G.R. No.

L-27421 September 12, 1986

ANITA MANG-OY, assisted by her husband, William Mang-oy; LEONORA

MIGUEL, assisted by her husband, Miguel Olila; HELENA TAYNAN, and
JOSE TUMPAO, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, BANDO TUMPAO, LAMBIA TUMPAO, married to
Salming Pirazo, and ABITO TUMPAO, respondents.

We are back to the early 1900's in the cool regions of the Mountain Province,
setting of many legends of adventure and romance among the highlanders of the
North. Our story is not as fanciful, involving as it does not a rivalry for the hand of
a beautiful Igorot maiden but a prosaic dispute over a piece of land. Even so, as in
those tales of old, the issue shall be decided in favor of the just and deserving
albeit according to the dictates not of the heart but of the law.

The hero of this story we shall call Old Man Tumpao although at the time it all
began he was still a young and vigorous man. He had a first wife by whom he
begot three children, who are the private respondents in this case. 1Upon her
death, he took to himself a second wife, by whom he had no issue but who had
two children she had "adopted" according to the practice of the Igorots then. 2 It is
their children who, with some others, are the petitioners in this case.

The facts are as simple as the ancient hills.

On September 4, 1937, Old Man Tumpao executed what he called a "last will and
testament" the dispositive portion of which declared:

Lastly, I appoint my son BANDO TUMPAO, whom I named, that after

departing from this life, he shall be the one to carry or fulfill my Testament,
and that he shall have the power to see and dispose all what I have stated,
he shall not change what I have already stated in my Testament so that
there is truth in my will. I will affix my right thumbmark at the end of my
written name because I do not know how to read and write, after it has
been read to me and affirm all what is my Win this 2:00 o'clock in the
afternoon this 4th day of September 1937, before those who are present
and have heard what I have stated, Pico La Trinidad, Benguet, 4th
September, 1937.

The contents of this document were read to the beneficiaries named therein who
at the time were already occupying the portions respectively allotted to them. In
implementation of this document, they then, on September 7, 1937, executed an
agreement providing as follows:

We who are named children and who will inherit from our father TUMPAO:
BANDO TUMPAO, LAMBIA ABITO, JOSE and LABET, and we also
 whose lands are included, SUCDAD BUTIOG, TULINGAN PUL-OT and
ANTHONY MENECIO all of legal age and residing in the town of La
Trinidad, Sub-Province of Benguet we say in truth after swearing under
oath in accordance to law that the testament of our father TUMPAO who is
presently ill by virtue of our right to inherit and also acknowledge or
recognize the lands as included in the area of said land as appearing in
Title No. 416 in the name of our father TUMPAO here in La Trinidad,
Barrio Pico, have heard and understood the Will as told by him concerning
our right to the land which we will inherit and also to those whose lands
which were included in the said Title No. 416 because we were all called
be present and hear his wilt We heard and agreed to his will as appearing
in his testament regarding the land which we will inherit. We also
recognized and agree to the appointment of our brother BANDO to whom
the parcels of land is to be delivered and he will also be the one, to deliver
to us our shares as soon as we will demand the partition in accordance
with the will of our father TUMPAO as soon in the Testament which we
saw and have heard by all.

It is also agreed upon among us in this confirmation that when our brother
BANDO who is appointed to distribute to us our shares we affirm in this
instrument that will answer for all the expenses when it shag be surveyed
so the share of each will be segregated so also with the approval of the
title, which shall appear the name of each of us and that we do not dispute
the land which we are actually working shall pertain to us as embodied in
the said win of our father TUMPAO.

We execute this deed of confirmation in the presence of the Notary Public

here in Baguio so that this Will, be used as our agreement so also with the
wig of our father so that they be one to be followed as regard upon by all
and we affix our right thumbmark at the end of our written name because
we do not know how to read and write this 7th day of September, 1937 in
the City of Baguio.

Two days later, Old Man Tumpao died.

The parties remained in possession of the lots assigned to them, apparently in

obedience to the wish of Old Man Tumpao as expressed in his last "will" and
affirmed by the other abovequoted instrument. But things changed unexpectedly
in 1960, twenty three years later, that brought this matter to the courts.

On November 4, 1960, the respondents executed an extrajudicial partition in

which they divided the property of Old Man Tumpao among the three of them only,
to the exclusion of the other persons mentioned in the above-quoted documents. 5
By virtue of this partition, Old Man Tumpao's title was cancelled and another one
was issued in favor of the three respondents. 6
It is this title that is now being questioned by the petitioners, who are suing for
reconveyance. They had been sustained by the trial court, 7 which, however, was
reversed by the Court of Appeals. They are before this Court to challenge that
reversal.

In deciding against them, the Court of Appeals held that the "will" executed by Old
Man Tumpao was null and void because it had not been probated The agreement
of partition among the supposed beneficiaries of the will was nullified because it
was a partition inter vivos and had not been approved by the Director of the
Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes. It was likewise held that the land in dispute was
acquired during Old Man Tumpao's first marriage although it was registered
during his second marriage and so the petitioners were liable in rentals for the lots
occupied by them, as well as attorney's fees.

After examining the musty records, we sustain the ruling-made both by the trial
court and the Court of Appeals-that the will, not having been probated as required
by law, was inoperative as such. The settled principle, as announced in a long line
of decisions in accordance with the Rules of Court, is that no will shall pass either
real or personal property unless it is proved or allowed in court. 9

We find, however, that the document may be sustained on the basis of Article
1056 of the Civil Code of 1899, which was in force at the time the said document
was executed by Old Man Tumpao in 1937. The said article reads as follows:

Art. 1056. If the testator should make a partition of his properties by an act
inter vivos, or by win, such partition shall stand in so far as it does not
prejudice the legitime of the forced heirs.

On this score, we agree with the trial court. The applicable decision is Albela vs.
Albela, also decided by the Court of Appeals, with Justice J.B.L. Reyes as the
ponente.

In this case, Agustin Albela executed on January 19, 1935, a deed of partition
dividing two parcels of land between hisdaughters, Eduarda and Restituta, who
indicated their conformity by signing the instrument. The took possession of their
respective shares upon his death, but fourteen years later, Restituta ejected
Eduarda from her lot, alleging title by purchase from a third party and denying the
existence of the partition. Eduarda sued for recovery and was upheld by the trial
court on the basis of the deed of partition.

