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2. G.R. No.

L-57438 January 3, 1984




Petitioner is the duly appointed guardian of the incompetent Estefania San Pedro in
Special Proceedings of the cfi of Bulacan. Respondent Pelagio Francisco, claiming to
be a first cousin of Estefania San Pedro, together with two others, petitioned the
court for the removal of petitioner and for the appointment in his stead grounded on
the failure of the guardian to submit an inventory of the estate of his ward and to
render an accounting. Respondent Judge also ordered the retirement of petitioner on
the ground of old age.

Petitioner also contended that to grant execution pending appeal would render
petitioner's appeal moot and academic that "advanced age" was not one of the,
grounds raised by private respondent in the court below; that the court a quo abuse
its discretion in appointing respondent as guardian despite the fact that private
respondent is five (5) years older than petitioner.


Whether or not the removal of petitioner as guardian of the ward on the ground of old age is a good
ground for the execution of the decision pending appeal?


There is need for petitioner Feliciano Francisco to be retired from the guardianship over the person and
property of incompetent Estefania San Pedro. The conclusion reached by the trial court about the "rather
advanced age" of petitioner at 72 years old (petitioner is now 76 years old) finding him unfit to continue
the trust cannot be disturbed. As correctly pointed out by the appellate court, this finds direct support in
the delay of the accounting and inventory made by petitioner. To sustain petitioner as guardian would,
therefore, be detrimental to the ward. While age alone is not a control criterion in determining a person's
fitness or qualification to be appointed or be retained as guardian, it may be a factor for consideration.

Upon urgent and compelling reasons, execution pending appeal is a matter of sound discretion on
the part of the trial court.

Inasmuch as the primary objective for the institution of guardianship is for the protection of the ward,
there is more than sufficient reason for the immediate execution of the lower court's judgment for the
replacement of the first guardian.



March, 1996 and subsequent thereto in barangay Bato, Bansud, province of Oriental Mindoro,
Philippines the above-named accused, with lewd and unchaste design, by means of force,
threat and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously lay with and have
carnal knowledge of one MARITES WATIWAT, his 10-year-old niece living in his own house
and therefore a guardian and relative within the third civil degree, against her will and without
her consent, to the damage and prejudice of the Offended Party.

Accused was found guilty and trial court imposed death penalty on the basis of its
conclusion that he is her guardian.

Issue ?

Whether or not the accused is the guardian of the victim?


There are three kinds of guardians under the law: (a) the legal guardian, who is such
by provision of law without the need of judicial appointment, as in the case of the parents
over the persons of their minor children, or the father, or in his absence the mother, with
respect to the property of the minor children not exceeding P50,000.00 in value;[28] (b) the
guardian ad litem, a competent person appointed by the court for purposes of a
particular action or proceeding involving a minor; and (c) the judicial guardian, one
appointed by the court over the person and/or property of the ward to represent the latter
in all his civil acts and transaction.[29]
As shown by the facts in this case, appellant is not Marites guardian, whether
natural, legal or judicial. That he allowed his surname to be used as her surname in her
Certificate of Live Birth is inconsequential.
At most, appellant was only an uncommitted caretaker of Marites over a limited
period of time. Clearly, he cannot be considered a guardian falling within the ambit of the
amendatory provision of Section 11, Republic Act No. 7659.
In view of the failure of the prosecution to prove the qualifying circumstance of
guardianship or relationship, it is error for the trial court to convict appellant for qualified
rape and impose upon him the supreme penalty of death.

12. G.R. No. L-3071 May 29, 1950

SALVACION LOPEZ, petitioner,

JOSE TEODORO, Sr., Judge of the Court of First Instance of Occidental Negros, EULALIO
LOPEZ, Jr., and JESUS JALBUENA, respondents.


