Article 353.

Definition of Libel

A libel is a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or

imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstances tending to cause the
dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the
memory of one who is dead.

Elements:

1. There must be an imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary,

or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance;

2. The imputation must be made publicly;

3. It must be malicious;

4. The imputation must be directed at a natural or juridical person, or one who is

dead;

5. The imputation must tend to cause the dishonor, discredit or contempt of the
person defamed.

There must be a defamatory imputation. The imputation may cover:

a. crime allegedly committed by the offended party;

b. vice or defect, real or imaginary, of the offended party; or

c. any act or omission, condition, status of, or circumstance relating to the

offended party.

 “Defamation” is the proper term for libel as used in Art. 353.

 “Libel” strictly is a defamation committed by means of writing, printing, lithography,

engraving, radio, phonograph …. or any similar means.

 When the defamation is oral, it is called “slander”.

 Seditious libel is punished not in this chapter but in Art. 142 (Inciting to sedition).

 Test of defamatory character of words used: A charged is sufficient if the words are
calculated to induce the hearers to suppose and understand that the person against
whom they were uttered was guilty of certain offenses, or are sufficient to impeach his
honesty, virtue or reputation, or to hold him up to public ridicule.
 The meaning of the writer is immaterial. It is not the intention of the writer or speaker,
or the understanding of the plaintiff or of any hearer or reader by which the actionable
quality of the words is to be determined, but the meaning that the words in fact
conveyed on the minds of persons of reasonable understanding, discretion and candor,
taking into consideration the surrounding circumstances which were known to the
hearer or reader.

 ELEMENT 1: IMPUTATION

Examples:

* Imputation of a vice  imputing upon a person lascivious and immoral habits in an

article

* Imputation of an act or omission  “X borrows money without intention to pay, she

had her breasts augmented without paying the doctor”

* Imputation of condition, status or circumstance  calling another a bastard or

mangkukulam

 ELEMENT 2: PUBLICATION

 Publication is the communication of the defamatory matter to some third person or

persons.

 Hence, sending a latter in a sealed envelope through a messenger is not publication.

But sending to the wife, a letter defamatory of her husband, is sufficient publication.
(The person defamed is the husband and the wife is already considered a 3 rd person)

If the defamatory imputation is not published there is NO crime. The law permits us to
think as badly as we please of our neighbors so long as we keep our uncharitable
thought to ourselves.

 ELEMENT 3: MALICE

 Malice is used to indicate that the offender is prompted by personal ill-will or spite
and speaks merely to injure the reputation of the person defamed.

 Malice may be in-fact or in-law.

 Malice in fact

- must be proved by a showing of ill-will, hatred or purpose to injure

 Malice in law

- is presumed from a defamatory imputation  proof of malice is not required

 (The distinction exists for purposes of determining WON there is defamation where
privileged communication is involved thus:) As a general rule, malice in law is presumed
from a defamatory imputation. But where privileged communication is involved, malice
(in law) is NOT presumed  the plaintiff must prove malice in fact. In either case, where
malice in fact is present, justifiable motives cannot exist and the imputations become
actionable.

ELEMENT 4: IDENTIFICATION

 It must be shown that at least a 3rd person could identify the offended party as the
object of the libelous publication.

 But libel published in different parts may be taken together to establish the
identification of the offended party.

ELEMENT 5: DISHONOR, DISCREDIT, CONTEMPT

 Dishonor – disgrace, shame, ignominy

Discredit – loss of credit or reputation; disesteem

Contempt – state of being despised

There are as many offenses as there were persons defamed (PP vs. Del Rosario).
When the alleged slanderous utterances were committed on the same date and at the
same place, but against two different persons, the situation has given rise to two
separate and individual causes for prosecution, with respect to each of the persons
defamed.

Mercado vs. CFI

Petitioner was charged with libel for imputing to Mrs. Virginia Mercado acts constituting
enrichment thru corrupt practices. The offensive telegram which contained the
allegations was addressed to the Secretary of the, Department of Public Works and
Communications purportedly in line with President Marcos' appeal to the public to give
information on undesirable employees in the government service to achieve the
objectives of the New Society. He filed an MTD on the ground of the telegram being
privileged communication. After the same was denied, a MTQ, alleging that the facts
charged do not constitute an offense, was filed but when the same again met with a
denial, the present action was instituted to annul the aforesaid orders. Respondents, in
their Comment, stressed there was absence of any privilege, there being malice and
bad faith, petitioner having been motivated by vengeance and ill-will in making the said
communication as established by his previous conduct viz a viz the private respondent:
the filing of several complaints, both administrative and criminal aimed to malign her
good character and reputation which were subsequently dismissed or closed for lack of
merit and/or insufficiency of evidence.

HELD: Petition dismissed. Qualified privilege communication may be lost by proof of

malice. The prosecution should be given the opportunity of proving malice in view of
petitioner's conduct towards private respondent which casts doubt on his good faith.

