RULE 91 – ESCHEATS be awarded to the latter, pursuant to the provisions of section
571 (sic) of Act No. 190, which property was specified in the
[G.R. No. 21570. August 30, 1924. ]
Intestate estate of Julia de la Peña, deceased. DIEGO DE
GUZMAN, ET AL., Petitioners-Appellants, v. RUFINO SEVILLA,
ET AL., opponents-appellants.
SYLLABUS
1. SUCCESSION; NATURAL CHILDREN; HEIRS OF. — The persons entitled to succeed
a natural child in an intestate succession are the father or mother who
acknowledged it (art. 944, Civil Code), and in default of either, its natural brothers
(art. 945, Civil Code). And with the exception of the relatives mentioned in said
articles 944 and 945 of the Civil Code, no other relative of the natural child has the
right to succeed it, as is clearly provided by article 943 of the same Code.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; AWARDING OF ESTATE. — Although there are no relatives entitled to
succeed the deceased, it is, however, premature to award the estate to the State
before the requirements of sections 750 to 752 of the Code of Civil Procedure are
complied with.
This case is concerned with the inheritance of the deceased Julia
de la Peña. The evidence shows that this Julia de la Peña was
daughter of Julio Sevilla and Catalina de la Peña, who were not
married. The petitioners have introduced evidence to the effect
that Julia de la Peña was an adulterous child because Julio Sevilla
was married with Josefa Gutierrez who was alive at that time.
The fact is that Julia de la Peña was a child of unmarried parents,
and therefore she was not a legitimate child, nor does she appear
to have been legitimated, and is, at most, an acknowledged
natural child, supposing it not to have been proven that she was
an adulterous child, as alleged by the petitioners.
Now the persons entitled to succeed a natural child in an
intestate succession are the father or mother who acknowledged
it (art. 944, Civil Code), and in default of either, its natural
brothers (art. 945, Civil Code). It was not proven nor it is
contended that the petitioners or the opponents are parents or
brothers of the deceased Julia de la Peña; and with the exception
of the relatives mentioned in said articles 944 and 945 of the Civil
Code, no other relative of the natural child has the right to
succeed it, as is clearly provided by article 943 of the same Code.
It is therefore, clear that neither the petitioners nor the
opponents can be declared heirs of the deceased Julia de la Peña
without a will.
We find no error in the order appealed from, except in its last
disposition which says "In lieu thereof, the estate is awarded to
the State." We think this awarding is premature because the
requirements of sections 750 to 752 of the Code of Civil
Procedure have not previously been complied with. The order
appealed from is affirmed
G.R. No. L-4824 February 13, 1912
In re estate of the deceased Chinaman BERNARDO RAFANAN
LAO SAYCO, alias SAYA. LAY CHUYTING, appellant.
This is an appeal by the Chinaman Lao Chiama, administrator of
the estate of the decedent Bernardo Rafanan Lao
Sayco, alias Saya, and guardian of the minor Lay Chuyting, from
the judgment rendered in these special proceedings. That, on
January 23, 1906, the municipal council of Mambajao appeared in
the said proceedings and prayed that, since Bernardo Rafanan
died in that pueblo without leaving any known legitimate
successor, the real and personal property left by the said
decedent within the district of the property left by the said
decedent within the district of the aforementioned municipality
inventory presented by the testamentary executor, Lao Chiaman;
that on October 19 of the same year, the administrator, Lao
Chiaman, filed a written petition wherein he alleged that there
were no longer any debts to pay any debts to pay and therefore
requested that, upon the approval of his final account, his
administration be closed, and, as the guardian of the Chiaman Lay
Chuyting, requested that the property referred to be delivered to
the latter as the son and sole heir of the decedent Rafanan; that
the municipal council of Mambajao, which believed that it was
entitled to the said property, opposed its delivery to the alleged
heir, whose character as such was denied by the petitioner, who
therefore prayed that he admitted as a party to the proceedings
and that a day be set for the hearing of the case, in order that the
alleged heir, Lay Chuyting, might prove his right, and should he
fail so to do, then that the right of the municipal council of
Mambajao be recognized, with such other findings, in addition, as
law and justice might demand.
Lao Chiaman, administrator of the property of the decedent
Rafanan and guardian of the minor Lay Chuyting, opposed in
writing the petition of the municipality of Mambajao, on the
ground that the said decedent left a legal heir, the minor Lay
Chuyting, residing in China, who was a son of the deceased Lao
Ta, the latter a brother of the decedent Bernardo Rafanan Lao
Sayco, and that, therefore, Lay Chuyting was the latter's nephew,
and not his son, as previously erroneously stated in the course of
these proceedings. The court, on March 5, 1908, rendered
judgment ordering that the property left by the decedent,
Bernardo Rafanan Lao Sayco, known by the name of Saya, be
assigned to the municipality of Mambajao, Province of Misamis,
to be administered by its municipal council and placed at the
disposal of the school in the same manner as other property
intended for the same use.
This case concerns the revision to the State of certain property
which was left at death by the Chinaman Bernardo Rafanan Lao
Sayco, alias Saya, who died in the pueblo of Mambajao, Province
of Misamis apparently without having executed any will during
his lifetime and without leaving any known heirs in said locality.
Counsel for the municipality of Mambajao merely prayed for an
order of reversion and for the adjudication in behalf of the
municipality of the property aforementioned; he did not comply
with the provisions of the law by furnishing the required proofs
in regard to the matters hereinabove indicated, which must be
the subject of an investigation. For the reasons aforestated, it is
proper, in our opinion, to reverse the judgment appealed from.
G.R. No. L-30381 August 30, 1988
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, BRANCH XIII, HON. JESUS P.
MORFE, PRESIDING JUDGE, AND PRES. ROXAS RURAL BANK
INC., respondents.
FACTS: Pursuant to Section 2 of Act No. 3936, otherwise known
as the Unclaimed Balance Law, some 31 banks including herein
private respondent Pres. Roxas Rural Bank forwarded to the
Treasurer of the Philippines in January of 1968 separate
statements under oath by their respective managing officers of all
deposits and credits held by them in favor, or in the names of
such depositors or creditors known to be dead, or who have not
been heard from, or who have not made further deposits or
withdrawals during the preceding ten years or more.
In the sworn statement submitted by private respondent Bank,
only two (2) names appeared: Jesus Ydirin with a balance of
P126.54 and Leonora Trumpeta with a deposit of P62.91. Upon
receipt of these sworn statements, the Treasurer of the
Philippines caused the same to be published. Republic of the
Philippines instituted before the CFI of Manila a complaint for
escheat against the aforesaid 31 banks, including herein private
respondent. Likewise named defendants therein were the
individual depositors and/or creditors reported in the sworn
statements and listed in Annex "A" of the complaint. On October
5,1968, private respondent Bank filed before the CFI a motion to
dismiss the complaint as against it on the ground of improper
venue. Opposed by the petitioner, the motion to dismiss was
granted in the first assailed Order.
ISSUES: a. Whether or not Pres. Roxas Rural Bank is a real party in
interest in the escheat proceedings or in Civil Case No. 73707 of the
Court of First Instance of Manila.
b. Whether or not venue of action in Civil Case No. 73707 has been
properly laid in the City of Manila, since all defendant banks,
wherever they may be found, could be included in one single action,
pursuant to the provisions of Act No. 3936.
c. Whether or not Section 2(b), Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court
on venue, likewise, governs escheat proceedings instituted by the
Republic in the Court of First Instance of Manila.
It is petitioner's contention that private respondent bank, being a
mere nominal party, could not file a motion to dismiss on the
ground of improper venue, the real party in interest being the
depositors themselves; that the avowed purpose of Act No. 3936
is to benefit the government by escheating unto itself dormant
bank deposits and that this purpose will be defeated if escheat
proceedings will have to be instituted in each and every province
or city where a bank is located because of the publication
expense.