Eulalio Lopez, Sr., an incapacitated under the judicial guardianship of Eulalio Lopez, Jr., was the
exclusive and absolute owner of an hacienda in Silay, Negros Occidental.
Court of First Instance, acting upon a motion of Gamboa’s (creditors) filed in the proceedings for
guardianship ordered the guardian to pay the movants P7,312 plus 12 per cent interest amount
which represented loans properly authorized by court. Thus the guardian Eulalio Jr sold the tract of
land, the only property possessed by the ward.

Although Eulalio Lopez, Jr. was the judicial guardian, the incapacitated was under the actual care
and custody of his sister, Salvacion Lopez. Believing that the sale was prejudicial to her brother's
interest, Salvacion filed a motion for reconsideration of the court's order authorizing said sale, and
upon the motion being denied, she brought this petition for certiorari and mandamus, contending that
the sale was null and void by reason of the court's failure to adhere to Rule 96.


Whether or not the said sale was unlawful?


It is not.

First, it is evident that appeal and not certiorari or mandamus is the proper remedy.

Petitioner has no legal interest in her complaint. The incapacitated has children, all of age, one of
whom is the judicial guardian, while the petitioner is only the ward's sister. Not being Eulalio Lopez's
forced heir, she was not prejudiced by the sale she seeks to impugn. It is true that she was a creditor
but she does not claim any right to be notified of the sale as such creditor, and her credit was not
impaired. On the contrary, she was benefited by the sale in that she was paid what was due her from
its proceeds.

The petitioner insist that she is next of kin. She is in error. "Next of kin" within the meaning of Rule 96
are relatives whose relationship is such that they are entitled to share in the estate as distributes.

14. BONIFACIA P. VANCIL, petitioner, vs. HELEN G. BELMES, respondent.

G.R. No. 132223. June 19, 2001


Petitioner, Bonifacia Vancil, is the mother of Reeder C. Vancil, a Navy serviceman of the United
States of America who died in the said country. Reeder had two (2) children named Valerie and
Vincent by his common-law wife, Helen G. Belmes. Petitioner commenced before the Regional
Trial Court of Cebu City a guardianship proceedings over the persons and properties of said
minors which was granted and appointed her as their legal and judicial guardian.

Helen Belmes (mother) opposed to the subject guardianship proceedings asseverating that she
had already filed a similar petition for guardianship efore the RTC of Pabgadian City.

Helen followed her opposition with a motion for the Removal of Guardian and Appointment of a
New One, asserting that she is the natural mother in actual custody of and exercising parental
authority over the subject minors; that the petition was filed under an improper venue; and that
at the time the petition was filed Bonifacia Vancil was a resident of 140 Hurliman Court, Canon
City, Colorado, U.S.A. being a naturalized American citizen.


Who between the mother and grandmother of minors should be the guardian.?
Respondent, being the natural mother of the minor, has the preferential right over that of
petitioner to be his guardian. Considering that Valerie is already of major age, this petition has
become moot with respect to her.
Art. 211. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the
persons of their common children. In case of disagreement, the fathers decision shall
prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the contrary.
Petitioner, as the surviving grandparent, can exercise substitute parental authority only in
case of death, absence or unsuitability of respondent. Considering that respondent is very much
alive and has exercised continuously parental authority over Vincent, petitioner has to prove, in
asserting her right to be the minors guardian, respondents unsuitability. Petitioner, however, has
not proffered convincing evidence showing that respondent is not suited to be the guardian of
Vincent. Petitioner merely insists that respondent is morally unfit as guardian of Valerie
considering that her (respondents) live-in partner raped Valerie several times. But Valerie, being
now of major age, is no longer a subject of this guardianship proceeding.

Even assuming that respondent is unfit as guardian of minor Vincent, still petitioner cannot
qualify as a substitute guardian. It bears stressing that she is an American citizen she will not be
able to perform the responsibilities and obligations required of a guardian.

19. G.R. No. 74769 September 28, 1990

BEATRIZ F. GONZALES, petitioner,

HON. ZOILO AGUINALDO, Judge of Regional Trial Court, Branch 143, Makati, Metro Manila
and TERESA F. OLBES, respondents.


