St.

John’s College

Deliberations upon Friendship in Plato’s ​Lysis

An Account of How Friendship Is Possible Without Knowing What A Friend Is

George Ward
(1.0) Introduction

The ​Lysis​ ends with Socrates making the following goodbye remark to two boys, Lysis and

Menexenus:

SOCRATES: "Though we conceive ourselves to be friends with each other— you see I class

myself with you— we have not as yet been able to discover what we mean by a friend!" (223b)

The subject of Plato's ​Lysis​ is friendship, and yet the people involved in the dialogue

seem not to be sure what a friend is. Socrates classes himself with Lysis and Menexenus on

account of how each of them conceives himself to be a friend to the other two. But on account

of what, again? What is this "friend"? Perhaps Socrates is friendly because Lysis and

Menexenus benefit him in some way, and he likewise benefits them. It’s also possible for the

three of them to be friends because they belong to each other “by some tie of nature” (221e).

Even then, it would still be necessary to investigate what tie of nature this would be, and what it

would mean for two people to belong to each other.

(1.1) Friendship among Men who are Good

It seems reasonable to address the most obvious possibility first. Perhaps these three

people became friends upon observing goodness or virtue within each other. This would mean

that Socrates, Lysis, and Menexenus, all being observably good, would immediately become

friends, even while not knowing what “friendship” means as a word. After all, Socrates says that

they have all become friends without really knowing what it means to be such.

The interlocutor Polemarchus in Plato's Republic offers a definition of a true friend: "The

man who both seems and is good is the friend" (Republic 334e). If this remark were taken as a

general rule, it would mean that anytime a good man crossed the path of another, they would

become friends if they perceived one another as they really were. This friendship would come

into existence on account of the goodness of each man, and it would not matter whether each
man had a great deal of knowledge about what was happening between them. Aristotle seems

to agree with this point when he says, “Perfect friendship is the friendship of men who are good,

and alike in virtue” (Ethics 8.3). It is perhaps very possible for a man to be good and seem that

way. Such a man could simultaneously have a virtue resembling that virtue of another, without

having any conception of what friendship is. In this way, it would be possible to have a friend,

without knowing what a friend is.

This would mean that people would be likely to become friends when each of them has

good properties. For instance, a man who is good at making wine might become friends with a

man who is good at making wine bottles, on account of each of them having good skills. In this

way, each of them would be alike in having virtue, and each would have a virtue that was useful

to the other. It would also be necessary for each of them to observe virtue in the other, or, to

rephrase, for each to notice that the other has a skill that is beneficial for the first.

(1.2) Problems Arise Since Most Men are Bad in Many Ways

Yet Socrates, Lysis, and Menexenus are all alike in ​lacking​ a virtue. Specifically, they

lack knowledge, because none of them know what friendship is, even though they all set out to

find a definition of friendship. It is obvious to each of them that the other two are ignorant

regarding friendship. Ignorance, according to Socrates, is not a good property, but a bad one:

Socrates appears to hold that ignorance would cause a person to be unworthy of friendship.

Just as people will be friendly to good men when it is obvious they are such, people will be

hostile to bad men under the same circumstances. It is therefore relevant for Socrates to say in

the ​Lysis​ that knowledge makes a person good, and that ignorance makes a person bad. “If you

acquire knowledge, my son, all men will be friendly to you, all men will be attached to you, for

you will be useful and good. If not, you will have no friend in anyone, not even your own family”

[Lysis 210c].
(1.3) A Friendship Must Have At Least One Good Person In It

In short, someone is useful and good in proportion to the knowledge they have got, and

they are bad or evil in proportion to how little they know. The winemaker, for instance, is useful

and good for everyone who enjoys wine. Further, Socrates would argue that a winemaker is

good on account of his knowledge, and, additionally, if he seemed to be good, he ought to have

many friends. Meanwhile, the winemaker would direct hate towards someone who lacked

knowledge, since lacking knowledge causes a man not to be useful or good for anything. Such

an ignorant man would be useless and good for nothing, and therefore perhaps a waste of

everybody’s time.

Polemarchus has already defined a "friend" as one who seems good, while actually

being ​such. If he is right, and Socrates is also right, then a very knowledgeable man would be

good, and would, if he seemed that way also, be "friendly" to everyone by definition. Further,

everyone else would be friendly to such a knowledgeable man, on account of his knowledge

being useful to them. Such a man, on account of his knowledge, would both be friendly, and

have others be friendly in return. In short, he would have reciprocal friendships with everyone.

Socrates provides an example of how this friendliness would be felt by everyone towards a man

with knowledge. He talks about how Lysis’ father will not let Lysis manage the family estate, or

take the reins of one of the family chariots. Socrates argues that Lysis is prevented from doing

these things not because he is too young, but because he is lacking knowledge. [Lysis 209a-b].

SOCRATES: “Is it not, then, for you to be old enough that your father is waiting in all cases, but

on the very day that he thinks you are wiser than he is, he will hand over to you himself and his

property”.

LYSIS: “I shouldn’t wonder”.

SOCRATES: “Does your neighbor not follow the same rule that your father does with regard to

you? Do you expect he will hand over to you his house to manage, as soon as he thinks you

have a better idea of the management of a house than he has himself, or will he keep it in his

own hands?”

LYSIS: “Hand it over to me, I should think”.

Socrates appears to be arguing that knowledge is a good way to make friends. Just as

Lysis’ father will yield the estate to his son on account of the son’s knowledge, any man will

yield power to a man who seems able to use that power better. Each of these men is willing to

yield property to others who seem to know more than themselves. They are, in essence, willing

to behave in a friendly manner towards people who seem better than they are.

If all of the above were true, there would be two kinds of friendships, and each would

exist on account of goodness. The first type of friendship would be found between the good

winemaker and the good wine-bottle-maker. It would exist between the good, on account of

each of them being good, and therefore useful to each other. Next, a second type of friendship

would be found between one man who is good at managing property, and another man who is

not so good. This would be a friendship where a superior man is useful to an inferior one. In the

first case, both friends have merit, and in the second case, only one friend has merit. Yet, in

either case, at least one person involved in the friendship must have merit.

Socrates specifically says that ​knowledge​ is the only kind of merit that will bring friends,

and that a lack of knowledge will cause a person to be alienated from others. Yet all three

participants in the dialogue lack knowledge with respect to friendship. One of them, therefore,

must have ​some​ knowledge in order for there to be some quantity of the merit which would

make friendship possible.

(1.4) Socrates: Is He Good?

 It would make sense to first suggest that Socrates has knowledge. In the beginning of

the ​Lysis​, Socrates says that he knows how to detect who is in love, and who they are in love

with. He detects that a man named Hippothales is in love upon observing him, and finds out that

Hippothales is specifically in love with Lysis. “Though in most matters I am a pretty useless

creature, yet by some means or other I have received from heaven the gift of being able to

detect at a glance both a lover and a beloved,” he says (204c). Since it seemed reasonable to

say before that knowledge alone makes a man useful and good, perhaps it is reasonable to say

now that Socrates, in specifically failing to be "useless" on account of his heavenly gift, must

have received specifically ​knowledge​ from heaven. This knowledge could have made him useful

and good, and therefore worthy of friendship. After all, if Socrates did not have knowledge, he

could not be useful and good, and it was just established that he was ​useful​ for detecting lovers

and beloveds. Therefore he must have had knowledge, because there is no other means by

which a man becomes useful.

