a) 1) Actual damages of P44,830.
00;
LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY, vs. NAVIDAD
The case before the Court is an appeal from the decision and resolution of the
Court of Appeals, promulgated on 27 April 2000 and 10 October 2000, respectively, in
CA-G.R. CV No. 60720, entitled Marjorie Navidad and Heirs of the Late Nicanor
Navidad vs. Rodolfo Roman, et. al., which has modified the decision of 11 August
1998 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 266, Pasig City, exonerating Prudent
Security Agency (Prudent) from liability and finding Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA)
and Rodolfo Roman liable for damages on account of the death of Nicanor Navidad.
On 14 October 1993, about half an hour past seven oclock in the evening,
Nicanor Navidad, then drunk, entered the EDSA LRT station after purchasing a token
(representing payment of the fare). While Navidad was standing on the platform near
the LRT tracks, Junelito Escartin, the security guard assigned to the area approached
Navidad. A misunderstanding or an altercation between the two apparently ensued
that led to a fist fight. No evidence, however, was adduced to indicate how the fight
started or who, between the two, delivered the first blow or how Navidad later fell on
the LRT tracks. At the exact moment that Navidad fell, an LRT train, operated by
petitioner Rodolfo Roman, was coming in. Navidad was struck by the moving train,
and he was killed instantaneously.
On 08 December 1994, the widow of Nicanor, herein respondent Marjorie
Navidad, along with her children, filed a complaint for damages against Junelito
Escartin, Rodolfo Roman, the LRTA, the Metro Transit Organization, Inc. (Metro
Transit), and Prudent for the death of her husband. LRTA and Roman filed a
counterclaim against Navidad and a cross-claim against Escartin and
Prudent. Prudent, in its answer, denied liability and averred that it had exercised due
diligence in the selection and supervision of its security guards.
The LRTA and Roman presented their evidence while Prudent and Escartin,
instead of presenting evidence, filed a demurrer contending that Navidad had failed to
prove that Escartin was negligent in his assigned task. On 11 August 1998, the trial
court rendered its decision; it adjudged:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the
defendants Prudent Security and Junelito Escartin ordering the latter to pay jointly and
severally the plaintiffs the following:
a) 2) Compensatory damages of P443,520.00;
b) 3) Indemnity for the death of Nicanor Navidad in the sum of P50,000.00;
c) Moral damages of P50,000.00;
d) Attorneys fees of P20,000;
e) Costs of suit.
The complaint against defendants LRTA and Rodolfo Roman are dismissed for lack of
merit.
The compulsory counterclaim of LRTA and Roman are likewise dismissed.[1]
Prudent appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 27 August 2000, the appellate
court promulgated its now assailed decision exonerating Prudent from any liability for
the death of Nicanor Navidad and, instead, holding the LRTA and Roman jointly and
severally liable thusly:
WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment is hereby MODIFIED, by exonerating the
appellants from any liability for the death of Nicanor Navidad, Jr. Instead, appellees
Rodolfo Roman and the Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA) are held liable for his
death and are hereby directed to pay jointly and severally to the plaintiffs-appellees,
the following amounts:
a) P44,830.00 as actual damages;
b) P50,000.00 as nominal damages;
c) P50,000.00 as moral damages;
d) P50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of the deceased; and
e) P20,000.00 as and for attorneys fees.[2]
The appellate court ratiocinated that while the deceased might not have then as
yet boarded the train, a contract of carriage theretofore had already existed when the
victim entered the place where passengers were supposed to be after paying the fare
and getting the corresponding token therefor. In exempting Prudent from liability, the
court stressed that there was nothing to link the security agency to the death of
Navidad. It said that Navidad failed to show that Escartin inflicted fist blows upon the
victim and the evidence merely established the fact of death of Navidad by reason of
his having been hit by the train owned and managed by the LRTA and operated at the
time by Roman. The appellate court faulted petitioners for their failure to present
1
expert evidence to establish the fact that the application of emergency brakes could
not have stopped the train.
The appellate court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration in its resolution
of 10 October 2000.
In their present recourse, petitioners recite alleged errors on the part of the
appellate court; viz:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED BY DISREGARDING
THE FINDINGS OF FACTS BY THE TRIAL COURT
II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT
PETITIONERS ARE LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF NICANOR NAVIDAD, JR.
III.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT
RODOLFO ROMAN IS AN EMPLOYEE OF LRTA.[3]
Petitioners would contend that the appellate court ignored the evidence and the
factual findings of the trial court by holding them liable on the basis of a sweeping
conclusion that the presumption of negligence on the part of a common carrier was not
overcome. Petitioners would insist that Escartins assault upon Navidad, which caused
the latter to fall on the tracks, was an act of a stranger that could not have been
foreseen or prevented. The LRTA would add that the appellate courts conclusion on
the existence of an employer-employee relationship between Roman and LRTA
lacked basis because Roman himself had testified being an employee of Metro Transit
and not of the LRTA.
Respondents, supporting the decision of the appellate court, contended that a
contract of carriage was deemed created from the moment Navidad paid the fare at
the LRT station and entered the premises of the latter, entitling Navidad to all the
rights and protection under a contractual relation, and that the appellate court had
correctly held LRTA and Roman liable for the death of Navidad in failing to exercise
extraordinary diligence imposed upon a common carrier.
Law and jurisprudence dictate that a common carrier, both from the nature of its
business and for reasons of public policy, is burdened with the duty of exercising
utmost diligence in ensuring the safety of passengers.[4] The Civil Code, governing the
liability of a common carrier for death of or injury to its passengers, provides:
Article 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as
human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious
persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances.
Article 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are
presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that
they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in articles 1733 and 1755.
Article 1759. Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers
through the negligence or willful acts of the formers employees, although such
employees may have acted beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the
orders of the common carriers.
This liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that they exercised all
the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their
employees.
Article 1763. A common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on
account of the willful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers, if the
common carriers employees through the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a
family could have prevented or stopped the act or omission.
The law requires common carriers to carry passengers safely using the utmost
diligence of very cautious persons with due regard for all circumstances. [5] Such duty
of a common carrier to provide safety to its passengers so obligates it not only during
the course of the trip but for so long as the passengers are within its premises and
where they ought to be in pursuance to the contract of carriage.[6] The statutory
provisions render a common carrier liable for death of or injury to passengers
(a) through the negligence or wilful acts of its employees or b) on account of
wilful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers if the common
carriers employees through the exercise of due diligence could have prevented
or stopped the act or omission.[7] In case of such death or injury, a carrier is
presumed to have been at fault or been negligent, and[8] by simple proof of injury, the
passenger is relieved of the duty to still establish the fault or negligence of the carrier
or of its employees and the burden shifts upon the carrier to prove that the injury is
due to an unforeseen event or to force majeure.[9] In the absence of satisfactory
explanation by the carrier on how the accident occurred, which petitioners, according
to the appellate court, have failed to show, the presumption would be that it has been
at fault,[10] an exception from the general rule that negligence must be proved.[11]
2
 The foundation of LRTAs liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation to between the latter and Roman; thus, Roman can be made liable only for his own fault
indemnify the victim arises from the breach of that contract by reason of its failure to or negligence.
exercise the high diligence required of the common carrier. In the discharge of its
The award of nominal damages in addition to actual damages is
commitment to ensure the safety of passengers, a carrier may choose to hire its own
untenable. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which
employees or avail itself of the services of an outsider or an independent firm to
has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and
undertake the task. In either case, the common carrier is not relieved of its
not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him. [18] It is an
responsibilities under the contract of carriage.
established rule that nominal damages cannot co-exist with compensatory
Should Prudent be made likewise liable? If at all, that liability could only be for damages.[19]
tort under the provisions of Article 2176[12] and related provisions, in conjunction with
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the appellate court is AFFIRMED with
Article 2180,[13] of the Civil Code. The premise, however, for the employers liability is
MODIFICATION but only in that (a) the award of nominal damages is DELETED and
negligence or fault on the part of the employee. Once such fault is established, the
(b) petitioner Rodolfo Roman is absolved from liability. No costs.
employer can then be made liable on the basis of the presumption juris tantum that the
employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the selection and SO ORDERED.
supervision of its employees. The liability is primary and can only be negated by
showing due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee, a factual [12]Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault
matter that has not been shown. Absent such a showing, one might ask further, how
or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there
then must the liability of the common carrier, on the one hand, and an independent
is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and
contractor, on the other hand, be described? It would be solidary. A contractual
is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
obligation can be breached by tort and when the same act or omission causes the
injury, one resulting in culpa contractual and the other in culpa aquiliana, Article Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for ones
[13]

2194[14] of the Civil Code can well apply.[15]In fine, a liability for tort may arise even own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
under a contract, where tort is that which breaches the contract.[16] Stated differently,
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the
when an act which constitutes a breach of contract would have itself constituted the
damages caused by the minor children who live in their company.
source of a quasi-delictual liability had no contract existed between the parties, the
contract can be said to have been breached by tort, thereby allowing the rules on tort Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated persons who
to apply.[17] are under their authority and live in their company.
