CANON 10
the reconstitution of this case and this tribunal the trouble of deciding
Director of Lands v. Adorable
SYLLABUS
1. ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW; STANDARDS OF TRUTHFULNESS, FAIR PLAY
AND NOBILITY; CASE AT BAR, AN EXAMPLE TO BE REMEMBERED.
— In this case the attorney for the claimants and appellees, acting
under the highest standards of truthfulness, fair play and nobility
as becomes a deserving member of the bar, instead of taking
advantage of claimant and appellant’s ignorance of what really
happened in the Court of Appeals, informed this court that the
case had been decided in favor of said claimant and appellant by
the Court of Appeals, filing to said effect the copy of the decision
promulgated on September 9, 1942, sent to him by said court, to
save the appellant the trouble of waiting for the reconstitution of
this case and this tribunal the trouble of deciding again a case
already decided. This is an example worth remembering by all
members of the bar.
At the reconstitution of the above-entitled case, claimant-appellant
presented copies of several papers, exhibits, pleadings, motions and
orders, including copy of the decision of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo,
record on appeal, and the time the printed brief of said claimant-appellant
who, at the time he filed his motion for reconstitution on February 26,
1946, was under the impression that the case, which was pending decision
in the Court of Appeals when the war broke out, remained unacted upon
by said court until the motion for reconstitution was filed.
On June 25, 1946, Attorney Manuel F. Zamora, for the claimants and
appellees, acting under the highest standards of truthfulness, fair play and
nobility as becomes a deserving member of the bar, instead of taking
advantage of claimant-appellant’s ignorance of what really happened in
the Court of Appeals, informed this court that the case had been decided
in favor of said claimant and appellant by the Court of Appeals, filing to
said effect the copy of the decision promulgated on September 9, 1942,
sent to him by said court, to save the appellant the trouble of waiting for
again a case already decided.
Upon being informed of the statements of Attorney Zamora, claimant
appellant’s attorneys filed a petition with the commissioner for
reconstitution to make a report to this Court that the records be declared
reconstituted, together with the decision of the Court of Appeals dated
September 9, 1942, and that said records be remanded to the lower court
for execution of the decision.
The court resolved to declare that the case is reconstituted and to order
that copy of the decision of the Court of Appeals, promulgated on
September 9, 1942, be sent to the lower court for execution. This
resolution is being adopted not without making of record that the action
taken by Attorney Manuel F Zamora should be considered as an example
worthy to be remembered by all members of the bar.
Facts:
Adorable files a land claim before the Director of Lands. The case
went to the CA for appeal. However, the war broke out. After the war,
Adorable files a reconstitution case before the SC believing that the case
was not resolved by the CA. Atty. Zamora, counsel of the appellee of the
case informed the Court that the case was already settled by the CA in
favor of Adorable.
Issue:
WON the conduct of Atty. Zamora is proper.
Held:
Yes. The conduct of Atty. Zamora is proper.
The Court in this case praised Atty. Zamora’s conduct as the
highest standard of truthfulness, fair play and nobility as becomes of the
deserving member of the bar.
 Hence, the act of Atty. Zamora is proper.
FACTS:
At the reconstitution of the above-entitled case, claimant-appellant Miguel
Peñaranda presented copies of several papers, exhibits, pleadings, motions
and orders, including copy of the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Iloilo, record on appeal, and the printed brief of Peñaranda who, at the
time he filed his motion for reconstitution on February 26, 1946, was
under the impression that the case, which was pending decision in the
Court of Appeals when the war broke out, remained unacted upon by said
court until the motion for reconstitution was filed.
On June 25, 1946, Attorney Manuel F. Zamora, for the claimants and
appellees, acting under the highest standards of truthfulness, fair play and
nobility as becomes a deserving member of the bar, instead of taking
advantage of Peñaranda's ignorance of what really happened in the Court
of Appeals, informed the court that the case had been decided in favor of
said claimant and appellant by the Court of Appeals, filing to said effect the
copy of the decision promulgated on September 9, 1942, sent to him by
said court, to save Peñaranda the trouble of waiting for the reconstitution
of this case and this tribunal the trouble of deciding again a case already
decided.
Upon being informed of the statements of Attorney Zamora, Peñaranda's
attorneys filed a petition with the commissioner for reconstitution to make
a report to this Court that the records be declared reconstituted, together
with the decision of the Court of Appeals dated September 9, 1942, and
that said records be remanded to the lower court for execution of the
decision.