Let Justice J.B.L. Reyes, who later became a distinguished member of this Court,
take over at this point: In their argument, appellants do not question the
authenticity of the above document, but argue against its validity, on the grounds
summarized in their brief (p. 7), as follows:
Therefore the allegations of the plaintiff-appellee, Eduarda Albela, rest on
a document which defies classification. If it is a deed of partition, it is null
and void because it is not embodied in a public document; if it is a simple
donation of realty, it is also null and void, because it is not in a public
document and there is no acceptance; if it is a donation Mortis Causa,
certainly it is null and void because it does not follow the rules governing
testamentary succession; and if ever it is to be classified as a will, more so,
it is still null and void because it does not conform to the requirements of
Section 618, Act 190 as amended by Act 2645.

None of these objections is valid in law. The appellants evidently fail to

realize that Article 1056 of the Civil Code of 1889 authorizes a testator to
partition inter vivos his property, and distribute them among his heirs, and
that this partition is not necessarily either a donation nor a testament, but
an instrument of a special character, sui generis, which is revocable at
any time by the causante during his lifetime, and does not operate as a
conveyance of title until his death. It derives its binding force on the heirs
from the respect due to the will of the owner of the property, limited only by
his creditors and the intangibility of the legitime of the forced heirs. 'El
testador es libre y sus herederos han de pasar por lo que haga en cuanto
no perjudique la legitime de los forsozos. Inutil es sonar en otras
limitaciones que no existen.' (7 Manresa Commentaries, 6th Ed., p. 639.

That such partition is not governed by the rules of wills or donations inter
vivos is a consequence of its special nature. Says the learned Manresa on
this point:

Con estas palabras (en acto entre vivos) la ley en el Articulo 1056, como
en el 1057, que despues examinaremos, alude a las formalidades con
que puede practicarse la particion, no a los efectos de esta, significando
que para ella no es preciso que intervengan las formas solemnes que
todo testamento o acto de ultima voluntad en general requiere. Ni aun
sera preciso guardar las formalidades especiales de las donaciones,
porque no se trata de disponer a titulo gratuito, sino de divider aquellos
bienes de que ya anteriormente sedispuso en forma legal (Emphasis
supplied. Op. Cit., p. 635)

It was sufficient, therefore, that the partition Exhibit A, should be in writing.

It does not have to be in a public document except to affect third persons
(Art. 1280), being valid between the parties who signed it in its present
form.

If any invalidity could be alleged against the partition, it would lie in the
absence of a previous testament preceding it (Legasto v. Verzosa, 54 Phil.
766). And even this may not be indispensable in the present case, for the
testator's partition did not depart from the shares allotted to his heirs by
 the law of intestacy. Nor is a prior win necessary under Article 1080 of the
new Civil Code, which replaced the word 'testator' in Article 1056 of the
Code of 1889 with the broader term 'person.'

Be that as it may, the nullity of the partition Exhibit A would not alter the
result. There being only two daughters surviving the deceased Agustin,
each one of them would necessarily be entitled to one-half of each of the
two parcels he owned at his death, and Agustin's former ownership is no
longer disputed by the appellants in this instance. In addition, since both
daughters signed the partition Exhibit A, its terms would bind both, and
estop them from asserting a different interest. Appellants' act; in
appropriating the whole inheritance and its fruits can find no support in law
or justice.

There is no difference in legal effect between Agustin Albela's deed of partition

and Old Man Tumpao's "last will and testament." Both are sustainable under
Article 1056 of the Civil Code, which was in force at the time they were executed
Even as Agustin Albela's partition was signed by the two daughters themselves,
so was Old Man Tumpao's "will" affirmed by the beneficiaries in their agreement of
September 7, 1937, which reiterated and recognized the terms of such "will."
While not valid as a partition inter vivos under Articles 816 and 1271 of the old
Civil Code, it was nevertheless binding on the parties as proof of their conformity
to the dispositions made by Old Man Tumpao in his "last will and testament."

As the trial court put it:

The will alone, 'Exh. B', would be inoperative for the simple reason that it
was not probated, However, when the persons who were named therein
as heirs and beneficiaries voluntarily agreed in writing to abide by its
terms probably to save the expenses of probate. and furthermore, carried
out its terms after the death of the testator until now, then it must be held
to be binding between them.

Said agreement was not a disposal of inheritance by a prospective heir

before the death of the testator, but an agreement to carry out the will. It
was not contested by the defendants and after the lapse of 25 years their
right, if any, to assail it has prescribed under Art. 1144 of the Civil Code.

Art. 1144-The following actions must be brought ten years from the time
the right of action accrues: 1) upon a written contract; 2) Upon an
obligation created by law; 3) Upon a judgment.

Any formal defect of the deed, 'Exh. 'C', was cured by the lapse of time.
 What the plaintiffs received had an aggregate area of less than 1/3 of the
land of Old Tumpao. It covers about 11,000 square meters while the total
area was more than 35,000 square meters, Under the old Civil Code, it
was within the free disposable portion of ones' estate despite the
existence of any forced heirs. (See old Civil Code, Art. 808)

In view of the foregoing considerations, the defendants are ordered to

execute a deed of conveyance in favor of the plaintiffs of the areas
respectively owned and occupied by them and to pay the costs.

Sucdad Butiog is ordered to pay the defendants P160.00 more as a

reasonable amount of his additional share in the expenses of segregating
his lot but the (defendants) are ordered to execute a deed of conveyance
in his favor of the said lot owned by him.

The expenses of Survey and segregation must be borne by the plaintiffs.

We may add that the agreement entered into by the parties in implementation of
Old Man Tumpao's "will" did not have to be approved by the Director of the
Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes because the Administrative Code of Mindanao
and Sulu was not extended to the Mountain Province. 11 Moreover, the document
was not a conveyance of properties or property right. 12

It remains to state that the property in dispute having been registered in 1917, the
presumption is that it was acquired during the second marriage and so cannot be
claimed by the respondents as the conjugal property of their mother and Old Man
Tumpao. Hence, they are not entitled to retain the entire land as their exclusive
inheritance or to collect rentals for the lots occupied by the petitioners.

