CATHERINE G.

MANALLO
1C-JD5
JURISDICTION | Sun 9-11:00 | Judge R. Makasiar
CASE DIGESTS | 18 Feb 2018

1. PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR)

vs. FONTANA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 187972 June 29, 2010

FACTS:
In this petition for review under Rule 45, the May 19, 2009 Decision of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 107247 is questioned for not
nullifying the November 18, 2008 Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in
Manila in Civil Case No. 08-120338 that issued a temporary restraining order
(TRO) against petitioner Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation
(PAGCOR), barring PAGCOR from committing acts that allegedly violate the
rights of respondent Fontana Development Corporation (FDC) under a
December 23, 1999 Memorandum of Agreement (MOA).

ISSUES:
(1) Whether the Manila RTC or this Court has jurisdiction over FDC’s complaint
for injunction and specific performance; and

(2) Did PAGCOR issue the license (MOA) under PD 1869 or under Executive
Order No. (EO) 80, Section 5?

HELD:
Jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter of the action is a matter of
law and is conferred only by the Constitution or by statute. It is settled that
jurisdiction is determined by the allegations of the complaint or the petition
irrespective of whether plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims or reliefs
asserted.

A perusal of FDC’s complaint in Civil Case No. 08-120338 easily reveals

that it is an action for injunction based on an alleged violation of contract—the
MOA between the parties—which granted FDC the right to operate a casino
inside the Clark Special Economic Zone (CSEZ). As such, the Manila RTC has
jurisdiction over FDC’s complaint anchored on Sec. 19, Chapter II of BP 129,
which grants the RTCs original exclusive jurisdiction over “all civil actions in
which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary
estimation.” Evidently, a complaint for injunction or breach of contract is
incapable of pecuniary estimation. Moreover, the RTCs shall exercise original
jurisdiction “in the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, habeas corpus and injunction which may be enforced in any part of
their respective regions” under Sec. 21 of BP 129.

In view of the vestment to PAGCOR by PD 1869 of the powers, authority,

and responsibilities of the SEC, PAGCOR concludes that any decision or ruling
it renders has to be brought to this Court via a petition for review based on
Sec. 6 of SEC’s Charter, PD 902-A, which reads: The aggrieved party may
appeal the order, decision or ruling of the Commission sitting en banc to the
Supreme Court by petition for review in accordance with the pertinent
provisions of the Rules of Court.

This reasoning is flawed. A scrutiny of PD 1869 demonstrates that it

has no procedure for the appeal or review of PAGCOR’s decisions or
orders. Neither does it make any express reference to an exclusive remedy that
can be brought before this Court. Even a review of PD 1869’s predecessor
laws—PD 1067-A, 1067-B, 1067-C, 1399, and 1632, as well as its amendatory
law, RA 9487––do not confer original jurisdiction to this Court to review
PAGCOR’s actions and decisions.

In PAGCOR v. Viola, the court ruled that PAGCOR, in the exercise of its
licensing and regulatory powers, has no quasi-judicial functions, as Secs. 8
and 9 of PD 1869 do not grant quasi-judicial powers to PAGCOR. As such,
direct resort to this Court is not allowed. While we allowed said recourse
in Del Mar v. PAGCOR and Jaworski v. PAGCOR, that is an exception to the
principle of hierarchy of courts on the grounds of expediency and the
importance of the issues involved. More importantly, we categorically ruled
in PAGCOR v. Viola that cases involving revocation of a license falls within the
original jurisdiction of the RTC, thus: Having settled that PAGCOR’s revocation
of MONDRAGON’s authority to operate a casino was not an exercise of quasi-
judicial powers then it follows that the case was properly filed before the
Regional Trial Court. Hence, as the Regional Trial Court had jurisdiction to
take cognizance of the case, petitioner’s contention that the temporary
restraining order and the preliminary injunction by the trial court are void
must fail.

