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Marina A. L. Oshana
The autonomous person formulates certain goals ,as relevant to the direc-
tion of her life, and is able to pursue these goals and make them effectivein
action. Moreover, she formulates these goals according to values, desires,
and convictions that have developed in an uncoerced and conscious fash-
ion. Such values can be described as the agent’s own even while they reflect
the influence of factors external to her. Additionally, an autonomous per-
son is able to meet her goals without depending upon the judgments of
others as to their validity and importance. Though the autonomous indi-
vidual may require the assistance of others in meeting these goals, she de-
cides which of them are most important.
Together, the intuitions suggest that an autonomous person is in con-
trol of her choices, her actions, and her will? There are many ways to un-
derstand the phenomenon of being in control.The idea could be interpreted
weakly. Some philosophers contend, for example, that a person can remain
in control of his choices, actions, and will even when the person acts under
conditions that could undermine self-government. For example, the per-
son who, for reasons of drug addiction, coercion, subordinaterank, or weak-
ness of will, could not do otherwise than perform a particular act (ingest a
drug, relinquish money to a mugger, execute a military order, or blow a
diet) might nevertheless be deemed in control of his actions if he would
have done the act anyway independently and of his own free will. Thus
control is possible even in the absence of alternate possibilities, and in the
face of factors that are suffiaent to determine one’s actions? It is this sort of
control that the internalists tend to highlight.
I believe that personal autonomy calls for a more stringent interpreta-
tion of “being in control.” As the case studies that follow illustrate, a person
might independently arrive at preferences that mirror those she holds un-
der conditions where control is absent. It may even be fortunate that this
coincidence occurs.’ But the fact that there is this coincidence will not de-
cide in favor of autonomy. When we say that a person is self-governing
because she is in control of her actions and choices, we are saying more
than that the person’s actions coincide with preferences or values that are
her own. We are saying that the person has the power to determine how
she shall live. Being autonomous is not simply a matter of having values
that are authentic, but of directing one’s life according to such values. And
this calls for control over one’s external circumstances.
One familiar way to understand these intui,tions is through the idea
that autonomy is the good which paternalism fails to respect. The autono-
mous individual may heed the advice, even the directives, of others, and
her choices and actions may be inspired by a source other than herself. But
no one must decide or act for the individual, and the opinions of others
must not be the wellspring from which the individual judges her choices
and actions to be valid and legitimate.
The self-governing person must face minimal interference in her ac-
tions and choices. Interferencescan be of a psychological or a physical na-
ture, and they can originate from within the individual as easily as they can
Personal Autonomy and Society 83
lem is not merely that internalists lack an adequate account of the condition
of personal autonomy in terms of things other than preferences. Rather,
they contend that the autonomy of persons is a matter of the condition of a
person’s psychology, and they seek no other account. Nor is it true that the
intemalist is attempting to explain something other than the autonomy of
persons, such as psychological freedom simpliciter.What is distinctiveabout
the internalist is his attempt to explain the autonomy of persons in terms of
one’s autonomy with respect to one’s psychological states.
But, as the case studies will show, there is no natural transition from a
conception of autonomy that focuses on psychological states, or capacities,
to an account of the autonomy of persons. Although a person’s status as
self-governing is in part dependent on her psychology, personal au-
tonomy and autonomy vis a vis one’s psychological states differ in kind;
since the subjects vary, the conditions for each may vary as well. In any
event, what I am interested in is not autonomy with respect to one’s
preferences or history and the conditions that make that possible but
rather the autonomy of persons, persons who have certain preferences,
and who pursue certain options.
Second, according to internalist theories, people with the same psychol-
ogy are, ips0 facto, equally autonomous (or nonautonomous). A more
”externalist” theory such as I will offer denies that personal autonomy is a
condition that supervenes on psychological or dispositional states alone.