Agbayani vs. Sayo

Mahinan, manager of the Cagayan Valley Branch of the GSIS at Cauayan, Isabela, file
at Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya a complaint for written defamation against 4
subordinates. The 4 accused filed a MTQ, contending that the CFI Nueva Vizcaya has
no jurisdiction over the case.

HELD: The proper venue of Mahinan’s criminal action against the petitioners is the CFI
Isabela, since as GSIS branch manager, he was a public officer stationed at Cauayan,
Isabela and that alleged libel was committed when he was in the public service.

Newsweek vs. IAC

An article entitled “An Island of Fear” was published in Newsweek. The author wrote
that that the island province of Negros Occidental is a place dominated by big
landowners who not only exploited the impoverished and underpaid sugarcane laborers,
but also brutalized and killed them with impunity. The sugarcane planters instituted a
class action for libel.

HELD: To maintain a libel suit, a victim must be identifiable. Defamatory matter which
does not reveal the identity of the person upon whom the imputation is cast affords no
ground of action unless it can be shown that the readers of the libel could have
identified the personality of the individual defamed. Defamatory remarks directed at a
group of persons is not actionable unless the statements are all-embracing or
sufficiently specific for the victim to be identifiable.

Lacsa vs. IAC

Lacsa and Marquez were officers of the Philippine Columbian Association. Lacsa
uncovered a glitch in the qualification of Marquez to be president. He addressed a letter
to Marquez in the ff. tenor: that Marquez should step down from the presidency,
because the position is open only for proprietary members and Marquez has failed to
show any proof of his proprietary membership, that in view of these, he has been
holding the position in a de facto capacity. This letter was published in the publication of
the association.

HELD: The test of libelous meanings is not the analysis of a sentence into component
phrases with the meticulous care of the grammarian or stylist, but the import conveyed
by the entirety of the language to the ordinary reader. The SolGen is correct in holding
that the imputation of being called a de facto president is tantamount to being
acknowledged as a pretender or impostor.

Soriano vs. IAC

Soriano’s criminal liability was based on an article published in “The Guardian”, of which
he is the editor. The basis of the article was a press release prepared in Tacloban and
delivered to various newspapers. The intended circulation of “The Guardian” is
nationwide. The libel case was docked at the RTC Letye. Soriano filed n MTQ on the
basis of improper venue. He argues that the Leyte court had no jurisdiction because the
publication house of “The Guardian” was located in Quezon City and that Tantuico also
holds office in QC.

HELD: Local jurisprudence follow the “multiple publication” rule – that each and every
publication of the same libel suit constitutes a separate offense, and warrants a
separate cause of action for filing a libel suit. However, the publication requirement set
forth by RPC360 refers to the “publication” (the official circulating organ) and not the
“press release”. In harmonizing RPC360 with the “multiple publication” rule, the “press
release” is not the document to be examined. Since the official publication is produced
in QC and was not proven to have been produced/copied in Leyte or elsewhere, the trial
should have been handled by a QC court.

Bulletin vs. Noel

The article contained statements to the effect that American influence was a significant
driver of the political ascendancy of the Mindalanos of Lanao. Complainants claimed
this was an insulting statement that damaged the social standing of the clan.

HELD: The published work alleged to contain the libelous excerpt must be examined
and viewed as a whole. Titles of royalty and nobility are not generally recognized or
acknowledged socially in the national community. Personal hurt or embarrassment,
even if real, is not automatically equivalent to defamation. The law against defamation
protects the interest of a person in acquiring, retaining, and enjoying a reputation as
good as one’s character and conduct warrant in the community. It is the community
standards, not personal or family standards, that a court must refer in evaluation a
publication claimed to be defamatory.

Santos vs. CA

The article published was a verbatim copy of a complained filed by Sandejas with the
SEC against the brokerage firm of Carlos Sison.

HELD: The public article is but a faithful reproduction of a pleading filed before a quasi-
judicial body. There are no embellishments, wild imputations etc. calculated to damage
the reputation of the offended parties and expose them to public contempt. No valid
cause of action to institute an action for libel exists.

Sazon vs. CA

HELD: When the imputation is already held defamatory, malice on the part of the
defendant (malice-in-fact) need not be proved because the law already presumes that
the imputation is malicious (malice-in-law).

Defamatory remarks and comments on the conduct or acts of public officers which are
related to the discharge of their duties will not constitute libel if the defendant proves
that truth of the imputation (thus a form of privileged communication), but any attack on
the private capacities of a public officer clearly beyond the scope of his official duties
may constitute libel.
Even if the article falls under the cloak of privileged communications, it will not discount
the fact that he wrote the same with malice, due to grudges an ill-will attendant in the
circumstances surrounding the facts.

