LRT vs.

NAVIDAD
G.R. No. 145804. February 6, 2003

FACTS:
Navidad was drunk when he entered the boarding platform of the LRT. He got into
an altercation with the SG Escartin. They had a fistfight and Navidad fell onto the
tracks and was killed when a train came and ran over him.

The Heirs of Navidad filed a complaint for damages against Escartin, the train
driver, (Roman) the LRTA, the Metro Transit Organization and Prudent Security
Agency (Prudent). The trial court found Prudent and Escartin jointly and severally
liable for damages to the heirs. The CA exonerated Prudent and instead held the
LRTA and the train driver Romero jointly and severally liable as well as removing
the award for compensatory damages and replacing it with nominal damages.

The reasoning of the CA was that a contract of carriage already existed between
Navidad and LRTA (by virtue of his havA ing purchased train tickets and the liability
was caused by the mere fact of Navidad's death after being hit by the train being
managed by the LRTA and operated by Roman. The CA also blamed LRTA for not
having presented expert evidence showing that the emergency brakes could not
have stopped the train on time.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not LRTA and/or Roman is liable for the death.
(2) Whether or not Escartin and/or Prudent are liable.
(3) Whether or not nominal damages may coexist with compensatory damages.

HELD:
(1) Yes. The foundation of LRTA's liability is the contract of carriage and its
obligation to indemnify the victim arising from the breach of that contract by reason
of its failure to exercise the high diligence required of a common carrier.
(2) Fault was not established. Liability will be based on Tort under Art. 2176 of the
New Civil Code.
(3) No. It is an established rule that nominal damages cannot co-exist with
compensatory damages.

RATIO:

Liability of LRTA – Read Arts. 1755,1756, 1759 and 1763 of the New Civil Code

A common carrier is required by these above statutory provisions to use utmost

diligence in carrying passengers with due regard for all circumstances. This
obligation exists not only during the course of the trip but for so long as the
passengers are within its premises where they ought to be in pursuance to then
contract of carriage.
Art. 1763 renders a common carrier liable for death of or injury to passengers (a)
through the negligence or wilful acts of its employees or (b) on account of willful
acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers if the common carrier’s
employees through theexercise of due diligence could have prevented or stopped
the act or omission. In case of such death or injury, a carrier is presumed to have
been at fault or been negligent, and by simple proof of injury, the passenger is
relieved of the duty to still establish the fault or negligence of the carrier or of its
employees and the burden shifts upon the carrier to prove that the injury is due to
an unforeseen event or to force majeure.

Liability of Security Agency – If Prudent is to be held liable, it would be for a tort

under Art. 2176 in conjunction with Art. 2180. Once the fault of the employee
Escartin is established, the employer, Prudent, would be held liable on the
presumption that it did not exercise the diligence of a good father of the family in
the selection and supervision of its employees.

Relationship between contractual and non-contractual breach – How then

must the liability of the common carrier, on the one hand, and an independent
contractor, on the other hand, be described? It would be solidary. A contractual
obligation can be breached by tort and when the same act or omission causes the
injury, one resulting in culpa contractual and the other in culpa aquiliana, Article
2194 of the Civil Code can well apply. In fine, a liability for tort may arise even
under a contract, where tort is that which breaches the contract. Stated differently,
when an act which constitutes a breach of ontract would have itself constituted the
source of a quasi-delictual liability had no contract existed between the parties, the
contract can be said to have been breached by tort, thereby allowing the rules on
tort to apply.

Nominal Damages - The award of nominal damages in addition to actual damages

is untenable. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff,
which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or
recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss
suffered by him. It is an established rule that nominal damages cannot co-exist
with compensatory damages. The award was deleted/\.

Light Rail Transit Authority vs. Navidad

Same; Obligations; Tort; The premise, however, for the employer’s liability is negligence or fault
on the part of the employee.—Should Prudent be made likewise liable? If at all, that liability
could only be for tort under the provisions of Article 2176 and related provisions, in conjunction
with Article 2180, of the Civil Code. The premise, however, for the employer’s liability is
negligence or fault on the part of the employee. Once such fault is established, the employer
can then be made liable on the basis of the presumption juris tantum that the employer failed
to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the selection and supervision of its employees. The
liability is primary and can only be negated by showing due diligence in the selection and
supervision of the employee, a factual matter that has not been shown.

