209.

Aberca vs Ver April 15 1988

FACTS:
This case stems from alleged illegal searches and seizures and other violations of the rights and liberties
of plaintiffs by various intelligence units of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, known as Task Force
Makabansa (TFM) ordered by General Fabian Ver "to conduct pre-emptive strikes against known
communist-terrorist (CT) underground houses in view of increasing reports about CT plans to sow
disturbances in Metro Manila," Plaintiffs allege, among others, that complying with said order, elements
of the TFM raided several places, employing in most cases defectively issued judicial search warrants;
that during these raids, certain members of the raiding party confiscated a number of purely personal
items belonging to plaintiffs; that plaintiffs were arrested without proper warrants issued by the courts;
that for some period after their arrest, they were denied visits of relatives and lawyers; that plaintiffs
were interrogated in violation of their rights to silence and counsel; that military men who interrogated
them employed threats, tortures and other forms of violence on them in order to obtain incriminatory
information or confessions and in order to punish them; that all violations of plaintiffs constitutional
rights were part of a concerted and deliberate plan to forcibly extract information and incriminatory
statements from plaintiffs and to terrorize, harass and punish them, said plans being previously known
to and sanctioned by defendants.

ISSUE: Whether there is valid searching questions

HELD:

No, it is wrong to at the plaintiffs' action for damages 5 Section 1, Article 19. to 'acts of alleged physical
violence" which constituted delict or wrong. Article 32 clearly specifies as actionable the act of violating
or in any manner impeding or impairing any of the constitutional rights and liberties enumerated
therein, among others —

1. Freedom from arbitrary arrest or illegal detention;

2. The right against deprivation of property without due process of law;
3. The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures;
4. The privacy of communication and correspondence;
5. Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against one's self, or
from being forced to confess guilt, or from being induced by a promise of
immunity or reward to make a confession, except when the person
confessing becomes a state witness.
The complaint in this litigation alleges facts showing with abundant clarity and details, how
plaintiffs' constitutional rights and liberties mentioned in Article 32 of the Civil Code were
violated and impaired by defendants. The complaint speaks of, among others, searches made
without search warrants or based on irregularly issued or substantially defective warrants;

1
seizures and confiscation, without proper receipts, of cash and personal effects belonging to
plaintiffs and other items of property which were not subversive and illegal nor covered by the
search warrants; arrest and detention of plaintiffs without warrant or under irregular, improper
and illegal circumstances; detention of plaintiffs at several undisclosed places of 'safehouses"
where they were kept incommunicado and subjected to physical and psychological torture and
other inhuman, degrading and brutal treatment for the purpose of extracting incriminatory
statements. The complaint contains a detailed recital of abuses perpetrated upon the plaintiffs
violative of their constitutional rights.

210. PANGANDAMAN VS CASAR, 159 SCRA 599

FACTS:

The shooting incident by armed men in Lanao led to the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
Petitioners assert that the respondent Judge issued a warrant of arrest against fifty (50) “John
Does” transgressing the Constitutional provision requiring that such warrants should particularly
describe the persons or things to be seized.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the warrant of arrest is valid? Can a court issue a warrant of arrest
against an unknown accused?

HELD:

Insofar as said warrant is issued against fifty (50) “John Does” not one of whom the
witnesses to the complaint could or would identify, it is of the nature of a general warrant, one of
a class of writs long proscribed as unconstitutional and once anathematized as “totally
subversive of the liberty of the subject.” Clearly violative of the constitutional injunction that
warrants of arrest should particularly describe the person or persons to be seized, the warrant
must, as regards its unidentified subjects, be voided.

WHEREFORE, the warrant complained of is upheld and declared valid insofar as it

orders the arrest of the petitioners. Said warrant is voided to the extent that it is issued against
fifty (50) “John Does.” The respondent Judge is directed to forward to the Provincial Fiscal of
Lanao del Sur the record of the preliminary investigation of the complaint in Criminal Case No.
1748 of his court for further appropriate action.

2
Warrantless searches and seizures--when valid or not.Read:

211. RICARDO VALMONTE VS. GEN RENATO DE VILLA, GR No. 83988,

September 29, 1989

Fact:

The sixth (6th) attempted coup d' etat (stronger than all previous ones) was staged only last 1
December 1989 at that time. Another attempt at a coup d' etat is taken almost for granted. The NPA,
through its sparrow units, has not relented but instead accelerated its liquidation of armed forces and
police personnel. Murders, sex crimes, hold-ups and drug abuse have become daily occurrences.
Unlicensed firearms and ammunition have become favorite objects of trade. Smuggling is at an all time
high.

On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) was activated
pursuant to Letter of Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with the mission of
conducting security operations within its area of responsibility and peripheral areas, for the purpose of
establishing an effective territorial defense, maintaining peace and order, and providing an atmosphere
conducive to the social, economic and political development of the National Capital Region. As part of its
duty to maintain peace and order, the NCRDC installed checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro
Manila.

Petitioners Atty. Ricardo Valmonte, who is a resident of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, and the
Union of Lawyers and Advocates For People’s Rights (ULAP) sought the declaration of checkpoints in
Valenzuela, Metro Manila and elsewhere as unconstitutional. In the alternative, they prayed that
respondents Renato De Villa and the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) be directed to
formulate guidelines in the implementation of checkpoints for the protection of the people. Petitioners
contended that the checkpoints gave the respondents blanket authority to make searches and seizures
without search warrant or court order in violation of the Constitution.

Issue: Do the military and police checkpoints violate the right of the people against unreasonable search
and seizures?

Resolution:

NO, military and police checkpoints DO NOT violate the right of the people against unreasonable search
and seizures.

The Supreme Court held that warrantless searches and seizures in military and police checkpoints are
not illegal as these measures to protect the government and safeguards the lives of the people. The
checkpoints are legal as where the survival of the organized government is on the balance, or where the

3
lives and safety of the people are in grave peril. However, the Supreme Court clarified that the military
officers manning the checkpoints may conduct VISUAL SEARCH ONLY, NOT BODILY SEARCH.

Read also the RESOLUTION ON THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION dated

JUNE 15, 1990, 185 SCRA 665

212. People vs. Malmstedt, June 19, 1991

FACTS:

Accused Mikael Malmstedt, a Swedish national, entered the Philippines for the third time in
December 1988 as a tourist. He had visited the country sometime in 1982 and 1985.

In the evening of 7 May 1989, accused left for Baguio City. Upon his arrival thereat in the
morning of the following day, he took a bus to Sagada and stayed in that place for two (2) days. At
around 7:00 o'clock in the morning of 11 May 1989, accused went to the Nangonogan bus stop in
Sagada to catch the first available trip to Baguio City. From Baguio City, accused planned to take a late
afternoon trip to Angeles City, then proceed to Manila to catch his flight out of the country, scheduled
on13 May 1989. From Sagada, accused took a Skyline bus with body number 8005 and Plate number
AVC 902.

At about 8: 00 o'clock in the morning of that same day (11 May 1989), Captain Alen Vasco, the
Commanding Officer of the First Regional Command (NARCOM) stationed at Camp Dangwa, ordered his
men to set up a temporary checkpoint at Kilometer 14, Acop, Tublay, Mountain Province, for the
purpose of checking all vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region. The order to establish a check pointi
n the said area was prompted by persistent reports that vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting
marijuana and other prohibited drugs. Moreover, information was received by the Commanding Officer
of NARCOM, that same morning, that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had in his possession prohibited
drugs.

ISSUE: Whether the warrantless seizure and seizure valid

HELD:

4
 It must be observed that, at first, the NARCOM officers merely conducted a routine check of the
bus (where accused was riding) and the passengers therein, and no extensive search was initially made.
It was only when one of the officers noticed a bulge on the waist of accused, during the course of the
inspection, that accused was required to present his passport. The failure of accused to present his
identification papers, when ordered to do so, only managed to arouse the suspicion of the officer that
accused was trying to hide his identity.

The constitution states that a peace officer or a private person may arrest a person without a
warrant when in his presence the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense. The offense was recognized with the warrantless search conducted by
NARCOM prompted by probable cause: (1) thereceipt of information by NARCOM that a Caucasian
coming from Sagada had prohibited drugs in his possession and (2) failure of the accused to immediately
presenthis passport.

Read also:
213. Rizal Alih vs. Gen. Castro, June 23, 1987

Facts: Respondents who were members of the Philippine marine and defense forces raided the
compound occupied by petitioner in search of loose firearms, ammunitions and explosives. A shoot-out
ensued after petitioners resisted the intrusion by the respondents, killing a number of men. The
following morning, the petitioners were arrested and subjected to finger – printing, paraffin testing and
photographing despite their objection. Several kinds of rifle, grenades and ammunitions were also
confiscated.

The petitioners filed an injunction suit with a prayer to have the items illegally seized returned to them
and invoked the provisions on the Bill of Rights

The respondents admitted that the operation was done without a warrant but reasoned that they were
acting under superior orders and that operation was necessary because of the aggravation of the peace
and order problem due to the assassination of the city mayor.

Issue:

1. Whether or not the seizing of the items and the taking of the fingerprints and photographs of
the petitioners and subjecting them to paraffin testing are violative of the bill of Rights and are
inadmissible as evidence against them.
2. Whether or not the acts done by the respondents are violative of the Bill of Rights and thus the
evidence obtained therein inadmissible in court

Held:

5
1.The court held that superior orders nor the suspicion that the respondents had against petitioners did
not excuse the former from observing the guaranty provided for by the constitution against
unreasonable searches and seizure. The petitioners were entitled to due process and should be
protected from the arbitrary actions of those tasked to execute the law. Furthermore, there was no
showing that the operation was urgent nor was there any showing of the petitioners as criminals or
fugitives of justice to merit approval by virtue of Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court. The items
seized, having been the “fruits of the poisonous tree” were held inadmissible as evidence in any
proceedings against the petitioners. The operation by the respondents was done without a warrant and
so the items seized during said operation should not be acknowledged in court as evidence. But said
evidence should remain in the custody of the law (custodia egis). However, as to the issue on finger-
printing, photographing and paraffin-testing as violative of the provision against self-incrimination, the
court held that the prohibition against self-incrimination applies to testimonial compulsion only. As
Justice Holmes put it in Holt v. United States, 18 “The prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court
to be a witness against himself is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort
communications from him, not an exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be material.”