Regrettably for LRT, as well as perhaps the surviving spouse and heirs of the The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible
late Nicanor Navidad, this Court is concluded by the factual finding of the Court of for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the
Appeals that there is nothing to link (Prudent) to the death of Nicanor (Navidad), for latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions.
the reason that the negligence of its employee, Escartin, has not been duly proven x x
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household
x. This finding of the appellate court is not without substantial justification in our own
helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not
review of the records of the case.
engaged in any business or industry.
There being, similarly, no showing that petitioner Rodolfo Roman himself is guilty
of any culpable act or omission, he must also be absolved from liability. Needless to
say, the contractual tie between the LRT and Navidad is not itself a juridical relation
3
The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent, but not
when the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly
pertains, in which case what is provided in article 2176 shall be applicable.
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for
damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain
in their custody.
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein
mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage.
_____________________-
PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION vs. IAC G.R. No. L-65295
March 10, 1987
In the early morning of 15 November 1975 — at about 1:30 a.m. — private respondent
Leonardo Dionisio was on his way home — he lived in 1214-B Zamora Street,
Bangkal, Makati — from a cocktails-and-dinner meeting with his boss, the general
manager of a marketing corporation. During the cocktails phase of the evening,
Dionisio had taken "a shot or two" of liquor. Dionisio was driving his Volkswagen car
and had just crossed the intersection of General Lacuna and General Santos Streets
at Bangkal, Makati, not far from his home, and was proceeding down General Lacuna
Street, when his car headlights (in his allegation) suddenly failed. He switched his
headlights on "bright" and thereupon he saw a Ford dump truck looming some 2-1/2
meters away from his car. The dump truck, owned by and registered in the name of
petitioner Phoenix Construction Inc. ("Phoenix"), was parked on the right hand side of
General Lacuna Street (i.e., on the right hand side of a person facing in the same
direction toward which Dionisio's car was proceeding), facing the oncoming traffic. The
dump truck was parked askew (not parallel to the street curb) in such a manner as to
stick out onto the street, partly blocking the way of oncoming traffic. There were no
lights nor any so-called "early warning" reflector devices set anywhere near the dump
truck, front or rear. The dump truck had earlier that evening been driven home by
petitioner Armando U. Carbonel, its regular driver, with the permission of his employer
Phoenix, in view of work scheduled to be carried out early the following morning,
Dionisio claimed that he tried to avoid a collision by swerving his car to the left but it
was too late and his car smashed into the dump truck. As a result of the collision,
Dionisio suffered some physical injuries including some permanent facial scars, a
"nervous breakdown" and loss of two gold bridge dentures.
Dionisio commenced an action for damages in the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga basically claiming that the legal and proximate cause of his injuries was the
negligent manner in which Carbonel had parked the dump truck entrusted to him by
his employer Phoenix. Phoenix and Carbonel, on the other hand, countered that the
proximate cause of Dionisio's injuries was his own recklessness in driving fast at the
time of the accident, while under the influence of liquor, without his headlights on and
without a curfew pass. Phoenix also sought to establish that it had exercised due rare
in the selection and supervision of the dump truck driver.
The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Dionisio and against Phoenix and
Carbonel and ordered the latter:
(1) To pay plaintiff jointly and severally the sum of P 15,000.00 for hospital bills and
the replacement of the lost dentures of plaintiff;
(2) To pay plaintiff jointly and severally the sum of P 1,50,000.-00 as loss of expected
income for plaintiff brought about the accident in controversy and which is the result of
the negligence of the defendants;
(3) To pay the plaintiff jointly and severally the sum of P 10,000. as moral damages for
the unexpected and sudden withdrawal of plaintiff from his lifetime career as a
marketing man; mental anguish, wounded feeling, serious anxiety, social humiliation,
besmirched reputation, feeling of economic insecurity, and the untold sorrows and
frustration in life experienced by plaintiff and his family since the accident in
controversy up to the present time;
(4) To pay plaintiff jointly and severally the sum of P 10,000.00 as damages for the
wanton disregard of defendants to settle amicably this case with the plaintiff before the
filing of this case in court for a smaller amount.
(5) To pay the plaintiff jointly and severally the sum of P 4,500.00 due as and for
attorney's fees; and
(6) The cost of suit. (Emphasis supplied)
Phoenix and Carbonel appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court. That court in CA-
G.R. No. 65476 affirmed the decision of the trial court but modified the award of
damages to the following extent:
4
 b) The award of P15,000.00 as compensatory damages was reduced
to P6,460.71, the latter being the only amount that the appellate court found
the plaintiff to have proved as actually sustained by him;
c) The award of P150,000.00 as loss of expected income was reduced
to P100,000.00, basically because Dionisio had voluntarily resigned his job
such that, in the opinion of the appellate court, his loss of income "was not
solely attributable to the accident in question;" and
d) The award of P100,000.00 as moral damages was held by the appellate
court as excessive and unconscionable and hence reduced to P50,000.00.
a) The award of P10,000.00 as exemplary damages and P4,500.00 as attorney's
fees and costs remained untouched.
This decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court is now before us on a petition for
review.
Both the trial court and the appellate court had made fairly explicit findings of fact
relating to the manner in which the dump truck was parked along General Lacuna
Street on the basis of which both courts drew the inference that there was negligence
on the part of Carbonel, the dump truck driver, and that this negligence was the
proximate cause of the accident and Dionisio's injuries. We note, however, that both
courts failed to pass upon the defense raised by Carbonel and Phoenix that the true
legal and proximate cause of the accident was not the way in which the dump truck
had been parked but rather the reckless way in which Dionisio had driven his car that
night when he smashed into the dump truck. The Intermediate Appellate Court in its
questioned decision casually conceded that Dionisio was "in some way, negligent" but
apparently failed to see the relevance of Dionisio's negligence and made no further
mention of it. We have examined the record both before the trial court and the
Intermediate Appellate Court and we find that both parties had placed into the record
sufficient evidence on the basis of which the trial court and the appellate court could
have and should have made findings of fact relating to the alleged reckless manner in
which Dionisio drove his car that night. The petitioners Phoenix and Carbonel contend
that if there was negligence in the manner in which the dump truck was parked, that
negligence was merely a "passive and static condition" and that private respondent
Dionisio's recklessness constituted an intervening, efficient cause determinative of the
accident and the injuries he sustained. The need to administer substantial justice as
between the parties in this case, without having to remand it back to the trial court
after eleven years, compels us to address directly the contention put forward by the
petitioners and to examine for ourselves the record pertaining to Dionisio's alleged
negligence which must bear upon the liability, or extent of liability, of Phoenix and
Carbonel.
There are four factual issues that need to be looked into: (a) whether or not private
respondent Dionisio had a curfew pass valid and effective for that eventful night; (b)
whether Dionisio was driving fast or speeding just before the collision with the dump
truck; (c) whether Dionisio had purposely turned off his car's headlights before contact
with the dump truck or whether those headlights accidentally malfunctioned moments
before the collision; and (d) whether Dionisio was intoxicated at the time of the
accident.
As to the first issue relating to the curfew pass, it is clear that no curfew pass was
found on the person of Dionisio immediately after the accident nor was any found in
his car. Phoenix's evidence here consisted of the testimony of Patrolman Cuyno who
had taken Dionisio, unconscious, to the Makati Medical Center for emergency
treatment immediately after the accident. At the Makati Medical Center, a nurse took
off Dionisio's clothes and examined them along with the contents of pockets together
with Patrolman Cuyno. 1 Private respondent Dionisio was not able to produce any
curfew pass during the trial. Instead, he offered the explanation that his family may
have misplaced his curfew pass. He also offered a certification (dated two years after
the accident) issued by one Major Benjamin N. Libarnes of the Zone Integrated Police
Intelligence Unit of Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga, which was said to have
authority to issue curfew passes for Pampanga and Metro Manila. This certification
was to the effect that private respondent Dionisio had a valid curfew pass. This
certification did not, however, specify any pass serial number or date or period of
effectivity of the supposed curfew pass. We find that private respondent Dionisio was
unable to prove possession of a valid curfew pass during the night of the accident and
that the preponderance of evidence shows that he did not have such a pass during
that night. The relevance of possession or non-possession of a curfew pass that night
lies in the light it tends to shed on the other related issues: whether Dionisio was
speeding home and whether he had indeed purposely put out his headlights before
the accident, in order to avoid detection and possibly arrest by the police in the nearby
police station for travelling after the onset of curfew without a valid curfew pass.
5
On the second issue — whether or not Dionisio was speeding home that night — both
the trial court and the appellate court were completely silent.