The trial judge, the Hon. Feliciano Belmonte, was correct in ordering the
reconveyance to the petitioners of their respective shares. We affirm his decision
in toto.

How much simpler was life among the natives in the North during the early days,
when right and wrong were weighed according to the primal code of the ancient
hills. Even so, though that past is gone forever, justice now, as it was then, is still
for the deserving.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and that of the
trial court reinstated, with costs against the respondents. SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. L-68282 November 8, 1990

RAQUEL CHAVEZ, GERARDO GIMENEZ and MANUELA BUENAVISTA VDA.

DE CHAVEZ, petitioners,
vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (4th Civil Cases Division),
ANTONIO CHAVEZ, ROSARIO CHAVEZ and CONCEPCION CHAVEZ,
respondents.

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision dated March 26, 1984 of
the Intermediate Appellate Court in AC-G.R. No. CV-64708 which (1) annulled the
sale made by Manuela Buenavista of her property in favor of the spouses Raquel
Chavez and Gerardo Gimenez (Exh. 2) and the subsequent sale by said spouses
of the same property to Pepito Ferrer, and (2) declared that the earlier deeds of
sale (Exhs. A, B, C and D) signed by Manuela and her children constituted a valid
partition of the land, subject to her lifetime usufruct. The Court of Appeals thereby
reversed the decision dated December 21, 1971 of the Court of First Instance of
Camarines Norte, Branch 1.

The land in question is the paraphernal property of petitioner Manuel Buenavista

(defendant in Civil Case No. 1934 of the Court of First Instance of Camarines
Norte) who had six (6) children, named Antonio, Rosario, Concepcion, Raquel,
Presentacion and Floserpina. The first three were the plaintiffs and the last three,
with their mother, were the defendants in Civil Case No. 1934.

On July 11, 1958, Presentacion Chavez, with the conformity of her mother,
Manuela Buenavista, executed a deed of sale whereby she sold her 1/6 undivided
share of the land in question to her sister, Concepcion Chavez, for P 450.

Two years later, on May 2, 1960, Floserpina Chavez, with the conformity of her
mother, also sold her 1/6 undivided share of the same land to her sister,
Concepcion, for the same price of P450. On May 19, 1960, Raquel, with the
conformity of her mother, likewise sold her undivided 1/6 share of the same
property to Concepcion Chavez for P600. Having acquired the shares of
Presentacion, Floserpina and Raquel, Concepcion thereby became the owner of
a total undivided 4/6 share of the land in question with Antonio and Rosario as
owners of the remaining 2/6 shares.

In all the documents, the following stipulation appears:

Na ang nasabing lupa o pag-aari ay ipinamana na sa amin ng aming ina,

ang nasabing Manuela Buenavista, kung kaya ito ay hatiin naming anim
(6) na mga magkakapatid, bagama't hindi pa namin naisasagawa ang
paghihiwatig o partition; ako bilang isa sa anim na magkakapatid ay may
karapatan sa isang ikaanim (1/6) na bahagi ng nasabing lupa, gayon pa
man ang kasunduan sa nasabing pagkamana namin ay samantalang
 nabubuhay pa ang aming ina, siya ang magkakandili at makikinabang sa
nasabing pag-aari. (p. 14, Rollo.)

meaning that the owner, Manuela Buenavista, had assigned or distributed to her
children, in equal pro-indiviso shares, her paraphernal property situated at Sitio
Langas, Barrio Calangcawan Norte, Vinzons, Camarines Norte, with an area of
4.1163 hectares more or less under Tax Declaration No. 9303 and assessed at
P1,630.00. The owner, however, reserved for herself the possession of the land
and the enjoyment of the fruits during her lifetime.

Despite the transfers or assignments her children had executed with her
conformity ten years earlier, Manuela Buenavista, on August 27, 1968, signed a
"Bilihang Patuluyan ng Lupa" of the entire property in favor of her daughter,
Raquel Chavez, and her husband, Gerardo Jimenez. On October 7, 1968, Antonio,
Rosario and Concepcion filed Civil Case No. 1934 against their mother Manuela
and their sister Raquel. Thereupon, Manuela sold the entire property to Pepito
Ferrer, on February 4, 1969 (Exh. F) with right to repurchase. Ferrer was later
sued as an additional defendant in Civil Case No. 1934.

After the trial, judgment was rendered by the trial court dismissing the complaint,
dissolving the preliminary injunction it had previously issued, and ordering the
plaintiffs to pay the costs. The court did not award damages.

The plaintiffs, Antonio, Rosario and Concepcion, appealed to the Court of Appeals
(CA-G.R. No. 64708-R).

On March 26, 1984, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court. The dispositive
portion of its decision reads:

WHEREFORE, we reverse and set aside the appealed decision and

render another one declaring the deeds of sale in favor of Raquel Chavez
and Gerardo Jimenez (Exh. 2) and the sale in favor of defendant-appellee
Pepito Ferrer as null and void ab initio, and declaring further that the
documents (Exhs. A, B, C and D) are evidence of a valid partition of the
land in question by and between Manuela Buenavista and her children,
subject to her right of usufruct during her lifetime, without pronouncement
as to damages and costs. (p. 17, Rollo.)

On April 5, 1984, the petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration alleging among
others:

3. That the late Manuela Buenavista Vda. de Chavez, one of the

defendants-appellees, was found lately to have executed during her
lifetime a LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT ... and there is now a pending
petition for probate of said last will and testament before the Municipal
Trial Court of Vinzons, Camarines Norte;
 6. In the case at bar, even granting that the late Manuela Buenavista's
execution of the documents referred to as Exhibits A, B, C and D are valid,
nevertheless its validity ceases from the time that she executed the Last
Will and Testament . . . because the execution of the Last Will invalidates
the former act of the said Manuela Buenavista;

7. That the Last will and Testament . . . which his now pending probate in
the Municipal Trial Court of Vinzons, Camarines Norte, will finally affect
the property — hence, there is a ground for this motion for reconsideration
and/or to suspend the decision-pending final outcome of the probate of
the last will and testament of the late Manuela Buenavista. (pp. 88-89,
Rollo.)

