detainees have not yet been given a
GARCILLA PADILLA VS. PONCE ENRILE
G.R. No. L-61388
FACTS:
Nine (9) of the fourteen (14) detainees herein
were arrested when three (3) teams of the PC/INP
of conducted a raid at the residence of Dra.
Aurora Parong who were having a conference. 4
other detainess were arested the next day
The (14) detainees were all detained at the
PC/INP Command Headquarters, Bayombong,
Nueva Viscaya until their transfer to an
undisclosed places.
Petition for the writ of habeas corpus and
mandamus filed by Josefina Garcia-Padilla,
mother of detained petitioner Sabino G. Padilla,
Jr.
The mandamus aspect of the instant petition has,
however, become moot and academic, the
whereabouts of petitioners having already
become known to petitioner Josefina Garcia-
Padilla.
Petitioner: “arrest of petitioners was patently
unlawful and illegal since it was effected without
any warrant of arrest; that the PC/INP raiding
team which made the arrest were only armed
with a search warrant
Nowhere in said warrant was authority
given to make arrests, much less
detention; that the search warrant which
authorized respondents to seize
"subversive documents, firearms of
assorted calibers, medicine and other
subversive paraphernalia" in the house
and clinic of Dra. Aurora Parong was a
roving and general warrant and is,
therefore, illegal per se because it does
not state specifically the things that are to
be seized
No criminal charges have as of yet been
filed against any of the detainees; there is
no judgment, decree, decision or order
from a court of law which would validate
the continued detention of the petitioner;
that while it is true that a purported
telegram stating the issuance of a
Presidential Commitment Order (PCO)
was shown to the detainees on or about
July 11 and 12, 1982, but counsel and the
copy of such PCO, nor notified of its
contents, raising a doubt whether such
commitment order has in fact been
issued.
Respondents are denying the detainees
their constitutional right to counsel,
averring that the detainees were allowed
regular visits by counsel and relatives
during their period of detention
ISSUES:
1. WON petitioners' detention is legal
2. WON the issuance of a Presidential
Commitment Order (PCO) has provided
the legal basis of the detention of herein
detainees following their arrest for
Proclamation No. 2045 covered offenses
RULING:
1. YES. The petitioner’s detention is legal.
Prior thereto to the arrest, the detainees were
identified as members of the Communist Party of
the Philippines (CCP) engaging in subversive
activities and using the house of detainee Dra.
Aurora Parong in Bayombong, Nueva Viscaya, as
their headquarters.
Caught in flagrante delicto, the nine (9) detainees
mentioned scampered towards different
directions leaving on top of their conference table
numerous subversive documents, periodicals,
pamphlets, books, correspondence, stationaries,
and other papers, including a plan on how they
would infiltrate the youth and student sector
(code-named YORK).
Also found were one (1) .38 cal. revolver with eight
(8) live bullets, nineteen (19) rounds of ammunition
for M16 armalite, eighteen thousand six hundred
fifty pesos (P18,650.00) cash believed to be
CPP/NPA funds, assorted medicine packed and
ready for distribution, and sizeable quantity of
printing paraphernalia, which were then seized.
There is no doubt that circumstances attendant in
the arrest of the herein detainees fall under a
situation where arrest is lawful even without a
judicial warrant as specifically provided for under
Section 6(a), Rules 113 of the Rules of Court and
allowed under existing jurisprudence on the
matter. As provided therein, a peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person when the person to be arrested has
committed or actually committing, or is about to
commit an offense in his presence.
The arrest of persons involved in the rebellion
whether as its fighting armed elements, or for
committing non-violent acts but in furtherance of
the rebellion, is more an act of capturing them in
the course of an armed conflict, to quell the
rebellion, than for the purpose of immediately
prosecuting them in court for a statutory offense.
The arrest, therefore, need not follow the usual
procedure in the prosecution of offenses which
requires the determination by a judge of the
existence of probable cause before the issuance
of a judicial warrant of arrest and the granting of
bail if the offense is bailable. Obviously, the
absence of a judicial warrant is no legal
impediment to arresting or capturing persons
committing overt acts of violence against arrest
and detention of persons ordered by the President
through the issuance of Presidential Commitment
Order (PCO) is merely preventive. Obviously, the
absence of a judicial warrant is no legal
impediment to arresting or capturing persons
committing overt acts of violence against
government forces, or any other milder acts but
equally in pursuance of the rebellious movement.
2. There is no answer because this is a
political Question.
What has been said above shows the need of
reexamining the Lansang case with a view to
reverting to the ruling of Barcelon vs. Baker
decision and Montenegro vs. Castaneda, that the
President's decision to suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus is "final and conclusive upon
the courts, and all other persons." This well-settled
ruling was diluted in the Lansang case which
declared that the "function of the Court is merely
to check — not to supplant — the Executive, or
ascertain merely whether he has gone beyond
the constitutional limits of his jurisdiction not to
exercise the power vested in him or to determine
the wisdom of his act." Judicial interference was
thus held as permissible, and the test as laid down
therein is not whether the President acted
correctly but whether he acted arbitrarily.
Under LOI 1211, a Presidential Commitment Order,
the issuance of which is the exclusive prerogative
of the President under the Constitution, may not
be declared void by the courts, under the
doctrine of "political question," as has been
applied in the Baker and Castañeda cases, on
any ground, let alone its supposed violation of the
provision of LOI 1211, thus diluting, if not
abandoning, the doctrine of the Lansang case.
The supreme mandate received by the President
from the people and his oath to do justice to every
man should be sufficient guarantee, without need
of judicial overseeing, against commission by him
of an act of arbitrariness in the discharge
particularly of those duties imposed upon him for
the protection of public safety which in itself
includes the protection of life, liberty and
property. This Court is not possessed with the
attribute of infallibility that when it reviews the acts
of the President in the exercise of his exclusive
power, for possible fault of arbitrariness, it would
not itself go so far as to commit the self-same fault.
In sum, the SC decision in the Lansang Case was
reversed and the ruling in the Barcelon Case &
the Montenegro Case was again reinstated. The
questioned power of the president to suspend the
privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus was once
again held as discretionary in the president. The
SC again reiterated that the suspension of the writ
was a political question to be resolved solely by
the president. It was also noted that the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus must, indeed, carry with it the suspension
of the right to bail, if the government’s campaign
to suppress the rebellion is to be enhanced and
rendered effective. If the right to bail may be
demanded during the continuance of the
rebellion, and those arrested, captured and
detained in the course thereof will be released,
they would, without the least doubt, rejoin their
comrades in the field thereby jeopardizing the
success of government efforts to bring to an end
the invasion, rebellion or insurrection.
(However, in present, this ruling was already
abandoned pursuant to Sec 18, Art 7 of the 1987
Constitution which expressly constitutionalized
the Lansang Doctrine:
SC declared that it had the power to
inquire into the factual basis of the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus by Marcos in Aug 1971
and to annul the same if no legal ground
could be established.
Also, under Art 3 (Sec 13) of the Constitution it is
stated that “the right to bail shall not be impaired
even if the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended.”)