LAUREL vs.

DESIERTO
G.R. No. 145368 April 12, 2002

FACTS: On June 13, 1991, President Aquino issued AO 223, constituting a Committee for the National Centennial Celebration in 1998.
Subsequently, President Ramos issued EO 128, reconstituting the Committee for Centennial Celebrations, naming Vice President, Salvador
H. Laurel as the Chairperson.

Subsequently, a corporation named the Philippine Centennial Expo ’98 Corporation (Expocorp) was created. Petitioner was among the nine
Expocorp incorporators, who were also its first nine directors. Petitioner was elected Expocorp Chief Executive Officer. Anomalies were
exposed in relation to the operations of the Commission. As a result, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee recommended the prosecution by
the Ombudsman of Salvador Laurel, chair of NCC and of EXPOCORP, for violating the anti-graft law.

Petitioner assails the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman on the ground that he is not a public officer because a) EXPOCORP was a private
corporation b) The National Centennial Commission was not a public office, and that c) The petitioner is not a Public Officer in connection with
his function as Chairman of the said corporations.

Petitioner invoked that the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman was limited to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, i.e., over public officers of
Grade 27 and higher. As petitioner’s position was purportedly not classified as Grade 27 or higher, the Sandiganbayan and, consequently, the
Ombudsman, would have no jurisdiction over him.

ISSUE: Whether or not, the Ombudsman lacks jurisdiction over the petitioner on the ground that the Ombudsman can only act as regards
cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan

HELD: No. The power to investigate and to prosecute granted by law to the Ombudsman is plenary and unqualified. It pertains to any act or
omission of any public officer or employee when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. The law does not
make a distinction between cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and those cognizable by regular courts. It has been held that the clause
"any illegal act or omission of any public official" is broad enough to embrace any crime committed by a public officer or employee.

The reference made by RA 6770 to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, particularly in Section 15(1) giving the Ombudsman primary
jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, and Section 11(4) granting the Special Prosecutor the power to conduct preliminary
investigation and prosecute criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, should not be construed as confining the scope of the
investigatory and prosecutory power of the Ombudsman to such cases.

Section 15 of RA 6770 gives the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. The law defines such primary
jurisdiction as authorizing the Ombudsman "to take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of the government, the investigation of
such cases." The grant of this authority does not necessarily imply the exclusion from its jurisdiction of cases involving public officers and
employees by other courts. The exercise by the Ombudsman of his primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan is not
incompatible with the discharge of his duty to investigate and prosecute other offenses committed by public officers and employees. Indeed, it
must be stressed that the powers granted by the legislature to the Ombudsman are very broad and encompass all kinds of malfeasance,
misfeasance and non-feasance committed by public officers and employees during their tenure of office.

Moreover, the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman should not be equated with the limited authority of the Special Prosecutor under
Section 11 of RA 6770. The Office of the Special Prosecutor is merely a component of the Office of the Ombudsman and may only act under
the supervision and control and upon authority of the Ombudsman.

The Ombudsman is mandated by law to act on all complaints against officers and employees of the government and to enforce their
administrative, civil and criminal liability in every case where the evidence warrants.

The prosecution of offenses committed by public officers and employees is one of the most important functions of the Ombudsman. In passing
RA 6770, the Congress deliberately endowed the Ombudsman with such power to make him a more active and effective agent of the people
in ensuring accountability in public office.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The preliminary injunction issued in the Court’s Resolution dated September 24, 2001 is
hereby LIFTED.

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Neither the Constitution nor the Ombudsman Act of 1989, however, defines who public officers are. A definition of public officers cited in
jurisprudence13 is that provided by Mechem, a recognized authority on the subject:
A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the
pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by
him for the benefit of the public. The individual so invested is a public officer.14

The characteristics of a public office, according to Mechem, include the delegation of sovereign functions, its creation by law and not by
contract, an oath, salary, continuance of the position, scope of duties, and the designation of the position as an office.15

Mechem describes the delegation to the individual of some of the sovereign functions of government as "[t]he most important characteristic" in
determining whether a position is a public office or not.

The most important characteristic which distinguishes an office from an employment or contract is that the creation and conferring of an office
involves a delegation to the individual of some of the sovereign functions of government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public; –
that some portion of the sovereignty of the country, either legislative, executive or judicial, attaches, for the time being, to be exercised for the
public benefit. Unless the powers conferred are of this nature, the individual is not a public officer.16

Did E.O. 128 delegate the NCC with some of the sovereign functions of government? Certainly, the law did not delegate upon the NCC functions
that can be described as legislative or judicial. May the functions of the NCC then be described as executive?

We hold that the NCC performs executive functions. The executive power "is generally defined as the power to enforce and administer the
laws. It is the power of carrying the laws into practical operation and enforcing their due observance."17 The executive function, therefore,
concerns the implementation of the policies as set forth by law.