The defendants in the trial court introduced the testimony of Patrolman Cuyno who
was at the scene of the accident almost immediately after it occurred, the police
station where he was based being barely 200 meters away. Patrolman Cuyno testified
that people who had gathered at the scene of the accident told him that Dionisio's car
was "moving fast" and did not have its headlights on. 2 Dionisio, on the other hand,
claimed that he was travelling at a moderate speed at 30 kilometers per hour and had
just crossed the intersection of General Santos and General Lacuna Streets and had
started to accelerate when his headlights failed just before the collision took place. 3
Private respondent Dionisio asserts that Patrolman Cuyno's testimony was hearsay
and did not fag within any of the recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule since the
facts he testified to were not acquired by him through official information and had not
been given by the informants pursuant to any duty to do so. Private respondent's
objection fails to take account of the fact that the testimony of Patrolman Cuyno is
admissible not under the official records exception to the hearsay rule 4 but rather as
part of the res gestae. 5 Testimonial evidence under this exception to the hearsay rule
consists of excited utterances made on the occasion of an occurrence or event
sufficiently startling in nature so as to render inoperative the normal reflective thought
processes of the observer and hence made as a spontaneous reaction to the
occurrence or event, and not the result of reflective thought. 6
We think that an automobile speeding down a street and suddenly smashing into a
stationary object in the dead of night is a sufficiently startling event as to evoke
spontaneous, rather than reflective, reactions from observers who happened to be
around at that time. The testimony of Patrolman Cuyno was therefore admissible as
part of the res gestae and should have been considered by the trial court. Clearly,
substantial weight should have been ascribed to such testimony, even though it did
not, as it could not, have purported to describe quantitatively the precise velocity at
winch Dionisio was travelling just before impact with the Phoenix dump truck.
A third related issue is whether Dionisio purposely turned off his headlights, or whether
his headlights accidentally malfunctioned, just moments before the accident. The
Intermediate Appellate Court expressly found that the headlights of Dionisio's car went
off as he crossed the intersection but was non-committal as to why they did so. It is
the petitioners' contention that Dionisio purposely shut off his headlights even before
he reached the intersection so as not to be detected by the police in the police precinct
which he (being a resident in the area) knew was not far away from the intersection.
We believe that the petitioners' theory is a more credible explanation than that offered
by private respondent Dionisio — i.e., that he had his headlights on but that, at the
crucial moment, these had in some mysterious if convenient way malfunctioned and
gone off, although he succeeded in switching his lights on again at "bright" split
seconds before contact with the dump truck.
A fourth and final issue relates to whether Dionisio was intoxicated at the time of the
accident. The evidence here consisted of the testimony of Patrolman Cuyno to the
effect that private respondent Dionisio smelled of liquor at the time he was taken from
his smashed car and brought to the Makati Medical Center in an unconscious
condition. 7 This testimony has to be taken in conjunction with the admission of
Dionisio that he had taken "a shot or two" of liquor before dinner with his boss that
night. We do not believe that this evidence is sufficient to show that Dionisio was so
heavily under the influence of liquor as to constitute his driving a motor vehicle per se
an act of reckless imprudence. 8 There simply is not enough evidence to show how
much liquor he had in fact taken and the effects of that upon his physical faculties or
upon his judgment or mental alertness. We are also aware that "one shot or two" of
hard liquor may affect different people differently.
The conclusion we draw from the factual circumstances outlined above is that private
respondent Dionisio was negligent the night of the accident. He was hurrying home
that night and driving faster than he should have been. Worse, he extinguished his
headlights at or near the intersection of General Lacuna and General Santos Streets
and thus did not see the dump truck that was parked askew and sticking out onto the
road lane.
Nonetheless, we agree with the Court of First Instance and the Intermediate Appellate
Court that the legal and proximate cause of the accident and of Dionisio's injuries was
the wrongful — or negligent manner in which the dump truck was parked in other
words, the negligence of petitioner Carbonel. That there was a reasonable relationship
between petitioner Carbonel's negligence on the one hand and the accident and
respondent's injuries on the other hand, is quite clear. Put in a slightly different
6
manner, the collision of Dionisio's car with the dump truck was a natural and
foreseeable consequence of the truck driver's negligence.
The petitioners, however, urge that the truck driver's negligence was merely a
"passive and static condition" and that private respondent Dionisio's negligence was
an "efficient intervening cause and that consequently Dionisio's negligence must be
regarded as the legal and proximate cause of the accident rather than the earlier
negligence of Carbonel. We note that the petitioners' arguments are drawn from a
reading of some of the older cases in various jurisdictions in the United States but we
are unable to persuade ourselves that these arguments have any validity for our
jurisdiction. We note, firstly, that even in the United States, the distinctions between
"cause" and "condition" which the 'petitioners would have us adopt have already been
"almost entirely discredited." Professors and Keeton make this quite clear:
Cause and condition. Many courts have sought to distinguish between the active
"cause" of the harm and the existing "conditions" upon which that cause operated. If
the defendant has created only a passive static condition which made the damage
possible, the defendant is said not to be liable. But so far as the fact of causation is
concerned, in the sense of necessary antecedents which have played an important
part in producing the result it is quite impossible to distinguish between active forces
and passive situations, particularly since, as is invariably the case, the latter are the
result of other active forces which have gone before. The defendant who spills
gasoline about the premises creates a "condition," but the act may be culpable
because of the danger of fire. When a spark ignites the gasoline, the condition has
done quite as much to bring about the fire as the spark; and since that is the very risk
which the defendant has created, the defendant will not escape responsibility. Even
the lapse of a considerable time during which the "condition" remains static will not
necessarily affect liability; one who digs a trench in the highway may still be liable to
another who fans into it a month afterward. "Cause" and "condition" still find
occasional mention in the decisions; but the distinction is now almost entirely
discredited. So far as it has any validity at all, it must refer to the type of case where
the forces set in operation by the defendant have come to rest in a position of
apparent safety, and some new force intervenes. But even in such cases, it is not the
distinction between "cause" and "condition" which is important but the nature of the
risk and the character of the intervening cause. 9
We believe, secondly, that the truck driver's negligence far from being a "passive and
static condition" was rather an indispensable and efficient cause. The collision
between the dump truck and the private respondent's car would in an probability not
have occurred had the dump truck not been parked askew without any warning lights
or reflector devices. The improper parking of the dump truck created an unreasonable
risk of injury for anyone driving down General Lacuna Street and for having so created
this risk, the truck driver must be held responsible. In our view, Dionisio's negligence,
although later in point of time than the truck driver's negligence and therefore closer to
the accident, was not an efficient intervening or independent cause. What the
Petitioners describe as an "intervening cause" was no more than a foreseeable
consequent manner which the truck driver had parked the dump truck. In other words,
the petitioner truck driver owed a duty to private respondent Dionisio and others
similarly situated not to impose upon them the very risk the truck driver had created.
Dionisio's negligence was not of an independent and overpowering nature as to cut,
as it were, the chain of causation in fact between the improper parking of the dump
truck and the accident, nor to sever the juris vinculum of liability. It is helpful to quote
once more from Professor and Keeton:
Foreseeable Intervening Causes. If the intervening cause is one which in ordinary
human experience is reasonably to be anticipated or one which the defendant has
reason to anticipate under the particular circumstances, the defendant may be
negligence among other reasons, because of failure to guard against it; or the
defendant may be negligent only for that reason. Thus one who sets a fire may be
required to foresee that an ordinary, usual and customary wind arising later wig spread
it beyond the defendant's own property, and therefore to take precautions to prevent
that event. The person who leaves the combustible or explosive material exposed in a
public place may foresee the risk of fire from some independent source. ... In all of
these cases there is an intervening cause combining with the defendant's conduct to
produce the result and in each case the defendant's negligence consists in failure to
protect the plaintiff against that very risk.
Obviously the defendant cannot be relieved from liability by the fact that the risk or a
substantial and important part of the risk, to which the defendant has subjected the
plaintiff has indeed come to pass. Foreseeable intervening forces are within the scope
original risk, and hence of the defendant's negligence. The courts are quite generally
7
agreed that intervening causes which fall fairly in this category will not supersede the
defendant's responsibility.
Thus it has been held that a defendant will be required to anticipate the usual weather
of the vicinity, including all ordinary forces of nature such as usual wind or rain, or
snow or frost or fog or even lightning; that one who leaves an obstruction on the road
or a railroad track should foresee that a vehicle or a train will run into it; ...
The risk created by the defendant may include the intervention of the foreseeable
negligence of others. ... [The standard of reasonable conduct may require the
defendant to protect the plaintiff against 'that occasional negligence which is one of the
ordinary incidents of human life, and therefore to be anticipated.' Thus, a defendant
who blocks the sidewalk and forces the plaintiff to walk in a street where the plaintiff
will be exposed to the risks of heavy traffic becomes liable when the plaintiff is run
down by a car, even though the car is negligently driven; and one who parks an
automobile on the highway without lights at night is not relieved of responsibility when
another negligently drives into it. --- 10
We hold that private respondent Dionisio's negligence was "only contributory," that the
"immediate and proximate cause" of the injury remained the truck driver's "lack of due
care" and that consequently respondent Dionisio may recover damages though such
damages are subject to mitigation by the courts (Article 2179, Civil Code of the
Philippines).
Petitioners also ask us to apply what they refer to as the "last clear chance" doctrine.
The theory here of petitioners is that while the petitioner truck driver was negligent,
private respondent Dionisio had the "last clear chance" of avoiding the accident and
hence his injuries, and that Dionisio having failed to take that "last clear chance" must
bear his own injuries alone. The last clear chance doctrine of the common law was
imported into our jurisdiction by Picart vs. Smith 11 but it is a matter for debate
whether, or to what extent, it has found its way into the Civil Code of the Philippines.
