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HAZID Worksheets ABC XYZ FIELD DEVELOPMENT PROJECT, Central Facilities Workshop Date: 2 July 2011

Note: Consequences and safeguards once cited are not repeated

#1 Hydrocarbons release - with or without ignition

Possible Causes Potential Consequences Safeguards & Procedures Recommendations Remarks Rank
Node 1: Global
Rupture of subsea 1) Gas cloud at sea surface. 1) Entry permits for vessel entering field 1) Consider providing subsea check / SD Gas cloud may impact people on
lines – import of Potential vapour cloud explosion 2) Mooring patterns valve the vessel.
produced fluids, export (VCE) 2) Include in Emergency response plan
of oil & gas due to: 3) Procedures / Signage / Patrolling by field
2) Oil/ Condensate pool at sea service boats. Nav Aids methods and procedures to approach the
surface. Pool fire on sea surface, platform with a gas cloud
if ignited 4) Export gas riser location is away from
Dragging anchor, vessel approach from -------
Supply or Fishing 3) Environmental impact
Boats collision, 5) Riser protection barriers; Fenders at boat
4) Production Loss landing
Dropped object,
Swinging load, Fitting 5) Equipment/ Structural 6) Subsea protection to pipelines to avoid
Failure or Leak, or damage anchors getting entangled.
Operator Error 6) Personnel injury 7) Oil Spill Contingency Procedure in line
with EIA
8) Vessel collision scenario included under Fine Print
non process hazard in QRA/ EIA Educational/ Training Material
9) Marine authorities informed of emergency Issued as a service to the
response plan
industry
10) F & G detection / ESD
for Free Distribution
11) Mechanical integrity, Maintenance
12) Lifting procedures SOP, Training
13) Dropped object study/ protection

Rupture of risers and/ 1) Pipeline / riser / piping leak/ 1) F & G detection / ESD/ Blowdown 3) Provide suitable type of crane and a
or on-deck piping due rupture leading to gas cloud. 2) Lifting procedures / look out man on the combination of cranes, forklifts, hydraulic
to: Potential vapour cloud explosion topsides / crane mechanic on standby manipulators, lifting beams and appliances.
(VCE) 4) Check operational requirements for lay-
2) Riser fire (jet fire for a long 3) Crane operating radius away from pipeline
Dropped object, corridor down areas, bumper bars and mechanical
duration) handling capabilities.
Swinging load, Fitting 3) Toxic exposure (CO2, H2S, 4) Certified crane operators. Dead man’s
Failure or Leak, or Mercury) handle to operate crane. 5) Ensure that wellheads are automatically
Operator Error shutdown upon confirmed fire detection on
4) Pool fire of oil/ condensate on 5) Regular crane maintenance topsides
deck and sea surface 6) Dropped Object / crane location / laydown

REPORT NUMBER: REV: A 26 MAY 2009 PAGE 1 OF 43


HAZID Worksheets ABC XYZ FIELD DEVELOPMENT PROJECT, Central Facilities Workshop Date: 2 July 2011

#1 Hydrocarbons release - with or without ignition


Possible Causes Potential Consequences Safeguards & Procedures Recommendations Remarks Rank
5) Equipment/ Structural area study to ensure that crane resting
damage position is not above equipment or escape
routes
6) Personnel injury
7) Fusible plugs near riser ESDV to
7) Missile generation, shutdown SDVs upon confirmed fire
equipment/ structural damage detection
8) Escalation to adjacent risers 8) PPE to prevent skin exposure to mercury
and other equipment on board
9) Hazardous area classification and
selection of electrical equipment conforming
classified zone
10) Automatic isolation of power to non-
essential electrical equipment on confirmed
fire detection
11) Decks are naturally ventilated

Corrosion / erosion + 1) Hole in pipeline or riser or 1) Material Selection Study 6) Material Selection Study. Chloride content Gas contains > 40% CO2,
Corrosion at piping piping leading to release of gas / 2) Corrosion inhibitor injection in wellheads/ in the well fluids should be determined and outside the flammability range.
supports condensate/ oil manifolds the metallurgy of piping and equipment on Potential for escalation to
2) Hole in on-deck piping leading the upstream end of the facilities should be structures is low because of
3) Corrosion allowance in wall thickness selected based on max chloride content inventory isolation and blow
to release of gas / condensate/
oil 4) External coating on pipeline / riser. 7) Provide pipeline repair kits down.
External painting of pipes and vessels
2) Corrosion of riser clamps 8) Check location of sand/ corrosion probes
5) Sacrificial anodes for cathodic protection
6) Splash zone coating on the risers
7) Regular pigging to prevent sand build up
8) Intelligent pigging to judge health of
pipeline
9) Diving inspections at regular intervals for
riser / clamps
10) Pipeline (P/L) sizes based on the
maximum operating velocity in the P/Ls.
Pipeline study decides max erosion velocity
of well fluid
11) Corrosion probes on the lines
12) NDT inspection/ Mechanical / Pipeline
Integrity Programs

REPORT NUMBER: REV: A 26 MAY 2009 PAGE 2 OF 43


HAZID Worksheets ABC XYZ FIELD DEVELOPMENT PROJECT, Central Facilities Workshop Date: 2 July 2011

#1 Hydrocarbons release - with or without ignition


Possible Causes Potential Consequences Safeguards & Procedures Recommendations Remarks Rank
13) Corrosion allowance of pipe works /
support pads
14) F & G detection / Fire detection; PPE
15) Fire, Explosion and Blast Protection
study. QRA
16) ESD and automatic blow down on
confirmed fire detection
17) Fusible plugs automatically initiate blow
down and deluge
18) SS cladding of Slug Catcher

Small bore pipe failure No new consequence identified 1) Minimum nozzle size is limited to 3/4"
(impact, vibration, high 2) Instrument piping are minimum of 300#
pressure across choke
or valve) 3) Reinforcement for free standing small
bore branches off main lines
4) Mono flanges are used for isolation of
instruments in HC services
5) Proper piping support
6) Instrumentation specification calls for
proper routing of small bore tubing ensuring
safeguard against impact
7) AIV/FIV Study

Flange / fitting defects No new consequence identified 1) Piping specifications (bolt tensioning
or leaks specification for bolt diameter > 38mm)
2) Installation QA / QC
3) Minimized flange connection where
possible
4) Maintenance. Operator surveillance. Pre-
commissioning pneumatic leak test of
flanges

Overpressure (check No new consequence identified PSV / SDV / BDV will be reviewed in detailed
valve slamming) HAZOP and SIL

REPORT NUMBER: REV: A 26 MAY 2009 PAGE 3 OF 43


HAZID Worksheets ABC XYZ FIELD DEVELOPMENT PROJECT, Central Facilities Workshop Date: 2 July 2011

#1 Hydrocarbons release - with or without ignition


Possible Causes Potential Consequences Safeguards & Procedures Recommendations Remarks Rank

Overpressurization of
gas pipeline

Overpressurization of Potential pipeline rupture 1) Water hammer study


oil pipeline, on water 2) P/L thickness is adequate (min 300#) for
hammer effect subsea service / corrosion

Simultaneous No new issues identified SIMPOS study to develop suitable


production while drilling procedures and safeguards
(SIMOPS)

Maintenance - Draining No new issues identified


liquids to drip pan

Node 2: Pig Launcher/ Receiver/ Manifolds Op Pressure: xxx kPa/ psia Op Temperature: xxx °C/F
Pigging valve line-up No new consequence identified 1) Operating manual detailing pigging 9) Provide a checklist for pigging operation to
error procedures. minimise human error
2) Permit to work system
Door failure in pig Pig dislodged at high velocity 1) Pig receiver door orientated outboard to
receiver and potential to impact ensure pig flies towards sea in case of
personnel or equipment leading mishap
to escalation 2) Personnel to stay clear of the door
3) Pigging is a manned operation with area
cordoning off, if required
4) Door locking mechanism is specified to
prevent opening the door under pressure

