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To cite this article: Michael Neocosmos (1986): Marx's third class: Capitalist
landed property and capitalist development, The Journal of Peasant Studies, 13:3,
5-44
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Marx's Third Class: Capitalist Landed
Property and Capitalist Development
Michael Neocosmos*
I. INTRODUCTION
Two interrelated sets of problems inform this article. First, the seemingly
contradictory position of landlords in Marxist theoretical discourse; and
second, the role of agriculture, and in particular that of landed class, in the
process of capitalist development.
In the conceptual apparatus of Historical Materialism's analysis of the
capitalist mode of production, based as it is on the dyadic opposition
between capital and wage-labour, landowners constitute an oddity. They
are an oddity for three main reasons which all result from Marx's persistence
in referring to this category, in Capital as well as in his other major scientific
* Research Fellow, c/o The Journal of Peasant Studies, Frank Cass & Co. Ltd. This article is a
revised version of a paper first submitted to the British Sociological Association Annual
Conference at Aberystwyth in April 1981 under a slightly different title. It also appears in a
different form and with detailed references in my Ph.D. Thesis [Neocosmos, 1982]. I am grateful
to T. Byres for editorial advice.
6 The Journal of Peasant Studies
works, as a class on a par with wage-labour and capital. This is exemplified
by the quotation at the head of this article.
The first problem arises immediately in connection with a position which
has traditionally seen classes as opposing 'poles of antagonistic production
relations' [Laclau, 1977: 159]. If classes are conceptualised as polar oppo-
sites it is of course impossible to have more than two classes in any mode of
production. The second problem is related to the conditions of existence of
such a class. The fact that landowners seem to be constituted as a class
merely through a legal relation of landownership, does seem prima facie to
contradict the economic basis of class theorisation. This is the case particu-
larly as recent Marxist theory has correctly stressed the view that economic
ownership and control, rather than legal ownership is to be taken as the basis
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of class identification.
The reaction of recent writers to these questions has been to assert either
explicitly or implicitly that Marx's use of the term 'class' with reference to
landowners cannot be taken too seriously and that landlords are best seen as
constituting a 'fraction' of capital. In this context Poulantzas, for example,
has at least the merit of explicitly asserting that Marx is wrong in referring to
landowners as a class and that one should refer to them as a fraction
[Poulantzas, 1973: 73, 231]. More often than not, however, recent writers
have merely assumed, without discussion, that the only form in which
landowners may exist is in that of a fraction of capital [e.g., Massey and
Catalano: 1978]. Indeed, this formulation does seem to avoid the two
problems stated above. The conceptualisation of classes as polar opposites is
no longer contradicted and, if one holds to a conception of 'levels', a legal
relation may be seen as a sufficient condition of existence of a fraction.
Unfortunately, as soon as one adopts this conceptualisation, a third
problem arises which can be most readily grasped with reference to numer-
ous statements by Marx and Lenin. It is reasonably well known that Marx
suggests on many occasions that landlords in the capitalist mode of produc-
tion, due to their extraction of part of surplus-value in the form of rent,
constitute an obstacle to the penetration of capital in agriculture and to the
accumulation of capital. Hence, Marx suggests, capital will attempt to
abolish landed property in order to remove this obstacle. Although Marx
theorises many other fractions in Capital (merchant's capital, interest-
bearing capital, etc.), nowhere does he suggest that any of these fractions is
constituted in antagonism to capital. On the contrary, as I shall later suggest,
Marx argues that these fractions are all part of the same capital and that no
general pressure towards their abolition exists. If we agree with Marx and
Lenin that a pressure towards the removal by capital of the obstacles
constituted by landed property is a necessary structural feature of the
capitalist mode of production, it becomes nonsensical to visualise landlords
as a fraction of capital. This is because the concept of fraction presupposes
the unity of capital. The antagonisms which exist between fractions of capital
are not of the same order as that between wage-labour and capital. To say
that landlords constitue a fraction of capital is to assert that they form a
Marx's Third Class 7
constituent part of the unity of capital. To say that a structural antagonism
exists between capital and landed property is to deny that unity. This point is
of course only valid if the antagonism between landed property and capital
stressed by Marx, and later Lenin, is not conjunctural, not 'accidental' as
Marx would put it. It is only valid if it pertains to capitalism in general, in a
similar fashion to the manner in which the structural antagonism between
wage-labour and capital pertains to capitalism in general.
To say, however, that such a structural antagonism exists, presupposes
that the conditions of existence of a class of landlords are indeed theorised in
Marx's work. This is of course not obvious and it may be that Marx merely
considers landowners as leftovers from a bygone feudal age; that he merely
accounts for their existence in an accidental 'historical' sense [Tribe, 1977] or
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that the problems I have discussed are the unfortunate result of the unques-
tioning incorporation into Historical Materialism of the 'three classes' of
Classical Political Economy.
If this is indeed the case, and if, in addition, no theorisation of a landlord
class is possible given the precepts of Marxism, it then becomes much more
difficult to explain in more than accidental terms the important role played
by landowners in the development of capitalism. In many contemporary
imperialised social formations the crucial element of the dominant power
bloc often seems to be an alliance between landowners and imperialism. In
some social formations, particularly in Africa and Asia, what Lenin called
the 'peasant road' to the capitalist development of agriculture might be said
to be dominant, but in others, for instance in Latin America, the capitalist
development of agriculture has largely been taking place under the aegis of
landlord control - what Lenin referred to as the 'Prussian' or 'Junker' road to
capitalist development. The failure of redistributive land reforms in Latin
America to make more than a small dent in the landowner/imperialism
power bloc has not automatically led to greater underdevelopment but to a
particular form of capitalist development where right-wing, military dicta-
torships have been presiding over impressive growth rates (Brazil, Argen-
tina, Chile, for example). The dominance of landlords over rapidly capitalis-
ing agricultures cannot simply be attributed to the presence of a 'restraining'
feudal mode with which capitalism is articulated, an argument beloved of
recent 'articulationist' positions. In such social formations agricultural
capital is not becoming less powerful. It is not losing its power to industrial
capital but is often dominating the power bloc along with financial and
imperialist interests. Hence in this situation it is not feudalism but capital-
ism, albeit of a different kind from the capitalism found in Western Europe,
which is to be confronted, to paraphrase Gunder Frank who, at least on this
point, was not far off the mark. It seems that the road to capitalist develop-
ment we have been witnessing in such social formations requires for its
adequate analysis, a theory of capitalist landed property. Such a theory
should enable us to posit the questions of class struggles and alliances as the
primary unit of analysis.
