AKBAYAN — Youth, SCAP, UCSC, MASP, KOMPIL II —
Youth, ALYANSA, KALIPI, PATRICIA O. PICAR, MYLA
GAIL Z. TAMONDONG, EMMANUEL E. OMBAO,
JOHNNY ACOSTA, ARCHIE JOHN TALAUE, RYAN
DAPITAN, CHRISTOPHER OARDE, JOSE MARI MODESTO,
RICHARD M. VALENCIA, EDBEN TABUCOL, petitioners,
vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent
Doctrine:
In Akbayan Youth v. COMELEC, the Supreme Court
upheld the action of the COMELEC denying petitioners’
request for two (2) additional registration days in order to
enfranchise more than 4 million youth between the ages
18-21 who failed to register on or before December 27,
2000. The law was simply followed by the COMELEC, and
it is an accepted doctrine in administrative law that the
determination of administrative agencies as to the
operation, implementation and application of a law is
accorded great weight, considering that these
specialized government bodies are, by their nature and
functions, in the best position to know what they can
possibly do or not do under prevailing circumstances.
Facts:
 Petitioners, representing the youth sector, seek to
direct the COMELEC to conduct a special
registration before the May 14, 2001 General
Elections of new voters. According to the petitioners
around 4 Million youth failed to register on or before
the December 27, 2000 deadline set by the
respondent Commission under R.A. 8189.
 On January 29, 2001 Commissioners Tantangco and
Lantion submitted Memorandum No. 2001-027
requesting for a two-day additional registration of
new voters, to be set on February 17 and 18, 2001
nationwide.
 Subsequently, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 3584
denying said request, it was the consensus.
 Aggrieved by the denial, petitioners filed a petition
for certiorari and mandamus, which seeks to nullify
respondent COMELEC’s resolution and/ or to
declare Sec. 8 of R.A. 8189 unconstitutional insofar
as said provision effectively causes the
disenfranchisement of petitioners and others
similarly situated.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent COMELEC committed grave
abuse of discretion in issuing Resolution No. 3584 as it
denies petitioners’ right to vote.
Held: No. The petitions are bereft of merit.
The right of suffrage in a representative democracy is
ought to be exercised within the proper bounds and
framework of the Constitution and must properly yield to
pertinent laws skillfully enacted by the Legislature, which
statutes for all intents and purposes, are crafted to
effectively insulate such so cherished right from
ravishment and preserve the democratic institutions our
people have, for so long, guarded against the spoils of
opportunism, debauchery and abuse.
To be sure, the right of suffrage ardently invoked by
herein petitioners, is not at all absolute –– subject to
existing substantive and procedural requirements
embodied in our Constitution, statute books and other
repositories of law.
The act of registration is an indispensable precondition
to the right of suffrage. For registration is part and parcel
of the right to vote and an indispensable element in the
election process. Section 8 of R.A. 8189, provides that no
registration shall be conducted 120 days before a
regular election and 90 days before a special election.
Likewise, Section 35 of R.A. 8189, which among others,
speaks of a prohibitive period within which to file a sworn
petition for the exclusion of voters from the permanent
voter's list.
It is an accepted doctrine in administrative law that the
determination of administrative agency as to the
operation, implementation and application of a law
would be accorded great weight considering that these
specialized government bodies are, by their nature and
functions, in the best position to know what they can
possibly do or not do, under prevailing circumstances.
Beyond this, it is likewise well-settled that the law does
not require that the impossible be done. The law obliges
no one to perform an impossibility, expressed in the
maxim, nemo tenetur ad impossible. In other words,
there is no obligation to do an impossible thing.
Impossibilium nulla obligatio est. Hence, a statute may
not be so construed as to require compliance with what
it prescribes cannot, at the time, be legally
accomplished. Incidentally, it must be presumed that
the legislature did not at all intend an interpretation or
application of a law which is far removed from the realm
of the possible. Truly, in the interpretation of statutes, the
interpretation to be given must be such that it is in
accordance with logic, common sense, reasonableness
and practicality. Thus, we are of the considered view
that the "stand-by power" of the respondent COMELEC
under Section 28 of R.A. 8436, presupposes the possibility
of its being exercised or availed of, and not otherwise.
Further, petitioners' bare allegation that they were
disenfranchised when respondent COMELEC pegged
the registration deadline on December 27, 2000 instead
of January 13, 2001 — the day before the prohibitive 120-
day period before the May 14, 2001 regular elections
commences — is, to our mind, not sufficient. They admit
in their petition that they failed to register, for whatever
reason, within the period of registration and came to this
Court and invoked its protective mantle not realizing, so
to speak, the speck in their eyes. Impuris minibus nemo
accedat curiam. Let no one come to court with unclean
hands. In a similar vein, well-entrenched is the rule in our
jurisdiction that the law aids the vigilant and not those
who slumber on their rights. Vigilantis sed non
dormientibus jura in re subveniunt.
This court is of the firm view that respondent COMELEC
did not commit an abuse of discretion, much less be
adjudged to have committed the same in some patent,
whimsical and arbitrary manner, in issuing Resolution No.
3584 which, in respondent's own terms, resolved "to deny
the request to conduct a two-day additional registration
of new voters on February 17 and 18, 2001."