Node 3: Separation Op Pressure: xxx kPa/ psia Op Temperature: xxx °C/F


Pool fire on slug 1) PFP on slug catcher vessel support
catcher drip pan saddles against condensate spray jet fires

Node 4: Booster Gas Compression, Sales Gas Compression and Metering Op Pressure: xxx kPa/ psia Op Temperature: xxx °C/F
Dropped Objects No new consequence identified Canopy protection above the compressors

REPORT NUMBER: REV: A 26 MAY 2009 PAGE 4 OF 43


HAZID Worksheets ABC XYZ FIELD DEVELOPMENT PROJECT, Central Facilities Workshop Date: 2 July 2011

#1 Hydrocarbons release - with or without ignition


Possible Causes Potential Consequences Safeguards & Procedures Recommendations Remarks Rank
provided by the WHRUs-CIBAS Design

Compressor seal 1) Purged labyrinth seal


failure 2) F & G detection (peripheral)
3) ESD and automatic blowdown on
confirmed fire detection
4) Fire detection automatically initiates
blowdown

Low temperature No new consequence identified 1) Stainless steel (mostly 316) pipe work.
embrittlement during 2) BDV and PSV tail pipes are LTCS
blow down

AIV/ FIV induced No new consequence identified 1) Pipe stress study, AIV, FIV studies
rupture of high velocity
BDV/ PCV tail pipes

Corrosion underneath No new consequence identified 1) Proper surface preparation and coating for 10) Hot oil flanges are box insulated, as per
insulation (CUI) - low CUI surfaces, including vendor furnished piping/insulation specs. It can lead to leaking
temperature insulation equipment hot oil accumulation within the insulation and
and noise protection 2) Regular inspection underneath the go unnoticed. Insulation soaked in leaking
insulation insulation for piping insulated with acoustic / hot oil will be a potential fuel ready to be
low temperature insulation, as a part of ignited, when opened for maintenance.
preventive maintenance. Removable Review if hot oil flanges need box insulation.
inspection windows specified as part of (------------ is selected as heating medium as
insulation to check CUI per design basis)

Node 5: Acid Gas Processing Op Pressure: xxx kPa/ psia Op Temperature: xxx °C/F
Corrosion 1) Acid gas release 1) Dry gas with low corrosion potential 11) Operator to conduct HSE awareness IDLH value for CO2 is 50 000
2) Exposure to high 2) NDT inspection training to all personnel on the hazards of ppm. In case of small leaks, it is
concentration of CO2 CO2 and H2S. expected that within a few
3) External painting of equipment metres, a value of 50 000 ppm
(asphyxiation hazard) 12) Operator to provide demarcation lines
4) Only limited sections/ streams may painted on decks / warning signs to indicate will be reached in case of CO2
3) Exposure to high contain H2S > 100 ppm leak. Personnel can easily avoid
concentration of H2S areas of high H2S content.
5) CO2 and H2S gas releases scenarios are hazardous conditions by running
13) Operator to impose mandatory a small distance.
studied in QRA requirement of carrying personal H2S

REPORT NUMBER: REV: A 26 MAY 2009 PAGE 5 OF 43


HAZID Worksheets ABC XYZ FIELD DEVELOPMENT PROJECT, Central Facilities Workshop Date: 2 July 2011

#1 Hydrocarbons release - with or without ignition


Possible Causes Potential Consequences Safeguards & Procedures Recommendations Remarks Rank
monitor as part of permit to work in high H2S
content areas.

H2S released on Exposure to high concentration Maintenance procedures 14) Operator should employ only qualified Wetting of silica gel can lead to
wetting silica gel in of H2S and trained contractors for loading, unloading release of huge amount of heat.
dehydrator, during and disposal of mercury adsorbent and silica
maintenance, if silica gel
gel is wetted to avoid 15) Check with supplier of mercury
pyrophoric ignition or adsorbent and silica gel for size and
dust locations of manholes (min 20") and ensure
that these are free of obstruction
16) Check with supplier if silica gel is
pyrophoric or whether it will release H2S and
HC on wetting while removal to control dust.
17) Add a caution on P & ID stating: "H2S,
HC and heat may be released when silica
gel in Dehydrators is wetted", if supplier
confirms so.

Improper dehydrator Such wet sour feed gas may Online moisture analyzers provided leading
bed regeneration may lead to corrosion downstream to trip on HIGH HIGH moisture content
lead to moisture and failure
carryover downstream.

Node 6: Condensate Processing Op Pressure: xxx kPa/ psia Op Temperature: xxx °C/F
Overpressure through No new consequence identified
gas blowby from the
high pressure gas side

Reboiler circulation No new consequence identified Tandem seals with pressure switch in
pump / reflux pump between with pump trip interlock
seal failure

Overpressure Condensate ingress into cooling 1) Cooling water system is at a higher 18) Consider providing online HC detectors Cooling water side may be at a
(stabilizer cooler tube water operating pressure than the condensate in the vent pipes of cooling water / heating lower pressure during start ups /
rupture) system medium expansion drums trips

REPORT NUMBER: REV: A 26 MAY 2009 PAGE 6 OF 43


HAZID Worksheets ABC XYZ FIELD DEVELOPMENT PROJECT, Central Facilities Workshop Date: 2 July 2011

#1 Hydrocarbons release - with or without ignition


Possible Causes Potential Consequences Safeguards & Procedures Recommendations Remarks Rank
2) Cooling water expansion vessel is
blanketed by N2 to cut off contact with
atmospheric oxygen. PSV of the vessel is
routed to LP flare. Expansion vessel outlet
PCV for N2 is also routed to LP flare.
Chances of fire and explosion due to ingress
of HC into the tank from a tube rupture case
(from other S & T coolers) are minimised.

Node 7: Fuel Gas/ Flare System Op Pressure: xxx kPa/ psia Op Temperature: xxx °C/F
Low temperature Potential for HP KO drum failure LTCS for flare KO drum and pipework
embrittlement from
high pressure
blowdown

Liquid carryover to flare Condensate fire on sea surface, 1) KO drum high level trip (ESD2) 19) Provide 2 oo 3 voting system on high
tip due to KO drum if the spill ignites 2) Auto draining system from KOD level trip of flare and drain drums
overfill

Loss of purge gas Potential for explosion in the Two independent sources of purge gas, plus 20) Review alternative sources of purging
flare header hold-up in fuel gas system the flare line, e.g. nitrogen or gas from Slug
Catcher as fuel gas backup for start-up.

Node 8: FPSO/ FSO Storage Op Pressure: xxx kPa/ psia Op Temperature: xxx °C/F
Rupture or leak due to: 1) Containment lost 1) Entry permits for vessel entering field
Supply or Fishing 2) Oil/ Condensate pool at sea 2) Mooring patterns
Boats collision, surface. Pool fire on sea surface, 3) Procedures / Signage / Patrolling by field
offloading hose failure, if ignited service boats
3) Environmental impact 4) Double hull design
4) Production Loss 5) Nav Aids, Collision Avoidance Radar
6) FSO/FPSO may sink 6) PALL shuts of oil transfer
7) Oil Spill Contingency Procedure in line
with EIA
8) Vessel collision scenario included under
non process hazard in QRA/ EIA

REPORT NUMBER: REV: A 26 MAY 2009 PAGE 7 OF 43


HAZID Worksheets ABC XYZ FIELD DEVELOPMENT PROJECT, Central Facilities Workshop Date: 2 July 2011

#1 Hydrocarbons release - with or without ignition


Possible Causes Potential Consequences Safeguards & Procedures Recommendations Remarks Rank
9) Marine authorities informed of emergency
response plan
10) Mechanical integrity, Maintenance

Flexi-Riser Rupture HP gas jetting out of subsea 1) Back-up systems


piping and/ or risers may affect 2) Instrument protection
ship buoyancy, stability, leading
to its capsizing