2. The precarious state of lawlessness in Zamboanga at the time in question did not excuse the non-
observance of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures. At the time of
the “zona” the petitioners were merely suspected of the mayor’s slaying and had not been in fact
investigated. Every person is entitled due process. The respondents defied the precept that “civilian
authority is at all times supreme over the military” so clearly proclaimed in the Constitution. The
respondents simply by-passed civil courts which had the authority to determine whether or not there
was probable cause to search the petitioners’ premises. It follows that as the search of the petitioners’
premises was violative of the Constitution, all the firearms and the ammunitions taken form the raided
compound are inadmissible as evidence in any of the proceedings against the petitioners.
214. P s. Cendana, October 17, 1990

FACTS:

In the early morning of November 24, 1986, the Police Station at Santa Barbara,
Pangasinan received a report that a man was found dead on the field near the ricemill of Mrs.
Thelma Bautista at Barangay Ventinilla West, Santa Barbara, Pangasinan. Upon investigation,
policemen found the cadaver, Identified to be that of Dominador Manongdo, lying prostrate on
the ground with one gunshot wound on the head. Subsequently, accused-appellant Arnulfo
Cendana y Reyes was apprehended and later charged with the crime of murder thru illegally
possessed firearm. Upon arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty. The pre-trial
conference was terminated on November 2, 1987 after which, trial proceeded. The trial judge
convicted accused-appellant in a decision dated June 3, 1988. To support its judgment of
conviction, the trial court relied mainly on the testimonies of the Police Station Commander Sgt.
Amadeo Asuncion, Pat. Alden Poserio, and Pat. Fernando Quinto, who were the police officers
investigating the case. Their testimonies sought to prove the following: After the cadaver was
brought to the morgue and later to a funeral parlor for autopsy, they went back to the place
where the body was found and after interviewing some people, received information that
accused-appellant was seen before the incident carrying a gun. When they went to accused-
appellant's house, he was not around and so they picked up one of his brothers, Antonio
Cendana, who informed them that accused-appellant was at Pogo District in Dagupan City. Not

6
knowing where such place was, they forced Antonio Cendana to accompany them to the house
where accused-appellant could be found. Upon their arrival, Sgt. Asuncion and Pat. Quinto
entered the house while Pat. Poserio remained outside. They were able to arrest accused-
appellant who afterwards admitted to them that he was the one who shot the victim. They also
recovered a homemade shotgun which, according to Pat. Quinto, was voluntarily handed to
them by accused-appellant but according to Sgt. Asuncion was handed to them by a woman
relative of accused-appellant upon the latter's instructions. They then proceeded to the NBI,
Dagupan City where accused-appellant was subjected to a paraffin test and the recovered
firearm surrendered for ballistics examination. From the NBI, they proceeded to the Sta.
Barbara Police Station where accused was thereafter detained. No written statement was taken
from accused-appellant.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the arrest and search was unlawful.

HELD:

From the foregoing narration of events, we note the following:

(1) That there was no eye witness to the killing of the victim Dominador Manongdo;

(2) That the accused-appellant was apprehended by the police investigators on the basis of
information obtained from unidentified persons that accused-appellant was seen carrying a gun
before the incident.

(3) That the accused-appellant was apprehended by the police officers without any warrant of
arrest;

(4) That the shotgun was recovered without a search warrant from the house where accused-
appellant was arrested; and

(5) That the alleged statement made by accused-appellant to the police officers admitting to the
commission of the offense and made after his arrest, was used as the main basis for his
conviction.

Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure enumerates the instances when a
peace officer or a private person may arrest a person without a warrant:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has commited is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

7
 (c) When the person to be arrrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.

The facts of the case do not warrant the applicability of paragraphs (a) and (c). Moreover, in
paragraph (b), the only instance under which accused-appellant's case could possibly fall, what
is essential is that the person making the arrest has personal knowledge of the facts indicating
that the arrestee is responsible for an offense which has just been committed [People v. Burgos,
G.R. No. 68955, September 4, 1986, 144 SCRA 1]. Accused-appellant was arrested one day
after the killing of the victim and only on the basis of information obtained by the police officers
from unnamed sources. These abovementioned circumstances clearly belie a lawful warrantless
arrest.

Considering that the arrest of accused-appellant herein was unlawful, any search
conducted on his person or place of arrest which is an incident thereof, was also
unlawful. Perforce, any evidence recovered during the unlawful search, being made
without a warrant, becomes inadmissible in evidence against accused-appellant and the
shotgun which was allegedly the fatal weapon cannot be presented against him

215. P. vs. Castiller, August 6, 1990

(drug seller at sarisari store)

FACTS: Appellant Castiller was charged with Selling of Illegal Drugs. The AntiNarcotics Intelligence
of Taguig received info from an undisclosed caller that marijuana was being sold by an old woman
in a store in Daang Hari Street. Through a buy-bust operation, they found accused in a small store.
Officer Mandibel asked “La paiskor ng dalawang foil” and the woman returned with marijuana foils.
When Mandibel said he was a policeman, accused locked herself in the door but eventually
surrendered.

ISSUE: W/N the search incidental to arrest was lawful (YES)

HELD: The Rules on Criminal Procedure (Section 11, Rule 113) specifically allows law enforcement
agents to break into the premises or enclosure in which a person to be arrested is reasonably
believed to be and if the accused refuses admittance after officers announce their authority. Here,
the officers did NOT even have to break into the premises as they were voluntarily allowed to enter
the store. Hence, their entry into the store and subsequent search and arrest was lawful.

DOCTRINE: Police officers are allowed to break into any building or enclosure to effect an arrest if
refused admittance after identifying themselves.

215.A P. vs. Olaes, July 30, 1990

8
FACTS: That at 12:50 in the afternoon of June 15, 1977, said officers were at their office at the CANU
investigating Manuelito Bernardo, whom they arrested earlier at No. 41 Harris St., East Bajac-Bajac,
Olongapo City for possession of several lids of marijuana. Bernardo informed them that the lids of
marijuana confiscated from him came from one alias "Abet" and his brother alias "Bonjing". They made
Bernardo agree to act as buyer and to go to the house which, according to Bernardo, was the source of
the confiscated marijuana. After giving instructions to Bernardo about the pre-arranged signal, they all
proceeded near the house of "Abet" located at No. 116 Jones Street, Olongapo City. Bernardo entered the
compound bringing with him marked money amounting to P300.00.

After consummating the deal on the marijuana, Bernardo came out and surrendered the same to the
officers. Immediately, they entered "Abet's" house and found him in the living room with some other
persons. "Abet" was confronted, searched, and in his person was found the P300.00 marked money and
lids of marijuana. "Abet" was interrogated on the spot as to the whereabouts of other marijuana if any.
They proceeded next door at his brother Benjamin Olaes' kitchen where they recovered sixty more lids
of marijuana. Thereafter, "Abet", which (sic) was later identified as accused Albert Olaes was brought to
the CANU office for investigation. Albert Olaes was finger-printed by C2C Armando Cases and the
booking sheet and arrest report were prepared (Exhibit "G"). The sworn statement of Olaes was taken
by Pacifico Mugar (Exhibit "K"). Pfc. Abello together with Capitulo, Elgar, Macomb and Cases executed a
Joint Affidavit in connection with this case (Exhibit "H"). The sixty lids of marijuana which were
confiscated from the kitchen of Benjamin Olaes are covered and stated in the Receipt for Property Seized
(Exhibit "I").

HELD: It is undisputed that the police operatives did not have either a search warrant or a warrant of
arrest. The searches on the person of appellant and of his house were not also incidental to a lawful
arrest. The police officers admittedly did not have personal knowledge at all of what actually transpired
inside the appellant's house. They only learned of the alleged consummation of the illicit transaction
when they were supposedly given a signal by their so-called poseur-buyer after the latter left appellant's
house. However, what they reportedly learned from said poseur-buyer was indubitably hearsay as the
latter was never called to appear and testify at the trial. Since what was conducted was a warrantless
search and the arrest of appellant was unlawful, any evidence obtained from him is also inadmissible in
evidence.

216. Papa vs. Mago, 22 SCRA 857

Facts:

This is a case of prohibition and certiorari, with a preliminary injunction filed by Ricardo Papa together
with Juan ponce enrile, Pedro pacis and martin Alagao against Remedios Mago.

Remedies Mago purchased some merchandises in Sta Monica grocery store in San Fernando, Pampanga,
she placed it in 9 cartons ( bales) ; she hired a truck owned by Valentin Lanopa, to transfer the said
goods in her residence in Sampaloc Manila, it was not long that the manila police departments seized
the items that she bought prior to the order of the Bureau of Customs. The authorities said that the
items that she bought were all illegally imported; that it was not assessed when it arrived in the port of
the Philippines with a tax amounting to Php 95,772 ( tariff) . The respondents then filed for a restraining
order, to prevent the authorities from opening said packages. However, still the packages had already

9
been opened. The items containing in the box included: 40 pieces ladies’ sweaters, 100 pieces of watch
bands, 20 dozens of handkerchief, and 320 dozens of gold metal watches.

Accused: that she was in good faith and did not know that from the buyer that she bought, the items
were all illegally imported

Issue: Was the search conducted valid??

Held:

Petitioner Martin Alagao and his companion policemen had authority to effect the seizure without any
search warrant issued by a competent court. The Tariff and Customs Code does not require said warrant
in the instant case. The Code authorizes persons having police authority under Section 2203 of the Tariff
and Customs Code to enter, pass through or search any land, inclosure, warehouse, store or building,
not being a dwelling house; and also to inspect, search and examine any vessel or aircraft and any
trunk, package, or envelope or any person on board, or to stop and search and examine any vehicle,
beast or person suspected of holding or conveying any dutiable or prohibited article introduced into the
Philippines contrary to law, without mentioning the need of a search warrant in said cases.

In the doctrine of Carrol, it was made lawful for customs officers not only to board and search vessels
within their own and adjoining districts, but also to stop, search and examine any vehicle, beast or
person on which or whom they should suspect there was merchandise which was subject to duty, or had
been introduced into the United States in any manner contrary to law, whether by the person in charge
of the vehicle or beast or otherwise, and if they should find any goods, wares, or merchandise thereon,
which they had probably cause to believe had been so unlawfully brought into the country, to seize and
secure the same, and the vehicle or beast as well, for trial and forfeiture.

217. Roldan vs. Arca, 65 SCRA 336

Facts: On 3 April 1964, Morabe, De Guzman & Company filed with the Court of First Ins tance (CFI)
of Manila a civil case (56701) against Fisheries Commissioner Arsenio N. Roldan, Jr., for the
recovery of fishing vessel Tony Lex VI which had been seized and impounded by the Fisheries
Commissioner through the Philippine Navy. On 10 April 1964, the company prayed for a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction with the CFI, but said prayer was denied. On 28 April 1964, the
CFI set aside its order of 10April 1964 and granted the company's motion for reconsideration
praying for preliminary mandatory injunction.

Thus, the company took possession of the vessel Tony Lex VI from the Philippine Fisheries
Commission and the Philippine Navy by virtue of the said writ. On 10 December 1964, the CFI
dismissed Civil Case 56701 for failure of the company to prosecute as well as for failure of the
Commission and the Navy to appear on the scheduled date of hearing. The vessel, Tony Lex VI or
Srta. Winnie however, remained in the possession of the company.

10
 On 20 July 1965, the Fisheries Commissioner requested the Philippine Navy to apprehend vessels
Tony Lex VI and Tony Lex III, also respectively called Srta. Winnie and Srta. Agnes, for alleged
violations of some provisions of the Fisheries Act and the rules and regulations promulgated
thereunder.

On August 5or 6, 1965, the two fishing boats were actually seized for illegal fishing with dynamite.
Fish caught with dynamite and sticks of dynamite were then found aboard the two vessels. On 18
August 1965, the Fisheries Commissioner requested the Palawan Provincial Fiscal to file criminal
charges against the crewmembers of the fishing vessels.