LUIS A. ASISTIO, petitioner, vs. HON. THELMA CANLAS
TRINIDAD-PE AGUIRRE, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court, Caloocan City, Branch 129; HON. ARTHUR O.
MALABAGUIO, Presiding Judge, Metropolitan Trial
Court, Caloocan City, Branch 52; ENRICO R.
ECHIVERRI, Board of Election Inspectors of Precinct
1811A, Barangay 15, Caloocan City; and the CITY
ELECTION OFFICER, Caloocan City, respondents.
Facts:
 Private respondent Enrico R. Echiverri filed against
petitioner Luis A. Asistio a Petition for Exclusion of
Voter from the Permanent List of Voters of
Caloocan City (Petition for Exclusion) before the
MeTC presided by public respondent Judge Arthur
O. Malabaguio.
 Echiverri alleged that Asistio is not a resident of
Caloocan City, specifically not of 123 Interior P.
Zamora St. Barangay 15, Caloocan City, the
address stated in his Certificate of Candidacy
(COC) for Mayor in the 2010 Automated National
and Local Elections.
 Echiverri, also a candidate for Mayor of Caloocan
City, was the respondent in a Petition to Deny Due
Course and/or Cancellation of the Certificate of
Candidacy filed by Asistio.
 According to Echiverri, when he was about to
furnish Asistio a copy of his Answer to the latter’s
petition, he found out that Asistios address is non-
existent. –– He mentioned that, upon verification of
the 2009 Computerized Voters List (CVL) for
Barangay 15, Asistio’s name appeared under voter
number 8, with address at 109 Libis Gochuico,
Barangay 15, Caloocan City.
 Judge Malabaguio rendered a decision removing
the name of Asistio from the list of permanent voters
of Caloocan City.
 Meanwhile, Echiverri filed with the COMELEC a
Petition for Disqualification on the grounds that
Asistio is (1) not a resident of Caloocan City and (2)
that he had been previously convicted of a crime
involving moral turpitude.
 Asistio raised the same arguments with respect to his
residency and also argued that the President of the
Philippines granted him an absolute pardon.
Issue:
Whether or not Asistios name must be removed from the
permanent list of voters in Precinct 1811A of Caloocan
City
Held: No. He should, therefore, remain in the list of
permanent registered voters of Precinct No. 1811A,
Barangay 15, Caloocan City.
The right to vote is a most precious political right, as well
as a bounden duty of every citizen, enabling and
requiring him to participate in the process of
government to ensure that it can truly be said to derive
its power solely from the consent of its constituents. Time
and again, it has been said that every Filipinos right to
vote shall be respected, upheld, and given full effect. A
citizen cannot be disenfranchised for the flimsiest of
reasons. Only on the most serious grounds, and upon
clear and convincing proof, may a citizen be deemed
to have forfeited this precious heritage of freedom.
In this case, even if the appellate docket fees were not
filed on time, this incident alone should not thwart the
proper determination and resolution of the instant case
on substantial grounds. Blind adherence to a
technicality, with the inevitable result of frustrating and
nullifying the constitutionally guaranteed right of
suffrage, cannot be countenanced.
The residency requirement of a voter is at least one (1)
year residence in the Philippines and at least six (6)
months in the place where the person proposes or
intends to vote. Residence, as used in the law
prescribing the qualifications for suffrage and for
elective office, is doctrinally settled to mean domicile,
importing not only an intention to reside in a fixed place
but also personal presence in that place, coupled with
conduct indicative of such intention inferable from a
person’s acts, activities, and utterances. Domicile
denotes a fixed permanent residence where, when
absent for business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one
intends to return. In the consideration of circumstances
obtaining in each particular case, three rules must be
borne in mind, namely: (1) that a person must have a
residence or domicile somewhere; (2) once established,
it remains until a new one is acquired; and (3) that a
person can have but one residence or domicile at a
time.
Domicile is not easily lost. To successfully effect a transfer
thereof, one must demonstrate: (1) an actual removal or
change of domicile; (2) a bona fide intention of
abandoning the former place of residence and
establishing a new one; and (3) acts which correspond
with that purpose. There must be animus manendi
coupled with animo non revertendi. The purpose to
remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an
indefinite period of time; the change of residence must
be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for
the new domicile must be actual.
Asistio has always been a resident of Caloocan City
since his birth or for more than 72 years. His family is
known to be among the prominent political families in
Caloocan City. In fact, Asistio served in public office as
Caloocan City Second District representative in the
House of Representatives, having been elected as such
in the 1992, 1995, 1998, and 2004 elections. In 2007, he
also sought election as City Mayor. In all of these
occasions, Asistio cast his vote in the same city. Taking
these circumstances into consideration, gauged in the
light of the doctrines above enunciated, it cannot be
denied that Asistio has qualified, and continues to
qualify, as a voter of Caloocan City. There is no showing
that he has established domicile elsewhere, or that he
had consciously and voluntarily abandoned his
residence in Caloocan City.
That Asistio allegedly indicated in his Certificate of
Candidacy for Mayor, both for the 2007 and 2010
elections, a non-existent or false address, or that he
could not be physically found in the address he
indicated when he registered as a voter, should not