Inert or fuel gas blanket 1) Air ingress into storage tanks 1) Back-up systems
failure to storage tanks 2) Potential explosion/ fire/ loss 2) Instrument protection
of FPSO/FSO
Hydrocarbon emission to 1) Back-up systems
atmosphere 2) Instrument protection

REPORT NUMBER: REV: A 26 MAY 2009 PAGE 8 OF 43


HAZID Worksheets ABC XYZ FIELD DEVELOPMENT PROJECT, Central Facilities Workshop Date: 2 July 2011

#2 Hydrocarbon Ingress with or without ignition


Possible Causes Potential Consequences Safeguards & Procedures Recommendations Remarks Rank
Node 1: Global
Lock closed, lock open HC migration / overpressure 1) Management of change procedure
valves in incorrect 2) Checklist of all LO / LC valves and
positions spading status with operation team

Hydrocarbon leak Undetected leak See # 1 Refer to earlier Recommendation 18


through exchangers to
Cooling Water /
Heating medium
network

Node 4: Booster Gas Compression, Sales Gas Compression and Metering Op Pressure: xxx kPa/ psia Op Temperature: xxx °C/F
Process leak drawn Potential explosion inside 1) Gas detection in ventilation air intake/ gas 21) Check all low point drains in the PDMS
into turbine enclosure / enclosure / potential explosion in detection in combustion air intake and model to ensure avoiding hydrocarbon into
combustion air intake the combustion air compression exhaust, tripping the turbine. air intakes
2) All air intakes (turbines, HVACs, FW pump
Flange leak in engine and air compressors) are located in
condensate vessel or non-hazardous safe areas.
piping 3) Rooms are positively pressurized
4) GT air ingress and exhaust plume
dispersion studies

REPORT NUMBER: REV: A 26 MAY 2009 PAGE 9 OF 43


HAZID Worksheets ABC XYZ FIELD DEVELOPMENT PROJECT, Central Facilities Workshop Date: 2 July 2011

#3 Moisture Ingress

Possible Causes Potential Consequences Safeguards & Procedures Recommendations Remarks Rank
Node 1: Global
1) Hot oil system not Leftover moisture in the system 1) Hot oil storage vessel is N2 blanketed to 22) Ensure that Hot oil system
dried properly during boils over when hot oil is heated avoid contact of hot oil with atmosphere commissioning procedure addresses this
start-up; hydrotest to produce steam which protecting degradation of hot oil issue with special reference to moisture
water left in the system expands many folds to cause 2) Caution note provided in operating manual removal from system. Water used to
explosion in hot oil vessel or & P&IDs to indicate that water / moisture hydrotest / flush / clean hot oil system during
piping ingress in hot oil system shall be avoided pre-commissioning should be fully drained.
2) Atmospheric N2 should be used to dry up the system
moisture ingress in hot before commissioning. Storage vessel and
oil system through hot low point drains shall be physically checked
oil storage vessel for unwanted water presence before
introducing hot oil

Other Nodes
No new causes or Scenarios identified For other nodes

REPORT NUMBER: REV: A 26 MAY 2009 PAGE 10 OF 43


HAZID Worksheets ABC XYZ FIELD DEVELOPMENT PROJECT, Central Facilities Workshop Date: 2 July 2011

#4 Draining / Sampling

Possible Causes Potential Consequences Safeguards & Procedures Recommendations Remarks Rank
Node 1: Global
Gas blowby into drain Overpressurization of drain 1) O & M procedures calling for
system. vessel depressurization before draining
Drain system blockage 2) Higher rating of drain lines maintained up
on icing to the last flange near the drain header
3) Thicker wall drain header to account for
saliferous environment

Gas or liquid discharge See earlier nodes on release of


while taking samples hydrocarbon inventory

Produced water with 1) Environmental impact Plant is shut down on loss of injection pump
mercury/ arsenic 2) Ground water contamination
discharged to sea or
soil when water
injection system is
down

Aqueous mixtures and Environmental impact 1) SOP for disposal of miscellaneous


discharges - mud and production waste including containerization
cuttings to sea or soil of hazardous waste to avoid possible
environmental impact from spills.

Drains from Hot Oil and Condensate, having low auto Hot oil drains are through drip pans 23) Add P&ID caution note stating: "Do not
Condensate / Aviation ignition temperature, may ignite drain oil under hot conditions" on all hot oil
Fuel routed to the in the drain system if operator drain outlet piping. Operating manual to
same hazardous open drains hot oil under hot caution: "Drain hot oil only after it cools down
drain header conditions by mistake to ambient temperature".

Other Nodes
No new causes or Scenarios identified For other nodes

REPORT NUMBER: REV: A 26 MAY 2009 PAGE 11 OF 43


HAZID Worksheets ABC XYZ FIELD DEVELOPMENT PROJECT, Central Facilities Workshop Date: 2 July 2011

#5 Thermal Radiation/ Flaring and Venting

Possible Causes Potential Consequences Safeguards & Procedures Recommendations Remarks Rank
Node 1: Global
Flare Radiation; design Impact to personnel / structures 1) Controlled Blowdown / Shutdown
inadequate 2) Flare Tip Location determined based on
Radiation Study

Hydrocarbon, green 1) Environmental impact; Ozone 1) Pilot burners with detectors and alarm
house gas discharge layer depletion provided
from unignited flare 2) Foul smell to neighbouring 2) Dispersion study from unignited flare at
population or facilities max flow

Large CO2 vents Environmental impact 1) EIA

Vent ignites during Impact to personnel / structures 1) No continuous vent identified


thunderstorm or 2) Vent locations studied for potential ignition
lightening
3) Lightening arrestors provided
4) Large continuous vents provided with
flame extinguishing system (CO2 or
equivalent)

Other Nodes
No new causes or Scenarios identified For other nodes

REPORT NUMBER: REV: A 26 MAY 2009 PAGE 12 OF 43


HAZID Worksheets ABC XYZ FIELD DEVELOPMENT PROJECT, Central Facilities Workshop Date: 2 July 2011

#6 Hazardous gas, liquids and solids release

Possible Causes Potential Consequences Safeguards & Procedures Recommendations Remarks Rank
Node 1: Global
Mercury vapour Impact to personnel 1) O & M procedures 24) Operating manual to detail Hg related
release due to venting 2) Mercury Removal beds hazards. Operator's training to provide
awareness
3) PPE appropriate for chemical

Mercury removal bed 1) Sales gas spec not met 1) Mercury level monitoring
saturated or 2) Mercury accumulation in
malfunctions subsea P/L

Mercury liquid Impact to personnel 1) O & M procedures


accumulation at vessel 2) Mercury Removal beds
bottoms due to draining
3) PPE appropriate for chemical
4) Mercury Distribution Study to identify
areas of mercury accumulation

Mercury in sludge and Exposure of personnel, spills to 1) O & M procedures 25) Operator should review and identify local
solid waste, sand well water 2) PPE appropriate for chemical infrastructure for waste disposal. If required,
mud from periodic method and resources as part of suitable
maintenance, clean 3) SOP for disposal of miscellaneous waste management plan
out, improper storage / production waste including containerization
of hazardous waste to avoid possible 26) Miscellaneous production waste may be:
disposal, dropped while spent silica gel, sand jetting sand, spent
handling environmental impact from spills.
mercury adsorbent etc. Proper disposal
methods for these should be addressed in
operating manuals and suppliers'
documents, which need to be reviewed
thoroughly.