On the external analysis, it is possible for two individuals to satisfy all the
psychological and historical conditions we have been discussing, but to
differ with respect to their status as autonomous beings-and this differ-
ence is to be explained in terms of some variance in their social circum-
stances. (Thestudy of Harriet, in the following section, illustratesthis point.)
In addition to whatever subjective psychological characteristicsare required
for autonomy there are objective social criteria according to which we judge
someone as autonomous, and these externalcriteria are independent of the
individual’s internal state.
I have called the externalist account I favor “socio-relational”by way of
contrasting it with an internalist account. By this I do not mean to imply
that intemalist accounts lack a relational component, and that they are flawed
for this reason. My complaint about intemalist accounts of autonomy is not
that they fail to include among the components of a person’s psychology
certain relational or ”interactive”qualities or abilities. Rather, my complaint
is that such accounts are exclusively subjective. The agent’s psychological
condition-specifically, the structural and historical character of her judg-
ments and preferences-is alone important for her autonomy.
The psychological emphasis of internalist theories reflects the convic-
tion that preserving the autonomy of persons consists in preserving what
is metaphorically described as the “inner citadel.‘’ The metaphor asks
us to assume the existence of some essential (presumably psychological)
element of the individual, independent of the world and inviolable, in
virtue of which autonomy is safeguarded. This element is often referred
86 Marina A. L. Oshana
2 Case Studies
The following four case studies establish that persons who are
nonautonomous in certain situations fail to be autonomous because they
lack characteristics that only a social theory of self-determination can ac-
commodate. Each is intended to highlight the extemalist’s intuition that
autonomy is incompatible with constraint-even where constraint is self-
chosen and reflects a free, rational choice. The first three cases depict per-
sonswho satisfy the various intemalist criteria for autonomy but who nev-
ertheless fail to meet the general intuitions for self-government. To sim-
plify, I consider a hybrid intemalist theory according to which the criteria
are second-order identification with the operative desire, integration of
motivational and valuational systems, and historically proper preference
formation. The fourth case depicts persons who lack autonomy but who
nevertheless have authority over this lack.
If this is coherent, and I think it is, one cannot argue against such slavery
on the grounds of autonomy.”
But is this coherent? Dworkin claims that one cannot argue that volun-
tary slavery offends autonomy, because its voluntary nature renders it con-
sistent with autonomy But Dworkin‘s argument is unsatisfactory for the
following reasons. First, it relies too heavily on choice as a sufficient condi-
tion for autonomy. But choice does not guarantee autonomy,for the person
who chooses might be compelled to do so, and to do so from within the
confines of a situation that grants her no autonomy; consider Sophie’s
choice.23And since a person can freely select a life that denies him self-
determination, the exercise of choice is no guarantee that the result of that
choice will be a situation in which the chooser is autonomous.
The person who chooses slavery is of course (at least partially) respon-
sible for his resulting lack of autonomy But autonomy is absent as long as
he remains a slave, for he is subject to coercion and his standing remains
one of compliance, submissiveness, and dependency.
This suggests a further point. It is certainly possible that a person could
autonomously choose nonautonomy; the example of the religious devo-
tee offers a plausible case in point. Some, however, would question
whether the person who conceives of servitude as a state that will con-
tribute to his welfare, and who pursues that state in light of this belief-
who opts for the choice that denies him autonomy-really is autono-
mous to begin with. For example, Thomas Hill recalls Rousseau’s thought
that the very idea of consenting to slavery (or, analogously, to torture or
imprisonment) is incoherent, since it means that the agent ”displays a
conditioned slavish mentality that renders [such] consent worthless.”
Hill argues that “a person’s consent releases others from obligation only
if it is autonomously given, and consent resulting from underestimation
of one’s moral status [as a human being entitled to a certain body of
rights] is not autonomously
Although I do not share Hill’s belief, it merits consideration. For if Hi11
is correct, then it is unlikely that truly autonomous desires-desires that
meet the hybrid conditions of the internalist-will be for states of
Personal Autonomy and Society 89
that others will take his expression of these values seriously. As a result,
others might regard this individual as less than capable of self-government
just because he appears incapable of upholding a system of values. None-
theless, that a person respects himself or fails to do so will not decide his
status as self-governing.
