Negation[edit]

If one wishes to include a connective

¬
{\displaystyle \lnot }

for negation rather than consider it an

abbreviation for
ϕ
→
⊥
{\displaystyle \phi \to \bot }

, it is enough to add:
• NOT-1': (
ϕ
→
⊥
)
→
¬
ϕ


{\displaystyle (\phi \to

\bot )\to \lnot \phi } 



• NOT-2': ¬
ϕ
→
(
ϕ
→
⊥
)


{\displaystyle \lnot \phi
 \to (\phi \to \bot )} 


There are a number of alternatives available if one wishes to omit the
connective
⊥
{\displaystyle \bot }

(false). For example, one may replace the

three axioms FALSE, NOT-1', and NOT-2' with the two axioms
• NOT-1:
(
ϕ
→
χ
)
→
(
(
ϕ
→
¬
χ
)
→
¬
ϕ
)


{\
displaystyle (\phi \to \chi )\to ((\phi \to \lnot \chi )\to \lnot

\phi )} 


• NOT-2: ϕ
→
(
¬
ϕ
→
χ
)


{\displaystyle \phi \to
 (\lnot \phi \to \chi )} 


as at Propositional calculus#Axioms. Alternatives to NOT-1 are
(
ϕ
→
¬
χ
)
→
(
χ
→
¬
ϕ
)
{\displaystyle (\phi \to \lnot \chi )\to (\chi \to \lnot \phi )}

or
(
ϕ
→
¬
ϕ
)
→
¬
ϕ
{\displaystyle (\phi \to \lnot \phi )\to \lnot \phi }

.
Equivalence[edit]
The connective
↔
{\displaystyle \leftrightarrow }

for equivalence may be treated as an

abbreviation, with
ϕ
↔
χ
{\displaystyle \phi \leftrightarrow \chi }
 standing for
(
ϕ
→
χ
)
∧
(
χ
→
ϕ
)
{\displaystyle (\phi \to \chi )\land (\chi \to \phi )}

. Alternatively, one may add the axioms

• IFF-1: (
ϕ
↔
χ
)
→
(
ϕ
→
χ
)


{\displaystyle (\phi
\leftrightarrow \chi )\to (\phi \to \chi )} 


• IFF-2: (
ϕ
↔
χ
)
→
(
χ
→
ϕ
)


{\displaystyle (\phi
\leftrightarrow \chi )\to (\chi \to \phi )} 



• IFF-3:
(
ϕ
→
χ
)
→
(
(
χ
→
ϕ
)
→
(
ϕ
↔
χ
)
)



{\displaystyle (\phi \to \chi )\to ((\chi \to \phi )\to (\phi

\leftrightarrow \chi ))} 



IFF-1 and IFF-2 can, if desired, be combined into a single axiom
(
ϕ
↔
χ
)
→
(
(
ϕ
→
χ
)
∧
(
χ
→
ϕ
)
)
{\displaystyle (\phi \leftrightarrow \chi )\to ((\phi \to \chi )\land
(\chi \to \phi ))}

using conjunction.
Relation to classical logic[edit]
The system of classical logic is obtained by adding any one of the
following axioms:
a ϕ
∨
¬
ϕ


{\displaystyle \phi \lor \lnot \phi } 


 (Law of the excluded middle. May also
be formulated as
(
ϕ
→
χ
)
→
(
(
¬
ϕ
→
χ
)
→
χ
)


{\disp
laystyle (\phi \to \chi )\to ((\lnot \phi \to \chi )\to \chi )} 



.)
b ¬
¬
ϕ
→
ϕ


{\displaystyle \lnot \lnot \phi \to \phi } 



(Double negation elimination)

c (
(
ϕ
→
χ
)
→
ϕ
)
→
ϕ


{\displaystyle ((\phi \to
 \chi )\to \phi )\to \phi } 

 (Peirce's
law)
d (
¬
ϕ
→
¬
χ
)
→
(
χ
→
ϕ
)


{\displaystyle
(\lnot \phi \to \lnot \chi )\to (\chi \to \phi )} 



(Law of contraposition)
In general, one may take as the extra axiom any classical tautology
that is not valid in the two-element Kripke frame
∘
⟶
∘
{\displaystyle \circ {\longrightarrow }\circ }

