POLICARPIO vs.
MANILA TIMES of the crimes of malversation of public funds
May 30, 1962
Facts:
Plaintiff Lumen Policarpio seeks to recover
damages from Manila Times by reason of the
publication in the Saturday and the Daily
Mirror of two articles which are claimed to be
per se defamatory, libelous and false and
jeopardize her integrity and good name.
These articles were about the charges against
her which caused her to be separated from her
service as the executive secretary of the local
UNESCO National Commission. Plainitff
maintains that the effect of these false
statements was to give the general impression
that she was guilty or at least probably guilty
1 "PALACE OPENS INVESTIGATION OF RAPS
AGAINST POLICARPIO
Alba Probes Administrative Phase of
Fraud Charges Against Unesco Woman
Official; Fiscal Sets Prelim Quiz
Of Criminal Suit on Aug. 22.
The administrative phase of two-pronged investigation Miss
Lumen Policarpio, head of the Unesco national commission
here, opened in Malacañan before Col. Crisanto V. Alba.
The judicial inquiry of charges filed by Herminia D. Reyes,
also the complainant in the Malacañan case before the
Presidential Complaints and Action Commission, will be
conducted by Fiscal Manases G. Reyes on Aug. 22 at 2 p.m.
Miss Policarpio stands accused by Reyes of having
malversed public property and of having fraudulently sought
reimbursement of supposed official expenses.
Colonel Alba, at the start of his investigation at the
Malacañan Park, clarified that neither he nor the PCAC had
initiated the criminal action before the city fiscal's office.
The complaint before the fiscal was started by an
information she naming Herminia D. Reyes as complainant
and citing other persons as witnesses. Fiscal Reyes set
preliminary investigation of these charges for Aug. 22.
Miss Reyes, technical assistant of the Unesco, stated at the
Palace inquiry that during 1955 Miss Policarpio allegedly
used several sheets of government stencils for her private
and personal use, such as for French lessons, contracts of
sale of pianos and for invitations of the League of Women
Voters of which she (Miss Policarpio) is an officer. The
Unesco commission here functions under the Office of the
President.
The charge was filed with the PCAC, and the PCAC
endorsed it to Colonel Alba for investigation.
Miss Policarpio this morning was not represented by an
lawyer. Federico Diaz, lawyer representing complainant
Miss Reyes, petitioned for the suspension of Miss
Policarpio, executive secretary of the Unesco.
and estafa. Likewise, she asserted that there
are other inaccuracies in the news item.1
Issue:
Whether or not Manila Times had acted
maliciously in publishing the aforementioned
articles.
Held:
Yes. Every defamatory imputation is
presumed to be malicious, even if it be true,
if no good intention and justifiable motive for
making it is shown, except in the following
cases:
1. A private communication made by
any person to another in the
Alba did not act immediately on the petition. He said he was
holding a hearing on the petition on August 15.
During this morning's investigation three witness appeared.
The first witness was Atty. Antonio Lopez of the PCAC who
brought with him 18 sheets of stencil which were allegedly
used by Miss Policarpio for her personal use. These sheets
were admitted as temporary exhibits.
The second witness was Federico Vergara of the Unesco
who said that he received four of the 18 sheets, but he could
not identify which of the sheets he had received.
The third witness was Francisco Manalo who certified on the
charge of oppression in office against Miss Policarpio.
The other charge of Miss Reyes corresponded to supposed
reimbursements sought by Miss Policarpio for a trip to
Quezon Province and to Pangasinan. On the first, Miss
Reyes' complaint alleged the Unesco official had asked for
refund of expenses for use of her car when, Miss Reyes
claimed she had actually made the trip aboard an army plane.
Miss Reyes also said Miss Policarpio was absent from the
Bayambang conference for which she also sought allegedly
refund of expenses.
The complainant had previously been ordered relieved of her
Unesco post by Miss Policarpio and had later sued at the
Palace and before the Court for payment of her salary.
The title of the article of August 11, 1956 — "WOMAN
OFFICIAL SUED" — was given prominence with a 6-
column (about 11 inches) banner headline of one-inch types.
Admittedly, its sub-title — "PCAC RAPS L. POLICARPIO
PIO ON FRAUD" — printed in bold one-centimeter types,
is not true. Similarly, the statement in the first paragraph of
the article, to the effect that plaintiff "was charged with
malversation and estafa in complaints filed with the city
fiscal's office by the Presidential Complaint and Action
Commission" — otherwise known as PCAC — is untrue, the
complaints for said offenses having been filed by Miss
Reyes. Neither is it true that said "criminal action was
initiated as a result of current administrative, investigation",
as stated in the second paragraph of the same article.
 performance of any legal, moral or
social duty; and
2. A fair and true report, made in good
faith, without any comments or
remarks, of any judicial legislative or
other official proceedings which are
not of confidential nature, or of any
statement, report or speech delivered
in said proceedings, or of any other
act performed by public officers in the
exercise of other functions.