operate to exclude him as a voter of Caloocan City.
These purported misrepresentations in Asistio’s COC, if
true, might serve as basis for an election offense under
the Omnibus Election Code (OEC),or an action to deny
due course to the COC. But they do not serve as proof
that Asistio has abandoned his domicile in Caloocan
City, or that he has established residence outside of
Caloocan City.
NURHUSSEIN A. UTUTALUM, petitioner, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ARDEN S. ANNI,
respondents.
Doctrine:
Ututalum v. COMELEC. The padding of the Registry List of
Voters of a municipality is not a listed ground for a pre-
proclamation controversy.
The Commission shall, upon verified petition of any voter
or election officer or duly registered political party, and
after notice and hearing, annul any book of voters that
is not prepared in accordance with the provisions of this
law, or was prepared through fraud, bribery, forgery,
impersonation, intimidation, force or any similar
irregularity, or which contains data that are statistically
improbable. No order, ruling or decision annulling a book
of voters shall be executed within 90 days before an
election. However, the annulment of the list of voters
shall not constitute a ground for a pre-proclamation
contest [Ututalum v. COMELEC, 181 SCRA 335].
Facts:
 Petitioner Untalum obtained 482 votes while
respondent Anni received 35,581 votes out of the
39,801 voters.
 If the returns of Siasi were excluded, petitioner
would have lead of 5,301 votes. And so, petitioner
filed his first Petition with the COMELEC seeking a
declaration of failure of elections in the Municipality
of Siasi and other mentioned municipalities; that the
COMELEC annul the elections in Siasi and conduct
another election thereat; and order the Provincial
Board of Canvassers to desist from proclaiming any
candidate pending a final determination of the
Petition.
 COMELEC resolved that there was no failure of
elections in the 1st and 2nd Districts of Sulu except
in specified precincts in the 1st District.
 Sulu Provincial Board of Canvassers proclaimed
respondent Anni as the winner.
 Petitioner filed a second Petition with the COMELEC
praying for the annulment of Respondent Anni's
proclamation and for his own proclamation as
Congressman for the Second District of Sulu.
 While those two petitions were pending, one Lupay
Loong, a candidate for Governor of Sulu, filed a
verified Petition with the COMELEC to annul the List
of Voters of Siasi, for purposes of the election of
local government officials which was was opposed
by Respondent Anni.
 COMELEC issued a Resolution annulling the Siasi List
of Voters "on the ground of massive irregularities
committed in the preparation thereof and being
statistically improbable” and ordering a new
registration of voters for the local elections the
canvass of the results since its original List of Voters
had already been finally annulled.
 Immediately after having been notified of the
annulment of the previous Siasi List of Voters,
Petitioner Ututalum filed a supplemental pleading
with the COMELEC entreating that such annulment
be considered and applied by the Commission in
resolving his two petitions which was denied for lack
of merit.
Issue:
Whether or not the election returns from Siasi should be
excluded from the canvass of the results since the
original List of Voters had been finally annulled.
Held:
It is our considered view, however, that given the factual
setting, it cannot justifiably be contended that the Siasi
returns, per se, were "obviously manufactured" and,
thereby, a legitimate issue in a pre-proclamation
controversy. It is true that in Lagumbay vs. COMELEC,
relied upon heavily by Ututalum, this Court ruled that the
returns are obviously manufactured where they show a
great excess of votes over what could have been legally
cast. The Siasi returns, however, do not show prima facie
that on the basis of the old List of Voters, there is actually
a great excess of votes over what could have been
legally cast considering that only 36,000 persons
actually voted out of the 39,801 voters. Moreover, the
Lagumbay case dealt with the "manufacture" of returns
by those charged with their preparation as shown prima
facie on the questioned returns themselves. Not so in this
case which deals with the preparation of the registry list
of voters, a matter that is not reflected on the face of
said returns.
Basically, therefore, petitioner's cause of action is the
padding of the Siasi List of Voters, which, indeed, is not a
listed ground for a pre-proclamation controversy.
"SEC. 243. Issues that may be raised in pre-proclamation
controversy. — The following shall be proper issues that
may be raised in a pre-proclamation controversy:
(a) Illegal composition or proceedings of the board
of canvassers;
(b) The canvassed election returns are incomplete,
contain material defects, appear to be tampered
with or falsified, or contain discrepancies in the
same returns or in other authentic copies thereof
as mentioned in Sections 233,234, 235 and 236 of
this Code;
(c) The election returns were prepared under duress,
threats, coercion, or intimidation, or they are
obviously manufactured or not authentic; and
(d) When substitute or fraudulent returns in
controverted polling places were canvassed, the
results of which materially affected the standing
of the aggrieved candidate or candidates."
But petitioner insists that the new Registry List should be
considered and applied by the COMELEC as the legal
basis in determining the number of votes which could be
legally cast in Siasi. To allow the COMELEC to do so
retroactively, however, would be to empower it to annul
a previous election because of the subsequent
annulment of a questioned registry in a proceeding
where petitioner himself was not a party. This cannot be
done.
Besides, the List of Voters used in the 1987 Congressional
