Heirs of Venancio Bajenting vs.
Bañez terms of equality in regard to the opportunity of giving
Ratio Decidendi:
Contrary to the allegations of petitioners, the collective
testimonies of Reyes and Oyco are admissible in
evidence despite the fact that when they testified,
Margarita Reusora was already dead. Section 20(a), Rule
130 of the Revised Rules of Court reads:
Section 20. Disqualification by reason of interest or
relationship.· The following persons cannot testify as to
matters in which they are interested, directly or
indirectly as herein enumerated:
(a) Parties or assignors of parties to a case, or persons in
whose behalf a case is prosecuted, against an executor
or administrator or other representative of a deceased
person, or against a person of unsound mind, upon a
claim or demand against the estate of such deceased
person or against such person of unsound mind, cannot
testify as to any matter of fact occurring before the
death of such deceased person or before such became
of unsound mind.
The bar under aforequoted rule applies only to parties
to a case, or assignors of parties to a case or persons in
whose behalf a case is prosecuted.
Reyes and Oyco were mere witnesses for respondents,
not parties in the court a quo,
nor assignors of any of the parties in whose behalf the
case was prosecuted.
Their testimonies were presented only to prove that the
petitioners intended to repurchase the property for
profit, and not for the purpose of preserving it for their
and their familiesÊ use and enjoyment.
Goni v. CA
Ratio Decidendi:
Disqualification by reason of interest is anchored on
Section 20(a) of Rule 130, commonly known as the
Survivorship Disqualification Rule or Dead Man Statute.
The object and purpose of the rule is to guard against
the temptation to give false testimony in regard to the
transaction in question on the part of the surviving
party and further to put the two parties to a suit upon
testimony.
It is designed to close the lips of the party plaintiff when
death has closed the lips of the party defendant, in
order to remove from the surviving party the
temptation to falsehood and the possibility of fictitious
claims against the deceased. But in this case, such
provision is inapplicable since such protection was
effectively waived when counsel for petitioners cross-
examined Vicente.
"A waiver occurs when plaintiff's deposition is taken by
the representative of the estate or when counsel for the
representative cross-examined the plaintiff as to matters
occurring during deceased's lifetime.
Disini vs. Sandiganbayan
Ratio Decidendi:
The filing of the criminal complaints in the Office of the
Ombudsman effectively interrupted the running of the
period of prescription. The criminal complaints were
filed and their records transmitted by the PCGG to the
Office of the Ombudsman on April 8, 1991 for the
conduct the preliminary investigation. In accordance
with Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code and the ruling
in Panaguiton, Jr. v. Department of Justice, 571 SCRA
549 (2008), the filing of the criminal complaints in the
Office of the Ombudsman effectively interrupted the
running of the period of prescription.
The prevailing rule is, therefore, that irrespective of
whether the offense charged is punishable by the
Revised Penal Code or by a special law, it is the filing of
the complaint or information in the office of the public
prosecutor for purposes of the preliminary investigation
that interrupts the period of prescription. Consequently,
prescription did not yet set in because only five years
elapsed from 1986, the time of the discovery of the
offenses charged, up to April 1991, the time of the filing
of the criminal complaints in the Office of the
Ombudsman.
Lacurom vs. Jacoba
Ratio Decidendi:
The marital privilege rule, being a rule of evidence, may
be waived by failure of the claimant to object timely to
its presentation or by any conduct that may be
construed as implied consent. This waiver applies to
Jacoba who impliedly admitted authorship of the 30 July
2001 motion.
Atty. Jacoba’s answer with Second Motion for Inhibition
did not contain a denial of his wife’s account. Instead,
Jacoba impliedly admitted authorship of the motion by
stating that he "trained his guns and fired at the errors
which he perceived and believed to be gigantic and
monumental”.
Reyes vs Ombudsman
Ratio Decidendi:
There appears to be no motive for any of the
whistleblowers, particularly, Luy, to incredulously
implicate the Napoles siblings in this case. With all these
factors together, there is, at least, some substantial basis
to conclude, that the Napoles siblings were, in all
reasonable likelihood, involved in the entire con.
Neither can the Napoles siblings discount the
testimonies of the whistleblowers based on their
invocation of the res inter alios acta rule under Section
28, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence, which states that
the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act,
declaration, or omission of another, unless the
admission is by a conspirator under the parameters of
Section 30 of the same Rule.
To be sure, the foregoing rule constitutes a technical
rule on evidence which should not be rigidly applied in
the course of preliminary investigation proceedings.