In the case at bar, aside from containing
information derogatory to the plaintiff, the
article presented her in a worse predicament
than that in which she, in fact, was. In other
words, said article was not a fair and true
report of the proceedings there in alluded to.
What is more, its sub-title – “PCAC RAPS L.
POLICARPIO ON FRAUD” – is a comment
or remark, besides being false. Accordingly,
the defamatory imputations contained in said
article are “presumed to be malicious”.
Lopez publisher and owner of Manila
Chronicle and Gatbonton (Editor) v.
Court of Appeals and Cruz (1970)
Ponente: Fernando, J.
Facts:
1. January 1956 – Front-page story on
the Manila Chronicle à Fidel Cruz,
sanitary inspector assigned to the
Babuyan Islands, sent distress signals
to US Airforce planes which
forwarded such message to Manila
2. An American Army plane dropped
emergency sustenance kits on the
beach of the island which contained,
among other things, a two way radio
set. Using the radio set Cruz reported
to the authorities in Manila that the
locals were living in terror due to a
series of killings committed on the
island since Christmas of 1955.
3. Philippine defense forces (scout
rangers) were immediately deployed
to the babuyan claro. They were led
by Major Wilfredo Encarnacion who
discovered that Cruz only fabricated
the story about the killings to get
attention. Cruz merely wanted
transportation home to Manila.
4. Major Encarnacion branded the fiasco
as a “hoax” à the same word to be
used by the newspapers who covered
the same.
5. January 13, 1956 - This Week
Magazine of the Manila Chronicle,
edited by Gatbonton devoted a
pictorial article to it. It claimed that
despite the story of Cruz being a hoax
it brought to light the misery of the
people living in that place, with
almost everybody sick, only 2
individuals able to read and write and
food and clothing being scarce
6. January 29, 1956 - This Week
Magazineà in the "January News
Quiz" made reference to Cruz as “a
health inspector who suddenly felt
"lonely" in his isolated post, cooked
up a story about a murderer running
loose on the island of Calayan so that
he could be ferried back to
civilization.” à Called it “Hoax of the
year”
7. In both issues photos of a Fidel Cruz
were published but both photos were
of a different person of the same name
à Fidel G. Cruz former mayor,
business man, contractor from Santa
Maria, Bulacan.
8. January 27, 1957 à published
statements correcting their misprint
and explained that confusion and
error happened due to the rush to meet
the Jan 13th issue’s deadline
9. Cruz sued herein petitioners for libel
in CFI Manila. Cruz won and was
awarded P11,000 in damages (5k
actual, 5k moral, 1k attorney’s fees)
10. CA affirmed CFI decision hence this
case
Issue:
1. WON petitioners should be held
liable for their error in printing the
wrong Fidel Cruz’s photo in relation
to the “hoax of the year”?
2. WON such error is sufficient ground
for an action for libel to prosper?
Held:
Yes they are liable but damages awarded to
Cruz is reduced to P1,000.00
Ratio:
1. Mistake is no excuse to absolve
publishers because libel is harmful on
its face by the fact that it exposes the
injured party to more than trivial
ridicule, whether it is fact or opinion
is irrelevant.
2. Citing Lu Chu Sing v. Lu Tiong Gui
à libel is "malicious defamation,
expressed either in writing, printing,
or by signs or pictures, or the like, ...,
tending to blacken the memory of one
who is dead or to impeach the
honesty, virtue, or reputation, or
publish the alleged or natural defects
of one who is alive, and thereby "pose
him to public hatred, contempt, or
ridicule,"
3. Citing standard treatise of Newell on
Slander and Libel à "Publication of a
person's photograph in connection
with an article libelous of a third
person, is a libel on the person whose
picture is published, where the acts
set out in the article are imputed to
such person."
4. In this case à 3rd person was Cruz à
his picture being published beside the
article imputes him as the purveyor of
the hoax of the year
5. Libel cannot be used to curtail press
freedom however it also cannot claim
any talismanic immunity form
constitutional limitations
6. State interest in press freedom à citing
Justice Malcolm: Full discussion of
public affairs is necessary for the
maintenance of good governance…
“Public officials must not be too thin-
skinned with reference to comments
on official acts”…”of course criticism
does not authorize defamation.
Nevertheless, as an individual is less
than the state, so must expected
criticism be born for the common
good.”
7. So long as it was done in good faith,
the press should have the legal right
to have and express their opinions on
legal questions. To deny them that
right would be to infringe upon
freedom of the press.
8. “Last word on the subject” à Citing
Quisumbing v. Lopez: Press should
be given leeway and tolerance as to
enable them to courageously and
effectively perform their important
role in our democracy
9. Freedom of the press ranks high in the
hierarchy of legal values
10. TEST of LIABLITY à must prove
there was actual malice in publishing
the story/photo! (Note: but this was
not done in this case)
11. Citing Concepcion, CJ. à Correction
of error in publishing does not wipe
out the responsibility arising from the
publication of the original article
Correction = Mitigating circumstance not a
justifying circumstance!
