CANON 14 SERVICE TO THE NEEDY Supreme Court, shall be entitled to an allowable deduction from the gross
income, the amount that could have been collected for the actual free legal
RULE 14.01- Availability of Services Regardless of Status
RA 9999 AN ACT PROVIDING A MECHANISM FOR FREE LEGAL
ASSISTANCE AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in
Congress assembled:
Section 1. Short Title. - This Act shall be known as the "Free Legal
Assistance Act of 2010".
Section 2. Declaration of Policy. - It is the declared policy of the State to value
the dignity of every human person and guarantee the rights of every individual,
particularly those who cannot afford the services of legal counsel.
Furthermore, it is the policy of the State to promote a just and dynamic social
order that will ensure the prosperity and independence of the nation and free
the people from poverty through policies and programs that provide adequate
social services and improve the quality of life for all.
In addition, the State shall guarantee free legal assistance to the poor and ensure
that every person who cannot afford the services of a counsel is provided with a
competent and independent counsel preferably of his/her own choice, if upon
determination it appears that the party cannot afford the services of a counsel,
and that services of a counsel are necessary to secure the ends of justice and
protect of the party.
Section 3. Definition of Terms. - As provided for in this Act, the term legal
services to be performed by a lawyer refers to any activity which requires the
application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experiences which
shall include, among others, legal advice and counsel, and the preparation of
instruments and contracts, including appearance before the administrative and
quasi-judicial offices, bodies and tribunals handling cases in court, and other
similar services as may be defined by the Supreme Court.
Section 4. Requirements for Availment. - For purposes of availing of the
benefits and services as envisioned in this Act, a lawyer or professional
partnership shall secure a certification from the Public Attorney's Office (PAO),
the Department of Justice (DOJ) or accredited association of the Supreme Court
indicating that the said legal services to be provided are within the services
defined by the Supreme Court, and that the agencies cannot provide the legal
services to be provided by the private counsel.
For purpose of determining the number of hours actually provided by the lawyer
and/or professional firm in the provision of legal services, the association and/or
organization duly accredited by the Supreme Court shall issue the necessary
certification that said legal services were actually undertaken.
The certification issued by, among others, the PAO, the DOJ and other
accredited association by the Supreme Court shall be submitted to the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR) for purposes of availing the tax deductions as provided
for in this Act and to the DOJ for purposes of monitoring.
Section 5. Incentives to Lawyers. - For purposes of this Act, a lawyer or
professional partnerships rendering actual free legal services, as defined by the
services rendered or up to ten percent (10%) of the gross income derived from
the actual performance of the legal profession, whichever is lower: Provided,
That the actual free legal services herein contemplated shall be exclusive of the
minimum sixty (60)-hour mandatory legal aid services rendered to indigent
litigants as required under the Rule on Mandatory Legal Aid Services for
Practicing Lawyers, under BAR Matter No. 2012, issued by the Supreme Court.
Section 6. Information, Education and Communication (IEC) Campaign. - The
DOJ, in cooperation with the Philippine Information Agency (PIA), is hereby
mandated to conduct an annual IEC campaign in order to inform the lawyers of
the procedures and guidelines in availing tax deductions and inform the general
public that a free legal assistance to those who cannot afford counsel is being
provided by the State.1avvph!1
Section 7. Reportorial Requirement. - For purposes of determining the
effectiveness and social impact of the provisions of this Act, the DOJ shall submit
an annual report to both Houses of Congress indicating therewith the number of
parties who benefited from this Act.
The report shall state in detail, among others, the geographic location,
demographic characteristics and socioeconomic profile of the beneficiaries of this
Act.
Section 8. Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR). - Within ninety (90) days
from the date effectivity of this Act, the BIR shall formulate the necessary
revenue regulations for the proper implementation of the tax component as
envisioned in this Act.
The Supreme Court shall formulate the necessary implementing rules and
regulations with respect to the legal services covered under this Act and the
process of accreditation of organizations and/or associations which will provide
free legal assistance.
Section 9. Separability Clause. - If any provision of this Act is declared
unconstitutional or invalid, the other provisions not affected by such declaration
shall remain in full force and effect.
Section 10. Repealing Clause. - Any law, decree, ordinance or administrative
circular not consistent with any provision of this Act is hereby amended,
repealed or modified accordingly.
Section 11. Effectivity Clause. - This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after
its complete publication in the Official Gazette or in two (2) newspapers of
general circulation.
Rule 138 Sec 20 RoC
It is the duty of an attorney:
(a) To maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to
support the Constitution and obey the laws of the Philippines.
 (b) To observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and
judicial officers;
(c) To counsel or maintain such actions or proceedings only as appear
to him to be just, and such defenses only as he believes to be honestly
debatable under the law.
(d) To employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to
him, such means only as are consistent with truth and honor, and never
seek to mislead the judge or any judicial officer by an artifice or false
statement of fact or law;
(e) To maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself, to
preserve the secrets of his client, and to accept no compensation in
connection with his client's business except from him or with his
knowledge and approval;
(f) To abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact
prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless
required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged;
(g) Not to encourage either the commencement or the continuance of
an action or proceeding, or delay any man's cause, from any corrupt
motive or interest;
(h) Never to reject, for any consideration personal to himself, the cause
of the defenseless or oppressed;
(i) In the defense of a person accused of crime, by all fair and honorable
means, regardless of his personal opinion as to the guilt of the accused,
to present every defense that the law permits, to the end that no
person may be deprived of life or liberty, but by due process of law.
Republic Act No. 10389 (2012) An Act Institutionalizing Recognizance
as a Mode of Granting the Release of an Indigent Person in Custody of
an Accused in a Criminal Case
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in
Congress assembled:
Section 1. Short Title. – This Act shall be known as the "Recognizance Act of
2012″.
Section 2. Statement of Policy. – It is the declared policy of the State to
promote social justice in all phases of national development, including the
promotion of restorative justice as a means to address the problems confronting
the criminal justice system such as protracted trials, prolonged resolution of
cases, lack of legal representation, lack of judges, inability to post bail bond,
congestion in jails, and lack of opportunity to reform and rehabilitate offenders.
In consonance with the principle of presumption of innocence, the 1987
Philippine Constitution recognizes and guarantees the right to bail or to be
released on recognizance as may be provided by law. In furtherance of this
policy, the right of persons, except those charged with crimes punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, to be released on recognizance
before conviction by the Regional Trial Court, irrespective of whether the case
was originally filed in or appealed to it, upon compliance with the requirements
of this Act, is hereby affirmed, recognized and guaranteed.
Section 3. Recognizance Defined. – Recognizance is a mode of securing the
release of any person in custody or detention for the commission of an offense
who is unable to post bail due to abject poverty. The court where the case of
such person has been filed shall allow the release of the accused on recognizance
as provided herein, to the custody of a qualified member of the barangay, city or
municipality where the accused resides.
Section 4. Duty of the Courts. – For purposes of stability and uniformity, the
courts shall use their discretion, in determining whether an accused should be
deemed an indigent even if the salary and property requirements are not met.
The courts may also consider the capacity of the accused to support not just
himself/herself but also his/her family or other people who are dependent on
him/her for support and subsistence.
Other relevant factors and conditions demonstrating the financial incapacity of
the accused at the time that he/she is facing charges in court may also be
considered by the courts for the purpose of covering as many individuals
belonging to the marginalized and poor sectors of society.
Section 5. Release on Recognizance as a Matter of Right Guaranteed by the
Constitution. – The release on recognizance of any person in custody or
detention for the commission of an offense is a matter of right when the offense
is not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment: Provided, That the accused or any person on behalf of the
accused files the application for such:
(a) Before or after conviction by the Metropolitan Trial Court,
Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities and Municipal
Circuit Trial Court; and
(b) Before conviction by the Regional Trial Court: Provided,
further, That a person in custody for a period equal to or more than the
minimum of the principal penalty prescribed for the offense charged,
without application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, or any modifying
circumstance, shall be released on the person’s recognizance.
Section 6. Requirements. – The competent court where a criminal case has
been filed against a person covered under this Act shall, upon motion, order the
release of the detained person on recognizance to a qualified
custodian: Provided, That all of the following requirements are complied with:
(a) A sworn declaration by the person in custody of his/her indigency or
incapacity either to post a cash bail or proffer any personal or real
property acceptable as sufficient sureties for a bail bond;
(b) A certification issued by the head of the social welfare and
development office of the municipality or city where the accused
actually resides, that the accused is indigent;
(c) The person in custody has been arraigned;
(d) The court has notified the city or municipal sanggunian where the
accused resides of the application for recognizance. The sanggunian shall
include in its agenda the notice from the court upon receipt and act on
the request for comments or opposition to the application within ten
(10) days from receipt of the notice. The action of the sanggunian shall
be in the form of a resolution, and shall be duly approved by the mayor,
and subject to the following conditions:
(1) Any motion for the adoption of a resolution for the
purpose of this Act duly made before the sanggunian shall he
considered as an urgent matter and shall take precedence over
any other business thereof: Provided, That a special session
shall be called to consider such proposed resolution if
necessary;
The resolution of the sanggunian shall include in its resolution a
list of recommended organizations from whose members the
court may appoint a custodian.
(2) The presiding officer of the sanggunian shall ensure that its
secretary shall submit any resolution adopted under this Act
within twenty-four (24) hours from its passage to the mayor
who shall act on it within the same period of time from receipt
thereof;
(3) If the mayor or any person acting as such, pursuant to law,
fails to act on the said resolution within twenty-four (24) hours
from receipt thereof, the same shall be deemed to have been
acted upon favorably by the mayor;
(4) If the mayor or any person acting as such, pursuant to law,
disapproves the resolution, the resolution shall be returned
within twenty-four (24) hours from disapproval thereof to the
sanggunian presiding officer or secretary who shall be
responsible in informing every member thereof that the
sanggunian shall meet in special session within twenty-four (24)
hours from receipt of the veto for the sole purpose of
considering to override the veto made by the mayor.
For the purpose of this Act, the resolution of the sanggunian of
the municipality or city shall be considered final and not subject
to the review of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, a copy of which
shall be forwarded to the trial court within three (3) days from
date of resolution.
(e) The accused shall be properly documented, through such processes
as, but not limited to, photographic image reproduction of all sides of
the face and fingerprinting: Provided, That the costs involved for the
purpose of this subsection shall be shouldered by the municipality or
city that sought the release of the accused as provided herein,
chargeable to the mandatory five percent (5%) calamity fund in its
budget or to any other available fund in its treasury; and
(f) The court shall notify the public prosecutor of the date of hearing
therefor within twenty-four (24) hours from the filing of the application
for release on recognizance in favor of the accused: Provided, That such
hearing shall be held not earlier than twenty-four (24) hours nor later
than forty-eight (48) hours from the receipt of notice by the
prosecutor: Provided, further, That during said hearing, the prosecutor
shall be ready to submit the recommendations regarding the application
made under this Act, wherein no motion for postponement shall be
entertained.
Section 7. Disqualifications for Release on Recognizance. – Any of the following
circumstances shall be a valid ground for the court to disqualify an accused from
availing of the benefits provided herein:
(a) The accused bad made untruthful statements in his/her sworn
affidavit prescribed under Section 5(a);
(b) The accused is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, habitual delinquent, or
has committed a crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
(c) The accused had been found to have previously escaped from legal
confinement, evaded sentence or has violated the conditions of bail or
release on recognizance without valid justification;
(d) The accused had previously committed a crime while on probation,
parole or under conditional pardon;
(e) The personal circumstances of the accused or nature of the facts
surrounding his/her case indicate the probability of flight if released on
recognizance;
(f) There is a great risk that the accused may commit another crime
during the pendency of the case; and
(g) The accused has a pending criminal case which has the same or
higher penalty to the new crime he/she is being accused of.1âwphi1
Section 8. Qualifications of the Custodian of the Person Released on
Recognizance. – Except in cases of children in conflict with the law as provided
under Republic Act No. 9344, the custodian of the person released on
recognizance must have the following qualifications:
(a) A person of good repute and probity;
(b) A resident of the barangay where the applicant resides;
(c) Must not be a relative of the applicant within the fourth degree of
consanguinity or affinity; and
(d) Must belong to any of the following sectors and institutions: church,
academe, social welfare, health sector, cause-oriented groups, charitable
 organizations or organizations engaged in the rehabilitation of offenders
duly accredited by the local social welfare and development officer.
If no person in the barangay where the applicant resides belongs to any of the
sectors and institutions listed under paragraph (d) above, the custodian of the
person released on recognizance may be from the qualified residents of the city
or municipality where the applicant resides.
Section 9. Duty of the Custodian. – The custodian shall undertake to guarantee
the appearance of the accused whenever required by the court. The custodian
shall be required to execute an undertaking before the court to produce the
accused whenever required. The said undertaking shall be part of the application
for recognizance. The court shall duly notify, within a reasonable period of time,
the custodian whenever the presence of the accussed is required. A penalty of
six (6) months to two (2) years imprisonment shall be imposed upon the
custodian who failed to deliver or produce the accused before the court, upon
due notice, without justifiable reason.
Section 10. Role of the Probation Officer. – Upon release of the person on
recognizance to the custodian, the court shall issue an order directing the
Probation Office concerned to monitor and evaluate the activities of such
person. The Probation Office concerned shall submit a written report containing
its findings and recommendations on the activities of the person released on
recognizance on a monthly basis to determine whether or not the conditions for
his/her release have been complied with. The prosecution including the private
complainant, if any, shall be given a copy of such report.
Section 11. Arrest of a Person Released on Recognizance. – The court shall
order the arrest of the accused, who shall forthwith be placed under detention,
due to any of the following circumstances:
(a) If it finds meritorious a manifestation made under oath by any person
after a summary healing, giving the accused an opportunity to be heard;
(b) If the accused fails to appear at the trial or whenever required by the
abovementioned court or any other competent court without
justification, despite due notice;
(c) If the accused is the subject of a complaint for the commission of
another offense involving moral turpitude and the public prosecutor or
the mayor in the area where the offense is committed recommends the
arrest to the court; or
(d) If it is shown that the accused committed an act of harassment such
as, but not limited to, stalking, intimidating or otherwise vexing private
complainant, prosecutor or witnesses in the case pending against the
accused: Provided, That upon the issuance by the court of such order,
the accused shall likewise become the proper subject of a citizen’s
arrest pursuant to the Rules of Court.
Section 12. No Release on Recognizance After Final Judgment or
Commencement of Sentence; Exception. – The benefits provided under this Act
shall not be allowed in favor of an accused after the judgment has become final
or when the accused has started serving the sentence: Provided, That this
prohibition shall not apply to an accused who is entitled to the benefits of the
Probation Law if the application for probation is made before the convict starts
serving the sentence imposed, in which case, the court shall allow the release on
recognizance of the convict to the custody of a qualified member of the barangay,
city or municipality where the accused actually resides.
Section 13. Separability Clause. – If any provision of this Act or the application
of such provision to any person or circumstance is declared invalid, the
remainder of this Act or the application of such provision to other persons or
circumstances shall not be affected by such declaration.
Section 14. Repealing Clause. – All laws, decrees and orders or parts thereof
inconsistent herewith are deemed repealed or modified accordingly, unless the
same are more beneficial to the accused.
Section 15. Effectivity. – This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its
publication in the Official Gazette or in at least two (2) newspapers of general
circulation.
S. Ct. B.M. No. 2012 approved Feb. 10, 2009 on Mandatory Legal Aid
Service for Practicing Lawyers (MLAS)
PROPOSED RULE ON MANDATORY LEGAL AID SERVICE FOR
PRACTICING LAWYERS
Acting on the Memorandum dated January 27, 2009 of Justice Renato C. Corona
re: Comment of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines on our Suggested Revisions
to the Proposed Rule of Mandatory Legal Aid Service for Practicing Lawyers, the
Court Resolved to APPROVE the same.
This Resolution shall take effect on July 1, 2009 following publication of the said
Rule and its implementing regulations in at least two (2) newpapers of general
circulation.
RULE 14.02 – Providing Counsel de oficio
Rule 138 sec. 31, 20 (h), Rules of Court
Section 31. Attorneys for destitute litigants. — A court may assign an attorney
to render professional aid free of charge to any party in a case, if upon
investigation it appears that the party is destitute and unable to employ an
attorney, and that the services of counsel are necessary to secure the ends of
justice and to protect the rights of the party. It shall be the duty of the attorney
so assigned to render the required service, unless he is excused therefrom by
the court for sufficient cause shown.
Section 20 (h) – Never to reject, for any consideration personal to himself, the
cause of the defenseless or oppressed
 Rule 116 sec. 6-8
Sec. 6. Duty of court to inform accused of his right to counsel. – Before
arraignment, the court shall inform the accused of his right to counsel and ask
him if he desires to have one. Unless the accused is allowed to defend himself in
person or has employed counsel of his choice, the court must assign a counsel de
officio to defend him.
Sec. 7. Appointment of counsel de officio. – The court, considering the gravity
of the offense and the difficulty of the questions that may arise, shall appoint as
counsel de officio such members of the bar in good standing who, by reason of
their experience and ability, can competently defend the accused. But in localities
where such members of the bar are not available, the court may appoint any
person, resident of the province and of good repute for probity and ability, to
defend the accused.
Sec. 8. Time for counsel de officio to prepare for arraignment. – Whenever a
counsel de office is appointed by the court to defend the accused at the
arraignment, he shall be given a reasonable time to consult with the accused as
to his plea before proceeding with the arraignment.
Rule 124 sec. 2
Sec. 2. Appointment of counsel de officio for the accused. – If it appears from
the record of the case as transmitted that (a) the accused is confined in prison,
(b) is without counsel de parte on appeal, or (c) has signed the notice of appeal
himself, ask the clerk of court of the Court of Appeals shall designate a counsel
de officio.
An appellant who is not confined in prison may, upon request, be assigned a
counsel de officio within ten (10) days from receipt of the notice to file brief and
he establishes his right thereto.