Private respondents opposed the Motion for Reconsideration asserting that the
partition inter vivos which had been implemented long before the execution of the
said Last Will and Testament could not be revoked by the later instrument; that the
supposed Last Will and Testament was executed on December 11, 1969, more
than one year after the filing of the complaint for annulment on October 9, 1968,
when said Manuela Buenavista was already senile and not of disposing mind; that
while Manuela Buenavista was able to sign with her own hand the several Deeds
of Sale, the supposed Last Will and Testament bears her thumbmark only; that
Manuela Buenavista had no more property to dispose of by will on December 11,
1969, when she supposedly executed her Last Will and Testament.

On June 28, 1984, the Appellate Court denied the Motion for Reconsideration.

In their petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals, the petitioners
allege:

(l) That the Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) erred in
declaring valid the deeds of sale (Exhs. A, B, C and D) as a partition by an
act inter vivos considering that examining the said exhibits will reveal that
it is not a testament amounting to a will of Manuela Buenavista;

(2) That the Intermediate Appellate Court erred in ruling against Article
1347 of the New Civil Code. (p. 126, Rollo.)

We find those contentions not well-taken.

Article 1080 of the New Civil Code allows a person to make a partition of his
estate either by an act inter vivos or by will and such partition shall be respected
insofar as it does not prejudice the legitimate of the compulsory heirs. While the
law prohibits contracts upon future inheritance, the partition by the parent, as
provided in Art. 1080, is a case expressly authorized by law (Art. 1347, par. 2, Civil
Code of the Phil. by Padilla, 1987 Edition, p. 744.) Art. 1080 of the Civil Code
clearly gives a person two options in making a partition of his estate; either by an
act inter vivos or by WILL. When a person makes a partition by will, it is imperative
that such partition must be executed in accordance with the provisions of the law
on wills; however, when a person makes the partition of his estate by an act inter
vivos, such partition may even be oral or written, and need not be in the form of a
will, provided that the partition does not prejudice the legitime of compulsory heirs.

In numerous cases it has been held or stated that parol partitions may be
sustained on the ground of estoppel of the parties to assert the rights of a
tenant in common as to parts of land divided by parol partition as to which
possession in severalty was taken and acts of individual ownership were
exercised. And a court of equity will recognize the agreement and decree
it to be valid and effectual for the purpose of concluding the right of the
parties as between each other to hold their respective parts in severalty.

A parol partition may also be sustained on the ground that the parties
thereto have acquiesced in and ratified the partition by taking possession
in severalty, exercising acts of ownership with respect thereto, or
otherwise recognizing the existence of the partition. (Hernandez vs. Andal,
et al., 78 Phil. 196, 203.)

In the instant case, the respondent appellate court declared the Deeds of Sale
executed by Presentacion, Floserfina and Raquel, all surnamed Chavez (Exhs. A,
B, and C) in favor of Concepcion Chavez as evidence of a valid partition of the
land in question by and between Manuela Buenavista and her children as she not
only gave her authority thereto but also signed the sales. The Deeds of Sale
(Exhs. A, B, and C) are not contracts entered into with respect to feature
inheritance but a contract perfected and consummated during the lifetime of
Manuela Buenavista who signed the same and gave her consent thereto. Such
partition inter vivos, executed by the property owner herself, is valid.

.... As the defendants freely participated in the partition, they are now
estopped from denying and repudiating the consequences of their own
voluntary acts. It is a general principle of law that no one may be permitted
to disavow and go back upon his own acts, or to proceed contrary thereto.
(Joaquin vs. Mitsumine 34 Phil. 858.)

Where a piece of land has been included in a partition, and there is no

allegation that the inclusion was effected through improper means or
without the petitioner's knowledge, the partition barred any further
litigation on said title and operated to bring the property under the control
and jurisdiction of the court for proper disposition according to the tenor of
the partition... They cannot attack the partition collaterally ... (Ralla vs.
Judge Untalan, 172 SCRA 858, 865, citing the case of Torres vs.
Encarnacion and De Borja, No. L-4681, July 31, 1951, 89 Phil. 678.)

As well argued by counsel for the respondents in their memorandum, it would be

unjust and inequitable to allow Manuela Buenavista Vda. de Chavez to revoke the
sales she herself authorized as well as the sale she herself executed in favor of
her son only to execute a simulated sale in favor of her daughter Raquel who had
already profited from the sale she made of the property she had received in the
partition inter vivos; it would run counter to the doctrine that "no person should be
allowed to unjustly enrich herself at the expense of another."

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision of the Court of Appeals

in AC-G.R. No. CV-64708, the same is affirmed in toto. The petition for review is
dismissed for lack of merit, with costs against the petitioners.
 [G.R. No. 78778 : December 3, 1990.]
191 SCRA 814
LEONIDA CORONADO, FELIX BUENO, MELANIA RETIZOS, BERNARDINO
BUENASEDA and JOVITA MONTEFALCON, Petitioners, vs. THE COURT
OF APPEALS and JUANA BUENO ALBOVIAS, Respondents.

