J. Politic. Soci. Sci. Vol.

, 1 (1), 6-10, 2014

Journal of Political & Social Sciences. Vol., 1 (1), 5-10, 2014

Available online at http://www.jpssjournal.com
ISSN 2148-5127 ©2014

The Role of Abulfaz Elchibey and Heydar Aliyev in

Karabakh Crisis: A Decision Model
Hassan Haghighian1, Akbar Mehdizadeh2*
1
Department of Political Sciences, East Azarbaijan Science and Research Branch, Islamic Azad University, Tabriz, Iran
2
Department of Political Sciences, Tabriz Branch, Islamic Azad University, Tabriz, Iran
*
Corresponding Author Email: Hg_hagigian@yahoo.com

ABSTRACT: One of the most intricate conflicts in South Caucasus that is still ongoing after 25 years is the Karabakh
conflict between Armenians and Azerbaijanis, which has affected the lives of the people of the region. In this paper, we
examine the role the decisions of presidents of Azerbaijan played in aggravating this conflict. The focus is on the
ethnocentric policy of Abulfaz Elchibey and Heydar Aliyev's attempt to create balance of power. The main hypothesis
is that the ethnocentric policy of Elchibey deprived Azerbaijan of Iran's financial and moral support, and Turkey, which
Elchibey had pinned all his hopes on, refused to help Azerbaijan due to political considerations. Finally, the balance of
power initiative of Aliyev resulted in nothing but occupation of Karabakh, although it significantly improved the
turbulent political, social, and economic conditions of Azerbaijan.

Keywords: Abulfaz Elchibey, Heydar Aliyev, Karabakh crisis.

INTRODUCTION

Although the Karabakh conflict was the product of the policies of the Soviet Union, the decisions and foreign
policies of the presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia has kept the conflict alive. People of both nations have suffered
from the war, with a portion of them being displaced, and both countries have failed to achieve economic development
and political stability. Over the last 25 years, the media have quoted hateful speeches from the presidents of these
countries. Moreover, any change in the political status of Karabakh requires a change in the constitution of these
countries, especially that of Azerbaijan. This article provides a brief introduction to Abulfaz Elchibey and Heydar
Aliyev, lists their most important actions and policies, and examines their role in the continuing conflict between
Armenia and Azerbaijan based on the decision-making model.

Analysis of Leadership Behavior in the Karabakh Conflict: The Communist Era

During the leadership of the communist party in the Soviet Union, Moscow's policy toward the Karabakh conflict
can be interpreted as an attempt to maintain a fragile balance. The central government adopted an unbalanced
reformation policy toward the parties involved and provoked them against each other, which was, in fact, a strategy to
protect its own interests and sovereignty over these republics. The attempts to bring the leaders of Azerbaijan and
Armenia together and come to a peaceful resolution to the conflict were in vain, and no agreements were reached about
withdrawal of Armenian paramilitaries from Karabakh or withdrawal of central forces from the region. For instance,
equivocal comments of Gorbachev who believed that seriously mediating in the conflict meant distancing one of the
parties from himself and his predisposition not to upset the Armenian residents of Moscow was intolerable for
Azerbaijanis. On the other hand, Gorbachev knew that taking harsh measures against Azerbaijan would lead to new
oppositions and possible reactions inside and outside the country (Amirahmadian, 1994).
Interestingly, the presidents of these republics agreed on the dereliction of the central government. On the one
hand, leaders of Armenia held the central government responsible for the Karabakh conflict and considered Moscow's
invitation to negotiations as a political gambit. They especially regarded the presence of Soviet troops in Karabakh as a
sign of dishonesty. On the other hand, Azerbaijanis considered the hesitations of the central government to be a
deliberate plan. They believed that appointing Armenians in key government positions had caused these hesitations. In
addition, they thought that KGB was trying to impose the solution favoring the Armenians. As a result, the Republic of
Azerbaijan, which at first relied on the central government to resolve the Karabakh conflict, turned toward chauvinism