Of course one can only give a detailed picture of the development of
8 The Journal of Peasant Studies
capitalism in specific social formations by a detailed analysis of such factors
in each individual case, a project which is far beyond the scope of this article.
What may be possible, however, is to trace several features of the different
roads to the general development of capitalism, with particular reference to
the role played by landowners in such transformations - an outline which
may then facilitate the investigation of concrete situations. This approach
should have the added advantage of avoiding both a purely accidental
account of a general problem without collapsing into a deterministic
explanation of capitalist development and underdevelopment which is often
provided by many current writings with references to the 'demands' of the
international market or the 'reproductive needs' of capitalism in the West.
Moreover, Lenin's conceptualisation of different 'roads' was not designed
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examined. Third, I shall point briefly to the distinctions which Marx draws
between landowners and other fractions of capital and show that the possi-
bility of landlords constituting a fraction is accounted for through the strug-
gle between capital and landed property. Finally, I shall return to a historical
account, and the role which this struggle fulfils in the development of
relative surplus-value extraction under capitalism will be outlined.
1857: 100, 108]. At the same time he distinguishes between the revenues of
these classes (for example, wages and gross profit) and their bases (for
example, variable capital and surplus-value). The importance of such cate-
gories as wage-labour, capital and landed property is, in the present context,
that they explain the possible existence of classes in specific capitalist social
formations.' These categories cannot therefore be conflated with class cate-
gories without invalidating the structure of Marx's argument. For the same
reasons neither can the bases of these classes' revenues be conflated with
their revenues themselves. Marx is not concerned in Capital with wage-
labourers, capitalists or landowners as such, because these are collectivities,
the existence of which can only make sense within specific societies.
Second, it should also be stressed that Capital is not concerned with
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procedures from the land - private landownership by the one, which implies
lack of ownership by the others - is the basis of the capitalist mode of
production' [1865: 812; see also 1865: 614]. Such a situation amounts to 'a
total restructuring of the mode of production [agriculture] itself [1858: 277].
What therefore are the characteristics of this specifically capitalist form of
landed property to which Marx refers as 'modern landed property'? Marx
notes initially that modern landed property is divorced from the 'relations of
dominion and servitude' characteristic of feudalism and that it 'discards all
its former political and social embellishments and associations' thereby
enabling 'the conscious scientific application of agronomy' to agricultural
production [1865: 617-18]. This divesting by modern landed property of its
erstwhile feudal relations hints at what constitutes its most fundamental
characteristic: its separation from both wage-labour and capital. Landed
property becomes separated from labour through the process of creation of
wage-labour itself — that is, the expropriation of the peasantry - but it also
becomes separated from capital via its separation from production itself.
The landlord is transformed from being 'the manager and master of the
process of production and of the entire process of social life to the position of
mere lessor of land, usurer in land and mere collector of rent' [1865: 883].
The capitalist mode of production in agriculture therefore implies the
separation of the functions of land ownership from those of production.
Marx argues that the development of this mode of production in agriculture
'separates land as an instrument of production from landed property and
landowner' so thoroughly that 'the landowner may spend his whole life in
Constantinople, while his estates lie in Scotland' [1865: 618]. The capitalist
transformation of agriculture - as far as production is concerned - is there-
fore characterised by the separation of landed property from any control of
the means of production including land. Such control is now vested in the
hands of a capitalist farmer who, like any other capitalist, employs wage-
labour to produce commodities [1865: 615, 618]. The specific character of
capitalist landed property is one where 'ownership' is reduced and restricted to
an institution of mere juridical tenure. This is not the case in pre-capitalist
modes of production. It is important to bear in mind, although I shall have
occasion to return to this below, that landownership (like the ownership of
14 The Journal of Peasant Studies
surplus labour' but its specific difference consists in the fact that it 'is always
surplus over and above profit' [1865:634]. Hence 'the income of the landlord
may be called rent, even under other forms of society. But it differs essen-
tially from rent as it appears in this [capitalist] mode of production' [1865:
883]. Landed property is therefore not a thing or a mere institutional form
for Marx, but an antagonistic social reation which is founded on rent
extraction. Moreover, Marx argues further that this purely capitalist rela-
tion comes to constitute a structural obstacle to the penetration of capital
itself into agriculture and to general capital accumulation [1865: 639].
Capital creates modern landed property by separating itself from the
latter; but in this very act of separation lies the fact that landed property
acquires the ability to appropriate part of surplus-value in the form of rent.
As if this were not enough, this ability increases with the development of
capitalism, thus posing an increasingly important obstacle in the path of
capital investment in agriculture and making landed property appear 'super-
fluous and harmful... even from the point of view of the capitalist mode of
production' [1865: 622]. In sum, Marx argues, we are now in the presence of
three classes 'wage-labourers, industrial capitalist and landowners constitut-
ing together, and in their mutual opposition, the framework of modern
society' [1865: 618].