(1.5) Hippothales is Friendly to Socrates on Account of Socrates Having Knowledge

Certainly it does seem like the teachings of Socrates have a profound effect upon both

Lysis and Menexenus. However, it is not immediately clear how Socrates’ knowledge is either

useful or good to either of them. On the contrary, Socrates actually appears to be acting in the

service of Hippothales. Early in the dialogue, Socrates tells Hippothales that he will demonstrate

for him how a man ought to converse with his beloved. The idea appears to be to assist

Hippothales and bolster his sexual advances upon Lysis (Lysis 206c).

HIPPOTHALES: “I put myself into your hands, and beg you to give me any advice you may

have to bestow, as to the course of conduct or conversation that a lover ought to adopt in order

to render himself agreeable to the object of his affection”.

SOCRATES: “That were no such easy matter. But if you would bring me to speak with Lysis,

perhaps I could give you a specimen of what you ought to say to him.”

This would mean for certain that Socrates had knowledge. However, it would also mean

that he was using this knowledge not to benefit either of the boys, Lysis or Menexenus. Rather,

he would be using it to demonstrate to Hippothales how a man wins the love of a boy. Socrates

says that a man will happily let another man manage their property, so long as he believes the

other will manage it better than he can. Perhaps in just the same way, Hippothales is letting

Socrates manage his romantic pursuit of Lysis, with the impression that Socrates knows better

how to manage such a thing.

Hippothales knows where Lysis can be found, while Socrates knows the proper way in

which a lover ought to speak to a beloved. In this light, the dialogue between Socrates and Lysis

would be the fruit of a joint partnership between Socrates and Hippothales, where each of them

would have knowledge that would make them useful and good to the other. The knowledge of

Socrates would help Hippothales gain the love of Lysis, and therefore would be useful and good

to Hippothales, lovestruck as he is. Yet it is not clear what Socrates stands to gain from the joint

partnership. In short, it is not clear why Socrates would want to speak to Lysis, but it certainly is

clear why Hippothales would want him to.

There are instances where Socrates behaves as though he is morally improving Lysis,

when he actually wants to covertly explain to Hippothales the proper means of seducing a

beloved. For instance, Socrates teaches Lysis not to have a "great idea" of himself (210d). This

teaching would normally seem like something that would benefit Lysis.

SOCRATES: "If you still require, as you do, an instructor, you are still without ideas."

LYSIS: "True".
SOCRATES: "It cannot be, then, that you have a great idea of yourself, if as yet you have no

idea."

At first glance, this teaching might appear to resemble that teaching which is offered by

Socrates on a regular basis, to the effect that it is a good idea to be humble, and not to think of

oneself as too “great”. Socrates generally seems to teach people this because it benefits people

to be humble, and they will be happier that way. In fact, if the personal motivations of Socrates

had been left out of the dialogue, I would have been inclined to say that Socrates was imparting

knowledge onto Lysis in a way that was useful and good, and that Socrates was a friend to

Lysis on this account. Yet, in this case, Socrates makes it clear that he is trying to be useful to

Hippothales, and that he is not trying to be useful to Lysis. Immediately after remarking to Lysis

that he ought not to have a great idea of himself, Socrates says the following:

SOCRATES: “It came into my head to say, ‘This is the way, Hippothales that you should talk to

your favorite, humbling and checking, instead of puffing him up and pampering him, as you now

do.’ However, on seeing him writhing with agitation at the turn the conversation was taking, I

recollected that though standing so near, he didn’t wish to be seen by Lysis. So I recovered

myself in time, and forebore to address him” (210e).

Socrates says that he wishes to humble Lysis and check him because this is the way

that a man should talk to his beloved. Knowledge is meant to be the basis by which a man

becomes useful and good, and, by humbling Lysis, Socrates can promote self-knowledge within

Lysis and thereby make him better and more useful. Yet Socrates seems to be performing this

favor out of a good-natured kindness to Hippothales. Can it be established that just as

Hippothales is grateful to Socrates, that Lysis is also grateful?

Perhaps not. There is a bit of evidence, in fact, to suggest that Lysis is annoyed by

Socrates trying to play matchmaker. In one instance, Socrates finally convinces Lysis to admit
that when a man truly loves another, he must be loved back. The text says that Lysis “gave but

a faint nod of assent; while Hippothales, in his delight, turned all manner of colors” (222b). It

seems like Hippothales is very enthusiastic about how much Socrates knows about lovers and

beloveds. Yet Lysis seems not to be enthusiastic. On the contrary, he seems to be unsettled

and even worried by the romantic feelings which Socrates is asserting him to have.

Perhaps Socrates is somehow benefiting Hippothales, while also benefiting Lysis and

Menexenus simultaneously. But I lack an argument for this, and it seems like if Socrates is

benefiting them, he is doing so very obscurely. And I ​clearly​ have not finished my argument to

the effect that friendship between Lysis, Menexenus, and Socrates must exist on account of

goodness. This is what I have intended to do, and I haven’t come to a conclusion either on one

side or the other.

(1.6) Friendship Among Two Men Who Are Neither Good Nor Evil

By the end of the dialogue, Socrates has found friendship to be impossible between

many people. He finds that a perfectly good man would be perfectly useful and knowledgeable,

and therefore would be self-sufficient, and would not have any desire for a friend (215b).

SOCRATES: "How then, I wonder, will the good be ever friends at all with the good, when

neither in absence do they feel regret from each other, being sufficient for themselves apart, nor

when present together have they any need of one another? Is there any possible way by which

such people can be brought to care for each other?"

Socrates offers two signs or symptoms of friendship in this passage. Two perfectly good

people would lack these signs, and would therefore seem not to be friends. First, a friend

should, in absence, feel regret from being apart from his friend. Next, a friend should also have

need of his friend, even when in his presence. A perfectly good man does not have either of

these feelings because he is perfectly sufficient for himself.

 Next, Socrates finds that a perfectly evil man would be unfriendly to another perfectly evil

man, also. Socrates says that “the nearer wicked men come to each other, and the more they

see of each other, the greater enemies they become. For they injure each other” (214c). In

order to solve this problem, I have tried to offer a friendship where two men are neither perfectly

blessed by heaven, nor perfectly stricken with evil.

Instead, each of the two friends must have some degree of goodness, perfection, and

knowledge, but must each also be deficient in some way. This is why I offered that the

winemaker and the maker of wine-bottles would be friends. For the winemaker would know how

to make wine, but not wine-bottles, and he would therefore have knowledge about his own craft,

but not other crafts. And the man who makes wine-bottles would also know how to practice his

own craft, but not how to practice the craft of the winemaker.