elections was then a validly existing and still
unquestioned permanent Registry List. Then, it was the
only legitimate roster which could be used as basis for
voting. There was no prior petition to set it aside for
having been effected with fraud, intimidation, force, or
any other similar irregularity in consonance with Section
145 of the Omnibus Election Code. 1 That list must then
be considered conclusive evidence of persons who
could exercise the right of suffrage in a particular
election.
Moreover, the preparation of a voter's list is not a
proceeding before the Board of Canvassers. A pre-
proclamation controversy is limited to challenges
directed against the Board of Canvassers, not the Board
of Election Inspectors, and such challenges should relate
to specified election returns against which petitioner
should have made specific verbal objections but did
not.
Finally, this Petition has to fail if only on the basis of the
equally important doctrine enunciated in Padilla vs.
COMELEC and reiterated in Baldo vs. COMELEC that:
"Where the respondent had already been proclaimed
as the elected representative of the contested
congressional district and has long assumed office and
has been exercising the powers, functions, and duties
appurtenant to said office, the remedy of the petitioner
lies with the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal.
The pre-proclamation controversy becomes moot and
academic."
JUAN GALLANOSA FRIVALDO, petitioner, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE LEAGUE OF
MUNICIPALITIES, SORSOGON CHAPTER, HEREIN
REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT, SALVADOR NEE ESTUYE,
respondents.
Doctrine:
Qualifications prescribed by law are continuing
requirements and must be possessed for the duration of
the officer’s active tenure. Once any of the required
qualifications is lost, his title to the office may be
seasonably challenged.
When should the qualification/s be possessed. The Local
Government Code does not specify any particular date
when the candidate must possess Filipino citizenship.
Philippine citizenship is required to ensure that no alien
shall govern our people. An official begins to govern only
upon his proclamation and on the day that his term
begins. Since Frivaldo took his oath of allegiance on
June 30, 1995, when his application for repatriation was
granted by the Special Committee on Naturalization
created under PD 825, he was, therefore, qualified to be
proclaimed and to assume office. Sec. 39 of the Local
Government Code speaks of qualifications of elective
officials, not of candidates. Furthermore, repatriation
retroacts to the date of the filing of his application (for
repatriation) on August 17, 1994.
Facts:
 Petitioner was proclaimed governor-elect of the
province of Sorsogon on January 22, 1988.
 On October 27, 1988, respondents filed with the
COMELEC a petition for the annulment of
petitioner’s election and proclamation on the
ground that he was a naturalized American citizen
and had not reacquired Philippine citizenship on
the day of the election on January 18, 1988. He was
therefore not qualified to run for and be elected
governor.
 Frivaldo admitted that he was naturalized in the
United States as alleged but pleaded the special
and affirmative defenses that he had sought
American citizenship only to protect himself against
President Marcos. His naturalization, he said, was
"merely forced upon himself as a means of survival
against the unrelenting persecution by the Martial
Law Dictator's agents abroad." He added that he
had returned to the Philippines after the EDSA
revolution to help in the restoration of democracy.
 Speaking for the public respondent, the Solicitor
General supported the contention that Frivaldo was
not a citizen of the Philippines and had not
repatriated himself after his naturalization as an
American citizen. As an alien, he was disqualified for
public office in the Philippines. His election did not
cure of this defect because the electorate could
not amend the Constitution, the Local Government
Code and the Omnibus Election Code.
 Frivaldo insisted that he was a citizen of the
Philippines because his naturalization as an
American citizen was not "impressed with
voluntariness." He said he could not have
repatriated himself before the 1988 elections
because the Special Committee on Naturalization
created for the purpose by LOI No. 270 had not yet
been organized then. His oath in his certificate of
candidacy that he was a natural-born citizen
should be a sufficient act of repatriation.
Additionally, his active participation in the 1987
congressional elections had divested him of
American citizenship under the laws of the US, thus
restoring his Philippine citizenship.
Issue:
Whether or not Juan G. Frivaldo was a citizen of the
Philippines at the time of his election on January 18,1988,
as provincial governor of Sorsogon. (Whether or not
petitioner was qualified to run for public office.)
Held: No.
The Court sees no reason not to believe that the
petitioner was one of the enemies of the Marcos
dictatorship. Even so, it cannot agree that as a
consequence thereof he was coerced into embracing
American citizenship. His feeble suggestion that his
naturalization was not the result of his own free and
voluntary choice is totally unacceptable and must be
rejected outright.
There were many other Filipinos in the US similarly situated
as Frivaldo, and some of them subject to greater risk
than he, who did not find it necessary — nor do they
claim to have been coerced — to abandon their
cherished status as Filipinos. They did not take the oath
of allegiance to the US, unlike the petitioner. The
martyred Ninoy Aquino heads the impressive list of those
Filipinos in exile who, unlike the petitioner, held fast to
their Philippine citizenship despite the perils of their
resistance to the Marcos regime.