The historical function of that doctrine in the common law was to mitigate the
harshness of another common law doctrine or rule that of contributory
negligence. 12 The common law rule of contributory negligence prevented any
recovery at all by a plaintiff who was also negligent, even if the plaintiff's negligence
was relatively minor as compared with the wrongful act or omission of the
defendant. 13 The common law notion of last clear chance permitted courts to grant
recovery to a plaintiff who had also been negligent provided that the defendant had the
last clear chance to avoid the casualty and failed to do so. 14 Accordingly, it is difficult
to see what role, if any, the common law last clear chance doctrine has to play in a
jurisdiction where the common law concept of contributory negligence as an absolute
bar to recovery by the plaintiff, has itself been rejected, as it has been in Article 2179
of the Civil Code of the Philippines. 15
Is there perhaps a general concept of "last clear chance" that may be extracted from
its common law matrix and utilized as a general rule in negligence cases in a civil law
jurisdiction like ours? We do not believe so. Under Article 2179, the task of a court, in
technical terms, is to determine whose negligence — the plaintiff's or the defendant's
— was the legal or proximate cause of the injury. That task is not simply or even
primarily an exercise in chronology or physics, as the petitioners seem to imply by the
use of terms like "last" or "intervening" or "immediate." The relative location in the
continuum of time of the plaintiff's and the defendant's negligent acts or omissions, is
only one of the relevant factors that may be taken into account. Of more fundamental
importance are the nature of the negligent act or omission of each party and the
character and gravity of the risks created by such act or omission for the rest of the
community. The petitioners urge that the truck driver (and therefore his employer)
should be absolved from responsibility for his own prior negligence because the
unfortunate plaintiff failed to act with that increased diligence which had become
necessary to avoid the peril precisely created by the truck driver's own wrongful act or
omission. To accept this proposition is to come too close to wiping out the
fundamental principle of law that a man must respond for the forseeable
consequences of his own negligent act or omission. Our law on quasi-delicts seeks to
reduce the risks and burdens of living in society and to allocate them among the
members of society. To accept the petitioners' pro-position must tend to weaken the
very bonds of society.
Petitioner Carbonel's proven negligence creates a presumption of negligence on the
part of his employer Phoenix 16 in supervising its employees properly and adequately.
The respondent appellate court in effect found, correctly in our opinion, that Phoenix
was not able to overcome this presumption of negligence. The circumstance that
Phoenix had allowed its truck driver to bring the dump truck to his home whenever
there was work to be done early the following morning, when coupled with the failure
8
to show any effort on the part of Phoenix to supervise the manner in which the dump
truck is parked when away from company premises, is an affirmative showing of culpa
in vigilando on the part of Phoenix.
Turning to the award of damages and taking into account the comparative negligence
of private respondent Dionisio on one hand and petitioners Carbonel and Phoenix
upon the other hand, 17 we believe that the demands of substantial justice are
satisfied by allocating most of the damages on a 20-80 ratio. Thus, 20% of the
damages awarded by the respondent appellate court, except the award of P10,000.00
as exemplary damages and P4,500.00 as attorney's fees and costs, shall be borne by
private respondent Dionisio; only the balance of 80% needs to be paid by petitioners
Carbonel and Phoenix who shall be solidarity liable therefor to the former. The award
of exemplary damages and attorney's fees and costs shall be borne exclusively by the
petitioners. Phoenix is of course entitled to reimbursement from Carbonel. 18 We see
no sufficient reason for disturbing the reduced award of damages made by the
respondent appellate court.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent appellate court is modified by reducing
the aggregate amount of compensatory damages, loss of expected income and moral
damages private respondent Dionisio is entitled to by 20% of such amount. Costs
against the petitioners. SO ORDERED.
VALENZUELA HARDWOOD vs. CA [G.R. No. 102316. June 30,
1997]
Is a stipulation in a charter party that the (o)wners shall not be responsible for loss,
split, short-landing, breakages and any kind of damages to the cargo[1] valid? This is
the main question raised in this petition for review assailing the Decision of
Respondent Court of Appeals[2] in CA-G.R. No. CV-20156 promulgated on October 15,
1991. The Court of Appeals modified the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch 171, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, Judgment is hereby rendered ordering South Sea Surety and
Insurance Co., Inc. to pay plaintiff the sum of TWO MILLION PESOS (P2,000,000.00)
representing the value of the policy of the lost logs with legal interest thereon from the
date of demand on February 2, 1984 until the amount is fully paid or in the alternative,
defendant Seven Brothers Shipping Corporation to pay plaintiff the amount of TWO
MILLION PESOS (P2,000,000.00) representing the value of lost logs plus legal
interest from the date of demand on April 24, 1984 until full payment thereof; the
reasonable attorneys fees in the amount equivalent to five (5) percent of the amount of
the claim and the costs of the suit.
Plaintiff is hereby ordered to pay defendant Seven Brothers Shipping Corporation the
sum of TWO HUNDRED THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P230,000.00) representing
the balance of the stipulated freight charges.
Defendant South Sea Surety and Insurance Companys counterclaim is hereby
dismissed.
In its assailed Decision, Respondent Court of Appeals held:
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is hereby AFFIRMED except in so far (sic) as
the liability of the Seven Brothers Shipping Corporation to the plaintiff is concerned
which is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.[3]
The Facts
The factual antecedents of this case as narrated in the Court of Appeals Decision
are as follows:
It appears that on 16 January 1984, plaintiff (Valenzuela Hardwood and Industrial
Supply, Inc.) entered into an agreement with the defendant Seven Brothers (Shipping
Corporation) whereby the latter undertook to load on board its vessel M/V Seven
Ambassador the formers lauan round logs numbering 940 at the port of Maconacon,
Isabela for shipment to Manila.
On 20 January 1984, plaintiff insured the logs against loss and/or damage with
defendant South Sea Surety and Insurance Co., Inc. for P2,000,000.00 and the latter
issued its Marine Cargo Insurance Policy No. 84/24229 for P2,000,000.00 on said
date.
On 24 January 1984, the plaintiff gave the check in payment of the premium on the
insurance policy to Mr. Victorio Chua.
In the meantime, the said vessel M/V Seven Ambassador sank on 25 January 1984
resulting in the loss of the plaintiffs insured logs.
On 30 January 1984, a check for P5,625.00 (Exh. E) to cover payment of the premium
and documentary stamps due on the policy was tendered due to the insurer but was
not accepted. Instead, the South Sea Surety and Insurance Co., Inc. cancelled the
insurance policy it issued as of the date of the inception for non-payment of the
premium due in accordance with Section 77 of the Insurance Code.
On 2 February 1984, plaintiff demanded from defendant South Sea Surety and
Insurance Co., Inc. the payment of the proceeds of the policy but the latter denied
9
 liability under the policy. Plaintiff likewise filed a formal claim with defendant Seven F. The trial court erred in disregarding the indorsement of cancellation of the policy due
Brothers Shipping Corporation for the value of the lost logs but the latter denied the
claim.
After due hearing and trial, the court a quo rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff and
against defendants. Both defendants shipping corporation and the surety company H. The trial court erred in not awarding to the defendant-appellant the attorneys fees
appealed.
Defendant-appellant Seven Brothers Shipping Corporation impute (sic) to the court a
quo the following assignment of errors, to wit:
A. The lower court erred in holding that the proximate cause of the sinking of the
vessel Seven Ambassadors, was not due to fortuitous event but to the negligence
of the captain in stowing and securing the logs on board, causing the iron chains
to snap and the logs to roll to the portside.
B. The lower court erred in declaring that the non-liability clause of the Seven
Brothers Shipping Corporation from logs (sic) of the cargo stipulated in the charter
party is void for being contrary to public policy invoking article 1745 of the New
Civil Code.
C. The lower court erred in holding defendant-appellant Seven Brothers Shipping
Corporation liable in the alternative and ordering/directing it to pay plaintiff-
appellee the amount of two million (P2,000,000.00) pesos representing the value
of the logs plus legal interest from date of demand until fully paid.
D. The lower court erred in ordering defendant-appellant Seven Brothers Shipping
Corporation to pay appellee reasonable attorneys fees in the amount equivalent
to 5% of the amount of the claim and the costs of the suit.
E. The lower court erred in not awarding defendant-appellant Seven Brothers
Corporation its counter-claim for attorneys fees.
F. The lower court erred in not dismissing the complaint against Seven Brothers
Shipping Corporation.
b) Defendant-appellant South Sea Surety and Insurance Co., Inc. assigns the following
errors:
A. The trial court erred in holding that Victorio Chua was an agent of defendant-appellant
South Sea Surety and Insurance Company, Inc. and likewise erred in not holding that
he was the representative of the insurance broker Columbia Insurance Brokers, Ltd.
B. The trial court erred in holding that Victorio Chua received compensation/commission
on the premiums paid on the policies issued by the defendant-appellant South Sea
Surety and Insurance Company, Inc.
C. The trial court erred in not applying Section 77 of the Insurance Code.
D. The trial court erred in disregarding the receipt of payment clause attached to and
forming part of the Marine Cargo Insurance Policy No. 84/24229.
E. The trial court in disregarding the statement of account or bill stating the amount of
premium and documentary stamps to be paid on the policy by the plaintiff-appellee.
to non-payment of premium and documentary stamps.