Each would have some knowledge and some things about which they are ignorant. They

would each have received something good, as if from heaven, and they each would be plagued

by ignorance, which is something evil. Yet just as each is useful to the other because of his

knowledge, each is also loved by the other because of his knowledge. After all, it is being useful

which causes people to be loved, according to Socrates. One would not expect a man to be

loved on account of his ignorance, any more than one would expect a man to be loved on

account of some disease.

This would be a friendship in which Socrates would see some potential. Neither man is

perfectly good, and neither man would be perfectly evil, either. Instead, each man would be

properly characterized as ​neither good nor evil.​ Socrates says that one who is neither good nor

evil would be friendly towards the good, if there was evil within himself. He offers an example of

a body which might be friendly towards medicine on account of a disease. Looking at such a

body, it would seem like the body loved the medicine because the medicine would purge
disease from itself, and certainly would not appreciate medicine for its own sake. Socrates says,

“It would then be made apparent that it was only on account of evil that we felt regard and

affection for good, as we considered good to be a medicine for evil, and evil to be a disease. But

where there is no disease, there is, we are aware, no need of medicine” (220d).

This would mean that men who loved people on account of them being good may

sometimes seem to be friendly to their doctors and their winemakers. Yet these men would be

more customers than friends, because they would only be friends towards the knowledge about

medicine and wine that would be within the doctor and the winemaker, on account of this

knowledge being useful to themselves. The doctor and the winemaker are neither good nor evil,

and therefore apparently unlikable. When a man is friendly to his winemaker, he is not really

behaving friendly to the winemaker because he likes him, but rather because the winemaker

knows how to make wine. In summary, he is friendly not to the man, but to his knowledge, which

alone makes him useful and good.

In just the same way, two men might be friendly to one another on account of each of

them having knowledge. They would not love each other, really, but only love one another’s

skills. The winemaker and the wine-bottle-maker mentioned previously would not really be

friendly towards each other, but rather both would be friendly towards knowledge, and not to

other human beings. They would be like two doctors, each with sufficient knowledge to treat the

disease of the other, but insufficient knowledge to treat their own diseases. Neither man is

self-sufficient, but the relationship is closer to codependency than friendship. For Socrates says

that “With that, then, to which we are truly friendly, we are not friendly for the sake of any other

thing to which we are friendly” (220b). And this would mean that such a pair of doctors would be

truly friendly to goodness, that they enjoy for its own sake. Yet they would not be truly friends

with each other, because each only behaves in a friendly way towards the other for the sake of
purging his own disease. Such a friendship would be for the sake of something else, and would

therefore not be truly such.

(1.7) Reconsiderations and Despair

Would it be fair to say that Socrates is friendly with Lysis because he is good? Aristotle

writes in Ethics 8.3: “Perfect friendship is the friendship of men who are good, and alike in

virtue; for these wish well alike to each other qua good, and they are good themselves.” This

would mean that Socrates, insofar as he is good, would wish well upon others, and would thus

be friendly towards them. Now, Socrates himself says that a man will become good if he has

knowledge. Putting these facts together, a man would wish others well, if he had knowledge.

Socrates has knowledge about lovers and beloveds, and really does seem to use his

knowledge to benefit the romantic Hippothales. Perhaps, just as a chef who knows a great deal

about cooking would wish an inferior chef to produce a superior dish, Socrates wishes that

Hippothales will be successful in his romantic pursuits.

Yet there is a problem. Socrates and Hippothales seem to be a superior and an inferior,

but Socrates and Lysis are each inferior to the other in knowledge. If having knowledge causes

one to wish well, perhaps ignorance causes a man to wish poorly. Socrates has never had a

friend before (212a). He appears to covet that friendship which Lysis has, and he says to

Menexenus that he is hopelessly ignorant and utterly fond of friendship:

SOCRATES: “I fully believe that I would sooner acquire a friend and companion, than all the

gold of Darius, aye, or than Darius himself. So fond am I of friendship. On seeing, therefore, you

and Lysis, I am lost in wonder, while I count you most happy, at your being able, at your years,

to acquire this treasure with such readiness and ease—in that you, Menexenus, have gained so

early and true a friend in Lysis, and he the same in you—while I, on the contrary, am so far from
making the acquisition, that I do not even know how one man becomes the friend of another,

but wish on this very point to appeal to you as a connoisseur.”

I said before that knowledge makes a man self-sufficient, good, and useful. In knowing

nothing about friendship, Socrates is deficient, bad, and useless. In never having had a friend,

he is just like the ignorant men who Socrates explains will be rejected by their own families.

Socrates, in being “lost in wonder” at the sight of Lysis and Menexenus, is actually dazzled by

their superiority. He apparently hopes that Lysis will teach him how friendship is possible,

because he thinks such knowledge will make him happy. Lysis is therefore ​useful​ to Socrates as

a “connoisseur” on the subject.

Lysis has knowledge about friendship, but is ignorant about himself. He does not know,

for example, that he cannot possibly have a great idea of himself, until Socrates proves this fact

to him at 210d. Nor does he know that there is an evil of pride within himself, that ought to be

purged by Socrates’ “humbling and checking” (210e). In short, each of them has ignorance, an

evil inside themselves that needs fixing. I described previously a case in which two doctors were

each able to treat the disease of the other. This would be just the circumstance between

Socrates and Lysis, because each of them has access to knowledge of which the other is in

need. Socrates wishes to know about friendship, and it seems like Lysis wishes to know about

himself. Yet I felt it was true before to say that such a pair of doctors would not be friends with

each other truly, but would be friendly towards each other for the sake of something else,

namely the knowledge which could be found in the possession of the other. Socrates and Lysis,

like each of these two doctors, would not be truly friendly towards each other, but would rather

be truly friendly only to knowledge.

This friendship felt wrong before, and it feels wrong now. The ignorance of Lysis is

naturally repulsive to Socrates, and likewise in the opposite direction. They essentially are
exchanging knowledge, while the human being that offers them knowledge is disgusting to

them. They certainly are not friendly to one another for the sake of one another, as friendship is

meant to be. Yet, surely there must be some true friendship between Socrates, Lysis, and

Menexenus. As of now, Socrates’ remark at the end of the dialogue appears to be a mere

acknowledgement of a false friendship, and not a beautiful acknowledgement of a true one. The

friendship seems to have lost true weight and meaning.

As of now, I’m in a kind of despair. Towards the very end of the ​Lysis​, Socrates does

offer a second, completely different definition of friendship. According to this definition, two

friends belong to each other by a tie of nature (221e). Yet I have no idea what this means.

SOCRATES: “That then which belongs to a man is found, it seems, Lysis and Menexenus, to be

the object of his love, and friendship, and desire”.

LYSIS AND MENEXENUS: ​(both assent)

SOCRATES: “If, then, you two are friendly to each other, then by some tie of nature you belong

to each other?”

LYSIS AND MENEXENUS: “To be sure we do!”

(2.0) A New Conception of True Friendship Independent of Goodness

Socrates offers this definition of friendship only tentatively. He tosses it away after

thinking about it only for a brief span of time, but it is probably the only hope I have. Socrates

adopts this definition in combination with a second maxim, that the good belong to the good,

and the evil to the evil, and the neutral to the neutral. This might not be true either, and might

bring more confusion.

