and privileges.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not the president abdicated its control power over the PNP and NPC by
virtue of RA 6975.
RULING: NO.
The President has control of all executive departments, bureaus, and offices. This
presidential power of control over the executive branch of government extends over all
executive officers from Cabinet Secretary to the lowliest clerk. Equally well accepted, as
a corollary rule to the control powers of the President, is the “Doctrine of Qualified Political
Agency”. As the President cannot be expected to exercise his control powers all at the
same time and in person, he will have to delegate some of them to his Cabinet members.
Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single executive, “all
executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the
heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief
Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution
or law to act in person on the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally,
the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are
performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of
such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are,
unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive presumptively the acts of the
Chief Executive.”
Thus, and in short, “the President’s power of control is directly exercised by him over the
members of the Cabinet who, in turn, and by his authority, control the bureaus and other
offices under their respective jurisdictions in the executive department.”
Additionally, the circumstance that the NAPOLCOM and the PNP are placed under the
reorganized DILG is merely an administrative realignment that would bolster a system of
coordination and cooperation among the citizenry, local executives and the integrated law
enforcement agencies and public safety agencies created under the assailed Act, the
funding of the PNP being in large part subsidized by the national government.
TOPIC: ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
REFERENCE:
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, represented herein
by its Secretary, HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ vs. DENR REGION 12 EMPLOYEES,
represented by BAGUIDALI KARIM, Acting President of COURAGE (DENR Region 12
Chapter)
G.R. No. 149724 August 19, 2003
FACTS:
On November 15, 1999, Regional Executive Director of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources for Region XII, Israel C. Gaddi, issued a Memorandum3 directing
the immediate transfer of the DENR XII Regional Offices from Cotabato City to Koronadal
(formerly Marbel), South Cotabato. The Memorandum was issued pursuant to DENR
Administrative Order No. 99-14, issued by then DENR Secretary Antonio H. Cerilles.
The DENR hereby adopts a policy to establish at least one Community Environment and
Natural Resources Office (CENRO) or Administrative Unit per Congressional District
except in the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) and the National Capital
Region (NCR). The Regional Executive Directors (REDs) are hereby authorized to
realign/relocate existing CENROs and implement this policy in accordance with the
attached distribution list per region which forms part of this Order.
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied in an Order dated April 10, 2000. A
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 was filed before the Court of Appeals, docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 58896. The petition was dismissed outright for: (1) failure to submit a
written explanation why personal service was not done on the adverse party; (2) failure
to attach affidavit of service; (3) failure to indicate the material dates when copies of the
orders of the lower court were received; (4) failure to attach certified true copy of the order
denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration; (5) for improper verification, the same
being based on petitioner’s "knowledge and belief," and (6) wrong remedy of certiorari
under Rule 65 to substitute a lost appeal.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not DENR Secretary has the authority to reorganize the DENR Region 12
Office.
RULING:
The qualified political agency doctrine, all executive and administrative organizations are
adjuncts of the Executive Department, and the acts of the Secretaries of such
departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless
disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, are presumptively the acts of the Chief
Executive. It is corollary to the control power of the President as provided for under Art.
VII Sec. 17 of the 1987 Constitution: "The President shall have control of all the executive
departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed."
In the case at bar, the DENR Secretary can validly reorganize the DENR by ordering the
transfer of the DENR XII Regional Offices from Cotabato City to Koronadal, South
Cotabato. The exercise of this authority by the DENR Secretary, as an alter ego, is
presumed to be the acts of the President for the latter had not expressly repudiated the
same.
It may be true that the transfer of the offices may not be timely considering that: (1) there
are no buildings yet to house the regional offices in Koronadal, (2) the transfer falls on the
month of Ramadan, (3) the children of the affected employees are already enrolled in
schools in Cotabato City, (4) the Regional Development Council was not consulted, and
(5) the Sangguniang Panglungsond, through a resolution, requested the DENR Secretary
to reconsider the orders. However, these concern issues addressed to the wisdom of the
transfer rather than to its legality. It is basic in our form of government that the judiciary
cannot inquire into the wisdom or expediency of the acts of the executive or the legislative
department, for each department is supreme and independent of the others, and each is
devoid of authority not only to encroach upon the powers or field of action assigned to
any of the other department, but also to inquire into or pass upon the advisability or
wisdom of the acts performed, measures taken or decisions made by the other
departments.
The Supreme Court should not be thought of as having been tasked with the awesome
responsibility of overseeing the entire bureaucracy. Unless there is a clear showing of
constitutional infirmity or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, the Court’s exercise of the judicial power, pervasive and limitless it may seem
to be, still must succumb to the paramount doctrine of separation of powers.26 After a
careful review of the records of the case, we find that this jurisprudential element of abuse
of discretion has not been shown to exist.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for review is GRANTED. The
resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 58896 dated May 31, 2000 and
August 20, 2001, as well as the decision dated January 14, 2000 of the Regional Trial
Court of Cotabato City, Branch 15, in Civil Case No 389, are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The permanent injunction, which enjoined the petitioner from enforcing the
Memorandum Order of the DENR XII Regional Executive Director, is LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.