In Estrada, the Court sanctioned the Ombudsman’s
appreciation of hearsay evidence, which would
otherwise be inadmissible under technical rules on
evidence, during the preliminary investigation “as long
as there is substantial basis for crediting the hearsay.”
This is because “such investigation is merely preliminary,
and does not finally adjudicate rights and obligations of
parties.”
Applying the same logic, and with the similar
observation that there lies substantial basis for crediting
the testimonies of the whistleblowers herein, the
objection interposed by the Napoles siblings under the
evidentiary res inter alios acta rule should falter.
Ultimately, as case law edifies, “the technical rules on
evidence are not binding on the fiscal who has
jurisdiction and control over the conduct of a
preliminary investigation,” as in this case.
An exception to the res inter alios acta rule is an
admission made by a conspirator under Section 30, Rule
130 of the Rules of Court.
This provision states that the act or declaration of a
conspirator relating to the conspiracy, and during its
existence, may be giver, in evidence against the co-
conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence
other than such act or declaration.
Thus, in order that the admission of a conspirator may
be received against his or her co-conspirators, it is
necessary that: (a) the conspiracy be first proved by
evidence other than the admission itself; (b) the
admission relates to the common object; and (c) it has
been made while the declarant was engaged in carrying
out the conspiracy. (People v. Ibañez, G.R. No. 191752)
Tamargo vs. Awingan & Antiporda
Ratio Decidendi:
Columna’s extrajudicial confession in his March 8, 2004
affidavit was not admissible as evidence against
respondents in view of the rule on res inter alios acta.
The rule on res inter alios acta provides that the rights
of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration,
or omission of another. Consequently, an extrajudicial
confession is binding only on the confessant, is not
admissible against his or her co-accused and is
considered as hearsay against them.
An exception to the res inter alios acta rule is an
admission made by a conspirator under
Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court:
Admission by conspirator. — The act or declaration of a
conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its
existence, may be given in evidence against the co-
conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence
other than such act or declaration.
This rule prescribes that the act or declaration of the
conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its
existence may be given in evidence against co-
conspirators provided that the conspiracy is shown by
independent evidence aside from the extrajudicial
confession. Thus, in order that the admission of a
conspirator may be received against his or her co-
conspirators, it is necessary that (a) the conspiracy be
first proved by evidence other than the admission itself
(b) the admission relates to the common object and (c)
it has been made while the declarant was engaged in
carrying out the conspiracy. Otherwise, it cannot be
used against the alleged co-conspirators without
violating their constitutional right to be confronted with
the witnesses against them and to cross-examine them.
Here, aside from the extrajudicial confession, which was
later on recanted, no other piece of evidence was
presented to prove the alleged conspiracy. There was no
other prosecution evidence, direct or circumstantial,
which the extrajudicial confession could corroborate.
Therefore, the recanted confession of Columna, which
was the sole evidence against respondents, had no
probative value and was inadmissible as evidence
against them.
Villanueva v. Balaguer
Ratio Decidendi:
Among the issues raised in this case is if the failure of
Balaguer and IBC-13 to respond to the letter of
Villanueva constitute their admission of the statements
in the letter and may be used in evidence against them,
pursuant to the rule on admission by silence in Sec. 32,
Rule 130.
In answering in the negative and affirming the CA’s
decision, the Supreme Court held that the burden of
proof is generally on the plaintiff, with respect to his
complaint. One cannot prove his claim by placing the
burden of proof on the other party.
Indeed, “(a) man cannot make evidence for himself by
writing a letter containing the statements he wishes to
prove. He does not make the letter evidence by sending
it to the party against whom he wishes to prove the
facts stated therein.
He no more can impose a duty to answer a charge than
he can impose a duty to pay by sending goods.
Therefore a failure to answer such adverse assertions in
the absence of further circumstances making an answer
requisite or natural has no effect as an admission.
Moreover, the rule on admission by silence applies to
adverse statements in writing if the party was carrying
on a mutual correspondence with the declarant.
However, if there was no such mutual correspondence,
the rule is relaxed on the theory that while the party
would have immediately reacted by a denial if the
statements were orally made in his presence, such
prompt response can generally not be expected if the
party is still has to resort to a written reply.
The Court also didn’t assume an admission by silence on
the part of Balaguer by virtue of his failure to protest or
disclaim the attribution to him by the newspapers that
he is the source of the articles. As explained above, the
rule on admission by silence is relaxed when the
statement is not made orally in one’s presence or when
one still has to resort to a written reply, or when there is
no mutual correspondence between the parties.
People vs De Leon
The testimonies of the witnesses, and pieces of
evidence presented by the prosecution, the crime of
robbery with homicide was indeed committed. There
was no mistaking from the actions of all the accused
that their main intention was to rob the gasoline station
and that on occasion of such robbery, a homicide was
committed.