H2S release due to Impact to personnel 1) O & M procedures


venting / draining 2) PPE appropriate for chemical

H2S release upon Refer to earlier nodes


wetting silica gel

REPORT NUMBER: REV: A 26 MAY 2009 PAGE 13 OF 43


HAZID Worksheets ABC XYZ FIELD DEVELOPMENT PROJECT, Central Facilities Workshop Date: 2 July 2011

#6 Hazardous gas, liquids and solids release


Possible Causes Potential Consequences Safeguards & Procedures Recommendations Remarks Rank
Large quantity of CO2 Environmental impact, global None 27) Operator to consider CO2 reinjection Future tie in provided
release from CO2 warming facilities in future
removal unit

NOx, SOx release in Environmental impact


diesel, GT exhaust

VOC release Carcinogen; Personnel injury Glycol Regen off gases are flared

Hot oil leak due to 1) Hot oil ingress into insulation 1) NDT inspection. Inspection under XXXXX is the heating medium.
corrosion underneath 2) Combustible inventory insulation
insulation, small bore vulnerable to fire 2) External painting of pipework
pipe failure, flange
defects or leaks 3) Fire detection; ESD and automatic
blowdown on confirmed fire detection
4) Fusible plugs automatically initiate deluge
5) Hazardous area classification
6) Hot oil max surface temperature is 315°C
7) Minimum nozzle size is limited to 50mm
on the vessel
9) Reinforcement for small bore branches off
main lines
10) Use mono flanges isolation for
instruments in HC services
11) Piping specifications (bolt tensioning
specification for bolt diameter > 38mm)
12) Installation QA / QC
13) Minimized flange connection where
possible
14) Maintenance. Operator surveillance.
Pre-commissioning pneumatic leak test of
flanges
15) Flange rating for hot oil circuit is 300#,
which is adequate. Special gaskets, spiral
wound graphite

REPORT NUMBER: REV: A 26 MAY 2009 PAGE 14 OF 43


HAZID Worksheets ABC XYZ FIELD DEVELOPMENT PROJECT, Central Facilities Workshop Date: 2 July 2011

#6 Hazardous gas, liquids and solids release


Possible Causes Potential Consequences Safeguards & Procedures Recommendations Remarks Rank
Hot oil leak due to Combustible inventory Double mechanical seal with seal flushing
circulation pump seal vulnerable to fire (hot oil flushing liquid with its own cooler)
leak

Release of chemicals 1) Exposure and skin injuries 1) PPE


due to 2) Environmental pollution 2) Safety showers
a) fitting failure 3) Tubings supported on tray as part of
b) day tank overfill design
c) tubing leak
d) impact of small fires

Accidental contact with Exposure and skin injuries 1) Standard operating procedures 28) Handling and disposal of mercury
harmful chemical, 2) Supervision containing sand at sand cyclone accumulator
during solution should be addressed in operating manual.
preparation / handing 3) Training of personnel
29) Dehydrator desiccant handling / storage /
due to human error, 4) Designated chemical storage area disposal procedure should be addressed in
untrained personnel, 5) PPE such as safety goggles, gloves, operating manual. Package supplier to
system leakage, safety aprons, BA, safety shoes, MSDS address desiccant loading and replacement
spread of chemicals procedure in package operating manual.
6) Eye wash and safety showers placed at
from one place to
strategic locations 30) Dosing chemical handling should be
another, inappropriate
storage of materials 7) First aid kit addressed in operating manual.

Node 4: Booster Gas Compression, Sales Gas Compression and Metering Op Pressure: xxx kPa/psia; Op Temperature: xx °C/F
Hot oil leak inside Possible fire hazard 1) Extra wall thickness. WHRU tubes are of
WHRU due to 600# rating instead of 300# rating for rest of
corrosion of tubes the system.
2) Suitable metallurgy for hot oil.

Lube oil loss Environmental pollution 31) Consider using environmentally friendly
lube and hydraulic oils

Node 5: Acid Gas Processing Op Pressure: xxx kPa/psia; Op Temperature: xx °C/F


Exposure of mercury Heat generation, possible fire, 1) PPE appropriate for chemical
adsorbent bed material exposure to personnel, 2) SOP

REPORT NUMBER: REV: A 26 MAY 2009 PAGE 15 OF 43


HAZID Worksheets ABC XYZ FIELD DEVELOPMENT PROJECT, Central Facilities Workshop Date: 2 July 2011

#6 Hazardous gas, liquids and solids release


Possible Causes Potential Consequences Safeguards & Procedures Recommendations Remarks Rank
to air environmental impact, 3) See previous nodes
equipment damage

FPSO/FSO:

Mercury accumulation Impact to personnel 1) O & M procedures


in tank sludge 2) PPE appropriate for chemical

REPORT NUMBER: REV: A 26 MAY 2009 PAGE 16 OF 43


HAZID Worksheets ABC XYZ FIELD DEVELOPMENT PROJECT, Central Facilities Workshop Date: 2 July 2011

#7 Non Process Fire

Possible Causes Potential Consequences Safeguards & Procedures Recommendations Remarks Rank
Node 1: Global
Fire in LER / Switch Damage to equipment in LER / 1) Smoke detection alarm
Room due to short Switch Room 2) Manual intervention fire suppression
circuit, electrical
overload, human error, 3) Portable CO2 and dry chemical
equipment failure, hot extinguishers at strategic locations
works 4) Operating procedures for LER / Switch
room
5) Inspection and maintenance programmes

Fire inside gas turbine Machine damage 1) Heat detection and UV flame detection
enclosures due to (2ooN system)
a) lube oil fire 2) Water mist fire suppression system inside
b) gas release & enclosure
immediate ignition
c) diesel release &
ignition

REPORT NUMBER: REV: A 26 MAY 2009 PAGE 17 OF 43


HAZID Worksheets ABC XYZ FIELD DEVELOPMENT PROJECT, Central Facilities Workshop Date: 2 July 2011

#8 Explosion

Possible Causes Potential Consequences Safeguards & Procedures Recommendations Remarks Rank
Node 1: Global
H2 explosion on Serious injuries 1) Unit trip on purge fan failure 32) Add a P&ID note to include electro-
hypochlorite tank 2) 2 x 100% purge fans chlorinator unit trip on purge fan failure and
vapour space due to purging for a specified period with the
purge fan failure and 3) H2 vent tip area is classified as Zone-1, standby fan before unit is restarted
flammable H2 / air gas group IIC area.
mixture formation 4) H2 vent from electrochlorinator unit is
routed to a safe location outside deck edge,
such that the vent is away from air intake
system of any compressor

Battery Room H2 Serious injuries 1) Forced ventilation


release during charging 2) Equalizing charging inhibited on loss of
ventilation fan

Other Nodes
No new causes or Scenarios identified For other nodes

REPORT NUMBER: REV: A 26 MAY 2009 PAGE 18 OF 43


HAZID Worksheets ABC XYZ FIELD DEVELOPMENT PROJECT, Central Facilities Workshop Date: 2 July 2011

#9 Asphyxiation / Confined Space

Possible Causes Potential Consequences Safeguards & Procedures Recommendations Remarks Rank
Node 1: Global
Electrical fire, confined Breathing trouble due to 1) VESDA alarm
spaces filled with depletion of oxygen 2) Manual isolation of power trips platform
external smoke, such
as LER / Switch Room 3) PPE such as BA, fire blanket etc. provided
at the entrance to the Electrical Room

Inert gas release due Exposure of personnel 1) Water mist extinguishing system is
to possible use in fire selected for all the turbine enclosures
suppression (flooding 2) PPE such as BA, fire blanket etc. provided
agent) in turbine at the entrance to the enclosure
enclosure

Ignition of diesel and Impact to personnel 1) Fire protection equipment


other flammables 2) F & G detection
3) Escape Evacuation and Rescue Analysis

Vessel entry Asphyxiation or toxic exposure 1) SOP


2) PPE

FPSO/FSO:
Tank inspection, Asphyxiation or toxic exposure 1) SOP
isolation and cleaning 2) PPE

REPORT NUMBER: REV: A 26 MAY 2009 PAGE 19 OF 43


HAZID Worksheets ABC XYZ FIELD DEVELOPMENT PROJECT, Central Facilities Workshop Date: 2 July 2011

# 10 Particulates (sand, dust, ash)

Possible Causes Potential Consequences Safeguards & Procedures Recommendations Remarks Rank
Node 1: Global
Particulate materials Personnel health hazard 1) Proper / vendor recommended 33) Operating procedures should ensure that
generated during procedures sieving is done away from gas turbine inlet,
sieving of silica gel 2) PPE under expert supervision.
while initial filling the 34) Evaluate alternative material that will
Dehydrators 3) Supplier’s procedure silica gel screening /
filling. Initial filling is under supplier avoid problem inherent with silica gel
supervision

Static electricity Static electricity gets Unloading procedure from the supplier is 35) Review unloading procedure from
generation during accumulated on the non expected to address such issues supplier in light of the scenario described and
unloading of spent conducting hose while the silica verify from package supplier if grounding
silica gel (spread) using gel particles leave the nozzle. provided for unloading equipment
a non conducting type HC released from adsorbent can 36) Check with supplier and provide N2
hose connection and get ignited from the accumulated connection at the inlet of the adsorber to
unearthed vacuum static electric charge. Explosion purge the bed before/during unloading
system may follow.