The Nottebohm case cited by the petitioner invoked the
international law principle of effective nationality which
is clearly not applicable to the case at bar. This principle
is expressed in Article 5 of the Hague Convention of 1930
on the Conflict of Nationality Laws.
That case is not relevant to the petition before us
because it dealt with a conflict between the nationality
laws of two states as decided by a third state. No third
state is involved in the case at bar; in fact, even the
United States is not actively claiming Frivaldo as its
national. The sole question presented to us is whether or
not Frivaldo is a citizen of the Philippines under our own
laws, regardless of other nationality laws. We can decide
this question alone as sovereign of our own territory,
conformably to Section 1 of the said Convention
providing that "it is for each State to determine under its
law who are its nationals."
It is also worth noting that Nottebohm was invoking his
naturalization in Liechtenstein whereas in the present
case Frivaldo is rejecting his naturalization in the US.
If he really wanted to disavow his American citizenship
and reacquire Philippine citizenship, the petitioner
should have done so in accordance with the laws of our
country. Under CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473
and PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship may be
reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization,
or by repatriation.
In actively participating in the elections in this country,
he automatically forfeited American citizenship under
the laws of the United States and such laws do not
concern us here. The alleged forfeiture is between him
and the United States as his adopted country. It should
be obvious that even if he did lose his naturalized
American citizenship, such forfeiture did not and could
not have the effect of automatically restoring his
citizenship in the Philippines that he had earlier
renounced. At best, what might have happened as a
result of the loss of his naturalized citizenship was that he
became a stateless individual.
It does not appear that Frivaldo has taken these
categorical acts. He contends that by simply filing his
certificate of candidacy he had, without more, already
effectively recovered Philippine citizenship. But that is
hardly the formal declaration the law envisions — surely,
Philippine citizenship previously disowned is not that
cheaply recovered. If the Special Committee had not
yet been convened, what that meant simply was that
the petitioner had to wait until this was done or seek
naturalization by legislative or judicial proceedings.
RAMON L. LABO, JR., petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC) EN BANC AND LUIS
LARDIZABAL, respondents.
Doctrine:
Qualifications prescribed by law are continuing
requirements and must be possessed for the duration of
the officer’s active tenure. Once any of the required
qualifications is lost, his title to the office may be
seasonably challenged.
Facts:
 Petitioner and Respondent were candidates for the
office of the Mayor of Baguio City during Elections.
 Having garnered the highest number of votes, Labo
was elected and proclaimed winner while
Lardizabal garnered the second highest number of
votes.
 Subsequently respondent filed a petition for quo
warranto contesting the election of the Petitioner
on the ground that the latter is a naturalized
Australian citizen and was divested of his Philippine
citizenship having sworn allegiance to the Queen of
Australia.
 Petitioner opposes to the contrary.
 Section 42 of the Local Government Code provides
for the qualifications that an elective official must
be a citizen of the Philippines.
 From the evidence adduced, it was found out that
citizenship requirements were not possessed by the
petitioner during elections.
 He was disqualified from running as mayor and,
although elected, is not now qualified to serve as
such.
Issue:
Whether or not Labo is a Filipino citizen eligible to run for
mayor of Baguio City
Held:
No. The petitioner's contention that his marriage to an
Australian national in 1976 did not automatically divest
him of Philippine citizenship is irrelevant. There is no claim
or finding that he automatically ceased to be a Filipino
because of that marriage. He became a citizen of
Australia because he was naturalized as such through a
formal and positive process, simplified in his case
because he was married to an Australian citizen. As a
condition for such naturalization, he formally took the
Oath of Allegiance and/or made the Affirmation of
Allegiance.
CA No. 63 enumerates the modes by which Philippine
citizenship may be lost. Among these are: (1)
naturalization in a foreign country; (2) express
renunciation of citizenship; and (3) subscribing to an
oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of
a foreign country, all of which are applicable to the
petitioner. It is also worth mentioning in this connection
that under Article IV, Section 5, of the present
Constitution, "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the
national interest and shall be dealt with by law."
Even if it be assumed that, as the petitioner asserts, his
naturalization in Australia was annulled after it was found
that his marriage to the Australian citizen was bigamous,
that circumstance alone did not automatically restore
his Philippine citizenship. His divestiture of Australian
citizenship does not concern us here. That is a matter
between him and his adopted country. What we must
consider is the fact that he voluntarily and freely
rejected Philippine citizenship and willingly and
knowingly embraced the citizenship of a foreign
country. The possibility that he may have been
subsequently rejected by Australia, as he claims, does
not mean that he has been automatically reinstated as
a citizen of the Philippines.