The prosecution was able to prove the
presence of an implied conspiracy. The witnesses were
able to narrate in a convincing manner, the
circumstances surrounding the commission of the
robbery and positively identified appellant as one of the
robbers. Witness Eduardo Zulueta testified that
appellant was one of the robbers who poked a gun at
him
Court found that the use of unlicensed firearm
was not duly proven by the prosecution. Although
jurisprudence dictates that the existence of the firearm
can be established by mere testimony, the fact that
appellant was not a licensed firearm holder must still be
established. The prosecution failed to present written or
testimonial evidence to prove that appellant did not
have a license to carry or own a firearm, hence, the use
of unlicensed firearm as an aggravating circumstance
cannot be appreciated.
Estrada vs Ombudsman
Probable cause can be established with hearsay
evidence, as long as there is substantial basis for
crediting the hearsay. Hearsay evidence is admissible in
determining probable cause in a preliminary
investigation because such investigation is merely
preliminary, and does not finally adjudicate rights and
obligations of parties. However, in administrative cases,
where rights and obligations are finally adjudicated,
what is required is "substantial evidence" which cannot
rest entirely or even partially on hearsay evidence.
Substantial basis is not the same as substantial evidence
because substantial evidence excludes hearsay evidence
while substantial basis can include hearsay evidence.
People vs Serenas
As an exception to the rule against hearsay evidence, a
dying declaration or ante mortem statement is evidence
of the highest order and is entitled to utmost credence
since no person aware of his impending death would
make a careless and false accusation.
In order for a dying declaration to be held admissible,
four requisites must concur: first, the declaration must
concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the
declarant's death; second, at the time the declaration
was made, the declarant must be under the
consciousness of an impending death; third, the
declarant is competent as a witness; and fourth, the
declaration must be offered in a criminal case for
homicide, murder, or parricide, in which the declarant is
the victim.
All requisites for a dying declaration were sufficiently
met by the statement of the victim communicated to
Cesar. First, the statement pertained to Niño being
stabbed, particularly pin-pointing Joe-An as the
perpetrator. Second, Niño must have been fully aware
that he was on the brink of death considering his
bloodied condition when Cesar met him near the
bridge. Third, the competence of Niño is unquestionable
had he survived the stabbing incident. Fourth, Niño’s
statement was being offered in a criminal prosecution
for his murder.
Lazaro vs Agustin
Issue:
Whether or not the sworn statement of Basilisa S.
Agustin is a declaration against interest which
establishes the co-ownership of lot no. 10676 by and
among the petitioners and respondents.
Ruling:
No. At the outset, it bears to point out that it is wrong
for petitioners to argue that Basilisa's alleged sworn
statement is a declaration against interest. It is not a
declaration against interest. Instead, it is an admission
against interest. Admissions against interest are those
made by a party to a litigation or by one in privity with
or identified in legal interest with such party, and are
admissible whether or not the declarant is available as a
witness. Declarations against interest are those made by
a person who is neither a party nor in privity with a
party to the suit, are secondary evidence, and constitute
an exception to the hearsay rule. They are admissible
only when the declarant is unavailable as a witness. In
the present case, since Basilisa is respondents'
predecessor-in-interest and is, thus, in privity with the
latter's legal interest, the former's sworn statement, if
proven genuine and duly executed, should be
considered as an admission against interest.
Settled is the rule that generally, a notarized
document carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon
it with respect to its due execution, and documents
acknowledged before a notary public have in their favor
the presumption of regularity. However, this
presumption is not absolute and may be rebutted by
clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.
Not all notarized documents are exempted
from the rule on authentication. Thus, an affidavit does
not automatically become a public document just
because it contains a notarial jurat. The presumptions
that attach to notarized documents can be affirmed only
so long as it is beyond dispute that the notarization was
regular.
Petitioners rely heavily on the presumption of
regularity accorded by law to notarized documents.
While indeed, a notarized document enjoys this
presumption, the fact that a deed is notarized is not a
guarantee of the validity of its contents. The
presumption cannot be made to apply to the present
case because the regularity in the execution of the
sworn statement was challenged in the proceedings
below where its prima facie validity was overthrown by
the highly questionable circumstances under which it
was supposedly executed, as well as the testimonies of
witnesses who testified on the improbability of
execution of the sworn statement, as well as on the
physical condition of the signatory, at the time the
questioned document was supposedly executed.