I shall examine the mechanisms of the creation and extraction of rent
below; two points however must be reiterated here. First, it is the separation
of the functions of land 'ownership' and production which structurally
constitute the relation of capitalist landed property and hence the basis for
landownership (and a class of landowners) under capitalism. This separation
parallels that between labour and production which constitutes the existence
of capital and wage-labour in an antagonistic relation. The former separa-
tion makes possible and is reproduced (as we shall see) by the extraction of
rent; the latter, of course, is what makes possible the extraction of surplus-
value which itself in turn reproduces the separation on an extending scale
[1867: 668]. As a consequence, and this is the second point, it is capitalism
itself which as a result of the production of landed property (or rent)
relation, gives rise to an obstacle to its own development. Landed property
constitutes an obstacle to capitalist accumulation and development not
Marx's Third Class 15
because of its supposedly pre-capitalist nature, but because of its capitalist
nature. Capital itself creates this contradiction.
The Basis of Revenue and the Determination of Revenue
As I have already stressed, capital, wage-labour and landed property are
visualised by Marx as constituting the bases of the three classes of capitalist
society. Before landed property can be discussed in this context it is neces-
sary to discuss Marx's theorisation of capital and wage-labour in order to
ascertain his general conceptualisation.of such class 'places'. It will then be
possible to ascertain whether landed property does indeed fit into this
theorisation.
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obtain the best possible return on his investment. Hence individual profits
deviate from surplus-values, and revenues themselves, as opposed to their
bases, depend partly on the business acumen of the receiver. Nevertheless,
classes do not create their own revenues. The existence of these revenues is
only explicable in terms of class relations.
The importance of imposing a conception of limits on the revenue of a
particular class rests, not so much in imposing abstract boundaries on what
might seem to be an 'unpredictable' reality, but more on the fact that one can
thereby theorise an otherwise accidental unity. Without a concept of limits it
becomes impossible to explain why the revenues of the individuals compos-
ing a class find their origin in one specific portion of the product of labour. In
other words it becomes impossible to theorise a unity. Indeed any theory of
class needs to explain the existence of this unity of individuals independently
of the individuals which compose it, if their unity is to be more than a
fortuitous accident. What Marx's concept of limits does therefore is to
enable him to theorise this unity, this 'place'. In addition this unity must be
accounted for independently of any 'collective will' on the part of the class in
question, for not to do so would simply constitute a collapse into voluntaris-
tic idealism with all its attendant problems.
The centrality and crucial importance of a conception of limits in Marx's
theorisation of class can now readily be appreciated. Such a theorisation, it
should be noted, is not strictly concerned with the phenomenal groupings of
class collectivities, but with the bases in essential relations of such groupings.
All that is theorised is the possible existence of class entities. Moreover, it is
the separation of labour from its conditions of production, thereby creating
wage-labour and capital in antagonism, which ultimately provides the basis
for the existence of classes of 'possessors' or 'owners'. This theorisation
implies therefore that capital and wage-labour cannot be conflated with
capitalists and wage-labourers. Neither, incidentally, can surplus-value and
variable capital be conflated with profit and wages (a truth valid for all
essential and phenomenal categories). This means, for instance, that a strict
mechanical notion of limits - that is, a conflation of revenue with its basis -
has the same theoretical effect as ignoring the basis of revenue altogether.
To posit or imply such a conflation is to assert a predetermined harmony
between essential relations and phenomenal forms. It is such procedures
Marx's Third Class 19
which underline both economism and a currently popular relativism.7 No
pre-ordained equality can be said to exist between the basis of revenue and
revenue itself, rather the first category is simply necessary in order to explain
the existence of the second.
has to explain the existence of a specific determinate portion of value and the
subsequent realisation of this value by the landowning class. Hence Marx
argues 'the various forms of manifestation of ground-rent, that is, the lease
money paid under the heading of ground-rent to the landlord for the use of
the land for purposes of production or consumption' must be distinguished
from the form of value, ground-rent itself [1865: 633]. The former is paid at
regular periods, fixed by contract in the same manner as wages are paid
hourly, daily, weekly or monthly according to contract. The magnitude of
this lease money, of this revenue, is determined by many more factors than
just ground-rent, as it may conceal interest on capital invested on the land,
and apart from this, it may also conceal a deduction from the average profit
of the capitalist, or a deduction from the labourer's wages. Nevertheless,
'economically speaking neither the one nor the other of these portions
constitutes ground-rent;, but, in practice, it constitutes the landlord's
revenue ... much as actual ground-rent... ' [1865: 625]. The magnitude of
any landlord's lease money (the phenomenal form of ground-rent) will
depend also (like other forms of revenue, for example, profit) on his
'business acumen', and on the struggle between the landlord and the capital-
ist (and that between the capitalist and the wage-labourer).
The main problem regarding Marx's theorisation of rent arises at this
point. This is concerned with the fact that although he warns us that much of
the confusion surrounding ground-rent is due to the fact that 'in practice,
naturally, everything appears as ground-rent that is paid as lease money by
tenant to landlord for the right to cultivate the soil' [1865: 625], he does not
systematically maintain throughout his exposition the crucial distinction
between on the one hand ground-rent as a portion of value, an essential
category, and on the other lease money or revenue, a phenomenal category.
This has had the unfortunate effect of allowing readings of Marx's theory of
rent which conflate essential categories with their phenomenal representa-
tion - with disastrous results. Nevertheless Marx's warnings are quite clear
and it is possible to have a reading of his theory which is consonant with the
position outlined so far.
It is not necessary at this point to provide a detailed explication of all the
intricacies of the theory of rent; rather, only the basic features of Marx's
theorisation need to be outlined, as my primary concern is with landed
Marx's Third Class 21
property. Let us therefore turn to Marx's theorisation of the basis of the
landlords' revenue, what he sometimes calls 'real economic rent' or 'actual
ground rent'. It must be kept in mind that the problem confronting Marx is
not one of explaining the existence of a rent derived from selling agricultural
commodities above their value. Such as explanation could not account for
the continuous and systematic existence of a landowning class. This is
because such a form of rent like, for instance, a rent derived from a
monopoly price, would only thereby be accounted for accidentally- like any
industrial monopoly price, or a price derived from speculation on the market
- as it would only be determined by supply and demand [1865: 775]. It is not
that such prices and the revenues derived therefrom do not exist, but rather
that no general theory of price can be determined on the basis of demand and
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supply. Only value can explain price, hence Marx's theory must be able to
explain the existence of a category of rent as a portion of the value of
agricultural commodities. Landlords, therefore, should have a basis for
their revenue when agricultural commodities sell at, or even below, their
value. What must be explained, therefore, is the existence of limits, of a
systematic 'place' within value, or more precisely within surplus-value,
which will provide the basis of a revenue for a landed class. Marx conceptual-
ises three such places: three forms of rent. They are: differential rent I;
differential rent II; and absolute rent.
