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S9 – Leases, Licences, Estoppel

Nature of Leases
lodger
(1) Definition case: important is exclusive possession
Street v Mountford
(2) [label] if agreements satisfies requirement of tenancy,
(Lord Templeman)
tenancy will arise even if parties claim they created
lease
s. 1 LPA 1925 lease is a legal estate in land
statutory definition: term of years, whether or not at a rent,not
s. 205(!)(xxvii)
determinable upon life of cesser
joint periodic tenancy, W left + gave notice to terminate
(1) Contractual periodic tenancy can only renew when
Hammersmith and Fulham v both joint tenants agree
1
Monk (2) [termination] yearly tenancies held by joint tenants =
will of all joint parties is necessary to the continuance
of the interest
[non-proprietary lease] grant of exclusive possession for a
Bruton v London and term amounts to a lease, irrespective of whether grantor had
2 exclusive possession
Quadrant Housing Trust
 Rent not necessary, though usually payable
[after Bruton]
(1) Lease in Bruton is not a proprietary interest, only
3 Kay v Lamberth LBC
enforceable between the parties
(2) Other options: estoppel, relativity of title
[after Bruton] doesn’t infringe ECHR
Kay v UK

4 Leeds City Council v Price

joint secure tenants, local authority re-homes one if serves notice
to quit
5 Sims v Dacorum BC(2014) [termination + HR] local authority re-homing conditional on
end of periodic tenancy doesn’t breach Mr. Sims human rights
 Inherent limitation argument; no independent right
[label not conclusive] label given by parties to agreement
The IDC Group v Clark
matters when distinguishing easements from licences
the basement room, 90 minutes absence, keys at freeholder
[exclusive possession]
Aslan v Murphy (1) 90 mins vacancy doesn’t deny exclusive possession
(2) retention of key  no relevance, if solely for carrying
repairs
right to intrudoce another tenant
Mikeover v Brady
[exclusive possession] prevents exclusive possession
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[exclusive possession - label] courts will look at the true nature
Hajiloucas v Crean
of the agreement, not the label or the document
charity homeless shelter = sham
(1) Sole occupancy of land is not exclusive possession
Westminster CC v Clarke (2) Court must look at nature of posession – if could be
required at any time to change rooms  not exclusive
(3) [landlord’s services] inconsistent with charity’s mission
reservation for adding future tenants in couple’s shack
Antoniades v Villiers [reservation] lease can arise if facts show tenants in fact have
exclusive possession, even if reservation (sham made)
four separate agreements with four separate dates
(1) [substance vs. form] if there wasn’t intention that death
should allow the others to assume all occupation = not
AG Securities v Vaughan
joint
(2) Four unities must be present for joint tenancy, not at
different times
basement room, “licece”, vacate 90 mins, keep key at F
Aslan v Murphy [shams] 90 minutes vacation daily + keeping keys at
freeholder = sham; court looks at the true bargain
two separate, identical agreements for one bedroom flat
(1) for joint tenants, all four unities must be present
Antoniades v Villiers (possession, title, time, interest)
(2) agreements are independent if reality is held to
prevail over the wording of the agreement
Mikeover v Brady [licences]
[rent] rent being payable demonstrates intention to create
Vesely v Levy
legal relations
[rent] payment of rent is not a necessary element of a lease,
Ashburn Anstalt v Arnold
SHOWN IN STATUTE
[Templeman exceptions] no lease will arise if there is no
Burrows v Brent LBC
intention to create legal relations
lodger
[Templeman exceptions] no lease if right to possession is
Street v Mountford
referable to a legal relationship other than a tenancy (like
license)
[equitable lease - contract] if tenant under a contract to grant
a lease goes into possession and pays rent before contract is
Walsh v Lonsdale
completed, he has an equitable lease for term agreed (intead
of legally implied periodical tenancy)
R v Tower Hamlets [equitable lease - contract]

Milmo v Carreras difference between assignment and subleasing =

assignment of legal leases requires deed, whatever the
Crago v Julian
duration of the lease
termination of a headlease terminates any subleases, with the
Barrett v Morgan
exception of ‘surrendered’ headleases
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Qazi v Harrow LBC [termination + HR]