TOPIC: ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
REFERENCE:
G.R. No. 96681 December 2, 1991
HON. ISIDRO CARIÑO, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Education,
Culture & Sports, DR. ERLINDA LOLARGA, in her capacity as Superintendent of City
Schools of Manila vs. THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, GRACIANO BUDOY,
JULIETA BABARAN, ELSA IBABAO, HELEN LUPO, AMPARO GONZALES, LUZ DEL
CASTILLO, ELSA REYES and APOLINARIO ESBER
FACTS:
On September 17, 1990, a Monday and a class day, some 800 public school teachers,
among them members of the Manila Public School Teachers Association (MPSTA) and
Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT) undertook what they described as "mass
concerted actions" to "dramatize and highlight" their plight resulting from the alleged
failure of the public authorities to act upon grievances that had time and again been
brought to the latter's attention. According to them they had decided to undertake said
"mass concerted actions" after the protest rally staged at the DECS premises on
September 14, 1990 without disrupting classes as a last call for the government to
negotiate the granting of demands had elicited no response from the Secretary of
Education. The "mass actions" consisted in staying away from their classes, converging
at the Liwasang Bonifacio, gathering in peaceable assemblies, etc.
Through their representatives, the teachers participating in the mass actions were served
with an order of the Secretary of Education to return to work in 24 hours or face dismissal,
and a memorandum directing the DECS officials concerned to initiate dismissal
proceedings against those who did not comply and to hire their replacements. Those
directives notwithstanding, the mass actions continued into the week, with more teachers
joining in the days that followed.
For failure to heed the return-to-work order, the CHR complainants (private respondents)
were administratively charged on the basis of the principal's report and given five (5) days
to answer the charges. They were also preventively suspended for ninety (90) days
"pursuant to Section 41 of P.D. 807" and temporarily replaced (unmarked CHR Exhibits,
Annexes F, G, H). An investigation committee was consequently formed to hear the
charges in accordance with P.D. 807.
In the administrative case docketed as Case No. DECS 90-082 in which CHR
complainants Graciano Budoy, Jr., Julieta Babaran, Luz del Castillo, Apolinario Esber
were, among others, named respondents, 6 the latter filed separate answers, opted for a
formal investigation, and also moved "for suspension of the administrative proceedings
pending resolution by . . (the Supreme) Court of their application for issuance of an
injunctive writ/temporary restraining order." But when their motion for suspension was
denied by Order dated November 8, 1990 of the Investigating Committee, which later also
denied their motion for reconsideration orally made at the hearing of November 14, 1990,
"the respondents led by their counsel staged a walkout signifying their intent to boycott
the entire proceedings." The case eventually resulted in a Decision of Secretary Cariño
dated December 17, 1990, rendered after evaluation of the evidence as well as the
answers, affidavits and documents submitted by the respondents, decreeing dismissal
from the service of Apolinario Esber and the suspension for nine (9) months of Babaran,
Budoy and del Castillo.
In the meantime, the "MPSTA filed a petition for certiorari before the Regional Trial Court
of Manila against petitioner (Cariño), which was dismissed (unmarked CHR Exhibit,
Annex I). Later, the MPSTA went to the Supreme Court (on certiorari, in an attempt to
nullify said dismissal, grounded on the) alleged violation of the striking teachers" right to
due process and peaceable assembly docketed as G.R. No. 95445, supra. The ACT also
filed a similar petition before the Supreme Court . . . docketed as G.R. No. 95590." 9 Both
petitions in this Court were filed in behalf of the teacher associations, a few named
individuals, and "other teacher-members so numerous similarly situated" or "other
similarly situated public school teachers too numerous to be impleaded."
In the meantime, too, the respondent teachers submitted sworn statements dated
September 27, 1990 to the Commission on Human Rights to complain that while they
were participating in peaceful mass actions, they suddenly learned of their replacements
as teachers, allegedly without notice and consequently for reasons completely unknown
to them.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not CHR has the power to try and decide and determine certain specific
cases such as the alleged human rights violation involving civil and political rights.
RULING: NO.
The CHR is not competent to try such case. It has no judicial power. It can only investigate
all forms of human rights violation involving civil and political rights but it cannot and
should not try and decide on the merits and matters involved therein. The CHR is hence
then barred from proceeding with the trial.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the Order of December 29, 1990 is ANNULLED
and SET ASIDE, and the respondent Commission on Human Rights and the Chairman
and Members thereof are prohibited "to hear and resolve the case (i.e., Striking Teachers
HRC Case No. 90-775) on the merits."
SO ORDERED.
TOPIC:
REFERENCE:
JOSE C. TECSON vs. HON. RAFAEL SALAS Executive Secretary, HON. ANTONIO V.
RAQUIZA, Secretary of Public Works and Communications, HON. MARCIANO D.
BAUTISTA, Undersecretary of Public Works and Communications, ALEJANDRO B.