At this juncture several conceptual definitions must be introduced. As I
have already intimated, when Marx comes to examine the total social capital
(as opposed to individual capitals) he drops the assumption that commod-
ities sell at their value and argues that in a capitalist economy there develops
a general rate of profit which capitalists use as the basis for their individual
profit calculations. The formation of this general rate of profit occurs
through a process of equalisation whereby, due to competition, amounts of
capital tend to gravitate toward those spheres of investment where the rate
of profit (s/c+v) is highest, thus producing a fall in the abnormally high, and
a rise in the abnormally low profit rates [1865: Part 2]. The upshot of the
matter is that individual profits are thereby calculated on the average rate of
profit obtaining in an economy. Prices of production are the prices at which,
discounting temporary oscillations due to supply and demand, commodities
will normally sell. Prices of production are formed by the cost price plus a
profit calculated on the average rate of profit. This process of equalisation is
a necessary condition for accumulation (extended reproduction), for in its
absence the cheapening of the capitalist's costs of production (that is, the
continuous increase in the extraction of surplus-value which capitalism
needs in order to survive) could not take place. The effect of the capitalist
exploitation of agriculture is to place obstacles in the way of the equalisation
of the rate of profit, both within the agricultural sphere and between
agriculture and industry. More precisely, this effect consists in creating
different kinds of permanent surplus profit, which constitute real economic
rent.
Now, surplus profits can exist in all spheres of production. They generally
22 The Journal of Peasant Studies
imply that the individual price of production of a commodity is lower than
the average price of production. A surplus profit arises, for example, after
the introduction of new machinery or a technique which, by increasing
labour productivity, decreases the price of production of an individual
capitalist's commodities in relation to the average price. After a time,
however, as this new machinery or technique is adopted by other capitalists
in this branch, the average price of production falls and the capitalist who
initially made the innovation is no longer in a position to produce a surplus
profit.
A similar process takes place within agriculture but, whereas it was the
introduction of an innovatory technique which caused the formation of a
surplus profit in industry, in agriculture a surplus profit can also arise out of
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the utilisation of a plot of land with higher than average fertility. A capitalist
farmer exploiting a plot of land which by virtue of its natural fertility or
location (independent of capital investment) increases the productivity of
his labour force, thereby reducing the price of production of his
commodities, is in a position to make a surplus profit. Contrary to his
equivalent in industry, however, this lucky capitalist farmer's surplus profit
is permanent. It is permanent because the higher natural fertility of the plot
he exploits is not available to other capitalists. The plot is owned, or as Marx
sometimes puts it 'monopolised', by a landlord who is thereby in a position
to realise this surplus profit or rent by adjusting his lease money accordingly,
while the capitalist farmer sells his commodities at the average price of
production. This form of rent which arises out of the application of equal
amounts of capital to plots of varying fertility or location Marx terms
differential rent I [1865: 645]. Hence, the fact that advantages in natural
fertility or location are not equally available to all capital, gives particular
capitals the ability to produce a surplus profit which is contained within the
limits imposed by the average price of production and the individual price of
production. This fact means that the mechanism of the equalisation of the
rate of profit cannot operate within agriculture; which means in addition,
given a particular state of demand, that the market price of agricultural
products will be regulated by the worst cultivated land. On this land there
will be no differential rent.
Differential rent II is similar in substance to differential rent I, but rather
than arising from the application of equal magnitudes of capital to plots of
differential fertility, it arises out of the application of different amounts of
capital to plots of equal fertility, or to the same plot [1865: 678]. The
particularly important feature of differential rent II consists in the fact that
the more capital is invested in the land, the greater the surplus profit and
hence the greater the potential for revenue realisation by the landed class,
with the result that capital encounters a barrier to its accumulation [1865:
725]. In other words, as capitalism develops, so does investment in agricul-
ture increase and so does the magnitude of real economic rent, as expressed
by differential rent II. Both forms of differential rent, however, are indi-
vidual forms of rent in the sense that they only exist on particular plots and
Marx's Third Class 23
hence can only be realised by particular landlords - those who possess the
more productive plots. Differential rent arises from differences in the pro-
ductivity of labour within agriculture and, in addition, it does not enter into
the price of agricultural commodities as these are regulated by the worst
plots which do not receive any differential rent.
In order to explain the existence of an economic rent on the worst plots,
Marx introduces the concept of absolute rent. This form of rent does enter
into the market price of agricultural commodities and is explained by the fact
that the sphere of agriculture as a whole is less productive than industry.
Marx argues that as capitalism develops at a slower rate in agriculture,8 the
organic composition of capital (c/v) will be lower in agriculture than in
industry (which is only another way of saying that the productivity of social
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noted that landlords do not normally act in concert, with the result that the
releasing of land for cultivation will have a tendency to reduce the market
price. As Marx makes clear on several occasions, the price of agricultural
products do not constitute, in general, monopoly prices; and competition
between landlords limits the market price and hence the revenue derived
from absolute rent.' In addition, if the landlord were in a monopoly position,
not only would it be irrelevant to limit absolute rent between value and price
of production, but also in this case the landlord would be creating his own
revenue himself and not just realising it. What monopoly would mean is that
the mere fact that the landlord owns the land would enable him to charge for
his products as much as the market could bear. The landlord would then be
in a position to create his own revenue, and hence to reproduce himself for
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from the social relations in which the exploitation of the land takes place'
[1863b: 96; 1847: 205].l2 Thus landowners, like capitalists and wage-
labourers, do not create their own revenues. What landlords do, like other
classes, is to realise a revenue from their basis which exists beyond their will.