G. The trial court erred in ordering defendant-appellant South Sea Surety and Insurance
Company, Inc. to pay plaintiff-appellee P2,000,000.00 representing value of the policy
with legal interest from 2 February 1984 until the amount is fully paid,
alleged and proven in its counterclaim.
The primary issue to be resolved before us is whether defendants shipping corporation
and the surety company are liable to the plaintiff for the latters lost logs.[4]
The Court of Appeals affirmed in part the RTC judgment by sustaining the liability
of South Sea Surety and Insurance Company (South Sea), but modified it by holding
that Seven Brothers Shipping Corporation (Seven Brothers) was not liable for the lost
cargo.[5] In modifying the RTC judgment, the respondent appellate court ratiocinated
thus:
It appears that there is a stipulation in the charter party that the ship owner would be
exempted from liability in case of loss.
The court a quo erred in applying the provisions of the Civil Code on common carriers
to establish the liability of the shipping corporation. The provisions on common carriers
should not be applied where the carrier is not acting as such but as a private carrier.
Under American jurisprudence, a common carrier undertaking to carry a special cargo
or chartered to a special person only, becomes a private carrier.
As a private carrier, a stipulation exempting the owner from liability even for the
negligence of its agent is valid (Home Insurance Company, Inc. vs. American
Steamship Agencies, Inc., 23 SCRA 24).
The shipping corporation should not therefore be held liable for the loss of the logs.[6]
South Sea and herein Petitioner Valenzuela Hardwood and Industrial Supply,
Inc. (Valenzuela) filed separate petitions for review before this Court. In a Resolution
dated June 2, 1995, this Court denied the petition of South Sea.[7] There the Court
found no reason to reverse the factual findings of the trial court and the Court of
Appeals that Chua was indeed an authorized agent of South Sea when he received
Valenzuelas premium payment for the marine cargo insurance policy which was thus
binding on the insurer.[8]
The Court is now called upon to resolve the petition for review filed by
Valenzuela assailing the CA Decision which exempted Seven Brothers from any
liability for the lost cargo.
10

The Issue
Petitioner Valenzuelas arguments revolve around a single issue: whether or not
respondent Court (of Appeals) committed a reversible error in upholding the validity of
the stipulation in the charter party executed between the petitioner and the private
respondent exempting the latter from liability for the loss of petitioners logs arising
from the negligence of its (Seven Brothers) captain.[9]
The Courts Ruling
The petition is not meritorious.
Validity of Stipulation is Lis Mota
The charter party between the petitioner and private respondent stipulated that
the (o)wners shall not be responsible for loss, split, short-landing, breakages and any
kind of damages to the cargo.[10] The validity of this stipulation is the lis mota of this
case.
It should be noted at the outset that there is no dispute between the parties that
the proximate cause of the sinking of M/V Seven Ambassadors resulting in the loss of
its cargo was the snapping of the iron chains and the subsequent rolling of the logs to
the portside due to the negligence of the captain in stowing and securing the logs on
board the vessel and not due to fortuitous event.[11] Likewise undisputed is the status
of Private Respondent Seven Brothers as a private carrier when it contracted to
transport the cargo of Petitioner Valenzuela. Even the latter admits this in its
petition.[12]
The trial court deemed the charter party stipulation void for being contrary to
public policy,[13] citing Article 1745 of the Civil Code which provides:
Art. 1745. Any of the following or similar stipulations shall be considered
unreasonable, unjust and contrary to public policy:
(1) That the goods are transported at the risk of the owner or shipper;
(2) That the common carrier will not be liable for any loss, destruction, or deterioration
of the goods;
(3) That the common carrier need not observe any diligence in the custody of the
goods;
(4) That the common carrier shall exercise a degree of diligence less than that of a
good father of a family, or of a man of ordinary prudence in the vigilance over the
movables transported;
(5) That the common carrier shall not be responsible for the acts or omissions of his or
its employees;
(6) That the common carriers liability for acts committed by thieves, or of robbers who
do not act with grave or irresistible threat, violence or force, is dispensed with or
diminished;
(7) That the common carrier is not responsible for the loss, destruction, or
deterioration of goods on account of the defective condition of the car, vehicle, ship,
airplane or other equipment used in the contract of carriage.
Petitioner Valenzuela adds that the stipulation is void for being contrary to
Articles 586 and 587 of the Code of Commerce[14] and Articles 1170 and 1173 of the
Civil Code. Citing Article 1306 and paragraph 1, Article 1409 of the Civil
Code,[15] petitioner further contends that said stipulation gives no duty or obligation to
the private respondent to observe the diligence of a good father of a family in the
custody and transportation of the cargo."
The Court is not persuaded. As adverted to earlier, it is undisputed that private
respondent had acted as a private carrier in transporting petitioners lauan logs. Thus,
Article 1745 and other Civil Code provisions on common carriers which were cited by
petitioner may not be applied unless expressly stipulated by the parties in their charter
party.[16]
In a contract of private carriage, the parties may validly stipulate that
responsibility for the cargo rests solely on the charterer, exempting the shipowner from
liability for loss of or damage to the cargo caused even by the negligence of the ship
captain. Pursuant to Article 1306[17] of the Civil Code, such stipulation is valid because
it is freely entered into by the parties and the same is not contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order, or public policy. Indeed, their contract of private carriage is not
even a contract of adhesion. We stress that in a contract of private carriage, the
parties may freely stipulate their duties and obligations which perforce would be
binding on them. Unlike in a contract involving a common carrier, private carriage does
not involve the general public. Hence, the stringent provisions of the Civil Code on
common carriers protecting the general public cannot justifiably be applied to a ship
transporting commercial goods as a private carrier. Consequently, the public policy
embodied therein is not contravened by stipulations in a charter party that lessen or
remove the protection given by law in contracts involving common carriers.
11
 The issue posed in this case and the arguments raised by petitioner are not
novel; they were resolved long ago by this Court in Home Insurance Co. vs. American
Steamship Agencies, Inc.[18] In that case, the trial court similarly nullified a stipulation
identical to that involved in the present case for being contrary to public policy based
on Article 1744 of the Civil Code and Article 587 of the Code of
Commerce. Consequently, the trial court held the shipowner liable for damages
resulting from the partial loss of the cargo. This Court reversed the trial court and laid
down, through Mr. Justice Jose P. Bengzon, the following well-settled observation and
doctrine:
The provisions of our Civil Code on common carriers were taken from Anglo-American
law. Under American jurisprudence, a common carrier undertaking to carry a special
cargo or chartered to a special person only, becomes a private carrier. As a private
carrier, a stipulation exempting the owner from liability for the negligence of its agent is
not against public policy, and is deemed valid.
Such doctrine We find reasonable. The Civil Code provisions on common carriers
should not be applied where the carrier is not acting as such but as a private
carrier. The stipulation in the charter party absolving the owner from liability for loss
due to the negligence of its agent would be void only if the strict public policy
governing common carriers is applied. Such policy has no force where the public at
large is not involved, as in this case of a ship totally chartered for the use of a single
party.[19] (Underscoring supplied.)
Indeed, where the reason for the rule ceases, the rule itself does not apply. The
general public enters into a contract of transportation with common carriers without a
hand or a voice in the preparation thereof. The riding public merely adheres to the
contract; even if the public wants to, it cannot submit its own stipulations for the
approval of the common carrier. Thus, the law on common carriers extends its
protective mantle against one-sided stipulations inserted in tickets, invoices or other
documents over which the riding public has no understanding or, worse, no
choice. Compared to the general public, a charterer in a contract of private carriage is
not similarly situated. It can -- and in fact it usually does -- enter into a free and
voluntary agreement. In practice, the parties in a contract of private carriage can
stipulate the carriers obligations and liabilities over the shipment which, in turn,
determine the price or consideration of the charter. Thus, a charterer, in exchange for
convenience and economy, may opt to set aside the protection of the law on common
carriers. When the charterer decides to exercise this option, he takes a normal
business risk.
Petitioner contends that the rule in Home Insurance is not applicable to the
present case because it covers only a stipulation exempting a private carrier from
liability for the negligence of his agent, but it does not apply to a stipulation exempting
a private carrier like private respondent from the negligence of his employee or
servant which is the situation in this case.[20] This contention of petitioner is bereft of
merit, for it raises a distinction without any substantive difference. The case of Home
Insurance specifically dealt with the liability of the shipowner for acts or negligence of
its captain and crew[21] and a charter party stipulation which exempts the owner of the
vessel from any loss or damage or delay arising from any other source, even from the
neglect or fault of the captain or crew or some other person employed by the owner on
board, for whose acts the owner would ordinarily be liable except for said
paragraph.[22] Undoubtedly, Home Insurance is applicable to the case at bar.
The naked assertion of petitioner that the American rule enunciated in Home
Insurance is not the rule in the Philippines[23] deserves scant consideration. The Court
there categorically held that said rule was reasonable and proceeded to apply it in the
resolution of that case.Petitioner miserably failed to show such circumstances or
arguments which would necessitate a departure from a well-settled
rule. Consequently, our ruling in said case remains a binding judicial precedent based
on the doctrine of stare decisis and Article 8 of the Civil Code which provides that
(j)udicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form part
of the legal system of the Philippines.