ISSUE/S: WON ATTY. Zamora acted in accordance with the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
HELD: Yes. ATTY. Zamora acted in accordance with the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
RATIO: The court resolved to declare that the case is reconstituted and to
order that copy of the decision of the Court of Appeals, promulgated on
September 9, 1942, be sent to the lower court for execution. This
resolution is being adopted not without making of record that the
considered as an example worthy to be remembered by all members of
the bar. Atty. Zamora showed truthfulness, fair play and nobility as
becoming a deserving member of the bar.
Carlet v. Court of Appeals
Facts:
Carlet who is the Special Administrator of the Estate of
Sevillo through Atty. Jimenez files before the Trial Court an action
for reconvenyance of property of Sevillo. Zarate then moved to
dismiss such action invoking res judicata since it was the same facts
that had been settled by the trial court, CA and SC. The action was
then dismissed by the Trial Court and ordered Atty. Jimenez
regarding forum-shopping. Atty. Jimenez then appealed it before
the CA, but to no avail.
Issue:
WON the action of Atty. Jimenez is proper.
Held:
No. The action of Atty. Jimenez is not proper.
Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
provides that “A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the
court”.
In the case at bar, the action of Atty Jimenez of filing a
reconveyance case despite his knowledge that there is finality of the
case shows that he does not have good faith towards the court.
 Hence, his conduct is not proper.
Facts:
 In 1917, a Transfer Certificate No. 1599 was issued in Jose
Sevilla’s name after payment of the full purchase price of
Lot 981 of the Biñan Estate in Laguna, with an area of 864
square meters.
 In 1949, Pablo Sevillo, one of Jose’s four sons with a wife
and four children of his own, declared the lot for taxation
purposes even if the property was still in Jose Sevillo’s
name.
 In 1955, Pablo, by then a widower, married Candida Baylo
who had a previous daughter already married named Cirila
Baylo Carolasan. The union produced no offspring.
 In 1965, Pablo Sevillo, with Candida Baylo, filed a petition
before the Court of First Instance for reconstitution of
title. Reconstitution was allowed and a TCT was issued in
the name of Pablo Sevillo, married to Candida Baylo. Pablo
Sevillo and his wife died in 1967 and in 1974, respectively.
 Before dying, Candida Baylo executed a Deed of Sale in
favor of Pablo’s former children in his previous marriage.
 In 1980, the heirs of Cirila Baylo Carolasan, all surnamed
Zarate and herein private respondents, filed a case
for annulment of the said Deed of Sale. The case was
docketed as Civil Case No. B-1656 before the Court of First
Instance of Biñan, Laguna.
 The Deed of Sale was rendered as null and void and of no
force and effect, and the representative of the estate of the
plaintiff Cirila Baylo Carolasan and the defendants Gregorio
Sevillo, Samero Sevillo, Maltin Sevillo, Andrea Sevillo and
Isidro Zamora, as the surviving spouse of Consolacion
Sevillo, are hereby ordered to partition Lot No. 981.
 The losing party, the Sevillos then filed several cases to
annul the decision to the IAC and the SC, all of which were
denied.
 On July 10, 1991, petitioner Iñigo F. Carlet, as special
administrator of the estate of Pablo and Antonia Sevillo,
filed the case at bar, an action for reconveyance of
property, docketed as Civil Case No. B-3582, against the
heirs of Cirila.
 Defendants Zarate moved to dismiss the case on the ground
of res judicata. The Defendants won and now Carlet has
appealed to the CA.
Issues:
 Whether or not the case should be dismissed on the ground
of res judicata.
Held/Ratio:
 NO. It was already decided in Civil Case No. B-1656. Res
Judicataaaaaa!!!!! There are four requisites to successfully
invoke res judicata: (a) finality of the former judgment; (b)
the court which rendered it had jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties; (c) it must be a judgment on the
merits; and (d) there must be between the first and second
actions identity of parties, subject matter and cause of
action. A judgment on the merits rendered in the first case
constitutes an absolute bar to the subsequent action when
 the three identities are present. Even though Civil Case No.
B-3582 was initiated by petitioner as administrator of the
estate of Pablo and Antonia Sevillo, the fact remains that
he represents the same heirs.