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(Najafzadeh, 1996). The leaders of Azerbaijan and Armenia believed that the central government is merely pursuing its
pervious ideas, and that the new political system with the promises of fair treatment of governments and political
decentralization were nothing but words. On the other hand, Armenians knew that Article 72 of the Soviet Constitution
(that each Union Republic “shall retain the right freely to secede from the USSR”) was symbolic and that the
composition of the congress was not in line with the interests of the Republics. It was also clear for Azerbaijanis,
Armenians, and others that the authorities of the Supreme Soviet and especially its board of directors granted in
accordance with Article 119 of the constitution was extraordinary and could lead to possible violent replacement of
central authority. A number of Soviet leaders believed that the entire system is built on the right to decide one's own
destiny. However, this right should have been understood in its true sense, not just to facilitate meaningless secessions
(Mohsenyan & Abediyan, 1994).
Therefore, under the authority of the communist government, the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan realized that
serious liberation and independence movements would be met with strong and adverse reactions from the central
government. On the other hand, the central government knew that it must choose moderation and give the Republics
some privileges.

Karabakh Conflict after the Dissolution of the Soviet Union

At the height of the conflicts in May 1992, the cities of Shusha and Lachin were occupied by Armenian forces.
These conflicts turned into a full-scale war when Abulfaz Elchibey was elected as the third president of Azerbaijan.
During his office, parts of Kalbajar and Aghdara were occupied by Armenian forces. During the presidency of Heydar
Aliyev as the fourth president of Azerbaijan, Armenian forces not only captured Karabakh, but also invaded and
occupied Agdam, Fizuli, Jabrail and Zangilan in southern Azerbaijan (Kazemi, 1987).
Finally in May 12, 1994, while one fifth of Azerbaijan was occupied by Armenian forces, the parties agreed to
cease hostilities. Since then many attempts have been made to establish permanent peace, but none of them have been
able to resolve the conflict. Since 1994, several negotiations have been held between Azerbaijani and Armenian
officials. In addition, over these years initiatives have been proposed to bring peace in the region by different countries
and organizations, including OSCE Minsk Group, the US, France, and Iran. In this paper, we try to examine this
conflict using decision and systemic models.

Applying the Decision Model to the Karabakh Conflict

An important issue in using a decision model is to examine the quality of the decisions and solutions made in
managing the conflict. Also the behavior of people and groups involved in decision-making and conflict management is
of interest. The behavior of the decision-making team is influenced by their interpretation of and reaction to the conflict
(Ettela'at Newspaper, 1998).
In October 1998, in a surprising announcement, Armen Darbinyan said to Los Angeles Times that his country is
ready not to consider Karabakh as a part of Armenia in order to break the diplomatic impasse with neighboring
Azerbaijan (Sajadpour, 1994). These comments were made a few days before the presidential election in Azerbaijan,
and apparently Armenia planned to encourage Azerbaijanis to vote for candidates other than Aliyev. However, Aliyev
won the election.
In the Book, “Armenia and Karabagh: The Struggle for Unity” by Christopher J. Walker, the historical roots and
political developments of this conflict are provided with a partial orientation toward Armenians. This book clearly
demonstrates how Armenian identity is intricately linked to history and geography. The anti-Azerbaijani sentiment in
Armenia which is deeply rooted in the Armenian Genocide of 1915 and the unresolved conflict over Nagorno-
Karabakh. Interestingly, Armenians living in foreign countries are more sentimental toward the issue of Karabakh than
those living in Armenia (Walker, 1991).
The atavistic mentality of Armenians is rooted in the 1915 Genocide by Ottoman soldiers, the 1988 earthquake and
its destructive psychological impacts, the wish to revive the Kingdom of Armenia, formation of a strong network of
Armenian immigrants in Western countries and Russia, rise of radical and left-wing groups among Armenian elites, and
formation of extremist parties such as Armenian Revolutionary Federation (also known as Dashnaktsutyun). This
mentality led to a powerful psychosocial urge to occupy or, according to Armenians, liberate Karabakh during the
period 1992-1994 (Furman & Asenius, 1996).
Another factor was nationalism, which took different forms in each of these countries. Armenian nationalism had a
painful and sick nature. A strong national myth emerged under the disguise of internationalism. Over time, the issue of
Karabakh became the core of Armenian mentality, with capturing Karabakh being the symbol of avenging past
tragedies. A similar mentality was prevalent in Azerbaijan. However, due to lower ethnic consciousness, development,
lower education levels, and fewer intellectual elites in Azerbaijan compared to Armenia, Azerbaijani nationalism
developed more slowly than Armenian nationalism. Nonetheless, Azerbaijani nationalism grew stronger as the number
and power of intellectual elites increased. During this period, the autonomous region of Karabakh was under increasing
pressure from Azerbaijanis (Amirahmadian, 1999).
Another important issue is that since 1992, the Nagorno-Karabakh War influenced the policies of Azerbaijan. Win
or loss in the frontline determined the destiny of the political leaders. After the massacre of Azerbaijanis in Khojaly,