Vasquez vs. CA

HELD: If the defamatory statement is made against a public official with respect to the
discharge of his official duties and functions and the truth of the allegation is shown, the
accused will be entitled to an acquittal even though he doesn’t prove that the imputation
was published with good motives and for justifiable ends. (Because, upon proof of truth,
the burden of proving that the offender acted with malice would be on the public officer)

Actual Malice Rule – Even if the defamatory statement is false, no liability can attach if it
relates to official conduct, unless the public official concerned proves that the statement
was made with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was
false or not.

Navarette vs. CA

Petitioner claims that private respondent alluded to him when she said the words
"stupid", "bastards", "swindlers", and "plunderers" while testifying on the Deed of Sale
with Right of Repurchase subject of a civil case. In her Answer, private respondent cited
decisions of the Supreme Court to the effect that no action for libel or for damages may
be founded on utterances made in the course of judicial proceedings.

HELD: It is a settled principle in this jurisdiction that statements made in the course
of judicial proceedings are absolutely privileged. This absolute privilege remains
regardless of the defamatory tenor and the presence of malice if the same are relevant,
pertinent or material to the cause in hand or subject of the inquiry. Thus, the person
making these statements such as a judge, lawyer or witness does not thereby incur the
risk of being found liable thereon in a criminal prosecution or an action for the recovery
of damages.

The statements made during the course of judicial proceedings enjoy the shield of
absolute privilege. The privilege is not intended so much for the protection of those
engaged in the public service and in the enactment and administration of law, as for the
promotion of public welfare, the purpose being that members of the legislature, judges
of courts, jurors, lawyers and witnesses may speak their minds freely and exercise their
respective functions without incurring the risk of a criminal prosecution or an action for
damages. In determining the issue of relevancy of statements made in judicial
proceedings, courts have adopted a liberal attitude by resolving all doubts in favor of
relevancy.

Without question, the use of blatantly defamatory language like "stupid", "bastards",
"swindlers", and "plunderers" in describing the adverse parties detract from the honor
and dignity that befits a court proceeding and should have been stricken out of the
records.

The foregoing notwithstanding, the Court finds that the terms used by the private
respondent in her pleading and in her testimony cannot be the basis for an award of
moral damages and attorney's fees in favor of petitioner.

Jalandoni vs. Drilon

Respondents here were accused of printing libelous matter in newspapers. The matter
pertained to actions by Jalandoni as member of the PCGG alleged to be illegal and
unauthorized (sold certain shares of a company at undervalued prices to RCBC thereby
defrauding the government). Justice secretary reversed the findings of prosecutors and
dismissed the complaints.

HELD: Articles are not libelous. Articles merely stated insinuations on the deal between
RCBC and Jalandoni as part of the PCGG. It just served to inform the public of
irregularities in the transaction. In libels against public officers, to be liable, libel must
relate to official conduct, even if the statement is false, unless officer proves that it was
made with actual malice (with knowledge that it was false or not).

Borjal vs. CA

Borjal wrote a series of articles in his column about a certain “Edsa hero who is
organizing conferences and seminars and soliciting money in the name of the President
and DOTC secretary without the latter’s consent and authority. Wenceslao filed a case
for libel saying that he felt alluded to in the articles as the organizer and that he was
almost certain that it was him.
HELD: No libel. In libel, it is essential that the victim be identifiable even if not actually
named. It is not sufficient that the victim himself made the identification, but it is
necessary that at least the victim be identifiable by a 3rd person.

CAB, no sufficient identification. Victim was not named, there were many Edsa heroes
and many organizers of the seminars. And even the victim was not absolutely sure that
it was him being alluded to.

Fortich vs. Galleron

Fortich is a salesman of San Miguel. His supervisor Galleron suspected him of

misappropriating the collections he received retailers and buyers, so an investigation
was conducted on the matter. Galleron submitted an inter-office memorandum
containing the results of his investigation. The memo was addressed to the Regional
Sales Manager and contained this paragraph:

“In addition, I would like to further inform management that S/M Stanley Fortich is an
avid mahjong player and a cockfighting enthusiast. In spite of several advices, there
seems to be no change in his lifestyle. Also, respondent had a similar case last
September 11, 1978.”

HELD: The controversial paragraph is not libelous. First, the memo was part and
parcel of the investigation on Fortich’s non-remittance of collections. Secondly, the
memo was notcirculated or publicized, much less read by officers of the corporation
other than those involved in the investigation or those directly supervising the
petitioner's work. More importantly, Fortich was unable to prove that the issuance of the
memo was motivated by malice.