A reading of the aforequoted provisions does not point to any authority

granted to PAGCOR to license casinos within Subic, Clark, or any other
economic zone. As a matter of fact, Sec. 13 of RA 7227 simply shows that
SBMA has no power to license or operate casinos. Rather, said casinos shall
continue to be licensed by PAGCOR. Hence, the source of PAGCOR’s authority
lies in its basic charter, PD 1869, as amended, and neither in RA 7227 nor its
extension, EO 80, for the latter merely recognizes PAGCOR’s power to license
casinos. Indeed, PD 1869 empowers PAGCOR to regulate and control all
games of chance within the Philippines, and clearly, RA 7227 or EO 80 cannot
be the source of its powers, but its basic charter, PD 1869.

2. PROTON PILIPINAS CORPORATION et al. v. BANQUE NATIONALEDE

PARIS
460 SCRA 260

FACTS:

Petitioner Proton Pilipinas Corporation (Proton) availed credit facilities of

respondent Banque Nationale De Paris (BNP). In order to assure payment, co-
petitioners Automotive Corporation, Asea One Corporation and Autocorp Group
executed a corporate guarantee. Proton failed to comply with his obligation to
BNP. Thereafter, BNP demanded the payment of Proton‘s obligation to its co-
petitioners pursuant to corporate guarantee. But the same remained
unheeded. BNP then filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
against Proton et al. The clerk of court assessed the docket fee. Proton et al.
filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the court cannot exercise
jurisdiction over the case because BNP did not properly pay the docket fees.
The RTC denied the motion to dismiss. On appeal, the Court of Appeals denied
the motion of Proton et al. Hence this present petition.

ISSUE:

Does the court acquire jurisdiction when there is an improper payment

of docket fees?

HELD:

The Court rules that it is not simply the filing of the complaint or
appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee
that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject-matter or nature of the
action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by
payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a
reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period. It also stated that where the trial
court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading
and payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment
awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has been
left for determination by the court, the additional filing fee therefore shall
constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of
Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect
the additional fee.

In the case at bar, BNP merely relied on the assessment made by the
clerk of court which turned out to be incorrect. Under the circumstances, the
clerk of court has the responsibility of reassessing what respondent must pay
within the prescriptive period, failing which the complaint merits dismissal.

3. OPTIMA REALTY CORPORATION vs HERTZ PHIL. EXCLUSIVE CARS,

INC. - JANUARY 9, 2013 – GR 183035

FACTS:

Optima is engaged in the business of leasing and renting out commercial

spaces and buildings to its tenants. Optima and Respondent Hertz entered into
a Contract of Lease over an office unit and parking slot in the Optima Bulding
for a period of 3 years. However, the lease agreement was amended by
shortening the lease period ot 2 years and 5 months. However, Hertz failed to
pay its rentals from August to December 2005 and January to February 2006
notwithstanding the fact that Optima granted the former’s request. It also
failed to pay its utility bills. Optima sent a letter to Hertz, reminding the latter
if it will renew its contract by a new negotiation between them and upon
written notice by the lessee to the lessor at least 90 days before the termination
of the lease period. Since Hertz failed to send written notice renewing its
contract and it’s desire to negotiate, Optima did not renew the lease.

MeTC - filed a Complaint for Specific Performance, Injunction, Damages

and Sum of money and prayed for the issuance of a TRO and writ of
preliminary Injunction against Optima. It sought the issuance of a TRO to
enjoin Optima from committing acts which would tend to disrupt it’s peaceful
use and possession of the leased premises and wit of preliminary injunction to
order Optima to reconnect its utilities.

Optima demanded Hertz to surrender and vacate the leased premises

and pay P420,967.28 covering rental arrearages, unpaid utility bills and other
charges. Due to Hertz’s refusal to vacate the leased premises, Optima filed an
action before the MeTC for Unlawful Detainer and Damages with Prayer for the
Issuance of a TRO and/or Preliminary Mandatory Injunction against Hertz.
MeTC rendered a judgment in favor of Optima and ordered Hertz to vacate the
premises.

RTC – affirmed the decision of the MeTC; CA – reversed and set aside the
decision of the RTC; ruled that due to the improper service of summons, the
MeTC failed to acquire jurisdiction over the person of respondent. Hence, this
petition for review on Certiorari under Rule 45.