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Baku was drowned in the waves of turmoil. Ayaz Mutallibov was forced to leave power in the following month. In
May, after the fall of the strongholds of Azerbaijani resistance in Karabakh, the Popular Front of Azerbaijan Party
(PFAP) took control of the Parliament of Azerbaijan and Azerbaijani State Radio and Television and elected Isa
Gambar as the new chairman of the National Assembly of Azerbaijan. Presidential elections were held in June, and
Abulfaz Elchibey was elected as the president. The early successes of Azerbaijan in the war were transient. As the
military situation of Azerbaijan deteriorate, Elchibey was increasingly becoming weaker and accused of incompetence
and corruption. At the height of war with Armenia, Azerbaijan was involved in a power struggle within the country. In
June 1993, Elchibey ordered an attack on Gyanja. Surat Huseynov, a renegade colonel, assumed control of the town and
overthrew Elchibey. Elchibey fled to Nakhichevan, the parliament transferred power to Aliyev, and Aliyev appointed
Huseynov as Prime Minister (Maleki, 2002).
Since the 1994 ceasefire between Azerbaijani and Armenian forces, thousands of soldiers at both sides of the line
of control have been performing military exercises against the other country. Although Armenia believes that
Azerbaijan is against the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic in this conflict, it is evident that war and negotiations is and have
been between Baku and Yerevan and no other country, even Armenia, is ready to recognize the Nagorno-Karabakh
Republic (Maleki, 2002). Over the years the presidents of these countries have entered direct negotiations with each
other (Amirahmadian, 1999). In May 1997, given the economic and political conflicts in Armenia, Heydar Aliyev tried
to resume relations with Armenia through a cooperation offer. In this proposal, Aliyev agreed to let Azerbaijan's gas
pipeline to cross Armenia. Ter-Petrossian expressed his interest in this cooperation and believed that it would benefit
both countries, but he also emphasized that this offer would be examined independent of the Karabakh issue.
Previously, the US had proposed the crossing of Azerbaijan's gas pipeline through Armenia and improvement of
relationships between Ankara, Baku, and Yerevan (Maleki, 2002).
Another instance of negotiations is the Key West Peace Talks in Florida. From the 3rd to 7th of April 2001,
President Robert Kocharian and President Heydar Aliyev entered direct dialogue under the auspices of representatives
from the OSCE Minsk Group. With the efforts of Jacques Chirac, the two presidents had met twice in Paris. Key West
Peace Talks did not result in a definitive outcome or a contract that both parties would observe, but apparently
Azerbaijan and Armenia reached an agreement about a set future agenda. Another progress was the agreement about the
schedule and priority of actions. Affairs Minister Vardan Askanian stated in an interview that the parties had never been
this close to a settlement of the conflict. Kocharian and Aliyev agreed to follow the negotiations in June 15th, 2001 in
Geneva under the auspices of the Minsk Group. The interval between these talks suggests that both parties were
prepared to continue the negotiations. Both countries sought to take all possible measures to steer the negotiations to
their own advantage. American officials were planning to have Kocharian and Aliyev sign a peace treaties during the
G8 leaders' summit in Italy in June 2001, witnessed by the co-chairmen of the Minsk Group (Maleki, 2002).
Overall, several negotiations have been arranged between the president of Armenia and Azerbaijan, but none have
led to tangible outcomes. There has been little common ground between the leaders of these countries and thus it is
difficult to reach a common solution to the conflicts. The importance of Key West Peace Talks lies in the new proposals
and the new status of South Caucasus. Mediators seek to prepare a comprehensive peace offer that would address both
the problems and the needs of the two parties. Apparently, the US President had separate meetings with Aliyev and
Kocharian, reminding them that if conflicts are settled, the US can provide massive economic assistance for
reconstruction of these countries. In the next section, we will discuss the psychological attributes and the performance
of the leaders of these republics.