On 30 September 1965, there were filed in the CFI of Palawan a couple of information’s, one
against the crew members of Tony Lex III, and another against the crew members of Tony Lex V
both for violations of Act 4003, as amended by Commonwealth Acts 462, 659 and1088, i.e., for
illegal fishing with the use of dynamite. On the same day, the Fiscal filed an ex part emotion to
hold the boats in custody as instruments and therefore evidence of the crime, and cabled the
Fisheries Commissioner to detain the vessels. On October 2 and 4, likewise, the CFI of Palawan
ordered the Philippine Navy to take the boats in custody.

On 2 October 1965, the company filed a complaint with application application for preliminary
mandatory injunction (Civil Case 62799) with the CFI of Manila against the Commission and the
Navy. Among others, it was alleged that at the time of the seizure of the fishing boats in issue, the
same were engaged in legitimate fishing operations off the coast of Palawan; that by virtue of the
offer of compromise dated 13 September 1965 by the company to the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, the numerous violations of the Fishery Laws, if any, by the crewmembers of the
vessels were settled. On 18 October 1965, Judge Francisco Arca issued an order granting the
issuance of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and issued the preliminary writ upon the
filing by the company of a bond of P5,000.00 for the release of the two vessels.

On 19 October1965, the Commission and the Navy filed a motion for reconsideration of the order
issuing the preliminary writ on 18 October 1965 on the ground, among others, th at on 18 October
1965 the Philippine Navy received from the Palawan CFI two orders dated October 2 and 4, 1965
requiring the Philippine Navy to hold the fishing boats in custody and directing that the said
vessels should not be released until further orders from the Court, and that the bond of P5,000.00
is grossly insufficient to cover the Government's losses in case the two vessels, which are worth
P495,000.00, are placed beyond the reach of the Government, thus frustrating their forfeiture as
instruments of the crime. On 23November 1965, Judge Arca denied the said motion for
reconsideration. The Commission and the Navy filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction to restrain Judge Arca from enforcing his order dated 18 Octobe r 1965, and
the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction thereunder issued.

Issue: Whether the Fisheries Commissioner and the Navy can validly direct and/or effect the
seizure of the vessels of the company for illegal fishing by the use of dynamite and w ithout the
requisite licenses.

Held: Section 4 of Republic Act 3512 approved on 20 March 1963 empowers the Fisheries
Commissioner to carry out the provisions of the Fisheries Act, as amended, and all rules and
regulations promulgated thereunder, to make searches and seizures personally or through his duly

11
authorized representatives in accordance with the Rules of Court, of "explosives such as dynamites
and the like; including fishery products, fishing equipment, tackle and other things that are subject
to seizure under existing fishery laws"; and "to effectively implement the enforcement of existing
fishery laws on illegal fishing. “Paragraph 5 of Section 4 of the same Republic Act 3512 likewise
transferred to and vested in the Philippine Fisheries Commission "all the powers, functions and
duties heretofore exercised by the Bureau of Customs, Philippine Navy and Philippine Constabulary
over fishing vessels and fishery matters." Section 12 of the Fisheries Act, otherwise known as
Republic Act 4003, as amended, prohibits fishing with dynamites or other explosives which is
penalized by Section 76 thereof "by a fine of not less than P1,500.00 nor more than P5,000.00, and
by imprisonment for not less than one (1) year and six (6)months nor more than five (5) years ,
aside from the confiscation and forfeiture of all explosives, boats, tackles, apparel, furniture, and
other apparatus used in fishing in violation of said Section 12 of this Act. “Section 78 of the same
Fisheries Law provides that "in case of a second offense, the vessel, together with its tackle,
apparel, furniture and stores shall be forfeited to the Government. “The second paragraph of
Section 12 also provides that "the possession provides that "the possession and/or finding, of
dynamite, blasting caps and other explosives in any fishing boat shall constitute a presumption
that the said dynamite and/or blasting caps and explosives are being used for fishing purposes in
violation of this Section, and that the possession or discover in any fishing boat or fish caught or
killed by the use of dynamite or other explosives, under expert testimony, shall constitute a
presumption that the owner, if present in the fishing boat, or the fishing crew have been fishing
with dynamite or other explosives. “Under Section 78 of the Fisheries Act, as amended, any
person, association or corporation fishing in deep sea fishery without the corresponding license
prescribed in Sections 17 to 22 Article V of the Fisheries Act or any other order or regulation
deriving force from its provisions, "shall be punished for each offense by a fine of not more than
P5,000.00, or imprisonment, for not more than one year, or both, in the discretion of the Court;
Provided, That in case of an association or corporation, the President or manage r shall be directly
responsible for the acts of his employees or laborers if it is proven that the latter acted with his
knowledge; otherwise the responsibility shall extend only as far as fine is concerned:

Provided, further, That in the absence of a known owner of the vessel, the master, patron or
person in charge of such vessel shall be responsible for any violation of this Act: and Provided,
further, That in case of a second offense, the vessel together with its tackle, apparel, furniture and
stores shall be forfeited to the Government." Under Section 13 of Executive Order 389 of 23
December 1950, reorganizing the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the Philippine Navy has the
function, among others, “to assist the proper governmental agencies in the enfo rcement of laws
and regulations pertaining to Fishing. Section 2210 of the Tariff and Customs Code, as amended by
PD 34 of 27 October 1972, authorized any official or person exercising police authority under the
provisions of the Code, to search and seize any vessel or air craft as well as any trunk, package, bag
or envelope on board and to search any person on board for any breach or violation of the
customs and tariff laws. Herein, when the Philippine Navy, upon request of the Fisheries
Commissioner, apprehended on August 5 or 6, 1965 the fishing boats Tony Lex III and Tony Lex VI,
otherwise known respectively as Srta. Agnes and Srta. Winnie, these vessels were found to be
without the necessary license in violation of Section 903 of the Tariff and Customs Code and
therefore subject to seizure under Section 2210 of the same Code, and illegally fishing with
explosives and without fishing license required by Sections 17 and 18 of the Fisheries Law. Search
and seizure without search warrant of vessels and aircrafts for violations of the customs laws have
been the traditional exception to the constitutional requirement of a search warrant, because the
vessel can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the search warrant must

12
besought before such warrant could be secured; hence it is not practicable to require a search
warrant before such search or seizure can be constitutionally effected. The same exception should
apply to seizures of fishing vessels breaching our fishery laws: They are usual ly equipped with
powerful motors that enable them to elude pursuing ships of the Philippine Navy or Coast Guard.

218. P. vs. CFI, 101 SCRA 86

FACTS:

The Regional Anti-Smuggling Action Center (RASAC) was informed by an undisclosed Informer that a
shipment of highly dutiable goods would be transported to Manila from Angeles City on a blue Dodge
car. Spurred by such lead, they stationed themselves in the vicinity of the toll gate of the North
Diversion Road at Balintawak, Quezon City. A light blue Dodge car driven by Sgt. Hope who was
accompanied by Monina Medina approached the exit gate and after giving the toll receipt sped away
towards Manila. The RASAC agents gave a chase and overtook Sgt. Hope's car. Agent Sabado blew his
whistle and signaled Sgt. Hope to stop but the latter instead of heeding, made a U-turn back to the
North Diversion Road, but he could not go through because of the buses in front of his car. At this point,
the agents succeeded in blocking Sgt. Hope's car and the latter stopped. The Agents saw four (4) boxes
on the back seat of the Dodge and upon inquiry as to what those boxes were, Sgt. Hope answered "I do
not know." Respondents told that they were bringing the boxes to the Tropical Hut at Epifanio de los
Santos. Arriving at the Tropical Hut, the party, together with Col. Abad who had joined them waited for
the man who according to Monina Medina was supposed to receive the boxes. As the man did not
appear, Col. Abad "called off the mission" and brought respondents and their car to Camp Aguinaldo.
An inspection of Sgt. Hope's car at Camp Aguinaldo yielded eleven (11) sealed boxes, four (4) on the rear
seat and seven (7) more in the baggage compartment which was opened on orders of Col. Abad.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the warrantless search and seizure conducted is lawful.

RULING:

What ASAC agents did was a faithful performance of a duty authorized under the Tariff and Customs
Code directing them as authorized agents to retrieve articles reasonably suspected of having been
possessed, issued or procured in violation of the tariff laws for which the government has a direct
interest.

The circumstances of the case at bar undoubtedly fall squarely within the privileged area where search
and seizure may lawfully be effected without the need of a warrant. The facts being no less receptive to
the applicability of the classic American ruling, the latter's force and effect as well as the Mago decision
must be upheld and reiterated in this petition. the find that the constitutional guarantee has not been
violated and the respondent court gravely erred in issuing the order of August 20, 1975 declaring as
inadmissible evidence the items or articles obtained and seized by the apprehending agents without any
search warrant, as well as the pictures of said items attempted to be presented as evidence against the

13
accused. WHEREFORE, the Order appealed from is hereby set aside and the case is ordered remanded
for further trial and reception of evidence without excluding the articles subject of the seizure or for
such action as the prosecution may take after the re-assessment and re-evaluation of its evidence as
hereinabove directed.

219. Pacis vs. Pamaran, 56 SCRA 16

Ricardo Santos bought from Donald James Hatch, a tax-exempt person, a

Mercury Automonbile Model 1975. Being originally owned by a tax-exempt
person, the said car was properly brought to the country without payment of its
custom duties and tax. This being the case and where the car was subsequently
transferred to Santos, a nontax-exempt person, the latter paid the customs
duties and taxes. Later however Pedro Pacis found out that the amount paid for
customs duties and taxes for the car was insufficient, Santos paid 300 php and
the amount collectible of said car should be more or less 2,500 php. As a result
he instituted seizure proceeding and issued the necessary warrant of seizure and
detention. The car was then seized and was under the detention in the General
Affairs Compound.

Santos requested the return of the car his contention being that the issuance of
the warrant was not authorized, such warrant being issued not by a judge and
therefore is in violation of the then Article III, Sec. 1, par. 3 of the 1935
Constitution against unreasonable search and seizures. He filed a case against
Pacis for usurpation of judicial function with the contention mentioned above.

Issue : whether there was unreasonable seizure of the automobile of Santos due
to unauthorized issuance of a seizure and detention

Held: No. It is undeniable that Pacis, as Acting Collector of Customs for the Port
of Manila, had the requisite authority for the issuance of the contested warrant
of seizure and detention for the automobile owned by respondent Ricardo
Santos. What was done by him certainly could not be the basis of a prosecution
for the usurpation of judicial functions. Prohibition is therefore the proper
remedy.

The law being that authority to issue warrant was extended to officers
authorized by law and such power is no longer solely confined to a judge, Pacis
can validly issue such warrant. Since it was established that the proper custom
and duty taxes was not yet paid (fully paid), the automobile became a proper

14
subject for seizure. The issuance of the warrant and the actual seizure was
therefore proper.