PD 543 – Authorizing the Designation of Municipal Judges and Lawyers
in Any Branch of the Government Service to Act As Counsel de oficio
for the Accused Who Are Indigent in Places Where There Are No
Practicing Attorneys
WHEREAS, under existing law, Municipal Judges and other lawyers in the
government service are prohibited from practicing law;
WHEREAS, there are some places where there are no available legal
practitioners, as a result of which the trial of cases in court is delayed to the
prejudice particularly of detention prisoners;
WHEREAS, for the protection of the rights of the accused who cannot afford to
hire lawyers from other places and to prevent miscarriage of justice, it is
necessary that they be provided with counsel;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines,
by virtue of the powers in me vested by the Constitution as commander-in-Chief
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081,
dated September 21, 1972, and General Order No. 1, dated September 22, 1972,
as amended, do hereby order and decree as follows:
Section 1. Designation of Municipal Judges and lawyers in any branch of the
government service, as counsel de oficio. In places where there are no available
practicing lawyers, the District Judge or Circuit Criminal Court Judge shall
designate a municipal judge or a lawyer employed in any branch, subdivision or
instrumentality of the government within the province, as counsel de oficio for
an indigent person who is facing a criminal charge before his court, and the
services of such counsel de oficio shall be duly compensated by the Government
in accordance with Section thirty-two, Rule One Hundred Thirty Eight of the
Rules of Court.
If the criminal case wherein the services of a counsel de oficio are needed is
pending before a City or municipal court, the city or municipal judge concerned
shall immediately recommend to the nearest District Judge the appointment of a
counsel de oficio, and the District Judge shall forthwith appoint one in
accordance with the preceding paragraph.
For purposes of this Decree an indigent person is anyone who has no visible
means of support or whose income does not exceed P300 per month or whose
income even in excess of P300 is insufficient for the subsistence of his family,
which fact shall be determined by the Judge in whose court the case is pending,
taking into account the number of the members of his family dependent upon
him for subsistence.
Section 2. Repealing Clause. All laws and decrees inconsistent with this Decree
are hereby repealed.
Section 3. Effectivity. This Decree shall take effect immediately.
RULE 14.03 – Valid ground for refusal
RULE 14.04 - Same Standard of Conduct for Paying and Non-Paying
Clients – Draft of the Proposed Implementing Regulations on the Rule on
Comprehensive Legal Aid Service
RA 6033 – AN ACT REQUIRING COURTS TO GIVE PREFERENCE
TO CRIMINAL CASES WHERE THE PARTY OR PARTIES INVOLVE
ARE INDIGENTS.
Section 1. Any provision of existing law to be contrary notwithstanding and
with the exception of habeas corpus and election cases and cases involving
detention prisoners, and persons covered by Republic Act Numbered Four
thousand nine hundred eight, all courts shall give preference to the hearing
and/or disposition of criminal cases where an indigent is involved either as the
offended party or accused. The trial in these cases shall commence within three
days from date of arraignment and no postponement of the hearings shall be
granted except on the ground of illness of the accused or other similar justifiable
grounds. City and provincial fiscals and courts shall forthwith conduct the
preliminary investigation of a criminal case involving an indigent within three days
after its filing and shall terminate the same within two weeks.
Section 2. As used in this Act, the term "indigent" shall refer to a person who
has no visible means of income or whose income is insufficient for the
subsistence of his family, to be determined by the fiscal or judge, taking into
account the members of his family dependent upon him for subsistence.
Section 3. An indigent who is the offended party, respondent or an accused in a
criminal case and who desires to avail of the preference granted under this Act
shall file a sworn statement of the fact of his being indigent and the said sworn
statement shall be sufficient basis for the court or fiscal to give preference to the
trial and disposition of such criminal case.
Section 4. Any willful or malicious refusal on the part of any fiscal or judge to
carry out the provisions of this Act shall constitute sufficient ground for
disciplinary action which may include suspension or removal.
Section 5. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
RA 6034 AN ACT PROVIDING TRANSPORTATION AND OTHER
ALLOWANCES FOR INDIGENT LITIGANTS.
Section 1. Any provision of existing law to the contrary notwithstanding, any
indigent litigant may, upon motion, ask the Court for adequate travel allowance
to enable him and his indigent witnesses to attendant the hearing of a criminal
case commenced by his complaint or filed against him. The allowance shall cover
actual transportation expenses by the cheapest means from his place of
residence to the court and back. When the hearing of the case requires the
presence of the indigent litigant and/or his indigent witnesses in court the whole
day or for two or more consecutive days, allowances may, in the discretion of
the Court, also cover reasonable expenses for meal and lodging.
For the purpose of this Act, indigent litigants shall include anyone who has no
visible means of income or whose income is insufficient for his family as
determined by the Court under Section 2, hereof.
Section 2. If the court determines that the petition for transportation allowance
is meritorious, said court shall immediately issue an order directing the
provincial, city or municipal treasurer to pay the indigent litigant the travel
allowance out of any funds in his possession and proceed without delay to the
trial of the case. The provincial, city or municipal treasurer shall hold any such
payments as cash items until reimbursed by the national government.
Section 3. All payments of travel allowances made by provincial, city and
municipal treasurer under this Act as of October 31 each year, shall be
transmitted to the Commissioner of the Budget not later than November 30
each year for inclusion in the annual General Appropriations Act. The necessary
sum is hereby authorized to be appropriated out of the funds in the National
Treasury not otherwise appropriated.
Section 4. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
RA 6035 AN ACT REQUIRING STENOGRAPHERS TO GIVE FREE
TRANSCRIPT OF NOTES TO INDIGENT AND LOW INCOME
LITIGANTS AND PROVIDING A PENALTY FOR THE VIOLATION
THEREOF.
Section 1. A stenographer who has attended a hearing before an investigating
fiscal or trial judge or hearing commissioner of any quasi-judicial body or
administrative tribunal and has officially taken notes of the proceeding thereof
shall, upon written request of an indigent or low income litigant, his counsel or
duly authorized representative in the case concerned, give within a reasonable
period to be determined by the fiscal, judge, commissioner or tribunal hearing
the case, a free certified transcript of notes take by him on the case.
Section 2. A litigant who desires to avail himself of the privilege granted under
Section one hereof shall, at the investigation, hearing, or trial, establish his status
as an indigent or low income litigant and the investigating fiscal or judge or
commissioner or tribunal hearing the case shall resolve the same in the same
proceeding.
For the purpose of this Act, an "indigent or low income litigant" shall include
anyone who has no visible means of support or whose income does not exceed
P300 per month or whose income even in excess of P300 per month is
insufficient for the subsistence of his family, which fact shall be determined by the
investigating fiscal or trial judge or commissioner or tribunal hearing the case
taking into account the number of the members of his family dependent upon
him for subsistence.
Section 3. Any stenographer who, after due hearing in accordance with the
pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 2260, as amended, has been found to
have violated the provisions of Section one of this Act or has unreasonable
delayed the giving of a free certified transcript of notes to an indigent or low
income litigant shall be subject to the following disciplinary actions:
(a) suspension from office for a period not exceeding thirty (30) days
upon finding of guilt for the first time;
(b) suspension from office for not less than thirty (30) days and not
more than sixty (60) days upon finding of guilt for the second time; and
(c) removal from office upon finding of guilt for the third time.
Section 4. This Act shall apply to all indigent or low income litigants who, at the
time of its approval, have pending cases in any fiscal office, court, or quasi-judicial
body or administrative tribunal.
Section 5. The Department of Justice shall prescribe such rules and regulations
as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act, and the Department
Head concerned shall provide the necessary supplies and authorize the use of
government equipment by the stenographers concerned.
Section 6. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
 RA 6036 AN ACT PROVIDING THAT BAIL SHALL NOT, WITH
CERTAIN EXCEPTIONS, BE REQUIRED IN CASES OF
VIOLATIONS OF MUNICIPAL OR CITY ORDINANCES AND IN
CRIMINAL OFFENSES WHEN THE PRESCRIBED PENALTY FOR
SUCH OFFENSES IS NOT HIGHER THAN ARRESTO MAYOR
AND/OR A FINE OF TWO THOUSAND PESOS OR BOTH.
Section 1. Any provision of existing law to the contrary notwithstanding, bail
shall not be required of a person charged with violation of a municipal or city
ordinance, a light felony and/or a criminal offense the prescribed penalty for
which is not higher than six months imprisonment and/or a fine of two thousand
pesos, or both, where said person has established to the satisfaction of the court
or any other appropriate authority hearing his case that he is unable to post the
required cash or bail bond, except in the following cases:
(a) When he is caught committing the offense in flagranti;
(b) When he confesses to the commission of the offense unless the
confession is later repudiated by him in a sworn statement or in open
court as having been extracted through force or intimidation;
(c) When he is found to have previously escaped from legal
confinement, evaded sentence, or jumped bail;
(d) When he is found to have previously violated the provisions of
Section 2 hereof;
(e) When he is found to be a recidivist or a habitual delinquent or has
been previously convicted for an offense to which the law or ordinance
attaches an equal or greater penalty or for two or more offenses to
which it attaches a lighter penalty;
(f) When he commits the offense while on parole or under conditional
pardon; and
(g) When the accused has previously been pardoned by the municipal or
city mayor for violation of municipal or city ordinance for at least two
times.
Section 2. Instead of bail, the person charged with any offense contemplated by
Section 1 hereof shall be required to sign in the presence of two witnesses of
good standing in the community a sworn statement binding himself, pending final
decision of his case, to report to the Clerk of the Court hearing his case
periodically every two weeks. The Court may, in its discretion and with the
consent of the person charged, require further that he be placed under the
custody and subject to the authority of a responsible citizen in the community
who may be willing to accept the responsibility. In such a case the affidavit herein
mentioned shall include a statement of the person charged that he binds himself
to accept the authority of the citizen so appointed by the Court. The Clerk of
Court shall immediately report the presence of the accused person to the Court.
Except when his failure to report is for justifiable reasons including circumstances
beyond his control to be determined by the Court, any violation of this sworn
statement shall justify the Court to order his immediate arrest unless he files bail
in the amount forthwith fixed by the Court.
Section 3. This Act shall apply to all person who, at the time of its approval, are
under temporary detention for inability to post bail for charges contemplated by
Section 1 above.
Section 4. This Act shall take effect upon its approval
RULE ON THE EXEMPTION FROM THE PAYMENT OF LEGAL
FEES OF THE CLIENTS OF THE NATIONAL LEGAL AID
COMMITTEE (NCLA) AND OF THE LEGAL AID OFFICES IN THE
LOCAL CHAPTERS OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE
PHILIPPINES (IBP)
RESOLUTION
Pursuant to En Banc Resolution in A.M. No. 08-11-7-SC dated August 28, 2009,
the Court Resolved to APPROVE A.M. No. 08-11-7-SC (IRR): Re Rule on the
Exemption From the Payment of Legal Fees of the Clients of the National Legal
Aid Committee (NCLA) and of the Legal Aid Offices in the Local Chapters of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).
The Rule on the Exemption From the Payment of Legal Fees of the Clients of the
NCLA and of the Legal Aid Offices in the Local Chapters of the IBP shall take
effect after fifteen days following its publication in a newspaper of general
circulation.
RA 9406 (2007), sec. 16-D
SEC. 16-D. Exemption from Fees and Costs of the Suit. - The clients of the
PAO shall exempt from payment of docket and other fees incidental to
instituting an action in court and other quasi-judicial bodies, as an original
proceeding or on appeal.
"The costs of the suit, attorney's fees and contingent fees imposed upon the
adversary of the PAO clients after a successful litigation shall be deposited in the
National Treasury as trust fund and shall be disbursed for special allowances of
authorized officials and lawyers of the PAO."
CANON 15 OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY
Rule 138 sec. 3, Rules of Court
Section 3. Requirements for lawyers who are citizens of the United States of
America. — Citizens of the United States of America who, before July 4, 1946,
were duly licensed members of the Philippine Bar, in active practice in the courts
of the Philippines and in good and regular standing as such may, upon satisfactory
proof of those facts before the Supreme Court, be allowed to continue such
practice after taking the following oath of office:
I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ., having been permitted to continue in
the practice of law in the Philippines, do solemnly swear that I recognize
the supreme authority of the Republic of the Philippines; I will support
its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly
 constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to
the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue
any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the
same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself
as a lawyer according to the best of may knowledge and discretion with
all good fidelity as well as to the courts as to my clients; and I impose
upon myself this voluntary obligation without any mental reservation or
purpose of evasion. So help me God.
RULE 15.01 and RULE 15.03 – Conflict of Interest
Hornilla v Salunat (2003; Ynares-Santiago)
Summary
Atty. Salunat is the counsel of PPSTA. However, when members of said PPSTA
filed a suit against its Board of Directors, Atty. Salunat represented said Board
against the members. The court considered this as a violation of the ban against
conflicting interests.
PENALTY: Admonished + warning
Facts:
Complainants, who are members of the PPSTA, filed
 an intra-corporate case against its members of the Board of Directors
for the terms 1992-1995 and 1995-1997 before the SEC; and
 a complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman for unlawful
spending and the undervalued sale of real property of the PPSTA.
Respondent entered his appearance as counsel for the PPSTA Board
members in the said cases.
Complainants contend that respondent was guilty of conflict of interest because:
 he was engaged by the PPSTA, which complainants are members
 being paid out of PPSTA corporate funds where complainants have
contributed.
Despite being told by PPSTA members of the said conflict of interest, respondent
refused to withdraw his appearance in the said cases.
Complainants aver that respondent violated Rule 15.06 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility when he appeared at the meeting of the PPSTA
Board and assured its members that he will win the PPSTA cases.
Respondent answered
 he entered his appearance as counsel for the PPSTA Board Members for
and in behalf of the ASSA Law and Associates.
 As a partner in the said law firm, he only filed a Manifestation of
Extreme Urgency in OMB Case No. 0-97-0695.
 On the other hand, SEC Case No. 05-97-5657 was handled by another
partner of the firm, Atty. Agustin V. Agustin.
 Respondent claims that it was complainant Atty. Ricafort who
instigated, orchestrated and indiscriminately filed the said cases
against members of the PPSTA and its Board.
 Relationship to Aurelio S. Salunat was immaterial
o when he entered into the retainer contract with the PPSTA Board,
he did so, not in his individual capacity, but in representation of the
ASSA Law Firm
 Denied that he ensured the victory of the PPSTA Board in the case he was
handling
o merely assured the Board that the truth will come out and
o the case before the Ombudsman will be dismissed for lack
of jurisdiction, considering that respondents therein are not
public officials, but private employees.
 Anent the SEC case, respondent alleged that the same was being handled
by the law firm of Atty. Eduardo de Mesa, and not ASSA.
By way of Special and Affirmative Defenses, respondent averred that
complainant Atty. Ricafort was himself guilty of gross violation of his oath of
office amounting to gross misconduct, malpractice and unethical conduct
for filing trumped-up charges against him and Atty. De Mesa.
 Prayed that complaint against him be dismissed and, instead, complainant
Ricafort be disciplined or disbarred.
After investigation, Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro recommended that respondent
be suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months.
 The Board of Governors thereafter adopted Resolution approving the
report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.
Respondent filed with this Court a Motion for Reconsideration of the above
Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors.
Issue:
WON a lawyer engaged by a corporation defend members of the board of
the same corporation in a derivative suit? NO.
Held:
Conflict of interest
 when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more opposing
parties
 This rule covers not only cases in which confidential communications have
been confided, but also those in which no confidence has been bestowed or
will be used
  if the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to perform
an act which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he
represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation
to use against his first client any knowledge acquired through their
connection
Tests
1. whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyers duty to fight for an issue
or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client.
 Basically, if he argues for one client, this argument will be opposed
by him when he argues for the other client.
2. whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full
discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite
suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance thereof
Corporations board of directors is understood to be that body which:
 exercises all powers provided for under the Corporation Code;
 conducts all business of the corporation; and
 controls and holds all property of the corporation.
 Its members have been characterized as trustees or directors clothed with
a fiduciary character. It is clearly separate and distinct from the
corporate entity itself.
Where corporate directors have committed a breach of trust and the
corporation is unable or unwilling to institute suit to remedy the wrong
 a stockholder may sue on behalf of himself and other stockholders
and for the benefit of the corporation, to bring about a redress of the
wrong done directly to the corporation and indirectly to the stockholders
(derivative suit)
 Settled is the doctrine that in a derivative suit, the corporation is the real
party in interest while the stockholder filing suit for the
corporation’s behalf is only nominal party.
o The corporation should be included as a party in the suit.
The possibility for conflict of interest here is universally recognized.
 Although early cases found joint representation permissible where no
conflict of interest was obvious
o the emerging rule is against dual representation in all derivative
actions.
o Outside counsel must thus be retained to represent one of
the defendants.
o this restriction on dual representation should not be waivable
by consent in the usual way; the corporation should be
presumptively incapable of giving valid consent
The interest of the corporate client is paramount and should not be influenced
by any interest of the individual corporate officials.
Records show that SEC Case No. 05-97-5657, entitled Philippine Public School
Teachers Assn., Inc., et al. v. 1992-1995 Board of Directors of the Philippine Public
School Teachers Assn. (PPSTA), et al., was filed by the PPSTA against its own Board
of Directors.
 Respondent admits that the ASSA Law Firm, of which he is the Managing
Partner, was the retained counsel of PPSTA.
 Yet, he appeared as counsel of record for the respondent Board of Directors
in the said case.
 Guilty of conflict of interest when he represented the parties against whom
his other client, the PPSTA, filed suit.
Respondents argues that he only represented the Board of Directors in OMB Case
No. 0-97-0695
 By filing the said pleading, he necessarily entered his appearance therein.
 Again, this constituted conflict of interests, considering that the complaint in
the Ombudsman, albeit in the name of the individual members of the PPSTA,
was brought in behalf of and to protect the interest of the corporation.
Considering however, that this is his first offense, we find the penalty of suspension,
recommended in IBP Resolution to be too harsh. Instead, we resolve to admonish
respondent to observe a higher degree of fidelity in the practice of his profession.
Gonzales v Cabucana (2006; Austria-Martinez)
Summary
Leticia Gonzales won a civil case in which she was represented by the Cabucana,
Cabucana, De Guzman, and Cabucana Law Office. Gonzales filed an
administrative complaint and criminal cases against Sheriff Romeo Gatcheco and
his wife for failure to implement the writ of execution and threats made against
her. Atty. Marcelino Cabucana, Jr., member of the law firm and brother of Atty.
Edmar Cabucana, agreed to become the lawyer for the Gatchecos in the
administrative and criminal cases. This caused Gonzales to file a disbarment case
against him.
PENALTY: P 2,000 fine and Stern warning
Facts
Before this Court is a complaint filed by Leticia Gonzales praying that Atty.
Marcelino Cabucana be disbarred for representing conflicting interests.