HELD: We find these contentions unmeritorious. A "real party in
interest" has been defined as the party who would be benefitted
or injured by the judgment of the suit or the party entitled to
avail of the suit. 1 There can be no doubt that private respondent
bank falls under this definition for the escheat of the dormant
deposits in favor of the government would necessarily deprive
said bank of the use of such deposits. It is in this sense that it
stands to be "injured by the judgment of the suit;" and it is for
this reason that Section 3 of Act No. 3936 specifically provides
that the bank shall be joined as a party in the action for escheat,
thus:
Section 3. Whenever the Attorney General shall
be informed of such unclaimed balances, he
shall commence an action or actions in the
name of the People of the Philippines in the
Court of First Instance of the province where
the bank is located, in which shall be joined as
parties the bank and such creditors or
depositors. All or any member of such creditors
or depositors or banks, may be included in one
action. (Emphasis supplied.)
Indeed, if the bank were not a real party in interest, the
legislature would not have provided for its joining as a party in
the escheat proceedings. Besides, under Section 2, Rule 3 of the
Rules of Court, private respondent bank is a real party in interest
as its presence in the action is necessary for a complete
determination and settlement of the questions involved therein.
The first sentence of Section 3 of Act No. 3936 directs the
Attorney General, now Solicitor General, to commence an action
or actions in the name of the People of the Philippines in the
Court of First Instance of the province where the bank is located.
Anent the third issue raised, suffice it to say that Section 2(b) of
Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court cannot govern escheat
proceedings principally because said section refers to personal
actions. Escheat proceedings are actions in rem which must be
brought in the province or city where the rem in this case the
dormant deposits, is located. We note that while private
respondent bank's motion to dismiss was granted, the trial court
in a subsequent order dated November 16, 1968 declared private
respondent bank's depositors and co-defendants Jose Ydirin and
Leonora Trumpeta in default for failure to file their answers.
RULES 91 – 97 – GUARDIANSHIP
G.R. No. 95305 August 20, 1992
ELENA, OSCAR, CELIA, TERESITA and VIRGILIO, all surnamed
LINDAIN, petitioners, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS,
SPOUSES APOLINIA VALIENTE and FEDERICO
ILA, respondents.
FACTS: When the plaintiffs were still minors, they were already
the registered owners of a parcel of land; their mother, Dolores
Luluquisin, then already a widow and acting as guardian of her
minor children, sold the land for P2,000 under a Deed of Absolute
Sale of Registered Land (Exh. 2) to the defendants spouses
Apolonia Valiente and Federico Ila. The Deed of Absolute Sale
was registered in the office of the Register of Deeds for the
Province of Nueva Ecija. The defendants admitted that the
property in question was sold to them by the mother of the
minors as evidenced by a Deed of Sale. Plaintiffs contend,
however, that the sale of the lot by their mother to the
defendants is null and void because it was made without judicial
authority and/or court approval. The defendants, on the other
hand, contend that the sale was valid, as the value of the property
was less than P2,000, and, considering the ages of plaintiffs now,
the youngest being 31 years old at the time of the filing of the
complaint, their right to rescind the contract which should have
been exercised four (4) years after reaching the age of majority,
has already prescribed. On May 25, 1989, the Regional Trial Court
of San Jose City rendered a decision for the plaintiffs (now
petitioners). Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals, the decision
was reversed.
ISSUE: whether judicial approval was necessary for the sale of the
minors' property by their mother. We find merit in the petition for
review.
HELD: Art. 320 of the New Civil Code, which was already in
force when the assailed transaction occurred, provides:
Art. 320.— The father, or in his absence the
mother, is the legal administrator of the
property pertaining to the child under parental
authority. If the property is worth more than
two thousand pesos, the father or mother shall
give a bond subject to the approval of the Court
of First Instance.
Under the law, a parent, acting merely as the legal (as
distinguished from judicial) administrator of the property of
his/her minor children, does not have the power to dispose of, or
alienate, the property of said children without judicial approval.
The powers and duties of the widow as legal administrator of her
minor children's property as provided in Rule 84 by the Rules of
Court entitled, "General Powers and Duties of Executors and
Administrators" are only powers of possession and management.
Her power to sell, mortgage, encumber or otherwise dispose of
the property of her minor children must proceed from the court,
as provided in Rule 89 which requires court authority and
approval.
The private respondents' allegation that they are purchasers in
good faith is not credible for they knew from the very beginning
that their vendor, the petitioners' mother, without court approval
could not validly convey to them the property of her minor
children. Knowing her lack of judicial authority to enter into the
transaction, the private respondents acted in bad faith when they
went ahead and bought the land from her anyway. One who
acquires or purchases real property with knowledge of a defect in
the title of his vendor cannot claim that he acquired title thereto
in good faith as against the owner of the property or for an
interest therein. The minors' action for reconveyance has not yet
prescribed for "real actions over immovables prescribe after
thirty years" (Art. 1141, Civil Code). Since the sale took place in
1966, the action to recover the property had not yet prescribed
when the petitioners sued in 1987. WHEREFORE, the petition is
GRANTED.
G.R. No. L-27876 April 22, 1992
ADELAIDA S. MANECLANG, in her capacity as Administrator
of the Intestate Estate of the late Margarita Suri
Santos, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JUAN T. BAUN and AMPARO S.
BAUN, ET AL., defendants. CITY OF DAGUPAN, defendant-
appellant.
ISSUE: the validity of a sale of a parcel of land by the
administrator of an intestate estate made pursuant to a petition
for authority to sell and an order granting it which were filed and
entered, respectively, without notice to the heirs of the
decedents.
FACTS: The records disclose that on 12 June 1947, Margarita Suri
Santos died intestate. She was survived by her husband Severo
Maneclang and nine (9) children. On 30 July 1947, a petition for
the settlement of her estate was filed by Hector S. Maneclang, one
of her legitimate children, with the Court of First Instance at
Dagupan City, Pangasinan.
No guardian ad litem was appointed by the court for the minor
children. Margarita left several parcels of land. Pedro M.
Feliciano, the administrator of the intestate estate of Margarita,
filed a petition in SP Proc. No. 3028 asking the court to give him
"the authority to dispose of so much of the estate that is
necessary to meet the debts enumerated" in the petition. While
notice thereof was given to the surviving spouse, Severo
Maneclang, through his counsel, Atty. Teofilo Guadiz, no such
notice was sent to the heirs of Margarita.
On 9 September 1949, despite the absence of notice to the heirs,
the intestate court issued an Order "authorizing the
administrator to mortgage or sell so much of the properties of the
estate for the purposes (sic) of paying off the obligations"
referred to in the petition. Pursuant to this Order, Oscar
Maneclang, the new administrator of the intestate estate,
executed on 4 October 1952 a deed of sale 1 in favor of the City of
Dagupan, represented by its mayor, Angel B. Fernandez, of a
portion consisting of 4,415 square meters of the aforementioned
Lot No. 203 for and in consideration of P11,687.50. This sale was
approved by the intestate court on 15 March 1954. The City of
Dagupan immediately took possession of the land and
constructed thereon a public market. The new judicial
administratrix of the intestate estate, Adelaida S. Maneclang,
daughter of the late Margarita Suri Santos, filed with the Court of
First Instance of Pangasinan an action for the annulment of the
sales made by the previous administrator pursuant to the order
of 9 September 1949, cancellation of titles, recovery of
possession and damages against the vendees.
The evidence adduced by plaintiff discloses that Oscar Maneclang
was induced by its then incumbent Mayor, Atty. Angel B.