 However, the CA ruled that the delay of more than twenty
years since petitioner learned of the reconstituted title was
unreasonable, giving rise to the presumption that he had
abandoned the idea of seeking annulment of the
proceedings on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, and that he
had opted to take other actions instead.
 Petitioner disputes this CA ruling, arguing that (1) on May
26, 1988, he filed Cad. Case No. M-10108 for the
cancellation of OCT No. 665, thus negating the presumption
that he had abandoned the annulment of the reconstitution
proceedings; (2) he could not file the action for annulment
while the Petition for Cancellation of Title was still pending,
because of the rule against forum-shopping; (3)there was no
unreasonable delay in the filing of his Petition for Annulment,
which was filed just eighteen days after his receipt of the CA
Decision upholding the dismissal of his Petition for
Cancellation of Title; and (4) the application of the equitable
doctrine of laches in this case will perpetrate fraud and
injustice against him.
 We remain unconvinced. Laches is the failure or neglect, for
an unreasonable or unexplained length of time, to do that
which by exercising due diligence could or should have been
done earlier, warranting the presumption that the right holder
has abandoned that right or declined to assert it. This
41
inaction or neglect to assert a right converts a valid claim
into a stale demand. 42
 Laches prevents a litigant from raising the issue of lack of
jurisdiction. True, petitioner filed the annulment Complaint
43
right after the dismissal of the cancellation-of-title case, but it
is equally true that it was filed only after the quieting-of-title
case had been decided in favor of the respondent. By
participating in the quieting-of-title case and arguing therein
his defenses against the legality of the title of the respondent
in order to establish his rights over the disputed property,
petitioner is deemed to have chosen this action over the
annulment of the reconstitution proceedings.
 Annulment of the reconstitution proceedings was belatedly
resorted to only after the CA had reversed the trial court and
upheld the reconstituted title of respondent. Laches bars a
party from invoking lack of jurisdiction for the first time on
appeal for the purpose of annulling everything done, with his
active participation, in the case below. 44
 It cannot be said either that the application of laches would
work an injustice against petitioner, because he was given a
fair chance in the quieting-of-title case to prove his
ownership of the disputed lot.
 Furthermore, by seeking the reexamination of the ownership
of the disputed lot, petitioner accepted the jurisdiction of the
court which heard the action for quieting of title. A litigant
cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative
relief and, after failing to obtain such relief, to repudiate or
question that same jurisdiction. Clearly, laches has
45
attached and barred the petitioner's right to file an action for
annulment.
 To show the cogency of the foregoing disquisition, the
interrelation of these rules has recently been synthesized
and codified in the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which
provides that an action for annulment of judgment based on
extrinsic fraud must be filed within four years from its
discovery or, if based on lack of jurisdiction, before it is
barred by laches
The Insurance Life Assurance Co. Employees Assoc.
FACTS:
The Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd., Employees Association-NATU,
FGU Insurance Group Workers & Employees Association-NATU, and
Insular Life Building Employees Association-NATU (hereinafter
referred to as the Unions), while still members of the Federation of
Free Workers (FFW), entered into separate collective bargaining
agreements with the Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. and the FGU
Insurance Group (hereinafter referred to as the Companies). Two of
the lawyers of the Unions then were Felipe Enaje and Ramon
Garcia; the latter was formerly the secretary-treasurer of the FFW
and acting president of the Insular Life/FGU unions and the Insular
Life Building Employees Association. Garcia, as such acting
president, in a circular issued in his name and signed by him, tried to
dissuade the members of the Unions from disaffiliating with the
FFW and joining the National Association of Trade Unions (NATU),
to no avail.
Enaje and Garcia soon left the FFW and secured employment with
the Anti-Dummy Board of the Department of Justice. Thereafter,
the Companies hired Garcia in the latter part of 1956 as assistant
corporate secretary and legal assistant in their Legal Department,
and he was soon receiving P900 a month, or P600 more than he was
receiving from the FFW. Enaje was hired on or about February 19,
1957 as personnel manager of the Companies, and was likewise
made chairman of the negotiating panel for the Companies in the
collective bargaining with the Unions. On May 20, 1958 the Unions
went on strike and picketed the offices of the Insular Life Building at
Plaza Moraga.