DELENA, Officer-In-Charge of the Bureau of Public Works, and Felix V. BAGTAS,
Assistant Superintendent of Dredging Bureau of Public Works
G.R. No. L-27524 July 31, 1970
FACTS:
The amended petition for certiorari and prohibition filed against respondents on
November 15, 1966 prayed that the detail dated October 14, 1966 of petitioner
Superintendent of Dredging of the Bureau of Public Works to the Office of the President
to assist in the San Fernando Port Project be declared illegal, null and void. There was a
motion to dismiss filed on November 29, 1966 by the then Solicitor General, now a
member of this Court, the Honorable Antonio P. Barredo, primarily based on a lack of
cause of action, as the power of the then Executive Secretary, acting by authority of the
President to detail petitioner, was beyond question. Such a motion elicited a favorable
response from the lower court, as shown by its order of December 17, 1966 dismissing
the petition without pronouncement as to costs and lifting the restraining order previously
issued.
The basic question was set forth in such order. Thus: "Stripping off the unnecessary
allegations and data contained in the kilometric allegations of the petitioner and the
respondents in their respective pleadings, and after a perusal of the amended petition,
the Court finds that the principal issue between petitioner and the herein respondents in
the amended petition, is whether or not the assignment of herein petitioner on temporary
detail to the office of Commodore Santiago Nuval, Presidential Assistant on Ports and
Harbors, by the President of the Philippines thru the Executive Secretary, constitutes
removal from office without cause. It incorporated the challenged directive of the then
Executive Secretary addressed to the Secretary of Public Works and worded as follows:
"Mr. Jose G. Tecson, Superintendent of Dredging Bureau of Public Works, is hereby
detailed to the Office of the President, effective immediately, to assist in the San Fernando
Port Project. Mr. Tecson shall report directly to Commodore Santiago Nuval Presidential
Assistant on Ports and Harbors." It was clearly set forth therein that it was issued "by
authority of the President."
Then came this portion of the lower Court's Order of dismissal: "It is to be presumed that
the Presidential directive, thru the Salas Order, must have been decided by Malacañang
in the interest of public service, and such official act should be considered regularly
issued. Petitioner, however, argues that the Salas detail order although issued by
Authority of the President, should be approved by the Budget Commissioner and the
Commissioner of Civil Service as there is no specification of the period of assignment.
This contention of the petitioner, if it were to be followed, would contravene the generally
accepted principle which recognizes presidential 'power control' over the executive
department. For then the acts of the President of the Philippines would be subject to a
subsequent approval or action by his subordinate officials in the executive department."
Why there was no removal from office without cause was explained in such order thus:
"The respondents further argue that the temporary assignment of the petitioner to the
Office of the President is not a demotion in rank and salary. Neither is it to be considered
as a disciplinary action taken against him. The detail does not involve removal from his
present position by transferring him to another position in a lower class. He will retain his
position as Superintendent of Dredging and will receive all the emoluments and privileges
appurtenant thereto. In citing Sec. 32 of the Civil Service Act of 1959, petitioner seems to
be of the impression that he is being transferred from one position to another, but this is
not the case as regards the abovequoted detail order of Secretary Salas. The same Sec.
32 of Civil Service Act of 1959 provides 'that a transfer from one position to another
without reduction in rank or salary shall not be considered disciplinary when made in the
interest of public service'." It was the conclusion of the lower court, therefore, that there
was likewise a statutory authority for such detail in the Office of the President, which was
neither a demotion nor a disciplinary action and as such valid. Hence the order of
dismissal.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not the assignment of Tecson on temporary detail to the office of
Commodore Nuval constitutes removal from office without cause.
RULING:
The question raised is on the appraisal of the validity of the acts of the President or
Congress is one of power, it is not for the Court to inquire on the motives that may have
prompted the exercise of a presidential authority, though at the most, it can look into the
question of whether there is a legal justification for what was done. This is the
manifestation of the concept of separation of power.
In the case of Villena v. Secretary of Interior, Justice Laurel expounded on the basic
philosophy of the presidential type of government, under this type the department
organization in force by paragraph 1, section 12, Article VII, of our Constitution, all
executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the
heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief
Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution
or the law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally,
the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are
performed by and through the executive department and the acts of the secretaries of
such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are,
unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the
Chief Executive.
Even if we are to consider the Civil Service Act, the transfer did not result to reduction in
rank or salary. To require as a prerequisite to its validity the approval of subordinate to an
action taken by their superior, the President, who tinder the Constitution is the Executive,
all prerogatives attaching to such branch being vested in him solely. In that sense, for
those discharging purely executive function in the national government, he lie gives
orders to all and takes orders from none.
TOPIC: QUASI-LEGISLATIVE POWER
REFERENCE:
HON. RENATO C. CORONA, in his capacity as Assistant Secretary for Legal Affairs,
HON. JESUS B. GARCIA, in his capacity as Acting Secretary, Department of
Transportation and Communications, and ROGELIO A. DAYAN, in his capacity as
General Manager of Philippine Ports Authority vs. UNITED HARBOR PILOTS
ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES and MANILA PILOTS ASSOCIATION
G.R. No. 111953 December 12, 1997
FACTS:
The PPA was created on July 11, 1974, by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 505. On
December 23, 1975, Presidential Decree No. 857 was issued revising the PPA's charter.