Fernandez, to sell the property to the City of Dagupan and that
the said City has been leasing the premises out to numerous
tenants at the rate of P0.83 per square meter per month, or a
total monthly rental of P3,747.45, since 4 October 1952. On 9
November 1966, the trial court rendered a partial decision
against the City of Dagupan. The City of Dagupan appealed to this
Court 12 alleging that said decision is contrary to law, the facts
and the evidence on record, and that the amount involved
exceeds P500,000.00.
HELD: 1. In support of the first, appellant maintains that notice of
the application for authority to sell was given to Severo
Maneclang, surviving spouse of Margarita. These contentions are
without merit. Article 320 of the Civil Code does not apply. While
the petition for authority to sell was filed on 2 September 1949,
the Civil Code took effect only on 30 August 1950. 16 Thus, the
governing law at the time of the filing of the petition was Article
159 of the Civil Code of Spain which provides as follows:
The father, or in his default, the mother, shall be
the legal administrator of the property of the
children who are subject to parental authority.
Article 320 of the present Civil Code, taken from the aforesaid
Article 159, incorporates the amendment that if the property
under administration is worth more than two thousand pesos
(P2,000.00), the father or the mother shall give a bond subject to
the approval of the Court of First Instance. This provision then
restores the old rule 18 which made the father or mother, as such,
the administrator of the child's property. Be that as it may, it does
not follow that for purposes of complying with the requirement
of notice under Rule 89 of the Rules of the Court, notice to the
father is notice to the children. Sections 2, 4 and 7 of said Rule
state explicitly that the notice, which must be in be writing, must
be given to the heirs, devisees, and legatees and that the court
shall fix a time and place for hearing such petition and cause
notice to be given to the interested parties.
In this case, however, only the surviving spouse, Severo
Maneclang, was notified through his counsel. Two of the heirs,
Hector Maneclang and Oscar Maneclang, who were then of legal
age, were not represented by counsel. The remaining seven (7)
children were still minors with no guardian ad litem having been
appointed to represent them. Obviously then, the requirement of
notice was not satisfied. The requisite set forth in the aforesaid
sections of Rule 89 are mandatory and essential. Without them,
the authority to sell, the sale itself and the order approving it
would be null and void ab initio. 19 The reason behind this
requirement is that the heirs, as the presumptive owners 20 since
they succeed to all the rights and obligations of the deceased
from the moment of the latter's death, 21 are the persons directly
affected by the sale or mortage and therefore cannot be deprived
of the property except in the manner provided by law.
Consequently, for want of notice to the children, the Order of 9
September 1949 granting the application, the sale in question of
4 October 1952 and the Order of 15 March 1954 approving the
sale are all void ab initio as against said children. Severo
Maneclang, however, stands on different ground altogether.
Having been duly notified of the application, he was bound by the
said order, sale and approval of the latter. However, the only
interest which Severino Maneclang would have over the property
is his right of usufruct which is equal to that corresponding by
way of legitime pertaining to each of the surviving children.
2 Estoppel is unavailable as an argument against the
administratrix of the estate and against the children.
3 As to prescription, this Court ruled in the Boñaga case that
"[a]ctions to declare the inexistence of contracts do not prescribe
(Art. 1410, N.C.C.), a principle applied even before the effectivity
of the new Civil Code.
4. Laches is different from prescription. While prescription is
concerned with the fact of delay, laches is concerned with the
effect of delay. Prescription is a matter of time; laches is
principally a question of inequity of permitting a claim to be
enforced, this inequity being founded on some change in the
condition of the property or the relation of the parties.
Prescription is statutory; laches is not. Laches applies in equity,
whereas prescription applies at law. Prescription is based on
fixed time, laches is not. In the instant case, from time the deed of
sale in favor of the City of Dagupan was executed on 4 October
1952, up to the time of the filing of the complaint for annulment
on 28 September 1965, twelve (12) years, ten (10) months and
twenty-four (24) days had elapsed. As it was Oscar who executed
the deed of sale, he cannot be expected to renounce his own act.
With respect to Hector, Cesar and Amanda, they should have
taken immediate steps to protect their rights. Their failure to do
so for thirteen (13) years amounted to such inaction and delay as
to constitute laches. This conclusion, however, cannot apply to
the rest of the children — who were then minors and not
represented by any legal representative. They could not have
filed an action to protect their interests; hence, neither delay nor
negligence could be attributed to them as a basis for laches.
Accordingly, the estate is entitled to recover 5/9 of the
questioned property.
5. In ruling out good faith, the trial court took into account the
testimony of Oscar Maneclang to the effect that it was Mayor
Fernandez of Dagupan City and Councilor Teofilo Guadiz, Sr.,
both lawyers, who induced him to sell the property and that the
execution of the sale was witnessed by the City Fiscal. We are
unable to agree. We find no circumstance in this case to have
alerted the vendee, the City of Dagupan, to a possible flaw or
defect in the authority of the judicial administrator to sell the
property. Since good faith is always presumed, and upon him
who alleges bad faith on the part of the possessor rests the
burden of proof, 30 it was incumbent upon the administrator to
established such proof, which We find to be wanting.
6. However, upon the filing of the Answer, the City of Dagupan
already became a possessor in bad faith. This brings Us to the
issue of reasonable rentals, which the trial court fixed at
P3,747.45 a month. Pursuant to Article 546 of the Civil Code, the
City of Dagupan may retain possession of the property until it
shall have been fully reimbursed the value of the building in the
amount of P100,000.00 and 5/9 of the purchase price amounting
to P6,493.05.
[G.R. No. L-5131. July 31, 1952.]
ANTONIO MA. CUI and MERCEDES CUI DE RAMAS, Petitioners,
v. EDMUNDO S. PICCIO, as Judge of the Court of First Instance
of Cebu, Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. GUARDIANSHIP; WARD’S PROPERTY CONCEALED OR EMBEZZLED; PURPOSE OF
EXAMINATION OF PERSON CONCEALING OR HAVING EMBEZZLED SUCH
PROPERTY. — Neither in guardianship proceedings nor in administration
proceedings may the court determine the ownership of property claimed by the
guardian or administrator to belong to the ward or to the estate of the deceased, and
order its delivery to them. The purpose of section 3 of Rule 97 and section 6 of Rule
88 is merely to secure evidence from persons suspected of embezzling, concealing
or conveying away any property of the ward or of the deceased so as to enable said
guardian or administrator to institute the appropriate action to obtain the
possession of and secure title to said property, all for the protection of the interests
of the ward and the estate of the deceased. The court may, however, issue an order
directing the delivery or return of any property embezzled, concealed or conveyed
which belongs to a ward, where the right or title of said ward is clear and
indisputable (Castillo v. Bustamante, 64 Phil., 839). Where title to any property said
to be embezzled, concealed or conveyed is in question as in the instant case, the
determination of said title or right whether in favor of the ward or in favor of the
person said to have embezzled, concealed or conveyed the property must be
determined in a separate ordinary action and not in guardianship proceedings.
FACTS: Don Mariano Cui, widower, sold said three lots to three of
his children named Rosario C. de Encarnacion, Mercedes C. de
Ramas and Antonio Ma. Cui, pro indiviso for the sum of P64,000.
Because Rosario C. de Encarnacion for lack of funds was unable
to pay her corresponding share of the purchase price, the sale to
her was cancelled and the one-third of the property
corresponding to her was returned to the vendor. These three
lots are commercial. Don. Mariano and his children Mercedes and
Antonio became co-owners of the whole mass in equal portions.
In the deed of sale vendor Don Mariano retained for himself the
usufruct of the property. Subsequently, a building was erected on
a portion of this mass facing Calderon street and was occupied by
a Chinese businessman for which he paid Don Mariano P600 a
month as rental. Sometime after the sale to Mercedes and
Antonio the two applied to the Rehabilitation Finance
Corporation (RFC) for a loan of P130,000 with which to construct
a 12-door commercial building presumably on a portion of the
entire parcel corresponding to their share. Don Mariano on
January 7, 1947, executed an authority to mortgage (Annex U)
authorizing his two children co-owners to mortgage his share.
