The Phenomenal World of the Sleeping Brain: Merging Predictive Processing and

Integrated Information Theory

TSC 2015, Helsinki University
Alessio Bucci (Independent)
Matteo Grasso (Roma Tre University)

Abstract:

Predictive Processing (PP) is an emerging theoretical framework in cognitive science which aims to unify
perception, action and cognition under a single mechanism (Clark 2013, in press; Hohwy 2013). The core
idea is that brains are predictive machines with a hierarchical structure, continuously in the business of
predicting their own sensory inputs. This is achieved through Bayesian statistical inferences based on a
generative model of the causal structure of the world. One form of PP has been recently applied to the study
of dreaming (Hobson & Friston 2012, Hobson, Hong & Friston 2014). This application highlights the
continuity and the differences of dreaming with other waking mental states, grounding them on the very
same cognitive architecture. However, many doubts still remain with regard to the phenomenal aspects of
dreaming and how we come to experience anything in the first place (the “hard problem” of consciousness).
It is critical to explain dream consciousness in particular because (1) we have no precise mapping of the
phenomenal aspects of dreaming onto the neural activity of the sleeping brain and (2) sleep mentation seems
to lack a solid evolutionary explanation.
In order to address these problems we propose to integrate PP with a leading theory of consciousness:
Integrated Information Theory (IIT), as proposed by Tononi (2012) and Oizumi, Albantakis & Tononi
(2014). IIT proposes an explicit account of phenomenal consciousness, defined as integrated information.
According to IIT the quantity of consciousness of a system is equal to the amount of integrated information
(ΦMAX) generated by its elements, while the quality of experience is defined in relation to maximally
irreducible conceptual structures (MICS), i.e. constellation of concepts in the “qualia space”. Phenomenal
consciousness is hence defined on the basis of the informational relationships generated by the system's
repertoire of internal states, which characterizes conscious experience in both the waking and dreaming state.
After the introduction of PP, IIT and the specific issues surrounding dreaming, we procede to explain how PP
and IIT can be merged in order to explain the cognitive mechanism behind the emergence of dream
phenomenology. We highlight the conceptual similarity in the two theories' vocabularies and argue that, if
IIT proves to be efficient in explaining the phenomenal aspect of dreaming, then PP could be integrated with
it for a more comprehensive explanation of cognition. We then move on to illustrate a few critical points in
this merging operation. In conclusion, we speculate that if dreaming consciousness is a positive case study
for the integration of PP and IIT, it can also be a springboard for a more general merging of the theories, in
which IIT is complementary to PP in explaining consciousness as well as cognition.

References:

- Clark, A. (2013). Whatever next? Predictive brains, situated agents, and the future of cognitive science.
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 36(03), 181-204.
- Clark, A. (in press). Surfing Uncertainty: Prediction, Action, and the Embodied Mind. Oxford University
Press.
- Hobson, A., & Friston, K. (2012). Waking and dreaming consciousness: Neurobiological and functional
considerations. Progress in neurobiology, 98(1), 82-98.
- Hobson, A., Hong, C. C. H., & Friston, K. (2014). Virtual reality in waking and dreaming consciousness.
Cognitive Science, 5, 1133.
- Hohwy, J. (2013). The predictive mind. Oxford University Press.
- Oizumi, M., Albantakis, L., & Tononi, G. (2014). From the Phenomenology to the Mechanisms of
Consciousness: Integrated Information Theory 3.0. PLoS computational biology, 10(5), e1003588.
- Tononi, G. (2012). Integrated information theory of consciousness: an updated account. Archives italiennes
de biologie, 150(2-3), 56-90.