Gonzales filed a petition before IBP alleging that:
 she was the complainant in a case for sum of money and damages
filed before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Santiago City
  she was represented by the law firm CABUCANA, CABUCANA, DE
GUZMAN AND CABUCANA LAW OFFICE, with Atty. Edmar
Cabucana handling the case and herein respondent as an
associate/partner;
 Decision was rendered in the civil case ordering the losing party to pay
Gonzales the amount of P17,310.00 with interest and P6,000.00 as attorneys
fees;
Sheriff Romeo Gatcheco, failed to fully implement the writ of
execution issued in connection with the judgment which prompted Gonzales
to file a complaint against the said sheriff with this Court
 Sheriff Gatcheco and his wife went to the house of Gonzales
 harassed Gonzales and asked her to execute an affidavit of desistance
regarding her complaint before this Court
 Gonzales thereafter filed against the Gatchecos criminal cases for trespass,
grave threats, grave oral defamation, simple coercion and unjust vexation
Notwithstanding the pendency of Civil Case No. 1-567, where respondent’s law
firm was still representing Gonzales, herein respondent represented the
Gatchecos in the cases filed by Gonzales against the said spouses
 respondent should be disbarred
 violates the lawyer-client relationship between complainant and respondents
law firm
 renders respondent liable under the Code of Professional Responsibility
Rules 10.01, 13.01, 15.02, 15.03, 21.01 and 21.02.
IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline ordered Atty. Marcelino Cabucana, Jr. to submit
his Answer to the complaint
In his Answer, respondent averred
 never appeared and represented complainant
o it was his brother, Atty. Edmar Cabucana who appeared
and represented Gonzales
 admitted that he is representing Sheriff Gatcheco and his wife in the cases
filed against them but his appearance is pro bono and that the spouses
pleaded with him as no other counsel was willing to take their case
 entered his appearance in good faith and opted to represent the spouses
rather than leave them defenseless
 the spouses said that the cases filed against them by Gonzales were merely
instigated by a high ranking official who wanted to get even with
them for their refusal to testify in favor of the said official in another case.
 At first, respondent declined to serve as counsel of the spouses as he too
did not want to incur the ire of the high-ranking official, but after realizing
that he would be abdicating a sworn duty to delay no man for money or
malice, respondent entered his appearance as defense counsel of the spouses
free of any charge.
o present complaint was crafted against respondent
o now the subject of a demolition job.
 The civil case filed by Gonzales where respondents brother served as
counsel is different and distinct from the criminal cases filed by complainant
against the Gatcheco spouses, thus, he did not violate any canon on legal
ethics.
Gonzales filed a Reply contending that:
 the civil case handled by respondent’s brother is closely connected
with the cases of the Gatchecos which the respondent is handling;
 claim of respondent that he is handling the cases of the spouses pro bono is
not true since he has his own agenda in offering his services to the
spouses;
 allegation that she is filing the cases against the spouses because she is being
used by a powerful person is not true since she filed the said cases out of
her own free will.
The Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP sent to the parties a Notice of
Mandatory Conference
 only a representative of complainant appeared.
 Commissioner Demaree Raval of the IBP-CBD then directed both parties
to file their respective verified position papers.
Complainant filed a Memorandum reiterating her earlier assertions and added that:
 respondent prepared and notarized counter-affidavits of the Gatcheco
spouses;
 that the high-ranking official referred to by respondent is Judge Ruben Plata
and the accusations of respondent against the said judge is an attack against
a brother in the profession which is a violation of the CPR;
 respondent continues to use the name of De Guzman in their law firm
despite the fact that said partner has already been appointed as Assistant
Prosecutor of Santiago City, again in violation of the CPR.
Respondent filed his Position Paper restating his allegations in his Answer.
Commissioner Wilfredo E.J.E. Reyes issued an Order notifying both parties to appear
before his office for a clarificatory question regarding said case
 only respondent appeared presenting a sworn affidavit executed by
Gonzales withdrawing her complaint against respondent
Commissioner Reyes issued an Order requiring Gonzales to appear before him to
affirm her statements and to be subject to clarificatory questioning
 However, none of the parties appeared

On February 24, 2005, Commissioner Reyes submitted his Report and
Recommendation
 recommended that Atty. Marcelino C. Cabucana, Jr. (be) sternly warned and
reprimanded
Resolution was passed by the Board of Governors of the IBP
 ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of
the Investigating Commissioner
Before going to the merits, let it be clarified that contrary to the report of
Commissioner Reyes, respondent did not only represent the Gatcheco
spouses in the administrative case filed by Gonzales against them. As respondent
himself narrated in his Position Paper, he likewise acted as their counsel in the
criminal cases filed by Gonzales against them
Issue
WON respondent is guilty of violating Rule 15.03 of Canon 15 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility? YES
Ruling:
It is well-settled that a lawyer is barred from representing conflicting interests except
by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts
 founded on principles of public policy and good taste as the nature of the
lawyer-client relations is one of trust and confidence of the highest degree
 Lawyers are expected not only to keep inviolate the clients confidence, but
also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing for only then
can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which
is of paramount importance in the administration of justice.[26]
Test of inconsistency of interests: whether the acceptance of a new relation
would prevent the full discharge of the lawyers duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty
to the client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance
of that duty
Rebuttal to claims of respondent
1. the civil case handled by their law firm where Gonzales is the complainant and
the criminal cases filed by Gonzales against the Gacheco spouses are not
related
 The representation of opposing clients in said cases, though unrelated,
constitutes conflict of interests or, at the very least, invites
suspicion of double-dealing which this Court cannot allow.
2. it was his brother who represented Gonzales in the civil case and not
him, thus, there could be no conflict of interests. We do not agree.
 it was their law firm which represented Gonzales in the civil case. Such being
the case, the rule against representing conflicting interests applies.
3. Respondents acted in good faith and with honest intention
 does not render the prohibition inoperative.
4. he could not turn down the spouses as no other lawyer is willing to take
their case cannot prosper
 it is settled that while there may be instances where lawyers cannot decline
representation they cannot be made to labor under conflict of
interest between a present client and a prospective one.
 Granting also that there really was no other lawyer who could handle the
spouses case other than him
o should have observed the requirements laid down by the
rules by conferring with the prospective client to ascertain as soon
as practicable whether the matter would involve a conflict with
another client then seek the written consent of all concerned after
a full disclosure of the facts.
We note the affidavit of desistance filed by Gonzales.
 HOWEVER, we are not bound by such desistance as the present case
involves public interest. Indeed, the Courts exercise of its power to
We shall consider however as mitigating circumstances the fact that
 he is representing the Gatcheco spouses pro bono and
 it was his firm and not respondent personally, which handled the civil
case of Gonzales.
o Atty. Edmar Cabucana signed the civil case of complainant by stating
first the name of the law firm CABUCANA, CABUCANA, DE
GUZMAN AND CABUCANA LAW OFFICE, under which, his
name and signature appear
o while herein respondent signed the pleadings for the Gatcheco
spouses only with his name without any mention of the law firm
 observation of the IBP Commissioner Reyes that there
was no malice and bad faith in respondents acceptance
of the Gatcheco’s cases as shown by the move of
complainant to withdraw the case.
Thus, for violation of Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
and taking into consideration the aforementioned mitigating circumstances, we
impose the penalty of fine of P2,000.00.
De Guzman v De dios (2001; Pardo)
Summary
Complainant engaged services of the lawyer in forming the SBHI Corporation.
Lawyer also appeared as counsel for the SBHI Corporation when the shares of
the complainant was declared delinquent and was sold at an auction. The
respondent lawyer became a member of the Board of Directors while
complainant was completely ousted from the corporation.
PENALTY: suspension for 6 months

Facts
The case before the Court is a complaint for disbarment against Atty. Lourdes
I. De Dios on the ground of violation of Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the code of
Professional Responsibility, for representing conflicting interests, and of
Article 1491 Civil Code, for acquiring property in litigation.
Complainant engaged the services of respondent as counsel in order to form
a corporation (hotel and restaurant business in Olongapo City)
With the assistance of Atty. De Dios, complainant registered Suzuki Beach
Hotel, Inc. (SBHI) with the SEC
Complainant paid on respondent a monthly retainer fee of P5,000.00.
Corporation required complainant to pay her unpaid subscribed shares of stock
(P2,235,000.00) or 22,350 shares
Complainant received notice of the public auction sale of her delinquent shares
and a copy of a board resolution authorizing such sale
 Complainant soon learned that her shares had been acquired by Ramon
del Rosario, one of the incorporators of SBHI.
 The sale ousted complainant from the corporation
completely. While respondent rose to be president of the corporation,
complainant lost all her life’s savings invested therein.
Complainant alleged that she relied on the advice of Atty. De Dios and believed
that as the majority stockholder, Atty. de Dios would help her with the management
of the corporation.
 respondent appeared as her counsel and signed pleadings in a case where
complainant was one of the parties.
Respondent, however, explained
 she only appeared because the property involved belonged to SBHI.
 Respondent alleged that complainant misunderstood the role of respondent
as legal counsel of Suzuki Beach Hotel, Inc.
o appearance as counsel for complainant Diana de Guzman was to
protect the rights and interest of SBHI since the latter was real
owner of the land in controversy.
 land on which the resort was established belonged to the Japanese
incorporators, not to complainant.
o The relationship of the complainant and the Japanese investors
turned sour because complainant misappropriated the funds and
property of the corporation.
o To save the corporation from bankruptcy, respondent advised all
concerned stockholders that it was proper to call for the payment
of unpaid subscriptions and subsequent sale of the delinquent
shares.
 lead to the auction of the unpaid shares of complainant
and hence, the ouster of complainant from the
corporation.
Meantime, Mr. Del Rosario transferred 100 shares to respondent in payment of legal
services as evidenced by a Deed of Waiver and Transfer of corporate Shares of Stock.
Integrated Bar of the Philippines issued a resolution finding that the acts of
respondent were not motivated by ill will as she acts in the best interest of
her client, SBHI.
 complainant failed to present convincing proof of her attorney-client
relationship with respondent other than the pleadings respondent filed in
the trial court where complainant was one of the parties.
Issue
WON there was conflict of interest? YES
Ruling
Complainant subscribed to 29,800 shares (P2,980,000.00).
 She was the majority stockholder.
 Out of the subscribed shares, she paid up P745,000.00 during the stage of
incorporation.
How complainant got ousted from the corporation considering the amount she had
invested in it is beyond us.
 Granting that the sale of her delinquent shares was valid, what happened to
her original shares?
Respondent claims that there was no attorney-client relationship between her
and complainant.
 It was complainant who retained respondent to form a corporation.
 She appeared as counsel in behalf of complainant.
There was evidence of collusion between the board of directors and respondent
 board of directors included respondent as the president, Ramon del Rosario
as secretary, Hikoi Suzuki as chairman, Agnes Rodriguez as treasurer and
Takayuki Sato as director
 clear case of conflict of interest of the respondent.
 Perez v de la Torre (2006; Ynares-Santiago)
Summary
Respondent offered his services to the suspects, who did not know that he was
representing the victim’s family.
PENALTY: suspension for 3 years
Facts
Nestor Perez charged respondent Atty. Danilo de la Torre with misconduct
or conduct unbecoming of a lawyer for representing conflicting interests.
Perez alleged that:
 he is the barangay captain of Binanuaanan, Calabanga, Camarines Sur
 several suspects for murder and kidnapping for ransom, among them
Sonny Boy Ilo and Diego Avila, were apprehended and jailed by the police
authorities
 respondent went to the municipal building of Calabanga where Ilo and Avila
were being detained and made representations that he could secure
their freedom if they sign the prepared extrajudicial confessions
o unknown to the two accused, respondent was representing
the heirs of the murder victim;
o that on the strength of the extrajudicial confessions, cases were
filed against them, including herein complainant who was
implicated in the extrajudicial confessions as the
mastermind in the criminal activities for which they were being
charged.
Respondent denied the accusations against him. He explained that:
 while being detained at the Calabanga Municipal Police Jail, Avila sought
his assistance in drafting an extrajudicial confession regarding his
involvement in the crimes of kidnapping for ransom, murder and robbery.
 He advised Avila to inform his parents about his decision to make an
extrajudicial confession, apprised him of his constitutional rights and of the
possibility that he might be utilized as a state-witness.
 when Ilo sought his assistance in executing his extrajudicial confession, he
conferred with Ilo in the presence of his parents; and only after he was
convinced that Ilo was not under undue compulsion did he assist the accused
in executing the extrajudicial confession.
The complaint was referred to IBP for investigation, report and recommendation
 recommended that Atty. Danilo de la Torre be 1 year
 Board of Governors of the IBP modified the recommendation by increasing
the period of suspension to two years.
Ruling:
To negate any culpability, respondent explained that he did not offer his legal
services to accused Avila and Ilo but it was the two accused who sought
his assistance in executing their extrajudicial confessions.
 Nonetheless, he acceded to their request to act as counsel after apprising
them of their constitutional rights and after being convinced that the accused
were under no compulsion to give their confession.
The excuse proferred by the respondent does not exonerate him from the clear
violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
prohibits a lawyer from representing conflicting interests except by written consent
of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
 at the time respondent was representing Avila and Ilo, two of the accused
in the murder of the victim Resurreccion Barrios, he was representing
the family of the murder victim.
What is unsettling is that respondent assisted in the execution by the two
accused of their confessions whereby they admitted their participation in various
serious criminal offenses knowing fully well that he was retained previously by the
heirs of one of the victims.
Considering that this is respondents first infraction, disbarment as sought by
the complaint is deemed to be too severe. Under the present circumstances,
we find that a suspension from the practice of law for three years is warranted.
Heirs of Falame v Baguio (2008; Tinga)
Summary
Atty. Baguio represented two parties in two different cases. However, the party
he represented in the first case became the party he was opposing in the second
case.
PENALTY: Reprimand
Facts
In Petition for Review is the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors
dismissing the disbarment complaint filed by the Heirs of Lydio Jerry
Falame (complainants) against Atty. Edgar J. Baguio (respondent),
In their Complaint, complainants alleged that
 their father, the late Lydio Jerry Falame, engaged the services of
respondent to represent him in an action for forcible entry
 o Heirs of Emilio T. Sy, represented by Anastacia Velayo Vda. De Sy
and
o Belen V. Sy vs. Lydio Jerry Falame, Raleigh Falame and Four (4) John
Does)
Complainants recounted that respondent, as counsel for the defendants, filed the
answer to the complaint in the first civil case.
 Subsequently, when the parties to the first civil case were required to file
their respective position papers, respondent used and submitted in evidence
the following:
o a special power of attorney executed by Lydio in favor of his
brother, Raleigh Falame, appointing the latter to be his attorney-in-
fact; and
o the affidavit of Raleigh Falame executed before respondent, in
which Raleigh stated that Lydio owned the property subject of the
first civil case
In representation of spouses Raleigh and Noemi Falame, respondent filed
a case against complainants allegedly involving the property subject of the first
civil case before the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City, Branch 6.
 sought the declaration of nullity of the deed of sale, its registration
in the registry of deeds, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 20241
issued as a consequence of the registration of the deed of sale, and the real
estate mortgage on the said property
 prayed for specific performance and reconveyance or legal
redemption and damages with preliminary injunction and restraining
order.
Complainants claimed that:
1. By acting as counsel for the spouses Falame in the second civil case
wherein they were impleaded as defendants
 respondent violated his oath of office and duty as an attorney.
 spouses Falames interests are adverse to those of his former client, Lydio.
2. respondent knowingly made false statements of fact in the complaint in the
second civil case to mislead the trial court.
 violated paragraph (d), Section 20 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court
3. Second civil case is baseless and fabricated suit
 Specifically, they averred that respondent filed the case for
the sole purpose of retaining, maintaining and/or withholding the
possession of the subject property from complainants
who are its true owners.
 Violated paragraph (g), Section 20 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
Respondent controverted complainant’s allegations.
1. it was only Raleigh Falame who personally engaged his legal services for
him and on Lydios behalf
2. signed the jurat in Raleighs affidavit, which was submitted as evidence in the first
civil case, believing to the best of his knowledge that there is good ground to
support it.
3. did not betray the confidence reposed in him by Lydio as the latters
counsel in the first civil case
 did not reveal or use any fact he acquired knowledge of during the existence
of the attorney-client relation in the first civil case
4. he did not knowingly make any misleading or untruthful statement of
fact in the complaint in the second civil case and neither did he employ any
means inconsistent with truth and honor in the hearing of the case.
5. averred that Lydio had not retained him as counsel in any case or transaction.
 Stressing the long interval of twelve years separating the
termination of the first civil case and his acceptance of the second
civil case
 respondent pointed out that the
o first civil case  not between Lydio and Raleigh but rather
between the heirs of Emilio T. Sy on one hand
and Lydio and Raleigh on the other where physical possession
of property was at stake.
o second civil case  involving the spouses Raleigh and
Noemi Falame as plaintiffs, and Melba, Leo and Jerry Jr., all
surnamed Falame, and Sugni Realty Holdings and Development
Corporation, as defendants case which arose from the wrongful
acts committed by Melba, Leo and Jerry Jr. after Lydios death.
6. second civil case was still pending before the trial court, the IBP had no
jurisdiction over the instant administrative case.
 He added that complainants filed this administrative case
when Raleigh could no longer testify in his own favor as he had died
a year earlier.
In their Position Paper, complainants claimed that respondent violated Rule
15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility when he represented the
cause of the spouses Falame against that of his former client, Lydio.
IBP Board of Governors passed a Resolution adopting and approving Investigating
Commissioner Winston D. Abuyuan’s report and recommendation for the dismissal
of this administrative case
 charge lacks specification as to what part of the lawyers oath was violated
by the respondent and what confidence was disclosed
 In administrative complaints for disbarment or suspension against lawyers,
the complainant must specify in the affidavit-complaint the alleged secrets or
confidential information disclosed or will be disclosed in the professional
employment
 Civil Case No. 5568, which was commenced three years since the
complainants became owners of Lydio Falame’s properties
 o The complainants are sued not on the basis of the acts,
rights, obligations and interest of Lydio Falame on the
material possession of the improvements found on Lot
345 litigated nor even on such land itself, but rather on the
facts alleged in the second amended and supplemental
complaint which give rise to their cause of action against
them.