The loan was eventually granted and was secured by a mortgage.
The 12-door commercial building was eventually constructed
and the builder-owners thereof Mercedes and Antonio received
and continued to receive the rents thereof amounting to P4,800 a
month and paying therefrom the installments due for payment on
the loan to the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation. On March 25,
1948, two other children of Don Mariano named Jesus and Jorge
brought an action in the Court of First Instance of Cebu for the
purpose of annulling the deed of sale of the three lots in question
on the ground that they belonged to the conjugal partnership of
Don Mariano and his deceased wife Antonia Perales. Thereafter,
plaintiffs Jesus and Jorge applied for the appointment of a
receiver to take charge of the lots and of the rentals of the
building. This petition was denied on November 8, 1948. On
March 19, 1949, Rosario C. de Encarnacion, that daughter of Don
Mariano who was one of the original vendees, filed a petition to
declare her father incompetent and to have a guardian appointed
for his property. Petition was granted.
On June 15, 1949, guardian Victorino Reynes filed a motion in the
guardianship proceedings seeking authority to collect the rentals
from the three lots in question and asking the Court to order
Antonio and Mercedes to deliver to him as guardian all the
rentals they had previously collected from the 12-door
commercial building, together with all the papers belonging to
his ward. This motion was denied. Judge Saguin rendered a
decision in civil case No. 599-R and found that the three lots in
question were not conjugal property but belonged exclusively to
Don Mariano and so upheld the sale of two-thirds of said lots to
Antonio and Mercedes. The plaintiffs appealed to the Court of
Appeals where the case is now pending.
On September 5, 1961, respondent Judge Piccio, the same Judge
who had denied a similar motion about two years before, that is,
on July 12, 1949, granted the motion in his order of the same date
directing Antonio and Mercedes to deliver to the guardian the
rentals of the building they had so far collected, at the same time
authorizing the guardian to collect future rentals. Said
determination requires an interpretation of section 6, Rule 97 of
the Rules of Court which reads as follows:
"SEC 6. Proceedings when person suspected of embezzling or concealing
property of ward. — Upon complaint of the guardian or ward, or of any person
having an actual or prospective interest in the estate of the ward as creditor, heir, or
otherwise, that anyone is suspected of having embezzled, concealed, or conveyed
away any money, goods, or interest, or a written instrument, belonging to the ward
or his estate, the court may cite the suspected person to appear for examination
touching such money, goods, interest, or instrument, and make such orders as will
secure the estate against such embezzlement, concealment, or conveyance."
We believe that the purpose of these two rules, Rule 97, section 6
and Rule 88, section 6 of the Rules of Court is merely to secure
evidence from persons suspected of embezzling, concealing or
conveying away any property of the ward or of the deceased so
as to enable said guardian or administrator to institute the
appropriate action to obtain the possession of and secure title to
said property, all for the protection of the interests of the ward
and the estate of the deceased.
This Court in that case said in effect that while in administration
proceedings the court under section 709 may only question the
person suspected of having embezzled, concealed or conveyed
away property belonging to the estate, section 593 of the same
Code of Civil Procedure authorizes the Judge or the court to issue
such orders as may be necessary to secure the estate against
concealment, embezzlement and conveyance, and this distinction
is now given emphasis by respondents’ counsel.
In the present case, is the right of the ward, Don Mariano, to the
rentals of the 12-door building, clear and indisputable? The
answer is definitely in the negative. Without any attempt or
desire to determine the rights or lack of right of the ward to said
rentals and prejudge the civil action No. R-1720 brought by the
guardian in the Court of First Instance of Cebu to recover said
rentals, on the basis only of the documents involved or presented
in this certiorari proceedings and without any additional
evidence, there are reasons to believe that the scales of title
instead of favoring the ward, incline more in favor of and point to
the owners of the building. We need not state those reasons here.
In conclusion, we hold that the respondent Judge had no
jurisdiction to issue his order of September 5, 1951, in the
guardianship proceedings requiring the petitioners to deliver the
rentals collected by them to the guardian and authorizing the
latter to collect rentals in the future, for the reason that the
jurisdiction of the court in guardianship proceedings, ordinarily,
is to cite persons suspected of having embezzled, concealed or
conveyed property belonging to the ward for the purpose of
obtaining information which may be used in an action later to be
instituted by the guardian to protect the right of the ward; and
that only in extreme cases, where property clearly belongs to the
ward or where his title thereto has already been judicially
decided, may the court direct its delivery to the guardian. In view
of the foregoing, the petition is granted.
G.R. No. L-57438 January 3, 1984
FELICIANO FRANCISCO, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF
APPEALS and PELAGIO FRANCISCO, respondents.
FACTS: Petitioner is the duly appointed guardian of the
incompetent Estefania San Pedro. Respondent Pelagio Francisco,
claiming to be a first cousin of Estefania San Pedro, together with
two others, said to be nieces of the incompetent, petitioned the
court for the removal of petitioner and for the appointment in his
stead of respondent Pelagio Francisco. Among other grounds, the
petition was based on the failure of the guardian to submit an
inventory of the estate of his ward and to render an accounting.
It would seem that petitioner subsequently rendered an
accounting but failed to submit an inventory, for which reason
the court on March 20, 1975 gave petitioner ten (10) days within
which to do so, otherwise he would be removed from
guardianship Petitioner thereafter submitted an inventory to
which respondent Pelagio Francisco filed an objection on the
ground that petitioner actually received P14,000.00 for the sale
of a residential land and not P12,000.00 only as stated in the
deed of sale and reported by him in his inventory. The
respondent Judge found the claim to be true, and, in his order of
April 17, 1980 relieved the petitioner as guardian.
On motion of petitioner, however, the respondent Judge
reconsidered his finding, relying on the deed of sale as the best
evidence of the price paid for the sale of the land. in his order
dated September 12, 1980, respondent judge acknowledged that
his finding was "rather harsh and somewhat unfair to the said
guardian." Nevertheless, respondent Judge ordered the
retirement of petitioner on the ground of old age.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, contending that he
was only 72 years of age and still fit to continue with the
management of the estate of his ward as he had done with zeal
for the past twelve years. In an order dated November 13, 1980
the court denied his motion. The trial court, however,
disregarded the opposition and required petitioner on January
27, 1981 to submit within three (3) days his nomination for
guardian of Estefania San Pedro as required in its order of
September 12, 1980, the court holding that "an indefinite
continuance in office would defeat the intent and purpose of the
said order of September 12, 1980, relieving the present
guardian." 4
The court a quo appointed respondent Pelagio Francisco as the
new guardian of the person and property of the incompetent
Estefania San Pedro. On March 13, 1981, petitioner filed with the
defunct Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari challenging the
validity of the order of the trial court granting the execution
pending appeal of its decision and appointing respondent Pelagio
Francisco as the new guardian despite the fact that respondent is
five (5) years older than petitioner. The Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition.