The inadequacy of intemalistaccounts can be illustrated by contrasting
the case of Harriet with that of a homemaker who is self-governing. Both
Harriet and her counterpart, whom I shall call Wilma, share the properties
touted by the internalist. Both possess structurally coherent psychologies,
and each offers reasons for her actions that are consistent, value-reflec-
tive, and historically sound. But suppose that the personal relations in
which Wilma finds herself, and the social institutions that affect her life,
afford her control over her choices. She directs her life from within a
range of possibilities that promise economic independence and the op-
portunity for personal growth. Moreover, although Wilma may view
herself as an other-regarding caregiver, she is treated by others as one
whose needs and wants deserve to be respected, and this desert is rein-
forced by her social situation. While both women desire to be of service
to others, only Harriet finds herself subservient. Wilma can be described
as autonomous while Harriet cannot.
tered way. Moreover, the choices he makes and the goals he sets as relevant
to the direction of his life must emanate from a variety of acceptable alter-
natives, and the individual must be able to pursue these choices without
undue social or psychological cost.
The preceding scenarios indicate the need for the following conditions
for autonomy In conjunction with one another they are sufficient to consti-
tute autonomy. I recognize that persons can be more or less autonomous,
and that not everyone need be autonomous to the same degree in order to
count as autonomous. But these conditions must be satisfied, each to some
significant degree, if a person is to be autonomous. Thus,there is a thresh-
old for autonomy. The scope of this paper does not allow a satisfactory
discussion of the threshold. However, it should be apparent that I view the
satisfaction of the intemalist’s conditions required for autonomy vis a vis
preferences to fall short of the threshold required for the autonomy of agents.
pare them for autonomy but the intemalist will contend that a person need
not be in these social situations in order to meet the requisite psychological
conditions and, thereby be autonomous.
Our case studies, however, illustrate that satisfylng the psychological
conditions simply will not be sufficient for self-government. We can speak
of a person’s desires as autonomous, or of a person as autonomous over her
desires, even where the person is not autonomous (just as we can speak of
a person’s desires as satisfied even where the person is not). We refuse to
count the slave et al. as self-governing because his external environment
renders him incapable of functioning in a self-governing way.
Not being subject to the dictates of others, or not being severely con-
strained,or not having an adequate range of options might only be causally
necessary for meeting the internalist’sconditions-for being what one might
call a “rational planner.” But they are constitutively necessary for being
autonomous. Thus in addition to whatever role social conditions play in
bringing about a climate more conducive to self-government, an
unconstraining social situation is partly constitutive of, or contributes ”ma-
terially” to, self-government.
Earlier versions ofthis paper have been presented at the University ofCalif0mia,
Davis, Temple University, and CaliforniaState University, Sun Bernardino. Thanks
are due to David Copp, John Martin Fischer, Ishtiyaque Haji, Tony Roy,Richard
Wollheim, and various refereesfor their comments.
Notes
Others who analyze autonomy in a similarly social light are Lawrence Haworth in Au-
tonomy: An Essay in Philosophical Psychology and Ethics, 1986 (New Haven: Yale
University Press), and Diana Meyers, in Self, Society, and Personal Choice, 1989 (New
York Columbia University Press).
The truth of this claim need not entail the denial of physical or psychological determin-
ism. An adult may have no more metaphysical control over the world than does a child,
but it makes sense to say that an adult is in control of her actions, and has certain rights
of sovereignty,where a child is not, and does not. While being in control of one’s choices
suggests that a person is able to alter her present way of life, if she so chooses, this
ability need not entail the denial of determinism a s long as one can be determined in
such a way as to make this ability possible.
Harry Frankfurt argues for the weak view in “Coercion and Moral Responsibility,”1973,
in Ted Honderich, ed., Essays on Freedom of Action, 63-86 (London:Routledge & Kegan
Paul), and in his “Three Concepts of Free Action, 2,” 1975, Proceedings of the Aristote-
lian Society, Supp. Vol. 40,113-25.