220. Lopez vs. Commisioner, 65 SCRA 336

FACTS:

Sometime in 1964, the petitioner and Reparations Commission entered into a conditional contract,
subject to the condition that the title to and ownership of the vessel shall remain with the Commission
until full payment. Later on, petitioner entered into a contract with one Tomas Velasco, authorizing the
latter to supervise and manage the M/V JOLO LEMA. The vessel however was however apprehended,
searched and then seized by the Collector of Customs. A seizure identification proceeding was instituted
against said vessel for smuggling into the Philippines 1,408 sacks of Indonesian copra and 86 sacks of
Indonesian coffee beans, in violation of Section 2530 (a) and (k) of the Tariff and Customs Code of the
Philippines. This appeal taken by Lopez directly to the Supreme Court, upon the ground that only
questions of law would be taken up therein.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of First Instance of Manila has jurisdiction to interfere with the Seizure
Identification proceeding No. 25/66 pending before the Commissioner of Customs, on account of the
Indonesian agricultural products smuggles into the Philippines through the use of M/VJOLO LEMA

HELD:

Lopez maintains that whatever powers the Commissioner of Customs had, prior thereto, over seizure
identification proceedings had been transferred to the Philippine Fisheries Commission. The Supreme
Court said that this pretense is manifestly devoid of merit. Said section 5 of Republic Act No. 3512
merely transfers to the Philippine Fisheries Commission the powers, functions and duties of the Bureau
of Customs, the Philippine Navy and the Philippine Constabulary over fishing vessels and fishery matters.
Such transfer should be construed in the light of section 1 of said Republic Act No. 3512, reading. It is
clear that the powers transferred to the Philippine Fisheries Commission by Republic Act No. 3512 are
limited to those relating to the "development, improvement, management and conservation of our
fishery resources." All other matters, such as those concerning smuggling, particularly of agricultural
products, into the Philippines, are absolutely foreign to the object and purpose of said Act and could not
have been and were not transferred to the aforementioned Commission. Seizure Identification
proceeding No. 25/66 for the smuggling of Indonesian agricultural products into the Philippines is
certainly beyond the jurisdiction of the Philippine Fisheries Commission.

15
221. P vs. Cruz, 165 SCRA 135

Facts:

In Criminal Case No. Q-45491 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Reynaldo Cruz alias Rene Hapon of No. 40
Sto. Cristo, Balintawak, Quezon City, was charged with the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition.
After trial, Judge Willelmo C. Fortun found the accused guilty as charged, and imposed on him the penalty
of reclusion perpetua (life imprisonment) and to pay the costs. The firearm and ammunition and the hand grenade,
as well as the bag which contained the same, were confiscated and ordered forfeited in favor of the government.

The incriminatory facts, as stated by the Solicitor General in his Brief, are as follows:

On May 9, 1986, Lt. Noel Manabat, along with the elements of CRIG stationed at Camp Bagong Diwa, Taguig,
Metro Manila, acting On an intelligence information of a reliable informant that about noon of that day a stolen
car, coming from Quezon City, was to be sold somewhere in MagaIlanes, Makati, nabbed Romeo Fernandez and
Joey Flores at the intersection of EDSA and Timog Street and brought them to headquarters. After some
questioning, these two (2) carnap suspects led the eight man-CRIG team to 61 Mabituan Street, Masambong,
Quezon City where they alleged the other members of the carnap gang were waiting for their shares of the
proceeds from the sale of a vehicle (Tsn., June 27, 1986, pp. 2-4). At said address, a sister of appellant, who owned
the apartment, opened the door to the CRIG team. Inside the apartment, the team found appellant, sleeping on
the floor, and gangmates Herminio Rivera and Lolito Timcang (Ibid. pp. 9 & 17). The team recognized appellant
because he was pointed to by Romeo Fernandez and Joey Flores. These two also informed the team that appellant
was armed and, sure enough, the team found a clutch bag (exhibit D) containing a caliber .38 paltik revolver
(Exhibit B), one (1) live ammunition (Exhibit B-1 ) and a hand grenade (Exhibit C) under a bar, located one (1) meter
away from the slumbering appellant (Ibid.). After waking him up, sgt. Reynaldo Cachuela confronted him at once
with these exhibits. Appellant, in the presence of all the eight-man CRIG team and gangmates admitted ownership
of the bag, firearm, bullet and grenade (Ibid., p. 17). The team arrested appellant and the rest of his group, as well
as confiscated the items of the crime.

At headquarters, Lt. Noel Manabat and Sgt. Reynaldo Cachuela narrated under oath the incident, (Joint Affidavit-
Exhibits E, E-1 and E-2). At the same time, they turned over to Sgt. Jesus Ordinario, police investigator, the
appellant and his party as well as Exhibits B, B-1 and C. Sgt. Jesus Ordinario took down the statement of appellant
(Exhibit A) wherein appellant admitted ownership of Exhibits B, B-1, C and D, after informing- him of his
constitutional rights, such as, he had the right to remain silent the right to get his own counsel, and everything he
would state in his statement might be used for or against him (Ibid, p. 10).

COTA:
The accused, upon the other hand, denied ownership or possession of the firearm and hand grenade, as well as
the bag which contained the same. According to the accused, the bag and its contents belonged to Joey Flores and
was "planted" by PC operatives. The appellant maintains that the revolver and hand grenade in question did not
belong to him; nor was he in actual possession thereof at the time he was arrested.

16
The appellant also claims that the firearm and explosive in question cannot be use as evidence against him since
the PC officers had no warrant of arrest when they entered the apartment, in violation of his constitutional rights.

Ownership, however, is not an essential element of the offense charged. What the law requires is merely
possession which includes not only actual physical possession but also constructive possession or the subjection of
the thing to one's control and management.

COTS: The contention is devoid of merit. PC Sgt. Reynaldo Cachuela categorically declared — and this is not
disputed — that they were allowed by the owner of the apartment to enter. Besides, it should be noted that the
unlicensed firearm and explosive were found when they arrested the accused and his companions for
"carnapping" and not for illegal possession of firearm ammunition

Issue: Whether an unlicensed firearm may be seized without the necessity of obtaining a search warrant.

Held:

YES. In Magoncia vs. Palacio, the Court ruled that an unlicensed firearm may be seized without the necessity of
obtaining a search warrant. As Mr. Justice Perfecto explained it in his concurring opinion in said case:

... The illegality of the search is independent from the illegal possession of prohibited arms. The illegality of the
search did not make legal an illegal possession of firearms. When, in pursuing an illegal action or, in the
commission of a criminal offense, the offending Police officers should happen to discover, a criminal offense being
committed by any person, they are not precluded from performing their duties as police officers for the
apprehension of the guilty person all the taking of the corpus delicti.

Finally, the accused, citing the case of Morales vs. Ponce Enrile, claims that the extrajudicial confession obtained
from him during custodial investigation, is inadmissible in evidence against him for having been obtained in
violation of his constitutional rights.

We agree. It would appear that the police officers failed to comply with the strictures laid down by the Court in the
cited case of Morales vs. Ponce Enrile, for police officers to follow in a custodial investigation in that, while Police
Sgt. Jesus Ordinario testified that he had informed the accused of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to
be represented by counsel and that the accused waived such rights, the waiver of constitutional rights was not
made with the assistance or even in the presence of counsel.

The conviction of the appellant is not based upon his extra-judicial confession alone. The evidence presented by
the prosecution, even without said extrajudicial confession, is abundant, to support a finding of guilt.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, with costs against the accused-appellant.

222. Nolasco vs. Pano, 147 SCRA 509 & 139 SCRA 152

1. Prior to August 6, 1984 (hereinafter to be referred to without the year), AGUILAR-ROQUE was one of
the accused of Rebellion in Criminal Case No.
MC-25-113 of Military Commission No. 25, both cases being entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Jose
Ma. Sison, et al." She was then still at large.

17
2. At 11:30 A.M. on August 6th, AGUILAR-ROQUE and NOLASCO were arrested by a Constabulary
Security Group (CSG) at the intersection of Mayon Street and P. Margall Street, Quezon City. The stated
time is an allegation of petitioners, not denied by respondents. The record does not disclose that a
warrant of arrest had previously beeen issued against NOLASCO.

3. At 12:00 N. on August 6th, elements of the CSG searched the premises at 239-B Mayon Street,
Quezon City. The stated time is an allegation of petitioners, not specifically denied by respondents. In
their COMMENT, however, respondents have alleged that the search was conducted "late on the same
day"; that is late on august 6th.

4. On August 6th, at around 9:00 A.M., Lt. Col. Virgilio G. Saldajeno of the CSG, applied for a Search
Warrant from respondent Hon. Ernani Cruz Paño, Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court in Quezon
City, to be served at No. 239-B Mayon Street, Quezon City, determined tyo be the leased residence of
AGUILAR-ROQUE, after almost a month of "round the clock surveillance" of the premises as a
"suspected underground house of the CPP/NPA." AGUILAR-ROQUE has been long wanted by the military
for being a high ranking officer of the Communist Party of the Philippines, particularly connected with
the MV Karagatan/Doña Andrea cases.

In connection with the Search Warrant issued, the following may be stated:

(a) The Search Warrant was issued in proceedings entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Mila Aguilar-
Roque, Accused, Search Warrant No. 80- 84 for rebellion" (the SEARCH WARRANT CASE). Judge Panos
Court was Branch 88.

(b) It does not appear from the records before us that an application in writing was submitted by Lt. Col.
Saldajeno to Judge Paño.

(c) According to the record, Lt. Col. Saldajeno and his witness S/A Dionicio A. Lapus, were examined
under oath by Judge Paño but only the deposition of S/A Lapus has been submitted to us. The latter
deposed that to his personal knowledge, there were kept in the premises to be searched records,
documents and other papers of the CPP/NPA and the National Democratic Front, including support
money from foreign and local sources intended to be used for rebellion. 1

5. In connection with the search made at 12:00 N. of August 6th the following may be stated:

(a) TOLENTINO was a person then in charge of the premises. He was arrested by the searching party
presumably without a warrant of arrest.

(b) The searching party seized 428 documents and written materials, 2 and additionally a portable
typewriter, and 2 wooden boxes, making 431 items in all. 3

(c) According to the Return, submitted in the SEARCH WARRANT CASE on August 10th, 4 the search was
made in the presence of Dra. Marciana Galang, owner of the premises, and of two (2) Barangay Tanods.
No mention was made that TOLENTINO was present. The list of the 428 articles and documents attached
to the Return was signed by the two Barangay Tanods, but not by Dra. Galang.

18
6. (a) On August 10th, the three petitioners, AGUILAR-ROQUE, NOLASCO and TOLENTINO, were charged
before the Quezon City Fiscal's Office (the CITY FISCAL, for short) upon complaint filed by the CSG
against petitioners for "Subversion/Rebellion and/or Conspiracy to Commit Rebellion/Subversion."

(b) On August 13th, the CITY FISCAL filed an Information for Violation of Presidential Decree No. 33
(Illegal Possession of Subversive Documents) against petitioners before Branch 42 of the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Quezon City (the SUBVERSIVE DOCUMENTS CASE), respondent Judge Antonio P. Santos,
presiding.

(c) On August 16th, CSG filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the CITY FISCAL, praying that AGUILAR-
ROQUE and NOLASCO be charged with Subversion. The Motion was denied on November 16th.

7. (a) On September 10th, the CSG submitted an Amended Return in the SEARCH WARRANT CASE
praying, inter alia, that the CSG be allowed to retain the seized 431 documents and articles, in
connection with cases that are presently pending against Mila Aguilar Roque before the Quezon City
Fiscal's Office and the court. 5

(b) On September 28th, petitioners were required by Judge Pano to comment on the Amended Return,
which AGUILAR-ROQUE did on October 18th, raising the issue of the inadmissibility of any evidence
obtained pursuant to the Search Warrant.