the petition at bar, petitioner contends that (a) The Honorable
Court of Appeals has committed grave abuse of discretion in
holding that the removal of petitioner as guardian of the ward
Estefania San Pedro on the ground of old age is a good ground for
the execution of the decision pending appeal; and (b) The
Honorable Court of Appeals committed grave misapprehension
and misinterpretation of facts when it declared that petitioner
did not question the appointment of private respondent as
guardian in his stead on the ground that the latter is older than
the former by five (5) years. A guardianship is a trust relation of
the most sacred character, in which one person, called a
"guardian" acts for another called the "ward" whom the law
regards as incapable of managing his own affairs.11 A
guardianship is designed to further the ward's well-being, not
that of the guardian, It is intended to preserve the ward's
property, as wen as to render any assistance that the ward may
personally require. It has been stated that while custody involves
immediate care and control, guardianship indicates not only
those responsibilities, but those of one in loco parentis as
well. 12
Having in mind that guardianship proceeding is instituted for the
benefit and welfare of the ward, the selection of a guardian must,
therefore, suit this very purpose. Thus, in determining the
selection of a guardian, the court may consider the financial
situation, the physical condition, the sound judgment, prudence
and trustworthiness, the morals, character and conduct, and the
present and past history of a prospective appointee, as wen as
the probability of his, being able to exercise the powers and
duties of guardian for the full period during which guardianship
will be necessary. A guardian is or becomes incompetent to serve
the trust if he is so disqualified by mental incapacity, conviction
of crime, moral delinquency or physical disability as to be
prevented from properly discharging the duties of his office. 14 A
guardian, once appointed may be removed in case he becomes
insane or otherwise incapable of discharging his trust or
unsuitable therefor, or has wasted or mismanaged the estate, or
failed for thirty (30) days after it is due to render an account or
make a return.15
We agree with the trial court and the appellate court that there is
need for petitioner Feliciano Francisco to be retired from the
guardianship over the person and property of incompetent
Estefania San Pedro. The conclusion reached by the trial court
about the "rather advanced age" of petitioner at 72 years old
(petitioner is now 76 years old) finding him unfit to continue the
trust cannot be disturbed. While age alone is not a control
criterion in determining a person's fitness or qualification to be
appointed or be retained as guardian, it may be a factor for
consideration. 16
We sustain the immediate retirement of petitioner Feliciano
Francisco as guardian, affirming thereby the rulings of both the
trial court and the appellate court. With respect to the issue of
execution pending appeal in appointing respondent Pelagio
Francisco as guardian to succeed petitioner while the latter's
appeal was still pending, We hold and rule that respondent
appellate court correctly sustained the propriety of said
execution pending appeal. Upon urgent and compelling reasons,
execution pending appeal is a matter of sound discretion on the
part of the trial court, 17 and the appellate court will not
interfere, control or inquire into the exercise of this discretion,
unless there has been an abuse thereof, 18 which We find none
herein. Inasmuch as the primary objective for the institution of
guardianship is for the protection of the ward, there is more than
sufficient reason for the immediate execution of the lower court's
judgment for the replacement of the first guardian.
G.R. No. L-45963 October 12, 1939
CARLOS PARDO DE TAVERA and CARMEN PARDO DE TAVERA
MANZANO, plaintiffs-appellants, vs. EL HOGAR FILIPINO,
INC., defendant-appellee. TAVERA-LUNA, INC., defendant-
appellant; VICENTE MADRIGAL, defendant-appellee.
FACTS: On January 17, 1931, defendant corporation, Tavera-
Luna Inc., for the purpose of constructing the Crystal Arcade
building on its premises at Escolta, Manila. To secure this loan,
the corporation executed a first mortgage on said premises and
on the building proposed to be erected thereon. On February 11,
1932, Tavera-Luna, Inc., secured from El Hogar Filipino an
additional loan of P300,000 with the same security executed for
the original loan. The Tavera-Luna, Inc., thereafter, defaulted in
the payment of the monthly amortizations on the loan:
whereupon, El Hogar Filipino foreclosed the mortgage proceeded
with the extra-judicial sale of the Crystal Arcade building, at
which it was the highest bidder for P1,363,555.36. One day
before the expiration of the period of redemption, Carlos Pardo
de Tavera and Carmen Pardo de Tavera Manzano, in their
capacity as stockholders of the Tavera-Luna, Inc., and El Hogar
Filipino, Inc., to annul the two secured loans as well as extra-
judicial sale made in favor of the latter.
ISSUE: whether or not the two secured loans are null and void.
HELD: We find it unnecessary to determine, in the instant case,
whether the Crystal Arcade is or is not a public building, for, even
if it is, the loan are valid. A loan given on a property which may be
considered as a public building, is not, in itself, null and void. It is
unlawful to make loans on that kind of security, but the law does
not declare the loan, once made, to be null and void. The unlawful
taking of the security may constitute a misuser of the powers
conferred upon the corporation by its charter, for which it may
be made to answer in an action for ouster or dissolution; but
certainly the stockholders and depositors of the corporation
should not be punished with a loss of the money loaned nor the
borrower be rewarded with it.
Appellants contend that El Hogar Filipino has been given the
possession and administration of the Crystal Arcade building, so
that it may apply the rentals thereof to the payment of interest
and the capital owed by Tavera-Luna, Inc., and that due to the
negligence of El Hogar Filipino, no rental sufficient to cover the
monthly amortizations on the debt had been realized therefrom.
Judgment is affirmed, with costs against appellants
G.R. No. L-58319 June 29, 1982
PATRIA PACIENTE, petitioner, vs. HON. AUXENCIO C.
DACUYCUY, Presiding Judge of the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court of Leyte and Southern Leyte; respondents.
FACTS: In 1972, Leonardo Homeres died leaving his wife, Lilia
Samson Homeres, and two minor children, Shirley and Leandro, a
parcel of land. Lilia S. Homeres, sold Lot No. 3085-G to Conchita
Dumdum for P10,000.00. On November 11, 1976, Lilia S.
Homeres filed a petition for guardianship over the persons and
estate of the minors. The petition was granted.
On September 21, 1977, Conchita Dumdum sold Lot No. 3085-G,
which had been titled in her name under TCT No. T-13121, to
petitioner Patria Paciente for the amount of P15,000.00. On
December 27, 1978, the petitioner mortgaged the lot to the
Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation for P30,000.00. Upon
being thus informed by the Register of Deeds, the respondent
court issued an order on November 14, 1980, directing the
petitioner and the manager of the Consolidated Bank and Trust
Corporation to appear before the court on January 21, 1981 and
show cause why TCT No. T-13238, covering a parcel of land co-
owned by the minors, Shirley and Leandro Homeres, should not
be cancelled for having been alienated without authority from the
court.
ISSUE: whether the respondent court acting as a guardianship
court has jurisdiction to order the Register of Deeds to cancel the
transfer certificate of title of petitioner and to order the issuance of
a new title to include the minors as co-owners with the petitioner
for her having failed to comply with the court's order directing her
to pay the minors the reasonable price of their property that their
mother alienated without authority of a competent court.
HELD: We find the orders of the respondent court valid. The
petitioner's contentions in this regard are untenable. While it is
true that in these two cases We ruled that where title to any
property said to be embezzled, concealed or conveyed is in
question, the determination of said title or right whether in favor
of the ward or in favor of the person said to have embezzled,
concealed or conveyed the property must be determined in a
separate ordinary action and not in guardianship proceedings,
We also emphasized that if the right or title of the ward to the
property is clear and indisputable the court may issue an order
directing its delivery or return.
In the present case the right or title of the two minors to the
property is clear and indisputable. They inherited a part of the
land in question from their father. The sale of this land, where
they are co-owners, by their mother without the authority of the
guardianship court is illegal. The respondent court's order
directing the deposit of an additional consideration of P10,000.00
is a different matter. It was issued without a hearing to determine
not only the valuation of the property but the time frame for
fixing said valuation which is not clear. It is, consequently, null
and void.
It is true that when the petitioner and Conchita Dumdum failed to
give the additional amount, the second order directing the
cancellation of the petitioner's title may be said to have
superseded or cancelled the first order. The second order
directed the issuance of a new title over the land inherited by
Leandro Homeres from his late father with each heir getting title
to one-third of the property.
[G.R. No. 44750. December 3, 1935.]