I am struggling. Are Lysis and Menexenus good? Evil? Neither good nor evil? Ought I

even to keep this maxim of the good belonging to the good, and each belonging towards that

which is morally comparable to itself? I don’t know. I do know that Lysis and Menexenus, if I am
to think of them as friends, must belong to each other by some tie of nature. Perhaps a solution

can be found by examining the natures of each boy.

(2.1) The Same Desires Belong to Lysis and Menexenus, Yet they Act Differently

There is, perhaps, one moment where Lysis displays a proud internal fire, in which he

breaks character. He is described at the beginning of the text to be fond of listening. Socrates

charms him mostly on this basis. The Platonic dialogue often takes the form of Socrates

speaking for long periods, and his interlocutor nodding assent and making remarks that signify

an agreement with Socrates. However, in this dialogue, the remarks of agreement from Lysis

are justified on the basis that he is fond of listening. At 206c, Hippothales remarks, “I have little

doubt that he will come to you of his own accord, for he is singularly fond of listening.”

Yet Lysis is fond of more than listening. It is as if he has a pent-up desire to speak within

himself. The conversation having been with Menexenus about whether the lovers are friends, or

the beloveds, Lysis suddenly surprises himself with a desire to talk, interrupting the

conversation between Socrates and Menexenus.

MENEXENUS: “To tell you the truth, Socrates, I don’t see my way at all.”

SOCRATES: “Is it possible, Menexenus, that from first to last we have been conducting our

search improperly?”

LYSIS: (crying out) “I am sure I think it is, Socrates.” (And he blushed as he said so)

Socrates then narrates the strange way in which Lysis had said this. Lysis seems to be

longing to get rid of his previous status as a boy who listens. He wants to speak, and it is as if

his instincts are overcoming his habits, bursting forth in a truly authentic display of emotion.

Socrates comments that “The words seemed to burst from him against his will in the intensity of

the interest he was paying to the conversation- an interest which his countenance had evinced

all the time we were talking” (213d).

 What a moment! Lysis had always been a listener, and now he speaks against his own

will. It’s difficult to think about what would make this possible.

There is another case in which Menexenus breaks his own characterization. Socrates is

well aware that Menexenus is a boy who is fond of a dispute. He has a conversation with Lysis

about Menexenus while Menexenus is away (211b).

SOCRATES: “Come to my aid, if Menexenus tries to baffle me. You know, don’t you, that he’s

fond of a dispute?”

LYSIS: “Oh, yes, desperately, I know. And that’s the very reason I want you to talk with him.”

For another example, when Socrates first converses with Menexenus, he asks

Menexenus an apparently obvious question: who is elder. Menexenus answers in that the

matter is “in dispute”, and also tells Socrates that it is a matter of dispute whether he or Lysis is

the better fellow (207c). So Menexenus really does seem to be fond of a dispute, as Socrates

says, and as Lysis himself “desperately knows”. This makes it strange how Menexenus, after

receiving a brief quantity of attention from Socrates, suddenly finds himself without words. As I

mentioned before, Menexenus finds himself absolutely confused.

MENEXENUS: “To tell you the truth, Socrates, I don’t see my way at all.”

This boy, who was previously willing to dispute his own height, is now afraid to talk about

philosophy, and much more willing to listen. Next, Lysis, having started as the quiet one, has

become the one who is willing to dispute. Does this mean that Lysis and Menexenus belong to

each other?

(2.2) A Man Is Friendly Towards That Which Belongs To Himself

Socrates, as I mentioned previously, says that that which belongs to a man is the object

of his affection, friendliness and desire. Socrates also says that a man will be in want for
something that belongs to him, and which is taken away. Finally, Socrates says that when a

man is in want, he will be friendly towards that of which he is in want (221d).

SOCRATES: That which is in want is friendly with that of which it is in want.”

LYSIS: “I imagine so.”

SOCRATES: “And becomes in want of that which is taken from it?”

LYSIS: “Of course.”

All this means is that, when some possession of a person is taken away, they will be in

want of it, and they will be friendly to that man who possesses it. For example, children have

momentary sentimental feeling for their baby teeth, even after they have fallen out. Next, a

balding man might feel a sorrowful affection for his hair, even as it falls out. Finally, a parent

might have affection for a child, even after they have departed home and even when they don’t

call as often as they should. All these attest to the fact that people love that which is produced

from themselves, even when this is taken away, and perhaps this is what Socrates means when

he speaks of friendship existing on account of belonging.

Aristotle helps illustrate this in Nicomachean Ethics, for he remarks:

“Parents love their children as being a part of themselves, and children their parents as being

something originating from them.... the product belongs to the producer (e.g. a tooth or hair or

anything else to him whose it is), but the producer does not belong to the product, or belongs in

a less degree” (8.12).

This love is everywhere in the world. For a man will have a natural affection for a tooth,

hair, or amputated leg that he has lost, on account of this thing belonging to himself. In just the

same way, a parent will have affection for a child, in turn on account of this child having been

removed from herself or himself. And people often wish to return to youth, on account of having
once possessed youth, and having now lost it. Perhaps this love exists between Lysis and

Menexenus.

(2.3) Two Fathers and Two Sons

Socrates remarked previously that Lysis was historically so fond of listening. Yet then

suddenly there appeared a fiery passion within Lysis, and he disputed points. Lysis always had

such affection for Menexenus, who was so “fond of a dispute”. It is as if there was something

strong and bold about Menexenus that Lysis loved, and wanted to mimic.

On the other hand, Menexenus seems to have, after having been stumped by Socrates,

become much more quiet. Lysis was always fond of listening. Perhaps Menexenus noticed that

Lysis was a good listener and wanted to mimic this too, but always found that he could not.

If each of them wanted to mimic the other, that would explain a lot. Socrates says that a

man will have affection for another, if that man belongs to himself by nature. This would be just

like a man who feels affection for a piece of jewelry which has been taken away, when that

jewelry has always been in his possession. Might it be said that Lysis has had some fondness of

a dispute laid in himself, that has been diminished, so that it ultimately surprised Lysis with

sudden strength? Likewise, might it be said that Menexenus has had some fondness for

listening, but is similarly afraid of showing it? How beautiful.

Aristotle says also that a man loves what he produces, on account of it being a part of

himself. It seems to me like Lysis and Menexenus would just be like two old men in two different

houses who exchange sons. So picture a house, where an old man and his son live. They are

alike, and each is fond of a dispute. This house would be Menexenus.

Let there be another house, in which an old man and his son live, where each is fond of

listening. When the two houses exchange sons, each father continues to love his own son, on
account of each son belonging to his father. The two households would therefore to some

extent belong to each other, and be produced by each other, and be loved by each other.

Each boy, like each household, could be divided in two. There would be one weak and

wizened piece, and one strong and healthy piece. Each weak piece would love the strong piece

of the other boy, because this strong piece would belong to the weak, almost like a son to his

father. For Socrates says that one must love that which belongs to oneself, and has been taken

away, and each weak and wizened piece has had something taken away from it, which it had

originally possessed. This is how Lysis and Menexenus may both love and belong to each

other. Lysis loves with one part, and belongs with another part, and likewise Menexenus does

the same.