Other Nodes
No new causes or Scenarios identified For other nodes

REPORT NUMBER: REV: A 26 MAY 2009 PAGE 20 OF 43


HAZID Worksheets ABC XYZ FIELD DEVELOPMENT PROJECT, Central Facilities Workshop Date: 2 July 2011

# 11 Radioactive / Explosive Material

Possible Causes Potential Consequences Safeguards & Procedures Recommendations Remarks Rank
Node 1: Global
Radioactive material Impact to personnel SOP has standing instructions in O & M
from other platforms manual to ensure that all radioactive material
left on deck are removed from platform after each use

Other Nodes
No new causes or Scenarios identified For other nodes

REPORT NUMBER: REV: A 26 MAY 2009 PAGE 21 OF 43


HAZID Worksheets ABC XYZ FIELD DEVELOPMENT PROJECT, Central Facilities Workshop Date: 2 July 2011

#12 Structural Failure

Possible Causes Potential Consequences Safeguards & Procedures Recommendations Remarks Rank
Node 1: Global
Extreme Weather / Potential for structural failure. 1) Designed with a reserve strength ratio of
Storm / High Waves/ Collapse of platform in extreme 100 years return period of storm, waves.
Sea Currents, lightning case Maximum subsea current at site considered.
2) Design based on specific location/ field
3) Early warning system
4) Daily weather forecast
5) Regular inspections.
6) Emergency procedures address storm
conditions. Regular inspection of structures
for marine growth and cracks carried out.
Splash structure damaged Thicker coating is provided in splash zone

Soil Erosion or Potential for structural failure 1) Design based on specific location/ field
subsidence or 2) Cathodic protection/ Painting
Seawater corrosion of
structure

Earthquake Potential for structural failure Design based on specific location/ field and
to specified seismic zone

Collision of vessel with Major structural damage 1) Operator entry permits for vessel entering 37) Boat fenders should be provided for
jacket structure or the Operator Field pump caissons of sea water / firewater pump
bridge 2) Mooring patterns block to minimize impact on collision with
unauthorized fishing boats.
3) Operator Procedures
4) Navigation aids for guidance to
approaching vessels
5) Radar beacon (RACON) is likely to be
provided

Overloading (due to Potential for localised structural Weight Control Report by Structural Group
addition of new failure
equipment)

REPORT NUMBER: REV: A 26 MAY 2009 PAGE 22 OF 43


HAZID Worksheets ABC XYZ FIELD DEVELOPMENT PROJECT, Central Facilities Workshop Date: 2 July 2011

#12 Structural Failure


Possible Causes Potential Consequences Safeguards & Procedures Recommendations Remarks Rank

Fire escalation to Collapse on HC equipment on PFP on base of antenna tower for structural
antenna tower upper deck and escalation integrity

Bridge failure Hydrocarbon release and SDVs on individual wellheads, triggered by


condensate pool on sea low pressure switches

Structural support on 1) HC release 1) PFP for saddles & skirts of critical vessels,
critical vessel 2) Structural steel damage subject to jet fire and pool fire as required
collapsing under fire 2) PFP for structural steel members based
on Fire and Explosion Study

Equipment / Piping Weakening of the equipment / 1) Standard design feature. It is presumed 38) Ensure from supplier that suitable design
Structural Failure Due piping over the years may lead that supplier has chosen metallurgy caters to cyclic thermal load and suitable
to Cyclic Thermal to failure and consequence conforming to cyclic heat load / stress MOC selected
Stress: release of HC requirement
Heat Exchangers 2) O & M Procedure: Regular inspection and
Dehydrators and maintenance
associated piping /
valves due to the
repeated drying
(normal) and heated
regeneration cycles

Other Nodes
No new causes or Scenarios identified For other nodes

REPORT NUMBER: REV: A 26 MAY 2009 PAGE 23 OF 43


HAZID Worksheets ABC XYZ FIELD DEVELOPMENT PROJECT, Central Facilities Workshop Date: 2 July 2011

# 13 Electrical Energy

Possible Causes Potential Consequences Safeguards & Procedures Recommendations Remarks Rank
Node 1: Global
Exposure to high Electrocution 1) Qualified high voltage technicians
voltage in transformers 2) Transformer area fenced off and access
Contact with bare live only to authorized personnel
electrical equipment or 3) High voltage signage
cable due to human
error, equipment 4) Earth leakage protection
malfunction, lack of 5) Supervision
training, poor 6) Inspection and maintenance programs
maintenance and
7) Warning signs
house keeping
8) Work permit system to allow access only
to authorised personnel
9) PPE
10) Electrical circuit isolation (control)

Static electricity in Fire Earthing of structures and piping through 39) Review whether earthing strips across
condensate lines pipe supports flanges need to be provided for condensate
lines

Static electricity Refer to Global Node 10 -


generation during Particulates (sand, dust, ash)
unloading of spent
silica gel

Other Nodes
No new causes or Scenarios identified For other nodes

REPORT NUMBER: REV: A 26 MAY 2009 PAGE 24 OF 43


HAZID Worksheets ABC XYZ FIELD DEVELOPMENT PROJECT, Central Facilities Workshop Date: 2 July 2011

# 14 Stored Energy (Pneumatic / Thermal)

Possible Causes Potential Consequences Safeguards & Procedures Recommendations Remarks Rank
Node 1: Global
Failure of compressed Personnel Injury 1) Flexible hose pressure rated for service
air or Nitrogen hoses 2) Inspection of flexible hose
3) General awareness of training of stored
energy
4) Instrument Air / Plant Air and Nitrogen
hoses couplings are of different sizes/ types
so that they cannot be interchanged. Also
the colour coding of IA / PA and N2 lines are
distinctly different to avoid routing air to N2
users and N2 into breathing air locations
(vessel entry air purge)

Backflow from high Injuries and or fatality 1) Check valves provided in all utility
pressure vessels connections
bursting hoses while 2) Operating procedures to depressurize
providing utility via vessels before purging or connecting utility
utility connections hose

Personnel accidentally Injuries 1) Hot surfaces above 66 deg C are either 40) Care should be taken not to externally
touching bare hot shielded by safety insulation or case / barrier insulate the internally lined equipment.
surface of equipment / guards
piping / instrument 2) FW pump diesel engine and exhaust are
tubing of hot service cooled as part of vendor package

Other Nodes
No new causes or Scenarios identified For other nodes

REPORT NUMBER: REV: A 26 MAY 2009 PAGE 25 OF 43


HAZID Worksheets ABC XYZ FIELD DEVELOPMENT PROJECT, Central Facilities Workshop Date: 2 July 2011

# 15 Vibration / Noise

Possible Causes Potential Consequences Safeguards & Procedures Recommendations Remarks Rank
Node 1: Global
Possible vibration Acute and chronic health effects; 1) Noise limit for equipment specified
caused by coolers, personnel exposure; asset 2) PPE for noise
compressors, pumps, damage / environmental effects;
control, chokes and impact to personnel 3) Vibration / Noise study
control/ blowdown 4) Acoustic Induced Vibration (AIV) and Flow
valves etc. Induced Vibration (FIV) study
5) Visual alarm in high noise areas

High noise level in the Occupational health issue Laboratory specifications includes acoustic
lab protection levels

Slugging in incoming Line break and hydrocarbon Slug catcher


multiphase flow lines release

Water hammer on 1) Rupture and flooding of decks 1) Lines near the pumps are metallic, 41) Consider alternative piping metallurgy or
seawater and firewater 2) Loss of firewater followed by GRP sections PE or cement lined steel pipes. Alternatively
GRE lines 2) Supervised construction handle GRE piping issue as separate Single
3) Commissioning delays Point Responsibility Vendor (SPRV) item for
3) Gradual, controlled and supervised start- design, construction and commissioning by
up with air venting the GRE supplier, including Transient Surge
Analysis for the network and start-up.