 A notary public should not notarize a document
unless the persons who signed the same are the very
same persons who executed and personally appeared
before him to attest to the contents and truth of what
are stated therein. In the instant case, the notary public
should have exercised utmost diligence in ascertaining
the true identity of the person executing the said sworn
statement. However, the notary public did not comply
with this requirement.
People, vs. ANECITO ESTIBAL y CALUNGSAG
ACCUSED IS ACQUITTED
In essence, the res gestae exception to the hearsay rule
provides that the declarations must have been
"voluntarily and spontaneously made so nearly
contemporaneous as to be in the presence of the
transaction which they illustrate and explain, and
were made under such circumstances as necessarily to
exclude the idea of design or deliberation."
AAA's statements to the barangay tanod and the
police do not qualify as part of res gestae in view of
the missing element of spontaneity and the lapse of an
appreciable time between the rape and the
declarations which afforded her sufficient opportunity
for reflection.
In People v. Manhuyod, Jr., 51 the Court stressed that in
appreciating res gestae the element of spontaneity
is critical. Although it was acknowledged that there is
no hard and fast rule to establish it, the Court cited a
number of factors to consider, already mentioned
in Dianos. The review of the facts below constrains this
Court to take a view opposite that of the RTC and the
CA.
There is no doubt, however, that there was nothing
spontaneous, unreflected or instinctive about the
declarations which AAA made to the barangay
tanodand later that night to the police. Her statements
were in fact a re-telling of what she had already
confessed to her mother earlier that afternoon; this
time however, her story to thetanods and the police was
in clear, conscious pursuit of a newly formed resolve,
exhorted by her mother, to see her father finally
exposed and put behind bars. AAA made her
declarations to the authorities precisely because she
was seeking their help to punish the accused-appellant.
There was then nothing spontaneous about her so-
called res gestae narrations, even as it is remarkable to
note that while AAA was giving her said statements to
the police, her father was already being held in
detention, and the investigation was conducted exactly
to determine if there was a basis to hold him for trial for
rape.
Res gestae speaks of a quick continuum of related
happenings, starting with the occurrence of a startling
event which triggered it and including any spontaneous
declaration made by a witness, participant or spectator
relative to the said occurrence. The cases this Court has
cited invariably reiterate that the statement must be an
unreflected reaction of the declarant, undesigned and
free of deliberation. In other words, the declarant is
spontaneously moved merely to express his instinctive
reaction concerning the startling occurrence, and not to
pursue a purpose or design already formed in his mind.
In People v. Sanchez, 53 the Court belabored to explain
that startling events "speak for themselves, giving out
their fullest meaning through the unprompted language
of the participants:" 54 DCcAIS
Res gestae means the "things done." It "refers to those
exclamations and statements made by either the
participants, victims, or spectators to a crime
immediately before, during, or immediately after the
commission of the crime, when the circumstances are
such that the statements were made as a spontaneous
reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the
occasion and there was no opportunity for the declarant
to deliberate and to fabricate a false statement." A
spontaneous exclamation is defined as "a statement or
exclamation made immediately after some exciting
occasion by a participant or spectator and asserting the
circumstances of that occasion as it is observed by him.
The admissibility of such exclamation is based on our
experience that, under certain external circumstances of
physical or mental shock, a stress of nervous excitement
may be produced in a spectator which stills the
reflective faculties and removes their control, so that
the utterance which then occurs is a spontaneous and
sincere response to the actual sensations and
perceptions already produced by the external shock.
Since this utterance is made under the immediate and
uncontrolled domination of the senses, rather than
reason and reflection, and during the brief period when
consideration of self-interest could not have been fully
brought to bear,' the utterance may be taken as
expressing the real belief of the speaker as to the facts
just observed by him." In a manner of speaking, the
spontaneity of the declaration is such that the
declaration itself may be regarded as the event speaking
through the declarant rather than the declarant
speaking for himself. Or, stated differently, ". . . the
events speak for themselves, giving out their fullest
meaning through the unprompted language of the
participants. The spontaneous character of the language
is assumed to preclude the probability of its
premeditation or fabrication. Its utterance on the spur
of the moment is regarded, with a good deal of reason,
as a guarantee of its truth. 55 (Citations omitted)
The RTC and the CA held that the inculpatory
statements of AAA to the barangay tanod and the police
are part of the res gestae occurrence of the rape. This is
error. It is obvious that AAA had by then undergone a
serious deliberation, prodded by her mother, whose
own outrage as the betrayed wife and grieving mother
so emboldened AAA that she finally resolved to emerge
from her fear of her father. Here then lies the crux of the
matter: AAA had clearly ceased to act unthinkingly
under the immediate influence of her shocking rape by
her father, and was now led by another powerful
compulsion, a new-found resolve to punish her
father. aIAcCH
Hearsay evidence is accorded no probative value for
the reason that the original declarant was not placed
under oath or affirmation, nor subjected to cross-
examination by the defense, except in a few instances
as where the statement is considered part of the res
gestae.