While malice is presumed in every defamatory imputation, there are certain exceptions
to this rule. The memo falls under the privileged communication rule. A privileged
communication is one made bona fide upon any subject matter in which the party
communicating has an interest, or in reference to which he has a duty. In the case at
bar, Galleron, being Fortich’s supervisor, was charged with the duty to carry out and
enforce company rules and policies, including the duty to undertake initial investigation
of possible irregularities in customer accounts. The memo was an official act done in
good faith, an honest innocent statement arising from a moral and legal obligation which
the private respondent certainly owed to the company in the performance of his duties.
Salcedo-Ortanez vs. CA

Rafael filed an action for annulment of his marriage to Teresita. Among the evidence
presented by Rafael in the trial court were several tape recordings of telephone
conversations between Teresita and unidentified persons. The recordings were
obtained when Rafael allowed his friends from the military to wire tap his home
telephone.

HELD: Rep. Act No. 4200 entitled "An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and
Other Related Violations of the Privacy of Communication, and for other purposes"
expressly makes such tape recordings inadmissible in evidence. Absent a clear
showing that both parties to the telephone conversations allowed to recording of the
same, the inadmissibility of the subject tapes is mandatory under Rep. Act No. 4200.

People v. Ogie Diaz (2007)

The last element of libel is that the victim is identified or identifiable from the contents of
the libelous article. In order to maintain a libel suit, it is essential that the victim be
identifiable, although it is not necessary that the person be named. It is enough if by
intrinsic reference the allusion is apparent or if the publication contains matters of
description or reference to facts and circumstances from which others reading the
article may know the person alluded to, or if the latter is pointed out by extraneous
circumstances so that those knowing such person could and did understand that he was
the person referred to. Kunkle v. Cablenews-American and Lyons laid the rule that this
requirement is complied with where a third person recognized or could identify the party
vilified in the article.

Article 354. Requirement for Publicity

Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good

intention and justiable motice for making it is shown, except in the following cases:

1. A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of

any legal, moral, or social duty;

2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of
any judicial, legislative, or other official proceedings which are not of confidential
nature, or of any statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of
any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions.
 The two exceptions in Art. 354 are the so-called privileged communications. When
privileged communication is involved, malice in fact must be proved to convict the
accused.

Illustration of Art. 354: A tells C that B is a thief. The fact is B is really is a thief, because
he was previously convicted of theft. Can it be presumed that the imputation by B is
malicious? Yes, because Art. 354 says that “every defeamatory imputation is presumed
to be malicious even if it be true.”

But the presumption of malice is rebutted if A can show (1) good intention and (2)
justifiable motive for making the imputation.

Thus, if B is applying for a position of security guard in the store of C, brother of A, and
the purpose of A is to protect his brother from undesirable employees, then malice
cannot be presumed.

 Two kinds of privileged communication:

(1) Absolute

- not actionable, EVEN IF its author acted in bad faith

- this class includes statements made by members of Congress in the discharge of their
functions as such, allegations in pleadings made by parties or their counsel, answers
given by witnesses in reply to questions propounded to them (provided the answers are
responsive and the allegations are relevant)

- usually limited to legislative and judicial proceedings and other acts of state

(2) Conditional or qualified

- not actionable UNLESS made with malice or bad faith

- this class includes those communications mentioned as exceptions in Art. 354

 RE: Par. 1 (Private communication made by any person to another…)

Illustration: X files a complaint in good faith against a priest to his ecclesiastical superior
allegedly for taking indecent liberties of women  private communication in the
performance of a moral duty  privileged!

 Unnecessary publicity destroys good faith. So for example, if a copy of the complaint
above is sent to a newspaper for publication, the privilege is destroyed.
 That the statement is a privileged communication is a matter of defense and, like all
other matters of defense, must be established by the accused.

 Tapos, if the accused sets up privileged communication as a defense, to overcome it,

the prosecutions must prove that (1) the defendant acted with malice in fact (because
the privileged only negates the presumption of malice in law), or (2) there is no
reasonable ground for believing the charge to be true.

Illustration of “no reasonable ground for believing the charge to be true”: X admitted that
he had personally made no investigation with reference to the truth of many of the
statements made in the communication to the Secretary of Justice, especially with
reference to the statements based on rumors that a judge received a bribe for
dismissing a murder case.

 RE: Par. 2 (Fair and true report of official proceedings…)

 Defamatory remarks and comments on the conduct or acts of public officers which
are related to the discharge of their official duties will not constitute libel if the defendant
proves the truth of the imputation. The conduct of public officers which are related to the
discharge of their official duties are matters of public interest, and it is a defense to an
action for libel or slander that the words complained of are a fair comment on a matter
of public interest.

What is a fair comment? If the comment is an expression of an opinion, based upon

proven facts, then it is no matter that the opinion happens to be mistaken so long as it
might be reasonably inferred from the facts. Comment may be fair, although wrong.

 But any attack upon the private character of the public officer on matters which are
not related to the discharge of their official functions, may constitute libel. No one has
the right to invade another’s privacy.

 Rule on self-defense – A person libeled is justified to hit back with another libel. But
the defamatory statements made by the accused must be a fair answer to the libel
made by the offended party and must be related to the imputation made. The answer
should not be unnecessarily libelous.