Other Nodes
No new causes or Scenarios identified For other nodes

REPORT NUMBER: REV: A 26 MAY 2009 PAGE 26 OF 43


HAZID Worksheets ABC XYZ FIELD DEVELOPMENT PROJECT, Central Facilities Workshop Date: 2 July 2011

# 16 Manual Work

Possible Causes Potential Consequences Safeguards & Procedures Recommendations Remarks Rank
Node 1: Global
Rigging Fall from height. Injury to 1) PPE
personnel or fatality 2) SOP

Handling chemical 1) Back injury; fall; fatality 1) Material handling study


drums 2) Chemical inhalation 2) Proper tools
Making chemical 3) Eye injury 3) PPE/ SOP
solution
4) Safety showers

Filling diesel Diesel spillage, overflow and 1) Manned operation


potential fire 2) SOP

Cutting & Welding Damage to equipment; Permit to work system


hydrocarbon release; fire

Hand tools Injury; Fatality 1) Training


2) SOP

Falling overboard Injury; Fatality 1) Lifebuoys


2) Training
3) SOP

Subsea maintenance 1) SOP


Diving

Other Nodes
No new causes or Scenarios identified For other nodes

REPORT NUMBER: REV: A 26 MAY 2009 PAGE 27 OF 43


HAZID Worksheets ABC XYZ FIELD DEVELOPMENT PROJECT, Central Facilities Workshop Date: 2 July 2011

# 17 Natural and Environmental Hazards

Possible Causes Potential Consequences Safeguards & Procedures Recommendations Remarks Rank
Node 1: Global
Wind, Cyclones/ 1) Approach by helicopter 1) Boat landing provided. Helicopter
hurricanes/ tornadoes, impeded operations are stopped during stormy
2) Ingress/Egress difficult condition
2) SOP
3) EERA study
Waves, High tides, Boat landing inaccessible 1) Boat movement stopped in rough weather
tsunami, Sea currents, 2) EERA study
Floods
Ice, Blizzards Structural damage See in # 12
Communication Failure. Inability 2 different systems – fixed phone via fibre
communicate optic and hand held radios

Earthquake, Volcano Road access closed


Structural damage See in # 12

Ground slide, Soil Structural damage See in # 12


subsidence

Hot summer weather, Safety shower water is hot 1) Water is routed below deck level to avoid
Solar heat solar heat pickup
2) Each shower point provided with insulated
storage tanks
Cold winter Water in drain pipes freezes 1) Winterization program

Saliferous or sand /
dust laden wind

Humidity, Heavy rains,


Lightening

REPORT NUMBER: REV: A 26 MAY 2009 PAGE 28 OF 43


HAZID Worksheets ABC XYZ FIELD DEVELOPMENT PROJECT, Central Facilities Workshop Date: 2 July 2011

# 18 Marine Operations

Possible Causes Potential Consequences Safeguards & Procedures Recommendations Remarks Rank
Node 1: Global
Limited Crane access May impede personnel transfer One of the cranes is covers the location
by basket

Inability to transfer a person in Procedures??


stretcher (Medical Evacuation) if
boat landing is not available

Vessel collision - Pipe See Node 1


lay Barge/ Fishing
Vessel/ Passing Ships

Cargo Operation See Node 1

Helicopter crash Personnel injury. Potential 1) Trained & qualified pilots


enroute or drops into fatality. 2) Passengers pre-training in survival
sea

Helicopter crash on Personnel injury. Potential 1) Structural design considers helicopter Check and ensure that one of the crane is
facility fatality. crash able to pick up any helicopter crash debris
2) EERA study

Helicopter rotor blades Personnel injury. Potential 1) Safe approach routes marked on deck
impinge fatality. 2) Training

Other Nodes
No new causes or Scenarios identified For other nodes

REPORT NUMBER: REV: A 26 MAY 2009 PAGE 29 OF 43


HAZID Worksheets ABC XYZ FIELD DEVELOPMENT PROJECT, Central Facilities Workshop Date: 2 July 2011

# 19 SIMOP

Possible Causes Potential Consequences Safeguards & Procedures Recommendations Remarks Rank
Node 1: Global
SIMOP No new issues identified SIMPOS study to develop suitable
procedures and safeguards

Blow-out in drilling rig No new issues identified

Other Nodes
No new causes or Scenarios identified For other nodes

REPORT NUMBER: REV: A 26 MAY 2009 PAGE 30 OF 43


HAZID Worksheets ABC XYZ FIELD DEVELOPMENT PROJECT, Central Facilities Workshop Date: 2 July 2011

# 20 Impeded Access / Approach / Escape/ Evacuation


Possible Causes Potential Consequences Safeguards & Procedures Recommendations Remarks Rank
Node 1: Global
Review Escape Routes marked
Slippery stair steps Injury to personnel Anti skid arrangement provided for the stairs

Rescue crew unable to 1) Search and rescue delay Escape, Evacuation & Rescue Analysis
access deck from LQ, 2) Potential for escalation (EERA) reviews access impairment to deck
delaying rescue of under major accident events
missing personnel in
an emergency

Piping routing blocking Personnel injury Part of PDMS 3D model review


escape routes

Release and Ignition of Impact to personnel. Egress 1) Fire Detection / Protection Equipment
Hydrocarbon, diesel difficult. 2) Two independent escape routes
and other smoke
forming flammables 3) Escape route lighting from an independent
source
4) EERA study

Laydown area, crane Impact to personnel as egress Part of PDMS 3D model review
handling area, may not be possible
removable hatch
impinging with primary
/ secondary escape
route

Hot turbine exhaust 1) Injury 1) GT air intake and GT plume dispersion


gases flow towards 2) Impeded helicopter landing study to ensure helipad is free of turbine
helicopter landing and take off. Potential crash exhaust discharge at all weather conditions.
P&ID note added.

Hot turbine exhaust 1) Injury 1) GT air intake and GT plume dispersion


gases flow towards study to ensure that the turbine exhaust

REPORT NUMBER: REV: A 26 MAY 2009 PAGE 31 OF 43


HAZID Worksheets ABC XYZ FIELD DEVELOPMENT PROJECT, Central Facilities Workshop Date: 2 July 2011

# 20 Impeded Access / Approach / Escape/ Evacuation


Possible Causes Potential Consequences Safeguards & Procedures Recommendations Remarks Rank
crane cabin 2) Exposure of crane cabin to discharge point is above the crane cabin
hot gases level. P&ID note added.

Hot surface Ignition source Exhaust duct for GT is internally lined. No


external insulation required as the surface
temperature will not exceed 66 deg C.
Caution should be added in P & IDs to not
externally insulate the exhaust duct.