ISSUES:
 Whether MeTC properly acquired jurisdiction over the person of
respondent won the unlawful detainer case is barred by Litis Pendentia

HELD:

Yes. Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant may be acquired either
by service of summons or by the defendant’s voluntary appearance in court
and submission to its authority. In this case, the MeTC acquired jurisdiction
over the person of respondent Hertz by reason of the latter’s voluntary
appearance in court. In spite of the defective service of summons, the
defendant opted to file an Answer with Counterclaim with Leave of Court.
Furthermore, it never raised the defense of improper service of summons in its
answer with counterclaim.

4. ELLICE AGRO-INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, represented by its

Chairman of the Board of Directors and President, RAUL E. GALA vs.
RODEL T. YOUNG, DELFIN CHAN, JIM WEE, and GUIA G. DOMINGO -
G.R. No. 174077

FACTS:

On July 24, 1995, Rodel T. Young, Delfin Chan and Jim Wee
(respondents) and Ellice Agro-Industrial Corporation (EAIC), represented by its
alleged corporate secretary and attorney-in-fact, Guia G. Domingo (Domingo),
entered into a Contract to Sell, under certain terms and conditions, wherein
EAIC agreed to sell to the respondents a 30,000 square-meter portion of a
parcel of land located in Lutucan, Sariaya, Quezon and registered under EAIC’s
name and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-157038 in
consideration of One Million and Fifty Thousand (P1,050,000.00) Pesos.

Pursuant to the Contract to Sell, respondents paid EAIC, through

Domingo, the aggregate amount of Five Hundred Forty Five Thousand
(P545,000.00) Pesos as partial payment for the acquisition of the subject
property. Despite such payment, EAIC failed to deliver to respondents the
owner’s duplicate certificate of title of the subject property and the
corresponding deed of sale as required under the Contract to Sell. Prompted by
the failure of EAIC to comply with its obligation, respondents had their Affidavit
of Adverse Claim annotated in TCT No. T-157038.

On November 14, 1996, respondents filed a Complaint for specific

performance, docketed as Civil Case No. 96-177, against EAIC and Domingo
before the RTC. Consequently, on November 18, 1996, respondents caused the
annotation of a Notice of Lis Pendentia involving Civil Case No. 96-177 in TCT
No. T-157038.

The initial attempt to serve the summons and a copy of the complaint
and its annexes on EAIC, through Domingo, on Rizal Street, Sariaya, Quezon,
was unsuccessful as EAIC could not be located in the said address.

Another attempt was made to serve the alias summons on EAIC at 996
Maligaya Street, Singalong, Manila, the residence of Domingo. The second
attempt to serve the alias summons to Domingo was, this time, successful.

On March 21, 1997, EAIC, represented by Domingo, filed its Answer with
Counterclaim. Meanwhile, respondent Jim Wee (Wee) sent Raul E. Gala (Gala),
EAIC’s Chairman and President, a letter, dated July 9, 1997, seeking a
conference with the latter relating to the execution of an absolute deed of sale
pursuant to the Contract to Sell entered into between EAIC and respondents.
 In response, the Robles Ricafrente Aguirre Sanvicente & Cacho Law
Firm, introducing itself to be the counsel of EAIC, sent Wee a letter,9 dated July
18, 1997, informing him of Domingo’s lack of authority to represent EAIC. On
the scheduled pre-trial conference on January 27, 1998, neither Domingo nor
her counsel appeared. As a result of EAIC’s failure to appear in the pre-trial
conference, respondents were allowed to present their evidence ex parte,
pursuant to Section 5, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court.

Following the presentation of evidence ex parte, the RTC rendered its

November 11, 1999 Decision ordering EAIC to deliver the owner’s duplicate
copy of TCT No. T-157038 and to execute a final deed of sale in favor of
respondents.

No motion for reconsideration or notice of appeal was filed by EAIC,

hence, the said RTC decision became final and executory on December 8, 1999.

On July 10, 2000 (roughly seven months after the finality of the RTC
Decision), EAIC, represented by Gala, filed its Petition for Relief from Judgment
under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court of the November 11, 1999 RTC Decision
before the same court. The petition for relief from judgment was premised on
the alleged fraud committed by Domingo in concealing the existence of both the
Contract to Sell and Civil Case No. 96-177 from EAIC.