U.S. v Bustos G.R. No. L-12592 March 8,
1918
J. Malcolm
Facts:
In 1915, 34 Pampanga residents signed a
petition to the Executive Secretary regarding
charges against Roman Punsalan, the justice
of the peace of Macabebe. They wanted to
oust him from his office.
Specific allegations against him included
bribery charges, involuntary servitude, and
theft.
The justice denied the charges. In the CFI, not
all the charges were proved. But, the judge
still found him guilty.
Punsalan filed charges alleging that he was
the victim of prosecution and one Jaime, an
auxiliary justice, instigated the charges
against him for personal reasons. He was
acquitted.
The complainants filed an appeal to the
Governor General but it wasn’t acted upon.
Criminal action was instituted aganst the
residents by Punsalan.
The CFI found almost all of the 34 defendants
guilty and sentenced them to pay 10 pesos or
suffer imprisonment in case of insolvency.
The defendants filed a motion for a retrial to
retire the objection made by Punsalan. The
trial court denied the motion. All except 2 of
the defendants appealed. Making
assignments of error.
1. The court erred in overruling motion for
retrial.
2. Error in not holding that the libelous
statement was not privileged
3. Error in not acquitting defendants
4. Evidence failed to show gult of defendants
beyond reasonable doubt.
5. Erred in making defendants prove that the
libelous statements were true.
6. Error in sustaining the prosecution’s
objection to the introduction in evidence by
the accused of the affidavits upon which the
petition forming the basis of the libelous
charge was based.
7. Erred in refusing to permit the defendants
to retire the objection in advertently
interposed by their counsel to the admission
in evidence of the expediente administrativo
out of which the accusation in this case arose.
Issue:
Whether or not the defendants and appellants
are guilty of a libel of Roman Punsalan,
justice of the peace in Pampanga.
Held: Yes. Defendants acquitted.
Ratio:
Freedom of speech was nonexistent in the
country before 1900. There were small
efforts at reform made by the La Solidaridad.
The Malolos Constitution, on the other hand,
guaranteed freedom of speech.
During the U.S. period, President McKinley
himself laid down the tenet Magna Charta of
Philippine Liberty when he wrote, “that no
law shall be passed abridging the freedom of
speech or of the press or of the rights of the
people to peaceably assemble and petition the
Government for a redress of grievances."
This was in the Philippine Bill.
In the Amrican cases it was held, there were
references to “public opinion should be the
constant source of liberty and democracy.” It
also said “the guaranties of a free speech and
a free press include the right to criticize
judicial conduct. The administration of the
law is a matter of vital public concern.
Whether the law is wisely or badly enforced
is, therefore, a fit subject for proper comment.
If the people cannot criticize a justice of the
peace or a judge the same as any other public
officer, public opinion will be effectively
muzzled. Attempted terrorization of public
opinion on the part of the judiciary would be
tyranny of the basest sort.”
“It is a duty which everyone owes to society
or to the State to assist in the investigation of
any alleged misconduct. It is further the duty
of all who know of any official dereliction on
the part of a magistrate or the wrongful act of
any public officer to bring the facts to the
notice of those whose duty it is to inquire into
and punish them.”
The right to assemble and petition is the
necessary consequence of republican
institutions and the complement of the part of
free speech. Assembly means a right on the
part of citizens to meet peaceably for
consultation in respect to public affairs.
Petition means that any person or group of
persons can apply, without fear of penalty, to
the appropriate branch or office of the
government for a redress of grievances. The
persons assembling and petitioning must, of
course, assume responsibility for the charges
made.
Public policy has demanded protection for
public opinion. The doctrine of privilege has
been the result of this. Privilged
communications may in some instances
afford an immunity to the slanderer. Public
policy is the “unfettered administration of
justice.”
Privilege is either absolute or qualified.
Qualified privilege is prima facie which may
be lost by proof of malice. This is apparent in
complaints made in good faith against a
public official’s conduct having a duty in the
matter. Even if the statements were found to
be false, the protection of privilege may cover
the individual given that it was in good faith.
There must be a sense of duty and not a self-
seeking motive.
A communication made bona fide upon any
subject-matter in which the party
communicating has an interest, or in
reference to which has a duty, is privileged, if
made to a person having a corresponding
interest or duty, although it contained
criminatory matter which without this
privilege would be slanderous and actionable.
In the usual case malice can be presumed
from defamatory words. Privilege destroys
that presumption. The onus of proving malice
then lies on the plaintiff. The plaintiff must
bring home to the defendant the existence of
malice as the true motive of his conduct.