Maintenance activities, Injuries 1) Adequate consideration given to space 42) Operator O & M Procedure: Ensure that
removed floor plates requirement for maintenance of equipment in escape routes are cleared of any material
the Equipment layout during maintenance activities. This has to be
2) Maintenance area barricaded part of the permit system for checking.
Material during maintenance should be kept
3) Maintenance carried out by trained in designated laydown areas only.
personnel under supervision
4) Work permit system to allow access to
authorised personnel only
5) Monorail / CP Blocks provided to transfer
equipment / material up to laydown area
6) Removable hatch provided at selected
decks for possible transfer across the decks
7) Safety belts & other precautions are in the
permit system for working at elevation

Other Nodes
No new causes or Scenarios identified For other nodes

REPORT NUMBER: REV: A 26 MAY 2009 PAGE 32 OF 43


HAZID Worksheets ABC XYZ FIELD DEVELOPMENT PROJECT, Central Facilities Workshop Date: 2 July 2011

# 21 Security issues

Possible Causes Potential Consequences Safeguards & Procedures Recommendations Remarks Rank
Node 1: Global
Unauthorized entry Piracy, theft and injury to No boat landing provided on facility 43) Operator to provide alarms triggered by
personnel. Sabotage CCTV, Motion Detectors, Security Gates and grappling hooks from external intruders
Alarms 44) Provide lockable gates on stairways from
sea levels
45) Operator may consider providing spring
loaded switches / pressure switches on the
stair-steps from the sea deck for alarm
purposes, alerting the platform when
unauthorized entry takes place from sea to
platform through these stairs at the lowest
level at sea deck.

Sabotage, Piracy,
Terrorist activities

Other Nodes
No new causes or Scenarios identified For other nodes

REPORT NUMBER: REV: A 26 MAY 2009 PAGE 33 OF 43


HAZID Worksheets ABC XYZ FIELD DEVELOPMENT PROJECT, Central Facilities Workshop Date: 2 July 2011

# 22 Construction difficulties

Possible Causes Potential Consequences Safeguards & Procedures Recommendations Remarks Rank
Node 1: Global
Poor planning Delayed construction and cost Measures are in place for timely delivery of
1) FPSO Hull not overruns the identified items
delivered in time
2) Civil work,
foundation not ready
3) Site power, water
not ready
4) Site manpower,
labour camp not ready
5) Construction permits
not ready

Buried obstructions Delayed construction and cost Site survey


overruns

Multi-center project Poor co-ordination leading to 1) Both contractor and owners are familiar
execution delays and cost overruns with multi-center executions
2) Measures are in place for timely delivery

Construction in part of 1) Potential accidents, explosion 1) It is planned to complete all the systems at
the plant while balance the same time before start-up
is under test or start-up

Other Nodes
No new causes or Scenarios identified For other nodes

REPORT NUMBER: REV: A 26 MAY 2009 PAGE 34 OF 43


HAZID Worksheets ABC XYZ FIELD DEVELOPMENT PROJECT, Central Facilities Workshop Date: 2 July 2011

# 23 Start up & Shutdown difficulties

Possible Causes Potential Consequences Safeguards & Procedures Recommendations Remarks Rank
Node 1: Global
Lack of preplanning 1) Explosion due to non 1) Black start liquid / gas / fuel gas schemes 46) Process design should consider initial
regarding start up inertization of HC systems identified in PFDs start / black start requirement for each
requirements w.r.t the 2) Start up delay and possible section of the process facilities, taking into
following : modification having schedule account special requirements from package
1) Sequence of start up impact vendors also. These requirements should be
identified as early as possible to avoid
2) Availability of N2 to changes in later stage of design.
inertise HC system
47) Operating Team to prepare start-up on
3) Availability of paper before actual start-up
suitable drying media
(N2 / methanol (?)) for 48) Operator may consider Operator
hot oil system Training Simulators (OTS) for operator
training and check out
4) Availability of black
start liquid / gas
5) Availability of hot oil
from WHRU
6) Availability of
Regeneration gas for
initial dehydrator
regeneration
7) Seal gas for
compressors

DCS screen graphics Operator fatigue DCS optimization 49) Operators to get involved in finalizing
and prioritization of DCS graphics and alarm prioritization
alarms

Fuel gas for turbine Unable to start gas turbine 1) Buyback gas from export gas line for
start up - Only high requiring low CO2 fuel gas subsequent starts
CO2 fuel gas available

Subcontracted offshore 1) Lack of suitable experienced 1) Proposed OTS 50) Operation team should get involved in
O & M team supported operation team 2) Training should be imparted to the the later stages of detailed engineering,
by onshore based 2) Lack of Operator procedures operation team fabrication and pre-commissioning.
production / operations 51) Operator's O & M procedures w.r.t the

REPORT NUMBER: REV: A 26 MAY 2009 PAGE 35 OF 43


HAZID Worksheets ABC XYZ FIELD DEVELOPMENT PROJECT, Central Facilities Workshop Date: 2 July 2011

# 23 Start up & Shutdown difficulties


Possible Causes Potential Consequences Safeguards & Procedures Recommendations Remarks Rank
team 3) Major package suppliers to be present following, but not limited to:
during start-up Marine vessel / boat entry permits, mooring
patterns, entry procedures, interface with
other platforms, emergency preparedness
(storm, fire, oil spill and other contingencies),
hot / cold work permits, HC vessel permits,
pre-commissioning / commissioning
procedures, pigging procedures.

Low inventory in
Emergency Equipment

Improper refilling / not


ordering refill SOP

Other Nodes
No new causes or Scenarios identified For other nodes

REPORT NUMBER: REV: A 26 MAY 2009 PAGE 36 OF 43


HAZID Worksheets ABC XYZ FIELD DEVELOPMENT PROJECT, Central Facilities Workshop Date: 2 July 2011

# Pigging Operation

Possible Causes Potential Consequences Safeguards & Procedures Recommendations Remarks Rank
Node 1: Global

Other Nodes
No new causes or Scenarios identified For other nodes

# Cellar or Lowest Deck

Possible Causes Potential Consequences Safeguards & Procedures Recommendations Remarks Rank
Wave crest

Location of Drain Impeded access. Difficult Close drain pumps and piping are located
Vessel & Pump maintenance above the crest of extreme storm wave

Location of Sewage Sewage Treatment plant is located above


Treatment Plant the crest of extreme storm wave

Poisonous sea snakes

# Upper Deck

Possible Causes Potential Consequences Safeguards & Procedures Recommendations Remarks Rank
Drooped objects See previous nodes

REPORT NUMBER: REV: A 26 MAY 2009 PAGE 37 OF 43


HAZID Worksheets ABC XYZ FIELD DEVELOPMENT PROJECT, Central Facilities Workshop Date: 2 July 2011

# Upper Deck
Possible Causes Potential Consequences Safeguards & Procedures Recommendations Remarks Rank

Helicopter crash See previous nodes

Life Saving Equipment

Muster or Temporary
Refuge location

Drum stacking

Laydown area

Solar heating

# FPSO

Possible Causes Potential Consequences Safeguards & Procedures Recommendations Remarks Rank
Node 1: Global
Poor planning Delayed construction and cost Measures are in place for timely delivery of
FPSO Hull not overruns the identified items
delivered in time

Mismatched shuttle Shuttle Tanker has to wait to FPSO capacity of xxx bbl matches capacity
tankers (~900,000 complete loading with a second of planned Shuttle Tankers
bbls) capacity vis-à-vis hook up. Extra waiting time is
FPSO storage volume. expensive.