Same; Same; Same; In fine, a liability for tort may arise even under a contract, where tort is that
which breaches the contract.—A contractual obligation can be breached by tort and when the
same act or omission causes the injury, one resulting in culpa contractual and the other in culpa
aquiliana, Article 2194 of the Civil Code can well apply. In fine, a liability for tort may arise even
under a contract, where tort is that which breaches the contract. Stated differently, when an
act which constitutes a breach of contract would have itself constituted the source of a quasi-
delictual liability had no contract existed between the parties, the contract can be said to have
been breached by tort, thereby allowing the rules on tort to apply.

Same; Damages; Nominal Damages; It is an established rule that nominal damages cannot co-
exist with compensatory damages.—The award of nominal damages in addition to actual
damages is untenable. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff,
which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not
for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him. It is an established
rule that nominal damages cannot co-exist with compensatory damages.

Phoenix Construction, Inc. vs. Internediate Appellate Court (148 SCRA 353) Facts: Leonardo
Dionisio was on his way from a cocktails-and-dinner meeting with his boss. Dionisio was driving
his Volkswagen car not far from his home when his car headlights (in his allegation) suddenly
failed. He switched his headlights on "bright" and thereupon he saw a Ford dump truck looming
some 2- 1/2 meters away from his car. The dump truck, owned by and registered in the name
of Phoenix Construction Inc. ("Phoenix"), was parked on the right hand side facing the
oncoming traffic. The dump truck was parked in such a manner as to stick out onto the street,
partly blocking the way of oncoming traffic. There were no lights nor any so-called "early
warning" reflector devices set anywhere near the dump truck, front or rear. Dionisio claimed
that he tried to avoid a collision by swerving his car to the left but it was too late and his car
smashed into the dump truck. As a result of the collision, Dionisio suffered some physical
injuries. Dionisio commenced an action for damages in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga
basically claiming that the legal and proximate cause of his injuries was the negligent manner in
which the driver had parked the dump truck entrusted to him by his employer Phoenix. Phoenix
and the driver, on the other hand, countered that the proximate cause of Dionisio's injuries was
his own recklessness in driving fast at the time of the accident, while under the influence of
liquor, without his headlights on and without a curfew pass. Phoenix also sought to establish
that it had exercised due rare in the selection and supervision of the dump truck driver. Issue:
Whether or Not Phoenix and the dump truck driver may be held liable for the injuries sustained
by Dionisio. Held: 68 Phoenix construction and its driver is liable.

There are four factual issues that need to be looked into: (a) whether or not private respondent
Dionisio had a curfew pass valid and effective for that eventful night; (b) whether Dionisio was
driving fast or speeding just before the collision with the dump truck; (c) whether Dionisio had
purposely turned off his car's headlights before contact with the dump truck or whether those
headlights accidentally malfunctioned moments before the collision; and (d) whether Dionisio
was intoxicated at the time of the accident.

As to the first issue relating to the curfew pass, it is clear that no curfew pass was found on the
person of Dionisio immediately after the accident nor was any found in his car. As to the
second, the testimony of the patrolman present immediately after the accident was given
credence by the court, hence leading to the conclusion that the volkswagon was “moving fast.”
As to the third issue, the court believes that the petitioners' theory is a more credible
explanation than that offered by private respondent Dionisio. Finally, as to the fourth issue, the
court finds there simply is not enough evidence to show how much liquor he had in fact taken
and the effects of that upon his physical faculties or upon his judgment or mental alertness. The
conclusion we draw from the factual circumstances outlined above is that private respondent
Dionisio was negligent the night of the accident. Nonetheless, the supreme court agrees with
the Intermediate Appellate Court that the legal and proximate cause of the accident and of
Dionisio's injuries was the wrongful or negligent manner in which the dump truck was parked in
other words, the negligence of petitioner Carbonel. That there was a reasonable relationship
between petitioner Carbonel's negligence on the one hand and the accident and respondent's
injuries on the other hand, is quite clear. The collision of Dionisio's car with the dump truck was
a natural and foreseeable consequence of the truck driver's negligence. Dionisio's negligence
was "only contributory," that the "immediate and proximate cause" of the injury remained the
truck driver's "lack of due care" and that consequently respondent Dionisio may recover
damages though such damages are subject to mitigation by the courts (Article 2179, Civil Code
of the Philippines). Phoenix also ask us to apply what they refer to as the "last clear chance"
doctrine. It is difficult to see what role, if any, the common law last clear chance doctrine has to
play in a jurisdiction where the common law concept of contributory negligence as an absolute
bar to recovery by the plaintiff, has itself been rejected, as it has been in Article 2179 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines.
_________________________________-
FACTS:

Plaintiff shipped at Maconcon Port, Isabela 940 round logs on board M/V Seven Ambassador, a vessel
owned by defendant Seven Brothers Shipping Corporation. Plaintiff insured the logs against loss and/or
damage with defendant South Sea Surety and Insurance Co., Inc. for P2M and the latter issued its Marine
Cargo Insurance Policy on said date. In the meantime, the M/V Seven Ambassador sank resulting in the
loss of the plaintiff’s insured logs.

Plaintiff demanded from defendant South Sea Surety and Insurance Co., Inc. the payment of the
proceeds of the policy but the latter denied liability under the policy. Plaintiff likewise filed a formal claim
with defendant Seven Brothers Shipping Corporation for the value of the lost logs but the latter denied
the claim.

Court of Appeals affirmed in part the RTC judgment by sustaining the liability of South Sea Surety and
Insurance Company (“South Sea”), but modified it by holding that Seven Brothers Shipping Corporation
(“Seven Brothers”) was not liable for the lost cargo.

ISSUE:

Whether defendants shipping corporation and the surety company are liable to the plaintiff for the latter’s
lost logs.

HELD:

The charter party between the petitioner and private respondent stipulated that the “(o)wners shall not
be responsible for loss, split, short-landing, breakages and any kind of damages to the cargo” –VALID

There is no dispute between the parties that the proximate cause of the sinking of M/V Seven
Ambassadors resulting in the loss of its cargo was the “snapping of the iron chains and the subsequent
rolling of the logs to the portside due to the negligence of the captain in stowing and securing the logs on
board the vessel and not due to fortuitous event.” Likewise undisputed is the status of Private
Respondent Seven Brothers as a private carrier when it contracted to transport the cargo of Petitioner
Valenzuela. Even the latter admits this in its petition.

Private respondent had acted as a private carrier in transporting petitioner’s lauan logs. Thus, Article
1745 and other Civil Code provisions on common carriers which were cited by petitioner may not be
applied unless expressly stipulated by the parties in their charter party.

In a contract of private carriage, the parties may validly stipulate that responsibility for the cargo rests
solely on the charterer, exempting the shipowner from liability for loss of or damage to the cargo caused
even by the negligence of the ship captain. Pursuant to Article 1306 of the Civil Code, such stipulation is
valid because it is freely entered into by the parties and the same is not contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order, or public policy. Indeed, their contract of private carriage is not even a contract of
adhesion. We stress that in a contract of private carriage, the parties may freely stipulate their duties and
obligations which perforce would be binding on them. Unlike in contract involving a common carrier,
private carriage does not involve the general public. Hence, the stringent provisions of the Civil Code on
common carriers protecting the general public cannot justifiably be applied to a ship transporting
commercial goods as a private carrier. Consequently, the public policy embodied therein is not
contravened by stipulations in a charter party that lessen or remove the protection given by law in
contracts involving common carriers.

The provisions of our Civil Code on common carriers were taken from Anglo-American law. Under
American jurisprudence, a common carrier undertaking to carry a special cargo or chartered to a special
person only, becomes a private carrier. As a private carrier a stipulation exempting the owner from
liability for the negligence of its agent is not against public policy and is deemed valid. Such doctrine We
find reasonable. The Civil Code provisions on common carriers should not be applied where the carrier is
not acting as such but as a private carrier. The stipulation in the charter party absolving the owner from
liability for loss due to the negligence of its agent would be void only if the strict public policy governing
common carriers is applied. Such policy has no force where the public at large is not involved as in this
case of a ship totally chartered for the use of a single party. (Home Insurance Co. vs. American
Steamship Agencies Inc., 23 SCRA 24, April 4, 1968)