Abulfaz Elchibey
Abulfaz Elchibey (24 June 1938, Nakhchivan-22 August 2000, Ankara) was an Azerbaijani politician, a Soviet
dissident, and the 2nd president of Azerbaijan. He was the first non-communist president of Azerbaijan who was
democratically elected in June 16, 1992. He was overthrown in a coup d'état in June 1993. Elchibey was the leader of
Azerbaijan Popular Front. He was preceded by Ayaz Mutallibov and succeeded by Heydar Aliyev, who came to power
in the coup d'état led by Surat Huseynov.
Elchibey was born on June 14, 1938, in the town of Keleki in the enclave of Nakhichevan. His father was from
Iranian Azerbaijan and his mother was from Anatolia. His father went missing in action in WWII. He entered the
Oriental Studies Faculty of Baku State University in 1957. In 1962-1963, he worked as a translator in Baku department
of USSR's Hydro-project Institute and in Egypt. He began his political activity in 1971 and was arrested for conducting
“nationalist and anti-Soviet propagation activities”.
In June 16, 1989, Elchibey established Azerbaijan Popular Front, and was selected as its leader. This organization
attracted a number of well-known intellectuals and young scientists. Its purpose was to lead social resistance and to
organize volunteers into defense brigades. Azerbaijan Popular Front also used every means to reveal Armenia's invasive
policies and Moscow's anti-Azerbaijani policies. In 1992-1993 he served as the president of the Azerbaijan Republic.
During this brief period, Elchibey's presidency was marked with incompetence, including his failure to resolve the
conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia over the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh, and his failure to regain other
territory lost to the Armenians in the process. He died from cancer in 2000.

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Heydar Aliyev
Heydar Aliyev was born in May 10 1923 in Nakhchivan City. Since 1967, he worked as the chairman of the Committee
of State Security in the Cabinet of Ministers of Azerbaijan Republic. The presence of a Muslim at the highest security
ranks was unprecedented. After 14 years of leading Azerbaijan, he briefly became the deputy chairman of Soviet KGB
under Yuri Andropov. Aliyev's luck ran out with the death of Andropov, and with the election of Mikhail Gorbachev as
General Secretary in October 1985 he was forced to resign.
Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Aliyev stayed in Nakhichevan for two years until Elchibey was
overthrown and he was elected the President of Azerbaijan. The stars favored Aliyev after the suppression and murder
of military figures who tried to overthrow him, including Rovshan Javadov, Surat Huseynov, and Aliakram Humbatov.
He gradually distanced himself from Iran and tried to win the trust of Western countries. In October 11, 1998, he was
reelected the president and continued his political activity until his death, but he did not benefit from his policies for
liberation of Karabakh.