Falsehood and the absence of probable cause
will amount to proof of malice.
It is true that the particular words set out in
the information, if said of a private person,
might well be considered libelous per se. The
charges might also under certain conceivable
conditions convict one of a libel of a
government official. As a general rule words
imputing to a judge or a justice of the peace
dishonesty or corruption or incapacity or
misconduct touching him in his office are
actionable. But as suggested in the beginning
we do not have present a simple case of direct
and vicious accusations published in the
press, but of charges predicated on affidavits
made to the proper official and thus
qualifiedly privileged. Express malice has not
been proved by the prosecution. Further,
although the charges are probably not true as
to the justice of the peace, they were believed
to be true by the petitioners. Good faith
surrounded their action. Probable cause for
them to think that malfeasance or
misfeasance in office existed is apparent. The
ends and the motives of these citizens— to
secure the removal from office of a person
thought to be venal — were justifiable. In no
way did they abuse the privilege. These
respectable citizens did not eagerly seize on a
frivolous matter but on instances which not
only seemed to them of a grave character, but
which were sufficient in an investigation by a
judge of first instance to convince him of
their seriousness. No undue publicity was
given to the petition. The manner of
commenting on the conduct of the justice of
the peace was proper.
G.R. No. 126466 January 14, 1999
ARTURO BORJAL a.k.a. ART BORJAL
and MAXIMO SOLIVEN, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and FRANCISCO
WENCESLAO, respondents.
Facts:
1. A civil action for damages
based on libel was filed before
the court against Borjal and
Soliven for writing and
publishing articles that are
allegedly derogatory and
offensive against Francisco
Wenceslao, attacking among
others the solicitation letters
he send to support a
conference to be launch
concerning resolving matters
on transportation crisis that is
tainted with anomalous
activities.
2. Wenceslao however was
never named in any of the
articles nor was the
conference he was organizing.
The lower court ordered
petitioners to indemnify the
private respondent for
damages which was affirmed
by the Court of Appeals. A
petition for review was filed
before the SC contending that
private respondent was not
sufficiently identified to be
the subject of the published
articles.
Issue:
Whether or not there are sufficient
grounds to constitute guilt of
petitioners for libel?
Ruling of the Case:
1. In order to maintain a libel suit, it is
essential that the victim be
identifiable although it is not
necessary that he be named. It is also
not sufficient that the offended party
recognized himself as the person
attacked or defamed, but it must be
shown that at least a third person
could identify him as the object of the
libelous publication. These requisites
have not been complied with in the
case at bar. The element of
identifiability was not met since it
was Wenceslaso who revealed he was
the organizer of said conference and
had he not done so the public would
not have known.
2. The concept of privileged
communications is implicit in the
freedom of the press and that
privileged communications must be
protective of public opinion. Fair
commentaries on matters of public
interest are privileged and constitute a
valid defense in an action for libel or
slander.
The doctrine of fair
comment means that while in
general every discreditable
imputation publicly made is
deemed false, because every
man is presumed innocent
until his guilt is judicially
proved, and every false
imputation is deemed
malicious, nevertheless, when
the discreditable imputation is
directed against a public
person in his public capacity,
it is not necessarily
actionable. In order that such
discreditable imputation to a
public official may be
actionable, it must either be a
false allegation of fact or a
comment based on a false
supposition. If the comment is
an expression of opinion,
based on established facts,
then it is immaterial that the
opinion happens to be
mistaken, as long as it might
reasonably be inferred from
the facts.
3. The questioned article dealt with
matters of public interest as the
declared objective of the conference,
the composition of its members and
participants, and the manner by which
it was intended to be funded no doubt
lend to its activities as being
genuinely imbued with public
interest. Respondent is also deemed to
be a public figure and even otherwise
is involved in a public issue. The
court held that freedom of expression
is constitutionally guaranteed and
protected with the reminder among
media members to practice highest
ethical standards in the exercise
thereof.
VASQUEZ VS CA GR No. 118971
September 15, 1999
Facts:
Sometime in April 1986, petitioner and some
37 families from Tondo Foreshore Area went
to see then NHA general Manager Lito
Atienza regarding their complaint against
their barangay Chairman, Jaime Olmedo.
After the meeting, petitioner and his
companions were interviewed by reporters of
the newspaper Ang Tinig ng Masa. The
article was published containing such
statements from the petitioner imputing that
Olmedo, through connivance with NHA
officials, was able to obtain title to several
lots in the area and that he was involved in
illegal activities such as attempted murder,
gambling and stealing. Olmeda filed a
complaint for libel.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is guilty
of libel
Held: Elements of libel under Art. 353 of
RPC: (a) allegation of a discreditable act or
condition concerning another; (b) publication
of the charge; (c) identity of the person
defamed; and (d) existence of malice.