(c) On December 13, 1984, Judge Paño admitted the Amended Return and ruled that the seized
documents "shall be subject to disposition of the tribunal trying the case against respondent."

8. (a) On December 12th, petitioners filed a Motion to Suppress in the SUBVERSIVE DOCUMENTS CASE,
praying that such of the 431 items belonging to them be returned to them. It was claimed that the
proceedings under the Search Warrant were unlawful. Judge Santos denied the Motion on January 7,
1985 on the ground that the validity of the Search Warrant has to be litigated in the SEARCH WARRANT
CASE. He was apparently not aware of the Order of Judge Paño of December 13th issued in the SEARCH
WARRANT CASE.

Hence, this Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and mandamus to annul and set aside the (1) Search
Warrant issued by respondent RTC Judge Paño; (2) his Order admitting the Amended Return and
granting the Motion to Retain Seized Items; and (3) Order of respondent MTC Judge Santos denying
petitioners' Motion to Suppress.

This Court, on February 12, 1985, issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the respondents or
their duly authorized representatives from introducing evidence obtained under the Search Warrant.

The PETITIONERS principally assert that the Search Warrant is void because it is a general warrant since
it does not sufficiently describe with particularity the things subject of the search and seizure, and that
probable cause has not been properly established for lack of searching questions propounded to the
applicant's witness. The respondents, represented by the Solicitor General, contend otherwise, adding
that the questions raised cannot be entertained in this present petition without petitioners first moving
for the quashal of the disputed Search Warrant with the issuing Judge.

ISSUE: WON the search warrant was valid?

19
HELD: NO. It is at once evident that the foregoing Search Warrant authorizes the seizure of personal
properties vaguely described and not particularized. It is an all- embracing description which includes
everything conceivable regarding the Communist Party of the Philippines and the National Democratic
Front. It does not specify what the subversive books and instructions are; what the manuals not
otherwise available to the public contain to make them subversive or to enable them to be used for the
crime of rebellion. There is absent a definite guideline to the searching team as to what items might be
lawfully seized thus giving the officers of the law discretion regarding what articles they should seize as,
in fact, taken also were a portable typewriter and 2 wooden boxes. It is thus in the nature of a general
warrant and infringes on the constitutional mandate requiring particular description of the things to be
seized. In the recent rulings of this Court, search warrants of similar description were considered null
and void for being too general.

2.) Nolasco vs. Cruz Pano, 132 SCRA 152 (1985)

FACTS: Milagros Aguilar-Roque was arrested together with Cynthia Nolasco by the Constabulary Security
Group (CSG). Milagros had been wanted as a high ranking officer of the CPP. The arrest took place at
11:30 a.m. of August 6, 1984. At noon of the same day, her premises were searched and 428
documents, a portable typewriter and 2 boxes were seized.
Earlier that day, Judge Cruz Paño issued a search warrant to be served at Aguilar-Roque’s leased
residence allegedly an underground house of the CPP/NPA. On the basis of the documents seized,
charges of subversion and rebellion by the CSG were filed by but the fiscal’s office merely charged her
and Nolasco with illegal possession of subversive materials. Aguilar-Roque asked for suppression of the
evidence on the ground that it was illegally obtained and that the search warrant is void because it is a
general warrant since it does not sufficiently describe with particularity the things subject of the search
and seizure, and that probable cause has not been properly established for lack of searching questions
propounded to the applicant’s witness.

ISSUE: WON the search warrant was valid?

HELD: NO. Section 3, Article IV of the Constitution, guarantees the right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose. It also specifically provides that no Search Warrant shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined by the Judge or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by
law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized.
It is at once evident that the foregoing Search Warrant authorizes the seizure of personal properties
vaguely described and not particularized. It is an all- embracing description which includes everything
conceivable regarding the Communist Party of the Philippines and the National Democratic Front. It
does not specify what the subversive books and instructions are; what the manuals not otherwise
available to the public contain to make them subversive or to enable them to be used for the crime of
rebellion. There is absent a definite guideline to the searching team as to what items might be lawfully
seized thus giving the officers of the law discretion regarding what articles they should seize as, in fact,
taken also were a portable typewriter and 2 wooden boxes.

20
It is thus in the nature of a general warrant and infringes on the constitutional mandate requiring
particular description of the things to be seized. In the recent rulings of this Court, search warrants of
similar description were considered null and void for being too general.

223. P vs. Claudio, 160 SCRA 646

Facts:

Daniel Obiña, a policeman came from Baguio City and arrived in Olongapo City at about 1:30 o'clock
in the afternoon having left Baguio at about 8:30 o'clock in the morning. He took the Victory Liner in
going back to Olongapo City. His family lives in Baguio City. On board the Victory Liner, he was
seated on the second seat at the back. While he was thus seated, suspect Anita Claudio boarded
the same bus and took the seat in front of him after putting a bag which she was carrying at the back
of the seat of Obiña. The bag placed by suspect behind his seat was a wooven buri bag made of
plastic containing some vegetables. The act of the accused putting her bag behind Pat. Obiña's seat
aroused his suspicion and made him felt (sic) nervous. With the feeling that there was some
unusual, he had the urge to search the woven plastic bag. But it was only at San Fernando,
Pampanga when he was able to go to the bag. He inserted one of his fingers in a plastic bag located
at the bottom of the woven bag and smelt marijuana. The plastic woven bag appearing to contain
camote tops on the top has a big bundle of plastic of marijuana at the bottom. He could recognize
the smell of marijuana because he was assigned at that time at the ANTI-NARCOTICS Unit. He did
not, however, do anything after he discovered that there was marijuana inside the plastic bag of the
accused until they reached Olongapo City and the accused alighted from the bus in front of the
Caltex Gasoline Station in Sta. Rita. Right after the accused alighted from the bus, policeman Obina
intercepted her and showed her his Id Identifying himself as a policeman and told her he will search
her bag because of the suspicion that she was carrying marijuana inside said bag. In reply, accused
told him, "Please go with me, let us settle this at home." However, the witness did not heed her plea
and instead handcuffed her right hand and with her, boarded a tricycle right away and brought the
suspect to the police headquarters with her bag appearing to contain vegetables.

At the police headquarters Investigation Section, the bag was searched in the presence of
Investigator Cpl. Tiongco; Pat. Obiña, the accused and Sgt. Leoncio Bagang. Inside the plastic bag
was found a big bundle of plastic containing marijuana weighing about one kilo. Witness stated that
he could detect marijuana even before the application of chemicals because of one year and a half
assignment with the CANU. After the marijuana was taken from the bag of the accused, photographs
were taken of the accused and the marijuana confiscated from her possession with Pat. Obiña and
that of Investigator Tiongco, accused and himself Identified photographs shown to him in open
Court. (Exhs. "D," "D-l," "D-2" and "D-3"). Witness was likewise shown a plastic bag of marijuana
contained in a plastic container (Exhs. "B," "B-1" and "B-1 -a") and Identified it as the one
confiscated from the accused and pointed to his initials on the newspaper wrapping which also
shows the date and time, although the wrapper at the time he testified appeared to be soiled
already. The marijuana was allegedly still fresh when confiscated.

To prove further that the accused transported the confiscated marijuana from Baguio City to
Olongapo City, witness Identified Victory Liner Ticket No. 684977 which was confiscated from the
accused and for Identification purposes, the witness presented the body number of the bus he wrote

21
at the back of the ticket which is "309" (Exhs. "F" and "F-l"). Regarding himself, he did not pay his
fare from Baguio City because as a policeman, he used his badge and a free ride.

On cross-examination, witness stated that he went to Baguio City on July 15,1981 and underwent
treatment of his heart while he was there. He was given a furlough for medical treatment. He stayed
in Baguio City for about five days and returned to Olongapo City on July 21, 1981. Prior to July 21,
1981, witness never knew the accused, and the first time he saw her was in Baguio when she
boarded the same Victory Liner he took. When the accused who was bringing with her a woven
plastic bag placed the bag right behind his seat instead of placing it in front of her or beside her seat.
Witness Obiña became suspicious and his suspicion was confirmed when they reached San
Fernando, Pampanga, after he checked the buri bag. The bus stopped at said town to load some
gasoline. Witness inserted one of his fingers inside the buri bag and thereafter smelt marijuana. He
confirmed his testimony on direct that when witness confronted accused he was invited to go with
her in order to settle the matter to which he refused. Accused further testified that from the time the
accused placed her bag behind his seat from Baguio City, he felt so nervous and had to take his
medicine at the Tarlac Station. It was only after having taken his medicine that his apprehension was
contained and thus was able to insert his right hand inside the buri bag in San Fernando,
Pampanga. His fingers reached the very bottom of the bag. He Identified his sworn statement
regarding this incident given on July 21, 1981 which is Exhibit "G." Witness likewise Identified
accused Anita Claudio in open court.

Issue:

Whether or not the warrantless search and arrest is valid.

Held:

Appellant Claudio was caught transporting prohibited drugs. Pat. Daniel Obiña did not need a
warrant to arrest Claudio as the latter was caught in flagrante delicto. The warrantless search being
an incident to a lawful arrest is in itself lawful. (Nolasco v. Pano, 147 SCRA 509). Therefore, there
was no infirmity in the seizure of the 1.1 kilos of marijuana.

The accused takes inconsistent positions in her appellant's brief. At first, she does not deny having
had with her marijuana at the time of her arrest. Instead, she claims that she should just be guilty of
possession. In a complete turnabout, in the latter portion of said brief, she claims that the evidence
against her were mere fabrications and the marijuana allegedly found in her possession was only
planted.

We have carefully examined the records of the case and we find no ground to alter the trial court's
findings and appreciation of the evidence presented.

Credence is accorded to the prosecution's evidence, more so as it consisted mainly of testimonies of

policemen. Law enforcers are presumed to have regularly performed their duty in the absence of
proof to the contrary (People v. De Jesus, 145 SCRA 521). We also find no reason from the records

22
why the prosecution witnesses should fabricate their testimonies and implicate appellant in such a
serious crime (See People v. Bautista, 147 SCRA 500).

The accused testified that she was not on that bus that came from Baguio City but rather she was in
Olongapo City all that time. She alleged that she was arrested by Pat. Obiña for no reason at all.

In the case at bar, alibi does not deserve much credit as it was established only by the accused
herself (People v. De la Cruz, 148 SCRA 582).

Moreover, it is a well-established rule that alibi cannot prevail over positive testimony (People v. De
La Cruz, supra).

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED.

224. PEOPLE VS. DEL ROSARIO, July 10, 1994

Facts:
Del Rosario was charged with illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions and illegal
sale of regulated drugs.
Upon application of SPO3 Raymundo Untiveros of the PNP Cavite, RTC Judge Arturo
de Guia issued a search warrant authorizing the search and seizure of an “undetermined quantity
of methamphetamine hydrochloride commonly known as shabu and its paraphernalia” in the
premises of appellant’s house. However, the search warrant was not implemented immediately
due to lack of police personnel to form the raiding team.
In the course of the search, they found and seized a black canister containing shabu, an
aluminum foil, a plastic .22 caliber, three set of ammunitions and three wallets containing the
marked money.