In fine, the respondent appellate court aptly stated that [in the case of] a private
carrier, a stipulation exempting the owner from liability even for the negligence of its
agent is valid.[24]
Other Arguments
On the basis of the foregoing alone, the present petition may already be
denied; the Court, however, will discuss the other arguments of petitioner for the
benefit and satisfaction of all concerned.
Articles 586 and 587, Code of Commerce
Petitioner Valenzuela insists that the charter party stipulation is contrary to
Articles 586 and 587 of the Code of Commerce which confer on petitioner the right to
recover damages from the shipowner and ship agent for the acts or conduct of the
captain.[25] We are not persuaded.Whatever rights petitioner may have under the
aforementioned statutory provisions were waived when it entered into the charter
party.
12
 Article 6 of the Civil Code provides that (r)ights may be waived, unless the waiver
is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to
a person with a right recognized by law. As a general rule patrimonial rights may be
waived as opposed to rights to personality and family rights which may not be made
the subject of waiver.[26] Being patently and undoubtedly patrimonial, petitioners right
conferred under said articles may be waived. This, the petitioner did by acceding to
the contractual stipulation that it is solely responsible for any damage to the cargo,
thereby exempting the private carrier from any responsibility for loss or damage
thereto. Furthermore, as discussed above, the contract of private carriage binds
petitioner and private respondent alone; it is not imbued with public policy
considerations for the general public or third persons are not affected thereby.
Articles 1170 and 1173, Civil Code
Petitioner likewise argues that the stipulation subject of this controversy is void
for being contrary to Articles 1170 and 1173 of the Civil Code[27] which read:
Art. 1170. Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud,
negligence, or delay, and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are
liable for damages
Art. 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that
diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the
circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place. When negligence shows
bad faith, the provisions of articles 1171 and 2201, shall apply.
If the law does not state the diligence which is to be observed in the performance, that
which is expected of a good father of a family shall be required.
The Court notes that the foregoing articles are applicable only to the obligor or
the one with an obligation to perform. In the instant case, Private Respondent Seven
Brothers is not an obligor in respect of the cargo, for this obligation to bear the loss
was shifted to petitioner by virtue of the charter party. This shifting of responsibility, as
earlier observed, is not void. The provisions cited by petitioner are, therefore,
inapplicable to the present case.
Moreover, the factual milieu of this case does not justify the application of the
second paragraph of Article 1173 of the Civil Code which prescribes the standard of
diligence to be observed in the event the law or the contract is silent. In the instant
case, Article 362 of the Code of Commerce[28] provides the standard of ordinary
diligence for the carriage of goods by a carrier. The standard of diligence under this
statutory provision may, however, be modified in a contract of private carriage as the
petitioner and private respondent had done in their charter party.
Cases Cited by Petitioner Inapplicable
Petitioner cites Shewaram vs. Philippine Airlines, Inc.[29] which, in turn,
quoted Juan Ysmael & Co. vs. Gabino Barreto & Co.[30] and argues that the public
policy considerations stated there vis--vis contractual stipulations limiting the carriers
liability be applied with equal force to this case.[31] It also cites Manila Railroad Co. vs.
Compaia Transatlantica[32] and contends that stipulations exempting a party from
liability for damages due to negligence should not be countenanced and should be
strictly construed against the party claiming its benefit.[33] We disagree.
The cases of Shewaram and Ysmael both involve a common carrier; thus, they
necessarily justify the application of such policy considerations and concomitantly
stricter rules. As already discussed above, the public policy considerations behind the
rigorous treatment of common carriers are absent in the case of private
carriers. Hence, the stringent laws applicable to common carriers are not applied to
private carriers. The case of Manila Railroad is also inapplicable because the action
for damages there does not involve a contract for transportation.Furthermore, the
defendant therein made a promise to use due care in the lifting operations
and, consequently, it was bound by its undertaking; besides, the exemption was
intended to cover accidents due to hidden defects in the apparatus or other
unforseeable occurrences not caused by its personal negligence. This promise was
thus construed to make sense together with the stipulation against liability for
damages.[34] In the present case, we stress that the private respondent made no such
promise. The agreement of the parties to exempt the shipowner from responsibility for
any damage to the cargo and place responsibility over the same to petitioner is the
lone stipulation considered now by this Court.
Finally, petitioner points to Standard Oil Co. of New York vs. Lopez
Costelo,[35] Walter A. Smith & Co. vs. Cadwallader Gibson Lumber Co.,[36] N. T.
Hashim and Co. vs. Rocha and Co.,[37] Ohta Development Co. vs.
SteamshipPompey[38] and Limpangco Sons vs. Yangco Steamship Co.[39] in support of
its contention that the shipowner be held liable for damages.[40] These however are not
on all fours with the present case because they do not involve a similar factual milieu
or an identical stipulation in the charter party expressly exempting the shipowner from
responsibility for any damage to the cargo.
Effect of the South Sea Resolution
13
 In its memorandum, Seven Brothers argues that petitioner has no cause of
action against it because this Court has earlier affirmed the liability of South Sea for
the loss suffered by petitioner. Private respondent submits that petitioner is not legally
entitled to collect twice for a single loss.[41] In view of the above disquisition upholding
the validity of the questioned charter party stipulation and holding that petitioner may
not recover from private respondent, the present issue is moot and academic. It
suffices to state that the Resolution of this Court dated June 2, 1995[42] affirming the
liability of South Sea does not, by itself, necessarily preclude the petitioner from
proceeding against private respondent. An aggrieved party may still recover the
deficiency from the person causing the loss in the event the amount paid by the
insurance company does not fully cover the loss. Article 2207 of the Civil Code
provides:
ART. 2207. If the plaintiffs property has been insured, and he has received indemnity
from the insurance company for the injury or loss arising out of the wrong or breach of
contract complained of, the insurance company shall be subrogated to the rights of the
insured against the wrongdoer or the person who has violated the contract. If the
amount paid by the insurance company does not fully cover the injury or loss, the
aggrieved party shall be entitled to recover the deficiency from the person causing the
loss or injury.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED for its utter
failure to show any reversible error on the part of Respondent Court. The assailed
Decision is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
JUAN J. SYQUIA, vs. CA G.R. No. 98695 January 27, 1993
Herein petitioners, Juan J. Syquia and Corazon C. Syquia, Carlota C. Syquia, Carlos
C. Syquia, and Anthony Syquia, were the parents and siblings, respectively, of the
deceased Vicente Juan Syquia. On March 5, 1979, they filed a complaint1 in the then
Court of First Instance against herein private respondent, Manila Memorial Park
Cemetery, Inc. for recovery of damages arising from breach of contract and/or quasi-
delict. The trial court dismissed the complaint.
The antecedent facts, as gathered by the respondent Court, are as follows:
On March 5, 1979, Juan, Corazon, Carlota and Anthony all surnamed Syquia, plaintiff-
appellants herein, filed a complaint for damages against defendant-appellee, Manila
Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc.
The complaint alleged among others, that pursuant to a Deed of Sale (Contract No.
6885) dated August 27, 1969 and Interment Order No. 7106 dated July 21, 1978
executed between plaintiff-appellant Juan J. Syquia and defendant-appellee, the
former, father of deceased Vicente Juan J. Syquia authorized and instructed
defendant-appellee to inter the remains of deceased in the Manila Memorial Park
Cemetery in the morning of July 25, 1978 conformably and in accordance with
defendant-appellant's (sic) interment procedures; that on September 4, 1978,
preparatory to transferring the said remains to a newly purchased family plot also at
the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, the concrete vault encasing the coffin of the
deceased was removed from its niche underground with the assistance of certain
employees of defendant-appellant (sic); that as the concrete vault was being raised to
the surface, plaintiffs-appellants discovered that the concrete vault had a hole
approximately three (3) inches in diameter near the bottom of one of the walls closing
out the width of the vault on one end and that for a certain length of time (one hour,
more or less), water drained out of the hole; that because of the aforesaid discovery,
plaintiffs-appellants became agitated and upset with concern that the water which had
collected inside the vault might have risen as it in fact did rise, to the level of the coffin
and flooded the same as well as the remains of the deceased with ill effects thereto;
that pursuant to an authority granted by the Municipal Court of Parañaque, Metro
Manila on September 14, 1978, plaintiffs-appellants with the assistance of licensed
morticians and certain personnel of defendant-appellant (sic) caused the opening of
the concrete vault on September 15, 1978; that upon opening the vault, the following
became apparent to the plaintiffs-appellants: (a) the interior walls of the concrete vault
showed evidence of total flooding; (b) the coffin was entirely damaged by water, filth
and silt causing the wooden parts to warp and separate and to crack the viewing glass
panel located directly above the head and torso of the deceased; (c) the entire lining of
the coffin, the clothing of the deceased, and the exposed parts of the deceased's
remains were damaged and soiled by the action of the water and silt and were also
coated with filth.