Tort distinguished from breach of contract

JUAN J. SYQUIA, CORAZON C. SYQUIA, CARLOTA C. SYQUIA, CARLOS C. SYQUIA and
ANTHONY C. SYQUIA vs.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and THE MANILA MEMORIAL PARK CEMETERY,
INC.
G.R. No. 98695, January 27, 1993, J. Campos, Jr.
FACTS:
Juan Syquia, father of the deceased Vicente Syquia, entered in a contract of Deed of Sale and
Interment Order with Manila Memorial Park Cemetery Inc (MMPCI). In the contract,
there contained a provision which stated that the coffin would be placed in a sealed
concrete vault to protect the remains of the deceased from the elements.
During the preparation for the transfer of Vicente’s remains in the newly bought lot in Manila
Memorial, it was discovered that there was a hole in the concrete vault which caused
total flooding inside, damaged the coffin as well as the body of the deceased and
covered the same with filth. Syquia filed a complaint for recovery of damages arising
from breach of contract and/or quasi-delict against the MMPCI for failure to deliver a
defect-free concrete vault to protect the remains of the deceased. In its defense, MMPCI
claimed that the boring of the hole was necessary in order to prevent the vault from
floating when water fills the grave. The trial court dismissed the complaint holding that
there was no quasi-delict because the defendant is not guilty of any fault or negligence
and because there was a pre-existing contract between the parties. The CA affirmed the
decision of the trial court. Hence, the present petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the private respondent is guilty of tort
HELD:
Denied. Decision of the CA affirmed. We are more inclined to answer the foregoing questions in
the negative. There is not enough ground, both in fact and in law, to justify a reversal of
the decision of the respondent Court and to uphold the pleas of the petitioners. Although
a pre-existing contractual relation between the parties does not preclude the existence of
a culpa aquiliana,
We find no reason to disregard the respondent’s Court finding that there was no negligence.

“Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done.
Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is
called a quasi-delict
x x x.”
In this case, it has been established that the Syquias and the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery,
Inc., entered into a contract entitled “Deed of Sale and Certificate of Perpetual Care” on August
27, 1969. That agreement governed the relations of the parties and defined their respective
rights and obligations. Hence, had there been actual negligence on the part of the Manila
Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., it would be held liable not for aquasi-delict or culpa aquiliana, but
for culpacontractual as provided by Article 1170 of the Civil Code, to wit: “Those who in the
performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay, and those who in any
manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages.”

Picart v Smith (Torts)

PICART V SMITH G.R. No. L-12219 March 15, 1918 AMADO PICART, plaintiff-appellant, vs. FRANK
SMITH, JR., defendant- appellee.

FACTS:
The plaintiff was riding on his pony over the Carlatan bridge in La Union. Before he had gotten half way across, the
defendant approached from the opposite direction in an automobile, going at the rate of about ten or twelve miles
per hour. As the defendant neared the bridge he saw a horseman on it and blew his horn to give warning of his
approach. He continued his course and after he had taken the bridge he gave two more successive blasts, as it
appeared to him that the man on horseback before him was not observing the rule of the road. Seeing that the pony
was apparently quiet, the defendant, instead of veering to the right while yet some distance away or slowing down,
continued to approach directly toward the horse without diminution of speed.
The plaintiff, it appears, saw the automobile coming and heard the warning signals. However, being perturbed by the
novelty of the apparition or the rapidity of the approach, he pulled the pony closely up against the railing on the right
side of the bridge instead of going to the left. He says that the reason he did this was that he thought he did not have
sufficient time to get over to the other side. The automobile passed in such close proximity to the animal that it
became frightened and turned its body across the bridge with its head toward the railing. The horse fell and its rider
was thrown off with some violence.
As a result of its injuries the horse died. The plaintiff received contusions which caused temporary unconsciousness
and required medical attention for several days. FLANGE HOCK
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
1. CFI – La Union – absolved the defendant from liability.

ISSUE:
whether or not the defendant in maneuvering his car in the manner above described was guilty of negligence such as
gives rise to a civil obligation to repair the damage done

RULING:
Yes, he is liable.
The control of the situation had then passed entirely to the defendant; and it was his duty either to bring his car to an
immediate stop or, seeing that there were no other persons on the bridge, to take the other side and pass sufficiently
far away from the horse to avoid the danger of collision. Instead of doing this, the defendant ran straight on until he
was almost upon the horse.
The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in
the situation before him. The law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of
ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that.
It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for he was guilty of antecedent negligence in
planting himself on the wrong side of the road. But as we have already stated, the defendant was also negligent; and
in such case the problem always is to discover which agent is immediately and directly responsible. It will be noted
that the negligent acts of the two parties were not contemporaneous, since the negligence of the defendant succeeded
the negligence of the plaintiff by an appreciable interval. Under these circumstances the law is that the person who
has the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences, without
reference to the prior negligence of the other party.