DECISION

PARAS, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse the decision* of the
respondent appellate court dated March 3, 1987 CA-G.R. CV No. 06911 entitled
"Juana (Bueno) Albovias et al., v. Leonida Coronado, et al.," affirming the decision
of the lower court, the decretal portion of which reads:: nad
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Declaring Leonida Coronado to have no title or interest over the property
in question, hence, has no authority to dispose of the same in favor of her
co-defendants;
2. Declaring the sales executed by Coronado and subsequent transactions
involving the same property null and void ab initio;
3. Declaring the plaintiff to be the true and legal owner of the subject parcel
of land;
4. Ordering the defendants to vacate the subject premises and to surrender
possession thereof unto the plaintiff;
5. Ordering the defendants to jointly and severally pay unto the plaintiff the
sum of P2,000.00 as attorney's fees and P10,000.00 as moral and
exemplary damages.
Costs against the defendants." (Rollo, p. 17)
As found by the respondent appellate court, the property subject of this case is a
parcel of land situated in Nagcarlan, Laguna, containing 277 square meters, more
particularly described as follows:: nad
"A parcel of land situated in the Poblacion, Municipality of Nagcarlan,
province of Laguna. Bounded on the North, by property of Epifania Irlandez
(formerly Bonifacio Formentera); on the East, by that of Julio Lopez; on the
South, by that of Dalmacio Monterola (formerly Domingo Bueno); and on
the West, by C. Lirio Street. Containing an area of two hundred seventy
seven (277) square meters, more or less. Assessed at P3,320.00 under tax
declaration No. 241." (Ibid., p. 15)
Said parcel of land is being contested by Juana Albovias, herein private
respondent, on the one hand, and Leonida-Coronado, Felix Bueno, Melania
Retizos, Bernardino Buenseda and Jovita Montefalcon, herein petitioners, on the
other hand.
Juana Albovias (JUANA, for brevity) claims that the property in question is a
portion of a bigger lot referred to as Parcel G in the last will and testament
executed in 1918 by Melecio Artiaga, grandfather of JUANA. This bigger lot was
inherited under that will by JUANA, her brother Domingo Bueno, and two other
grandchildren, namely Bonifacio and Herminigildo, both surnamed Formentera.
Parcel G is described as follows:
"Isang lagay na lupa na ang bahagi ay walang tanim na halaman at ang bahagi
naman ay may tanim na saguing, tumatayo sa gawin Canloran ng Calle Avenida
Rizal nitong Nagcarlan, at humahangan sa Ibaba; sa ari cong Testador; sa
Silangan, sa cay Enrique Jovellano; sa Ilaya, sa namatay na Perfecto Nanagas, at
sa Canloran, tubig na pinamamagatang San Cido." (Ibid., p. 16)
JUANA further claims that sometime in 1925 or 1926, C. Lirio Street was created
by the Municipality of Nagcarla traversing said Parcel G and thus dividing it into
two portions, one on the west of C. Lirio St. and the other to the east of said street.
Parcel G was divided by the heirs in the following manner; the land was divided
into two portions, the northern portion of which was adjudicated in favor of the
Formenteras and the southern portion was given to JUANA and Doming Bueno.
The southern portion in turn was partitioned between JUANA and Domingo Bueno,
the former getting the northern part adjoining the lot of the Formenteras, and the
latter the southern part which adjoins the lot of Perfecto Nanagas (not owned by
Dalmacio Monterola). The part allocated to Domingo was later sold by him to
Dalmacio Monterola, owner of the adjoining property (Ibid.).: nad
Moreover, JUANA claims that her property was included together with the two
parcels of land owned by Dalmacio Monterola, which were sold by Monterola's
successor-in-interest Leonida Coronado (now married to Felix Bueno) to Melania
Retizos on April 18, 1970. Melania Retizos in turn sold the lots, including that one
being claimed by JUANA, to the spouse Bernardino Buenaseda and Jovita
Montefalcon, now the present possessors thereof, sometime in 1974 (Ibid., pp.
16-17).
On the other hand, Leonida Coronado and her co-petitioners (CORONADO, for
brevity) claim that the property in question was bequeathed to Leonida Coronado
under a Will executed by Dr. Dalmacio Monterola, who was allegedly in
possession thereof even before the outbreak of World War II (Ibid., p. 107).
Parenthetically, said will was probated under Sp. Proc. No. SC-283, entitled
"Testate Estate of the Deceased Monterola Leonida F. Coronado, petitioner (Ibid.,
p. 105). JUANA, together with her husband, opposed the said probate. Despite
their opposition, however, the Will was allowed by the then Court of First Instance
of Laguna, Sta. Cruz Branch (Ibid., p. 106). On appeal, said decision was affirmed
by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 40353, entitled "Leonida F. Coronado,
petitioner-appellee v. Heirs of Dr. Dalmacio Monterola, oppositors-appellants"
(Ibid.). It is not apparent, however, from the record whether or not said decision
has already become final and executory.
As a result of the conflicting claims over the property in question, JUANA filed an
action for quieting of title, declaratory relief and damages against CORONADO in
the Regional Trial Court of the Fourth Judicial Region, Branch XXVI, Sta. Cruz,
Laguna, docketed as Civil Case No. 7345 (Ibid., p. 4).
As adverted to above (first par.), the lower court rendered judgment in favor of
JUANA.
Not satisfied with the decision of the lower court, CORONADO elevated the case
to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the decision appealed from (Ibid., p. 20).
Hence, this petition.:-cralaw
CORONADO raised the following assigned errors:
I. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN
ARRIVING AT A CONCLUSION WHICH IS CONTRARY TO THE FACTS AND
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE AND IN NOT APPLYING THE
APPLICABLE PROVISION OF LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE LAID DOWN
BY THIS HONORABLE COURT. (Ibid., p. 108)
II. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE PRESENTED TO SHOW THAT THE LAND IN
QUESTION CLAIMED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS THE SAME
PROPERTY ADJUDICATED TO JUANA BUENO UNDER THE WILL OF THE
DECEASED MELECIO ARTIAGA; NEITHER IS THERE EVIDENCE TO
SHOW THAT SAID WILL HAD BEEN PROBATED. (Ibid., p. 114)
III. PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS IN ESTOPPEL FROM QUESTIONING THE
OWNERSHIP OF THE PETITIONER OVER THE LAND IN QUESTION
HAVING FAILED TO RAISE THE SAME IN THE ESTATE PROCEEDING IN
THE TRIAL COURT AND EVEN ON APPEAL. (Ibid., p. 119)
IV. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS MISAPPRECIATED THE
EVIDENCE SUBMITTED AND FACTS ADMITTED ON RECORD. IT
THEREFORE COMMITTED GRAVE AND SERIOUS ERROR. (Ibid., p. 121)
As required by this Court, CORONADO filed their memorandum on May 8, 1989
(Ibid., p. 105); while that of JUANA was filed on October 13, 1989 (Ibid., p. 139).
The petition is devoid of merit.
Under the first assigned error, CORONADO assails the respondent appellate
court's finding that Dr. Dalmacio Monterola could not have acquired the subject
land by acquisitive prescription. Citing Art. 1116 of the New Civil Code in relation
to Section 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure, CORONADO claims that JUANA had
already foreclosed whatever right or legal title she had over the property in
question, the reason being that Monterola's continued possession of the said
property for over ten years since 1934 ripened into full and absolute ownership
(Ibid., p. 112).
The argument has no factual basis.
Time and again, it has been ruled that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in