’
Along these lines, Irving Thalberg discusses prudent behavior under situations of coer-
cion in ”Hierarchical Analyses of Unfree Action,” 1978, Canadian Journal of Philoso-
phy, Vol. 8, No. 2.
Dworkin, “Acting Freely,” 1970, Nous, Vol. 9: 367-83.
Dworkin, “The Concept of Autonomy,” in Science and Ethics, ed.Rudolph Haller (Rodopi
Press, 1981). Reprinted in The Inner Citadel, ed. John Christman (New York Oxford
University Press, 1989).Al1references are to this text. Dworkin develops his view inThe
Theory and Practiceof Autonomy (New York CambridgeUniversity Press, 1988).Frank-
furt, too, employs the hierarchical theory, but does so in an effort to discover the kind of
freedom relevant for moral responsibility. Frankfurt’s view may be that these varieties
of freedom-viz., acting freely, choosing freely, and willing freely-are adequate for
autonomy. (See his ”Identification and Wholeheartedness,” in The Importance of What
We Care About [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 19881, pp.170-71.) And
Dworkin’s employment of the hierarchical apparatus to generate a theory of autonomy
also suggests that similar use of this tool could have been made by Frankfurt. But
Frankfurt’s claim is that the variety of freedom required for responsibility need not
include the ability to do otherwise, and in this respect his account differs fmm my ac-
count, and Dworkin‘s account, of personal autonomy.
Dworkin, 1989, p.61. Dworkin’s account of autonomy and his employment of the condi-
tion of procedural independence are ihtemalist, in the sense I have defined. Although
procedural independence requires that the environment external to the agent be free of
factors that impair the agent’s ability to critically appraise her lower-order reasons for
100 Marina A. L. Oshana
acting, Dworkin's concern is only with the effect such external phenomena have upon
the psychology of the agent. Nothing about the external environment or its relation to
the individual matters in itself. It does not matter, for example, whether the individual
has been coerced or manipulated. What matters is that the individual has not been
affected in a way that undermines her critical and reflective hdties.Thus, as Dworkin
understands it, procedural independence only requires that a person's psychological
abilities not be undermined. His account of autonomy remains intemalist, the condi-
tion of procedural independence notwithstanding.
Dworkin, 1988, p. 15.
Dworkin, 1988, pp. 20 and 108. Lawrence Haworth raises problems with the capacity
condition in "Dworkin on Autonomy," Ethics 102 (Oct., 1991), 129-39.
lo Watson, "Free Agency," Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 72, No. 8,1975.
l1 Christman, 1989, pp. 5-6.Also see his "Autonomy: A Defense of the Split-Level Self,"
1987, Southern Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 25, No. 3,281-93, and "Autonomy and Per-
sonal History," 1991, Canadian Joumal of Philosophy, Vol. 20, No. 1,l-24.
l2 As with Dworkin's condition of procedural independence, Christman's devetopmental
or "historical" criteria for individual self-government may seem external in character.
But I take Christman's theories to be internalist since he views the psychological stand-
ing of the individual as decisive for personal autonomy.
l 3 In addition to the structural and historical criteria that internalists provide, disposi-
tional considerations also figure importantly for autonomy. It matters, for example,
whether the individual is docile and easily swayed by others, or is strong-minded
and confident.
Both Charles Taylor and Gerald Dworkin employ the ideas of "true" and 'real' selves;
various challenges to these notions have been raised by Isaiah Berlin, Marilyn Fried-
man, and Susan Wolf.
l5 Joseph Raz discussessuch cases at pp. 3W91, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1986).
I h Both of these persons differ from the individual who believes that a life of service to
others is the most fulfilling. This individual may value other-regarding behavior more
highly than he does behavior founded on self-interest,but may still value his autonomy
and view it as compatible with service to others.