Hull built to shipping Maintenance issues such as 1) See individual issues below
standards and topsides seawater pump, storage tanks 2) Good and specific instructions provided in
to industry standard etc. Ships operate in a batch hull spec; Difficult to interpret and vague

REPORT NUMBER: REV: A 26 MAY 2009 PAGE 38 OF 43


HAZID Worksheets ABC XYZ FIELD DEVELOPMENT PROJECT, Central Facilities Workshop Date: 2 July 2011

# FPSO
Possible Causes Potential Consequences Safeguards & Procedures Recommendations Remarks Rank
mode with enough time for repair functional specification not provided
and maintenance in sea-ports.
FPSOs operate continuously
and offshore repair and
maintenance work is expensive

Rupture or leak due to: See node 1


Supply or Fishing
Boats collision,
offloading hose failure
Flexi-Riser Rupture

Inert or fuel gas blanket See node 1


failure to storage tanks

FPSO’s axial, rotational


and static motions
affect. Trim ~ 1-2m
Separation; Distillation; Separated liquids remix on 1) Good inlet devices, baffled internals
Storage tanks liquid motion, sloshing and foaming specified
levels 2) Large separators placed in centre along
length. Columns located close to centre
3) CFD modelling
Internals fail on fatigue and Internals designed to cater to such loads
(accelerated) liquid loads
Accelerated corrosion of storage 1) Storage tanks built with thicker plates Design crude and ballast tanks for
tank plates due to liquid sloshing. 2) Plate stiffening and fatigue analysis maintenance - Tank washing, gas freeing,
specified solids removal, tank and pipework isolation,
and personnel access, repair and recoating
Tank coatings and wall thickness 3) Hull designer and supplier told of methods.
measurement are difficult. High continuous FPSO operation (as opposed to
risk areas: slops tanks, areas batch operation of ships with enough
under solids build up and where cleaning, inspection and maintenance time at
coatings may crack due to hull sea ports) and to design to allow easy
strains. cleaning and inspection

Internal cracks between tanks

REPORT NUMBER: REV: A 26 MAY 2009 PAGE 39 OF 43


HAZID Worksheets ABC XYZ FIELD DEVELOPMENT PROJECT, Central Facilities Workshop Date: 2 July 2011

# FPSO
Possible Causes Potential Consequences Safeguards & Procedures Recommendations Remarks Rank
Changing liquid levels 1) Higher than normally specified LALL
momentarily leave liquid outlets 2) Vapour outlets specified outlet devices
uncovered leading to gas blowby
to downstream equipment and
similarly liquid carry over with
gas
Changing liquid level Extra liquid submergence specified
momentarily expose heating
coils in Regen;
FPSO trim (static slope) affects Open and closed drain system design
gravity flow, self draining, considers effect of FPSO tilt (trim) on
backflow via tundish, overflow longitudinal direction
Poor liquid distribution in column 1) High pressure drop liquid distributor in
columns including GDU reboiler still
2) Packed rather than trayed internals
3) Higher than usual circulation rates
Erroneous liquid level alarms 1) Stilling wells specified
and trips 2) DP switches instead of floats
3) Time delay/ averaging to smoothen level
readings
3) Additional top nozzles with stilling wells
Lube oil/ Flare/ Drain pumps lose 1) Deeper tanks with higher than usual LALL
suction 2) Internal baffles to minimize level impacts
Compressor: Gas seal failures, 1) Additional liquid flows considered in KOD
repeated bundle change-outs sizing
and cracked pistons due to liquid 2) Larger than usual KOD size selected
carry-over. Ship movement
affects separation, liquid holds
up in pipes - cause slugs and
poor performance in KOD. Good
to install larger scrubbers than
normal
Liquid carry over to compressor 1) Additional liquid flows considered in KOD
results in deposits on blades, sizing. Larger than usual KOD size selected
unbalanced loads and damaged 2) Better outlet devices in KOD
bearing. Compressor lost.

REPORT NUMBER: REV: A 26 MAY 2009 PAGE 40 OF 43


HAZID Worksheets ABC XYZ FIELD DEVELOPMENT PROJECT, Central Facilities Workshop Date: 2 July 2011

# FPSO
Possible Causes Potential Consequences Safeguards & Procedures Recommendations Remarks Rank
Recip compressor vibration: 1) These issues are mentioned in RFQ and
Poor mounting, failure to fit vendors are aware of FPSO issues
bellows and flexi hoses lead to
high potential leaks and failures.
Vibration affects drive motors
with isolating pads coming loose
and damaging rotors. Noise is
also a problem for personnel.
Liquid accumulation / hold-up in Drip-legs provided in flare headers at
Flare headers results liquid carry suitable points
over and burning droplets rain

PAU (Pre-assembled 1) Excessive vibration of Recip 1) Hogging and sagging info provided to
units)/ Piping supports compressors and pumps. packaged unit suppliers
and structures affected 2) Noise and vibration 2) Piping stress study considers flexibility
by deck hogging and transferred to hull required to take care of deflection imparted
sagging by hull and differential movements between
3) Flexing of compressor
supports and excessive PAU modules.
stiffness lead to cracks in deck, 3) Designed for vessel movement,
pipework stresses due to moving machinery vibration, vessel roll, wind and live
independent of PAU. liquid load and construction tolerances
1) Rotating equipment – Compressors,
specified with 3 point mounting with gimbals/
soft support
2) Inclinometers / accelerometers provided
for equipment protection

Green water waves Waves over bows may damage 1) Stairways, fire stations, accommodation
stairways, fire stations, windows, cable trays and pipework are
accommodation windows, cable located away from bows
trays and pipework 2) Non-slippery plates specified for stairs

Semi-subs – fire water One of the 4 legs may get 1) Adequately sized overboard drains
pipe rupture during flooded, overloading it leading to provided
start-up or testing capsize 2) SOP

REPORT NUMBER: REV: A 26 MAY 2009 PAGE 41 OF 43


HAZID Worksheets ABC XYZ FIELD DEVELOPMENT PROJECT, Central Facilities Workshop Date: 2 July 2011

# FPSO
Possible Causes Potential Consequences Safeguards & Procedures Recommendations Remarks Rank
Semi-subs – Internal One of the 4 legs may get 1) Adequately sized vapour outlets/ vents to
explosion of closed or damaged, leading to seawater avoid pressure excursions
open drain vessel flooding and capsize 2) SOP
located in one of the
legs

Cranes: Solid boom Poor response due to their Cranes suitable for offshore operation
are affected by wind weight while offloading a supply specified
vessel or working on equipment

Maintenance Issues
Seawater pumps in Difficult to maintain Consider deck mounted caisson pumps, as
deep in hull in sea in fixed platforms - reduced pipework, easy
water chest access, less cavitation. Simple pump
maintenance and marine growth removal
Sea Chests - ideal location for Review the need for sea chests - used in
marine growth and difficult to ships needs to be reviewed in FPSO.
clean. Difficult to blank off sea Submersible pumps in a caisson are OK
chests in the event of leaking
main seawater valve - time
consuming and weather
sensitive.
Tank inspection, See node 9
isolation and cleaning
Mercury accumulation See node 6
in tank sludge

Painting done late Suitable paints/ coating specified compatible Methods to safely clean, prepare and paint
when the pressure for with project ‘s 20- year offshore life hulls at splash zone while on location and in
sail-away is high production

Helicopters: Forward Helicopter crash Reliable weather and heave monitoring Advantage cf. aft helidecks are:
helideck is not optimum equipment clean air, no vessel-induced
for landing - misaligned turbulence and no take off
approach, no forward obstructions.
visual reference-point

REPORT NUMBER: REV: A 26 MAY 2009 PAGE 42 OF 43


HAZID Worksheets ABC XYZ FIELD DEVELOPMENT PROJECT, Central Facilities Workshop Date: 2 July 2011

# FPSO
Possible Causes Potential Consequences Safeguards & Procedures Recommendations Remarks Rank
and increased vertical
movement

# Onshore Location
Possible Causes Potential Consequences Safeguards & Procedures Recommendations Remarks Rank
Node 1: Global
Proximity to population

Ground water
contamination

Historical monuments
damaged by fumes

Public roads

Nearby land use


(Farming/ Fishing)

REPORT NUMBER: REV: A 26 MAY 2009 PAGE 43 OF 43