 The other allegations of the complainants that the respondent
violated paragraph (d), Section 20 of Rule 139, Rules of Court, and
his lawyers oath when he allegedly betrayed the trust and
confidence of his former client
o It is beyond the competence of the complainants to
conclude and is outside the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Commission to rule as to whether or nor (sic) the
complaint in Civil Case No.5568 is baseless or fabricated.
o It is only the Honorable Court which has the exclusive
jurisdiction to determine the same and cannot be the
subject of an administrative complaint against the
respondent.
Dissatisfied, complainants filed the instant petition for review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court reiterating their allegations in the complaint and their position paper.
 Also assert that the IBP erred in holding that the instant administrative
complaint had been filed out of time since it was filed 3 years, 4 months and
16 days after the second civil case was filed on
 invoke the Courts ruling in Frias v. Bautista-Lozada to support their
contention that administrative complaints against members of the bar do not
prescribe
Ruling
At the outset, the Court holds that the instant administrative action is not
barred by prescription.
 Calo, Jr. v. Degamo
o The ordinary statutes of limitation have no application to
disbarment proceedings, nor does the circumstance that
the facts set up as a ground for disbarment constitute a
crime, prosecution for which in a criminal proceeding is barred by
limitation, affect the disbarment proceeding
o reaffirmed in the relatively recent case of Frias v. Bautista-Lozada
 Rule VII, Section 1 of the Rules of Procedure of the CBD-
IBP, which provides for a prescriptive period for the filing
of administrative complaints against lawyers, should be
struck down as void and of no legal effect for
being ultra vires.
Prescinding from the unavailability of the defense of prescription, the Court concurs
with the Investigating Commissioners opinion that some of the charges raised by
complainants in their complaint are unsubstantiated.
 There is, however, sufficient basis to hold respondent accountable
for violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
o not raised in the initiatory pleading
o put forward in complainants position paper filed with the IBP and
in the petition filed with the Court.
o In fact, respondent proffered his defenses to the charge in his
position paper before the IBP and likewise in his comment before
the Court.
 he denied having Lydio as his client
The termination of attorney-client relation provides no justification for a
lawyer to represent an interest adverse to or in conflict with that of the
former client.
 Client’s confidence once reposed should not be divested by mere expiration
of professional employment.
In relation to this, Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
provides that a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and shall be
mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on him.
 highest and most unquestioned duty is to protect the client at all hazards
and costs even to himself.
 The protection given to the client is perpetual and does not cease
with the termination of the litigation, nor is it affected by the
party's ceasing to employ the attorney and retaining another, or
by any other change of relation between them. It even survives the
death of the client.
In the case at bar, respondent admitted having jointly represented Lydio and
Raleigh as defendants in the first civil case.
 Evidently, the attorney-client relation between Lydio and respondent was
established despite the fact that it was only Raleigh who paid him
 The case of Hilado v. David tells us that it is immaterial whether
such employment was paid, promised or charged for.
As defense counsel in the first civil case, respondent advocated the stance
that Lydio solely owned the property subject of the case. In the second civil case
involving the same property, respondent, as counsel for Raleigh and his spouse, has
pursued the inconsistent position that Raleigh owned the same property in common
with Lydio, with complainants, who inherited the property, committing acts which
debase respondents rights as a co-owner
 the fact that the attorney-client relation had ceased by reason
of Lydios death or through the completion of the specific task for which
 respondent was employed is not reason for respondent to advocate a
position opposed to that of Lydio.
 Precedents tell us that even after the termination of his
employment, an attorney may not act as counsel against his client
in the same general matter, even though, while acting for his
former client, he acquired no knowledge which could operate to
his clients disadvantage in the subsequent adverse employment.
Aninon v Sabitsana (2012; Brion)
Summary
Petitioner filed a disbarment complaint against respondent for representing her
and subsequently her common-law husband’s real wife in the sale of a piece of
land owned by said husband who was deceased.
PENALTY: suspension of 1 year
Facts
We resolve this disbarment complaint against Atty. Clemencio Sabitsana, Jr.
who is charged of:
 violating the lawyers duty to preserve confidential information received from
his client
 violating the prohibition on representing conflicting interests.
In her complaint, Josefina M. Anion related that she previously engaged the
legal services of Atty. Sabitsana in the preparation and execution in her
favor of a Deed of Sale over a parcel of land owned by her late common-law
husband, Brigido Caneja, Jr.
 Atty. Sabitsana allegedly violated her confidence when he subsequently filed
a civil case against her for the annulment of the Deed of Sale in
behalf of Zenaida L. Caete, the legal wife of Brigido Caneja, Jr.
 The complainant accused Atty. Sabitsana of using the confidential
information he obtained from her in filing the civil case.
Atty. Sabitsana admitted having advised the complainant in the preparation and
execution of the Deed of Sale
 he denied having received any confidential information.
 Atty. Sabitsana asserted that the present disbarment complaint was
instigated by one Atty. Gabino Velasquez, Jr., the notary of the
disbarment complaint who lost a court case against him and had
instigated the complaint for this reason.
The Findings of the IBP Investigating Commissioner
 IBP Commissioner Pedro A. Magpayo Jr. found Atty. Sabitsana
administratively liable for representing conflicting interests.
 recommended that Atty. Sabitsana be suspended from the practice of law
for a period of 1 year
The Findings of the IBP Board of Governors
 resolved to adopt and approve the Report and Recommendation of the
IBP Commissioner
Issue
The issue in this case is whether Atty. Sabitsana is guilty of misconduct for
representing conflicting interests? Yes
Ruling
Jurisprudence has provided three tests in determining whether a violation of interest
is present in a given case.
1. whether a lawyer is duty-bound to fight for an issue or claim in behalf of
one client and, at the same time, to oppose that claim for the other client.
a. if a lawyer’s argument for one client has to be opposed by that same
lawyer in arguing for the other client
2. whether the acceptance of a new relation would prevent the
full discharge of the lawyers duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty
to the client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-
dealing in the performance of that duty.
3. whether the lawyer would be called upon in the new relation to
use against a former client any confidential information
acquired through their connection or previous employment.
On the basis of the attendant facts of the case, we find substantial evidence
to support Atty. Sabitsanas violation of the above rule, as established by the
following circumstances on record:
 his legal services were initially engaged by the complainant to protect
her interest over a certain property
 Atty. Sabitsana met with Zenaida Caete to discuss the latter’s legal
interest over the property subject of the Deed of Sale.
o already had knowledge that Zenaida Caetes interest clashed with
the complainants interests.
 despite the knowledge of the clashing interests between his two clients, Atty.
Sabitsana accepted the engagement from Zenaida Caete.
 Atty. Sabitsana’s actual knowledge of the conflicting interests
between his two clients was demonstrated by his own actions:
o he filed a case against the complainant in behalf of Zenaida Caete;
o he impleaded the complainant as the defendant in the case; and
 o the case he filed was for the annulment of the Deed of Sale that he
had previously prepared and executed for the complainant.
Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides an exception to the
above prohibition.
 However, Atty. Sabitsana did not make a full disclosure of facts to the
complainant and to Zenaida Caete before he accepted the new
engagement with Zenaida Caete.
 although Atty. Sabitsana wrote a letter to the complainant informing her of
Zenaida Caetes adverse claim to the property, he did not disclose to the
complainant that he was also being engaged as counsel by Zenaida
Caete
 failed to obtain the written consent of his two clients, as required by
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
We note that Atty. Sabitsana takes exception to the IBP recommendation on
the ground that the charge in the complaint was only for his alleged
disclosure of confidential information, not for representation of conflicting
interests. To Atty. Sabitsana, finding him liable for the latter offense is a violation of
his due process rights since he only answered the designated charge.
 We find no violation of Atty. Sabitsanas due process rights.
 allegations of acts sufficient to constitute a violation of the rule on the
prohibition against representing conflicting interests
 essence of due process is simply the opportunity to be informed of the
charge against oneself and to be heard or, as applied to administrative
proceedings, the opportunity to explain ones side or the opportunity to seek
a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.
o These opportunities were all afforded to Atty. Sabitsana
Orola v Ramos (2013; Perlas-Bernabe)
Facts
Complainants Josephine, Myrna, Manuel, (all surnamed Orola), Mary Angelyn
Orola-Belarga (Mary Angelyn), and Marjorie Melba Orola-Calip (Marjorie) are the
children of the late Trinidad Laserna-Orola married to Emilio Q. Orola
(Emilio).
Meanwhile, complainant Karen Orola (Karen) is the daughter of Maricar Alba-Orola
(Maricar) and Antonio L. Orola (Antonio), the deceased brother of the above-
named complainants and the son of Emilio.
In the settlement of Trinidad’s estate, pending before the Regional Trial Court
of Roxas City, Branch 18 (RTC) the parties were represented by the following:
 Atty. Roy M. Villa (Atty. Villa) as counsel for and in behalf of Josephine,
Myrna, Manuel, Mary Angelyn, and Marjorie (Heirs of Trinidad);
 Atty. Ely F. Azarraga, Jr. (Atty. Azarraga) as counsel for and in behalf of
Maricar, Karen, and the other heirs of the late Antonio (Heirs of
Antonio), with respondent as collaborating counsel; and
 Atty. Aquiliana Brotarlo as counsel for and in behalf of Emilio, the initially
appointed administrator of Trinidad’s estate.
In the course of the proceedings, the Heirs of Trinidad and the Heirs of Antonio
moved for the removal of Emilio as administrator and, in his stead,
sought the appointment of the latter’s son, Manuel Orola, which the RTC
granted
 respondent filed an Entry of Appearance as collaborating counsel for Emilio
in the same case and moved for the reconsideration of the RTC Order
Due to the respondent’s new engagement, complainants filed the instant
disbarment complaint before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), claiming
that he violated:
 Rule 15.03 of the Code, as he undertook to represent conflicting interests
in the subject case;
 Section 20(e), Rule 138 of the Rules, as he breached the trust and
confidence reposed upon him by his clients, the Heirs of Antonio.
 Complainants further claimed that while Maricar, the surviving spouse of
Antonio and the mother of Karen, consented to the withdrawal of
respondent’s appearance, the same was obtained only after he
had already entered his appearance for Emilio
For his part, respondent refuted the abovementioned charges, contending that he
never appeared as counsel for the Heirs of Trinidad or for the Heirs of
Antonio.
 He pointed out that the records of the case readily show that the Heirs of
Trinidad were represented by Atty. Villa, while the Heirs of Antonio
were exclusively represented by Atty. Azarraga.
 He averred that he only accommodated Maricar's request to temporarily
appear on her behalf as their counsel of record could not attend 2
of the scheduled hearings and his appearances thereat were free of
charge
 obtained Maricar’s permission for him to withdraw from the case as no
further communications transpired after these two hearings.
 Likewise, he consulted Maricar before he undertook to represent Emilio in
the same case.
 He added that he had no knowledge of the fact that the late Antonio had
other heirs and, in this vein, asserted that no information was disclosed to
him by Maricar or their counsel of record at any instance.
 his representation for Emilio in the subject case was more of a
mediator, rather than a litigator and that since no settlement was
forged between the parties, he formally withdrew his appearance

The Recommendation and Action of the IBP
 respondent was found guilty of representing conflicting interests
only with respect to Karen as the records of the case show that he
never acted as counsel for the other complainants.
 failed to obtain the consent of Karen, who was already of age and one of
the Heirs of Antonio, as mandated under Rule 15.03 of the Code
 no violation of Section 20, Rule 138 of the Rules as complainants
themselves admitted that respondent “did not acquire confidential
information from his former client nor did he use against the latter any
knowledge obtained in the course of his previous employment.
 first offense
o found the imposition of disbarment too harsh a penalty and,
instead, recommended that he be severely reprimanded
The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved with modification the
aforementioned report
 imposed against respondent the penalty of 6 months suspension from the
practice of law.
Issue
The sole issue in this case is whether or not respondent is guilty of representing
conflicting interests in violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code.
Ruling
The Court concurs with the IBP’s finding that respondent violated Rule 15.03
of the Code, but reduced the recommended period of suspension to
three (3) months.
Under Rule 15.03, it is explicit that a lawyer is prohibited from representing
new clients whose interests oppose those of a former client in any
manner, whether or not they are parties in the same action or on totally
unrelated cases.
Records reveal that respondent was the collaborating counsel not only for
Maricar as claimed by him, but for all the Heirs of Antonio
 Heirs of Trinidad and the Heirs of Antonio succeeded in removing Emilio
as administrator for having committed acts prejudicial to their interests.
 Hence, when respondent proceeded to represent Emilio for the
purpose of seeking his reinstatement as administrator in the
same case, he clearly worked against the very interest of the
Heirs of Antonio – particularly, Karen – in violation of the above-
stated rule.
Respondent's justification that no confidential information was relayed to
him cannot fully exculpate him for the charges against him
 the rule on conflict of interests provides an absolute prohibition from
representation with respect to opposing parties in the same case.
o In other words, a lawyer cannot change his representation from
one party to the latter’s opponent in the same case.
 That respondent’s previous appearances for and in behalf of the Heirs of
Antonio was only a friendly accommodation cannot equally be
given any credence since the aforesaid rule holds even if the
inconsistency is remote or merely probable or even if the lawyer
has acted in good faith and with no intention to represent
conflicting interests
Neither can respondent's asseveration that his engagement by Emilio was
more of a mediator than a litigator and for the purpose of forging a settlement
among the family members render the rule inoperative.
 In fact, even on that assertion, his conduct is likewise improper since Rule
15.04, Canon 15 of the Code similarly requires the lawyer to obtain
the written consent of all concerned before he may act as
mediator, conciliator or arbitrator in settling disputes.
 Irrefragably, respondent failed in this respect as the records show that
respondent was remiss in his duty to make a full disclosure of his
impending engagement as Emilio’s counsel to all the Heirs of Antonio –
particularly, Karen – and equally secure their express written consent
before consummating the same
 a lawyer who acts as such in settling a dispute cannot represent any of the
parties to it.
Resolution is bereft of any explanation showing the bases of the IBP
Board of Governors’ modification of penalty;
 it contravened Section 12(a), Rule 139-B of the Rules which
specifically mandates that “[t]he decision of the Board upon such review
shall be in writing and shall clearly and distinctly state the facts and the
reasons on which it is based.”
 Court looks with disfavor the change in the recommended penalty without
any ample justification therefor.
 Court finds the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a
period of three (3) months to be more appropriate taking into
consideration the following factors:
o respondent is a first time offender;
o it is undisputed that respondent merely accommodated Maricar’s
request out of gratis to temporarily represent her only during
hearings due to her lawyer’s unavailability;
o it is likewise undisputed that respondent had no knowledge that
the late Antonio had any other heirs aside from Maricar whose
consent he actually acquired
o complainants admit that respondent did not acquire confidential
information from the Heirs of Antonio nor did he use against
 them any knowledge obtained in the course of his previous
employment
NUIQUE v SEDILLO (2013; Reyes)
Summary
 The complainant claims that the respondent
o represented conflicting interest
 Resp. was still counsel for Kiyoshi, a Japanese citizen, and
Kiyoshi’s wife when
 he represented the Kiyoshi’s wife and wife’s brother
in a case of falsification filed by Kiyoshi against them.
 He represented the wife in a case for accounting,
sum of money and attachment filed by the assignee
of Kiyoshi against the wife and wife’s brother.
 He opposed the motion of Kiyoshi in a civil case
o Disrespected the court when he said that he “would have taken the
resolution with a grain of salt.”
o Spread rumors against a colleague in the legal profession
 Rumor: complainant detained Kiyoshi and provided him with
women.
Facts
 Complaint for disbarment filed by Atty. Nuique with CBP of IBP against Atty.
Sedillo who is charged with:
o violating the prohibition on representing conflicting interests
o using abusive language against and disrespecting the court
o spreading rumors against a colleague in the legal profession.
 Nuique alleged that, sometime in 1992, the respondent became the lawyer of
Kiyoshi Kimura, a Japanese citizen, and his wife Estrelieta Patrimonio-Kimura
in a case for collection/recovery of overpayment against Carlos Amasula, Jr.
o Since the spouses Kimura had to leave the country, the case was
prosecuted by their representative Manuel Patrimonio, Estrelieta’s
brother. The spouses Kimura obtained a favorable decision in the trial
court, but the case was still on appeal with this Court at the time
when the instant complaint was filed.
 The respondent remained the counsel of record of the
spouses Kimura until July 2007 when Kiyoshi terminated his
services.
 Kiyoshi, during the course of his marriage to Estrelieta, purchased several
properties in Dumaguete City, some of which were registered under the name
of Estrelieta and Manuel.
o Sometime in September 2006, the sps. had a falling out.
o Because Estrelieta and Manuel falsified Kiyoshi’s signature to make it
appear that he loaned P1,500,000.00 from the DBP and, as security for
the said loan, mortgaged a parcel of land he owned.
o Kiyoshi then hired complainant Nuique. Kiyoshi, acting through his
representative Danilo Estocoming and Kazuhiro Sampie, filed a
complaint against Estrelieta and Manuel for falsification.
 The respondent appeared as counsel of Estrelieta and Manuel.
 On February 22, 2007, a civil action for accounting, sum of money and
attachment was filed by Kimura Business Concepts, Inc., an assignee of Kiyoshi,
RTC of Dumaguete City against Estrelieta and Manuel.
o The respondent likewise entered his appearance as counsel for
Estrelieta and Manuel in the said case.
 Further, sometime in February 2007, Kiyoshi intervened in Civil Case No.
13866, entitled Nelson Patrimonio v. Development Bank of the Philippines, then
pending before the RTC.
o The respondent opposed Kiyoshi’s motion for intervention in Civil
Case No. 13866.
 The respondent likewise assisted Estrelieta in instituting a habeas corpus case
against Danilo and Kazuhiro, alleging that they were detaining Kiyoshi against
his will.
o The case, however, was dismissed after Kiyoshi appeared in court and
testified that he was not detained by Danilo and Kazuhiro.
o The complainant averred that the respondent disrespected the court
when, in the motion for recon, which he prepared, he stated that he
“would have taken the resolution with a grain of salt.”
o The complainant further alleged that, after the habeas corpus case was
dismissed, the respondent had spread rumors against the complainant;
that the complainant supposedly detained Kiyoshi and provided him
with women.
Respondent’s denials
 As to representing conflicting interests
o He claims that it was Manuel who sought his legal assistance and not
Kiyoshi in the Amasula case.
 his client is Manuel and the spouses Kimura were merely
“litigation- beneficiaries-in-waiting.”
o For the falsification case against Estrelieta and Manuel, the respondent
claims that the same was instituted by Danilo and Kazuhiro and not
Kiyoshi.