McCann v Birmingham City
[termination + HR]
Council
[repudiatory breach] where there is a breach of a
Hussein v Mehlman fundamental term, courts may hold agreement to be
repudiated and the contract to be at an end
Chartered Trust v Davies [repudiatory breach]
closure of the only access road for 20 months of 10-year lease
NOT frustration
National Carriers v Panalpina
[frustration] if supervening event brings dundamental change
of circumstances, tenancy may be said to be frustrated
Barrett v Morgan [surrender]

Certainty of Term of Leases

6 Ashburn Anstalt v Arnold agreeme

attempted lease until land required
Prudential Assurance v (1) Term must be certain – can’t be partly uncertain bcs
7
London Residuary Body only tenant cannot determine it
(2) Periodic tenacy arises based on possession + rent
occupied from monthh to month, weekly rent; Local Authority
could only terminate if in arrears
8 Berrisford v Mexfield Two step-process:
(a) Common law rule turns this into lease for life
(b) Section 149(6) turns it into 90-year lease determinable
Say v Smith maximum duration of the term must be certain from the outset
tenancy for duration of war, uncertain length
term must be expressed either (a) certainly + specifically or
Lace v Chantler
(b) by refrence to something which can be looked to as certain
at the time when lease takes effect
Adler v Blackman [periodic]
[periodic] rent + entry into possession while negotiating long-
Javad v Aqil term lease  no periodic tenancy, but tenancy at will
 Rent is not the only factor
(1) Periodic tenancy regarded as running for period of the
Hammersmith and Fulham v
term of a single unit
Monk
(2) [ending periodic]
formality rules apply in creation of lease for life through s.
Hardy v Haselden
149(6) of LPA 1925
s. 149(6) route doesn’t turn an uncertain term into a lease for
Southward Housing Co-
life where it was clearly not intended that the tenant should
Operative v Walker (2015)
enjoy the property for life
Distinction Between Licences and Leases
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[exclusive possession] lodger doesn’t have E.P. because
9 Street v Mountfort services are provided (collection of rubbish) and this precludes
exclusive possession
separate but identical agreements = lease
[label] insertion of terms which are purely a sham, signing
10 Antoniades v Villiers
separate agreements (but with 4 unities) doesn’t preclude
licence
Bruton v London and (1) [exclusive possession] there can be E/P even where
11
Quadrant Housing Trust landlord doesn’t have legal estate to suppport a lease
licence definition = passes no interest, but makes an action
Thomas v Sorrell
lawful
[rent] rent review clause to vary amount to be paid doesn’t
Dresden Estates v Collinson
preclude lease, but arbitrary variation suggests licence
[residual rights] right to put pleasure boats on canal is not an
Hill v Tupper
easement, but a licencse
[residual] multiple occupancy agreements are not a joint lease
AG Securities v Vaughan
in absence of four unities, but a licences
(1) [grace period] licensee whose licence has expired can
stay on the prmises for a reasonable time needed to
Winter Garden Theater v
vacate
Millennium Productions
(2) [contractual licence] equity prevents revocation by
licensor if licensee is within terms
[grace period] licensee must leave within a reasonable period
Gibson v Douglas (2016)
(can be minutes)
Robson v Hallett minutes of grace period
leaving ancestral home after 10 years
Parker v Parker
grace period can be two years
James Jones & Sons v Earl of
[licence + interest]
Tankerville
Wood v Leadbitter [contractual licences]
Hounslow LBC v
Twickenham Garden [contractual licences]
Developments
Hurst v Picture Theaters [contractual licences]
Verrall v Great Yarmough
[contractual licences]
BC
[third parties] contractual licensee can sue in trespass too if he
Manchester Airport v Dutton has not yet taken physical possession, but the licence confers a
right to occupation
King v David Allen & Sons [disponees]

Clore v Theatrical Properties [disponees]

[disponees] contractual licence does not create property
Ashburn Anstalt v Arnold
interest
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Lloyd v Dugdale
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contractual licence + notice  doesn’t mean a proprietary
interest is created to bind a 3rd party on this account alone
[new, direct right]

Lloyd v Dugdale [new, direct right]

Chaudhary v Yavuz [new, direct right]