In its July 12, 2000 Order, the RTC denied the petition for relief from
judgment for being clearly filed out of time under Section 3, Rule 38 of the
Rules of Court.

On April 24, 2001, EAIC, represented by Gala, initiated the Petition for
Annulment of Judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court of the November
11, 1999 RTC Decision before the CA. The petition was grounded on the RTC’s
lack of jurisdiction over EAIC and the extrinsic fraud committed by Domingo.
EAIC discarded any knowledge of the said sale and the suit filed by
respondents against it. According to EAIC, it could not be bound by the
assailed RTC Decision pursuant to Section 13, Rule 14 of the 1964 Rules of
Court which was, the applicable rule then. Domingo was not its President,
Manager, Secretary, Cashier, Agent or Director, as evidenced by the General
Information Sheets17 (GIS) it filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), at the time the summons was served upon her and she did
not possess the requisite authorization to represent EAIC in the subject
transaction. Furthermore, her misrepresentation that she was EAIC’s corporate
secretary who was properly authorized to sell and receive payment for the
subject property, defrauded EAIC of the potential gains it should have realized
from the proceeds of the sale.

In their Answer with Counterclaim filed before the CA, respondents

countered that considering EAIC’s petition for relief from judgment under Rule
38 grounded on extrinsic fraud, had already been rejected with finality, EAIC
could not be permitted to invoke the same ground in a petition for annulment
of judgment under Rule 47. Further, EAIC could not feign ignorance of Civil
Case No. 96-177 because of the November 8, 1996 Adverse Claim and the
November 18, 1996 Notice of Lis Pendens annotated at the back of TCT No. T-
157038. Respondents insisted that the mentioned annotations in TCT No. T-
157038 should be deemed constructive notices to the world of the pending
litigation referred to therein and, therefore, bound EAIC to Civil Case No. 96-
177. Moreover, with the exchange of letters, dated July 9, 1997 and July 18,
1997, between Wee and EAIC, through Gala, EAIC was informed of the pending
civil case against it.

In its Reply filed before the CA, EAIC explained that the RTC did not
touch upon the issue of fraud in the petition for relief from judgment as it was
dismissed for being filed out of time. In addition, EAIC claimed that the
exchange of letters between Wee and EAIC never stated anything whatsoever of
any pending suit between them.

Even without the constructive notices, the businessmen herein

respondents, through a letter signed by one of them, apprised the corporation,
through Raul E. Gala, of their contract to sell. This was in July, 1997. The
letter was duly acknowledged and the parties thereafter even tried to settle
among themselves the consideration and conveyance of the 30,000 square-
meter portion.

When this failed, there was no reason why the corporation could not
have proceeded with the pre-trial in Civil Case No. 96-177. It did not.

The corporation’s reticence in view of the constructive notices and its

then incumbent board’s personal knowledge of the case had, in effect,
amounted to a waiver of its right to actively participate in the proper
disposition of Civil Case No. 96-177, to move for a new trial therein and to
appeal from the decision rendered therein. Certainly, these remedies no longer
are available, but only the corporation should be faulted for this. Be that as it
may, the corporation had availed of the remedy of relief from the judgment in
Civil Case No. 96-177. The fact that it was not able to prove that it was entitled
thereto does not mean that it can now avail of the instant remedy. EAIC’s
motion for reconsideration was denied by the CA in its Resolution, dated
August 8, 2006. Hence, this petition for review.

ISSUE:

Whether the RTC validly acquired jurisdiction over the person of EAIC,
defendant in Civil Case No. 96-177.