 As to the charge of disrespect to the court
o the phrase “with a grain of salt” is but a common phraseology that is
neither offensive nor disrespectful.
o Also denied having spread rumors to malign the complainant.
 On December 2, 2008, the complainant manifested to the Commission that he
is no longer interested in pursuing his complaint against the respondent, praying
that he be allowed to withdraw the same.
 IBP found him guilty for representing conflicting interests
o Because he was still counsel for Kiyoshi when he appeared as counsel
for the wife and her brother in the case filed by Kiyoshi.
Issues and Ratio:
Whether the respondent should be administratively sanctioned based on the
allegations in the Complaint? Yes.
He may be disbarred or suspended
 Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that a lawyer may be
disbarred or suspended from the practice of law, inter alia, for gross
misconduct.
 A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct showing any fault
or deficiency in his moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.
o Gross misconduct is any inexcusable, shameful or flagrant
unlawful conduct on the part of a person concerned with the
administration of justice; i.e., conduct prejudicial to the rights of
the parties or to the right determination of the cause. The motive
behind this conduct is generally a premeditated, obstinate or
intentional purpose.w library
Rule 15.03, Canon 15
 Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that:
Rule 15.03. – A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except
by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the
facts.
 “A lawyer may not, without being guilty of professional misconduct, act as
counsel for a person whose interest conflicts with that of his present or
former client.”
 It is only upon strict compliance with the condition of full disclosure of
facts that a lawyer may appear against his client; otherwise, his
representation of conflicting interests is reprehensible.
 Such prohibition is founded on principles of public policy and good taste as
the nature of the lawyer-client relations is one of trust and confidence of
the highest degree.
Concept of conflict of interest
 Quiambao v. Atty. Bamba, the Court explained the concept of conflict of
interest.
 In broad terms, lawyers are deemed to represent conflicting interests
when, in behalf of one client, it is their duty to contend for that which duty
to another client requires them to oppose. Developments in jurisprudence
have particularized various tests to determine whether a lawyer’s conduct
lies within this proscription. One test is whether a lawyer is duty-bound to
fight for an issue or claim in behalf of one client and, at the same time, to
oppose that claim for the other client. Thus, if a lawyer’s argument for one
client has to be opposed by that same lawyer in arguing for the other
client, there is a violation of the rule.
Another test of inconsistency of interests is whether the
acceptance of a new relation would prevent the full discharge of
the lawyer’s duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or
invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the
performance of that duty. Still another test is whether the lawyer
would be called upon in the new relation to use against a former client any
confidential information acquired through their connection or previous
employment.
Applying to facts of the case
 Based on the established facts of this case, the Court finds substantial evidence
to conclude that the respondent violated the prohibition on representation of
conflicting interests.
o respondent was still the counsel on record of Kiyoshi and Estrelieta in
the case against Amasula at the time when he represented Estrelieta
and Manuel in the complaint for falsification filed by Kiyoshi.
o respondent likewise appeared as counsel for Estrelieta and Manuel in
the case for accounting, sum of money and attachment that was filed
by Kimura Business Concepts, Inc., the assignee of Kiyoshi, despite
being the counsel of Kiyoshi in the case against Amasula.
o Clearly, the respondent violated the prohibition against representing
conflicting interests.
 The respondent’s representation of Estrelieta and Manuel against Kiyoshi,
notwithstanding that he was still the counsel of Kiyoshi and Estrelieta in the
case against Amasula, creates a suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-
dealing in the performance of his duty towards his clients. Under the
circumstances, the decent and ethical thing which the respondent
should have done was to advise Estrelieta and Manuel to engage the
services of another lawyer.
 Lawyers are expected not only to keep inviolate their client’s confidence, but
also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing for only then can
litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is
paramount in the administration of justice.
 The fact that the civil case instituted by Kiyoshi and Estrelieta against Amasula
is totally unrelated to the subsequent cases in which he represented Estrelieta
and Manuel against Kiyoshi is immaterial.
o The representation of opposing clients in said cases, even if
unrelated, is tantamount to representing conflicting interests
or, at the very least, invites suspicion of double-dealing which
the Court cannot allow.
 In Aniñon v. Sabitsana, Jr.
o The proscription against representation of conflicting interests applies
to a situation where the opposing parties are present clients in the
same action or in an unrelated action. The prohibition also applies
even if the lawyer would not be called upon to contend for one client
 that which the lawyer has to oppose for the other client, or that there
would be no occasion to use the confidential information acquired
from one to the disadvantage of the other as the two actions are
wholly unrelated. To be held accountable under this rule, it is enough
that the opposing parties in one case, one of whom would lose the
suit, are present clients and the nature or conditions of the lawyer’s
respective retainers with each of them would affect the performance
of the duty of undivided fidelity to both clients.
 Respondent’s claim that it was Manuel who was his client in the case against
Amasula and not Kiyoshi, since it was Manuel who sought his services and was
the one who actively and personally pursued the said case, is untenable.
o Manuel was merely the agent of Kiyoshi and Estrelieta in the case
against Amasula.
o That Manuel was the one who actively prosecuted the said case is of
no consequence; the real parties in interest in the case against
Amasula were the principals of Manuel, i.e., Kiyoshi and Estrelieta.
Desistance of Complainant does not bind the Court
 the Court is not bound by such desistance as the instant case involves public
interest.
 The exercise of the power is not for the purpose of enforcing civil remedies
between parties, but to protect the court and the public against an attorney
guilty of unworthy practices in his profession.
RULE 15.02 – Privileged communication
Regala v Sandiganbayan (1996; Kapunan)
Summary
PCGG was compelling the petitioners to divulge information regarding
corporations alleged to have been involved in the case involving ill-gotten wealth
against Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. by naming them as co-defendants. Petitioners
were part of ACCRA Law Firm who assisted in the legal matters of the
companies named. The Court ruled that the information within the ambit of
attorney-client privilege.
Facts
The matters raised herein are an offshoot of the institution of the Complaint
before the Sandiganbayan by the Republic of the Philippines, through the
Presidential Commission on Good Government against Eduardo M.
Cojuangco, Jr., as one of the principal defendants, for the recovery of alleged ill-
gotten wealth, which includes shares of stocks in the named corporations in
"Republic of the Philippines versus Eduardo Cojuangco, et al.
Among the defendants named in the case are herein petitioners Teodoro Regala,
Edgardo J. Angara, Avelino V. Cruz, Jose C. Concepcion, Rogelio A. Vinluan, Victor
P. Lazatin, Eduardo U. Escueta and Paraja G. Hayudini, and herein private respondent
Raul S. Roco, who all were then partners of the law firm Angara, Abello,
Concepcion, Regala and Cruz Law Offices (hereinafter referred to as the
ACCRA Law Firm).
 ACCRA Law Firm performed legal services for its clients, which included
the organization and acquisition of business associations and/or
organizations
o More specifically, the members of the law firm delivered to its client
documents which substantiate the client's equity holdings,
i.e., stock certificates endorsed in blank representing the shares
registered in the client's name, and a blank deed of trust or
assignment covering said shares.
o In the course of their dealings with their clients, the members of
the law firm acquire information relative to the assets of
clients as well as their personal and business
circumstances.
 As members of the ACCRA Law Firm, petitioners and private respondent
Raul Roco admit that they assisted in the organization and
acquisition of the companies included in Civil Case and in keeping
with the office practice, ACCRA lawyers acted as nominees-stockholders of
the said corporations involved in sequestration proceedings.
PCGG filed a "Motion to Admit Third Amended Complaint" and "Third
Amended Complaint" which excluded private respondent Raul S.
Roco from the complaint in PCGG Case No. 33 as party-defendant.
 exclusion of Roco as party-defendant was because of his
undertaking that he will reveal the identity of the principal/s for
whom he acted as nominee/stockholder in the companies involved in
PCGG Case
Petitioners were included in the Third Amended Complaint on the strength of the
following allegations:
 Defendants ACCRA plotted, devised, schemed. conspired and
confederated with each other in setting up, through the use of the
coconut levy funds, the financial and corporate framework
and structures that led to the establishment of UCPB,
UNICOM, COCOLIFE, COCOMARK, CIC, and more than
twenty other coconut levy funded corporations, including the
acquisition of San Miguel Corporation shares and its
institutionalization through presidential directives of the
coconut monopoly.
In their answer to the Expanded Amended Complaint,
petitioners ACCRA lawyers alleged that:
 Defendants-ACCRA lawyers participation in the acts with which their
co-defendants are charged, was in furtherance of legitimate lawyering.
 In the course of rendering professional and legal services to clients,
defendants-ACCRA lawyers became holders of shares of stock in the
corporations
 Defendant ACCRA-lawyer Avelino V. Cruz was one of the
incorporators in 1976 of Mermaid Marketing Corporation, which was
organized for legitimate business purposes not related to the
allegations of the expanded Amended Complaint. However, he has
long ago transferred any material interest therein
Petitioner Paraja Hayudini, who had separated from ACCRA law firm, filed a
separate answer denying the allegations in the complaint implicating him in the
alleged ill-gotten wealth.
In its "Comment," respondent PCGG set the following conditions precedent for the
exclusion of petitioners, namely:
1. the disclosure of the identity of its clients;
2. submission of documents substantiating the lawyer-client relationship; and
3. the submission of the deeds of assignments petitioners executed in favor of its
clients covering their respective shareholdings
 Consequently, PCGG presented supposed proof to
substantiate compliance by private respondent Roco of the
conditions precedent to warrant the latter's exclusion
It is noteworthy that during said proceedings, private respondent Roco did not
refute petitioners' contention that
 he did actually not reveal the identity of the client involved in PCGG
Case No. 33, nor
 had he undertaken to reveal the identity of the client for whom he acted
as nominee-stockholder
Sandiganbayan promulgated the Resolution, herein questioned, denying the
exclusion of petitioners in PCGG Case No. 33, for their refusal to comply with
the conditions required by respondent PCGG. It held:
 ACCRA lawyers may take the heroic stance of not revealing the identity of
the client for whom they have acted
 But until they do identify their clients, considerations of whether or not the
privilege claimed by the ACCRA lawyers exists cannot even begin to be
debated.
 PCGG is satisfied that defendant Roco has demonstrated his agency and that
Roco has apparently identified his principal, which revelation could show the
lack of cause against him.
 The ACCRA lawyers cannot, therefore, begrudge the PCGG for keeping
them as party defendants. In the same vein, they cannot compel the PCGG
to be accorded the same treatment accorded to Roco.
ACCRA lawyers moved for a reconsideration of the above resolution but the same
was denied by the respondent Sandiganbayan. Hence, the ACCRA lawyers filed the
petition for certiorari
Issue
The Honorable Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in not holding
that, under the facts of this case, the attorney-client privilege prohibits petitioners
ACCRA lawyers from revealing the identity of their client(s) and the other
information requested by the PCGG.
1. Under the peculiar facts of this case, the attorney-client privilege
includes the identity of the client(s).
2. The factual disclosures required by the PCGG are not limited to the
identity of petitioners ACCRA lawyers' alleged client(s) but extend to
other privileged matters.
Ruling
The nature of lawyer-client relationship is premised on the Roman Law
concepts of locatio conductio operarum (contract of lease of services)
where one person lets his services and another hires them without reference to the
object of which the services are to be performed, wherein lawyers' services may be
compensated
 by honorarium or for hire and
 mandato (contract of agency) wherein a friend on whom reliance could be
placed makes a contract in his name, but gives up all that he gained by the
contract to the person who requested him.
In modern day perception of the lawyer-client relationship, an attorney is
more than a mere agent or servant, because:
 he possesses special powers of trust and confidence reposed on him
by his client.
 A lawyer is also as independent as the judge of the court
o different from and superior to those of an ordinary agent
 also occupies what may be considered as a "quasi-judicial office" since he
is in fact an officer of the Court and exercises his judgment in the choice of
courses of action to be taken favorable to his client.
Thus, in the creation of lawyer-client relationship, there are rules, ethical conduct
and duties that breathe life into it, among those, the fiduciary duty to his client
which is of a very delicate, exacting and confidential character, requiring a very high
degree of fidelity and good faith, that is required by reason of necessity and
public interest based on the hypothesis that abstinence from seeking legal advice in
a good cause is an evil which is fatal to the administration of justice.
It is also the strict sense of fidelity of a lawyer to his client that distinguishes
him from any other professional in society.
 Stockton v. Ford
o there are few of the business relations of life involving a
higher trust and confidence than that of attorney and client, or
generally speaking, one more honorably and faithfully discharged
In our jurisdiction, this privilege takes off from the old Code of Civil
Procedure enacted by the Philippine Commission on August 7, 1901.
 Section 383 of the Code specifically forbids counsel, without authority
of his client to reveal any communication made by the client to
him or his advice given thereon in the course of professional
employment.
 Passed on into various provisions of the Rules of Court, the attorney-client
privilege, as currently worded provides:
Sec. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. - The following
persons cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the following cases:
xxx
An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined as to
any communication made by the client to him, or his advice given
thereon in the course of, or with a view to, professional employment, can an
attorney’s secretary, stenographer, or clerk be examined, without the consent of
the client and his employer, concerning any fact the knowledge of which has been
acquired in such capacity
Further, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 20. It is the duty of an attorney:
(e) to maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself, to
preserve the secrets of his client, and to accept no compensation in
connection with his clients business except from him or with his
knowledge and approval.
This duty is explicitly mandated in Canon 17 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides that:
Canon 17. A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful
of the trust and confidence reposed in him.
Canon 15 of the Canons of Professional Ethics also demands a lawyer's fidelity to
client:
The lawyer owes "entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the
maintenance and defense of his rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and
ability," to the end that nothing be taken or be withheld from him, save by the rules
of law, legally applied.
No fear of judicial disfavor or public popularity should restrain him from
the full discharge of his duty.
 In the judicial forum the client is entitled to the benefit of any and every
remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the land, and he may
expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense.
 But it is steadfastly to be borne in mind that the great trust of the
lawyer is to be performed within and not without the bounds of
the law.
 The office of attorney does not permit, much less does it demand of him
for any client, violation of law or any manner of fraud or chicanery. He
must obey his own conscience and not that of his client.
Considerations favoring confidentiality in lawyer-client relationships are many and
serve several constitutional and policy concerns.
 In the constitutional sphere, the privilege gives flesh to one of the most
sacrosanct rights available to the accused, the right to counsel
It necessarily follows that in order to attain effective representation, the lawyer must
invoke the privilege not as a matter of option but as a matter of duty and professional
responsibility.
The question now arises whether or not this duty may be asserted in refusing
to disclose the name of petitioners' client(s) in the case at bar.
Under the facts and circumstances obtaining in the instant case, the answer must be
in the affirmative.
As a matter of public policy, a client’s identity should not be shrouded in mystery.
The general is that a lawyer may not invoke the privilege and refuse to divulge the
name or identity of his client.
1) the court has a right to know that the client whose privileged information is
sought to be protected is flesh and blood.
2) the privilege begins to exist only after the attorney-client relationship has been
established. The attorney-client privilege does not attach until there is a client.
3) the privilege generally pertains to the subject matter of the relationship.
Finally, due process considerations require that the opposing party should, as a
general rule, know his adversary. “A party suing or sued is entitled to know who his
opponent is.” He cannot be obliged to grope in the dark against unknown forces.
Except:
1) Client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists that revealing the
client’s name would implicate that client in the very activity for which he sought the
lawyer’s advice.
2) Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability, his identity is privileged.
3) Where the government’s lawyers have no case against an attorney’s client unless,
by revealing the client’s name, the said name would furnish the only link that would
form the chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual of a crime, the
client’s name is privileged. That client identity is privileged in those instances where
a strong probability exists that the disclosure of the client's identity would implicate
the client in the very criminal activity for which the lawyer’s legal advice was
obtained
The instant case falls under at least two exceptions to the general rule.
 First, disclosure of the alleged client's name would lead to establish said
client's connection with the very fact in issue of the case, which is privileged
information, because the privilege, as stated earlier, protects the subject
matter or the substance (without which there would be no attorney-client
relationship).
 The link between the alleged criminal offense and the legal advice or legal
service sought was duly established in the case at bar, by no less than the
PCGG itself. The key lies in the three specific conditions laid down by the
PCGG which constitutes petitioners ticket to non-prosecution should they
accede thereto:
o the disclosure of the identity of its clients;
o submission of documents substantiating the lawyer-client
relationship; and
o the submission of the deeds of assignment petitioners executed in
favor of their clients covering their respective shareholdings.
From these conditions, particularly the third, we can readily deduce that the clients
indeed consulted the petitioners, in their capacity as lawyers, regarding the financial
and corporate structure, framework and set-up of the corporations in question. In
turn, petitioners gave their professional advice in the form of, among others, the
aforementioned deeds of assignment covering their clients shareholdings.
Furthermore, under the third main exception, revelation of the client's name
would obviously provide the necessary link for the prosecution to build its
case, where none otherwise exists
People v Sandiganbayan (1997; Regalado)
Facts
 Special civil action for certiorari → petitioner seeks the annulment of the
resolution of Sandiganbayan (12/22/93) which denied petitioner's motion for
the discharge of respondent Generoso S. Sansaet to be utilized as a state
witness, and its resolution (03/07/94) denying the motion for
reconsideration
 Respondent Honrada was the Clerk of Court and Acting Stenographer
of the First Municipal Circuit Trial Court, San Francisco-Bunawan-Rosario in
Agusan del Sur
 Respondent Paredes was successively the Provincial Attorney of Agusan
del Sur, then Governor of the same province, and is at present a
Congressman.
 Respondent Sansaet was a practicing attorney who served as counsel for
Paredes in several instances pertinent to the criminal charges involved in the
present recourse.
 Sometime in 1976 → Paredes applied for a free patent over a lot in the
poblacion of San Francisco, Agusan del Sur.of the Rosario Public Land
Subdivision Survey
◦ His application was approved and an original certificate of title was
issued in his favor
 However, in 1985, the Director of Lands filed an action for the cancellation
of respondent Paredes' patent and certificate of title since the land had been
designated and reserved as a school site in the subdivision survey.
 Trial Court → nullified said patent and title after finding that Paredes had
obtained the same through fraudulent misrepresentations in his application
◦ Sansaet served as counsel of Paredes in that civil case
 Information for perjury was filed against respondent Paredes in the MCTC
 Provincial Fiscal was directed by the Deputy Minister of Justice to move for
the dismissal of the case on the ground of prescription → proceedings were
terminated.