Pursuant to its power of control, regulation, and supervision of pilots and the pilotage
profession,1 the PPA promulgated PPA-AO-03-852 on March 21, 1985, which embodied
the "Rules and Regulations Governing Pilotage Services, the Conduct of Pilots and
Pilotage Fees in Philippine Ports." These rules mandate, inter alia, that aspiring pilots
must be holders of pilot licenses3 and must train as probationary pilots in outports for
three months and in the Port of Manila for four months. It is only after they have achieved
satisfactory performance4 that they are given permanent and regular appointments by
the PPA itself5 to exercise harbor pilotage until they reach the age of 70, unless sooner
removed by reason of mental or physical unfitness by the PPA General Manager. Harbor
pilots in every harbor district are further required to organize themselves into pilot
associations which would make available such equipment as may be required by the PPA
for effective pilotage services. In view of this mandate, pilot associations invested in
floating, communications, and office equipment. In fact, every new pilot appointed by the
PPA automatically becomes a member of a pilot association and is required to pay a
proportionate equivalent equity or capital before being allowed to assume his duties, as
reimbursement to the association concerned of the amount it paid to his predecessor.
Subsequently, then PPA General Manager Rogelio A. Dayan issued PPA-AO No. 04-927
on July 15, 1992, whose avowed policy was to "instill effective discipline and thereby
afford better protection to the port users through the improvement of pilotage services."
This was implemented by providing therein that "all existing regular appointments which
have been previously issued either by the Bureau of Customs or the PPA shall remain
valid up to 31 December 1992 only" and that "all appointments to harbor pilot positions in
all pilotage districts shall, henceforth, be only for a term of one (1) year from date of
effectivity subject to yearly renewal or cancellation by the Authority after conduct of a rigid
evaluation of performance."
On August 12, 1992, respondents United Harbor Pilots Association and the Manila Pilots
Association, through Capt. Alberto C. Compas, questioned PPA-AO No. 04-92 before the
Department of Transportation and Communication, but they were informed by then DOTC
Secretary Jesus B. Garcia that "the matter of reviewing, recalling or annulling PPA's
administrative issuances lies exclusively with its Board of Directors as its governing body."
Meanwhile, on August 31, 1992, the PPA issued Memorandum Order No. 08-928 which
laid down the criteria or factors to be considered in the reappointment of harbor pilot, viz.:
(1) Qualifying Factors:9 safety record and physical/mental medical exam report and (2)
Criteria for Evaluation:10 promptness in servicing vessels, compliance with PPA Pilotage
Guidelines, number of years as a harbor pilot, average GRT of vessels serviced as pilot,
awards/commendations as harbor pilot, and age.
Respondents reiterated their request for the suspension of the implementation of PPA-
AO No. 04-92, but Secretary Garcia insisted on his position that the matter was within the
jurisdiction of the Board of Directors of the PPA. Compas appealed this ruling to the Office
of the President (OP), reiterating his arguments before the DOTC.
On December 23, 1992, the OP issued an order directing the PPA to hold in abeyance
the implementation of PPA-AO No. 04-92. In its answer, the PPA countered that said
administrative order was issued in the exercise of its administrative control and
supervision over harbor pilots under Section 6-a (viii), Article IV of P.D. No. 857, as
amended, and it, along with its implementing guidelines, was intended to restore order in
the ports and to improve the quality of port services.
On March 17, 1993, the OP, through then Assistant Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs
Renato C. Corona, dismissed the appeal/petition and lifted the restraining order issued
earlier.11 He concluded that PPA-AO No. 04-92 applied to all harbor pilots and, for all
intents and purposes, was not the act of Dayan, but of the PPA, which was merely
implementing Section 6 of P.D. No. 857, mandating it "to control, regulate and supervise
pilotage and conduct of pilots in any port district."
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not PPA-AO-04-92 IS CONSTITUTIONAL
RULING:
The court is convinced that PPA-AO NO. 04-92 was issued in stark disregard of
respondents' right against deprivation of property without due process of law. The
SUPREME COURT said that in order to fall within the aegis of this provision, two
conditions must concur, namely, that there is a deprivation and that such deprivation is
done without proper observance of due process. As a general rule, notice and hearing,
as the fundamental requirements of procedural due process, are essential only when an
administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial function. In the performance of its
executive or legislative functions, such as issuing rules and regulations, an administrative
body need not comply with the requirements of notice and hearing
There is no dispute that pilotage as a profession has taken on the nature of a property
right. It is readily apparent that PPA-AO NO. 04-92 unduly restricts the right of harbor
pilots to enjoy their profession before their compulsory retirement.
TOPIC: QUASI-LEGISLATIVE POWER
REFERENCE:
RESTITUTO YNOT vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, THE STATION
COMMANDER, INTEGRATED NATIONAL POLICE, BAROTAC NUEVO, ILOILO and
THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF ANIMAL INDUSTRY, REGION IV, ILOILO
CITY
G.R. No. 74457 March 20, 1987
FACTS:
The essence of due process is distilled in the immortal cry of Themistocles to Alcibiades
"Strike — but hear me first!" It is this cry that the petitioner in effect repeats here as he
challenges the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 626-A.
The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo on
January 13, 1984, when they were confiscated by the police station commander of
Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, for violation of the above measure. 1 The petitioner sued for
recovery, and the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City issued a writ of replevin upon his filing
of a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. After considering the merits of the case, the court
sustained the confiscation of the carabaos and, since they could no longer be produced,
ordered the confiscation of the bond. The court also declined to rule on the
constitutionality of the executive order, as raise by the petitioner, for lack of authority and
also for its presumed validity.
The petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court,* 3 which upheld
the trial court, ** and he has now come before us in this petition for review on certiorari.
The thrust of his petition is that the executive order is unconstitutional insofar as it
authorizes outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being transported across
provincial boundaries. His claim is that the penalty is invalid because it is imposed without
according the owner a right to be heard before a competent and impartial court as
guaranteed by due process. He complains that the measure should not have been
presumed, and so sustained, as constitutional. There is also a challenge to the improper
exercise of the legislative power by the former President under Amendment No. 6 of the
1973 Constitution.
While also involving the same executive order, the case of Pesigan v. Angeles 5 is not
applicable here. The question raised there was the necessity of the previous publication
of the measure in the Official Gazette before it could be considered enforceable. We
imposed the requirement then on the basis of due process of law. In doing so, however,
this Court did not, as contended by the Solicitor General, impliedly affirm the
constitutionality of Executive Order No. 626-A. That is an entirely different matter.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not the law is valid.
RULING: NO.
The SC ruled that the EO is not valid as it indeed violates due process. EO 626-A ctreated
a presumption based on the judgment of the executive. The movement of carabaos from
one area to the other does not mean a subsequent slaughter of the same would ensue.
Ynot should be given to defend himself and explain why the carabaos are being
transferred before they can be confiscated.
The SC found that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power
because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to
the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because
the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and
is immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the administrative
authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear
encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of
powers.
There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned
therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily
taken.
The strength of democracy lies not in the rights it guarantees but in the courage of the
people to invoke them whenever they are ignored or violated. Rights are but weapons on
the wall if, like expensive tapestry, all they do is embellish and impress. Rights, as
weapons, must be a promise of protection. They become truly meaningful, and fulfill the
role assigned to them in the free society, if they are kept bright and sharp with use by
those who are not afraid to assert them.
WHEREFORE, Executive Order No. 626-A is hereby declared unconstitutional. Except
as affirmed above, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The supersedeas
bond is cancelled and the amount thereof is ordered restored to the petitioner. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
TOPIC: QUASI-LEGISLATIVE POWERS
REFERENCE:
AUGUSTO TOLEDO vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 92646-47 October 4, 1991
FACTS:
Petitioner Atty. Augusto Toledo was appointed by then Comelec Chairman Ramon Felipe
as Manager of the Education and Information Department of the Comelec, on May 21,
1986. At the time of his appointment, petitioner, having been born on July 8, 1927 was
already more than fifty-seven (57) years old. It was the first time petitioner joined the
government service as he was then engaged in active private practice prior to said
appointment.
Petitioner's appointment papers, particularly Civil Service Form No. 333 and his oath of
office were endorsed by the Comelec to the Civil Service Commission (CSC, for brevity)
on June 11, 1986, for approval and attestation. However, no prior request for exemption
from the provisions of Section 22, Rule III of the Civil Service Rules on Personnel Action
and Policies (CSRPAP, for brevity) was secured. Said provision prohibits the appointment
of persons 57 years old or above into the government service without prior approval by
the Civil Service Commission (CSC Memorandum Circular No. 5, Series of 1983).
Petitioner officially reported for work and assumed the functions of his office on June 16,
1986.
On January 29, 1989, public respondent Comelec, upon discovery of the lack of authority
required under Section 22, Rule III of the CSRPAP, and CSC Memorandum Circular No.
5, Series of 1983 issued Resolution No. 2066.
Unable to obtain a reconsideration from the aforesaid Resolution, petitioner filed the
present petition for certiorari.
It is first contended by petitioner that CSC Resolution No. 89-468 is without legal basis
because the CSRPAP is invalid and unenforceable for not having been published in the
Official Gazette or in any newspaper of general circulation as required under Section 9(b)
of P.D. 807. This being the case, petitioner argues that the requirement of prior CSC
authority to appoint persons 57 years or older under Section 22, Rule III of the CSRPAP
has not "become effective" and cannot be invoked against him.
It will be recalled that the Civil Service Act of 1959 (Republic Act No. 2260) took effect on
June 19, 1959. That act, among other things, established a Civil Service Commission one
of the functions of which was, "with the approval by the President, to prescribe, amend,
and enforce suitable rules and regulations for carrying into effect the provisions of ... the
Civil Service Law," said rules "to become effective thirty days after publication in the
Official Gazette" [Sec. 16 (e)].
The Commission subsequently adopted and promulgated rules intended to carry the law
into effect, known as the Revised Civil Service Rules. Those rules were published in the
supplement to Vol. 58, No. 49 of the Official Gazette, dated December 3, 1962.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not the CSRPAP provision is valid
RULING: NO.
The Civil Service Act of 959 (RA 2260), which established the CSC, contained no
provision prohibiting appointment or reinstatement into government service of any person
already 57 years old. Sec 5 Rule 6 of the Revised Civil Service Rules, which prohibits
such, was purely the creation of CSC.
Marcos’s PD 807 (Civil Service Decree), which established a new CSC and superseded
RA 2260, also provided that rules and regulations shall become effective only 30 days
after publication in the OG or in any newspaper of general circulation. The new CSC
adopted the CSRPAP . No provision re prohibition of appointment of 57 year old made in
PD 807; prohibition was purely created by CSC.