Each boy, then, would have two parts. Each would love the other on account of one of

his parts, but this would not be superficial or false, like the friendship between the winemaker

and the wine-bottle-maker which I have described previously. Neither boy would gain anything

from his friend, speaking truly, except a glimpse of what crucial part of himself had been taken

away. This would be like a glimpse of a son, without content or useful information. Yet even

such a glimpse will still bring joy to parents. This friendly feeling is of a strange kind. It is not like

the friendship between the two doctors who can treat the diseases of one another. Each of

those two doctors offers good things to the other in the form of medicine. But each man is only

interested in the medicine of the other because it is useful for helping him pursue his own goals.

Namely, the medicine of each man helps the other pursue health, so that each does not really

love the other, but rather loves his knowledge.

The friendship between Lysis and Menexenus is radically different. Each boy has

something good, healthy and strong in their souls, as well as something weak, wizened, and

old. Each of them becomes happy upon observing the strong, good part of the other, and covets
this strength as something which originally had belonged to himself. Yet neither of them actually

gets any strength, goodness, or knowledge by observing the strength of the other. Lysis only

gets a reminder that he is not strong enough to make disputes. Likewise, Menexenus only gets

a reminder that he is too weak to listen.

(2.4) The Effect of Socrates

When Socrates arrives, the friendship of Lysis and Menexenus is therefore observably at

a deadlock. Menexenus disputes, and Lysis listens. However, Socrates is capable of bringing

about an innovation in this system. By the time the conversation is over, Socrates has caused

Lysis to surprise himself with a fondness for disputation, and has caused Menexenus to have a

fondness for listening. It would be correct to say that Lysis and Menexenus have the same

desires. Yet before Socrates spoke, a young and strong desire always got its chance to act

within each boy. This is what I think Socrates meant when he said that Lysis and Menexenus

had great ideas of themselves. After Socrates has left, a historically weak and wizened desire

rules in each of them, which Socrates has made stronger through his arguments. Each boy has

become less repressed and more balanced.

It is obvious that Lysis and Menexenus have been corrected in some way. After Socrates

“humbles and checks” Lysis by proving to him that he cannot possibly have a great idea of

himself, Menexenus suddenly returns after finishing some task that he had been busy with.

Socrates says that the following happens next:

“Lysis, in a boyish fondling way, said to me in a low voice, so that Menexenus couldn’t

hear, ‘I say, Socrates, say over again to Menexenus what you have been saying to me” (211a).

What work has Socrates done in these boys? I do not think he has disrupted their

friendship, or even come close to doing so. Rather, it seems to me like he has awoken new

emotions in each of them, that had always existed, but only recently are loved. I mean by this
that Socrates must love Lysis and Menexenus, and think that each of them belongs to himself.

He certainly does in many cases refer to them as “my boys” (217a, 219b, 222a). Yet he loves

them in ways that they are not accustomed to being loved. He prompts Lysis to make disputes,

and he prompts Menexenus to listen, because he loves even the desires which each of them

have bottled up.

In this way, Socrates would be a radically different animal from either Lysis or

Menexenus. He would love both the desire to listen and the desire to dispute, and would feel

each desire to belong to himself, and love each boy on this account. But it remains to be seen

on what account Lysis and Menexenus love Socrates. For Socrates may have a bottled-up

fondness to dispute, and a bottled-up fondness for listening, yet if all of this is true, what about

Socrates would be strong, healthy, and worthy of love? It would also be beneficial for my

argument to offer up more evidence from the text to indicate the truth of this account of

friendship, so I would like to show next how such a friendship exists between Hippothales and

Lysis.

(2.5) Do Hippothales and Lysis Love Each Other Because They Belong to Each Other?

Menexenus and Lysis are friendly to each other, on account of belonging to each other.

Yet that which belongs to a man is not merely the object of his friendship. What belongs to a

man is also the object of his love and desire. If this theory of friendship offered by Socrates were

to hold, it would hold for Hippothales as well as it would hold for Menexenus and Lysis.

Hippothales must, in loving Lysis, believe Lysis to belong to himself.

Yet Lysis is beautiful and noble, and Hippothales is apparently ignoble. Socrates says

upon first observing Lysis: “You would say he was not beautiful merely, but even of a noble

mien” (207a). And Hippothales seems to be the opposite of Lysis. For he does not seem to be

beautiful or noble, but on the contrary he makes a mockery of himself in his slavish pursuit of
Lysis. His friend Ctesippus sees nothing whatsoever noble and self-sufficient about Hippothales,

saying there is something wrong with him at 205a: “He is in a bad way, why, he raves like a

madman!”

When two people belong to each other, each loves the other equally. It is not like the

friendship Socrates described between a parent and child, where a man loves what he has

produced more than it can ever possibly reciprocate. Rather, when two people belong to each

other, they have an equal reciprocal love. This love would exist on account of each lover

resembling a bottled-up or diminished part of the other, as was said before. In this case, it would

be necessary for Lysis’s outward nobility to resemble a nobility within Hippothales which the

man finds it difficult to express. It would also be necessary for the outward ridiculousness of

Hippothales to resemble something in Lysis that is not immediately apparent.

And even if Socrates never offers a decent proof of a love existing between Hippothales

and Lysis on account of each of them belonging to the other, there is regardless evidence of it in

the text. For Socrates, when he meets this ridiculous Hippothales and finds him to be in love

with Lysis, compliments Hippothales and calls him noble for loving someone who is so noble.

“What an altogether noble and gallant love you have discovered there!” he exclaims (204e).

Socrates here implies that a love for noble things implies oneself to be noble, at least to

a small and diminished degree. Now, towards the second point, Hippothales is called ridiculous,

but he is called such, it seems to me, on account of praising Lysis and stimulating his pride,

when Lysis already has a “great idea” of himself and has pride already. Hippothales writes

poems and songs in praise of Lysis. These songs are absurd and very bad, and Ctesippus

remarks: “To be a lover, and to be singularly intent on one's boy, yet to have nothing particular

to tell him that a mere boy could not say, is surely ridiculous” (205b).
 Yet this is exactly what one would expect, for Hippothales to say what a boy would, if

Hippothales belonged to Lysis. He would be a servant of the boyish will of Lysis, and would

therefore speak boyishly. He would have a great idea of Lysis in his heart, and this great idea

would resemble the great idea which Lysis already has of himself.

This pair may resemble Lysis and Menexenus. Each would have one wizened and

diminished piece and one fresh and strong piece, like two households, each containing an old

man and his sons. Each lover would contain a part that is fond of praising Lysis, and a part that

is very noble. In Lysis, the noble part would be strong and more obvious. In Hippothales, the

part which enjoys praising Lysis has made itself more apparent. Yet each acts for the sake of

the other, so that each might be said to belong to each other. Socrates is wrong to say, as he

does at the end of the dialogue, that all men who love, are loved in return:

SOCRATES: “And so, in general, if one man, my children, is desirous and enamoured of

another, he can never have conceived his desire, or love, or friendship, without in some way

belonging to the object of his love, either in his soul, or in some quality of his soul, or in

disposition, or in form….Then the true lover must be loved in return by his favorite (Lysis 222a).