The process of realisation of revenue is, however, crucial, for by this very act
the essential relations of capitalism are reproduced. The extraction of lease-
money reproduces the rent relation, the realisation of profit and interest
reproduces surplus-value and so on. The reproduction of phenomenal clas-
ses in struggle reproduces the contradictions between wage-labour, capital
and landed property.
In view of my earlier argument it is superfluous to show again how these
production relations are created through a historical process of separation of
landed property, capital and wage-labour from each other. Marx makes it
clear that this process operates throughout - indeed it is the necessary result
of - the process of capitalist development.
... the continual tendency and law of development of the capitalist
mode of production is more and more to divorce the means of produc-
tion from labour, and more and more to concentrate the scattered
means of production into large groups, thereby transforming labour
into wage-labour and means of production into capital. And to this
tendency, on the other hand, corresponds the independent separation
of landed property from capital and labour, or the transformation of all
landed property into the form of landed property corresponding to the
capitalist mode of production [1865: 885].
This triple separation of landed property from capital, of landed property
from wage-labour, and of wage-labour from capital, is what constitutes the
essential relations of capitalism which provide, for Marx, the bases of the
three main classes of the capitalist mode of production capitalists, wage-
labourers and landowners.
It follows from my argument that a specifically capitalist form of landed
property can only exist if three conditions are secured. First, the capital/
wage-labour relations must exist; second, this relation rnust produce surplus
profits which have the possibility of becoming entrenched through their
Marx's Third Class 27
transformation into real economic rent; and third, landed property must
exist separated from capital in order to transform such surplus profits into
rent. In other words, a capital/landed property relation must exist. It should
also be kept in mind, although this should be clear, that the fact that landed
property might exist, does not imply in any way that a class of landowners (a
collectivity of individuals) also exists within a particular social formation. In
a similar manner, the existence of capital does not of necessity imply the
existence of a class of individual capitalists. The functions of capital of
landed property may be fulfilled by the state, by corporations, or by any
number of agencies. The bases of classes need not take the forms of actual
collectivities in any given social formation. The existence of landed property
is the necessary (but not sufficient) condition of existence of a class of
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landlords.
property 'as its antithesis' [1865:879]. The foregoing remarks, along with the
theorisation I have outlined, do indeed seem to suggest that, under capital-
ism, landed property constitutes the basis of a distinct class along with capital
and wage-labour.
Nevertheless landed property need not exist under capitalism. Indeed, we
have seen that for Marx it is superfluous and harmful to the capitalist mode
of production. We must now therefore turn to an examination of the
conditions of its disappearance.
We have seen that the economic conditions of existence of capitalist
landed property are capitalist production relations, a determinate category
of real economic rent (surplus profits) and the capital/landed property
relation. Let us examine each in turn. The first condition-capitalism itself—
hardly deserves any comment. It is quite clear from what has already been
said that, in the absence of capitalist relations, there is no generalised
commodity production, no surplus-value and no capital. Under such condi-
tions, of course, there is no capitalist landed property. However, the other
two conditions, with certain qualifications, need not necessarily pertain
under capitalist conditions, thus occasioning the disappearance of landed
property. I say 'with certain qualifications' because, as I shall proceed to
show, the abolition of landed property is not necessarily the immediate, nor
the automatic result of the absence of such features. Rather, the disappear-
ance of landed property should be seen as a more or less rapid phenomenon,
which results ultimately from the pressures brought to bear by the dis-
appearnce of landed property's conditions of existence, pressures which it
finds very difficult to resist. Like all processes of transformation of essential
relations, this process is a gradual one, conditioned by struggles. It cannot
simply be accomplished by legal measures.
If we turn to the second condition of existence of capitalist landed prop-
erty, namely, real economic rent, it follows from our argument, for example,
that agriculture may attain the level of productivity pertaining in industry. In
such a case the difference between price of production and value, which
forms the limits of absolute rent, will be abolished. In the absence of
absolute rent the landlord may nevertheless still attempt to acquire a form of
revenue not based on differential rent. If he succeeds in doing so his revenue
30 The Journal of Peasant Studies
will consist of either a deduction from the capitalist's profit or a deduction
from the labourer's wage, or both. Faced with a deduction from profit, the
capitalist could either move out to a more profitable area of investment, or
pay for his labour power below its value.11 In either case, however, the
intensification of the class struggle may force landed property to rely solely
on differential rent. Anyhow, the details of such struggles can only be
analysed in conjunctural situations. What is important here is that the
absence of absolute rent may occasion the disapperance of landed property,
at least on those plots which rely solely on this form of rent; in other words,
on the worst plots.
It may seem paradoxical that landed property may exist on certain plots
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and not on others, but only if we forget that capitalist landed property is
characterised by its separation from capital. It follows that if this separation
does not exist - for example, if the capitalist and the landowner are one and
the same person - landed property, in the capitalist sense, also ceases to
exist. Marx refers to this phenomenon as the 'de facto abolition' of landed
property. We can understand this point more clearly through an examina-
tion of the third and final condition of existence of capitalist landed prop-
erty: the capital/landed property relation itself. The abolition of this relation
requires the abolition of the separation of landed property from capital. As
capitalist landed property cannot exist without capital, the abolition of the
relation amounts to a takeover of landed property by capital. This can occur
in two distinct ways: either, on the one hand, the capitalist state or the
capitalist himself becomes a landowner, or, on the other hand, the land-
owner is transformed into a capitalist.
The most well known of these options is the nationalisation of the land.