cases brought to it from the Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing and revising
the errors of law imputed to it, its findings of fact being conclusive. It is not the
function of the Supreme Court to analyze or weigh such evidence all over again,
its jurisdiction being limited to reviewing errors of law that might have been
committed. Absent, therefore, a showing that the findings complained of are totally
devoid of support in the record, so that they are so glaringly erroneous as to
constitute serious abuse of discretion, such findings must stand, for the Supreme
Court is not expected or required to examine or contrast the oral and documentary
evidence submitted by the parties (Andres v. Manufacturers Hanover & Trust
Corporation, G.R. 82670, September 15, 1989). There are no convincing reasons
in the instant case to depart from this rule.
As found by the respondent appellate court, Monterola never claimed ownership
over the property in question. As a matter of fact, one of the deeds of donation
executed by Monterola in favor of Leonida Coronado acknowledged that the
boundary owner on the property conveyed to her is JUANA. This is precisely the
reason why during the lifetime of the late Dalmacio Monterola, JUANA had always
been allowed to enter and reap the benefits or produce of the said property. It was
only after the death of said Monterola in 1970 that Leonida Coronado prohibited
JUANA from entering it (Ibid., p. 18).:- nad
Even assuming arguendo that Monterola was indeed in continued possession of
the said property for over ten years since 1934, said possession is insufficient to
constitute the fundamental basis of the prescription. Possession, under the Civil
Code, to constitute the foundation of a prescriptive right, must be possession
under claim of title (en concepto de dueno), or to use the common law equivalent
of the term, it must be adverse. Acts of possessory character performed by one
who holds by mere tolerance of the owner are clearly not en concepto de dueno,
and such possessory acts, no matter how long so continued, do not start the
running of the period of prescription (Manila Electric Company v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, G.R. 71393, June 28, 1989).
In this case, Monterola, as found by the respondent appellate court and the lower
court, never categorically claimed ownership over the property in question, much
less his possession thereof en concepto de dueno. Accordingly, he could not have
acquired said property by acquisitive prescription.
Anent the contention of CORONADO that Leonida Coronado could tack her
possession to that of Monterola, so that claim of legal title or ownership over the
subject property, even against the petitioners, the Buenasesas, who are
purchasers for value and in good faith, is a foregone or settled issue, the
respondent appellate court aptly answered the same in this wise:
"It follows that Leonida Coronado could not have derived ownership of the land in
question from her predecessor-in-interest Dalmacio Monterola, whether by
prescription or by some other title. Neither can she claim acquisitive prescription
in her own name. It was only in 1970 after the death of Dalmacio Monterola that
she asserted her claim of ownership adverse to that of plaintiff-appellee. Having
knowledge that she had no title over the land in question, she must be deemed to
have claimed it in bad faith. Under Article 1137 of the Civil Code, ownership and
other real rights over immovables prescribe through uninterrupted adverse
possession thereof for thirty years, without need of title or good faith. And even
granting that she had no notice or defect in her title and was, therefore, in good
faith, a period of ten years of possession is necessary for her to acquire the land
by ordinary prescription. (Article 1134, Civil Code). But she can claim to have
possessed the land only in 1968, the year the Monterola lots were donated to her.
The period, however, was interrupted in 1975, or 7 years after, when the complaint
below was filed." (Rollo, pp. 18-19)
Under the second assigned error, CORONADO claims that the will under which
JUANA inherited the property in question from her grandfather, Melecio Artiaga,
was never probated; hence, said transfer for ownership was ineffectual
considering that under Rule 75, Sec. 1 of the Rules of Court (formerly Sec. 125 of
Act No. 190, no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved
and allowed in the proper court (Ibid., p. 115).
The contention is without merit.chanrobles virtual law library
While it is true that no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is
proved and allowed in the proper court (Art. 838, Civil Code), the questioned will,
however, may be sustained on the basis of Article 1056 of the Civil Code of 1899,
which was in force at the time said document was executed by Melecio Artiaga in
1918. The said article read as follows:
"Article 1056. If the testator should make a partition of his properties by an act
inter vivos, or by will, such partition shall stand in so far as it does not prejudice
the legitime of the forced heir." (Mang-Oy v. Court of Appeals, 144 SCRA 33
[1986])
In this case, nowhere was it alleged nor shown that Leonida Coronado is entitled
to legitime from Melecio Artiaga. The truth of the matter is that the record is bereft
of any showing that Leonida Coronado and the late Melecio Artiaga were related
to each other.
Under the third assigned error, CORONADO claims that JUANA is estopped from
questioning the ownership of Leonida Coronado over the land in question having
failed to raise the same in the estate proceedings in the trial court and even on
appeal (Rollo, p. 119).
The contention is likewise without merit.
Normally, the probate of a will does not look into its intrinsic validity. The
authentication of a will decides no other questions than such as touch upon the
capacity of the testator and the compliance with those requisites or solemnities
which the law prescribes for the validity of the wills. It does not determine nor even
by implication prejudge the validity or efficiency of the provisions of the will, thus
may be impugned as being vicious or null, notwithstanding its authentication. The
question relating to these points remain entirely unaffected, and may be raised
even after the will has been authenticated (Maninang, et al., v. Court of Appeals,
114 SCRA 473 [1982]). Consequently, JUANA is not estopped from questioning
the ownership of the property in question, notwithstanding her having objected to
the probate of the will executed by Monterola under which Leonida Coronado is
claiming title to the said property.:-cralaw
Under the fourth assigned error, it is alleged by CORONADO that JUANA's
petition is weak for want of factual and legal support; the weakness of JUANA's
position lies in the fact that she did not only fail to identify the subject land, but also
failed to explain the discrepancy in the boundary of the property she is claiming to
be hers (Rollo, p. 125).
The contention is unavailing.
The fact that JUANA failed to identify the property in question and to explain the
discrepancy in the boundary of said property, assuming they are true, is
immaterial, in view of the findings of the lower court as to the identity of the
property in question. Moreover, the lower court found sufficient evidence to
support the conclusion that the property in question is the same property
adjudicated to JUANA under the will of Melecio Artiaga, and that CORONADO has
no right whatsoever to said property (Ibid., p. 20). Such findings are conclusive
upon this Court (Reynolds Philippine Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 169 SCRA
220 [1989]).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. L-46903 July 23, 1987