Due to the alleged unlawful and malicious breach by the defendant-appellee of its
obligation to deliver a defect-free concrete vault designed to protect the remains of the
14
deceased and the coffin against the elements which resulted in the desecration of
deceased's grave and in the alternative, because of defendant-appellee's gross
negligence conformably to Article 2176 of the New Civil Code in failing to seal the
concrete vault, the complaint prayed that judgment be rendered ordering defendant-
appellee to pay plaintiffs-appellants P30,000.00 for actual damages, P500,000.00 for
moral damages, exemplary damages in the amount determined by the court, 20% of
defendant-appellee's total liability as attorney's fees, and expenses of litigation and
costs of suit.2
In dismissing the complaint, the trial court held that the contract between the parties
did not guarantee that the cement vault would be waterproof; that there could be no
quasi-delict because the defendant was not guilty of any fault or negligence, and
because there was a pre-existing contractual relation between the Syquias and
defendant Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc.. The trial court also noted that the
father himself, Juan Syquia, chose the gravesite despite knowing that said area had to
be constantly sprinkled with water to keep the grass green and that water would
eventually seep through the vault. The trial court also accepted the explanation given
by defendant for boring a hole at the bottom side of the vault: "The hole had to be
bored through the concrete vault because if it has no hole the vault will (sic) float and
the grave would be filled with water and the digging would caved (sic) in the earth, the
earth would caved (sic) in the (sic) fill up the grave."3
From this judgment, the Syquias appealed. They alleged that the trial court erred in
holding that the contract allowed the flooding of the vault; that there was no
desecration; that the boring of the hole was justifiable; and in not awarding damages.
The Court of Appeals in the Decision4
dated December 7, 1990 however, affirmed the
judgment of dismissal. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in a
Resolution dated April 25, 1991.5
Unsatisfied with the respondent Court's decision, the Syquias filed the instant petition.
They allege herein that the Court of Appeals committed the following errors when it:
1. held that the contract and the Rules and Resolutions of private respondent
allowed the flooding of the vault and the entrance thereto of filth and silt;
2. held that the act of boring a hole was justifiable and corollarily, when it held that
no act of desecration was committed;
3. overlooked and refused to consider relevant, undisputed facts, such as those
which have been stipulated upon by the parties, testified to by private
respondent's witnesses, and admitted in the answer, which could have justified a
different conclusion;
4. held that there was no tort because of a pre-existing contract and the absence of
fault/negligence; and
5. did not award the P25,000.00 actual damages which was agreed upon by the
parties, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees.
At the bottom of the entire proceedings is the act of boring a hole by private
respondent on the vault of the deceased kin of the bereaved petitioners. The latter
allege that such act was either a breach of private respondent's contractual obligation
to provide a sealed vault, or, in the alternative, a negligent act which constituted a
quasi-delict. Nonetheless, petitioners claim that whatever kind of negligence private
respondent has committed, the latter is liable for desecrating the grave of petitioners'
dead.
In the instant case, We are called upon to determine whether the Manila Memorial
Park Cemetery, Inc., breached its contract with petitioners; or, alternatively, whether
private respondent was guilty of a tort.
We understand the feelings of petitioners and empathize with them. Unfortunately,
however, We are more inclined to answer the foregoing questions in the negative.
There is not enough ground, both in fact and in law, to justify a reversal of the decision
of the respondent Court and to uphold the pleas of the petitioners.
With respect to herein petitioners' averment that private respondent has
committed culpa aquiliana, the Court of Appeals found no negligent act on the part of
private respondent to justify an award of damages against it. Although a pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties does not preclude the existence of a culpa
aquiliana, We find no reason to disregard the respondent's Court finding that there
was no negligence.
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is
no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict . . . .
(Emphasis supplied).
15
In this case, it has been established that the Syquias and the Manila Memorial Park
Cemetery, Inc., entered into a contract entitled "Deed of Sale and Certificate of
Perpetual Care"6 on August 27, 1969. That agreement governed the relations of the
parties and defined their respective rights and obligations. Hence, had there been
actual negligence on the part of the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., it would be
held liable not for a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana, but for culpa contractual as
provided by Article 1170 of the Civil Code, to wit:
Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence, or
delay, and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for
damages.
The Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. bound itself to provide the concrete box to
be send in the interment. Rule 17 of the Rules and Regulations of private respondent
provides that:
Rule 17. Every earth interment shall be made enclosed in a concrete box, or in an
outer wall of stone, brick or concrete, the actual installment of which shall be made by
the employees of the Association.7
Pursuant to this above-mentioned Rule, a concrete vault was provided on July 27,
1978, the day before the interment, and was, on the same day, installed by private
respondent's employees in the grave which was dug earlier. After the burial, the vault
was covered by a cement lid.
Petitioners however claim that private respondent breached its contract with them as
the latter held out in the brochure it distributed that the . . . lot may hold single or
double internment (sic) underground in sealed concrete vault."8 Petitioners claim that
the vault provided by private respondent was not sealed, that is, not waterproof.
Consequently, water seeped through the cement enclosure and damaged everything
inside it.
We do not agree. There was no stipulation in the Deed of Sale and Certificate of
Perpetual Care and in the Rules and Regulations of the Manila Memorial Park
Cemetery, Inc. that the vault would be waterproof. Private respondent's witness, Mr.
Dexter Heuschkel, explained that the term "sealed" meant "closed."9 On the other
hand, the word "seal" is defined as . . . any of various closures or fastenings . . . that
cannot be opened without rupture and that serve as a check against tampering or
unauthorized opening." 10 The meaning that has been given by private respondent to
the word conforms with the cited dictionary definition. Moreover, it is also quite clear
that "sealed" cannot be equated with "waterproof". Well settled is the rule that when
the terms of the contract are clear and leave no doubt as to the intention of the
contracting parties, then the literal meaning of the stipulation shall control. 11 Contracts
should be interpreted according to their literal meaning and should not be interpreted
beyond their obvious intendment. 12 As ruled by the respondent Court:
When plaintiff-appellant Juan J. Syquia affixed his signature to the Deed of Sale
(Exhibit "A") and the attached Rules and Regulations (Exhibit "1"), it can be assumed
that he has accepted defendant-appellee's undertaking to merely provide a concrete
vault. He can not now claim that said concrete vault must in addition, also be
waterproofed (sic). It is basic that the parties are bound by the terms of their contract,
which is the law between them (Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation vs. Court of
Appeals, et al. 178 SCRA 739). Where there is nothing in the contract which is
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy, the validity of the
contract must be sustained (Phil. American Insurance Co. vs. Judge Pineda, 175
SCRA 416). Consonant with this ruling, a contracting party cannot incur a liability more
than what is expressly specified in his undertaking. It cannot be extended by
implication, beyond the terms of the contract (Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation
vs. Court of Appeals, supra). And as a rule of evidence, where the terms of an
agreement are reduced to writing, the document itself, being constituted by the parties
as the expositor of their intentions, is the only instrument of evidence in respect of that
agreement which the law will recognize, so long as its (sic) exists for the purpose of
evidence (Starkie, Ev., pp. 648, 655, Kasheenath vs. Chundy, 5 W.R. 68 cited in
Francisco, Revised Rules of Court in the Phil. p. 153, 1973 Ed.). And if the terms of
the contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties,
the literal meaning of its stipulations shall control (Santos vs. CA, et al., G. R. No.
83664, Nov. 13, 1989; Prudential Bank & Trust Co. vs. Community Builders Co., Inc.,
165 SCRA 285; Balatero vs. IAC, 154 SCRA 530). 13
We hold, therefore, that private respondent did not breach the tenor of its obligation to
the Syquias. While this may be so, can private respondent be liable for culpa
aquiliana for boring the hole on the vault? It cannot be denied that the hole made
possible the entry of more water and soil than was natural had there been no hole.
16
The law defines negligence as the "omission of that diligence which is required by the
nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the
time and of the place." 14 In the absence of stipulation or legal provision providing the
contrary, the diligence to be observed in the performance of the obligation is that
which is expected of a good father of a family.
The circumstances surrounding the commission of the assailed act — boring of the
hole — negate the allegation of negligence. The reason for the act was explained by
Henry Flores, Interment Foreman, who said that:
Q It has been established in this particular case that a certain Vicente Juan Syquia
was interred on July 25, 1978 at the Parañaque Cemetery of the Manila Memorial
Park Cemetery, Inc., will you please tell the Hon. Court what or whether you have
participation in connection with said internment (sic)?
A A day before Juan (sic) Syquia was buried our personnel dug a grave. After digging
the next morning a vault was taken and placed in the grave and when the vault was
placed on the grave a hole was placed on the vault so that water could come into the
vault because it was raining heavily then because the vault has no hole the vault will
float and the grave would be filled with water and the digging would caved (sic) in and
the earth, the earth would (sic) caved in and fill up the grave. 15 (Emphasis ours)
Except for the foreman's opinion that the concrete vault may float should there be a
heavy rainfall, from the above-mentioned explanation, private respondent has
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in preventing the accumulation of
water inside the vault which would have resulted in the caving in of earth around the
grave filling the same with earth.
Thus, finding no evidence of negligence on the part of private respondent, We find no
reason to award damages in favor of petitioners.
In the light of the foregoing facts, and construed in the language of the applicable laws
and jurisprudence, We are constrained to AFFIRM in toto the decision of the
respondent Court of Appeals dated December 7, 1990. No costs. SO ORDERED.