This is what Marx refers to as the abolition of landed property 'in the
Ricardian sense', or the 'legal' abolition of landed property [e.g., 1863b:
44-5, 152-3; 1863c: 472; 1865: 75]. The transformation of land into the
property of the state abolishes, of course, the ability of the landlord to realise
a revenue and hence it abolishes the class of landowners. This measure is,
however, a bourgeois measure as it does not touch capitalist production
relations. Marx exhibited an ambivalent attitude to this measure, at times
asserting it to be progressive and recommending it as a transitional measure
for a socialist state [1848b: 52], at other times condemning it as in effect (as
we shall see) a measure to expand capitalist exploitation [1881: 323; 1847:
203]. In this context an important point must be mentioned. This consists in
the fact that although the nationalisation of land abolishes immediately the
existence of a class of landowners, it does not necessarily abolish landed
property. This is because (a) the basis of rent in the existence of surplus
profit may still exist, and (b) even though the land is now the legal property
of the state rather than that of individuals, landed property is still separated
from capital. Engels, for example, was very much aware of this fact:
the abolition of property in land is not the abolition of ground rent but
its transfer, if in a modified form, to society. The actual seizure of all
Marx's Third Class 31
the instruments of labour by the working people, therefore, does not at
all preclude the retention of rent relations [Engels, 1873: 370].
Hence, as long as capitalist production relations exist, it cannot be dis-
counted a priori, with the land as state property, that absolute as well as
differential rent might be realised to the detriment of capital. Under such
conditions it may be possible for the state to realise part or the whole of the
rent if it wishes and is able to do so.14 If the state does not realise this rent it
ceases to act as a barrier to capital, and in time landed property disappears.
Capital, however, need not rely on a legal measure such as land nationa-
lisation or redistribution in order to abolish landed property: 'landedprop-
erty may in effect also cease to exist where the capitalist and the owner of the
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land are one and the same person' [1862:124]. Marx refers to this situation as
'de facto abolition of landed property' [1865: 751]. The obstacle to the
process of equalisation is removed and capital is free to move into agricul-
ture as in any other sphere of production, as 'the barrier of ownership ... can
make itself felt only vis-a-vis a capital... separated from landownership, by
erecting an obstacle to the investment of capital' [1865: 806]. This situation
eventually abolishes the difference between the value and price of produc-
tion of agricultural products by increasing labour productivity in agriculture.
The place of absolute rent in surplus-value disappears. This process also
abolishes differential rent II (assuming that innovation is available in equal
amounts to all capitals), as the capitalist farmer can now keep the surplus
profit derived from new investments for himself. Only differential rent I can
never be abolished as long as capitalist production relations persist, as the
surplus profits on which it is founded result from natural fertility and
location within the context of such relations.
The second option consists in the transformation of the landowner into a
capitalist. This constitutes the other form of 'de facto abolition'. As soon as
capitalist landed property is created, the struggle towards its abolition takes
place. If the landowner is rich enough, he may attempt to take over the
productive activity on the land himself [1858: 277]. He may prefer to
continue realising a rent rather than increase his investment, or he may
'modernise' only slowly, for in the short run the advantages of profit will
weigh against rent. Whether the landlord becomes a capitalist, or the
capitalist a landlord, depends on the outcome of the class struggle between
landed property and capital. In either case, the ultimate result is the penetra-
tion of capital into agriculture and the further development of capitalism.
Nevertheless, the importance of drawing the crucial distinction between the
two outcomes of the class struggle over landed property lies, as we shall see
below, in the different forms of capitalist development which they each
engender.
For the present the important point to be aware of is that in a situation
where landed property has disappeared de facto - where the independence
of landed property has been abolished by its incorporation into capital - in
such a case landed property can be said to constitute a fraction of capital in
32 The Journal of Peasant Studies
the strict sense. Landed property in this case no longer constitutes an 'alien
force', but is now part and parcel of capital itself. It follows that, in such a
case, any attempt to nationalise the land would be striking at the heart of
capitalist relations themselves. Such a measure could be revolutionary, for it
would now be attacking private property itself, and it goes without saying
that an a priori support of industrial capital towards such a strategy cannot be
expected. Hence, all land nationalisation or land reform programmes need
not be straightforward bourgeois measures. It seems, therefore, that Marx
also allows for the possibility of landed property constituting a fraction of
capital, as well as theorising it as an independent class.
Having arrived at the end of our examination of Marx's theorisation of
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landed property, it seems clear that capitalist production relations may, but
need not, include a capital/landed property relation as well as a capital/
wage-labour relation. The existence of a landed class does not imply either
the existence of, or the remains of, feudalism. The process of capitalist
development can only correctly be understood on this basis.
order that social formations be better understood. It is here that theory can
help, and it is with this point in mind that we must proceed to study the
effects of the struggle between landed property, capital and wage-labour.
The distinction on which I wish to concentrate here is one between what
might be termed a 'capital-led' and a 'landlord-led' form of capitalist
development. Capital-led devlopment can take place in a number of ways;
for example, through land nationalisation, redistributive land reforms, as
well as through a simple buying up of land by capital. The process is a
complex one, as agriculture also contains various peasant classes. Indeed,
the 'classical' Marxist conception of the development of capitalism in agri-
culture visualises the process as characterised by a differentiation of the
peasantry: some becoming capitalists and others, proletarians. Capital-led
development, therefore, also involves the transformation of a section of the
peasantry into capitalists, as well as landlord expropriation. As is well
known, this is what Lenin referred to as the 'peasant' or 'American' road to
capitalist development in his analysis of Russia. Capitalist transition under
the aegis of a landed class is referred to by Lenin as the 'Junker' or 'Prussian'
road to capitalist development. Both roads lead to the capitalist develop-
ment of agriculture, but Lenin argued for the support of the peasants'
demands for land nationalisation, as the peasant road would be more rapid
and would destroy the remaining feudal relations and would thus create
more favourable conditions for the advance to socialism. In this case 'the
development of capitalism and the growth of the productive forces would
have been wider and more rapid' [Lenin, 1907a: 240]. The 'Prussian' road,
on the other hand, is based on the 'internal metamorphosis of feudalist
landlord economy' [Lenin, 1907b: 32]. This form of transition 'would pre-
serve to the utmost the landlord economies, the landlord revenues, and the
landlord [bondage] methods of exploitation' [Lenin, 1907a: 240].