SERAFIN GAMBOA, Petitioner, v. JOSE LOPEZ VITO, Judge of
First Instance of Occidental Negros, and DEMETRIO
GAMBOA, as guardian of Eulalio Lopez, Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. COURTS; GUARDIANSHIP; APPLICATION TO LEASE; JURISDICTION. — In the
order of November 7, 1935, the respondent judge alleges as his reason for
disapproving the petitioner’s lease offer that article 1548 of the Civil Code is not
applicable in this case because the order of October 20, 1934, authorizing the
respondent guardian to lease the hacienda, expressly provided that the contract to
be entered into by him is subject to judicial approval. Without anticipating whether
the respondent guardian could enter into a valid contract of lease for six (6) years
without the authority of approval of the court having cognizance of the
guardianship, Held: That the respondent judge had jurisdiction to pass on the
petitioner’s application offer whose purpose was to secure judicial approval of his
contract of lease. The leasing of a realty belonging to the guardianship of a minor
forms part of the acts of administration of the guardian who, in said administration,
is subject to the direction, supervision and jurisdiction of the court having
cognizance of the guardianship (secs. 551 and 555 [3] of the Code of Civil
Procedure).
2. CERTIORARI; WHEN WRIT DOES NOT LIE. — We are of the opinion that the order
of November 7, 1935, is appealable because it finally determines the right relied
upon by the petitioner under the contract of lease to retain possession of the
portions of the hacienda delivered to him by the respondent guardian and to take
possession of the other portions that were to be vacated or abandoned by the
present lessee. Inasmuch as said order is appealable and the respondent judge had
jurisdiction and did not exceed the same in entering it, neither the writ
of certiorari nor the preliminary injunction applied for lies. (Secs. 217 and 166 of the
Code of Civil Procedure.)
The petition alleges, among other things, that the respondent
Demetrio Gamboa, as guardian of the minor Eulalio Lopez,
obtained from the petitioner a loan of P2,500, securing it by a
mortgage on the Hacienda Macamig which was approved by the
court and registered in accordance with law; that after the
constitution of the mortgage, said respondent leased said
hacienda to the petitioner but the contract entered into did not
have the previous approval of the court; that the contract of lease
was noted but not registered in the registry; that upon the
suggestion of the attorney for said respondent the petitioner filed
a petition with the court offering to lease the hacienda for the
stipulated period of six (6) years and the lessee Glicerio
Montinola and Gonzalo Junsay likewise submitted propositions to
lease said hacienda; that on October 17, 1935, the court, acting on
the lease offers, chose that of Gonzalo Junsay; that the petitioner
excepted to the order entered therein, announced his intention to
appeal therefrom and perfected his appeal; that the petitioner,
with the guardian’s consent but without the knowledge or
permission of the court, took possession of certain portions of the
hacienda covering an area of about 25 hectares, from which
Glicerio Montinola had already gathered his sugar cane crop; that
on November 7, 1935, the respondent judge entered the order
the annulment of which is sought, directing the petitioner to
return to the guardian, within ten (10) days, the portions of the
hacienda in his possession and to desist from taking possession
of the other portions to be abandoned by Glicerio Montinola, he
having already gathered his sugar cane crop, with the warning
that in case of noncompliance therewith he would be proceeded
against in accordance with the provisions of sections 610 and
611 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and that the petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration of said order, which was denied.
The petitioner contends that the respondent judge had no
jurisdiction to disapprove the contract of lease entered into
between him and the respondent guardian because the term
thereof did not exceed six (6) years, nor had he jurisdiction to
enter the order of November 7, 1935; and claims that, this latter
order being unappealable, he has no other adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of the law.
In the order of November 7, 1935, the respondent judge alleges
as his reason for disapproving the petitioner’s lease offer that
article 1548 of the Civil Code is not applicable in this case
because the order of October 20, 1934, authorizing the
respondent guardian to lease the hacienda, expressly provided
that the contract to be entered into by him is subject to judicial
approval.
Without anticipating whether the respondent guardian could
enter into a valid contract of lease for six (6) years without the
authority or approval of the court having cognizance of the
guardianship, we hold that the respondent judge had jurisdiction
to pass upon the petitioner’s application offer whose purpose
was to secure judicial approval of his contract of lease already
executed.
The leasing of a realty belonging to the guardianship of a minor
forms part of the acts of administration of the guardian who, in
said administration, is subject to the direction, supervision and
jurisdiction of the court having cognizance of the guardianship.
We are of the opinion that the order of November 7, 1935, is
appealable because it finally determines the right relied upon by
the under the contract of lease to retain possession of the
portions of the hacienda delivered to him by the respondent
guardian and to take possession of the other portions that were
to be vacated or abandoned by the present lessee. Inasmuch as
said order is appealable and the respondent judge had
jurisdiction and did not exceed the same in entering it, neither
the writ of certiorari nor the preliminary injunction applied for
lies.
G.R. No. L-17066 December 28, 1961
IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF CARMEN
PADILLA VDA. DE BENGSON, Incompetent. CARMEN PADILLA
VDA. DE BENGSON, petitioner-appellee, vs. PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL BANK, guardian-appellant, ADMINISTRATION OF
VETERANS AFFAIRS, oppositor-appellant.
As the mother of a veteran who died in World War II, Carmen
Padilla Vda. de Bengson became entitled to certain accrued
insurance benefits and to a monthly death compensation for the
rest of her life, all extended by the United States Veterans
Administration. Upon inquiry which showed that the beneficiary
was incompetent, the Veterans Administration filed Special
Proceeding No. 586 in the Court of First Instance of La Union,
where in due course, an order was entered on August 8, 1957,
adjudging Carmen Vda. de Bengzon to be an incompetent and
appointing the Philippine National Bank (PNB) as guardian of her
estate comprising the monies due from the said Veterans
Administration. Letters of guardianship were issued in favor of
the Philippine National Bank.
On March 5, 1960, alleging that she had regained her
competence, her ward, by counsel, filed a petition asking for an
order terminating the guardianship, and for delivery to her of the
residuary estate. Attached to this petition was a medical
certificate attesting that she was mentally competent and
possessed full knowledge of her environmental surroundings.
This was opposed by the Veterans Administration on the ground
that by reason of her advanced age (78), physical and mental
debility, she was still an incompetent within the meaning of
Section 2, Rule 93 of the Rules of Court. On March 30, 1960, the
son of the ward, Francisco Bengson, filed a "Manifestation" to the
effect that he was the personal guardian of the incompetent. He
prayed to be appointed guardian of the ward's estate in place of
the Philippine National Bank. On the same date, the lower court
ordered Francisco Bengson to be appointed guardian of the
ward's estate to substitute the Philippine National Bank; the
lower court observed that the ward was living with Francisco
Bengson in the latter's capacity as personal guardian; that the
appointment of Bengson in place of the Philippine National Bank
would save the compensation being paid that Bank; and that the
transfer to the Philippine National Bank branch at San Fernando,
La Union would be more convenient to all concerned for the
proper administration of the estate. The required bond was
thereafter filed and letters of guardianship issued to Francisco
Bengson. A motion to reconsider was denied.
We find this appeal meritorious. The grounds for which a
guardian may be removed are found in Section 2, Rule 98 of the
Rules.
When a guardian becomes insane or otherwise incapable of
discharging his trust or unsuitable therefor, or has wasted or
mismanaged the estate, or failed for thirty days after it is due
to render an account or make a return, the court may, upon
reasonable notice to the guardian, remove him, and compel
him to surrender the estate of the ward to the person found
to be lawfully entitled thereto.... (emphasis supplied).