Issue:
Whether or not there is a violation of the constitutional right against unreasonable search
and seizure

Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that the accused cannot be convicted of the illegal possession of
firearms and ammunitions. Sec 2 art. III of the constitution specifically provides that a search
warrant must particularly describe the things to be seized. In herein case, the search warrant
implemented by the raiding party authorized only the search and seizure of the described
quantity of shabu and paraphernalia.

A search warrant is not a sweeping authority empowering a raiding party to undertake a

fishing expedition to seize and confiscate any and all kinds of evidence or articles relating to a
crime. The constitution itself and the Rules of Court specifically mandate that the search warrant
must particularly describe the things to be seized. Thus, the search warrant was no authority for

23
the police officers to seize the firearms which was not mentioned, much less described with
particularity, in the search warrant. The seizure of the firearms was unconstitutional.

Neither may it maintain that the gun was seized in the course of an arrest, for as earlier
observed, accused arrest was far from regular and legal. Aid firearm, having been illegally
seized, the same is not admissible in evidence.

Wherefore the decision is reversed and the accused is acquitted.

May a non-judicial officer issue a warrant of arrest?

Read:
225. Harvey vs. Miriam Defensor-Santiago , June 26 , 1988

FACTS:
Andrew Harvey and John Sherman, both American Nationals residing in Laguna and Adriann
Van Eslhout, Dutch citizen residing in Laguna as well petitioned for habeas corpus because they were
apprehended by agent of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation by virtue of Mission Orders
issued by Miriam Defensor-Santiago. Seized during their apprehension were photo negatives of suspected
child prostitutes as well as girls and boys engaged in sexual act.

ISSUE:

 Whether or not their apprehension and the search and seizure was valid,

HELD:

One of the constitutional requirements of a valid search warrant or warrant of arrest is that it must
be based upon probable cause. Probable cause has been defined as referring to "such facts and
circumstances antecedent to the issuance of the warrant that in themselves are sufficient to induce a
cautious man to rely on them and act in pursuance thereof." The 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure also
provide that an arrest wit a warrant may be effected by a peace officer or even a private person (1) when
such person has committed, actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense in his presence;
and (2) when an offense has, in fact, been committed and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating
that the person to be arrested has committed it.

226. Moreno vs. Vivo, 20 SCRA 562

24
Chan Sau Wah, a Chinese citizen born in Fukien, China on January 6, 1932, arrived in the Philippines on
November 23, 1961 to visit her cousin, Samuel Lee Malaps. She left in mainland China two of her
children by a first marriage: Fu Tse Haw and Fu Yan Kai With her was Fu Yan Fun, her minor son also
by the first marriage, born in Hongkong on September 11, 1957.

Chan Sau Wah and her minor son Fu Yan Fun were permitted only into the Philippines under a temporary
visitor's visa for two (2) months and after they posted a cash bond of P4,000.00.

On January 24, 1962, Chan Sau Wah married Esteban Morano, a native-born Filipino citizen. Born to this
union on September 16, 1962 was Esteban Morano, Jr.

To prolong their stay in the Philippines, Chan Sau Wah and Fu Yan Fun obtained several extensions. The
last extension expired on September 10, 1962.

In a letter dated August 31, 1962, the Commissioner of Immigration ordered Chan Sau Wah and her son,
Fu Yan Fun, to leave the country on or before September 10, 1962 with a warning that upon failure so to
do, he will issue a warrant for their arrest and will cause the confiscation of their bond.

Instead of leaving the country, on September 10, 1962, Chan Sau Wah (with her husband Esteban
Morano) and Fu Yan Fun petitioned the Court of First Instance of Manila for mandamus to compel the
Commissioner of Immigration to cancel petitioners' Alien Certificates of Registration; prohibition to stop
the Commissioner from issuing a warrant for their arrest, and preliminary injunction to restrain the
Commissioner from confiscating their cash bond and from issuing warrants of arrest pending resolution
of this case.1 The trial court, on November 3, 1962, issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for,
upon a P2,000-bond. After trial and the stipulations of facts filed by the parties, the Court of First Instance
rendered judgment,

ISSUE:

Whether the Commissioner has the power to issue a warrant of arrest?

HELD:

They say that the Constitution limits to judges the authority to issue warrants of arrest and that the
legislative delegation of such power to the Commissioner of Immigration is thus violative of the Bill of
Rights.

Section 1 (3), Article III of the Constitution, we perceive, does not require judicial intervention in the
execution of a final order of deportation issued in accordance with law. The constitutional limitation
contemplates an order of arrest in the exercise of judicial power4 as a step preliminary or incidental to
prosecution or proceedings for a given offense or administrative action, not as a measure indispensable to
carry out a valid decision by a competent official, such as a legal order of deportation, issued by the
Commissioner of Immigration, in pursuance of a valid legislation.

The following from American Jurisprudence,5 is illuminating:

It is thoroughly established that Congress has power to order the deportation of aliens whose
presence in the country it deems hurtful. Owing to the nature of the proceeding, the deportation of
an alien who is found in this country in violation of law is not a deprivation of liberty without due

25
 process of law. This is so, although the inquiry devolves upon executive officers, and their
findings of fact, after a fair though summary hearing, are made conclusive.

The determination of the propriety of deportation is not a prosecution for, or a conviction of,
crime; nor is the deportation a punishment, even though the facts underlying the decision may
constitute a crime under local law. The proceeding is in effect simply a refusal by the government
to harbor persons whom it does not want. The coincidence of local penal law with the policy of
Congress is purely accidental, and, though supported by the same facts, a criminal prosecution
and a proceeding for deportation are separate and independent.

In consequence, the constitutional guarantee set forth in Section 1 (3), Article III of the Constitution
aforesaid, requiring that the issue of probable cause be determined by a judge, does not extend to
deportation proceedings.6

The view we here express finds support in the discussions during the constitutional convention. The
convention recognized, as sanctioned by due process, possibilities and cases of deprivation of liberty,
other than by order of a competent court.7

Indeed, the power to deport or expel aliens is an attribute of sovereignty. Such power is planted on the
"accepted maxim of international law, that every sovereign nation has the power, as inherent in
sovereignty, and essential to self-preservation, to forbid the entrance of foreigners within its
dominions."8 So it is, that this Court once aptly remarked that there can be no controversy on the fact that
where aliens are admitted as temporary visitors, "the law is to the effect that temporary visitors who do
not depart upon the expiration of the period of stay granted them are subject to deportation by the
Commissioner of Immigration, for having violated the limitation or condition under which they were
admitted as non-immigrants (Immigration Law, Sec. 37 (a), subsection (7); C.A. 613, as amended)." 9

And, in a case directly in point, where the power of the Commissioner to issue warrants of arrest was
challenged as unconstitutional, because "such power is only vested in a judge by Section 1, paragraph 3,
Article III of our Constitution," this Court declared —

This argument overlooks the fact that the stay of appellant Ng Hua To as temporary visitor is
subject to certain contractual stipulations as contained in the cash bond put up by him, among
them, that in case of breach the Commissioner may require the recommitment of the person in
whose favor the bond has been filed. The Commissioner did nothing but to enforce such
condition. Such a step is necessary to enable the Commissioner to prepare the ground for his
deportation under section 37 (a) of Commonwealth Act 613. A contrary interpretation would
render such power nugatory to the detriment of the State.10

It is in this context that we rule that Section 37 (a) of the Immigration Act of 1940 is not constitutionally
proscribed.

227. Lim vs. Ponce de Leon, 66 SCRA 299

Facts:

26
On April 29, 1961, plaintiff-appellant Jikil Taha sold to a certain Alberto Timbangcaya of
Brooke's Point, Palawan a motor launch named M/L "SAN RAFAEL". A year later or on April
9, 1962 Alberto Timbangcaya filed a complaint with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of
Palawan alleging that after the sale Jikil Taha forcibly took away the motor launch from him.

On May 14, 1962, after conducting a preliminary investigation, Fiscal Francisco Ponce de Leon
in his capacity as Acting Provincial Fiscal of Palawan, filed with the Court of First Instance of
Palawan the corresponding information for Robbery the Force and Intimidation upon Persons
against Jikil Taha. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 2719.

On June 15, 1962, Fiscal Francisco Ponce de Leon, upon being informed that the motor launch
was in Balabac, Palawan, wrote the Provincial Commander of Palawan requesting him to direct
the detachment commander-in Balabac to impound and take custody of the motor launch.

On June 26, 1962, Fiscal Ponce de Leon reiterated his request to the Provincial Commander to
impound the motor launch, explaining that its subsequent sale to a third party, plaintiff-appellant
Delfin Lim, cannot prevent the court from taking custody of the same. So, on July 6, 1962 upon
order of the Provincial Commander, defendant-appellee Orlando Maddela, Detachment
Commander of Balabac, Palawan, seized the motor launch "SAN RAFAEL" from plaintiff-
appellant Delfin Lim and impounded it.

On July 15, 1962 plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim pleaded with Orlando Maddela to return the
motor launch but the latter refused. Likewise, on September 20, 1962, Jikil Taha through his
counsel made representations with Fiscal Ponce de Leon to return the seized property to plaintiff-
appellant Delfin Lim but Fiscal Ponce de Leon refused, on the ground that the same was the
subject of a criminal offense.

All efforts to recover the motor launch going to naught, plaintiffs-appellants Delfin Lim and Jikil
Taha, on November 19, 1962, filed with the Court of First Instance of Palawan a complaint for
damages against defendants-appellees Fiscal Francisco Ponce de Leon and Orlando Maddela,
alleging that on July 6, 1962 Orlando Maddela entered the premises of Delfin Lim without a
search warrant and then and there took away the hull of the motor launch without his consent;
that he effected the seizure upon order of Fiscal Ponce de Leon who knew fully well that his
office was not vested with authority to order the seizure of a private property

ISSUE: May a non-judicial officer issue a warrant of arrest? (whether or not defendant-appellee
Fiscal Ponce de Leon had the power to order the seizure of the motor launch in question without
a warrant of search and seizure)?
HELD: The mere fact that a man is an officer, whether of high or low degree, gives him no more
right than is possessed by the ordinary private citizen to break in upon the privacy of a home and
subject its occupant to the indignity of a search for the evidence of crime, without a legal warrant
procured for that purpose. No amount of incriminating evidence whatever its source, will supply
the place of such warrant. At the closed door of the home be it palace or hovel even
bloodhounds must wait till the law, by authoritative process, bids it open.

27
Defendant-appellee Fiscal Ponce de Leon would also invoke lack of time to procure a search
warrant as an excuse for the seizure of the motor launch without one. He claimed that the motor
launch had to be seized immediately in order to preserve it and to prevent its removal out of the
locality, since Balabac, Palawan, where the motor launch was at the time, could only be reached
after three to four days' travel by boat. The claim cannot be sustained. The records show that on
June 15, 1962 Fiscal Ponce de Leon made the first request to the Provincial Commander for the
impounding of the motor launch; and on June 26, 1962 another request was made. The seizure
was not effected until July 6, 1962. In short, Fiscal Ponce de Leon had all the time to procure a
search warrant had he wanted to and which he could have taken in less than a day, but he did not.
Besides, there is no basis for the apprehension that the motor launch might be moved out of
Balabac because even prior to its seizure the motor launch was already without its engine. In
sum, the fact that there was no time to secure a search warrant would not legally justify a search
without one.