◦ respondent Paredes was likewise represented by respondent Sansaet as
counsel.
 Paredes was haled before the Tanodbayan for preliminary investigation on
the charge that, by using his former position as Provincial Attorney to
influence and induce the Bureau of Lands officials to favorably act on his
application for free patent, he had violated Section 3(a) of Republic Act No.
3019, as amended.
◦ For the third time, respondent Sansaet was Paredes' counsel
 August 29, 1988 → Tanodbayan issued a resolution recommending the
criminal prosecution of Paredes.
 Atty. Sansaet moved for reconsideration → Double Jeopardy
 Criminal case was subsequently filed with the Sandiganbayan against Paredes
 However, a motion to quash filed by the defense was later granted by
Sandiganbayan and the case was dismissed on the ground of prescription.
 Teofilo Gelacio, a taxpayer who had initiated the perjury and graft charges
against Paredes, sent a letter to the Ombudsman seeking the investigation
of the 3 respondents herein for falsification of public documents
◦ He claimed that Honrada, in conspiracy with his Paredes and Sansaet,
simulated and certified as true copies certain documents purporting to
be a notice of arraignment and transcripts of stenographic notes
supposedly taken during the arraignment of Paredes on the perjury
charge.
◦ He attached to his letter the ff:
 ▪ a certification that no notice of arraignment was ever received by
the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Agusan del Sur in connection
with that perjury case;
▪ and a certification of Presiding Judge Ciriaco Ariño that said perjury
case in his court did not reach the arraignment stage since action
thereon was suspended pending the review of the case by the
Department of Justice
 Respondents filed their respective counter-affidavits but Sansaet
subsequently discarded and repudiated the submissions he had made in his
counter-affidavit.
 Sansaet in a so-called Affidavit of Explanations and Rectifications
◦ revealed that Paredes contrived to have the graft case under preliminary
investigation dismissed on the ground of double jeopardy by making it
appear that the perjury case had been dismissed by the trial court after
he had been arraigned therein.
◦ For that purpose, the documents which were later filed by respondent
Sansaet in the preliminary investigation were prepared and falsified by
his co-respondents in this case in the house of Paredes.
◦ To evade responsibility for his own participation in the scheme, he
claimed that he did so upon the instigation and inducement of Paredes.
◦ This was intended to pave the way for his discharge as a government
witness in the consolidated cases, as in fact a motion therefor was filed
by the prosecution pursuant to their agreement.
 Ombudsman approved the filing of falsification charges against all the herein
private respondents.
 The proposal for the discharge of respondent Sansaet as a state witness was
rejected
◦ difficult to believe that a lawyer of his statur would be unwittingly
induced by another to commit a crime.
◦ Testimony of Atty. Sansaet falls under the mantle of privileged
communication between the lawyer and his client.
 The Ombudsman refused to reconsider that resolution and decided to file
separate informations for falsification of public documents against each of
the herein respondents.
 However, the same were consolidated for joint trial in the Second Division
of the Sandiganbayan.
 A motion was filed by the People for the discharge of respondent Sansaet as
a state witness.
◦ It was submitted that all the requisites therefor, as provided in Section 9,
Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, were satisfied insofar as respondent
Sansaet was concerned.
◦ The basic postulate was that, except for the eyewitness testimony of
respondent Sansaet, there was no other direct evidence to prove the
confabulated falsification of documents by respondents Honrada and
Paredes.
 Sandiganbayan denied the discharge of Sansaet as state witness
◦ hewing to the theory of the attorney-client privilege adverted to by the
Ombudsman
 Reconsideration → DENIED
Issue:
 Whether or not the projected testimony of respondent Sansaet, as
proposed state witness, is barred by the attorney-client privilege? - NO
 Whether or not, as a consequence thereof, he is eligible for discharge to
testify as a particeps criminis? - YES
Ratio:
Sansaet’s Projected Testimony is not barred by the attorney-client
privilege
 The attorney-client privilege cannot apply in these cases, as the facts thereof
and actuations of both respondents therein constitute an exception to the
rule.
 It may correctly be assumed that there was a confidential communication
made by Paredes to Sansaet in connection with criminal cases for falsification
before respondent court.
◦ The fact that Sansaet was called to witness the preparation of the
falsified documents by Paredes and Honrada was as eloquent a
communication as to the fact and purpose of such falsification.
◦ The privilege is not confined to verbal or written communications but
extends as well to information communicated by the client to the
attorney by other means
◦ Said documents were thereafter filed by Sansaet in behalf of Paredes as
annexes to the motion for reconsideration in the preliminary
investigation of the graft case before the Tanodbayan.
◦ Also, the acts and words of the parties during the period when the
documents were being falsified were necessarily confidential since
Paredes would not have invited Sansaet to his house and allowed him
to witness the same except under conditions of secrecy and confidence.
 A distinction must be made between confidential communications relating
to past crimes already committed, and future crimes intended to be
committed, by the client.
▪ It is admitted that the announced intention of a client to commit a
crime is not included within the confidences which his attorney is
bound to respect.
▪ SC → It is true that by now, insofar as the falsifications to be testified
to in respondent court are concerned, those crimes were
necessarily committed in the past.
 Application of the attorney-client privilege → the period to be
considered is the date when the privileged communication was
made by the client to the attorney in relation to either a crime
committed in the past or with respect to a crime intended to be
committed in the future.
 In other words, if the client seeks his lawyer's advice with
respect to a crime that the former has theretofore committed,
 he is given the protection of a virtual confessional seal which
the attorney-client privilege declares cannot be broken
 The same privileged confidentiality does not attach with regard
to a crime which a client intends to commit thereafter or in
the future
 Statements and communications regarding the commission of
a crime already committed, made by a party who committed it,
to an attorney, consulted as such, are privileged
communications.
 Communications between attorney and client having to do
with the client's contemplated criminal acts, or in aid or
furtherance thereof, are not covered by the cloak of privileges
ordinarily existing in reference to communications between
attorney and client.
◦ Present cases → confidential communications made by Paredes to
Sansaet were for purposes of and in reference to the crime of
falsification which had not yet been committed in the past by Paredes but
which he later committed.
▪ Having been made for purposes of a future offense, those
communications are outside the pale of the attorney-client
privilege.
◦ Sansaet was himself a conspirator in the commission of that crime of
falsification
▪ It is well settled that in order that a communication between a
lawyer and his client may be privileged, it must be for a lawful
purpose or in furtherance of a lawful end.
▪ The existence of an unlawful purpose prevents the privilege from
attaching.
◦ It is evident, therefore, that it was error for respondent Sandiganbayan
to insist that such unlawful communications intended for an illegal
purpose contrived by conspirators are nonetheless covered by the so-
called mantle of privilege.
Sansaet is eligible for discharge to testify as a particeps criminis.
 A reservation is raised over the fact that the three private respondents here
stand charged in three separate informations.
◦ there having been a consolidation of the three cases, the several actions
lost their separate identities and became a single action in which a single
judgment is rendered
 SC → earlier held that Sansaet was a conspirator in the crime of falsification,
and the rule is that since in a conspiracy the act of one is the act of all, the
same penalty shall be imposed on all members of the conspiracy.
◦ one of the requirements for a state witness is that he "does not appear
to be the most guilty." not that he must be the least guilty as is so often
erroneously framed or submitted.
◦ The query would then be whether an accused who was held guilty by
reason of membership in a conspiracy is eligible to be a state witness.
◦ People v Ocimar
▪ Ocimar contends that in the case at bar Bermudez does not satisfy
the conditions for the discharge of a co-accused to become a state
witness.
▪ SC →
 (1) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of Bermudez.
 (2) without his testimony, no other direct evidence was
available for the prosecution to prove the elements of the
crime.
 (3) his testimony could be substantially corroborated in its
material points as indicated by the trial court in its well-
reasoned decision.
 (4) he does not appear to be the most guilty.
◦ What the law prohibits is that the most guilty will be set
free while his co-accused who are less guilty will be sent
to jail.
◦ And by "most guilty" we mean the highest degree of culpability
in terms of participation in the commission of the offense and
not necessarily the severity of the penalty imposed. While all
the accused may be given the same penalty by reason of
conspiracy, yet one may be considered least guilty if We take
into account his degree of participation in the perpetration of
the offense.
 (5) there is no evidence that he has at any time been convicted
of any offense involving moral turpitude.
 Rule on the discharge of an accused to be utilized as state
witness clearly looks at his actual and individual participation in
the commission of the crime, which may or may not have been
perpetrated in conspiracy with the other accused.
 The rule of equality in the penalty to be imposed upon conspirators found
guilty of a criminal offense is based on the concurrence of criminal intent in
their minds and translated into concerted physical action although of varying
acts or degrees of depravity.
 SC → reasonably convinced that the other requisites for the discharge of
respondent Sansaet as a state witness are present and should have been
favorably appreciated by the Sandiganbayan following the 5 reqs stated in
Ocimar
 (1) Respondent Sansaet is the only cooperative eyewitness to the actual
commission of the falsification
 (2) There is thus no other direct evidence available for the prosecution of
the case,
 (3) His testimony can be substantially corroborated on its material points by
reputable witnesses,
 (5) It does not appear that respondent Sansaet has at any time been
convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude.
  This Court is not unaware of the doctrinal rule that, on this procedural
aspect, the prosecution may propose but it is for the trial court, in the
exercise of its sound discretion, to determine the merits of the proposal and
make the corresponding disposition.
 It must be emphasized, however, that such discretion should have been
exercised, and the disposition taken on a holistic view of all the facts and
issues herein discussed, and not merely on the sole issue of the applicability
of the attorney-client privilege.
 This change of heart and direction respondent Sandiganbayan eventually
assumed, after the retirement of two members of the 2 nd Division
 In an inversely anticlimactic Manifestation and Comment → the chairman
and new members thereof declared:
◦ That while the legal issues involved had been already discussed and
passed upon by the Second Division in the aforesaid Resolution,
however, after going over the arguments submitted by the Solicitor-
General and re-assessing Our position on the matter, We respectfully
beg leave of the Honorable Supreme Court to manifest that We are
amenable to setting aside the questioned Resolutions and to grant the
prosecution's motion to discharge accused Generoso Sansaet as state
witness, upon authority of the Honorable Supreme Court for the
issuance of the proper Resolution to that effect within fifteen (15) days
from notice thereof.
Judgment: WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari prayed for is hereby granted
SETTING ASIDE the impunged resolutions and ORDERING that the present reliefs
sought in these cases by petitioner be allowed and given due course by respondent
Sandiganbayan.
Castillo v Sandiganbayan (2012; Buena)
Facts
 Republic of the Philippines filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint for
reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and damages against several
persons, one of which is Gregorio Castillo.
 Petitioner Castillo was accused of acting as a dummy, nominee and/or agent of
defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, the Enriquezes and the
Panlilios in establishing Hotel properties Inc. in order to acquire beneficial
interest and control, and conceal ownership, of Silahis International Hotel.
 Panlilios and Enriquezes
o took advantage of their close relationship with the Marcoses
o acquired a controlling interest (71% of the capital stock), along with
various receivables, of Silahis International Hotel from Development
Bank of the Philippines at a steep discount, to the detriment of the public
 Petitioner Castillo was accused of being a co-principal because he signed all
pertinent documents as attorney-in-fact of the
defendants Enriquezes and Panlilios
 Castillo later died, therefore, a motion to dismiss was subsequently filed on the
ground that the action did not survive the death of petitioner
o Sandiganbayan denied the motion, stating that the case is not only one
for recovery of money, debt or interest thereon, but one for recovery
of real and personal property and that the cause of action being
inclusive of claim for damages for tortuous misconduct.
 In another motion to dismiss, petitioner contended that the complaint filed
against Castillo is violative of the lawyer-client confidentiality privilege (since
Castillo is attorney-in-fact)
o But Sandiganbayan ruled that Castillo is sued as principal defendant for
being in conspiracy with other defendants in the commission of the
acts complained of
Issue:
 Whether or not the suit is violative of the lawyer-client confidentiality privilege
- YES
Petitioner’s Contention
The suit is violative of the lawyer-client confidentiality privilege and must be
dismissed pursuant to the Court’s decision in Regala vs. Sandiganbayan
Sandiganbayan’s defense
The ruling in Regala does not apply because in said case, there was a clear finding
that the ACCRA lawyers were impleaded by the PCGG as co-defendants to force
them to disclose the identity of their clients as shown by the PCGG’s willingness to
cut a deal with the ACCRA lawyers – the names of their clients in exchange for
exclusion from the complaint. In the present case, petitioner is being sued as
principal defendant for being in conspiracy with the other defendants in the
commission of the act complained of, and he is not being required to name his
clients.
The claim that petitioner merely acted in his professional capacity as counsel with
neither participation in nor knowledge is a mere allegation not yet proven.
Held:
SC found for the petitioner. The ruling in the case of Regala v. Sandiganbayan
applies.
 Petitioners are not mere witnesses, but co-principals in the case for
recovery of ill- gotten wealth, they cannot be compelled to testify in view
of their constitutional right against self-incrimination and of their
fundamental legal right to maintain inviolate the privilege of attorney-client
 confidentiality. Recommended refund of Php56,000 to Dalisay and to dismiss
The doctrine of adherence to judicial precedents or stare decisis, provided in Art. complaint.
8, C.C., enjoins adherence to judicial precedents. ○ April 22, 2005 -- Court rendered respondent guilty of malpractice
 It required courts in a country to follow the rule established in a decision and gross misconduct. Suspended for six months.
of the Supreme Court thereof. ● Upon learning decision, Atty. went to MTC and inquired about the status of
 That decision becomes a judicial precedent to be followed in subsequent
the Civil Case. He found out that the tax declarations and title submitted by
cases by all courts in the land.
 The doctrine of stare decisis is based on the principle that once a question complainant are not official records. Thus, he filed a Sworn Affidavit
of law has been examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and Complaint against her charging her of falsification of documents.
closed to further argument. ○ Atty.’s MR stated the following arguments:
1. Dalisay did not engage his services as counsel for the Civil
Judgment: Sandiganbayan is ordered to exclude petitioner Castillo as party- Case
defendant in the case of Republic of the Philippines v. Modesto Enriquez, et al. 2. He was hired on October 2001, two months after the
decision for the Civil Case was rendered (August 2001)
Dalisay v Mauricio (2006; Sandoval-Gutierrez) 3. Dalisay refused to provide him with documents related to
the case, preventing him from doing his job
Summary:
4. Dalisay tampered with evidence and falsified documents.
Dalisay had a pending Civil Case who was previously handled by a certain Atty.
— court said this is ironic because the respondent
Oliver Lozano.
(counsel; Atty Mauricio) became the accuser of the complainant
○ Complainant Dalisay filed her reply, saying:
Atty. Mauricio accepted the amount of P56, 000 for his legal fee, however, it was
1. Atty. violated principle of confidentiality when he
found that he did not render any legal action nor prepared any pleading for Dalisay,
filed falsification charges against her
except for the conferences and opinions rendered in his law office.
2. Atty. should have returned the money
3. Atty. should have verified the authenticity of her
Atty. Mauricio even filed a case against Dalisay for submitting falsified documents in
documents
violation of Article 171 (falsification of any public officer - specifically # 6. Making
4. Atty’s refusal to return money constitutes contempt
any alteration or intercalation in a genuine document which changes its meaning)
and Article 172 (Falsification by private individuals and use of falsified documents)
ISSUE:
and/or Article 182 (false testimony in civil cases) of the RPC in tampering evidence.
W/N Atty. Mauricio violated the principle of confidentiality between him and
This action of filing the falsification case was said to have violated the rule on
complainant? YES
privileged communication.

RATIO:
FACTS:
1. Once a lawyer accepts money from a client, an attorney-client
● October 13, 2001 -- Complainant Valeriana Dalisay engaged respondent
relationship is established, giving rise to the duty of fidelity to the
Atty. Mauricio Jr’s services in Civil Case No. 00-044. She paid
client’s cause. He is expected to be mindful of the trust and confidence
Php56,000 for his legal services, but respondent never rendered
reposed in him, and must serve client with competence and diligence. This
legal services for her. She terminated their attorney-client relationship
did not happen here, because Atty. Mauricio had been remiss in the
and demanded the return of her money. Respondent refused.
performance of his duties by not appearing as counsel despite acceptance of
○ IBP investigated and found out that no action nor pleadings were
money.
made by the respondent except his alleged conferences and
> There is nothing in the records to show that he filed any petition. The
opinions rendered when Dalisay frequented his law office.
ethics of the profession demands that, in such a case, he should immediately
 return the filing fees to complainant. In January 1981, Donald Dee and his father went to the residence of Atty. Amelito
Pariñas v. Paguinto: we held that "a lawyer shall account for all money or Mutuc to seek his advice regarding his brother’s, Dewey Dee, indebtedness to
property collected from the client. Money entrusted to a lawyer for a Caesar’s Palace in Las Vegas. Dee’s father was concerned about the safety of Dewey
specific purpose, such as for filing fee, but not used for failure to file the case having heard of a link between the mafia and Caesar’s Palace.
must immediately be returned to the client on demand."
> Per records, complainant made repeated demands, but respondent is yet Atty. Mutuc assured Donald Dee and his father that he would inquire into the matter,
after which his services were contracted for 100,000. Atty. Mutuc made several long
to return the money.
distance calls to Caesar’s Palace and two trips to Las Vegas. He was able to know
2. Respondent’s assertion that complainant did not engage his services for the
that the amount of debt was $1M. More so, he found out that it was actually a certain
Civil Case is obviously a last-ditch attempt to evade culpability. He
Ramon Sy who’s actually in debt as Dewey Dee merely signed the chits. Also, he was
categorically stated in his Affidavit-Complaint that Dalisay engaged his
able to establish that the mafia and Caesar’s Palace were not linked in any way.
services for that Case, and he cannot just change his version because it will
be contrary to rules of fair play, justice, and due process. Caesar’s Palace agreed to exculpate Dewey Dee if Atty. Mutuc would be able to
3. It bears reiterating that respondent did not take any action on the case convince Ramon Sy to answer for the indebtedness, which he was able to do.
despite having been paid for his services. This is tantamount to abandonment Thereafter, the account of Dewey Dee was cleared.
of his duties as a lawyer and taking undue advantage of his client.