Since the Rules enumerate the grounds for removal of a guardian,
a guardian cannot be legally removed from office except for the
causes therein mentioned. To the extent that a court uses its
discretion in appraising whether a person is insuitable or
incapable of discharging his trust, that much it can be said that
removal is discretionary. But the discretion must be exercised
within the law, and when the latter has laid down the grounds for
removal of a guardian, discretion is limited to inquiring as to the
existence of any of those grounds. No pretense is made in this
case, and nothing in the record would indicate, that there was any
legal ground upon which the removal of the Philippine National
Bank as guardian was founded. Neither in Francisco Bengzon's
manifestation nor in the orders of the lower court is it made to
appear that the Philippine National Bank had become incapable
of discharging its trust or was unsuitable therefor, or that it had
committed anything which the Rules includes as grounds for
removal. On the contrary, it appears incontestable that all
throughout, the Philippine National Bank has discharged its trust
satisfactorily. Neither is it sufficient to base removal on the
unsubstantiated opinion that it would be more beneficial to the
interests of the ward and more convenient for the administration
of the estate. A guardian should not be removed except for the
most cogent reasons (39 C.J.S. 65); otherwise, the removal is
unwarranted and illegal.
ADOPTION
G.R. No. L-19391. September 29, 1964.]
CECILIO DE LA CRUZ and EUSTAQUIA DEVIS DE LA
CRUZ, Petitioners-Appellants, v. MANUEL JESUS DE LA
CRUZ, Respondent-Appellee.
1. ADOPTION; RESCISSION AND REVOCATION; VENUE; PLACE OF RESIDENCE OF
PETITIONER. — The venue of an action for revocation of adoption, applying Rule 99
of the Rules of Court in a suppletory character, is the place of resident of the
petitioner.
2. SAME; SAME; DISTINCT AND SEPARATE PROCEEDINGS FROM ADOPTION. — The
proceedings for adoption and revocation of adoption are separate and distinct from
each other. In the first what is determined is the propriety of establishing the
relationship of parent and child between two persons not so related by nature. In
the other proceeding either the adopting parent or the adopted seeks to severe the
relationship previously established, and the inquiry refers to the truth of the
grounds upon which the revocation is sought. Once the proper court has granted a
petitioner for adoption and the decree has become final the proceedings is
terminated and closed. A subsequent petition for revocation of the adoption is
neither a continuation of nor an incident in the proceeding for adoption. It is an
entirely new one, dependent on facts which have happened since the decree of
adoption.
3. SAME; SAME; SAME; NO INTERFERENCE WITH DECREES OF COURT OF
COORDINATE JURISDICTION. — The doctrine that no court has the power to
interfere by injunction with the judgments or decrees of a court of coordinate
jurisdiction is not applicable to a petition for revocation of an adoption where the
validity and effectiveness of the decree of adoption is not in question and such
decree is not sought to be enjoined nor its execution restrained but what is sought is
its revocation because of circumstances subsequently supervening which, under the
law, render the continuation of the adoptive relationship unjustified and
impractical.
By judgment dated August 16, 1954 of the Court of First Instance
of Ilocos Sur (Sp. Proc. No. 1401) the minor Manuel J. Aquino was
declared the legally adopted child of the spouses Cecilio de la
Cruz and Eustaquia Devis de la Cruz. Seven years later the
adopting parents filed in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan
1 a petition to have the decree of adoption revoked on the ground
that the adopted minor had definitely repudiated the adoption by
open display of defiance, animosity, revulsion and disobedience
to petitioners and had for more than three years abandoned
petitioners’ home by living with his natural mother, Felicidad
Dasalla, in Sta. Maria, Ilocos Sur. A special appearance was
entered by counsel for the minor with a motion to dismiss the
petition on the grounds that (1) the court lacked jurisdiction over
the subject-matter thereof; (2) the Court had not acquired
jurisdiction over the person of the adopted minor; (3) venue was
improperly laid; and (4) the petitioner did not state facts
sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
The motion to dismiss was granted. The provisions of the Civil
Code on revocation of adoption do not specify the court where
the proceedings should be filed. The Rules of Court designate the
venue of a proceeding for adoption, which is the place where the
petitioner resides (Section 1, Rule 99), but is silent with respect
to the venue of proceeding for rescission and revocation of
adoption (Rule 100). It is clear that the two proceedings are
separate and distinct from each other. In the first what is
determined is the propriety of establishing the relationship of
parent and child between two persons not so related by nature.
For that purpose the court inquires into the qualifications and
disqualifications of the adopter; the personal circumstances of
the person to be adopted; the probable value and character of h is
estate; the other proceeding either the adopting parent or the
adopted seeks to severe the relationship previously established,
and the inquiry refers to the truth of the grounds which the
revocation is sought.
Once the proper court has granted a petition for adoption and the
decree has become final the proceeding is terminated and closed.
A subsequent petition for revocation of the adoption is neither a
continuation of nor an incident in the proceeding for adoption. It
is an entirely new one, defendant on facts which have happened
since the decree of adoption. The venue of this new case, applying
Rule 99 in a suppletory character, is also the place of the
residence of the petitioner. In the present instance petitioners
reside in Pangasinan, having moved there form their former
residence in Ilocos Sur. The doctrine relied upon by the lower
court, to the effect that no court has the power to interfere by
injunction with the judgments or decrees of a court of coordinate
jurisdiction, is not here applicable. There is no such interference.
The validity of effectiveness of the decree of adoption issued by
the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur is not in question. What is
sought is its revocation because of circumstances subsequently
supervening which, under the law, render the continuation of the
adoptive relationship unjustified and impractical. We hold that
venue was properly laid in the case; and with respect to the
objection that the court does not have jurisdiction over the
adopted minor, we note that petitioners-appellants filed a motion
below for the appointment of the minor’s natural mother,
Felicidad Dasalla, as his guardian ad litem, although the court did
not think it necessary to grant the same in view of its order of
dismissal. The order of dismissal is set aside and the case
remanded for further proceedings.
G.R. No. L-62465 May 24, 1985
SPOUSES ERNESTO S. NIETO and MATILDE NILO
NIETO, petitioners, vs. HON. ROMEO D. MAGAT JUDGE
DESIGNATE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
PANGASINAN, THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, BRANCH
XIII, respondents.
The spouses Ernesto S. Nieto and Matilde Nilo Nieto filed a
petition to adopt Roy Nieto Sumintac, their nephew. The spouses
are childless and they reared Roy from his birth in 1971 until
1975 and they continue to support him. Roy had to be left in the
Philippines when the spouses went to Guam wherefore husband
is employed. The Ministry of Social Services and Development
favorably recommended the adoption to the court. It said that the
petitioners are in a better position to provide for the minor child
considering that his natural parents are impoverished Despite
the favorable recommendation, the court denied the petition.
That the adopting parents are non-residents of the Philippines
(albeit presumably temporarily only) is an uncontested fact. That
"they are already aliens" is an unjustified conclusion it has no
basis. Does the fact that the petitioner reside temporarily in
Guam disqualify them from adopting the minor child? A reading
of Articles 27 and 28 of P.D. No. 603 gives a negative answer.
They provide as follows:
Art. 27. Who May Adopt. — Any person of age
and in full possession in his civil rights may
adopt: Provided, That he is in a position to
support and care for his legitimate, legitimated,
acknowledged natural children, or natural
children by legal fiction, or other illegitimate
children, in keeping with the means, both
material and otherwise, of the family.
In all cases of adoption, the adopter must be at
least fifteen years older than the person to be
adopted.
Art. 28. Who May Not Adopt. — The following
persons may not adopt:
(1) A married person without the written
consent of the spouse;
(2) The guardian with respect to the ward prior
to final approval of his accounts;
(3) Any person who has been convicted of a
crime involving moral turpitude;
(4) An alien who is disqualified to adopt
according to the laws of his own country or one
with whose government the Republic of the
Philippines has broken diplomatic relations.
(Rollo, pp. 46-47.)