Yet Socrates is right in his conclusions, even if his reasoning is false. Lysis and

Hippothales really do seem to belong to each other by nature. And if this is a valid definition of

love, then it seems like they must love each other. Socrates seems to regularly imply that

Hippothales and Lysis each have components belonging to the other. Socrates actually speaks

in a way that is quite radical. Instead of saying that Hippothales has a part of himself that

resembles a part of Lysis, he says that Hippothales, in praising Lysis, is actually praising

himself.

(2.6) Hippothales Correctly Assumes Himself to Resemble a Lost Tooth of Lysis

 Hippothales had written several songs on various subjects relating to the deeds of

Lysis’s ancestors, and their horses, and their accomplishments in the races, and Socrates,

rather strangely, responds to all this, “You ridiculous Hippothales! Before you have gained the

victory, you compose and sing a hymn of praise on yourself.”

Now, what about himself is Hippothales praising? Socrates says he is praising his own

victory, because his songs only offer something good to him if he is victorious in winning Lysis’

heart. If Hippothales cannot win the heart of Lysis, his music in praise of his beloved will only

bring him shame by making him look like a ridiculous, rejected fool. Specifically, Socrates says

“If you succeed in winning the youth that you describe, all that you have said and sung will

redound to your honor, and in fact be your hymn of triumph, as if you had gained a victory in

obtaining such a favorite” (Lysis 205e). But when a man composes a hymn of victory to himself,

he is really praising his own virtues, it seems to me, and his capacity to win battles. So when

Hippothales composes music that honors Lysis, he would really be praising his own capacity to

win the heart of Lysis. In short, he would be lauding the fact that he had sufficient merit to win

the heart of Lysis, and that he was good enough for a youth that was so beautiful.

Another way of phrasing the same idea would be that if Hippothales had won the heart

of Lysis, this would serve as a proof that Hippothales and Lysis belonged to each other in some

way. Socrates convinces Lysis and Menexenus to assert two friends to belong to each other.

Friendship is said to be resulting from a belonging, but desire and love are also said to result

from belonging, so that it seems like even mutual love would be a proof of two people belonging

to each other somehow by nature (221e).

SOCRATES: “If, then, you two are friendly to each other, then by some tie of nature you belong

to each other?”

LYSIS AND MENEXENUS: (crying together) “To be sure we do!”

 If this is true, then it serves to prove that a mutual love between Hippothales and Lysis

would be a sign that each belonged to the other. Yet Lysis very well might have failed to return

the love of Hippothales, meaning that Socrates was correct in practice, but does not seem to

have been correct in theory when he said that a man who loves genuinely must be loved in

return. It in fact seems quite possible for a man to belong to one who loves him, and not to, in

return, hold the lover as his property. Many relationships can be this way, where one loves

another in an unrequited fashion, and Socrates does not disprove such relationships to my

satisfaction, or explain why true love must be reciprocal. But enough on this subject.

Whether or not this last argument of Socrates’ is sound, Hippothales would be, in

presuming his love to be requited, be presuming that himself to belong to Lysis already, and be

coveted by him. A man who presumes himself to belong to Lysis would presume himself to have

some property that belonged to Lysis at the beginning of his life and had yet since been lost. He

would think of himself as having something like a lost tooth or hair of Lysis in his soul, and

would believe Lysis to already love him on this account. In this way, Socrates would be correct

to say that, in praising Lysis, Hippothales would be praising himself. That is because, in driving

himself crazy and deluding himself into the ridiculous feeling that he is loved by Lysis, he also

comes to feel that he can praise himself by praising Lysis, because he is a mere component of

Lysis, in belonging to him already! After all, in praising something, one also praises each of the

things that belong to it, so that, in praising Lysis, Hippothales can praise himself.

So it would seem like Hippothales is thinking of himself as a component, or a thing which

belongs to Lysis, when he praises Lysis. This is why Socrates says that he is praising himself,

because he thinks of himself as doing this. Yet he thinks of himself as doing this on account of

an assumption, that he belongs to Lysis, and this is another way of saying that Lysis loves him.
This is how Socrates knows, or notices, that Hippothales has quietly assumed that Lysis has

returned his love.

Yet of course, it is not as if Lysis has produced Hippothales, to my previous point, nor is

it like Hippothales has produced Lysis. It in fact at immediate glance seems ridiculous for two

people to belong to each other. How can two people each take such a position, and how is this

feeling that he is a piece of Lysis anything but the ridiculous feeling of a lover?

(2.7) True Friendship Existing Among Those who are Both Like and Unlike

I said before that in the case of true friendship, each man has a strong part and a

clamped-down, weak part, and that the strong part of each resembles the bottled-up weak part

of the other. In this way, a man can be friends with another on account of appreciation of the

strong part of the other. This strong part of the other resembles the hidden, weak part of himself.

For this reason, it might be said that the strong part of the second man belongs to the hidden,

weak part of the first man, because this strong part does what the weak part would like to do,

and behaves the way the weak part would like to behave. So, for example, Menexenus does the

disputing, but Lysis would like to do some disputing. Likewise, Lysis listens, but Menexenus also

would like to listen.

Hippothales, in the recently provided example, would be, in loving the noble Lysis, be

asserting there to be something noble belonging to himself, which would be Lysis. Next, Lysis,

in loving the ignoble and rather ridiculous Hippothales, would be asserting that there was

something apparently ignoble and rather ridiculous belonging to himself, which would be

Hippothales. Lysis is, at the beginning of the dialogue, perhaps too proud to really acknowledge

this, even if it is true. It would be difficult to acknowledge this: a man has trouble noticing

something ignoble belonging to himself. This would mean acknowledging a love of something
bad, and Lysis seems to take pride in his “noble mien”. For this reason, perhaps, Socrates takes

to “humbling and checking” Lysis, which seemed so strange before.

Again, this may make it seem like loving someone is the same as acknowledging a

likeness to them. Rather, it is like acknowledging a likeness of constituent parts, while

acknowledging a distinction or unlikeness between oneself and the beloved with respect to

which of the two parts is stronger and which of the two parts is weaker.

The next and final question would be basically, “How does this impact what sorts of

friendship are possible between the good, neutral, and evil?” For it still remains to be seen what

sort of friendship exists between any of these people and Socrates. It seemed reasonable

before to say that among two friends, each does not need to be useful to each other. Neither

needs to have components that actually benefit the other. This is how a friendship of belonging

can be distinct from a friendship between the good and that which is neither good nor evil. Even

in a world without evil, this friendship is possible.