This Court has a situation where the incriminatory
statements allegedly made by AAA were conveyed to
the trial court not by AAA herself but by PO3 Cobardo,
BSF Estudillo and BSF Perlas. In particular, PO3 Cobardo
made a summation of what she claims was AAA's
narration of her ordeal, along with her own
observations of her demeanor during the investigation.
But unless the prosecution succeeded in invoking res
gestae, their testimonies must be dismissed as hearsay,
since AAA's statements were not subjected to cross-
examination consistent with the constitutional right of
the accused-appellant to confront the evidence against
him.
||| (People v. Estibal y Calungsag, G.R. No. 208749,
November 26, 2014)
When inculpatory facts are susceptible of two or more
interpretations, one of which is consistent with the
innocence of the accused, the evidence does not fulfill
or hurdle the test of moral certainty required for
conviction.
It is well-settled, to the point of being elementary, that
when inculpatory facts are susceptible to two or more
interpretations, one of which is consistent with the
innocence of the accused, the evidence does not fulfill
or hurdle the test of moral certainty required for
conviction . 61 A forced application of the res
gestae exception below results if the Court says that
AAA's incriminatory statements were spontaneous and
thus part of a startling occurrence. It produces an
outright denial of the right of the accused-appellant to
be presumed innocent unless proven guilty, not to
mention that he was also denied his right to confront
the complainant.
Malayan vs Alberto
under the rules of evidence, a witness can testify only to
those facts which the witness knows of his or her
personal knowledge, that is, which are derived from the
witness’ own perception.[18] Concomitantly, a witness
may not testify on matters which he or she merely
learned from others either because said witness was
told or read or heard those matters. [19] Such testimony
is considered hearsay and may not be received as proof
of the truth of what the witness has learned. This is
known as the hearsay rule
As discussed in D.M. Consunji, Inc. v. CA,
[21]
“Hearsay is not limited to oral testimony or
statements; the general rule that excludes hearsay as
evidence applies to written, as well as oral statements.”
There are several exceptions to the hearsay rule
under the Rules of Court, among which are entries in
official records.[22]Section 44, Rule 130 provides:
Entries in official records made
in the performance of his duty by a
public officer of the Philippines, or by a
person in the performance of a duty
specially enjoined by law are prima facie
evidence of the facts therein stated.
In Alvarez v. PICOP Resources,[23] this Court reiterated
the requisites for the admissibility in evidence, as an
exception to the hearsay rule of entries in official
records, thus: (a) that the entry was made by a public
officer or by another person specially enjoined by law to
do so; (b) that it was made by the public officer in the
performance of his or her duties, or by such other
person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined
by law; and (c) that the public officer or other person
had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him or her
stated, which must have been acquired by the public
officer or other person personally or through official
information.
Notably, the presentation of the police report itself is
admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule even if
the police investigator who prepared it was not the Rules of Court, not necessarily to those of Section
presented in court, as long as the above requisites could 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, as a distinct rule on
be adequately proved evidence that imposes further requirements in the use
of depositions in a different case or proceeding. In other
Republic vs Sandiganbayan words, the prior use of the deposition under Section
4(c), Rule 23 cannot be taken as compliance with
Section 47, Rule 130 which considers the same
A fundamental characteristic of hearsay evidence is the deposition as hearsay, unless the requisites for its
adverse party’s lack of opportunity to cross-examine the admission under this rule are observed. The aching
out-of-court declarant. However, Section 47, Rule 130 question is whether the petitioner complied with the
explicitly requires, inter alia, for the admissibility of latter rule.
a former testimony or deposition that the adverse party
must have had an opportunity to cross-examine the Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court lays down the
witness or the deponent in the prior proceeding. following requisites for the admission of a testimony or
deposition given at a former case or proceeding.
This opportunity to cross-examine though is not the
ordinary cross-examination119 afforded an adverse party 1. The testimony or deposition of a witness
in usual trials regarding "matters stated in the direct deceased or otherwise unable to testify;
examination or connected therewith." Section 47, Rule
130 of the Rules of Court contemplates a different kind 2. The testimony was given in a former case or
of cross-examination, whether actual or a mere proceeding, judicial or administrative;
opportunity, whose adequacy depends on the requisite
identity of issues in the former case or proceeding and
3. Involving the same parties;
in the present case where the former testimony or
deposition is sought to be introduced.