Illustration: A to B, C & D: “You pimp, women of ill repute, thieves, paramours of my

husband”. B to A: “You are a woman of the street, you smell bad, and your money was
stolen from the PCAU” + C to A “You are shameless, blackmailer, murderer” + D to A
“You have a thick face, you are not legally married, you are the paramour of Father
Baluyut.”

Held: To repel attack, the defendant may make an explanation of the imputation, and it
is only where, if by explaining, he must of necessity have to use scurrilous and
slanderous remarks, that he may legally be allowed to do so without placing himself
under criminal prosecution. Here, B, C, D’s remarks were unnecessarily scurrilous.

Article 355. Libel by Means of Writings or Similar Means

A libel may be committed by means of -

1. Writing;

2. Printing;

3. Lithography;

4. Engraving;

5. Radio;

6. Photograph;

7. Painting;

8. Theatrical exhibition;

9. Cinematographic exhibition; or

10. Any similar means.

 Defamation through amplifier is not libel, but oral defamation. The word ‘radio’
should be considered in relation to the terms with which it is associated – all of which
have a common characteristic, namely, their permanent nature as a means of
publication.

 But defamation made in a TV program is libel. It easily qualifies under the general
provision “or any similar means”.

Magno v. People (2006)

Sending an unsealed libelous letter to the offended party constitutes publication.

Buatis v. People (2006)

Facts: One lawyer sent another an insulting letter, in closing saying, “Yours in Satan’s
name”.

Held: There is publication in this case. In libel, publication means making the
defamatory matter, after it is written, known to someone other than the person against
whom it has been written. Petitioner’s subject letter-reply itself states that the
same was copy furnished to all concerned. Also, petitioner had dictated the letter
to his secretary. It is enough that the author of the libel complained of has
communicated it to a third person. Furthermore, the letter, when found in the
mailbox, was open, not contained in an envelope thus, open to public.

While Vaca case is for violation of B.P. 22, we find the reasons behind the imposition
of fine instead of imprisonment applicable to petitioner’s case of libel. We note
that this is petitioner’s first offense of this nature. He never knew respondent prior to the
demand letter sent by the latter to Mrs. Quingco who then sought his assistance
thereto. He appealed from the decision of the RTC and the CA in his belief that he was
merely exercising a civil or moral duty in writing the letter to private complainant. In fact,
petitioner could have applied for probation to evade prison term but he did not do so
believing that he did not commit a crime thus, he appealed his case. We believe that the
State is concerned not only in the imperative necessity of protecting the social
organization against the criminal acts of destructive individuals but also in redeeming
the individual for economic usefulness and other social ends. Consequently, we delete
the prison sentence imposed on petitioner and instead impose a fine of six thousand
pesos.

This is not the first time that we removed the penalty of imprisonment and imposed a
fine instead in the crime of libel. In Sazon v. Court of Appeals, petitioner was convicted
of libel and was meted a penalty of imprisonment and fine; and upon a petition filed with
us, we affirmed the findings of libel but changed the penalty imposed to a mere fine.
Article 356. Threatening to Publish and Offer to Prevent Such Publication for A
Compensation

Acts punished

1.Threatening another to publish a libel concerning him, or his parents, spouse, child, or
other members of his family;

2. Offering to prevent the publication of such libel for compensation or money

consideration.

 Blackmail - In its metaphorical sense, blackmail may be defined as any unlawful

extortion of money by threats of accusation or exposure. Two words are expressive of
the crime - hush money.

 In what felonies is blackmail possible? Blackmail is possible in (1) light threats under
Article 283; and (2) threatening to publish, or offering to prevent the publication of, a
libel for compensation, under Article 356.

Article 357. Prohibited Publication of Acts Referred to in the Course of Official

Proceedings

Elements

1. Offender is a reporter, editor or manager of a newspaper, daily or magazine;

2. He publishes facts connected with the private life of another;

3. Such facts are offensive to the honor, virtue and reputation of said person.

 The provisions of Art. 357 constitute the so-called “Gag Law”. Newspaper reports on
cases pertaining to adultery, divorce, issues about the legitimacy of children etc., will
necessarily be barred from publication.

 The prohibition applies even though said publication be made in connection with or
under the pretext that it is necessary in the narration of any judicial or administrative
proceedings wherein such facts have been mentioned.

Illustration: A uttered defamatory remarks calling a priest a savage and that he had a
concubine. While the case was pending trial, a newspaper published the complaint
verbatim including the defamatory expressions of A.
 RA1477 – The publisher, editor, columnist or reporter of any periodical of general
circulation cannot be compelled to reveal the source of any news report or information
appearing in said publication which was related in confidence to such publisher etc.
unless the court or a House or committee of Congress finds that such revelation is
demanded by the security of the State, without prejudice to the publisher’s etc. liability
under civil and criminal laws.