HELD:

The Court finds merit in the petition. It is a settled rule that jurisdiction
over the defendant is acquired either upon a valid service of summons or the
defendant’s voluntary appearance in court. When the defendant does not
voluntarily submit to the court’s jurisdiction or when there is no valid service of
summons, any judgment of the court which has no jurisdiction over the person
of the defendant is null and void. The purpose of summons is not only to
acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, but also to give notice to
the defendant that an action has been commenced against it and to afford it an
opportunity to be heard on the claim made against it. The requirements of the
rule on summons must be strictly followed, otherwise, the trial court will not
acquire jurisdiction over the defendant. Granting arguendo that EAIC had
actual knowledge of the existence of Civil Case No. 96-177 lodged against it,
the RTC still failed to validly acquire jurisdiction over EAIC. In Cesar v.
Ricafort-Bautista, it was held that "x x x jurisdiction of the court over the
person of the defendant or respondent cannot be acquired notwithstanding his
knowledge of the pendency of a case against him unless he was validly served
with summons. Such is the important role a valid service of summons plays in
court actions."

The Court cannot likewise subscribe to respondents argument that by

filing its answer with counterclaim, through Domingo, with the RTC, EAIC is
deemed to have voluntarily submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the RTC. In
Salenga v. Court of Appeals, the Court stated: A corporation can only exercise
its powers and transact its business through its board of directors and through
its officers and agents when authorized by a board resolution or its bylaws. The
power of a corporation to sue and be sued is exercised by the board of
directors. The physical acts of the corporation, like the signing of documents,
can be performed only by natural persons duly authorized for the purpose by
corporate bylaws or by a specific act of the board.
 In this case, at the time she filed the Answer with Counterclaim,
Domingo was clearly not an officer of EAIC, much less duly authorized by any
board resolution or secretary’s certificate from EAIC to file the said Answer with
Counterclaim in behalf of EAIC. Undoubtedly, Domingo lacked the necessary
authority to bind EAIC to Civil Case No. 96-177 before the RTC despite the
filing of an Answer with Counterclaim. EAIC cannot be bound or deemed to
have voluntarily appeared before the RTC by the act of an unauthorized
stranger. Thus the petition is GRANTED. The July 1, 2003 Decision and
August 8, 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 64421,
are hereby REVERSED. The November 11, 1999 Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Lucena City, Branch 60, in Civil Case No. 96-177, is hereby declared
VACATED and SET ASIDE.

The records of the case is hereby ordered remanded to the Regional Trial
Court of Lucena City, Branch 60, for the proper service of summons to the
petitioner and other parties, if any, and for other appropriate proceedings.

5. MACASAET ET. AL. VS CO. - G.R. No. 156759

June 5, 2013

FACTS:

On July 3, 2000, respondent, a retired police officer assigned at the Western

Police District in Manila, sued Abante Tonite, a daily tabloid of general
circulation; its Publisher Allen A. Macasaet; its Managing Director Nicolas V.
Quijano; its Circulation Manager Isaias Albano; its Editors Janet Bay, Jesus R.
Galang and Randy Hagos; and its Columnist/Reporter Lily Reyes (petitioners),
claiming damages because of an allegedly libelous article petitioners published
in the June 6, 2000 issue of Abante Tonite. The suit, docketed as Civil Case
No. 0097907, was raffled to Branch 51 of the RTC, which in due course issued
summons to be served on each defendant, including Abante Tonite, at their
business address at Monica Publishing Corporation, 301-305 3rd Floor, BF
Condominium Building, Solana Street corner A. Soriano Street, Intramuros,
Manila. In the morning of September 18, 2000, RTC Sheriff Raul Medina
proceeded to the stated address to effect the personal service of the summons
on the defendants. But his efforts to personally serve each defendant in the
address were futile because the defendants were then out of the office and
unavailable. He returned in the afternoon of that day to make a second attempt
at serving the summons, but he was informed that petitioners were still out of
the office. He decided to resort to substituted service of the summons, and
explained why in his sheriff’s return dated September 22, 2005.

ISSUE:

Whether the jurisdiction over the petitioners have been acquired.

HELD:

Yes. Jurisdiction over the person, or jurisdiction in personam –the power of

the court to render a personal judgment or to subject the parties in a particular
action to the judgment and other rulings rendered in the action – is an element
of due process that is essential in all actions, civil as well as criminal, except in
actions in rem or quasi in rem. Jurisdiction over the defendant in an action in
rem or quasi in rem is not required, and the court acquires jurisdiction over an
action as long as it acquires jurisdiction over the res that is the subject matter
of the action. The purpose of summons in such action is not the acquisition of
jurisdiction over the defendant but mainly to satisfy the constitutional
requirement of due process.