BUHAY DE ROMA, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and FELICIDAD CARINGAL, as
Guardian of Rosalinda de Roma,respondents.

Candelaria de Roma had two legally adopted daughters, Buhay de Roma and
Rosalinda de Roma. She died intestate on April 30, 1971, and administration
proceedings were instituted in the Court of First Instance of Laguna by the private
respondent as guardian of Rosalinda. Buhay was appointed administratrix and in
due time filed an inventory of the estate. This was opposed by Rosalinda on the
ground that certain properties earlier donated by Candelaria to Buhay, and the
fruits thereof, had not been included.1

The properties in question consisted of seven parcels of coconut land worth

P10,297.50.2 There is no dispute regarding their evaluation; what the parties
cannot agree upon is whether these lands are subject to collation. The private
respondent rigorously argues that it is, conformably to Article 1061 of the Civil
Code. Buhay, for her part, citing Article 1062, claims she has no obligation to
collate because the decedent prohibited such collation and the donation was not
officious.

The two articles provide as follows:

Article 1061. Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory
heirs, must bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he
may have received from the decedent during the lifetime of the latter, by way
of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that it may be computed in
the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of the
partition.

Article 1062. Collation shall not take place among compulsory heirs if the
donor should have so expressly provided, or if the donor should repudiate
the inheritance, unless the donation should be reduced as inofficious.

The issue was resolved in favor of the petitioner by the trial court,* which held
that the decedent, when she made the donation in favor of Buhay, expressly
prohibited collation. Moreover, the donation did not impair the legitimes of the
two adopted daughters as it could be accommodated in, and in fact was
imputed to, the free portion of Candelaria's estate.3

On appeal, the order of the trial court was reversed, the respondent court**
holding that the deed of donation contained no express prohibition to collate
as an exception to Article 1062. Accordingly, it ordered collation and equally
divided the net estate of the decedent, including the fruits of the donated
 property, between Buhay and Rosalinda.4

The pertinent portions of the deed of donation are as follows:

IKALAWA. Na alang-alang sa aking pagmamahal, pagtingin at pagsisilbi sa

akin ng aking anak na si BUHAY DE ROMA, kasal kay Arabella Castaneda,
may karampatang gulang, mamamayang Pilipino at naninirahan at may
pahatirang-sulat din dito sa Lunsod ng San Pablo sa pamamagitan ng
kasulatang ito ay kusang-loob kong ibinibigay, ipinagkakaloob at inililipat sa
nabanggit na BUHAY DE ROMA, sa kanyang mga kahalili at tagapagmana,
sa pamamagitan ng pagbibigay na di na mababawing muli, ang lahat ng mga
lagay ng lupa na sinasabi sa itaas, sa ilalim ng kasunduan na ngayon pa ay
siya na ang nagmamay-aring tunay ng mga lupang ito at kanya nang maaring
ipalipat ang mga hoja declaratoria ng mga lupang ito sa kanyang pangalan,
datapwa't samantalang ako ay nabubuhay, ay ako rin ang makikinabang sa
mga mapuputi at mamomosesion sa mga nasabing lupa;

IKATLO. Na pinagtibay ko na ako ay marami pang ibang mga pag-aari sa

sapat pang aking ikabuhay at sa pagbibigay kong ito ay hindi masisira ang
legitimate ng mga tao na dapat magmana sa akin, sapagkat ang mga lupang
sinasabi sa itaas ay bahagui ng aking kabuhayan na ako ay may layang
ipamigay kahit na kaninong tao na kung tawagin ay Libre Disposicion. 5

We agree with the respondent court that there is nothing in the above provisions
expressly prohibiting the collation of the donated properties. As the said court
correctly observed, the phrase "sa pamamagitan ng pagbibigay na di na
mababawing muli" merely described the donation as "irrevocable" and should not
be construed as an express prohibition against collation.6 The fact that a donation
is irrevocable does not necessarily exempt the subject thereof from the collation
required under Article 1061.

We surmise from the use of such terms as "legitime" and "free portion" in the deed
of donation that it was prepared by a lawyer, and we may also presume he
understood the legal consequences of the donation being made. It is reasonable
to suppose, given the precise language of the document, that he would have
included therein an express prohibition to collate if that had been the donor's
intention.

Anything less than such express prohibition will not suffice under the clear
language of Article 1062.1awphil The suggestion that there was an implied
prohibition because the properties donated were imputable to the free portion of
the decedent's estate merits little consideration. Imputation is not the question
here, nor is it claimed that the disputed donation is officious The sole issue is
whether or not there was an express prohibition to collate, and we see none.

The intention to exempt from collation should be expressed plainly and

unequivocally as an exception to the general rule announced in Article 1062.
Absent such a clear indication of that intention, we apply not the exception but the
rule, which is categorical enough.

There is no need to dwell long on the other error assigned by the petitioner
regarding the decision of the appealed case by the respondent court beyond the
12-month period prescribed by Article X, Section 11 (1) of the 1973 Constitution.
As we held in Marcelino v. Cruz,7 the said provision was merely directory and
failure to decide on time would not deprive the corresponding courts of jurisdiction
or render their decisions invalid.

It is worth stressing that the aforementioned provision has now been reworded in
Article VIII, Section 15, of the 1987 Constitution, which also impresses upon the
courts of justice, indeed with greater urgency, the need for the speedy disposition
of the cases that have been clogging their dockets these many years. Serious
studies and efforts are now being taken by the Court to meet that need.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against the
petitioner. It is so ordered.
 G.R. No. 137287 February 15, 2000

REBECCA VIADO NON, JOSE A. NON and DELIA VIADO, petitioners,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ALICIA N. VIADO, CHERRI VIADO
and FE FIDES VIADO,respondents.