PICART VS SMITH G.R. No. L-12219 March 15, 1918
In this action the plaintiff, Amado Picart, seeks to recover of the defendant, Frank
Smith, jr., the sum of P31,000, as damages alleged to have been caused by an
automobile driven by the defendant. From a judgment of the Court of First Instance of
the Province of La Union absolving the defendant from liability the plaintiff has
appealed.
The occurrence which gave rise to the institution of this action took place on
December 12, 1912, on the Carlatan Bridge, at San Fernando, La Union. It appears
that upon the occasion in question the plaintiff was riding on his pony over said bridge.
Before he had gotten half way across, the defendant approached from the opposite
direction in an automobile, going at the rate of about ten or twelve miles per hour. As
the defendant neared the bridge he saw a horseman on it and blew his horn to give
warning of his approach. He continued his course and after he had taken the bridge he
gave two more successive blasts, as it appeared to him that the man on horseback
before him was not observing the rule of the road.
The plaintiff, it appears, saw the automobile coming and heard the warning signals.
However, being perturbed by the novelty of the apparition or the rapidity of the
approach, he pulled the pony closely up against the railing on the right side of the
bridge instead of going to the left. He says that the reason he did this was that he
thought he did not have sufficient time to get over to the other side. The bridge is
shown to have a length of about 75 meters and a width of 4.80 meters. As the
automobile approached, the defendant guided it toward his left, that being the proper
side of the road for the machine. In so doing the defendant assumed that the
horseman would move to the other side. The pony had not as yet exhibited fright, and
the rider had made no sign for the automobile to stop. Seeing that the pony was
apparently quiet, the defendant, instead of veering to the right while yet some distance
away or slowing down, continued to approach directly toward the horse without
diminution of speed. When he had gotten quite near, there being then no possibility of
the horse getting across to the other side, the defendant quickly turned his car
sufficiently to the right to escape hitting the horse alongside of the railing where it as
then standing; but in so doing the automobile passed in such close proximity to the
animal that it became frightened and turned its body across the bridge with its head
toward the railing. In so doing, it as struck on the hock of the left hind leg by the flange
17
of the car and the limb was broken. The horse fell and its rider was thrown off with
some violence. From the evidence adduced in the case we believe that when the
accident occurred the free space where the pony stood between the automobile and
the railing of the bridge was probably less than one and one half meters. As a result of
its injuries the horse died. The plaintiff received contusions which caused temporary
unconsciousness and required medical attention for several days.
The question presented for decision is whether or not the defendant in maneuvering
his car in the manner above described was guilty of negligence such as gives rise to a
civil obligation to repair the damage done; and we are of the opinion that he is so
liable. As the defendant started across the bridge, he had the right to assume that the
horse and the rider would pass over to the proper side; but as he moved toward the
center of the bridge it was demonstrated to his eyes that this would not be done; and
he must in a moment have perceived that it was too late for the horse to cross with
safety in front of the moving vehicle. In the nature of things this change of situation
occurred while the automobile was yet some distance away; and from this moment it
was not longer within the power of the plaintiff to escape being run down by going to a
place of greater safety. The control of the situation had then passed entirely to the
defendant; and it was his duty either to bring his car to an immediate stop or, seeing
that there were no other persons on the bridge, to take the other side and pass
sufficiently far away from the horse to avoid the danger of collision. Instead of doing
this, the defendant ran straight on until he was almost upon the horse. He was, we
think, deceived into doing this by the fact that the horse had not yet exhibited fright.
But in view of the known nature of horses, there was an appreciable risk that, if the
animal in question was unacquainted with automobiles, he might get exited and jump
under the conditions which here confronted him. When the defendant exposed the
horse and rider to this danger he was, in our opinion, negligent in the eye of the law.
The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be
stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that person
would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The law
here in effect adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct
of the discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law. The existence of negligence in a given
case is not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the
situation before him. The law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or
negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by
that.
The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given
situation must of course be always determined in the light of human experience and in
view of the facts involved in the particular case. Abstract speculations cannot here be
of much value but this much can be profitably said: Reasonable men govern their
conduct by the circumstances which are before them or known to them. They are not,
and are not supposed to be, omniscient of the future. Hence they can be expected to
take care only when there is something before them to suggest or warn of danger.
Could a prudent man, in the case under consideration, foresee harm as a result of the
course actually pursued? If so, it was the duty of the actor to take precautions to guard
against that harm. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by ignoring of the
suggestion born of this prevision, is always necessary before negligence can be held
to exist. Stated in these terms, the proper criterion for determining the existence of
negligence in a given case is this: Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man
in the position of the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect harmful to another
was sufficiently probable to warrant his foregoing conduct or guarding against its
consequences.
Applying this test to the conduct of the defendant in the present case we think that
negligence is clearly established. A prudent man, placed in the position of the
defendant, would in our opinion, have recognized that the course which he was
pursuing was fraught with risk, and would therefore have foreseen harm to the horse
and the rider as reasonable consequence of that course. Under these circumstances
the law imposed on the defendant the duty to guard against the threatened harm.
It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for he was guilty
of antecedent negligence in planting himself on the wrong side of the road. But as we
have already stated, the defendant was also negligent; and in such case the problem
always is to discover which agent is immediately and directly responsible. It will be
noted that the negligent acts of the two parties were not contemporaneous, since the
negligence of the defendant succeeded the negligence of the plaintiff by an
appreciable interval. Under these circumstances the law is that the person who has
the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with
the consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of the other party.
18
The decision in the case of Rkes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co. (7 Phil. Rep., 359)
should perhaps be mentioned in this connection. This Court there held that while
contributory negligence on the part of the person injured did not constitute a bar to
recovery, it could be received in evidence to reduce the damages which would
otherwise have been assessed wholly against the other party. The defendant
company had there employed the plaintiff, as a laborer, to assist in transporting iron
rails from a barge in Manila harbor to the company's yards located not far away. The
rails were conveyed upon cars which were hauled along a narrow track. At certain
spot near the water's edge the track gave way by reason of the combined effect of the
weight of the car and the insecurity of the road bed. The car was in consequence
upset; the rails slid off; and the plaintiff's leg was caught and broken. It appeared in
evidence that the accident was due to the effects of the typhoon which had dislodged
one of the supports of the track. The court found that the defendant company was
negligent in having failed to repair the bed of the track and also that the plaintiff was,
at the moment of the accident, guilty of contributory negligence in walking at the side
of the car instead of being in front or behind. It was held that while the defendant was
liable to the plaintiff by reason of its negligence in having failed to keep the track in
proper repair nevertheless the amount of the damages should be reduced on account
of the contributory negligence in the plaintiff. As will be seen the defendant's
negligence in that case consisted in an omission only. The liability of the company
arose from its responsibility for the dangerous condition of its track. In a case like the
one now before us, where the defendant was actually present and operating the
automobile which caused the damage, we do not feel constrained to attempt to weigh
the negligence of the respective parties in order to apportion the damage according to
the degree of their relative fault. It is enough to say that the negligence of the
defendant was in this case the immediate and determining cause of the accident and
that the antecedent negligence of the plaintiff was a more remote factor in the case.
A point of minor importance in the case is indicated in the special defense pleaded in
the defendant's answer, to the effect that the subject matter of the action had been
previously adjudicated in the court of a justice of the peace. In this connection it
appears that soon after the accident in question occurred, the plaintiff caused criminal
proceedings to be instituted before a justice of the peace charging the defendant with
the infliction of serious injuries (lesiones graves). At the preliminary investigation the
defendant was discharged by the magistrate and the proceedings were dismissed.
Conceding that the acquittal of the defendant at the trial upon the merits in a criminal
prosecution for the offense mentioned would be res adjudicata upon the question of
his civil liability arising from negligence -- a point upon which it is unnecessary to
express an opinion -- the action of the justice of the peace in dismissing the criminal
proceeding upon the preliminary hearing can have no effect. (See U. S. vs. Banzuela
and Banzuela, 31 Phil. Rep., 564.)
From what has been said it results that the judgment of the lower court must be
reversed, and judgment is her rendered that the plaintiff recover of the defendant the
sum of two hundred pesos (P200), with costs of other instances. The sum here
awarded is estimated to include the value of the horse, medical expenses of the
plaintiff, the loss or damage occasioned to articles of his apparel, and lawful interest
on the whole to the date of this recovery. The other damages claimed by the plaintiff
are remote or otherwise of such character as not to be recoverable. So ordered.
Separate Opinions MALCOLM, J., concurring:
After mature deliberation, I have finally decided to concur with the judgment in this
case. I do so because of my understanding of the "last clear chance" rule of the law of
negligence as particularly applied to automobile accidents. This rule cannot be
invoked where the negligence of the plaintiff is concurrent with that of the defendant.
Again, if a traveler when he reaches the point of collision is in a situation to extricate
himself and avoid injury, his negligence at that point will prevent a recovery. But
Justice Street finds as a fact that the negligent act of the interval of time, and that at
the moment the plaintiff had no opportunity to avoid the accident. Consequently, the
"last clear chance" rule is applicable. In other words, when a traveler has reached a
point where he cannot extricate himself and vigilance on his part will not avert the
injury, his negligence in reaching that position becomes the condition and not the
proximate cause of the injury and will not preclude a recovery. (Note especially Aiken
vs. Metcalf [1917], 102 Atl., 330.)
19