Pursuant to the foregoing provisions, a person whose constitutional rights have been violated or
impaired is entitled to actual and moral damages from the public officer or employee responsible
therefor.

228. HORTENCIA SALAZAR VS. HON TOMAS ACHACOSO, G.R. NO. 81510,
March 14, 1990 (En bane)

FACTS:
This concerns the validity of the power of the Secretary of Labor to issue warrants of arrest and
seizure under Article 38 of the Labor Code, prohibiting illegal recruitment.
On October 21, 1987, Rosalie Tesoro filed with the POEA a complaint against petitioner. Having
ascertained that the petitioner had no license to operate a recruitment agency, public respondent
Administrator Tomas D. Achacoso issued his challenged CLOSURE AND SEIZURE ORDER.
The POEA brought a team to the premises of Salazar to implement the order. There it was found
that petitioner was operating Hannalie Dance Studio. Before entering the place, the team served said
Closure and Seizure order on a certain Mrs. Flora Salazar who voluntarily allowed them entry into the
premises. Mrs. Flora Salazar informed the team that Hannalie Dance Studio was accredited with
Moreman Development (Phil.). However, when required to show credentials, she was unable to produce
any. Inside the studio, the team chanced upon twelve talent performers — practicing a dance number
and saw about twenty more waiting outside, The team confiscated assorted costumes which were duly
receipted for by Mrs. Asuncion Maguelan and witnessed by Mrs. Flora Salazar.

28
 A few days after, petitioner filed a letter with the POEA demanding the return of the confiscated
properties. They alleged lack of hearing and due process, and that since the house the POEA raided was
a private residence, it was robbery.
` On February 2, 1988, the petitioner filed this suit for prohibition. Although the acts sought to be
barred are already fait accompli, thereby making prohibition too late, we consider the petition as one
for certiorari in view of the grave public interest involved.

ISSUE:
May the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (or the Secretary of Labor) validly issue
warrants of search and seizure (or arrest) under Article 38 of the Labor Code?

HELD:
PETITION GRANTED. it is only a judge who may issue warrants of search and arrest. Neither may it be
done by a mere prosecuting body.

229. PRES'L ANTI-DOLLAR SALTING TASK FORCE CASE, March 16, 1989

Facts: State Prosecutor Jose B. Rosales, who is assigned with the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force (PADS
Task Force) for purposes of convenience, issued search warrants Nos. 156, 157, 158, 159, 160 and 161 against
Karamfil Import-Export Co., Inc., P & B Enterprises Co., Inc., Philippine Veterans Corporation, Philippine Veterans
Development Corporation, Philippine Construction Development Corporation, Philippine Lauan Industries
Corporation, Inter-trade Development (Alvin Aquino), Amelili U. Malaquiok Enterprises and Jaime P. Lucman
Enterprises.

The application for the issuance of said search warrants was filed by Atty. Napoleon Gatmaytan of the Bureau of
Customs who is a deputized member of the PADS Task Force. Attached to the said application is the affidavit of
Josefin M. Castro who is an operative and investigator of the PADS Task Force.

The Karamfil Import-Exports, et al. went to RTC which found the material issues to be:

1) Competency of this Court to act on petition filed by the petitioners;

2) Validity of the search warrants issued by respondent State Prosecutor;

3) Whether or not the petition has become moot and academic because all the search warrants
sought to be quashed had already been implemented and executed. 8

The regional trial court declared the search warrants to be null and void.

29
The PADS task force went to court of appeals that renders the RTC’s judgement reversered. Upon motion of the
Kamarfil the judgement of the court of appeals was reversed in favor of Kamarfil by the issue: whether or not PADS
task force is a “responsible officer” which was granted by the 1973 constitution with the power to issue warrants.
Hence, the petition.

Issue: may the presidential body PADS task force be said to be "such other responsible officer as may be
authorized by law" to issue search warrants under the 1973 Constitution questions we take up seriatim.

NO, they cannot issue warrant. A quasi-judicial body has been defined as "an organ of government other than a
court and other than a legislature, which affects the rights of private parties through either adjudication or rule
making." What they can do is to conduct an inquiry preliminary to a judicial recourse, and to “recommend action”
of appropriate authorities.

It is not unlike a fiscal's office that conducts a preliminary investigation to determine whether or not prima facie
evidence exists to justify haling the respondent to court.

It must be observed that under the present Constitution, the powers of arrest and search are exclusive upon
judges.

Since the 1973 Constitution took force and effect and until it was so unceremoniously discarded in 1986, its
provisions conferring the power to issue arrest and search warrants upon an officer, other than a judge, by fiat of
legislation have been at best controversial.

It is our ruling, thus, that when the 1973 Constitution spoke of "responsible officer" to whom the authority to issue
arrest and search warrants may be delegated by legislation, it did not furnish the legislator with the license to give
that authority to whomsoever it pleased. It is to be noted that the Charter itself makes the qualification that the
officer himself must be "responsible". We are not saying, of course, that the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task
Force (or any similar prosecutor) is or has been irresponsible in discharging its duty. Rather, we take
"responsibility", as used by the Constitution, to mean not only skill and competence but more significantly,
neutrality and independence comparable to the impartiality presumed of a judicial officer. A prosecutor can in no
manner be said to be possessed of the latter qualities.

Hence petition is dismissed.

Properties subject to seizure Read:

Sec. 2, Rule 126,1985 Rules on Crimial Procedure, as amended
230. ESPANO VS. CA, 288 SCRA 558

FACTS:

Petitioner was charged for unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and under his custody and control
twelve (12) plastic cellophane (bags) containing crushed flowering tops, marijuana weighing 5.5 grams which is a
prohibited drug.
The evidence for the prosecution, based on the testimony of Pat. Romeo Pagilagan, shows that on July 14,
1991, at about 12:30 a.m., he and other police officers, namely, Pat. Wilfredo Aquino, Simplicio Rivera, and Erlindo
Lumboy of the Western Police District (WPD), Narcotics Division went to Zamora and Pandacan Streets, Manila to
confirm reports of drug pushing in the area. They saw petitioner selling something to another person. After the
alleged buyer left, they approached petitioner, identified themselves as policemen, and frisked him. The search

30
yielded two plastic cellophane tea bags of marijuana. When asked if he had more marijuana, he replied that there
was more in his house. The policemen went to his residence where they found ten more cellophane tea bags of
marijuana. Petitioner was brought to the police headquarters where he was charged with possession of prohibited
drugs. On July 24, 1991, petitioner posted bail and the trial court issued his order of release on July 29, 1991.
Annabelle Alip, forensic chemist of the WPD Criminal Investigation Laboratory Section, testified that the
articles sent to her by Pat. Wilfredo Aquino regarding the apprehension of a certain Rodolfo Espano for
examination tested positive for marijuana, with a total weight of 5.5 grams.
By way of defense, petitioner testified that on said evening, he was sleeping in his house and was awakened
only when the policemen handcuffed him. He alleged that the policemen were looking for his brother-in-law
Lauro, and when they could not find the latter, he was instead brought to the police station for investigation and
later indicted for possession of prohibited drugs. His wife Myrna corroborated his story.
The trial court rejected petitioners defense as a mere afterthought and found the version of the prosecution
more credible and trustworthy.
The court found the accused him guilty of the crime of violation of Section 8, Article II, in relation to Section 2
(e-L) (I) of Republic Act No. 6425 known as the Dangerous Drugs Act as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 179.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the pieces of evidence seized were admissible as evidence against the accused?

HELD:

The marijuana seized from Espano when he was frisked is admissible as evidence even if the search was
done without a warrant. Rule 113 Section 5(a) of the Rules of Court provides that a peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. Petitioner's arrest falls squarely under the
aforementioned rule. He was caught in flagrant as a result of a buy-bust operation conducted by police officers on
the basis of information received regarding the illegal trade of drugs within the area of Zamora and Pandacan
Streets, Manila. The police officer saw petitioner handing over something to an alleged buyer. After the buyer left,
they searched him and discovered two cellophanes of marijuana. His arrest was, therefore, lawful and the two
cellophane bags of marijuana seized were admissible in evidence, being the fruits of the crime.

As for the marijuana found at petitioner's residence, however, the same are inadmissible in evidence. The
1987 Constitution guarantees freedom against unreasonable searches and seizures under Article III, Section 2
which provides that the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable causeto be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

An exception to the said rule is a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest for dangerous weapons
or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense. 11 It may extend beyond the person of
the one arrested to include the premises or surroundings under his immediate control. In this case, the bags of

31
marijuana seized at Espano's house after his arrest at Pandacan and Zamora Streets do not fall under the said
exceptions.

Warrantless searches and arrests

Read:

231. P. vs. Bati, August 27, 199

Facts: By the word of their civilian informer, Patrolmen Jose Luciano, Angelito Caraan, Nelson
Dimatulac and Democrito Cuenca immediately proceeded to the vicinity an alleged buy-and-sell
of marijuana was taking place. They saw Marquez giving something to Bati, who, thereafter,
handed a wrapped object, which turned out to be marijuana worth P190, to Marquez who then
inserted the object inside the front of his pants in front of his abdomen while Bati, on his part,
placed the thing given to him inside his pocket. Marquez was arrested on the spot. Both Bati
and Marquez were brought to the Police station where they admitted they were in the buying
and selling of the confiscated marijuana.

Issue: Appellant contends that the arrest was not valid as the requirements for a warrantless
arrest were not complied with.

Held: This contention is without merit.

Section 5 Rule 113 of the Rules in Criminal Procedure clearly provides:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant, when lawful. — A peace officer or private person may, without
warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it x x x

It is the considered view of the Court that there was no need for Luciano and Caraan to be
armed with a warrant of arrest when they arrested Marquez and the accused since they had
personal knowledge of the actual commission of the crime viz: They were eyewitnesses to the
illegal exchange of marijuana and P190.00 between Marquez and accused who were caught in
flagrante delicto. The facts and circumstances attendant precisely fall under Sec. 5, (a), Rule
113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure. The subsequent arrest of Marquez and accused were
made under the principle of "hot pursuit". The recovery of the marijuana from Marquez and the
P190.00 from accused by the said police officers were not violative of their constitutional rights

32
since Marquez and the accused voluntarily surrendered them to the police officers. But even for
the sake of argument that the recovery of the marijuana and peso bills were against the consent
of Marquez and accused, still, the search on their persons was incidental to their valid
warrantless arrest. For, the rule that searches and seizures must be supported by a valid
warrant is not an absolute rule. There are at least three exceptions: (1) search incidental to an
arrest, (2) search of a moving vehicle and (3) seizure of evidence in plain view. In the case at
bar, the searches made on Marquez and accused were incidental to their valid arrest.

Having caught the appellant in flagrante as a result of the buy-bust operation, the policemen
were not only authorized but were also under obligation to apprehend the drug pusher even
without a warrant of arrest And since appellant's arrest was lawful, it follows that the search
made incidental to the arrest was also valid.