Petitioners, in their petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, seek a reversal of the 29th May 1996 decision of the Court of Appeals,
basically affirming that rendered on 30 April 1991 by the Regional Trial Court
("RTC") of Queron City, Branch 23, adjudicating the property subject matter of the
litigation to respondents. The case and the factual settings found by the Court of
Appeals do not appear to deviate significantly from that made by the trial court.

During their lifetime, the spouses Julian C. Viado and Virginia P. Viado owned
several pieces of property, among them a house and lot located at 147 Isarog
Street, La Loma, Quezon City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42682.
Virginia P. Viado died on 20 October 1982. Julian C. Viado died three years later
on 15 November 1985. Surviving them were their children — Nilo Viado, Leah
Viado Jacobs, and herein petitioners Rebecca Viado, married to Jose Non, and
Delia Viado. Nilo Viado and Leah Viado Jacobs both died on 22 April 1987. Nilo
Viado left behind as his own sole heirs herein respondents — his wife Alicia Viado
and their two children Cherri Viado and Fe Fides Viado.

Petitioners and respondents shared, since 1977, a common residence at the

Isarog property. Soon, however, tension would appear to have escalated between
petitioner Rebecca Viado and respondent Alicia Viado after the former had asked
that the property be equally divided between the two families to make room for the
growing children. Respondents, forthwith, claimed absolute ownership over the
entire property and demanded that petitioners vacate the portion occupied by the
latter. On 01 February 1988, petitioners, asserting co-ownership over the property
in question, filed a case for partition before the Quezon City RTC (Branch
93).1âwphi1.nêt

Respondents predicated their claim of absolute ownership over the subject

property on two documents — a deed of donation executed by the late Julian
Viado covering his one-half conjugal share of the Isarog property in favor of Nilo
Viado and a deed of extrajudicial settlement in which Julian Viado, Leah Viado
Jacobs (through a power of attorney in favor of Nilo Viado) and petitioner Rebecca
Viado waived in favor of Nilo Viado their rights and interests over their share of the
property inherited from Virginia Viado. Both instruments were executed on 26
August 1983 and registered on 07 January 1988 by virtue of which Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 42682 was cancelled and new Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 373646 was issued to the heirs of Nilo Viado.

Petitioners, in their action for partition, attacked the validity of the foregoing
instruments, contending that the late Nilo Viado employed forgery and undue
influence to coerce Julian Viado to execute the deed of donation. Petitioner
Rebecca Viado, in her particular case, averred that her brother Nilo Viado
employed fraud to procure her signature to the deed of extrajudicial settlement.
She added that the exclusion of her retardate sister, Delia Viado, in the
extrajudicial settlement, resulted in the latter's preterition that should warrant its
annulment. Finally, petitioners asseverated that the assailed instruments,
although executed on 23 August 1983, were registered only five years later, on 07
January 1988, when the three parties thereto, namely, Julian Viado, Nilo Viado
and Leah Viado Jacobs had already died.

Assessing the evidence before it, the trial court found for respondents and
adjudged Alicia Viado and her children as being the true owners of the disputed
property.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court with
modification by ordering the remand of the records of the case to the court a quo
for further proceedings to determine the value of the property and the amount
respondents should pay to petitioner Delia Viado for having been preterited in the
deed of extrajudicial settlement.

Petitioners are now before the Supreme Court to seek the reversal of the decision
of the Court of Appeals.

The appellate court ruled correctly.

When Virginia P. Viado died intestate in 1982, her part of the conjugal property,
the Isarog property in question included, was transmitted to her heirs — her
husband Julian and their children Nilo Viado, Rebecca Viado, Leah Viado and
Delia Viado. The inheritance, which vested from the moment of death of the
decedent,1 remained under a co-ownership regime2 among the heirs until
partition.3 Every act intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and
legatees or devisees would be a partition although it would purport to be a sale, an
exchange, a compromise, a donation or an extrajudicial settlement.4

In debunking the continued existence of a co-ownership among the parties hereto,

respondents rely on the deed of donation and deed of extrajudicial settlement
which consolidated the title solely to Nilo Viado. Petitioners assail the due
execution of the documents on the grounds heretofore expressed.

Unfortunately for petitioners, the issues they have raised boil down to the
appreciation of the evidence, a matter that has been resolved by both the trial
court and the appellate court. The Court of Appeals, in sustaining the court a quo,
has found the evidence submitted by petitioners to be utterly wanting, consisting
of, by and large, self-serving testimonies. While asserting that Nilo Viado
employed fraud, forgery and undue influence in procuring the signatures of the
parties to the deeds of donation and of extrajudicial settlement, petitioners are
vague, however, on how and in what manner those supposed vices occurred.
Neither have petitioners shown proof why Julian Viado should be held incapable
of exercising sufficient judgment in ceding his rights and interest over the property
to Nilo Viado. The asseveration of petitioner Rebecca Viado that she has signed
the deed of extrajudicial settlement on the mistaken belief that the instrument
merely pertained to the administration of the property is too tenuous to accept. It is
also quite difficult to believe that Rebecca Viado, a teacher by profession, could
have misunderstood the tenor of the assailed document.

The fact alone that the two deeds were registered five years after the date of their
execution did not adversely affect their validity nor would such circumstance alone
be indicative of fraud. The registration of the documents was a ministerial act5 and
merely created a constructive notice of its contents against all third persons.6
Among the parties, the instruments remained completely valid and binding.

The exclusion of petitioner Delia Viado, alleged to be a retardate, from the deed of
extrajudicial settlement verily has had the effect of preterition. This kind of
preterition, however, in the absence of proof of fraud and bad faith, does not justify
a collateral attack on Transfer Certificate of Title No. 373646. The relief, as so
correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, instead rests on Article 1104 of the
Civil Code to the effect that where the preterition is not attended by bad faith and
fraud, the partition shall not be rescinded but the preterited heir shall be paid the
value of the share pertaining to her. Again, the appellate court has thus acted
properly in ordering the remand of the case for further proceedings to make the
proper valuation of the isarog property and ascertainment of the amount due
petitioner Delia Viado.1âwphi1.nêt

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED, and the decision, dated 29 May
1996, in CA-G.R. No. 37272 of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. No special
pronouncement on costs. SO ORDERED.