Lenin's intention was to argue for the nationalisation of the land and its
distribution to peasant enterprises in order to encourage a 'peasant road'
(the emergence of capitalist farmers from the ranks of the peasantry) to
capitalist development, and to provide the socio-economic foundation for a
bourgeois-democratic revolution. In this context he was acutely aware of the
fact that a correct comprehension of the effects of land nationalisation
34 The Journal of Peasant Studies
requires an analysis of capitalist ground-rent [1907a: 297]. There are,
however, two small problems exhibited by Lenin's formulation of the 'two
roads' which need to be mentioned in this context. First, to call the two roads
to the capitalist development of agriculture 'Junker road' and 'peasant road'
gives the unfortunate impression that this process is the result of a struggle
within agriculture alone. Lenin's formulation could thus be misleading
despite the fact that in his own analyses of the development of capitalism, he
was acutely aware of the effects of forces outside agriculture on the trans-
formation of agriculture itself [Lenin, 1899: Chs. 3-7]. In order to avoid the
impression that agriculture can be understood as a self-contained realm I
shall prefer to utilise the terms capital-led and landlord-led forms of capital-
ist development. In this sense, Lenin's 'peasant' and 'Junker' roads are
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the working day, with the result that the extraction of surplus-value in its
absolute form can only operate within these strict limits, with a correspond-
ing restriction on profits and capital accumulation [1867: 223].l6
The extraction of relative surplus-value, on the other hand, is not founded
on an extension of the working day. In a situation where working time is
given (for example, by legislation) or generally restricted by working-class
struggles, greater quantities of surplus-value can be extracted by decreasing
the value of labour-power and hence necessary labour-time. This is done,
Marx argues, by introducing new machinery and techniques which increase
labour productivity in those branches of industry which provide the socially
necessary means of subsistence [1867: 299]. We know already that by the
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It can readily be appreciated at this stage of the argument that during and
following the creation of capitalist landed property in the period of 'primi-
tive accumulation', agricultural production only relies on a formal subsump-
tion of labour - on the extraction of absolute surplus-value. The develop-
ment of the real subordination of labour in agriculture is impeded by the
barrier of landed property, which constitutes an obstacle to investment in
this sector. Hence, the longer the barrier of landed property exists, the
longer will the extraction of relative surplus-value be impeded in agriculture
and the longer will agricultural capital have to be confined to the extraction
of absolute surplus-value. This implies, therefore, the longer persistence of
highly repressive, but essentially capitalist forms of labour control within
this sector. However, as soon as the barrier of private property is overcome,
whether in a form which is led by capital or by landed property itself, capital
investment can circulate freely within agriculture and the real subsumption
of labour can take place in this sector without hindrance.
It will be recalled that a consequence of the failure of the process of
equalisation to operate in agriculture (or between agriculture and industry)
is that the price of agricultural products will be higher than they would be
otherwise. This is because, as we know, the introduction of new machinery
or techniques raises the productivity of labour and thereby cheapens the
individual prices of commodities, and, after equalisation, their social value.
But agriculture, especially in early capitalism, is the main producer of food,
one of the necessities of life. This means that the value of labour-power (in
society as a whole and in industry in particular) will be higher than it would
be if landed property were abolished. Hence, the decrease in the price of
food via the abolition of landed property, leads to an increase in the quantity
of extracted (relative) surplus-value throughout society. The extraction of
relative surplus-value, as we have seen, operates by decreasing the value of
labour-power, by cheapening the necessities of life. These necessities are the
products of various industries and sectors [1867: 299]; but agriculture is the
only such sector in which a structural obstacle is provided to the cheapening
of its commodities. Hence, this obstacle must be overcome before the value
of labour-power in society can be cheapened. This is the basis of the
'agrarian question' under capitalism for Marx -that is, the problem which an
Marx's Third Class 37
tries (for example, Chile) meant that the pressure to transform landed
property emanated in the main from the 'urban sectors'. Second, the relative
weakness of organised labour in many Latin American countries meant that
pressure was insufficient to reverse the power of landed property. Third,
and most importantly, of course, was the influence of foreign capital's
penetration into Latin American social formations; a fact which contributes
towards accounting for the first two points. The penetration of foreign
capital took different forms through history: those of merchant's capital,
commodity capital and imperialism and finance capital. Whatever its form
the effect of this penetration was generally to block the development of
domestic industrial capital, with the result that the other major source of
antagonism to landed property was weakened. This amounts to saying that
the pressure to cheapen the value of the necessities of life was not always
strong enough to dislodge landed property from its control over agriculture.
This was especially the case in those instances where the cost of reproducing
labour-power was in large measure borne by petty-commodity production.
Imperialist penetration, therefore, contributed to the fact that landed
property was able to resist its abolition. The results were reasonably clear:
This thirst for surplus, its wastage and leakage abroad under depen-
dent capitalism, has in many cases led to the imposition of authorita-
rian military regimes to increase the absolute surplus-value of labour
by reducing the worker's wage and extending his working hours or
intensifying the labour process. Brazil, Chile and Argentina illustrate
the above [Kay, 1981: 487].
The two major attacks of the domestic bourgeoisie/working class/ peasantry
alliance were, of course, the import-substitution policies of the period
following the 1930s and the land reform programmes of the 1960s and 1970s.
Both failed ultimately to defeat the alliance of landed property and imperial-
ism, with the result that landed property was able to control the develop-
ment of capitalism in agriculture and that the antagonistic relation between
capital and landed property has virtually been suppressed. New strategies
based on a different set of class alliances will have to be developed in order to
overcome the new power bloc.