The trial court also said that adoption had to be denied because
"the trial custody as required by PD 603 cannot be effected as the
petitioners are non-residents." But Art. 35 of P.D. No. 603
specifically authorizes the court, either upon its own or on
petitioner's motion, to dispense with the trial custody if it finds
that it is to the best interest of the child. The Minister of Social
Services and Development suggests that the trial custody is
unnecessary because:
We submit that the six months trial custody is only observed to
insure the emotional adjustment of the child to his adoptive
family, which is now at this point unnecessary, considering that
both parties are ready for their legal union. It was indicated that
the minor is comfortable with the adopters. Moreover, the
petitioners can obviously discipline the child without being
doubtful if the child can accept them as his own true parents.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted.
G.R. No. 71370 January 3l, 1987
SLOBODAN BOBANOVIC AND DIANNE ELIZABETH
CONNUNGHAM BOBANOVIC, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE
SYLVIA P. MONTES (in her capacity as Minister of Social
Services and Development), respondent.
In our decision in this case promulgated on July 7, 1986 and
which is now the subject of the motion for reconsideration filed
by the Ministry of Social Services and Development, this Court
emphasized that in adoption cases, the interest and welfare of the
child is of paramount consideration. Applying the aforecited
judicial guidelines, this Court directed the present Ministry of
Social Services and Development "to forthwith issue without
undue delay, the requisite travel clearance certificate in favor of
herein petitioners' adopted child, Adam Christopher Bobanovic."
Respondent's motion for reconsideration of the decision in this
case, dated August 5, 1986, although filed late, in the interest of
justice, was nevertheless admitted under our resolution of
September 5, 1986. In said motion, public respondent stressed
the existence of the 1981 Memorandum of Agreement between
the State and Territory Adoption Authorities of Australia and the
Ministry of Social Services and Development of the Philippines.
The Court does not say nor do We entertain a belief that the
herein petitioners are in any way disqualified to be adopting
parents in their home State or ordinary place of residence. What
the Court simply wishes to express is that it would be more
prudent and desirable to require that the petitioners herein
submit themselves to a Family Study Report in their home
country so that if a favorable report is thereafter submitted to the
Ministry of Social Services and Development, then the
corresponding travel certification should then forthwith issue, in
implementation of the judgment of adoption already rendered.
While the Court takes the view that the decision in the adoption
case should not be disturbed and that all the technicalities that
were raised against the adoption should yield to the ultimate end
of promoting the best interest of the adopted child, the same
guiding principle should be applied in the matter of the issuance
of the travel clearance certificate. It is well worth considering
that the welfare of the adopted child can be truly protected if
there is at least an assurance that the home State of the
petitioners has undertaken a family case study concerning them.
As petitioners profess their desire to extend to their adopted
child the warmth of a parent's love, the comforts of a caring home
and the material provision he needs, their sincerity in this regard
can best be manifested by laying aside any possible
inconvenience on their part or searching for legal technicalities.
Whether or not the referred Memorandum Agreement has the
force and effect of law should be of least consideration to the
petitioners if they are truly disposed to do their part to expedite
the travel for their adopted child to their country. The best
solution would be for them to accept and submit themselves to a
family case study which should not be at all a difficult thing for
them to do.
WHEREFORE, and in the light of the facts and circumstances
hereinabove discussed, the dispositive portion of our judgment in
the instant case directing the issuance of the requisite travel
clearance certificate in favor of the child, Adam Christopher
Bobanovic, is hereby SUSPENDED and DEFERRED until after
petitioners shall have submitted themselves to a Family Case
Study in their home State of Victoria, Australia where they are
said to be residing. Upon furnishing herein respondent Minister
of Social Services and Development with the corresponding
official report on said Family Case Study and if such is favorable
to the petitioners herein, then the requisite travel clearance
certificate for the adopted child, Adam Christopher Bobanovic,
should thus be issued by the office of the public respondent
Minister as previously decreed. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 78339 September 29, 1989
WENCESLAO D. MONSERRATE, IGNACIO D. MONSERRATE,
JOSE D. MONSERRATE and HEIRS OF MARIA MONSERRATE
VDA. DE CAILES, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS,
respondents.
FACTS: On September 7, 1981, a verified petition for the
adoption of Ervin O. Pompa who, at the time was alleged to be
married to Dorothea Albovia, 32 years of age, and a resident of
Nagcarlan, Laguna, was filed with the then Court of First Instance
of Laguna. The petitioner purports to be Nieves Suiza, 77 years
old, widow, and a resident also of Nagcarlan, Laguna and bears
the written consent of the spouse of the person to be adopted.
The petition alleged among others:
5. That the Adopted's real mother, AURELIA
OSUNA, now deceased, was the daughter of
MELECIO OSUNA's brother whom they also
cared for and reared until her marriage to
SILVESTRE POMPA, also deceased, who in turn
was the first cousin of herein petitioner;
6. That the petitioner has taken care of said
Adopted from the time the latter became an
orphan when he was still a minor and up to
the present time, treating and rearing the
same as her own true son and giving the
attention and love of a mother ever since then;
7. That the petitioner does not fall under the
disqualification of adoption as provided for by
law
On July 31, 1982, Nieves Suiza died intestate
without any issue (Exh. C). On February 14,
1984, plaintiffs commenced the present action
with this Court claiming that the adoption
proceedings, as well as the order of adoption,
were null and void and of no legal force and
effect.
Respondent Court of Appeals, in a decision promulgated on
January 29, 1987 (Rollo, pp. 6-15), dismissed the complaint.
ISSUES: 1. WHETHER OR NOT THE DEFUNCT COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF LAGUNA HAD ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER
THE QUESTIONED ADOPTION CASE, NOTWITHSTANDING THAT
THE SOLICITOR GENERAL WAS NOT NOTIFIED OR
REPRESENTED IN SUCH ADOPTION.
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE CHALLENGED ADOPTION
PROCEEDINGS AND ORDER OF ADOPTION ARE VITIATED WITH
NULLITY FOR LACK OF STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH STATUTORY
REQUIREMENTS AS PRESCRIBED BY LAWS GOVERNING
ADOPTION; AND
3. WHETHER OR NOT THE QUESTIONED PROCEEDINGS AND
ORDER OF ADOPTION SHOULD BE NULLIFIED BY REASON OF
EXTRINSIC FRAUD.

HELD: As to the first issue, it is petitioners' contention that the

Solicitor General, not having been notified so as to make the State
a party thereto, the then Court of First Instance of Laguna did not
acquire jurisdiction over the questioned adoption case. To
support this contention, they claimed that there is no dispute that
the State has an interest in the adoption, particularly in securing
the observance of our laws concerning the qualifications and
disqualifications of both the adopted and adopter designed to
conserve the best interests of society and the State.

Petitioners' contention is untenable. As aptly ruled by respondent

Court of Appeals, no existing law or rule has been pointed out
requiring notice to the Solicitor General as a condition precedent
or as a jurisdictional pre-requisite for the valid exercise of the
court's jurisdiction in an adoption case. Anent the second issue,
petitioners claim that the statutory requirements, in three
instances, were not strictly carried out in the questioned
adoption case. It is their contention that pursuant to Republic Act
No. 644, the questioned adoption case should have been filed
with the Municipal Court of Nagcarlan, Laguna, where the
supposed adopter, Nieves Suiza, was then residing.

These contentions of petitioners are without merit. Republic Act

No. 644 gave to the justices of the peace and judges of municipal
courts concurrent jurisdiction on adoption cases with the then
Courts of First Instance. In other words, adoption cases could be
filed in any of the said courts. As to the third issue, petitioners
impute grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Court
of Appeals simply because it did not give weight to petitioners'
evidence, particularly their documentary evidence which they
claim to have been admitted by private respondent. Petitioners'
contention is untenable. It must be stated that even granting that
private respondent admitted petitioners' proffered documentary
evidence, the Court of Appeals, nevertheless, has the
discretionary power to look into related matters of record having
some bearing on specific issues raised before it, stressing the
paramount aim of promoting the ends of justice.