Instead of being useful, each needs to have components that ​would ​have benefited the

other, if they were in the possession of the other. For example, one might love someone on

account of their beauty, or their goodness. This would be, as was said before, tantamount to an

assertion that the beautiful, good beloved belongs to oneself. In a sense, it would be an

assertion that beauty and goodness belong to oneself, and yet the love would be proof that the

beauty and goodness had been taken away. Just as a man who has lost his farming tools might

be friendly towards a man who turns up with them, a man would love the beautiful and the good

if he felt that he had originally had them, and that they had been lost somehow.

Yet it is impossible for beauty and goodness to really change hands. When someone

who turns up who is beautiful, it is ridiculous to crave to actually have the beauty. So instead,

one loves the beauty as a thing which belongs to oneself, without ever really expecting to get it
back again. This is just like a parent with a child who is grown up. They never expect to really

get the child back again, and yet they love it, on account of the child originally belonging to

them.

(2.8) Do the Good Belong to the Good Only, or does Good Belong to All?

Now, Socrates asks at the end of the Lysis the following, rather interesting question, and

the response from Lysis and Menexenus is perhaps a bit premature (222c). He wants to

determine how we might distinguish this whole “friendship on account of belonging” business

from friendship on account of goodness, so he says:

SOCRATES: “Shall we further say that the good belongs to everyone and that to everyone evil

is a stranger, or rather, that good belongs to good, evil to evil, and that which is neither evil nor

good, to that which is of the same nature?”

And Socrates says that Lysis and Menexenus “both agreed that the latter was their

opinion in each particular”. Yet this might not be the case, if the above characterization of

belonging is correct. Instead, it might be truer to say that the good belongs to everyone. For it

was said previously that a man is not friendly only to those who are useful, but that he is also

friendly to those who have properties that ​would​ be useful to him, if he possessed them.

For this reason, Lysis is friendly to Menexenus. There is talkativeness within Lysis, but

the habit of outward talkativeness has been lost. And in the same way, Menexenus is friendly to

Lysis, on account of how there is a capacity to listen without wanting to dispute within him, but

the habit of it has been lost. And they are friendly to one another, despite Lysis believing

listening to be his nature, and Menexenus likewise believing disputing to be his nature. And it

seems generally to be the case that good properties would be beneficial if they were had, and

that evil properties would be harmful. After all, Socrates says that knowledge makes a man

useful and good.

 So, in order for Socrates, Menexenus, and Lysis to be friends, it must be the case that

Socrates belongs to Menexenus and Lysis. I take this to mean that they are friendly to him on

account of some property of Socrates’ which Lysis and Menexenus have each originally had.

Yet they must have each since lost this property, which would therefore rightfully belong to each

of them. And this property ​would​ be beneficial, if it were in their possession.

This makes me think that the good belongs to everyone, because it is fair to say that

goodness would benefit anyone who possessed it. It would follow from this that the good would

belong to the good, evil, and neutral, and that anyone who had goodness would be loved, even

if this goodness were not beneficial.

I said before that friendship existed on account of both likeness, and unlikeness. Two

friends would be alike in components, but unlike in ruling parts. This quandary of Socrates’ can

be addressed in a similar way. Only the good parts of Socrates will belong to his friends. Yet it is

only possible for Socrates to be friends with people who have similar components. In this way,

like belongs to like. Yet it could also be said that unlike belongs to unlike.

In short, both of the possibilities offered by Socrates here are true. The like belongs to

the like, and the good is desirable to all. They ought not to be presented as mutually exclusive.

Instead, it is more appropriate to say that a good will be desirable only to a person who already

has that good in a diminished degree. Each person will have affection for goods that really do

resemble goods within themselves, but are lacking within themselves. They will have affection

for those who have powerful quantities of what they love, so that Lysis will have affection for a

boy with powerful quantities of disputation, and Menexenus will have affection for a boy with

powerful quantities of listening.

What good thing would Socrates see in Lysis and Menexenus? For goodness, in

belonging to everyone by nature, would be something that everyone wanted.

 Socrates might love Menexenus and Lysis on account of them having friendship.

Socrates does say that he craves friendship more than all the gold of Darius. But would it be fair

to say that friendship is something which properly or originally belongs to Socrates? This would

mean that he had a friend once, but that this friend was taken away. On what other account

would Socrates be fond of friendship, except if friendship somehow belonged to himself? “So

fond am I of friendship, that, on seeing, therefore, you and Lysis, I am lost in wonder, while I

count you most happy, at your being able, at your years, to acquire this treasure with such

readiness and ease, in that you, Menexenu, have gained so early and true a friend in Lysis, and

he the same in you” (212a).

Well, if friendship were a good, it would be possible for Socrates to love friendship on

account of himself being neutral, with the goal of getting it to purge some evil from himself.

Perhaps loneliness might be one such evil. This would be a friendship between that which is

neither good nor evil, and that which is good.

Yet this friendship would not exist between human beings. It would exist between the

neutral Socrates and the good Friendship. And for this friendship to be possible, it must exist

between the neutral Socrates and the neutral Lysis, and the neutral Menexenus. None of these

people are good, or evil, because they are human beings, susceptible to the influences of either.

In order for two of them to be friends with each other, it must be on account of belonging, and

not on account of the purgation of some evil from within oneself. Only the good is capable of

such a feat, and while Lysis and Menexenus may have good aspects about themselves,

Socrates is said to be friends with them, not with aspects of them.

This puts me in a bit of a precarious position in relation to what I have said previously. I

said before that a man loves another man when some property of the beloved is a bottled-up or

hidden property of the lover. For instance, if Hippothales were friendly towards Lysis on account
of his nobility, then I would argue this to be a sign that some bottled-up or hidden nobility is

locked within Hippothales. He would love Lysis on account of how the company of Lysis makes

him feel as though he has recovered his nobility, which has been lost or taken from him. He

would be getting a sense of ancient majesty, and get a feeling similar to the feeling of looking at

an old photograph.

Yet, a man loves that which belongs to him. Hippothales, as we have just described him,

would love Lysis on account of his nobility. For goodness belongs to everyone, as was said

before. Yet there is more to Lysis than his nobility or his goodness. In fact, there ought to be

much of Lysis that is not lovable. The text makes a specific reference to him having “a great

idea of himself”, which does not sound lovable, and in fact sounds rather repulsive. How can

Hippothales have affection for Lysis, who is both attractive and repulsive? He can either have

affection for Lysis, both on account of his goodness, and on account of his evilness. Yet evil is

meant to be repulsive to everyone. It would also seem wrong to say that Hippothales loves only

a selection of the properties of Lysis, and that he loves only the good things about him and none

of the bad things. This simply does not seem like true love. No one who truly loves somebody

else will only love certain, specific things about them. It is necessary to love every aspect of the

other person.

To restore everything, a friend must be asserted again to be one who is loved, and

loves, and belongs wholly to his friend, and whose friend belongs wholly to himself. Otherwise, it

is not the man who is loved, but rather a selection of the many properties of the man. How

would it be possible to love a man wholly, and yet not love any of his flaws?

Socrates solves this problem. A flaw in a man’s character may resemble a disease, in

that it is possible to love the man wholly, and yet hate the disease. Socrates says that it is
possible for a man to be in the presence of evil, and appear evil, and yet not actually be evil. He

offers a metaphor (217d).