Under CA No. 63 as amended by PD No. 725, Philippine

citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress,
by naturalization, or by repatriation. It does not appear
in the record, nor does the petitioner claim, that he has
reacquired Philippine citizenship by any of these
methods.

The petitioner is not now, nor was he on the day of the

local elections on January 18, 1988, a citizen of the
Philippines. In fact, he was not even a qualified voter
under the Constitution itself because of his alienage. He
was therefore ineligible as a candidate for mayor of
Baguio City under Section 42 of the Local Government
Code.

The probability that many of those who voted for the

petitioner may have done so in the belief that he was
qualified only strengthens the conclusion that the results
of the election cannot nullify the qualifications for the
office now held by him. These qualifications are
continuing requirements; once any of them is lost during
incumbency, title to the office itself is deemed forfeited.

In the case at bar, the citizenship and voting

requirements were not subsequently lost but were not
possessed at all in the first place on the day of the
election. The petitioner was disqualified from running as
mayor and, although elected, is not now qualified to
serve as such.

Nevertheless, the candidate obtaining the second

highest number is still not qualified to replace the
disqualified candidate for the simple reason is that as he
obtained only the second highest number of votes in the
election, he was obviously not the choice of the people
of Baguio City. The Court held it would be extremely
repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally
guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who has not
acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed
a winner and imposed as the representative of a
constituency, the majority of which have positively
declared through their ballots that they do not choose
him.