42 The Journal of Peasant Studies
NOTES
1. Of course there is no necessary guarantee that a class of capitalists (for example) neces-
sarily exists in any capitalist social formation. One can have capital without capitalists.
Nevertheless this does not alter the fact that a theorisation of capital in general is strictly
necessary in any particular explanation of specific classes. Some of the reasons for capital-
ism giving rise to a dominant contradiction other than that between capitalists and wage-
labourers have been discussed in the case of 'African Socialism' in P. Gibbon and M.
Neocosmos [1985].
2. I review the major contributions to the debate over Marx's theory of rent in Neocosmos
[1982, Ch.5 appendix]. I argue that both defenders and critics of Marx's theory of rent
conflate essential and phenomenal categories, with the result that they are incapable of
providing coherent account of that theory.
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3. Class unities are not simply given by capitalism but are produced by specific practices in
opposition to other classes. For a brief discussion of this point see Gibbon and Neocosmos
[1985], and in connection with the proletariat specifically see Bettelheim [1971].
4. See in this context, for example, Emmanuel [1972: 216-22]; Cutler and Taylor [1972];
Gutelman [1974]; Tribe [1977] and my discussion of these authors and others in Neocosmos
[1982: Ch.5 appendix].
5. By the term 'profit', I am referring here to 'gross profit' and I am ignoring, in order to
simplify the issue, its sub-division into interest and profit of enterprise. Marx suggests that
gross profit is 'the specific characteristic form of surplus-value belonging to the capitalist
mode of production' [1865: 814]. It is for Marx the clearest realised form of surplus-value
under capitalism and constitutes the specific revenue of a class of capitalists [Sayer, 1979:
54].
6. The 'basis' of revenue must not be confused with the 'source' of revenue which, for Marx, is
of course labour.
7. This point is argued in detail in Neocosmos [1982: Part II]. For examples of a relativistic
conception of Marx's theory of rent see Fine [1979; 1980] and Massey and Catalano [1978].
For example of an economistic approach to rent see Cutler and Taylor [1972], Emmanuel
[1972], Rey [1973], Gutelman [1974]. All these authors conflate the basis of landlord
revenue with that revenue itself, and the basis of a landed class (landed property) with
landownership itself.
8. Marx gives a number of reasons for this which are mainly concerned with the level of
science and technology employed in agriculture [1862: 123]. He also argues that in agricul-
ture production time is longer than working time, a fact which lengthens the turnover
period of agricultural capital and means that a smaller amount of surplus-value is created in
agriculture [1863b: 18-21, 1874: Chs.12, 13]. Ultimately of course the slower rate of
development of the productive forces in agriculture is explained by the existence of the
capital/landed property relation.
9. See Marx [1865: 758]. Monopoly rents based on monopoly price are distinguished from
both differential and absolute rent in [1865: 765; 832-3]. Marx also states that the landlord's
so-called 'monopoly' of land is no different from the capitalist's 'monopoly' of the means of
production [1865: 815, 816, 1863b: 94].
10. This needs to be stressed in view of the tendency in recent literature to represent rural
relations not as historical but as somehow 'natural' determined, for instance, by the quality
of land itself, for example, Vergopoulos [1974].
11. It is this independence I would argue, which forms the basis of the phenomenal illusion that
landlords are in a position to create their own rent through a 'natural monopoly' in land.
12. Although for Marx rent is a social law, it appears phenomenally as a law of nature. Just as
capital seems to create interest, technology profit and labour wages, so rent seems to arise
from the land itself [1865: Ch.48, 1863c: addenda].
13. Marx [1865: 627-33] argues that the latter is often the rule in agriculture.
14. This point is made clear in the remark by Marx cited above [28]. See also Lenin [1907a:
296-7]. The fact that land nationalisation does not automatically abolish the capital/landed
Marx's Third Class 43
property relation follows from the fact that the latter is an essential relation. The point is
similar to the now obvious one that the nationalisation of enterprises does not automati-
cally abolish capitalism. A mere legal measure cannot of itself transform production
relations.
15. It should be recalled as I have noted at the beginning of this article, that Lenin [1905; 1907a]
did not restrict his comments on the effects of the two roads to socio-economic conditions
alone. He was also crucially concerned with their effects on politics and political institu-
tions: bourgeois democracy, different forms of bourgeois state and so on [Gibbon, 1984].
Restrictions of space preclude a discussion of these effects here, so I have preferred to
concentrate on the difference in socio-economic forms engendered by capital-led and
landlord-led development.
16. There is an additional important limit to capital accumulation provided by absolute
surplus-value which concerns the process of realisation on the market. Absolute surplus-
value implies low wages and low levels of consumption. If the working class constitutes also
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the market for the commodities produced, production and, hence, accumulation will be
limited by their low levels of consumption. Such a limit is not operative with relative
surplus-value or if the producers are not at the same time the consumers of the commodities
produced as, for example, in the cases of production for consumption by the bourgeoisie
and petty-bourgeoisie, production for export, reproduction of labour power by petty-
commodity production. This argument is developed in Neocosmos [1982: 563-7].
17. Of course increased productivity in agriculture also means greater exploitation of rural
labourers and poor peasants and a more rapid differentiation of the peasantry as Lenin was
aware.
18. I expound these and the following arguments at length in [Neocosmos 1982: Chs.9, 10].
19. Although it is often noted quite correctly that the increase in the internal market resulting
from a land redistribution programme constitutes one of the major incentives for the
industrial bourgeoisie to support such a programme, this is often mistakenly overstressed,
particularly if one bears in mind that a large number of commodities (for example,
agriculture machinery, pesticides and so on) which would be demanded by a capitalising
agriculture are imported in imperialised social formations. This was certainly the case in
Chile [Neocosmos, 1982: 795]. Much more important a factor in the Chilean case was the
pressure to reduce wages.
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