4. Relating to the same matter;
Section 47, Rule 130 requires that the issues involved in
5. The adverse party having had the opportunity
both cases must, at least, be substantially the same;
to cross-examine him.123
otherwise, there is no basis in saying that the former
statement was - or would have been - sufficiently tested
The reasons for the admissibility of testimony or
by cross-examination or by an opportunity to do
deposition taken at a former trial or proceeding are the
so.120 (The requirement of similarity though does not
necessity for the testimony and its
mean that all the issues in the two proceedings should 124
trustworthiness. However, before the former
be the same.121 Although some issues may not be the
testimony or deposition can be introduced in
same in the two actions, the admissibility of a former
evidence, the proponent must first lay the proper
testimony on an issue which is similar in both actions
predicate therefor,125 i.e., the party must establish the
cannot be questioned.12
basis for the admission of the Bane deposition in the
realm of admissible evidence. This basis is the prior
These considerations, among others, make Section 47,
issue that we must now examine and resolve.
Rule 130 a distinct rule on evidence and therefore
should not be confused with the general provisions on
IV (c). Unavailability of witness
deposition under Rule 23 of the Rules of Court. In other
words, even if the petitioner complies with Rule 23 of
For the admission of a former testimony or deposition,
the Rules of Court on the use of depositions, the
Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court simply
observance of Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
requires, inter alia, that the witness or deponent be
cannot simply be avoided or disregarded.
"deceased or unable to testify." On the other hand, in
using a deposition that was taken during the pendency
Undisputably, the Sandiganbayan relied on the Bane
of an action, Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court
deposition, taken in Civil Case No. 0130, for purposes of
provides several grounds that will justify dispensing with
this very same case. Thus, what the petitioner
the actual testimony of the deponent in open court and
established and what the Sandiganbayan found, for
specifies, inter alia, the circumstances of the deponent’s
purposes of using the Bane deposition, refer only to the
inability to attend or testify, as follows:
circumstances laid down under Section 4(c), Rule 23 of
(3) that the witness is unable to attend
or testify because of age, sickness, infirmity, or
imprisonment[.] [emphases ours]126
The phrase "unable to testify" appearing in both Rule 23
and Rule 130 of the Rules of Court refers to a physical
inability to appear at the witness stand and to give a
testimony.127 Hence notwithstanding the deletion of the
phrase "out of the Philippines," which previously
appeared in Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court, absence from jurisdiction128 - the petitioner’s
excuse for the non-presentation of Bane in open court
- may still constitute inability to testify under the same
rule. This is not to say, however, that resort to
deposition on this instance of unavailability will always
be upheld. Where the deposition is taken not for
discovery purposes, but to accommodate the deponent,
then the deposition should be rejected in evidence. 129
Although the testimony of a witness has been given in
the course of a former proceeding between the parties
to a case on trial, this testimony alone is not a ground
for its admission in evidence. The witness himself, if
available, must be produced in court as if he were
testifying de novo since his testimony given at the
former trial is mere hearsay. 130 The deposition of a
witness, otherwise available, is also inadmissible for the
same reason.
Indeed, the Sandiganbayan’s reliance on the Bane
deposition in the other case (Civil Case No. 0130) is an
argument in favor of the requisite unavailability of the
witness. For purposes of the present case (Civil Case No.
0009), however, the Sandiganbayan would have no basis
to presume, and neither can or should we, that the
previous condition, which previously allowed the use of
the deposition, remains and would thereby justify the
use of the same deposition in another case or
proceeding, even if the other case or proceeding is
before the same court. Since the basis for the admission
of the Bane deposition, in principle, being
necessity,131 the burden of establishing its existence
rests on the party who seeks the admission of the
evidence. This burden cannot be supplanted by
assuming the continuity of the previous condition or
conditions in light of the general rule against the non-
presentation of the deponent in court.132
Casumpang vs Cortejo
To qualify a witness as a medical expert, it must be
shown that the witness (1) has the required
professional knowledge, learning and skill of the
subject under inquiry sufficient to qualify him to speak
with authority on the subject; and (2) is familiar with
the standard required of a physician under similar
circumstances; where a witness has disclosed sufficient
knowledge of the subject to entitle his opinion to go to
the jury, the question of the degree of his knowledge
goes more to the weight of the evidence than to its
admissibility.
xxxx
Nor is it critical whether a medical expert is a general
practitioner or a specialist so long as he exhibits
knowledge of the subject. Where a duly licensed and
practicing physician has gained knowledge of the
standard of care applicable to a specialty in which he is
not directly engaged but as to which he has an opinion
based on education, experience, observation, or
association wit that specialty, his opinion is competent.