232. Manuel et al., vs. Judge Tirso Velasco, GR No. 84666, February 9, 1989(di
mahanap)

233. Garcia-Padilla vs. Enrile,121 SCRA 47 & 137 SCRA 647

In July 1982, Sabino Padilla, together w/ 8 others who were having a conference in a house in
Bayombong, NV, were arrested by members of the PC. The raid of the house was authorized by a search
warrant issued by Judge Sayo. Josefina, mother of Sabino, opposed the arrest averring that no warrant
of arrest was issued but rather it was just a warrant of arrest hence the arrest of her son and the others
was w/o just cause. Sabino and companions together with 4 others were later transferred to a facility
only the PCs know. Josefina petitioned the court for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus.

ISSUE: Whether or not the arrests done against Sabino et al is valid.

HELD: In a complete about face, the SC decision in the Lansang Case was reversed and the ruling in the
Barcelon Case & the Montenegro Case was again reinstated. The questioned power of the president to
suspend the privilege of the WoHC was once again held as discretionary in the president. The SC again
reiterated that the suspension of the writ was a political question to be resolved solely by the president.
It was also noted that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus must, indeed, carry
with it the suspension of the right to bail, if the government’s campaign to suppress the rebellion is to
be enhanced and rendered effective. If the right to bail may be demanded during the continuance of the
rebellion, and those arrested, captured and detained in the course thereof will be released, they would,
without the least doubt, rejoin their comrades in the field thereby jeopardizing the success of
government efforts to bring to an end the invasion, rebellion or insurrection.

NOTE: This ruling was abrogated by Sec 18, Art 7 of the 1987 Constitution which expressly
constitutionalized the Lansang Doctrine. Note as well that under Art 3 (Sec 13) of the Constitution it is

33
stated that “the right to bail shall not be impaired even if the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended.”

234. P. vs. Maspil, Jr., August 20, 1990 (Compare with P. vs.
Aminnudin, July 6, 1988, supra)

FACTS:

By virtue of the report coming from the informant, that two persons would be transporting a
large quantity of marijuana, police officers set up a checkpoint in Benguet to monitor, inspect,
and scrutinize vehicles bound for Baguio City. After hours of waiting, a jeepney was flagged
down in the checkpoint and the informers identified the two. When inspected the jeepney,
there were sacks and cans inside it, when opened, the sacks and cans were filled with
marijuana leaves. The two were placed under arrest.

Issue:

Whether or not the arrest is valid

Ruling:

The court made a distinction between Maspil and Amunnudin case. In the latter, the offers
were aware of the identity of the accused, his plans, and the vessel that he would be taking.
Further, the officers have ample of time to obtain in a warrant but failed to do so. In the
former, the officers had no exact description of the vehicle of the accused and no idea as to
what the vehicle would exactly arrive.

The court explained that the jeepney on the road is not the same as the passenger boat the
route and the time of arrival of which are more or less certain and which ordinarily cannot
deviate or alter its course or select another destination.

235. Posadas vs. CA, Aug. 2, 1990

Facts:
On October 16, 1986 at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning Pat. Ursicio Ungab and Pat. Umbra
Umpar, both members of the Integrated National Police (INP) of the Davao Metrodiscom
assigned with the Intelligence Task Force, were conducting a surveillance along Magallanes
Street, Davao City. While they were within the premises of the Rizal Memorial Colleges they
spotted petitioner carrying a "buri" bag and they noticed him to be acting suspiciously.

34
They approached the petitioner and identified themselves as members of the INP. Petitioner
attempted to flee but his attempt to get away was thwarted by the two notwithstanding his
resistance.
They then checked the "buri" bag of the petitioner where they found one (1) caliber .38 Smith &
Wesson revolver with Serial No. 770196 1 two (2) rounds of live ammunition for a .38 caliber
gun 2 a smoke (tear gas) grenade,3 and two (2) live ammunitions for a .22 caliber gun. 4 They
brought the petitioner to the police station for further investigation. In the course of the same, the
petitioner was asked to show the necessary license or authority to possess firearms and
ammunitions found in his possession but he failed to do so.
ISSUE: Hence, the herein petition for review, the main thrust of which is that there being no lawful
arrest or search and seizure, the items which were confiscated from the possession of the petitioner are
inadmissible in evidence against him.

HELD:

The Solicitor General, in justifying the warrantless search of the buri bag then carried by the
petitioner, argues that under Section 12, Rule 136 of the Rules of Court a person lawfully
arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything used as proof of a commission of
an offense without a search warrant. It is further alleged that the arrest without a warrant of the
petitioner was lawful under the circumstances.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides as follows:
SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful — A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a
warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he
shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7. (6a, 17a)
From the foregoing provision of law it is clear that an arrest without a warrant may be effected
by a peace officer or private person, among others, when in his presence the person to be arrested
has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; or when an offense
has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the
person arrested has committed it.

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At the time the peace officers in this case identified themselves and apprehended the petitioner as
he attempted to flee they did not know that he had committed, or was actually committing the
offense of illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions. They just suspected that he was
hiding something in the buri bag. They did now know what its contents were. The said
circumstances did not justify an arrest without a warrant.
The constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures has not been violated.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED with costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

P. vs. De la Cruz
236. P. vs. Ortiz, Dec. 3, 1990

FACTS:

The Narcotics Command Unit in Calamba, Laguna, having received information that a
certain Meo, later identified as Romeo Ortiz, was selling marijuana in Canlubang, organized a
buy-bust team for his apprehension. The team consisted of Sgt. Arnel Angsioco as leader and
CIC Edgar Groyon, Sgt. Agaton Enriquez and Pat. Heidi Zulueta as members. The operation
was scheduled on June 26, 1985, and was duly recorded in the station log book. So was the
serial number of the P20.00 to be used for the pretended purchase, which was delivered by
Major Vivencio Ramilo, the Unit Commander, to Angsioco. The latter marked it by dotting the
nose on the picture of President Quezon, then gave it to Groyon, who was to pose as the buyer.
As a routinary precaution, Ramilo made sure before they left that none of the team members
was carrying any marijuana.

The team arrived at the Labor Hall in Canlubang, Laguna, at about 9:15 in the morning
and waited for their informer. Upon his arrival, the operation began. The informer, at Groyon's
bidding, went to Ortiz and told him Groyon was looking for marijuana. The informer returned to
Groyon to tell him that Ortiz was willing to sell. Groyon then approached Ortiz and gave him the
marked bill in exchange for which Ortiz handed him two tea bags. At this juncture, Groyon gave
the pre-arranged signal by touching his hair. Angsioco and Zulueta, who were at the time about
four to eight meters away, pounced upon Ortiz and arrested him after introducing themselves as
peace officers. After initial resistance, Ortiz submitted. The team recovered the marked bill and
confiscated the tea bags. Ortiz was later taken to the police station for interrogation. The tea
bags were sealed in a letter envelope initiated by Groyon, Angsioco and Zulueta and sent to the
National Bureau of Investigation, where they were subjected to microscopic and chemical and
chromotographic examination. The contents were found to be marijuana.

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ISSUE:

Whether the arrest was valid.

HELD:

Ortiz's submission that he was subjected to an illegal search and seizure is not
acceptable. The demonstrated facts are that he was arrested in flagrante and so came under
the exception to the rule requiring previous obtention of a warrant to justify a search or seizure.
Rule 113, Section 5, provides that a peace officer or indeed even a private person may, without
warrant, arrest a person who, "in his presence, has committed, is actually committing or is
attempting to commit an offense." In these circumstances, a search may also be made without
warrant, being incidental to a lawful arrest. Articles seized as a result of such lawful search are
admissible in evidence.

The person accused of an offense is entitled to the constitutional presumption of

innocence but this right may be offset by proof of his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. That proof
has been established in the case at bar. We are convinced from the evidence before us that the
accused-appellant did sell the marijuana to the narcotics team on the day in question and so
violated Section 4 of the Dangerous Drugs Act. For contributing to the spread of drug addiction,
which is exacting a heavy toll on the lives and future of our people, he is justly punished.

237. Rolito Go vs. CA, Feb. 11, 1992

Facts:

Rolito Go while traveling in the wrong direction on a one-way street, nearly bumped Eldon Maguan’s
car. Go alighted from his car, shot Maguan and left the scene. A security guard at a nearby restaurant
was able to take down petitioner’s car plate number. The police arrived shortly thereafter at the scene
of the shooting. A manhunt ensued. An Information then was filed charging herein petitioner Rolito Go
for murder before the Regional Trial Court of MetroManila.

Six days after, petitioner presented himself before the San Juan Police Station to verify news reports
that he was being hunted by the police; he was accompanied by two (2) lawyers. However, he was
immediately detained because an eyewitness to the shooting, who was at the police station at that
time, positively identified petitioner as the gunman.

Petitioner posted bail, the prosecutor filed the case to the lower court, setting and commencing trial
without preliminary investigation. Prosecutor reasons that the petitioner has waived his right to
preliminary investigation as bail has been posted and that such situation, that petitioner has been
arrested without a warrant lawfully, falls under Section 5, Rule 113 and Section 7, Rule 112 of The 1985

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Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides for the rules and procedure pertaining to situations of lawful
warrantless arrests.

Petitioner argues that he was not lawfully arrested without warrant because he went to the police
station six (6) days after the shooting which he had allegedly perpetrated. Thus, petitioner argues, the
crime had not been “just committed” at the time that he was arrested. Moreover, none of the police
officers who arrested him had been an eyewitness to the shooting of Maguan and accordingly none had
the “personal knowledge” required for the lawfulness of a warrantless arrest. Since there had been no
lawful warrantless arrest, Section 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court which establishes the only exception
to the right to preliminary investigation, could not apply in respect of petitioner.

Issue:

Whether or not the warrantless arrest of herein petitioner was lawful

Resolution:

The general rule on arrest provides that the same is legitimate if affected with a valid warrant. However,
there are instances specifically enumerated under the law when a warrantless arrest may be considered
lawful. Despite that, the warrantless arrest of herein petitioner Rolito Go does not fall within the terms
of said rule. The police were not present at the time of the commission of the offense, neither do they
have personal knowledge on the crime to be committed or has been committed not to mention the fact
that petitioner was not a prisoner who has escaped from the penal institution. In view of the above, the
allegation of the prosecution that petitioner needs to sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code before a preliminary investigation may be conducted is baseless. In this connection,
petitioner has all the right to ask for a preliminary investigation to determine whether is probable cause
that a crime has been committed and that petitioner is probably guilty thereof as well as to prevent him
from the hassles, anxiety and aggravation brought by a criminal proceeding. This reason of the accused
is substantial, which he should not be deprived of. On the other hand, petitioner did not waive his right
to have a preliminary investigation contrary to the prosecutor’s claim. The right to preliminary
investigation is deemed waived when the accused fails to invoke it before or at the time of entering
pleas at arraignment. The facts of the case show that petitioner insisted on his right to preliminary
investigation before his arraignment and he, through his counsel denied answering questions before the
court unless they were afforded the proper preliminary investigation. For the above reasons, the
petition was granted and the ruling of the appellate court was set aside and nullified. The Supreme
Court however, contrary to petitioner's allegation, declared that failure to accord the right to
preliminary investigation did not impair the validity of the information charging the latter of the crime of
murder.

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