4. Assuming that complainant indeed offered falsified documentary evidence in Having thus settled Dewey’s account, Atty. Mutuc wrote letters demanding the
the Civil Case, it is still not sufficient to exonerate respondent because of balance of 50,000 as attorney’s fees. The Dees ignored these demands. Hence, Atty.
Rule 19.02 (He should have confronted complainant and ask her to rectify Mutuc filed before RTC Makati for collection of attorney’s fees and refund of
her fraudulent representation, and if client refuses, the lawyer shall transport fare and other expenses.
terminate his relationship with client).
First, he did not follow said canon. Atty. Mutuc claimed that Donald Dee formally engaged his service for a fee of 100,000
Second, the pleadings show that he learned of the alleged falsification when and that the services he rendered were professional services. Dee, however, denied
the existence of an attorney-client relationship between them.
their attorney-client relationship has already been terminated and only
after the “news of his suspension spread in the legal community.”
Dee admitted that they visited Atty. Mutuc for advice. However, he insists that such
Clearly, respondent was motivated by vindictiveness in filing of charges
visit was an informal one and that there was no formal contract. As for the first
against complainant. 50,000 given, Dee claims that it was not in the nature of attorney’s fees but merely
pocket money solicited by Atty. Mutuc for his trips to Las Vegas and that such amount
> the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the correlative duties was sufficient renumeration for his strictly voluntary service.
—> to the client
RTC Ruling: Ordered Dee to pay 50,000 with interest
—> to the court, to the bar, & to the public CA Ruling: First Ruling: First 50,000 given already enough payment.
Final Ruling: Upheld RTC and ordered Dee to pay 50,000
MR (Motion for Reconsideration) DENIED. ISSUE: WON there was an attorney-client relationship between the parties – YES
APRIL 22, 2005 DECISION IS UPHELD (RESPONDENT SUSPENDED 6 WON Dee should therefore pay another 50,000 to Atty. Mutuc – YES
MONTHS).
RATIO:
RULE 15.04 – Mediator, Conciliator or Arbiter
The lower courts concur in their findings that there was a lawyer-client relationship.
Dee v CA (1989; Regalado) The SC finds no reason to interfere with this factual finding. Once the lower courts
Facts have found that there was such a relationship, the SC cannot disturb such finding of
fact, absent cogent reasons.

The absence of a formal contract will not preclude that there was a professional
relationship which merits attorney’s fees for professional services rendered.
Documentary formalism is not an essential element in the employment of an attorney.
To establish the relation, it is enough that the advice and assistance of an attorney is
sought and received in any manner pertinent to his profession. An acceptance of the
relation is implied on the part of the attorney from hi acting on behalf of his client in
pursuance of a request from the latter.
The evidence shows that the services of Atty. Mutuc were engaged for the purposes
mentioned. The previous 50,000 payment and the tenor of the demand letters
ineluctably prove these facts such that Dee hired the services of Atty. Mutuc, that
there was a prior agreement as to the amount of attorney’s fees, and that there was
still a balance due. The duplicate-original copy of the initial receipt shows that it was
acknowledged that from the payment of 30,000, there still exists a balance of 70,000.
It is not completely accurate to argue that Atty. Mutuc’s position by assumption that
the interests of Caesar’s Palace were adverse to Dee. Dee was established to not be
the debtor. Hence, Atty. Mutuc’s representations were not in resistance to the
casino’s claim but were geared toward proving that it was Ramon Sy who was actually
in debt.
Even assuming that the conflict of interests obtained, Atty. Mutuc’s role is ethically
and legally defensible. Generally, an attorney is prohibited from representing parties
with contending positions. However, at a certain stage in a controversy before it
reaches the court, a lawyer may represent conflicting interests with the consent of
the parties. A common representation may work to the advantage of both parties
since a mutual lawyer, with honest motivations, may well be better situated to work
out an acceptable settlement, being free of partisan inclinations and acting with the
cooperation and confidence of both parties.
Here, Dee was aware of the dual nature of Atty. Mutuc’s representation to the effect
that Atty. Mutuc also represents Caesar’s Palace in the Philippines as proven by his
testimony such that of all the lawyers in the country, it was Atty. Mutuc whom they
got to deal with debt exculpation from Caesar’s Palace. Hence he actually consented
to and cannot now decry the dual representation that he postulates.
A lawyer is entitled to have and receive the just and reasonable compensation for
services rendered.
RULING:
CA RULING is hereby AFFIRMED.
RULE 15.05 – Candid, Honest Advice
RULE 15.06 – Not to claim influence
Mercado v Security Bank (2006; Sandoval-Gutierrez)
Summary
Petitioners filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing CA’s decision. It was
denied by the Court. Petitioners filed for MFR and was granted, however a
Resolution was issued denying the same. Two MFRs were filed but were also
denied. Petitioner wrote a letter to the CJ Davide Jr. containing contemptuous
remarks insinuating that (1) the ponente succumbed to the tremendous pressure of
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. in denying his petition; (2)the Security Bank
Corporation, respondent, financed the ponente’s travel to the United States;
and (3) the ponente gave respondent a go signal to sell his property. A contempt
proceeding followed. Court found petitioners and Atty. Villanueva guilty of indirect
contempt.
Facts
Jose Teofilo T. Mercado and Ma. Agnes R. Mercado, petitioners, filed with
this Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing CA’s decision of (1)
dismissing their petition for annulment of judgment; and (2) denying their motion
for reconsideration.
 Petition was denied for failure to show reversible error
Petitioners filed an MFR alleging:
 the CA merely relied on technical rules of procedure which sacrificed the
greater interest of justice and equity; and
 their former counsel’s gross negligence constitutes extrinsic fraud, a
ground for annulling the trial courts judgment.
MFR was granted
 However, a Resolution was later on issued denying their petition on the
ground that they failed to show reversible error
Petitioners filed MFR, but was dismissed
Filed another MFR but was subsequently denied for being prohibited
Mercado wrote to Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. stating the following:
 according to Mercado’s counsel, Atty. Jose Villanueva
 the ponente informed him that he has to deny petition
on the same ground because of the tremendous pressure
 from the Chief Justice to favor Security Bank
Corporation
 Ponente are very close and long time friends to each other.
 suspicious that after a few days after the conversation
with Atty. Villanueva, he and his family left for London,
leaving his case to the care of one of his Associates.
 Later on, the ponente herself left for the U.S.A. to visit
her children.
 Petitioner claimed: “Is this a coincidence? As the
saying goes, when there is smoke, there is fire.”
 SBC sold their property to M. Miranda Development Corporation
and succeeded in getting a permit to demolish the 4 building
erected in the property from the Forbes Park Association, even if
the case is still pending and MFR with the Supreme Court wasn’t
filed yet
 The person who bought property from SBC
for P120,000,000.00 while having a drink with petitioner’s
nephew bragged that he just bought the property of the
Mercado’s in Forbes Park.
 Buyer said: I paid already the property because
SBC told me that they already have the go-signal
from the ponente to sell the property.
Petitioner further included contemptuous remarks in his letter against the
CJ as follows:
 “Have you no conscience at all? Are you not bothered of
the final judgment after life? Is this the legacy you want to
impart to your children and all the Filipino people? What
you did to my family and I is unforgivable not only to God and to
humanity. You have deprived us of our precious possession
without due process.”
 “If you, the Chief Justice, himself, are the first person to
make a mockery of our laws, no wonder why foreign
investors do not want to invest in our country because they said,
there is no justice in our courts, the Supreme Court in
particular.”
 “Please I beg of you, have a last hard look on our Petition and the
2 MFR and let us focus and not evade on the real issue on
lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court and not
concentrate on negligence of counsel and other trivial
reasons, etc. Or better yet, please refrain from
influencing the members of the Third Division.”
 “SBCs counsels are experts in fabrication of facts and in
misleading the courts. Please don’t be an instrument of their
wicked schemes, lest the Supreme Court itself becomes
their means to perpetrate injustice. This is the only Bank
which is not interested in amicable settlement in spite of my
several sincere offers of amicable settlement.”
 “Please enlighten us before we seek another forum to
seek redress the injustices, sleepless nights, humiliation
and embarrassment we suffered. If we are wrong about you,
and I hope we really are wrong, please accept our appeal for
forgiveness and apologies.”
Chief Justice Davide required Mercado’s lawyer, Atty. Jose P. Villanueva, to
comment on the letter and show cause why he should not be held in contempt of
court.
The Court’s Third Division ordered Mercado to personally appear and show cause
why he should not be held in contempt of court.
 Mercado, together with Atty. Pablo G. Macapagal, his new counsel,
appeared before the Third Division and swore to the truth of the letter he
wrote.
 Only stated therein what Atty. Villanueva told him
 He further manifested that during the wake of Atty. Villanuevas
mother, he pointed to Justice Angelina Sandoval-
Gutierrez, bragging that she is a close and long time
friend of his.
 However, while stating this, Mercado referred
to Justice Conchita Carpio Morales as Justice
Gutierrez.
Atty. Villanueva submitted a comment,
 denied Mercado’s allegations
 denied having told petitioners that their petition had to be denied
again because there was a tremendous pressure from the CJ
 there was no correlation between the ponente’s trip to the United
States and his trip to London.
 he and his family went to London to attend the graduation of his
daughter, Cherriemaya Veloso Villanueva.
 submitted a photocopy of London School of Economics (LSE) and
Political Science Presentation Ceremonies where the name of his
daughter, Cherriemaya Veloso Villanueva, is listed as one of the
successful graduates.
 submitted a photocopy of his passport
 there is no truth to Mercado’s statement regarding his nephews alleged
encounter with the new owners of the subject property.
Mercado submitted his explanation
 contemptuous statements in his letter merely reiterate the tenor of Atty.
Villanueva’s statements.
  offered an apology, explaining that he wrote the letter while he was under
the impulse of personal stress as he was losing his residential house.
The Third Division ordered both Mercado and Atty. Villanueva to appear to
elucidate their respective positions.
 Mercado testified that it was Atty. Villanueva who informed him that
the ponente is Justice Gutierrez.
 Atty. Villanueva testified that it was Mercado who informed him that
Justice Gutierrez is the ponente. He also confirmed that she attended the
wake of his mother. But he denied Mercados claim that he pointed to
Justice Gutierrez and said that she is his close friend.
Third Division designated Court of Appeals Justice Renato C. Dacudao as
Commissioner to receive evidence
 Justice Dacudao submitted his Investigation, Report and Recommendation.
 Mercado
 guilty of improper conduct tending to bring the authority
and the administration of justice by the Court into
disrespect
 However, he held that there was no showing that he
acted with malice and/or in bad faith or that he was
properly motivated.
 fined in the sum of five thousand pesos (P5,000.00).
ISSUE # 1: WON the court should sustain Justice Dacudao’s finding that Mercado
did not act with malice or bad faith – NO
Bad faith imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing
of a wrong. Malice is of the same genre. It connotes a sinister motive.
 Mercados addressing such letter to Chief Justice Davide is a perfect
illustration of bad faith and malice tending directly to degrade the
administration of justice.
 It transgresses the permissible bounds of fair comment and criticisms
bringing into disrepute, not only the authority and integrity of Chief Justice
Davide and the ponente, but also of the entire Judiciary.
 Furthermore, he alleged that an irregularity or bribery attended the denial
of his petition for review.
 insinuated that the travels of Atty. Villanueva and
the ponente abroad were financed by respondent bank
 recklessly accused the ponente of giving respondent bank a go-
signal to sell his property.
 condemned the entire Judiciary by saying there is no justice in our courts,
the Supreme Court in particular.
 threatened Chief Justice Davide to enlighten him before he seeks
another forum to seek redress for the injustices
Contrary to his claim that he is just verifying the truth of Atty. Villanuevas
statements, the words in his letter are more accusatory than inquisitorial.
 accusations have no basis in fact and in law
 caused intense pain and humiliation on the part of Chief Justice Davide and
the ponente.
In a bid to escape liability for contempt, Mercado invokes freedom of speech and
privacy of communication.
 A person charged with contempt of court for his utterances
which clearly constitute contempt may not ordinarily escape
liability by merely invoking the constitutional guaranty of
freedom of speech.
 Liberty of speech must not be confused with abuse of such
liberty.
 When he attributed those contemptuous remarks to Chief Justice Davide
and the ponente, Mercado abused such liberty.
Accordingly, we hold Mercado guilty of indirect contempt of court.
Section 3, Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, provides:
Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and
hearing. After a charge in writing has been filed, and an
opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within
such period as may be fixed by the court and to be heard by
himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may
be punished for indirect contempt:
d. Any improper conduct tending, directly or
indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the
administration of justice;
ISSUE # 2 (MAIN ISSUE): WON Atty. Villanueva should be held guilty of
indirect contempt – YES
Court is inclined to believe that:
 Atty. Villanueva gave such information to Mercado, and
 also revealed the name of the ponente;
it was only through Atty. Villanueva that petitioner could have learned or
known the name of the ponente in the case.
 petitioner consistent, firm, and candid and detailed in his
testimony, but he was also able to corroborate his claims, by
 submitting his diary which contained vital entries and by
presenting the testimony of his nephew. x x x
 admitted by Atty. Villanueva that he and Justice Gutierrez have
known each other since 1964 and that Justice Gutierrez was in
the wake of his mother.
Rule 15.06 of Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that a
lawyer shall not state or imply that he is able to influence any public
official, tribunal or legislative body. Further, Rule 15.07 provides that a
lawyer must impress upon his client compliance with the laws and the
principles of fairness.
 In informing Mercado that he was a close and long time friend of
the ponente, Atty. Villanueva impressed upon the former that he can
obtain a favorable disposition of his case.
 However, when his petition was dismissed twice, Mercados expectation
crumbled. This prompted him to hurl unfounded, malicious, and
disrespectful accusations against Chief Justice Davide and the ponente.
Responsibility enjoins lawyers to observe and maintain the respect due to courts
and the judicial officers. Atty. Villanuevas conduct, no doubt, degraded the integrity
and dignity of Chief Justice Davide and the ponente and this Court as well.
JUDGMENT:
WHEREFORE, Jose Teofilo T. Mercado and Atty. Jose P. Villanueva are
declared GUILTY of indirect contempt of court. They are FINED P50,000.00
each and WARNED that a repetition of similar acts will warrant a more severe
penalty.
RULE15.07 – Impress Compliance with Laws
RULE 15.08 – Dual Profession
Nakpil v Valdez (1998; Puno)
Summary: Jose Nakpil and Carlos Valdes, who have been friends since the ‘50s,
come into an agreement with regards the Moran property which Nakpil wanted to
buy. Valdes was to keep the property in trust, which he also obtained loans for. The
Nakpils have occupied the house until Jose died. Now, his widow, is trying to sue
Valdes for claiming the property for his own, as well as representing conflicting
parties. In the end, the Court rules in favor of Nakpil, suspending Valdes for one
year.
FACTS
- Jose Nakpil and Carlos Valdes have been friends since their school days in
De La Salle and the Philippine Law School. They were really close.
- When Jose Nakpil became interested in purchasing a property in Moran
Street, Carlos Valdes agreed to keep the property in trust until Nakpil
would buy it for him
o In response to this, Valdes obtained two loans from a bank (P65k
and P75k) which he used to purchase and renovate the property
- The Nakpils occupied the Moran summer house
- Jose Nakpil died on July 8, 1973
o Valdes acted as the legal counsel and accountant of his widow,
Imelda Nakpil
- Ownership of the Moran property became an issue in intestate
proceedings
o Respondent Valdes excluded the Moran property from the
inventory of Jose’s estate
o Valdes transferred his title to the Moran property to his company,
Caval Realty Corporation
- Complainant, the widow, sought to recover the property against
respondent and his corporation
o Valdes claimed absolute ownership over the property and denied
that a trust was created
- During the pendency of the civil case(action for reconveyance),
complainant filed this administrative case to disbar the respondent
o Charging him with violations of professional ethics when he:
 Assigned to his corporation the Moran property which
belonged to the estate he was settling as its lawyer and
auditor
 Excluded Moran property from inventory of real estate
properties of deceased
 Prepared and defended monetary claims against the
estate that retained him as counsel and auditor
o 1st charge – Valdes maliciously appropriated the property in trust
knowing that it didn’t belong to him
o 2nd charge – Valdes’ auditing firm (C.J. Valdes & Co., CPAs)
excluded the Moran property from inventory but included in the
claims against the estate the amounts of P65k and P75k which
were represented as loans “probably for the purchase of a house
and lot in Moran Street, Baguio City”
o 3nd charge – Valdes’ law firm (Carlos J. Valdes and Associations)
filed petition for settlement of estate in court while his auditing
firm acted as accountant of both the estate and two of its
creditors
 Conflicting interests when creditors Angel Nakpil and
ENORN, Inc. were represented by the law firm
 - In SC’s January 21, 1980 Resolution, they deferred action on disbarment
case until resolution of the action for reconveyance involving the issue of
ownership
o Complainant moved for reconsideration, claiming issue of
ownership wasn’t prejudicial to admin case
o Admin case was referred to OSG for investigation, report, and
recommendation
- CFI of Baguio dismissed the action for reconveyance
o Ruled that Moran property was held in trust but that the
complainant waived her right over it
- CA reversed trial court holding that respondent was absolute owner of
Moran property
- When case was pending appeal to the Supreme Court, OSG submitted its
Report on disbarment complaint
o Relied heavily of CA decision finding that respondent was not put
on notice of complainant’s claim over the property
o No trust agreement created and respondent was absolute owner
o Recommended dismissal of admin case
ISSUE
W/N respondent Valdes should be disbarred for this demeanor in his accounting
profession and law practice in connection with the property of his client.
RULING
Court finds Atty. Carlos J. Valdes guilty of misconduct. He is suspended for 1 year,
with a warning that a similar infraction shall be dealt with more severely in the
future.
RATIO
- As a rule, lawyers are not barred from dealing with his client. But the
business must be characterized with utmost honestly and good faith.
o Business transactions are disfavored and discouraged
o No presumption of innocence or improbability of wrongdoing is
considered in an attorney’s favor
- SC cannot subscribe to OSG’s recommendations
o Their findings were solely based on CA decision
o But SC reversed the CA decision in 1993
- Respondent was in violation of the trust agreement by claiming
absolute ownership over the property and refused to sell the
property to complainant after the death of Jose Nakpil
o Valdes had acknowledged and respected the trust nature of
Moran property initially
o He was in bad faith when he transpired the property to his
corporation
- Also guilty of excluding the Moran property from estate which his law firm
was representing
o Misuse of legal expertise to deprive his client of Moran property is
clearly unethical
o To make matters worse, he even charged the two loans as liability
of the estate, after said loans were obtained by Valdes for
purchase and renovation of property which he claimed for himself
- “Respondent wanted to have his cake and eat it too” subordinating the
interest of his client to his own pecuniary gain.