As a rule, Philippine courts cannot try any case against a defendant who
does not reside and is not found in the Philippines because of the impossibility
of acquiring jurisdiction over his person unless he voluntarily appears in court;
but when the case is an action in rem or quasi in rem enumerated in Section
15, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, Philippine courts have jurisdiction to hear
and decide the case because they have jurisdiction over the res, and
jurisdiction over the person of the non-resident defendant is not essential. In
the latter instance, extraterritorial service of summons can be made upon the
defendant, and such extraterritorial service of summons is not for the purpose
of vesting the court with jurisdiction, but for the purpose of complying with the
requirements of fair play or due process, so that the defendant will be informed
of the pendency of the action against him and the possibility that property in
the Philippines belonging to him or in which he has an interest may be
subjected to a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, and he can thereby take steps
to protect his interest if he is so minded. On the other hand, when the
defendant in an action in personam does not reside and is not found in the
Philippines, our courts cannot try the case against him because of the
impossibility of acquiring jurisdiction over his person unless he voluntarily
appears in court.

As the initiating party, the plaintiff in a civil action voluntarily submits

himself to the jurisdiction of the court by the act of filing the initiatory
pleading. As to the defendant, the court acquires jurisdiction over his person
either by the proper service of the summons, or by a voluntary appearance in
the action.

The significance of the proper service of the summons on the defendant in

an action in personam cannot be overemphasized. The service of the summons
fulfills two fundamental objectives, namely: (a) to vest in the court jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant; and (b) to afford to the defendant the
opportunity to be heard on the claim brought against him. As to the former,
when jurisdiction in personam is not acquired in a civil action through the
proper service of the summons or upon a valid waiver of such proper service,
the ensuing trial and judgment are void. If the defendant knowingly does an act
inconsistent with the right to object to the lack of personal jurisdiction as to
him, like voluntarily appearing in the action, he is deemed to have submitted
himself to the jurisdiction of the court. As to the latter, the essence of due
process lies in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit any
evidence the defendant may have in support of his defense. With the proper
service of the summons being intended to afford to him the opportunity to be
heard on the claim against him, he may also waive the process. In other words,
compliance with the rules regarding the service of the summons is as much an
issue of due process as it is of jurisdiction.

Under the Rules of Court, the service of the summons should firstly be
effected on the defendant himself whenever practicable. Such personal service
consists either in handing a copy of the summons to the defendant in person,
or, if the defendant refuses to receive and sign for it, in tendering it to him. The
rule on personal service is to be rigidly enforced in order to ensure the
realization of the two fundamental objectives earlier mentioned. If, for
justifiable reasons, the defendant cannot be served in person within a
reasonable time, the service of the summons may then be effected either (a) by
leaving a copy of the summons at his residence with some person of suitable
age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copy at his office
or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof. The
latter mode of service is known as substituted service because the service of
the summons on the defendant is made through his substitute.

There is no question that Sheriff Medina twice attempted to serve the

summons upon each of petitioners in person at their office address, the first in
the morning of September 18, 2000 and the second in the afternoon of the
same date. Each attempt failed because Macasaet and Quijano were “always
out and not available” and the other petitioners were “always roving outside
and gathering news.” After Medina learned from those present in the office
address on his second attempt that there was no likelihood of any of petitioners
going to the office during the business hours of that or any other day, he
concluded that further attempts to serve them in person within a reasonable
time would be futile. The circumstances fully warranted his conclusion. He was
not expected or required as the serving officer to effect personal service by all
means and at all times, considering that he was expressly authorized to resort
to substituted service should he be unable to effect the personal service within
a reasonable time. In that regard, what was a reasonable time was dependent
on the circumstances obtaining. While we are strict in insisting on personal
service on the defendant, we do not cling to such strictness should the
circumstances already justify substituted service instead. It is the spirit of the
procedural rules, not their letter, that governs.