The provision cannot be valid, being entirely a CSC creation, it has no basis in the law
which it was meant to implement. It cannot be justified as a valid exercise of its function
of promulgating rules and regulations for that function, to repeat, may legitimately be
exercised only for the purpose of carrying the provisions of the law into effect; and since
there is no prohibition or restriction on the employment of 57-year old persons in the
statute—or any provision respecting age as a factor in employment—there was nothing
to carry into effect through an implementing rule on the matter. The power vested in the
CSC was to implement the law or put it into effect, not to add to it; to carry the law into
effect or execution, not to supply perceived omissions in it.
Additionally, the CSRPAP cannot be considered effective as of the time of the application
to Toledo of a provision thereof, for the reason that said rules were never published as
required by both RA 2260 and PD 807. The argument that it was a “mere reiteration of
existing law” and “circularized” cannot stand as formerly discussed.
Also, Toledo’s separation from service was through no fault of his own. Petition granted.
TOPIC: QUASI-LEGISLATIVE POWER
REFERENCE:
AMERICAN TOBACCO COMPANY, CARNATION COMPANY, CURTISS CANDY
COMPANY, CUDAHY PACKING CO., CLUETT, PEABODY & CO., INC.,
CANNONMILLS COMPANY, FORMICA CORPORATION, GENERALMOTORS
CORPORATION, INTERNATIONAL LATEX CORPORATION, KAYSER-ROTH
CORPORATION, M and R DIETETIC LABORATORIES, INC., OLIN MATHIESON,
PARFUM CIRO, INC., PROCTER and GAMBLE COMPANY, PROCTER and GAMBLE
PHILIPPINE MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, PARFUMS PORVIL DENTRIFICES
DU DOCTEUR PIERRE REUNIS SOCIETE ANONYME, R.J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO
COMPANY, SWIFT AND COMPANY, STERLING PRODUCTS INTERNATIONAL, THE
CLOROX COMPANY, WARNER LAMBERT PHARMACEUTICALS COMPANY and
ZENITH RADIO CORPORATION vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF PATENTS, ATTYS. AMANDO L. MARQUEZ, TEOFILO P.
VELASCO, RUSTICO A. CASIA and HECTOR D. BUENALUZ
G.R. No. L-26803 October 14, 1975
FACTS:
Petitioners are parties, respectively, in the following opposition, interference and
cancellation proceedings in said Office: Inter Partes Cases Nos. 157, 392, 896, 282, 247,
354, 246,332, 398, 325, 374, 175, 297, 256, 267, 111, 400, 324, 114, 159, 346, and 404.
In accordance with the amended Rule, the Director of Patents delegated the hearing of
petitioners' cases to hearing officers, specifically, Attys. Amando Marquez, Teofilo
Velasco, Rustico Casia and Hector Buenaluz, the other respondents herein.
Petitioners filed their objections to the authority of the hearing officers to hear their cases,
alleging that the amendment of the Rule is illegal and void because under the law the
Director must personally hear and decide inter partes cases. Said objections were
overruled by the Director of Patents, hence, the present petition for mandamus, to compel
The Director of Patents to personally hear the cases of petitioners, in lieu of the hearing
officers.
It would take an extremely narrow reading of the powers of the Director of Patents under
the general law2 and Republic Acts Nos. 1653 and 166 3 * to sustain the contention of
petitioners. Under section 3 of RA 165, the Director of Patents is "empowered to obtain
the assistance of technical, scientific or other qualified officers or employees of other
departments, bureaus, offices, agencies and instrumentalities of the Government,
including corporations owned, controlled or operated by the Government, when deemed
necessary in the consideration of any matter submitted to the Office relative to the
enforcement of the provisions" of said Act. Section 78 of the same Act also empowers
"the Director, subject to the approval of the Department Head," to "promulgate the
necessary rules and regulations, not inconsistent with law, for the conduct of all business
in the Patent Office." The aforecited statutory authority undoubtedly also applies to the
administration and enforcement of the Trade-mark Law (Republic Act No. 166).
It has been held that power-conferred upon an administrative agency to which the
administration of a statute is entrusted to issue such regulations and orders as may be
deemed necessary or proper in order to carry out its purposes and provisions maybe an
adequate source of authority to delegate a particular function, unless by express
provisions of the Act or by implication it has been withheld.4 There is no provision either
in Republic Act No. 165 or 166 negativing the existence of such authority, so far as the
designation of hearing examiners is concerned. Nor can the absence of such authority be
fairly inferred from contemporaneous and consistent Executive interpretation of the Act.
The nature of the power and authority entrusted to The Director of Patents suggests that
the aforecited laws (Republic Act No. 166, in relation to Republic Act No. 165) should be
construed so as to give the aforesaid official the administrative flexibility necessary for the
prompt and expeditious discharge of his duties in the administration of said laws. As such
officer, he is required, among others, to determine the question of priority in patent
interference proceedings, decide applications for reinstatement of a lapsed patent,
cancellations of patents under Republic Act No. 165,7 inter partes proceedings such as
oppositions, claims of interference, cancellation cases under the Trade-mark Law and
other matters in connection with the enforcement of the aforesaid laws. It could hardly be
expected, in view of the magnitude of his responsibility, to require him to hear personally
each and every case pending in his Office. This would leave him little time to attend to his
other duties. For him to do so and at the same time attend personally to the discharge of
every other duty or responsibility imposed upon his Office by law would not further the
development of orderly and responsible administration. The reduction of existing delays
in regulating agencies requires the elimination of needless work at top levels.