Application to the Present Case
In the case and the facts before us, we find that Dr.
Jaudian is competent to testify on the standard of care
in dengue fever cases.
Although he specializes in pathology, it was established
during trial that he had attended not less than 30
seminars held by the Pediatric Society, had exposure in
pediatrics, had been practicing medicine for 16 years,
and had handled not less than 50 dengue related cases.
As a licensed medical practitioner specializing in
pathology, who had practical and relevant exposure in
pediatrics and dengue related cases, we are convinced
that Dr. Jaudian demonstrated sufficient familiarity with
the standard of care to be applied in dengue fever cases.
Furthermore, we agree that he possesses knowledge
and experience sufficient to qualify him to speak with
authority on the subject.
People vs Soriano
In cases involving the special complex crime of rape with
homicide both the rape and the homicide must be
proven beyond reasonable doubt, as the victim can no
longer testify against the perpetrator of the offense.
Thus, a resort to circumstantial evidence becomes
inevitable to prove the case. Under Section 4, Rule 133
of the Rules of Court, circumstantial evidence is
sufficient for conviction when the concurrence of the
following factors obtain: (a) there is more than one
circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences
are derived have been proven; and (c) the combination
of all the circumstances is such as would prove the
crime beyond reasonable doubt. These circumstances
and facts must be absolutely incompatible with any
reasonable hypothesis propounding the innocence of
the accused
GEPULLE-GARBO v. SPOUSES GARABATO G.R. No.
200013, 14 January 2015
Probative value of expert witness’ testimony
Facts:
This case pertains to a Deed of Sale over a parcel land in
Pasay City, originally owned by Spouses Eduviges and
Nick Garbo. In March 1977, Eduviges, with the supposed
consent and signature of Nick, sold said lot to their
daughter, Florence. Florence registered the property in
her name in October 1996. In 1996, Florence sold said
lot to respondents Spouses Garabato. Thereafter,
Eduviges, Nick and Florence died.
Petitioner, Nick’s second wife after the death of Eduviges
in 1978, alleges that the sale between Eduviges and
Florence in March 1977 was void as Eduviges’ and Nick’s
signatures therein were forged. To support her
allegation, petitioner presented the report and
testimony of a document examiner of the National
Bureau of Investigation.
Issue: What is the probative value of a handwriting
expert’s testimony on cases where there are allegations
of forgery?
Held: As a rule, forgery cannot be presumed and must
be proved by clear, positive and convincing evidence,
the burden of proof lies on the party alleging forgery.
One who alleges forgery has the burden to establish his
case by a preponderance of evidence, or evidence which
is of greater weight or more convincing than that which
is offered in opposition to it. The fact of forgery can only
be established by a comparison between the alleged
forged signature and the authentic and genuine
signature of the person whose signature is theorized to
have been forged.
In Jimenez v. Commission on Ecumenical Mission,
United Presbyterian Church, USA, the Court identified
and explained the factors involved in the examination
and comparison of handwritings:
x x x [T]he authenticity of a questioned signature cannot
be determined solely upon its general characteristics,
similarities or dissimilarities with the genuine signature.
Dissimilarities as regards spontaneity, rhythm, pressure
of the pen, loops in the strokes, signs of stops, shades,
etc., that may be found between the questioned
signature and the genuine one are not decisive on the
question of the former’s authenticity. The result of
examinations of questioned handwriting, even with the
benefit of aid of experts and scientific instruments, is, at
best, inconclusive. There are other factors that must be
taken into consideration. The position of the writer, the
condition of the surface on which the paper where the
questioned signature is written is placed, his state of
mind, feelings and nerves, and the kind of pen and/or
paper used, play an important role on the general
appearance of the signature. Unless, therefore, there is,
in a given case, absolute absence, or manifest dearth, of
direct or circumstantial competent evidence on the
character of a questioned handwriting, much weight
should not be given to characteristic similarities, or
dissimilarities, between that questioned handwriting
and an authentic one.
The opinion of handwriting experts are not necessarily
binding upon the court, the expert’s function being to
place before the court data upon which the court can
form its own opinion. This principle holds true especially
when the question involved is mere handwriting
similarity or dissimilarity, which can be determined by a
visual comparison of specimens of the questioned
signatures with those of the currently existing ones. A
finding of forgery does not depend entirely on the
testimonies of handwriting experts, because the judge
must conduct an independent examination of the
questioned signature in order to arrive at a reasonable
conclusion as to its authenticity.