An allegation is defamatory if it ascribes to a
person the commission of a crime, the
possession of a vice or defect, real or
imaginary, or any act, omission, condition,
status or circumstance which tends to
dishonor or discredit or put him in contempt,
or which tends to blacken the memory of one
who is dead.
There is publication if the material is
communicated to a third person – it is not
required that the person defamed has read or
heard about the libelous remark. In
determining the meaning of any publication
alleged to be libelous the words shall be taken
in their ordinary sense.
To satisfy the element of identifiability, it
must be shown that at least a third person or
stranger was able to identify the defamed
person as an object of the defamatory
statement.
Under Art. 361 of RPC, if the defamatory
statement is made against a public official
with respect to the discharge of his official
duties and functions and the truth of the
allegation is shown, the accused will be
entitled to an acquittal even though he does
not prove the imputation was published with
good motives and for justifiable ends. Even if
the defamatory statement is false, no liability
can attach if it relates to official conduct,
unless the public official concerned proves
that the statement was made with actual
malice – that is with knowledge is false or
with reckless disregard of whether it was
false or not. In this case, petitioner was able
to prove his allegation of land grabbing based
on a letter of NHA Inspector General, and the
memoranda of the NHA general manager.
With regard to those charge of involvement
in illegal activities there are in fact charges
filed, the truth of which were not in issue.
G.R. No. 128959
September 30, 2005
CIRIACO BOY GUINGUING
VS.
COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
1. On Oct. 13, 1991 Lim published a
paid advertisement at the SUNDAY
POST, a weekly publication in
Visayas and Mindanao, edited and
published by petitioner
GUINGUING, containing pictures of
arrests made and records of criminal
cases filed against CISER
TORRALBA.
2. CISER TORRALBA is a radio
broadcast journalist of DYLA and
DYFX based in Cebu city.
3. TORRALBA filed a complaint
against LIM and GUINGUING
asserting that the paid advertisement
was libelous and sought for damages
against LIM and the petitioner.
4. LIM claimed that TORRALBA made
defamatory attacks against him and
his family over his radio programs, so
he opted for paid advertisement to
answer his attacks.
5. After the trial, the lower court
concluded that the publication in
question was indeed libelous.
6. In the appeal, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the RTCʼs decision and
modified the penalty imposed.
7. Petitioner sought for the reversal of
the decision by the CA with the
Supreme Court, contending that as a
publisher and a member of the press,
the decision of the lower courts of the
complaint against him constitutes an
infringement of his constitutional
right to freedom of speech and of the
press.
8. In the re-examination of the
evidences and contentions of the
petitioner, it has been established that
the pieces of information in said
publication/advertisement were
indeed actually true.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the publication of the
advertisement paid for by Lim and published
by Guingguing is libelous.
RULING:
1. The assailed resolution of the Court of
Appeals dated July 29, 1996 and
October 3, 1996 respectively are
reversed and set aside. Petitioner is
ACQUITTED of the charge of libel.
2. Actual malice is not proven in the
publication of the advertisement
3. TORRALBA is a public figure.
SUPREME COURT:
“To this end, the publication of the
advertisement by petitioner and LIM cannot
be deemed by this Court to have been done
with actual malice. Aside from the fact that
the information contained in the said
publication was true, the intention to let the
public know the character of their radio
commentator can be at best subsumed under
the mantle of having been done with good
motives and for justifiable ends. The
advertisement in question falls squarely
within the bounds of constitutionally
protected expression under ART.3 Sec. 4 of
the 1987 Constitution.
Being a radio commentator on issues of
corruption by public officials, irregularities in
government, deems the complainant
TORRALBA, as a public figure. By entering
this line of work, complainant in effect, gave
the public a legitimate interest in his life. He
likewise gave them a stake in finding out if
he himself had the integrity and the character
to have the right to criticize others of their
conduct.”
MALICE:
“When the offender, in performing an act
or in incurring an omission, has the intention
to do an injury to the person, property or right
of another, such offender acts with malice. If
the act or omission is punished by the RPC,
the offender is liable for intentional felony.”
(Reyes p.37)
ART. 3 SEC. 4 1987 CONSTITUTION
STATES:
“No law shall be passed abridging the
freedom of speech, of expression, or of the
press, or the right of the people to peaceably
assemble and petition the government for
redress of grievances.”
SOLIVEN v. MAKASIAR
In these consolidated cases, three principal
issues were raised: (1) whether or not
petitioners were denied due process when
informations for libel were filed against them
although the finding of the existence of
a prima faciecase was still under review by
the Secretary of Justice and, subsequently, by
the President; (2) whether or not the
constitutional rights of Beltran were violated
when respondent RTC judge issued a warrant
for his arrest without personally examining
the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to
determine probable cause; and (3) whether or
not the President of the Philippines, under the
Constitution, may initiate criminal
proceedings against the petitioners through
the filing of a complaint-affidavit.