Unnecessary and unimportant details often occupy far too much of the time and energy
of the heads of these agencies and prevent full and expeditious consideration of the more
important issues. the remedy is a far wider range of delegations to subordinate officers.
This sub-delegation of power has been justified by "sound principles of organization"
which demand that "those at the top be able to concentrate their attention upon the larger
and more important questions of policy and practice, and their time be freed, so far as
possible, from the consideration of the smaller and far less important matters of detail."
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not the designation of hearing officers other than the Director of Patents is
a violation of due process.
RULING: NO.
The Supreme Court ruled that the power to decide resides solely in the administrative
agency vested by law, this does not preclude a delegation of the power to hold a hearing
on the basis of which the decision of the administrative agency will be made. The rule
that requires an administrative officer to exercise his own judgment and discretion does
not preclude him from utilizing, as a matter of practical administrative procedure, the aid
of subordinates to investigate and report to him the facts, on the basis of which the officer
makes his decisions.
It is sufficient that the judgment and discretion finally exercised are those of the officer
authorized by law. Neither does due process of law nor the requirements of fair hearing
require that the actual taking of testimony be before the same officer who will make the
decision in the case. As long as a party is not deprived of his right to present his own case
and submit evidence in support thereof, and the decision is supported by the evidence in
the record, there is no question that the requirements of due process and fair trial are fully
met. In short, there is no abnegation of responsibility on the part of the officer concerned
as the actual decision remains with and is made by said officer.
It is, however, required that to “give the substance of a hearing, which is for the purpose
of making determinations upon evidence the officer who makes the determinations must
consider and appraise the evidence which justifies them.”
TOPIC: QUASI-LEGISLATIVE POWERS
REFERENCE:
PHILIPPINE COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE CORPORATION vs. JOSE LUIS A.
ALCUAZ, as NTC Commissioner, and NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION
G.R. No. 84818 December 18, 1989
FACTS:
By virtue of Republic Act No. 5514, PHILCOMSAT was granted "a franchise to establish,
construct, maintain and operate in the Philippines, at such places as the grantee may
select, station or stations and associated equipment and facilities for international satellite
communications." Under this franchise, it was likewise granted the authority to "construct
and operate such ground facilities as needed to deliver telecommunications services from
the communications satellite system and ground terminal or terminals."
Pursuant to said franchise, petitioner puts on record that it undertook the following
activities and established the following installations:
1. In 1967, PHILCOMSAT established its provisional earth station in Pinugay, Rizal.
2. In 1968, earth station standard "A" antenna (Pinugay I) was established. Pinugay I
provided direct satellite communication links with the Pacific Ocean Region (the United
States, Australia, Canada, Hawaii, Guam, Korea, Thailand, China [PROC], New Zealand
and Brunei) thru the Pacific Ocean INTELSAT satellite.
3. In 1971, a second earth station standard "A" antenna(Pinugay III) was established.
Pinugay II provided links with the Indian Ocean Region (major cities in Europe, Middle
East, Africa, and other Asia Pacific countries operating within the region) thru the Indian
Ocean INTELSAT satellite.
4. In 1983, a third earth station standard "B" antenna (Pinugay III) was established to
temporarily assume the functions of Pinugay I and then Pinugay II while they were being
refurbished. Pinugay III now serves as spare or reserved antenna for possible
contingencies.
5. In 1983, PHILCOMSAT constructed and installed a standard "B" antenna at Clark Air
Field, Pampanga as a television receive-only earth station which provides the U.S.
Military bases with a 24-hour television service.
6. In 1989, petitioner completed the installation of a third standard "A" earth station
(Pinugay IV) to take over the links in Pinugay I due to obsolescence. 3
By designation of the Republic of the Philippines, the petitioner is also the sole signatory
for the Philippines in the Agreement and the Operating Agreement relating to the
International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (INTELSAT) of 115 member
nations, as well as in the Convention and the Operating Agreement of the International
Maritime Satellite Organization (INMARSAT) of 53 member nations, which two global
commercial telecommunications satellite corporations were collectively established by
various states in line with the principles set forth in Resolution 1721 (XVI) of the General
Assembly of the United Nations.
Since 1968, the petitioner has been leasing its satellite circuits to:
1. Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company;
2. Philippine Global Communications, Inc.;
 3. Eastern Telecommunications Phils., Inc.;
4. Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corp. ITT; and
5. Capitol Wireless, Inc.
or their predecessors-in-interest. The satellite services thus provided by petitioner enable
said international carriers to serve the public with indispensable communication services,
such as overseas telephone, telex, facsimile, telegrams, high speed data, live television
in full color, and television standard conversion from European to American or vice versa.