- Respondent is also guilty of representing conflicting interests
o Representation may be allowed after full disclosure of facts
because clients must give their informed consent to such
representation
- No question that interests of estate of its creditors are adverse to each
other
o Respondent’s accounting firm prepared the list of assets and
liabilities of the estate and at the same time computed the claims
of two creditors of the estate
o He cannot claim having resigned, because the succession of events
show that respondent couldn’t have been totally ignorant of the
proceedings
o There was no full disclosure of the situation, complainant’s silence
regarding arrangement is not equal to informed consent
- The test to determine whether there is a conflict of interest in the
representation is probability, not certainty of conflict
o It was respondent’s duty to inhibit either of his firms from said
proceedings to avoid probability of conflict of interest
- He allowed his accounting firm to represent two creditors of the estate
and, at the same time, allowed his law firm to represent the estate in the
proceedings where these claims were presented
o Breach of professional ethics and undesirable as it placed his firms’
loyalties under a cloud of doubt
- Even if his misconduct refers to his accountancy practice, it will not
prevent the Court from disciplining him as a member of the Bar
o A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for ANY
misconduct, even if it pertains to his private activities, as
long as it shows him to be wanting in moral character,
honesty, probity, or good demeanor.
CANON 16 Hold in Trust Client’s Moneys and Properties
RULE16.01 – Account
 Berbano v Barcelona (2003)
SUMMARY:
Berbano, one of the heirs of Rufino Esteban Hilapo, appointed as attorney-in-fact
Porfrio Daen to settle their land dispute with Filinvest Dev. Corp. Pending the land
dispute, Daen was incarcerated. She sought the assistance of Barcelona in releasing
Daen. Berbano and Daen's nephew gave Barcelona a total of PhP64,000 for the
cause as Barcelona purported that he knew a Justice of the Supreme Court who can
help with Daen's release but that he would need money for it. However, Daen was
not released from jail as promised and Berbano, in her several attempts to recover
the money, was evaded by Barcelona.
The Court held that Berbano has violated several canons of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, including Canon 16 and Rule 16.01, which
demands that lawyers must account for all the money received from the
client. Furthermore, Barcelona had a previous administrative complaint against him
of similar nature and had, as in that case, ignored all hearings and notices from the
Investigating Commissioner. Barcelona was thus declared disbarred from the
practice of law and was ordered to return PhP64,000 to Berbano.
DOCTRINE:
The Code exacts from lawyers not only a firm respect for law, legal processes and
the courts but also mandates the utmost degree of fidelity and good faith in
dealing with clients and the moneys entrusted to them pursuant to their
fiduciary relationship.
FACTS:
 11 Mar 1999 – Felicitas Berbano filed a sworn affidavit before the IBP and
alleged the following:
 Berbano was one of the heirs of Rufino Esteban Hilapo and had appointed
Porfirio Daen as their attorney-in-fact in the settlement of a land dispute
against Filinvest Dev. Corp. with the Commission on the Settlement of Land
Problems (COSLAP) involving 244 hectare land in Alabang, Muntinlupa
 26 Jan 1999 – Daen was arrested by a Muntinlupa police who presented an
expired warrant dated Feb 1990 and was detained at Muntinlupa City Jail,
Tunasan o Naty Sibuya, a friend, recommended Wenceslao Barcelona, her
cousin-in-law, to assist in the release of Daen
 26 Jan 1999 - Barcelona purported that he could have Daen released the
following day if he would be given PhP50,000. Berbano gave him only
PhP15,700 as it was already around 10:30PM and could only gather the money
from their relatives
 27 Jan 1999 – At a Max's Restaurant, 12NN, Berbano handed Barcelona a pay-
to-cash cheque amounting to PhP24,000 dated 29 Jan 1999. Barcelona claimed
that the Justices of the Supreme Court do not accept cheques but took the
cheque presented nonetheless.
 28 Jan 1999 – Berbano gave an additional PhP10,000 in cash to Barcelona through
the latter's wife. As the cheque was allegedly not encashed according to Barcelona,
PhP15,000 was given to him by Gil Daen, Porfrio's nephew. Berbano also gave
PhP1,000 for Barcelona's gasoline expenses.
 3 Feb 1999 – Barcelona told Berbano that Daen will be released the following day.
 4 Feb 1999 – Daen was not released and Barcelona, according to his wife, was in
Mindanao attending a peace talk with the Muslims
 After more than a week – Barcelona promised that he would return the PhP64,000
but was never heard from or seen again by Berbano
 15 Apr 1999 – Investigating Commissioner J. Virgilio A. Bautista of CBD IBP
required Barcelona to submit an answer to the complaint. Barcelona never
submitted despite due notice received by him.
 13 Aug 1999 – Respondent failed to appear in the hearing and was then considered
in default. Complainant testified and manifested that she would bring the
PhP24,0000 cheque.
 Complainant and respondent failed to appear in the following hearings:
1 Oct and 19 Nov in 1999, 12 Oct and 14 Dec in 2001 and 28 Jun 2002.
23 Dec 2002 – Commissioner Bautista recommended that respondent was guilty of
malpractice and serious breach of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
recommended that he be disbarred and ordered to return the PhP24,0000.
 IBP Board of Governors affirmed the recommendation but modified the penalty to
suspension for 6 years
Issue
WON Barcelona should be disbarred? YES.
Held
 Respondent callously demeaned the legal profession by taking money from a
client under the pretext of having connections with a Justice of the Supreme
Court
 Respondent had the audacity to say that Justices of the Supreme Court do not
accept cheques
 Respondent had been charged and found guilty of conduct unbecoming of a
lawyer in Gil T. Aquino v. Atty Wenceslao C. Barcelona where he asked and
received an amount of PhP60,000 as he misrepresented that he knew a legal
assistant named Gonzalo Mericullo in PNB who could restructure the loan of
the then complainant. No such person was employed by PNB and as a result,
 Aquino's property was foreclosed. The Court suspended respondent for six
years.
 Respondent has a penchant for misrepresenting to clients that he has the
proper connections to secure the relief they seek and ask for money allegedly
to be given to said connections
 Act of respondent of not filing his answer and not attending the hearings
displays his contempt for legal proceedings
 RULING: Court ordered the disbarment of Barcelona as he was found guilty of
gross misconduct and in violating Canons 1, 7, 11, 16 and Rule 16.01 and
ordered that PhP64,000 be returned to the complainant within 30 days from
receipt of the notice.
DISSENT: Vitug, J.: Civil award should be taken apart from the administrative case.
Licuanan v Melo (1989)
Facts
 An affidavit-complaint, dated November 11, 1981, was filed by Licuanan
with the Office of the Court Administrator on 5 February 1982 against
respondent, Atty. Melo, for breach of professional ethics, alleging that
respondent, who was her counsel in an ejectment case filed against her
tenant, failed to remit to her the rentals collected by respondent
on different dates over a twelve-month period, much less did he report
to her the receipt of said amounts.
 Only after approximately a year from actual receipt that respondent
turned over his collections to complainant after the latter, through another
counsel, acquired knowledge of the payment and had demanded the same.
 Respondent admitted having received the payment of rentals from
complainant's tenant, Aida Pineda, but explained that he kept this matter
from the complainant for the purpose of surprising her with his
success in collecting the rentals.
 Upon being asked for report and recommendation, SolGen finds:
o The issue to be resolved is whether there was unreasonable
delay on the part of the respondent in accounting for the
funds
o A lawyer, under his oath, pledges himself not to delay any
man for money or malice and is bound to conduct himself
with all good fidelity to his clients.
o Under paragraph 11 of the Canons of Legal Ethics, he is obligated
to report promptly the money of client that has come to his
possession and should not commingle it with his private property
or use it for his personal purpose without his client's consent
o Paragraph 32 of the Canons of Legal Ethics further requires a
lawyer to maintain a reputation for honesty and fidelity to private
trust
o In the instant case, respondent failed to observe his oath of office.
o On August 8, 1979, respondent, as Licuanan's attorney, obtained
judgment in Licuanan's favor against Aida Pineda whereby the
latter was directed by the City Court of Manila to pay Licuanan all
her monthly rentals from October, 1978 and succeeding months
thereafter.
o When several months had elapsed without them hearing a word
from Pineda, respondent decided to send her a letter on February
4, 1980, demanding that she pay the monthly rental of her
apartment otherwise he will be constrained to take the necessary
legal action
o On February 11, 1980, Pineda yielded to the demand of
Melo. She went to respondent's office and paid him
P3,060.00 for which respondent gave her a receipt for the said
amount representing her rental payments for October, 1978 to
February, 1980 at the rate of P180.00 per month
o March 31,1980, Pineda again went back to respondent and paid
the rentals of her apartment for the months of March and April
o Respondent again received from Pineda on June 30, 1980 rental
payments covering the months of May, June and July
o September 29, 1980, Respondent received payment for August,
September, October
o January 23, 1981, he collected again from Pineda the total sum of
P720.00 covering the months of October, November, December,
1980 and January 1981
o During the entire twelve-month period that respondent had been
receiving the said rental payments, he did not bother to
inform or report to complainant about the said payments
and instead unnecessarily retained the money.
o It was only when Atty. Ponciano B. Jacinto, the new
counsel retained by complainant, wrote respondent a
letter on May 4, 1981, advising him to surrender the
money to complainant that he accounted for it
o Late because on April 27, 1981, complainant, not knowing that
respondent had been receiving the rental payment, instituted an
administrative case against her (Aida Pineda) before the Chief of
the Philippine Tuberculosis Society accusing her of "moral
turpitude" arising from her alleged failure to pay the rent
o This led therefore Pineda to bring an action against her (Licuanan)
for damages before the then Court of First Instance of Manila
o This unfortunate incident would not have happened had
respondent been only true to his oath as a lawyer, i.e., to
be honest and candid towards his client.
 o Hard to believe respondent's defense that he kept the money of
complainant for a year merely because he wanted to surprise her
with his success in collecting the rental payments from Pineda. On
the contrary, it is very much discernible that he did not surrender
immediately the money to complainant because he was using it for
his own benefit.
o Common sense dictates that by unnecessarily withholding the
money of complainant for such length of time, respondent
deprived her of the use of the same.
o The "highly fiduciary" and "confidential relation" of attorney and
client requires that the attorney should promptly account
for all funds and property received or held by him for the
client's benefit, and failure to do so constitutes
professional misconduct (Fermina Legaspi Daroy, et al., vs.
Atty. Ramon Chaves Legaspi)
o Money collected by a lawyer in pursuance of a judgment
in favor of his clients is held in trust and must be
immediately turned over to them (Aya vs. Bigonia)
o Respondent is guilty of breach of trust reposed in him by
his client.
o Recommendation: Suspended from the practice of law for a
period of not less than one (1) year, and that he be strongly
admonished to strictly and faithfully observe his duties to his
clients.
Issue:
W/N Atty Melo violated the lawyer’s oath? Yes
Held:
 Court adopts SolGen’s findings but different recommendation
 Glaringly a breach of the Lawyer's Oath to which he swore
observance:
11. DEALING WITH TRUST PROPERTY
The lawyer should refrain from any action whereby for his
personal benefit or gain he abuses or takes advantage of the
confidence reposed in him by his client.
Money of the client or collected for the client of other trust
property coming into the possession of the lawyer should be
reported and accounted for promptly, and should not under any
circumstance be commingled with his own or be used by him.
(Substantially reiterated in Rules 16.01. 16.02 and 16.03)
 Respondent has breached the trust reposed in him by his client. He has
shown himself unfit for the confidence and trust which should characterize
an attorney-client relationship and the practice of law. By reason thereof
complainant was compelled to file a groundless suit against her tenant for
non-payment of rentals thereby exposing her to jeopardy by becoming a
defendant in a damage suit filed by said tenant against her By force of
circumstances, complainant was further compelled to engage the services
of another counsel in order to recover the amount rightfully due her but
which respondent had unjustifiedly withheld from her.
 Guilty of deceit, malpractice and gross misconduct in office. He has
displayed lack of honesty and good moral character. He has violated his
oath not to delay any man for money or malice, besmirched the
name of an honorable profession and has proven himself
unworthy of the trust reposed in him by law as an officer of the
Court.
Judgment:
WHEREFORE, consistent with the crying need to maintain the high traditions and
standards of the legal profession and to preserve undiminished public faith in
attorneys-at-law, the Court Resolved to DISBAR respondent, Atty. Manuel L.
Melo, from the practice of law. His name is hereby ordered stricken from the Roll
of Attorneys.
Sison Jr. v Camacho (2016)
Fact
 Complaint was filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD)
 Complainan Atty. Antero M. Sison, Jr. (Atty. Sison), president of Marsman-
Drysdale Agribusiness Holdings Inc. (MDAHI), charged respondent Atty.
Manuel Camacho (Atty. Camacho) of violating Rule 1.01, for dishonestly
entering into a compromise agreement without authorization, and Rule
16.01, for failure to render an accounting of funds which were supposed to
be paid as additional docket fees.
Complainant's Position
 Atty. Sison alleged that Atty. Camacho was the counsel of MDAHI in an
insurance claim action against Paramount Life & General Insurance Corp.
(Paramount Insurance),
o The initial insurance claim of MDAHI against Paramount Insurance
was P14,863,777.00.
 On March 4, 2011, Atty. Camacho met with Atty. Enrique Dimaano (Atty.
Dimaano), corporate secretary of MDAHI, and proposed to increase their
claim to P64,412,534.18 by taking into account the interests imposed.
 Atty. Camacho, however, clarified that the increase in the claim would
require additional docket fees in the amount of P1,288,260.00, as shown in
his hand-written computation.
 MDAHI agreed and granted the said amount to Atty. Dimaano
  On May 27, 2011, Atty. Dimaano gave the money for docket fees to Atty.
Camacho who promised to issue a receipt for the said amount, but never
did.4
 Atty. Sison later discovered that on May 26, 2011, the RTC had already
rendered a decision in favor of MDAHI granting its insurance claim plus
interests in the amount of approximately P65,000,000.00.
 On August 11, 2011, Atty. Camacho sent a letter to MDAHI recommending
a settlement with Paramount Insurance in the amount of PI5,000,000.00
allegedly to prevent a protracted appeal with the appellate court.
 MDAHI refused the offer of compromise and did not indicate its conforme
on the letter of Atty. Camacho.
 Even without the written conformity of MDAHI, Atty. Camacho filed the
Satisfaction of Judgment before the RTC stating that the parties had entered
into a compromise agreement.
 On August 18, 2011, Atty. Sison met with Atty. Camacho to clarify the
events that transpired.
o He asked Atty. Camacho whether he paid the amount of
P1,288,260.00 as additional dockets fees, and the latter replied that
he simply gave it to the clerk of court as the payment period had
lapsed.
 Atty. Sison sent a letter stating that he was alarmed that Camacho would
accept a disadvantageous compromise; that it was against company policy to
bribe any government official with respect to the P1,288,260.00 given to the
clerk of court; and that MDAHI would only pay P200,000.00 to Atty.
Camacho as attorney's fees.
Respondent's Position
 Atty. Camacho stressed that he had the authority to enter into the
compromise agreement. Moreover, the alleged docket fees given to him by
MDAHI formed part of his attorney's fees.
 He further stated that the judgment debt was paid and accepted by MDAHI
without any objection, as duly evidenced by an acknowledgment receipt.
Thus, there was no irregularity in the compromise agreement.
 With respect to the amount handed to him, Atty. Camacho averred that he
filed a Motion to Compel Plaintiff to Pay Attorney's Fee on September 13,
2011 before the RTC. The Court granted the said motion stating that the
amount of PI,288,260.00 was considered as part of his attorney's fees.
 On July 6, 2012, the RTC issued an Order that only P300,000.00 was
previously paid to Atty. Camacho as attorney's fees.
 Based on the foregoing, Atty. Camacho asserted that the amount of
P1,288,260.00 which he received, truly formed part of his unpaid attorney's
fees.
 He stressed that the said RTC order had attained finality and constituted res
judicata on the present administrative case.
 He added that MDAHI disregarded the RTC order as it filed an estafa case
against him concerning the amount of PI,288,260.00.
Report and Recommendation
 IBP-CBD found Atty. Camacho to have violated the provisions of Rule 1.01
and Rule 16.01 of the CPR and recommending the imposition of the penalty
of one (1) year suspension from the practice of law against him.
 The Board adopted the report and recommendation of National Director
Dominic CM. Solis.
 The penalty of one (1) year suspension imposed was lowered to six (6)
months suspension from the practice of law.
ISSUE: W/N Atty. Camacho violated Canon 16.01 – YES
RATIO:
 Atty. Camacho set up a defense that the said amount formed part of his
attorney's fees. Such defense, however, is grossly contradictory to the
established purpose of the P1,288,260.00.
o In its Payment Request/Order Form, it is plainly indicated therein
that MDAHI released the said amount only to be applied as
payment for additional docket fees, and not for any other purposes.
o Well-settled is the rule that lawyers are not entitled to unilaterally
appropriate their clients' money for themselves by the mere fact
that the clients owe them attorney's fees.
 Atty. Camacho failed to issue a receipt to MDAHI from the moment he
received the said amount.
o ethical and practical considerations made it both natural and
imperative for a lawyer to issue receipts, even if not demanded, and
to keep copies of the receipts for his own records.
o Pursuant to Rule 16.01 of the CPR, a lawyer must be aware that he
is accountable for the money entrusted to him by the clients, and
that his only means of ensuring accountability is by issuing and
keeping receipts.
 The fiduciary nature of the relationship between the counsel and his client
imposes on the lawyer the duty to account for the money or property
collected or received for or from his client.
 Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose but not used for the
purpose should be immediately returned.
  A lawyer's failure, to return upon demand, the funds held by him on behalf
of his client gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same
for his own use in violation of the trust reposed in him by his client.
JUDGMENT: Atty. Manuel N. Camacho is found guilty of violating Rule 1.01 and
Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. For reasons above-stated, he
is DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name stricken off the Roll of
Attorneys