Psychological Characteristics and Performance of Azerbaijani Leaders

During the Nagorno-Karabakh War, a power struggle was afoot between the remnants of the Communist Era led
by Ayaz Mutallibov and their opposition led by Abulfaz Elchibey. In the course of capturing the capital of Karabakh,
that is, Khankendi or Stepanakert, Elchibey ordered his young soldiers to return to Baku. He thought that the actual
frontline is Baku and through this strategy he managed to overthrow Mutallibov and assume power (Amirahmadian,
1994).
Another important decision that exacerbated the Karabakh conflict was made in 1991. In this year, as the Nagorno-
Karabakh Autonomous Oblast decided to join Armenia, the Republic of Azerbaijan sanctioned the region and blocked
all transportation, fuel, and emergency paths to the region. This decision put the people of Karabakh under pressure,
and infuriated Armenians (Mohsenyan & Abediyan, 1994).
Aliyev, who was an experienced and shrewd politician, realized that one of the reasons for the overthrow of
Elchibey was tensions in the country caused by the war. As a result, although during his presidency the Republic of
Azerbaijan lost a major portion of its land, he skillfully reconstructed his army and used every leverage to reduce
tensions within the country and to strike a political balance between the countries of the Commonwealth realm, the
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, and Moscow (Maleki, 1998). Aliyev used the schemes he had
learned as the General Secretary of the Communist Party and the Deputy Chairman of KGB to divert attentions from
the realities of war. In response to the political, economic, and social difficulties he faced, he attempted to involve
Western countries in the Caucasus and the Caspian Sea conflicts. Aliyev was could justify any peace treatise or failure
to the people of his country (Maleki, 2002).
Although at some points during peace talks Aliyev made fiery speeches about liberation of their motherland,
Azerbaijan was no match to the Armenian militia. In addition, the Azerbaijani government were more inclined toward
immediate benefits such as earning a percentage of oil contracts, buying lands in Europe, or assigning their
acquaintances to key positions. Azerbaijani society is also not willing to mobilize and retrieve their lost land. Aliyev's
disease and his temporary absences from the political scene since 1999 prevented him from taking firm and decisive
measures. This led to oppositions against him within Azerbaijan, including resignation of Tofig Zulfugarov, the
Minister of Foreign Affairs, as a protest to Aliyev's policies (Ettela'at Newspaper, 1999).

CONCLUSION

Abulfaz Elchibey was an independence activist in the Soviet era, but after the collapse of the Eastern Bloc, he
followed his dreams during the years of communist rule and made unification of Azerbaijan his first priority. Even the
liberation of Karabakh was secondary to his ethnocentric dream. Naturally, this policy increased tensions between
Tehran and Baku, and even Turkey did not support Azerbaijan due to political considerations.
In an interview with the Azerbaijani axar.az, Qabil Huseynli, the Azerbaijani politician, argued that during the
occupation of Kalbajar, Turkey refused to help Azerbaijan merely to please the Russians. At this time, Azerbaijani
armed forces retreated from some key positions, and Russian commandos were involved in the occupation of Kalbajar.
For instance, Abulfaz Elchibey asked Süleyman Demirel, the President of Turkey, for two helicopters to evacuate
civilians from the occupied region. Demirel responded that even giving a single bullet will infuriate the Russians and
seriously damage their relationship.
These factors may have been the main reasons for ineffectiveness of Elchibey's Karabakh policy. Elchibey was
overthrown, delivering his successor, Heydar Aliyev, a politically, economically, and socially turbulent society. Aliyev
improved his relations with Iran and strengthened Azerbaijan's ties with Western countries, thus overcoming some of
the socioeconomic challenges. However, he ignored the potential capabilities of his people and thought that liberation
of Karabakh lies in his diplomacy with the West and international organizations.
Azerbaijani officials, especially Aliyev, sought to close oil contracts with the Big Oil, which not only would
provide them with financial resources, but would also allow them to use these contracts as leverage in international
lobbying. Moreover, Aliyev hoped that the US, Israel, and Turkey would help him out of the Karabakh predicament,

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not realizing that the stronger lobbying of Armenians with Western countries in spite of their invasion of Azerbaijan
prevented any financial support from the US. Section 907 of the United States Freedom Support Act banned any kind of
direct aid to the Azerbaijani government until the President determines that the Government of Azerbaijan is taking
palpable steps to cease all blockades and other offensive uses of force against Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh. There
is also a significant difference between Russia's military support of Armenia and the West's support of Azerbaijan.
Russia has built forces in Armenia along its borders with Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Iran, while Azerbaijan only possesses
a newborn army.
At present, Azerbaijanis have agreed to the autonomy of Karabakh within the bounds of Azerbaijan’s legal system,
but their requirement is unconditional evacuation of Armenian military forces from the occupied land. Armenia does
not agree with this proposal and requires guarantees from Azerbaijan that are approved by the Armenians of Karabakh
and international bodies (Maleki, 2002).
Like Azerbaijan, Armenia is living in a global economic isolation. Armenian officials tried to resolve this problem
by developing their relations with Russia and Iran and reinforcing their ties with Western countries, especially with the
US. The conflicting conditions of Armenia and Azerbaijan for the settlement of the Karabakh conflict have hindered the
progress of negotiations.

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