Subsequent events have rendered the first
issue moot and academic. On March 30,
1988, the Secretary of Justice denied
petitioners' motion for reconsideration and
upheld the resolution of the Undersecretary
of Justice sustaining the City Fiscal's finding
of a prima facie case against petitioners. A
second motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioner Beltran was denied by the
Secretary of Justice on April 7, 1988. On
appeal, the President, through the Executive
Secretary, affirmed the resolution of the
Secretary of Justice on May 2, 1988. The
motion for reconsideration was denied by the
Executive Secretary on May 16, 1988. With
these developments, petitioners' contention
that they have been denied the administrative
remedies available under the law has lost
factual support.
It may also be added that with respect to
petitioner Beltran, the allegation of denial of
due process of law in the preliminary
investigation is negated by the fact that
instead of submitting his counter- affidavits,
he filed a "Motion to Declare Proceedings
Closed," in effect waiving his right to refute
the complaint by filing counter-affidavits.
Due process of law does not require that the
respondent in a criminal case actually file his
counter-affidavits before the preliminary
investigation is deemed completed. All that is
required is that the respondent be given the
opportunity to submit counter-affidavits if he
is so minded.
The second issue, raised by petitioner
Beltran, calls for an interpretation of the
constitutional provision on the issuance of
warrants of arrest. The pertinent provision
reads:
Art. III, Sec. 2. The right of
the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to
be determined personally by
the judge after examination
nder oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses
he may produce, and
particularly describing the
place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
The addition of the word "personally" after
the word "determined" and the deletion of the
grant of authority by the 1973 Constitution to
issue warrants to "other responsible officers
as may be authorized by law," has apparently
convinced petitioner Beltran that the
Constitution now requires the judge to
personally examine the complainant and his
witnesses in his determination of probable
cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest.
This is not an accurate interpretation.
What the Constitution underscores is the
exclusive and personal responsibility of the
issuing judge to satisfy himself of the
existence of probable cause. In satisfying
himself of the existence of probable cause for
the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge
is not required to personally examine the
complainant and his witnesses. Following
established doctrine and procedure, he shall:
(1) personally evaluate the report and the
supporting documents submitted by the fiscal
regarding the existence of probable cause
and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of
arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds
no probable cause, he may disregard the
fiscal's report and require the submission of
supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him
in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence
of probable cause.
Sound policy dictates this procedure,
otherwise judges would be unduly laden with
the preliminary examination and
investigation of criminal complaints instead
of concentrating on hearing and deciding
cases filed before their courts.
On June 30, 1987, the Supreme Court
unanimously adopted Circular No. 12, setting
down guidelines for the issuance of warrants
of arrest. The procedure therein provided is
reiterated and clarified in this resolution.
It has not been shown that respondent judge
has deviated from the prescribed procedure.
Thus, with regard to the issuance of the
warrants of arrest, a finding of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction cannot be sustained.
Anent the third issue, petitioner Beltran
argues that "the reasons which necessitate
presidential immunity from suit impose a
correlative disability to file suit." He
contends that if criminal proceedings ensue
by virtue of the President's filing of her
complaint-affidavit, she may subsequently
have to be a witness for the prosecution,
bringing her under the trial court's
jurisdiction. This, continues Beltran, would
in an indirect way defeat her privilege of
immunity from suit, as by testifying on the
witness stand, she would be exposing herself
to possible contempt of court or perjury.
The rationale for the grant to the President of
the privilege of immunity from suit is to
assure the exercise of Presidential duties and
functions free from any hindrance or
distraction, considering that being the Chief
Executive of the Government is a job that,
aside from requiring all of the office holder's
time, also demands undivided attention.
But this privilege of immunity from suit,
pertains to the President by virtue of the
office and may be invoked only by the holder
of the office; not by any other person in the
President's behalf. Thus, an accused in a
criminal case in which the President is
complainant cannot raise the presidential
privilege as a defense to prevent the case
from proceeding against such accused.
Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that
would prevent the President from waiving the
privilege. Thus, if so minded the President
may shed the protection afforded by the
privilege and submit to the court's
jurisdiction. The choice of whether to
exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely
the President's prerogative. It is a decision
that cannot be assumed and imposed by any
other person.
As regards the contention of petitioner
Beltran that he could not be held liable for
libel because of the privileged character or
the publication, the Court reiterates that it is
not a trier of facts and that such a defense is
best left to the trial court to appreciate after
receiving the evidence of the parties.
As to petitioner Beltran's claim that to allow
the libel case to proceed would produce a
"chilling effect" on press freedom, the Court
finds no basis at this stage to rule on the point.
The petitions fail to establish that public
respondents, through their separate acts,
gravely abused their discretion as to amount
to lack of jurisdiction. Hence, the writs of
certiorari and prohibition prayed for cannot
issue.
WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction on the part of the public
respondents, the Court Resolved to DISMISS
the petitions in G. R. Nos. 82585, 82827 and
83979. The Order to maintain the status
quo contained in the Resolution of the
Court en banc dated April 7, 1988 and
reiterated in the Resolution dated April 26,
1988 is LIFTED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera,
Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla,
Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Griño-Aquino
Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Ayer Production PTY Ltd. V Capulong
(1988)
FACTS:
Pivate respondent Juan Ponce Enrile filed an
action in the RTC of Makati to enjoin the
petitioners from producing the movie "The
Four Day Revolution," a documentary of the
EDSA Revolution in 1986 on the ground that
it violated his right to privacy. Petitioners
contended that the movie would not involve
his private life not that of his family. But the
trial court issued a writ of preliminary
injunction and ordered petitioners to desist
from making the movie making reference
whatsoever to Ponce Enrile. This, this action
for certiorari.
HELD: Freedom of speech and expression
includes freedom to produce motion pictures
and to exhibit them. What is involved is a
prior restraint by the Judge upon the exercise
of speech and of expression by petitioners.
Because of the preferred character of speech
and of expression, a weighty presumption of
invalidity vitiates measures of prior restraint.
The Judge should have stayed his hand
considering that the movie was yet
uncompleted and therefore there was no
"clear and present danger." The subject
matter of the movie does not relate to the
private life of Ponce Enrile. The intrusion is
no more than necessary to keep the film a
truthful historical account. He is, after all, a
public figure. The line of equilibrium in the
specific context of the instant case between
freedom of speech and of expression and the
right of privacy may be marked out in terms
of a requirement that the proposed motion
picture must be fairly truthful and historical
in its presentation of facts. There must be no
showing of a reckless disregard of
truth.Notes: Ayer sought to produce a movie
on the 4-day revolution. Enrile, who had
previously been asked for the use of his
character in the movie and had refused the
offer, sued to enjoin the filming because he
did not want any mention of his and his
family's name. The SC lifted the injunction
issued by the lower court on the ground that
it amounted to prior restraint, which is no
better if imposed by the courts than if
imposed by administrative bodies or by
ecclesiatical officials.In Ayer, the reference
to Enrile is unavoidable because his name is
part of history and this cannot be changed or
altered; thus his name can be used so long as
only his public life is dwelled only. But in
Lagunzad, although Moises Padilla was also
a public figure, the movie dealth with both the
public and private lives of Moises Padilla.
CRISTINELLI S. FERMIN vs. PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES
[G.R. No. 157643; March 28, 2008]
Constitutional Law| Freedom of the
Press|Freedom of Expression|
FACTS:
Spouses Annabelle Rama and Eduardo
(Eddie) Gutierrez, filed a libel suit against
Cristinelli S. Fermin and Bogs C. Tugas.
Fermin as a publisher and Tugas as an Editor-
in-Chief of Gossip Tabloid printed and
circulated an article that depicts Rama as a
fugitive from justice and a swindler.
RTC rendered a decision finding Fermin and
Tugas guilty of Libel. On appeal, Tugas was
acquitted on account of non-participation in
the publication article. Fermin submits that
being similarly situated with Tugas, she is
also entitled to an acquittal, as a publisher she
did not participated nor consented to the
preparation and publication of the libelous
article. Fermin raised that the said article is
not libelous and is protected by the mantle of
freedom of the press.
ISSUE:
Whether the questioned article is protected by
the mantle of the Freedom of the Press and is
within the realm of fair and honest comment.
HELD:
Petitioner cannot take refuge in the
constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech
and of the press. Although a wide latitude is
given to critical utterances made against
public officials in the performance of their
official duties, or against public figures on
matters of public interest, such criticism does
not automatically fall within the ambit of
constitutionally protected speech. If the
utterances are false, malicious or unrelated to
a public officer’s performance of his duties or
irrelevant to matters of public interest
involving public figures, the same may give
rise to criminal and civil liability. While
complainants are considered public figures
for being personalities in the entertainment
business, media people, including gossip and
intrigue writers and commentators such as
petitioner, do not have the unbridled license
to malign their honor and dignity by
indiscriminately airing fabricated and
malicious comments, whether in broadcast
media or in print, about their personal lives.
Freedom of expression is man’s birthright –
constitutionally protected and guaranteed,
and that it has become the singular role of the
press to act as its “defensor fidei” in a
democratic society. But it is also worth
keeping in mind that the press is the servant,
not the master, of the citizenry, and its
freedom does not carry with it an unrestricted
hunting license to prey on the ordinary
citizen.
In view of the foregoing disquisitions, the
conviction of petitioner for libel is upheld.