(in other words, that is not included in

Smetanich's logic).
Another relationship is given by the Gödel–Gentzen negative
translation, which provides an embedding of classical first-order logic
into intuitionistic logic: a first-order formula is provable in classical
logic if and only if its Gödel–Gentzen translation is provable
intuitionistically. Therefore, intuitionistic logic can instead be seen as
a means of extending classical logic with constructive semantics.
In 1932, Kurt Gödel defined a system of logics intermediate between
classical and intuitionistic logic; Gödel logics are concomitantly known
as intermediate logics.
Non-interdefinability of operators[edit]
In classical propositional logic, it is possible to take one of
conjunction, disjunction, or implication as primitive, and define the
other two in terms of it together with negation, such as in
Łukasiewicz's three axioms of propositional logic. It is even possible
to define all four in terms of a sole sufficient operator such as the
Peirce arrow (NOR) or Sheffer stroke (NAND). Similarly, in classical
first-order logic, one of the quantifiers can be defined in terms of the
other and negation.
These are fundamentally consequences of the law of bivalence,
which makes all such connectives merely Boolean functions. The law
of bivalence does not hold in intuitionistic logic, only the law of non-
contradiction. As a result, none of the basic connectives can be
dispensed with, and the above axioms are all necessary. Most of the
classical identities are only theorems of intuitionistic logic in one
direction, although some are theorems in both directions. They are as
follows:
Conjunction versus disjunction:
• (
ϕ
∧
ψ
)
→
¬
(
¬
ϕ
∨
¬
ψ
)


{\displaystyle
(\phi \wedge \psi )\to \neg (\neg \phi \vee \neg \psi )} 



• (
ϕ
∨
ψ
)
→
¬
(
¬
ϕ
∧
¬
ψ
)


{\displaystyle
(\phi \vee \psi )\to \neg (\neg \phi \wedge \neg \psi )} 


• (
¬
ϕ
∨
¬
ψ
)
→
¬
(
ϕ
∧
ψ
)


{\displaystyle
(\neg \phi \vee \neg \psi )\to \neg (\phi \wedge \psi )} 



• (
¬
ϕ
∧
¬
ψ
)
↔
¬
(
ϕ
∨
ψ
)


{\displaystyle
(\neg \phi \wedge \neg \psi )\leftrightarrow \neg (\phi \vee

\psi )} 


Conjunction versus implication:
Weaker than Classical Logic[edit]
Intuitionistic logic is weaker than classical logic. Each theorem of
intuitionistic logic is a theorem in classical logic. Many tautologies in
classical logic are not theorems in intuitionistic logic. Examples
include the law of excluded middle p ∨ ¬p, Peirce's law ((p → q) → p)
→ p, and double negation elimination ¬¬p → p. But double negation
introduction p → ¬¬ p is a theorem.
Rejecting excluded middle may seem strange to those more familiar
with classical logic. To prove it in intuitionistic logic, it is necessary to
prove the truth or falsity of all possible propositional formulae, which
is impossible for a variety of reasons.
Sequent calculus[edit]
Main article: Sequent calculus
Gentzen discovered that a simple restriction of his system LK (his
sequent calculus for classical logic) results in a system which is
sound and complete with respect to intuitionistic logic. He called this
system LJ. In LK any number of formulas is allowed to appear on the
conclusion side of a sequent; in contrast LJ allows at most one
formula in this position.
Other derivatives of LK are limited to intuitionistic derivations but still
allow multiple conclusions in a sequent. LJ'[4] is one example.
Hilbert-style calculus[edit]
Intuitionistic logic can be defined using the following Hilbert-style
calculus. This is similar to a way of axiomatizing classical
propositional logic.
In propositional logic, the inference rule is modus ponens

• MP: from ϕ


{\displaystyle \phi } 



and ϕ
→
ψ


{\displaystyle \phi \to \psi } 



infer ψ


{\displaystyle \psi } 



and the axioms are
• THEN-1: ϕ
→
(
χ
→
ϕ
)


{\displaystyle \phi \to (\chi

\to \phi )} 


• THEN-2:
(
ϕ
→
(
χ
→
ψ
)
)
→
(
(
ϕ
→
χ
)
→
(
ϕ

→
ψ
)
)


{\displaystyle (\phi \to (\chi \to \psi ))\to

((\phi \to \chi )\to (\phi \to \psi ))} 



• AND-1: ϕ
∧
χ
→
ϕ


{\displaystyle \phi \land \chi \to \phi
 } 


• AND-2: ϕ
∧
χ
→
χ


{\displaystyle \phi \land \chi \to \chi

} 


• AND-3: ϕ
→
(
χ
→
(
ϕ
∧
χ
)
)


{\displaystyle \phi

\to (\chi \to (\phi \land \chi ))} 



• OR-1: ϕ
→
ϕ
∨
χ


{\displaystyle \phi \to \phi \lor \chi }




• OR-2: χ
→
ϕ
∨
χ


{\displaystyle \chi \to \phi \lor \chi }




• OR-3:
(
ϕ
→
ψ
)
→
(
(
χ
→
ψ
)
→
(
ϕ
∨
χ
→
ψ

)
)


{\displaystyle (\phi \to \psi )\to ((\chi \to \psi )\to

(\phi \lor \chi \to \psi ))} 



• FALSE: ⊥
→
ϕ


{\displaystyle \bot \to \phi } 



To make this a system of first-order predicate logic, the generalization

rules
• ∀


{\displaystyle \forall } 

 -GEN:
from ψ
→
ϕ


{\displaystyle \psi \to \phi } 



infer
ψ
→
(
∀
x

ϕ
)


{\displaystyle \psi \to (\forall x\

\phi )} 

 , if x


{\displaystyle x}



•