Article 358. Slander

Slander is oral defamation. There are tow kinds of oral defamation:

(1) Simple slander; and

(2) Grave slander, when it is of a serious and insulting nature.

 Factors that determine the gravity of oral defamation:

1. expressions used

2. personal relations of the accused and the offended party

3. circumstances surrounding the case

Illustration of grave slander: “You sold the union. You swindled the money of the
members and received bribe money in the amount of P10K…”

Illustration of simple slander: An accusation that the offended party has been living
successively and with several men uttered before several persons, when intended to
correct an improper conduct of the offended party, a kin of the accused, is only simple
slander.

 The slander need not be heard by the offended party, because a man’s reputation is
the estimate in which other hold him, not the good opinion which he has of himself.

People vs. Pelayo

Pelayo told Clapano (councilor), within the hearing of three people, that in one of his
investigations on illegal gambling, an operator, Lim Peng, told him Almendras
(governor) received P500 from said operator as protection money. The following day,
Pelayo delivered a privileged speech in the City Council’s session where it could be
inferred that he was referring to Almendras as a “tong collector”.
HELD: Facts of the case do NOT constitute intriguing against honor where the source of
the derogatory information cannot be determined and defendant borrows the same
without subscribing to the truth thereof, passes it to others. The information allegedly
came from a definite source (Lim Peng) which he adopted as his, passed it to another
for the purpose of causing dishonor to the other’s reputation. The act is slander (light
oral defamation).

Victorio vs. CA

Father and son Victorio were overheard by people to have uttered defamatory words
against Atty. Ruiz after a hearing where Atty. Ruiz moved for contempt of the counsel of
Victorio. They were found guilty of Grave Oral Defamation.

HELD: Oral defamation or slander has been defined as the speaking of base and
defamatory words which tend to prejudice another in his reputation, office, trade,
business or means of livelihood. The special circumstances of the case, antecedents or
relationship between offended and offender, which might tend to prove intention of
offender at the time, aside from the sense and grammatical meaning of the defamatory
words are considered as guidelines in determining whether the offense is serious or
slight.

Attributing to a prominent lawyer a crime (estafa) is a serious and insulting imputation

that strikes deep into the character of the victim. No special circumstance need be
shown for defamatory words to be considered grave oral defamation.

That defamatory words were uttered in the heat of anger cannot lie where there was no
reason or lawful cause to be angry against Ruiz who was merely performing his duties
aw a lawyer in defense of client, and no provocation.

People vs. Orcullo

Judge Orcullo dismissed the case for oral defamation against Peralta (she imputed
adultery and prostitution against Flores) on the ground that it was a private crime to be
instituted by the offended party. SC reinstated case for trial.
HELD: The words said by Peralta are indubitably imputation of the crime of prostitution,
which can be prosecuted de oficio and not adultery. Connotation of hostess is
notoriously referred to prostitutes. Only when derogatory remarks clearly and
categorically reflect the elements constituting adultery would the complainant for libel by
the offended party be necessary to commence prosecution

Villanueva v. People (2006)

The Court does not condone the vilification or use of scurrilous language on the part of
petitioner, but following the rule that all possible circumstances favorable to the accused
must be taken in his favor, it is our considered view that the slander committed by
petitioner can be characterized as slight slander following the doctrine that uttering
defamatory words in the heat of anger, with some provocation on the part of the
offended party, constitutes only a light felony.

Figeroa v. People (2006)

While it is true that a publication's libelous nature depends on its scope, spirit and
motive taken in their entirety, the article in question as a whole explicitly makes mention
of private complainant Rivera all throughout. It cannot be said that the article was a
mere general commentary on the alleged existing state of affairs at the aforementioned
public market because Rivera was not only specifically pointed out several times therein
but was even tagged with derogatory names. Indubitably, this name-calling was, as
correctly found by the two courts below, directed at the very person of Rivera himself.

Article 359. Slander by Deed

Elements

1. Offender performs any act not included in any other crime against honor;

2. Such act is performed in the presence of other person or persons;

3. Such act casts dishonor, discredit or contempt upon the offended party.

Slander by deed refers to performance of an act, not use of words.

Two kinds of slander by deed

1. Simple slander by deed; and

2. Grave slander by deed, that is, which is of a serious nature.

 What is slander by deed? It is a crime against honor which is committed by performing

an act which casts dishonor, discredit, or contempt upon another person.

Illustrations: slapping the face of another if the intention is to cause shame and
humiliation, fighting another with intention to humiliate him

 vs. Acts of lasciviousness

Kissing a girl in public and touching her breasts without lewd designs, committed by a
rejected suitor to cast dishonor on the girl is slander by deed NOT acts of
lasciviousness.

 vs. Maltreatment

The nature and effects of the maltreatment determine the crime committed. If the
offended party suffered from shame or humiliation caused by the maltreatment, it is
slander by deed.