Here, both the RTC and CA found that the expert
witness did not explain the manner of examination of
the specimen signatures in reaching his conclusion. The
expert witness did not point out distinguishing marks,
characteristics and discrepancies in and between
genuine and false specimens of writing which would
ordinarily escape notice or detection by an untrained
observer. The Court also aptly ruled that courts are not
bound by expert testimonies especially that the
examination was upon the initiative of Nick and Betty decide for itself the merits thereof.
and they had complete control on what documents and As discussed above, Dr. Gestuvo's negligence is clearly
specimens to be examined by the NBI. Betty, in coming demonstrable by the doctrines of res ipsa loquitur and
before us, had the onus of showing that the signatures informed consent.
were forged. She fell short of demonstrating that her An expert witness is not necessary as the res ipsa
case fell within the limited exceptions for disturbing loquitur doctrine is applicable
conclusiveness of factual findings of lower courts.
To establish medical negligence, this Court has held that
Rosit vs Davao Doctors an expert testimony is generally required to define the
standard of behavior by which the court may determine
whether the physician has properly performed the
Dr. Pangan's Affidavit is not admissible
requisite duty toward the patient. This is so considering
that the requisite degree of skill and care in the
The appellate court's Decision absolving Dr. Gestuvo of
treatment of a patient is usually a matter of expert
negligence was also anchored on a letter signed by Dr.
opinion.[10]
Pangan who stated the opinion that Dr. Gestuvo did not
commit gross negligence in his emergency management
Solidum v. People of the Philippines [11] provides an
of Mr. Rosit's fractured mandible. [18] Clearly, the
exception. There, the Court explained that where the
appellate court overlooked the elementary principle
application of the principle of res ipsa loquitur is
against hearsay evidence.
warranted, an expert testimony may be dispensed with
in medical negligence cases:
In Dantis v. Maghinang, Jr.,[19] the Court reiterated the
oft-repeated rule that "an affidavit is merely hearsay
Although generally, expert medical testimony is relied
evidence where its affiant/maker did not take the
upon in malpractice suits to prove that a physician has
witness stand." Here, Dr. Pangan never took the witness
done a negligent act or that he has deviated from the
stand to affirm the contents of his affidavit. Thus, the
standard medical procedure, when the doctrine of res
affidavit is inadmissible and cannot be given any weight.
ipsa loquitur is availed by the plaintiff, the need for
The CA, therefore, erred when it considered the affidavit
expert medical testimony is dispensed with because
of Dr. Pangan, mpreso for considering the same as
the injury itself provides the proof of negligence. The
expert testimony.
reason is that the general rule on the necessity of expert
Moreover, even if such affidavit is considered as
testimony applies only to such matters clearly within the
admissible and the testimony of an expert witness, the
domain of medical science, and not to matters that are
Court is not bound by such testimony. As ruled in Ilao-
within the common knowledge of mankind which may
Quianay v. Mapile:[20]
be testified to by anyone familiar with the facts. x x x
Indeed, courts are not bound by expert testimonies.
They may place whatever weight they choose upon such
Thus, courts of other jurisdictions have applied the
testimonies in accordance with the facts of the case.
doctrine in the following situations: leaving of a foreign
The relative weight and sufficiency of expert testimony
object in the body of the patient after an operation,
is peculiarly within the province of the trial court to
injuries sustained on a healthy part of the body which
decide, considering the ability and character of the
was not under, or in the area, of treatment, removal of
witness, his actions upon the witness stand, the weight
the wrong part of the body when another part was
and process of the reasoning by which he has supported
intended, knocking out a tooth while a patient's jaw was
his opinion, his possible bias in favor of the side for
under anesthetic for the removal of his tonsils, and loss
whom he testifies, and any other matters which serve to
of an eye while the patient plaintiff was under the
illuminate his statements. The opinion of an expert
influence of anesthetic, during or following an operation
should be considered by the court in view of all the facts
for appendicitis, among others.
and circumstances of the case. The problem of the
We have further held that resort to the doctrine of res
evaluation of expert testimony is left to the discretion of
ipsa loquitur as an exception to the requirement of an
the trial court whose ruling thereupon is not revicwable
expert testimony in medical negligence cases may be
in the absence of an abuse of that discretion.
availed of if the following essential requisites are
Thus, the belief of Dr. Pangan whether Dr. Gestuvo is
satisfied: (1) the accident was of a kind that does not
guilty of negligence or not will not bind the Court. The
ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; (2) the
Court must weigh and examine such testimony and
instrumentality or agency that caused the injury was
under the exclusive control of the person charged; and
(3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary
action or contribution of the person injured.