Consequently, under date of September 9, 1987, petitioner filed with respondent NTC an
application 4 for authority to continue operating and maintaining the same facilities it has
been continuously operating and maintaining since 1967, to continue providing the
international satellite communications services it has likewise been providing since 1967,
and to charge the current rates applied for in rendering such services. Pending hearing,
it also applied for a provisional authority so that it can continue to operate and maintain
the above mentioned facilities, provide the services and charge therefor the aforesaid
rates therein applied for.
On September 16, 1987, petitioner was granted a provisional authority to continue
operating its existing facilities, to render the services it was then offering, and to charge
the rates it was then charging. This authority was valid for six (6) months from the date of
said order. 5 When said provisional authority expired on March 17, 1988, it was extended
for another six (6) months, or up to September 16, 1988.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not there is an undue delegation of power.
RULING: NO.
There is no undue delegation. The power of the NTC to fix rates is limited by the
requirements of public safety, public interest, reasonable feasibility and reasonable rates,
which conjointly more than satisfy the requirements of a valid delegation of legislative
power. Fundamental is the rule that delegation of legislative power may be sustained only
upon the ground that some standard for its exercise is provided and that the legislature
in making the delegation has prescribed the manner of the exercise of the delegated
power.
Therefore, when the administrative agency concerned, NTC in this case, establishes a
rate, its act must both be non-confiscatory and must have been established in the manner
prescribed by the legislature; otherwise, in the absence of a fixed standard, the delegation
of power becomes unconstitutional. In case of a delegation of rate-fixing power, the only
standard which the legislature is required to prescribe for the guidance of the
administrative authority is that the rate be reasonable and just. However, it has been held
that even in the absence of an express requirement as to reasonableness, this standard
may be implied.
However, in this case, it appears that the manner of fixing the rates was done without due
process since no hearing was made in ascertaining the rate imposed upon
PHILCOMSAT.
TOPIC: QUASI-LEGISLATIVE POWER
REFERENCE:
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC. vs. HON. RUBEN D.
TORRES, as Secretary of the Department of Labor & Employment, and JOSE N.
SARMIENTO, as Administrator of the PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT
ADMINISTRATION
G.R. No. 101279 August 6, 1992
FACTS:
PASEI is the largest national organization of private employment and recruitment
agencies duly licensed and authorized by the POEA, to engaged in the business of
obtaining overseas employment for Filipino landbased workers, including domestic
helpers.
On June 1, 1991, as a result of published stories regarding the abuses suffered by Filipino
housemaids employed in Hong Kong, DOLE Secretary Ruben D. Torres issued
Department Order No. 16, Series of 1991, temporarily suspending the recruitment by
private employment agencies of "Filipino domestic helpers going to Hong Kong" (p. 30,
Rollo). The DOLE itself, through the POEA took over the business of deploying such Hong
Kong-bound workers.
On August 1, 1991, the POEA Administrator also issued Memorandum Circular No. 37,
Series of 1991, on the processing of employment contracts of domestic workers for Hong
Kong.
On September 2, 1991, the petitioner, PASEI, filed this petition for prohibition to annul the
aforementioned DOLE and POEA circulars and to prohibit their implementation.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion and/or in excess of
their rule-making authority in issuing said circulars;
2. Whether or not the assailed DOLE and POEA circulars are contrary to the Constitution,
are unreasonable, unfair and oppressive; and
3. Whether or not the requirements of publication and filing with the Office of the National
Administrative Register were not complied with.
RULING:
FIRST, the respondents acted well within in their authority and did not commit grave
abuse of discretion. This is because Article 36 (LC) clearly grants the Labor Secretary to
restrict and regulate recruitment and placement activities, to wit:
Art. 36. Regulatory Power. — The Secretary of Labor shall have the power to restrict and
regulate the recruitment and placement activities of all agencies within the coverage of
this title [Regulation of Recruitment and Placement Activities] and is hereby authorized to
issue orders and promulgate rules and regulations to carry out the objectives and
implement the provisions of this title.
SECOND, the vesture of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers in administrative
bodies is constitutional. It is necessitated by the growing complexities of the modern
society.
THIRD, the orders and circulars issued are however, invalid and unenforceable. The
reason is the lack of proper publication and filing in the Office of the National
Administrative Registrar as required in Article 2 of the Civil Code to wit:
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazatte, unless it is otherwise provided;
Article 5 of the Labor Code to wit:
Art. 5. Rules and Regulations. — The Department of Labor and other government
agencies charged with the administration and enforcement of this Code or any of its parts
shall promulgate the necessary implementing rules and regulations. Such rules and
regulations shall become effective fifteen (15) days after announcement of their adoption
in newspapers of general circulation;
and Sections 3(1) and 4, Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987 which
provide:
Sec. 3. Filing. — (1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law
Center, three (3) certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of
effectivity of this Code which are not filed within three (3) months shall not thereafter be
the basis of any sanction against any party or persons. (Chapter 2, Book VII of the
Administrative Code of 1987.)
Sec. 4. Effectivity. — In addition to other rule-making requirements provided by law not
inconsistent with this Book, each rule shall become effective fifteen (15) days from the
date of filing as above provided unless a different date is fixed by law, or specified in the
rule in cases of imminent danger to public health, safety and welfare, the existence of
which must be expressed in a statement accompanying the rule. The agency shall take
appropriate measures to make emergency rules known to persons who may be affected
by them. (Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987).