Unjust Slander by Acts of

vexation deed lasciviousness

Irritation or annoyance

+ With + presence of
publicity the
and circumstances
dishonor or provided for in
contempt RPC 335 on
rape (force or
intimidation,
unconscious
etc.) together
with lewd
designs

People vs. Motita

Motita used a mirror to view reflection of private parts of Letada. Crowd nearby were
laughing with their eyes directed towards her.

HELD: Crime committed was slander by deed.

Unjust vexation is committed when the offender’s act caused annoyance, irritation,
vexation, torment, distress or disturbance to the mind of the person to whom it is
directed. If there was attendant publicity and dishonor or contempt in addition to the
irrigation or annoyance, offense would be slander by deed as in this case. If any of the
circumstances provided for rape together with lewd designs were present in addition to
the annoyance, the offense would be act of lasciviousness.

Article 360. Persons responsible

The persons responsible for libel are:

1. The person who publishes, exhibits or causes the publication or exhibition of any
defamation in writing or similar means;

2. The author or editor of a book or pamphlet;

3. The editor or business manager of a daily newspaper magazine or serial

publication;

4. The owner of a printing plant which publishes a libelous article with his consent
and all other persons who in any way participate in or have connection with its
publication.

Venue of criminal and civil actions for damages in cases of written defamations (In case
one of the offended parties is a private individual)

1. Where the libelous article is printed and first published; or

2. Where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission
of the offense.
 Where one of the offended parties is a public officer, the action shall be filed in the
CFI (1) of the province or city where he held office at the time of the commission of the
offense OR (2) where the libelous article is printed and first published.

 The civil action shall be filed in the same cdourt where the criminal action is filed and
vice versa.

 The court where the criminal action or civil action for damages is 1 st filed shall
acquire jurisdiction to the exclusion of other courts.

 If the defamation consists in the imputation of a crime which cannot be prosecuted

de oficio (adultery, concubinage, seduction, abduction and acts of lasciviousness), then
the offended party must a complaint.

 RE: DAMAGES recoverable

 Actual damages need not be proved, at least (1) where the publication is libelous per
se or (2) when the amount of the award is more or less nominal, because libel, by its
nature, causes injury to the reputation of the offended party.

 There is no remedy for damages for slander or libel in case of absolutely privileged
communication.

Article 361. Proof of the truth

In every criminal prosecution for libel, the truth may be given in evidence to the court
and if it appears that the matter charged as libelous is true, and, moreover, that it was
published with good motives and for justifiable ends, the defendant shall be acquitted.

Proof of the truth of an imputation of an act or omission not constituting a crime shall not
be admitted, unless the imputation shall have been made against the Government
employees with respect to facts related to the discharge of their duties.

In such cases, if the defendant proves the truth of the imputation made by him, he shall
be acquitted.

Proof of truth is admissible in any of the following:

 1. When the act or omission imputed constitutes a crime regardless of whether the
offended party is a private individual or a public officer;

2. When the offended party is a Government employee, even if the act or omission
imputed doesn’t constitute a crime, provided, it is related to the discharge of his
official duties.

Illustration: A said that B, a gov’t official, was in the habit of drinking during office hours
and that he was always in a boisterous condition. Is proof of truth allowed in case B
should file a complaint against A for defamation? Yes. Both public interest and the good
of the service demand that a drunkard be barred from the service. But when the
imputation involves the private life of B which is not related to the discharge of his
official duties, the offender cannot prove the truth thereof.

Another illustration: A made several imputations against C, a private individual, some of

which insinuated the commission of crimes and some did not. Is proof of truth allowed?
It depends. The defendant will be allowed to prove the truth of the imputations
constituting crimes but he will not be allowed to prove the truth of the imputations not
constituting crimes.

 DEFENSE in defamation, requisities:

1. Truth

2. Matter was published with good motives

3. For justifiable ends

 Retraction may mitigate damages. But in order to have the desired effect, the
retraction should contain an admission of the falsity of the libelous publication and
evince a strong desire to repair the wrong occasioned thereby.

Article 362. Libelous remarks

Libelous remarks or comments connected with the matter privileged under the
provisions of Article 354, if made with malice, shall not exempt the author thereof nor
the editor or managing editor of a newspaper from criminal liability.
 Thus, the author of a publication who distorts or discolors official proceedings
reported by him, or adds comments thereon to cast aspersion on the character of the
parties concerned, is guilty of libel, notwithstanding that the defamatory matter is
published in connection with a privileged matter.

Article 363. Incriminating Innocent Persons

Elements

1. Offender performs an act;

2. By such an act, he incriminates or imputes to an innocent person the commission

of a crime;

3. Such act does not constitute perjury.

 This article is limited to “planting” evidence and the like, which do not in themselves
constitute false prosecutions but tend directly to cause false prosecution.