SOCRATES: “Suppose that I were to cover your auburn locks with white lead, would they be

really white, or would they only appear to be white?”

LYSIS: “They would only appear to be white.”

Socrates suggests that just as a dye is imposed upon hair from the outside, contrary to

its natural color, evil might be imposed from the outside in many cases. This would mean that

many people, perhaps including Lysis, are not naturally evil, but are rather just subject to

diseases. Socrates explains further how this is a problem specifically faced by those people who

are neither good nor evil. The perfectly good are immune to evil.

SOCRATES: “Then that which is neither good nor evil may be in the presence of evil, but not as

yet evil, and that has happened before now?”

LYSIS: “Yes.”

If Lysis were one of these people who are truly neither good nor evil, then it would be

possible to love him, without loving evil. Hippothales could therefore be a true lover, and love

might be true in many cases generally.

One possible counter-argument here would be to say that all men are neither good nor

evil by nature. Men certainly do not seem to be purely good. Instead, men seem susceptible to

the influences of good and evil. Thus far, I have said that Hippothales is friendly to Lysis on

account of Lysis belonging to him by nature. If Lysis, as a human being, were neither good nor

evil, then he must be loved on account of both his goodness, and his neutrality. This would

mean that, on top of good things, neutral things also must belong to Hippothales. Generally, it

would mean that people can love that which is neither good nor evil, on top of loving what is

good.
(2.8) Lysis, Menexenus, and Socrates are Friends on Account of Belonging

And this makes sense, for Lysis and Menexenus each love something about the other

which is neither good nor evil. Listening and disputing, after all, can be good or evil, depending

on the manner in which they are done. Therefore it is in accordance with the text to say that it is

possible to love what is neither good nor evil. And I certainly hope it is possible, because all

men appear to be neither good nor evil. For love to be accessible to anyone, it must be possible

to love what is neither good nor evil, and for what is neither good nor evil to belong to oneself.

Lysis and Menexenus are each neither good nor evil. They may each have character

flaws also, but these would be contrary to each of their natures. I said before that a friend will

resemble a bottled-up part of oneself. But I am not yet finished. It seems also true to say that for

two friends to love each other wholly, each of the two must love both what the other

predominantly is, and what the other bottles up.

In order for Menexenus to love Lysis, it is necessary for him to love not merely that

predominant fondness for listening within Lysis. Menexenus must also love that bottled-up

fondness for disputes that exists within Lysis.

Menexenus and Lysis all have the same components, but that each has a different ruling

component. This was said before. It is also correct that Menexenus is friends with Lysis on

account of Lysis having properties that ​would​ be beneficial to Menexenus, and this was said

before, too. I add to these another point, that Menexenus loves not only the strong part of Lysis,

but also the weak part. The parts of Lysis, whether strong and predominating or weak and

subjugated, must all be worthy of love.

Menexenus under this theory would love Lysis on account of what he is open about

being fond of doing (listening). He would also love Lysis on account of what he ​bottles up​ being

fond of doing (making disputes). Menexenus would still resemble a bottled-up version of Lysis,
and vice versa. Yet in this way, each would love the other wholly. And he would love his friend

on account of observing a sort of hierarchy within the friend. He would say to himself, “This

hierarchy could have emerged from me, but it has not” and he would covet this hierarchy as

something belonging to himself by nature. In this way, both friends are like and unlike as I said

before.

The same must be said of Socrates, Lysis, and Menexenus, if they are all to be friends.

So it must be said that Menexenus, Lysis, and Socrates all have the same components, but that

each has a different hierarchy among the components. Friendship with Socrates would exist on

account of there being some element which lay dormant in each youth, but ruled powerfully

within the soul of Socrates. Socrates already has a listening part, and a disputing part, as

anyone who has read a Platonic dialogue can attest.

There are a few possibilities. The best one I can think of would be that Socrates might

have a knowing part, and this part might also exist within Lysis and Menexenus, so that

Socrates would be merely unearthing existing knowledge within them, and offering it a chance

to be strong. Socrates would have a power of rejuvenating the weak parts of Lysis and

Menexenus. So, to conclude the question, each would have the same parts as the other two,

yet Socrates would have a knowing part as the strongest in himself. Lysis and Menexenus

would be friendly towards him on account of him speaking knowledge that each of them already

knows. Just the same way, Socrates would love each of them for acting on feelings that he

already feels​—​with respect to Lysis, an urge to listen, and with respect to Menexenus, an urge

to dispute. Yet perhaps Socrates often bottles these feelings up. For instance, he might want to

dispute, but be afraid to do it, or might want to listen, but find that many ideas are difficult to

listen to. He would therefore be fond of both boys on this account.

(2.9) Friendship as an Intoxicant

 One final question would be how Socrates is able to count himself a friend of Lysis and

Menexenus, without knowing what a friend is. Towards the end of the dialogue, Socrates talks

about how conversation can lead people to say things that they do not even really believe.

SOCRATES: “What say you, then, said I, since we are, as it were, intoxicated by our talk, in

allowing that there is a difference between that which belongs and that which is like?”

In this case, Socrates, Lysis, and Menexenus had hoped that friendship on account of

belonging could be distinguished from friendship on account of likeness. Socrates is worried

that if the good belongs to the good, and the evil to the evil, and the neutral to the neutral, then

everything will belong to that which resembles itself. His hope of a distinction between belonging

and likeness appears shattered.

Socrates speaks as if the possibility of such a distinction has intoxicated him. He

specifically says that “our talk” is what affects him. The way an intoxicant works is simple. Not

only does it have an effect on a person, but it also distorts a person’s own ability to determine

how they have been affected. Friendship might be just like an intoxicant, in that it has an effect,

but is difficult to characterize while under the influence of it. In this way, friendship would be just

like alcohol. For it is possible to be drunk, without knowing what being drunk really is. Yet there

is an answer to the question. One is simply too drunk to notice.

(3.0) Conclusions

To begin with, I have asked what friendship is, and the extent to which it exists on

account of goodness. True friendship appears to exist when two people belong to each other,

meaning that they are alike in components, but different with respect to ruling parts. I have

offered an example of a false friendship, namely two doctors who are each able to treat the

disease of the other. For both of these men love health, and do not love each other, but only
what health they can receive from each other. True friendship is not for the sake of something

else.

Next, certain men can love each other, if each of them resembles a bottled-up part of the

other. Men will be friends when they can look at each other, and observe a hierarchy in the

other which might have emerged from himself. In this way, a man would acknowledge both a

likeness and an unlikeness with his friend. A true friendship would therefore exist between

Lysis, Menexenus, and Socrates. For each of them is fond of listening, disputation, and

knowledge. Yet Lysis and Menexenus have bottled up their knowledge, while Socrates is aware

of it. Likewise, Menexenus and Socrates have bottled up their fondness for listening, perhaps.

Lastly, Lysis and Socrates would have perhaps bottled up a fondness for dispute. After giving

this account of how friendship comes into existence, I went on to explain how it is possible to

have a friend, and yet not know what a friend is. And this would be because friendship

resembles intoxication.