Estoppel
(1) [core example]
(2) Principle of preventing unconscionability permeates all
12 Gillett v Holt elements of PE
(3) Elements intertwined by principle of unconscionability

(1) proprietary estoppel protects reliance by informally

Ramsden v Dyson creating rights relating to land
(2) passive ascquiescence can be “assurance”
Orgie v Orgie [remedy]

Jennings v Rice [remedy] remedy tailored to remove the unconscionability

Crabb v Arun DC can operate as a sword  gives right to a cause of action

(1) wide jurisdiction to interfere to prevent assertio of strict
Taylors Fashions v Liverpool
legal rights that are unconscionable
Victoria Trustees
(2) requirement of unconscionable conduct
[assurance]
(1) Passive acquiescence can be reliance
(2) Active assurance = the meaning conveyed by
Thorner v Major*
representations must reasonablye be undertstood as
intended to be relied on
(3) Representation must be clear enough, within context
Wayling v Jones [clear enough]

Gillett v Holt [clear enough]

Cobbe v Yeoman’s Row [clear enough]

Hoyl Group v Cromer Town
[clear enough]
Council
Burton v Linden (2016 [clear enough]
(1) [co-trustees] only the interests of those who
acquiesce/make representations are bound by the
Preedy v Dunne estoppel
(2) If trustee who is also beneficiary makes representation,
estoppel may arise over his beneficial interest
Greasley v Cooke [reliance]
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Wayling v Jones [reliance]

[detriment]
(1) detriment judged at the moment when the person who
Gillett v Holt has given assurance seeks to go back on it
(2) detriment needs to be substantial, but need not be
financial; it’s a broad inquiry of conscionabiity
(1) [detriment]
(2) [equity] if compensation is given for detriment, and
detriment is the basis, that removes the foundation of
Davies v Davies (2016)* the claim
(3) [equity] the clearer the expectation, greater detriment,
longer passage of time with expectation = greater
weight given to expectation
(1) [detriment]
Crabb v Arun
(2) Court must find minimum inchoate equity
(1) [detriment]
Southwell v Blackburn (2) Assurance + reliance + detriment are not of themselves
sufficient; there must be unsconscionability
(1) [countervailing benefits]
Sledmore v Dalby
(2) [equity] no base equity
Henry v Henry [countervailing benefits]
[formality] where constructive trust exists on the same facts,
13 Yaxley v Gotts
agreement is excempt from formality requirements
(1) [detriment]
(2) [equity] value of equity depends upon circumstances;
includingrequirement that there must be proportionality
14 Jennings v Rice between expectation and detriment
(3) [equity] mutual understanding in reasonably clear
terms = expectations to be satisfied, unless
disproportionate to detriment
Suggitt v Suggitt [equity - agreements]

Powell v Benney [equity - agreements]

15 Lloyds v Dugdale
(1) unsconscionability alone will not found an estoppel
claim
16 Cobbe v Yeoman’s Row* (2) unconscionability is an objective value judgment of
behaviour, both part of other elements and separate
(3) [formality]
[formality] despite Cobbe, estoppel in a case involving sale of
Whittaker v Kinnear land has survived enactment of s. 2 of 1989 Act (signed
writing)
Ghazaani v Rowshan (2015) [formality]
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(1) [assurance] if parties intended to make formal contract
= no estoppel because assurance not intended to be
Muhammad v ARY relied on
Properties (2016) (2) [formality] agreement excempt from formality
requirements because claim based on equities arising
from conduct, not agreement
Birmingham Midshires
[overreaching] in a family situation, trust and equitable
Mortgage Services v
estoppel are almost interchangeable, so both overreached
Sabherwal
(1) Three elements:
(a) Representation/assruance
17 Thorner v Major
(b) Reliance
(c) Detriment after reasonable reliance
Hoyl Group v Cromer Town
Council
18 Herbert v Doyle

19 Binions v Evans

20 Ashburn Anstalt v Arnold

[policy concerns] flexible though the doctrine is, it must be
21 Cobbe v Yeoman’s Row formulated and applied in a disciplined and principled way
for the sake of certainty
[compared to constructive trust] developed differently, but rest
22 Grant v Edwards
on same foundation and reach same conclusions
23 Stack v Dowden [compared to constructive trust]