Diaz vs. People, G.R. No. 159787, May 25,
2007
(1st Division), J. Sandoval Gutierrez
Facts:
Manny Pichel and Ogie Diaz, managing
editor and writer, respectively for Bandera,
were accused of conspiring and
confederating together and mutually helping
each other, with the malicious purpose of
impeaching the integrity, honor and
reputation of one Florinda Bagay. The
accused were alleged to have feloniously
written and published an article about the
sexual activities of certain “Miss S” and
Philip Henson, in which through the words
and phrases used in the article meant and
conveyed false and malicious imputations
that this “Miss S” is a sexual pervert and
possesses lascivious and immoral habits.
Florinda Bagay, who happened to use
“Patricia Santillan” as her screen name,
claims that she was this “Miss S” being
referred to in the said article.
The RTC convicted the Diaz and Pichel of the
crime of libel. The Court of Appeals
sustained the conviction of Diaz but acquitted
Pichel.
Issue:
Whether or not the article published by
petitioners fall under the crime of libel.
Held:
No. The elements of the crime of libel are the
following: (a) it must be defamatory; (b) it
must be malicious; (c) it must be given
publicity; and (d) the victim must be
identifiable.
In the case at bar, the first element is present.
In determining whether a statement is
defamatory, the words used are to be
constructed in their entirely and should be
taken in their plain, natural, and ordinary
meaning as they would naturally be
understood in another sense. In the instant
case, the article in question details the sexual
activities of a certain “Miss S” and one
“Philip Henson” who had a romantic liaison.
In their ordinary sense, the words used cast
aspersion upon the character, integrity, and
reputation of “Miss S.”
As to the element of malice, since on its face
the article is defamatory, there is a
presumption that the offender acted with
malice. In Article 354 of the same Code,
every defamatory imputation is presumed to
be malicious, even if it be true, if no good
intention and justifiable motive for making it
is shown. There was neither good reason nor
motive why the subject article was written
except to embarrass “Miss S” and injure her
reputation.
On the element of publication, there can be
no question that the article appeared in the
December 28, 1991 issue of Bandera, a local
tabloid.
The last element of libel is that the victim be
identifiable, although it is not necessary that
the person be named. It is enough if by
intrinsic reference the allusion is apparent or
if the publication contains matters of
description or reference to facts and
circumstances from which others reading the
article may know the person alluded to, or if
the latter is pointed out by extraneous
circumstance so that those knowing such
person could and did understand that he was
the person referred to.
The libelous article, while referring to “Miss
S,” does not give a sufficient description or
other indications which identify “Miss S.” In
short, the article fails to show that “Miss S”
and Florinda Bagay are one and the same
person.
Although the article is libelous, Florinda
Bagay could not have been the person
defamed therein. In Uy Tioco v. Yang Shu
Wen, where the requirement for an identified
or identifiable victim has not been complied
with, the case for libel must be dismissed.
Judgment reversed and Petitioner acquitted.
Disini, et al. v. The Secretary of Justice, et
al., G.R. No. 203335, 11 February 2014
Constitutional law; Unsolicited commercial
communications, also known as “spam” is
entitled to protection under freedom of
expression. To prohibit the transmission of
unsolicited ads would deny a person the right
to read his emails, even unsolicited
commercial ads addressed to
him. Commercial speech is a separate
category of speech which is not accorded the
same level of protection as that given to other
constitutionally guaranteed forms of
expression but is nonetheless entitled to
protection. The State cannot rob him of this
right without violating the constitutionally
guaranteed freedom of
expression. Unsolicited advertisements are
legitimate forms of expression.
FACTS:
Petitioners lament that libel provisions of the
penal code and, in effect, the libel provisions
of the cybercrime law carry with them the
requirement of “presumed malice” even
when the latest jurisprudence already
replaces it with the higher standard of “actual
malice” as a basis for conviction. Petitioners
argue that inferring “presumed malice” from
the accused’s defamatory statement by virtue
of Article 354 of the penal code infringes on
his constitutionally guaranteed freedom of
expression.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 4(c)(4) of the
Cybercrime Prevention Act on cyberlibel
affected the requirement of “actual malice” as
opposed to “presumed malice” as basis for
conviction of libel.
RULING:
The prosecution bears the burden of proving
the presence of actual malice in instances
where such element is required to establish
guilt. The defense of absence of actual
malice, even when the statement turns out to
be false, is available where the offended party
is a public official or a public figure, as in the
cases of Vasquez (a barangay official) and
Borjal (the Executive Director, First National
Conference on Land Transportation). Since
the penal code and implicitly, the cybercrime
law, mainly target libel against private
persons, the Court recognizes that these laws
imply a stricter standard of “malice” to
convict the author of a defamatory statement
where the offended party is a public figure.
Society’s interest and the maintenance of
good government demand a full discussion of
public affairs.
But, where the offended party is a private
individual, the prosecution need not prove the
presence of malice. The law explicitly
presumes its existence (malice in law) from
the defamatory character of the assailed
statement. For his defense, the accused must
show that he has a justifiable reason for the
defamatory statement even if it was in fact
true.