I 7 A s Isaiah Berlin notes, consenting to a loss of liberty does not negate or reverse that loss:
"If I consent to be oppressed, or acquiesce in my condition with detachment or irony,
am I the less oppressed? If I sell myself into slavery, am I the less a slave? If I commit
suicide, am I the less dead because I have taken my own life freely?" Berlin, "Two
Concepts of Liberty," in Four Essayson Liberty (Oxford:Oxford UniversityPress, 1969),
p.164.
InThe slave could be self-governingwith respect to any activitiesor relations in his life over
which he retained control-in his status as spouse, or sibling, or parent, for example.
But being autonomous in certain activities or with respect to certain roles-being ',lo-
cally" autonomousdoes not make the slave an autonomous person, or one who lives
a "globally" autonomous life. I also grant that autonomy can be had in degrees, to the
extent that the conditions for autonomy are met. section four, bdow, addresses this
point.
Along this line, Alfred Mele notes that one who autonomously chooses a particular state
might fail to be autonomous with respect to remaining in that state; an appropriately
autonomous history of choice might not be adequate for the continued or occurrent
condition of autonomy.See his "History and Personal Autonomy" CanadianJournal of
Philosophy 23 (June 1993), 271-80.
Jeremy Waldron, The Right to Private Property (Oxford:Clarendon Press, 1988), p. 302.
Though Waldron is speaking of what ought to characterize human involvement in
projects of self-assertionupon nature, he takes autonomy to involve self-assertion.
Christman (1987) denies autonomy to the slave on the grounds that the slave does suffer
from an unsuitable psychological history. I pursue my disagreement with Christman in
"Autonomy Naturalized," Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Vol. XIX (1994), 7694.
Dworkin, "Paternalism: Some Second Thoughts," p.111, in Rolf Sartorius, ed., Paternal-
Personal Autonomy and Society 101
must face a range of options that "enable him to sustain throughout his life activities
which, taken together, exercise all the capacities human beings have an innate drive to
exercise, as well as [have the option] to decline to develop any of them."
)6 A satisfactory analysis of this condition (in particular, of the notions of an option and of
being able to achieve options) is not possible in thispaper. I am relying on the intuition
that we can speak meaningfully about having options for action, even though we may
be undecided about the truth of determinismand of the Principleof Alternate Possibili-
ties. Clearly, a variety of alternativesof every sort is not necessary for autonomy. At the
very least, I am restricted in my choices by the fact that I suffer from certain physical,
intellectual,geographic, and financiallimitations, as well as by the fact that I share this
planet with others to whom I must accord certain courtesies. But none of this need limit
my autonomy.
37 A parent, for example, is responsible for fulfilling the needs of his children; an attorney is
expected to serve the needs of her client.
38 I wish to thank Richmond Campbell for his suggestion that I emphasize the external
nature of the first three conditions.
In fact, Christman shuns social criteria for autonomy where such criteria incorporate
external elements of the sort sufficient to compromise self-government.Christman ar-
gues that, in order "to capture the idea of self-government that is the motivating con-
cept behind autonomy," the rationality of an autonomous agent must be defined in
terms of a set of "subjective" criteria internal to the agent. His account is thus doubly
internalist;no externalcriteria are allowed for rationality, and agent autonomy turns on
the psychological character of the individual. See Christman (1991), notes 18 and 23,
pp.9 and 14,respectively.
* Berlin remarks that, while "Kant's free man needs no public recognition for his inner
freedom," the need humans have for recognition within their social sphere "is bound
up wholly with the relation that [they]have with others....I feel myself to be somebody
or nobody in terms of my position and function in the social whole; this is the most
'heteronomous' condition imaginable." See his 'Two Concepts of Liberty", p.156, note 1.
41 Berlin, 1969, p. 156, my emphasis.
42 Joel Feinberg, Harm To Self, Vol. 3 of The Moral Limits of Criminal Law (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 46-47. See also Raz, 1986, p. 394.