Incriminating an Perjury by
innocent person making false
accusation

Committed by The gravamen is

performing an act the imputation
by which the itself, falsely made
offender directly before an officer
incriminates
another

Limited to the act Giving of false

of planting statement under
evidence oath or making a
false affidavit,
imputing to
another the
commission of a
crime

Incriminatory Defamation
machinations

Offender doesn’t Words, written or

avail himself of spoken, are
written or spoken availed of
words in
besmirching the
victim’s reputation

Not required Imputation must be

public and
malicious & must
be calculated to
cause the
dishonor, discredit
or contempt of the
aggrieved party

People vs. Alagao

Is there a complex crime of incriminating an innocent person through unlawful arrest?

HELD: Yes. The two acts imputed to the accused closely followed each other, the
unlawful arrest being a necessary means to plant the incriminatory evidence. Under the
circumstances of the case, the accused had to arrest M because it was the only way
that they could with facility detain him, search his person or effects and, commingle
therewith the marked peso bill. A complex crime was committed.

Huggland vs. Lantin

Judge Lantin was arrested for bribery for allegedly having received marked money
amounting to P5,000 from one Magdalena Huggland who was implicated in a criminal
case. The P5,000 was allegedly part of the P25,000 being asked by Judge Lantin for
the cancellation of the hold departure order issued against Ms. Huggland. The issue is
whether this is case of entrapment or planting of evidence.

HELD: This is a case of entrapment. Let us distinguish entrapment from planting of

evidence. In entrapment, the criminal intent or design to commit the offense charged
originates in the mind of the accused and the law enforcement officials merely facilitate
the commission of the offense, the accused cannot justify his conduct. Planting of
evidence or incriminating innocent person is committed by performing an act by which
the offender directly incriminates or imputes to an innocent person the commission of a
crime.

From the testimonial and documentary evidence submitted by the parties, there is
reason to believe that indeed, this is a case of entrapment not planting of evidence. The
conclusion is based on the following:

(1) The subpoena was illegally issued;

(2) The Motion to Quash Hold Departure Order and the Order of Cancellation of the
Hold Departure Order were prepared and typewritten by the respondent; and

(3) The Money used in the entrapment operation was recovered from one of the left
drawers of the respondent's table.

Article 364. Intriguing against Honor

This crime is committed by any person who shall make any intrigue which has for its
principal purpose to blemish the honor or reputation of another person.

Incriminating an Intriguing against

innocent person Honor

Offender performs Offender resorts to

an act by which he an intrigue for the
directly purpose of
incriminates or blemishing the
imputes to an honor or reputation
innocent person of another person
the commission of
a crime

Defamation Intriguing against

Honor

Done by availing Committed by

directly of spoken means which
words consists of some
tricky and secret
ex., gossiping plot
Slander Intriguing against
Honor

The source of the The source or the

info can be author of the
pinpointed and derogatory info
the defendant, cannot be
adopting as his determined and
own the the defendant
information he has borrows the same,
obtained, passes and without
the same to subscribing to the
another for the truth thereof,
purpose of causing passes it to others
dishonor to
complainant’s
reputation

Gaanan vs. IAC

Atty. Pinto filed a complaint for direct assault against Atty. Laconico. Pintor, through
phone, offered to withdraw the complaint for consideration. Atty. Gaanan was able to
overhear this conversation through a telephone extension. Pinto was arrested for
extortion. But Gaanan and Laconico were charged with violation of RA4200 and found
guilty by the lower court.

HELD: The phrase “any other device or arrangement” in the Ant-Wiretapping Law
doesn’t cover an extension line. The law refers to a tap of a wire or cable or the use of a
device or arrangement for the purpose of secretly overhearing, intercepting or recording
the communication. There must be the physical interruption through a wiretap or the
deliberate installation of a device or arrangement in order to overhear, intercept or
record the spoken words. The extension here was not installed for the purpose but for
ordinary office use. Also, an extension phone is an instrument which is very common,
not what the law refers to in which the presence of such devices cannot be presumed
by the party being overheard.

Ramirez vs. CA

Ramirez field a civil case for damages against Garcia. IN support of her claim, she
produced a verbatim transcript of the confrontation with Garcia where the latter
allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her. The transcription on which the civil case
was based was culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made by petitioner. As
a result of the recording, Garcia filed a criminal case against Ramirez for violation of RA
4200.

HELD: The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by
the statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private
communication. The statute’s intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such
recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier “any”. Consequently, as respondent
CA correctly concluded, even a person privy to a communication who records his
private conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a
violator under the provisions of RA4200. The lawmakers contemplated to make illegal
unauthorized taped recording of private conversation or communication taken by either
of the parties themselves of by third persons. The nature of the conversation is
immaterial for conviction of the crime and communication as used includes
conversation.