In an intestate proceeding involving the estate of the deceased Doña Ramona Gonzales Vda. de
Faviswhich was survived by her four (4) children namely, Asterio Favis, Beatriz F. Gonzales, Teresa
F. Olbes, and Cecilia Favis-Gomez. The court appointed petitioner Beatriz Gonzales and private
respondent Teresa Olbes as co-administratices of the estate.

Respondent Teresa filed a motion to remove Beatriz as co-administratrix, on the ground that she is
incapable or unsuitable to discharge the trust and had committed acts and omissions detrimental to
the interest of the estate and the heirs because petitioner was in the United States accompanying
her ailing husband who was receiving medical treatment in that country. Thus, respondent judge
cancelled the letters of administration granted to Beatriz F. Gonzales and retained Teresa Olbes as
the administratrix of the estate of the late Ramona Gonzales.


Whether or not respondent judge erred in removing petitioner as co- administratrix?


Yes respondent judge erred.

The court a quo did not base the removal of the petitioner as co-administratrix on any of the causes
specified in respondent's motion for relief of the petitioner. The court based the removal of the
petitioner on the fact that in the administration of the estate, conflicts and misunderstandings have
existed between petitioner and respondent.

The court a quo failed to find hard facts showing that the conflict and disharmony between the two
(2) co-administratrices were unjustly caused by petitioner, or that petitioner was guilty of
incompetence in the fulfillment of her duties, or prevented the management of the estate according
to the dictates of prudence, or any other act or omission showing that her continuance as co-
administratrix of the estate materially endangers the interests of the estate.

Petitioner had never abandoned her role as co-administratrix of the estate nor had she been remiss
in the fullfilment of her duties. Temporary absence in the state does not disqualify one to be an
administrator of the estate. Thus, as held in re Mc Knight's Will, a temporary residence outside of the
state, maintained for the benefit of the health of the executors' family, is not such a removal from the
state as to necessitate his removal as executor.

20. G.R. No. L-17066 December 28, 1961


Incompetent. CARMEN PADILLA VDA. DE BENGSON, petitioner-appellee,
AFFAIRS, oppositor-appellant.


As the mother of a veteran who died in World War II, Carmen Padilla Vda. de Bengson became
entitled to certain accrued insurance benefits and to a monthly death compensation for the rest of
her life, all extended by the United States Veterans Administration. The Veterans Administration filed
a petition in the CFI of La Union adjudging Carmen Vda. de Bengzon to be an incompetent and
appointing the Philippine National Bank (PNB) as guardian of her estate. Then letters of
guardianship were issued in favor of the Philippine National Bank.
Petitioner filed a petition asking for an order terminating the guardianship, and for delivery to her of
the residuary estate alleging that she had regained her competence.

Thereafter, the son of the ward, Francisco Bengson, filed a "Manifestation praying that he be
appointed guardian of the ward's estate in place of the Philippine National Bank.


Whether or not respondent PNB should be removed as guardian ?


The grounds for which a guardian may be removed are found in Section 2, Rule 98 of the Rules.

When a guardian becomes insane or otherwise incapable of discharging his trust or unsuitable
therefor, or has wasted or mismanaged the estate, or failed for thirty days after it is due to render an
account or make a return, the court may, upon reasonable notice to the guardian, remove him, and
compel him to surrender the estate of the ward to the person found to be lawfully entitled thereto

Nothing in the record would indicate, that there was any legal ground upon which the removal of the
Philippine National Bank as guardian was founded. Neither in Francisco Bengzon's manifestation
nor in the orders of the lower court is it made to appear that the Philippine National Bank had
become incapable of discharging its trust or was unsuitable therefor, or that it had committed
anything which the Rules includes as grounds for removal. On the contrary, it appears incontestable
that all throughout, the Philippine National Bank has discharged its trust satisfactorily.