On July 29, 1958 the CIR prosecutor filed a complaint for unfair
labor practice against the Companies under Republic Act 875. The
complaint specifically charged the Companies with (1) interfering
with the members of the Unions in the exercise of their right to
concerted action, by sending out individual letters to them urging
them to abandon their strike and return to work, with a promise of
comfortable cots, free coffee and movies, and paid overtime, and,
subsequently, by warning them that if they did not return to work
on or before June 2, 1958, they might be replaced; and (2)
discriminating against the members of the Unions as regards
readmission to work after the strike on the basis of their union
membership and degree of participation in the strike. On August 4,
1958 the Companies filed their answer denying all the material
allegations of the complaint, stating special defenses therein, and
asking for the dismissal of the complaint. After trial on the merits,
the Court of Industrial Relations, through Presiding Judge Arsenio
Martinez, rendered on August 17, 1965 a decision dismissing the
Unions' complaint for lack of merit. On August 31, 1965 the Unions
seasonably filed their motion for reconsideration of the said
decision, and their supporting memorandum on September 10,
1965. This was denied by the Court of Industrial Relations en banc in
a resolution promulgated on October 20, 1965.
ISSUE/S: WON there was a violated made in the Canon 10.2 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility
HELD: Yes. There was a violation made. RATIO: Be that as it may, we
must articulate our firm view that in citing this Court's decisions and
rulings, it is the bounden duty of courts, judges and lawyers to
reproduce or copy the same word-for-word and punctuation mark-
for-punctuation mark. Indeed, there is a salient and salutary reason
why they should do this. Only from this Tribunal's decisions and
rulings do all other courts, as well as lawyers and litigants, take their
bearings. This is because the decisions referred to in article 8 of the
Civil Code which reads, "Judicial decisions applying or interpreting
the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of
the Philippines," are only those enunciated by this Court of last
resort.
We said in no uncertain terms in Miranda, et al. vs. Imperial, et al.
(77 Phil. 1066) that "[O]nly the decisions of this Honorable Court
establish jurisprudence or doctrines in this jurisdiction." Thus, ever
present is the danger that if not faithfully and exactly quoted, the
decisions and rulings of this Court may lose their proper and correct
meaning, to the detriment of other courts, lawyers and the public
who may thereby be misled. But if inferior courts and members of
the bar meticulously discharge their duty to check and recheck their
citations of authorities culled not only from this Court's decisions
but from other sources and make certain that they are verbatim
reproductions down to the last word and punctuation mark,
appellate courts will be precluded from acting on misinformation, as
well as be saved precious time in finding out whether the citations
are correct.
Del Rosario v. Chingcuangco
Facts:
As leasehold tenant, petitioner, Leon del Rosario, occupied a
parcel of land owned by respondent Tomas Imperio. Said land
became the subject matter of litigation before the Court of Agrarian
Relations. A decision was rendered therein, ordering the ejectment
of petitioner from the landholding, and ordering Tomas Imperio to
pay del Rosario the value of the excess rentals received by him.
Subsequently, Imperio filed with the Court of Agrarian Relations a
motion for execution of the aforestated judgment. Del Rosario
however opposed it, on the ground that he has a right of retention
over the land until he is indemnified for expenses and
improvements. Acting thereon, the Court of Agrarian Relations,
issued an order for the issuance of a writ of execution, stating that
the judgment had become final and executory, and that Del
Rosario's claim for indemnity cannot stop execution of said
judgment. Eventually, the corresponding writ of execution was
issued. Thus, petitioner filed the present special civil action herein.
Thereafter, respondent filed a petition to declare petitioner's
counsel in direct contempt, on the alleged ground that in his
petition herein said lawyer cited a fictitious authority. According to
them, Sec 43 of RA 1199 merely grants the tenant the right to
recover one-half of the value of improvements he made on the
land, without giving him any right of retention over the land until he
is so reimbursed. As to Section 1 of Rule 15 of the Rules of the Court
of Agrarian Relations, they contend that the same had been
superseded with the advent of the Agricultural Land Reform Code
R.A. 3844
The record bears out that petitioner's counsel alleged in page 5 of
the petition for certiorari herein, thus:
"Section 1, Rule 15, Rules of the Courts of Agrarian Relations,
predicated on Section 43 of Republic Act No. 1199, as amended,
supra, has been upheld to be valid by this Honorable Tribunal so
that now no writ of execution can be issued unless it is complied
with first (Paz Ongsiako, Inc. vs. Celestino Abad). This ruling, in
effect, created and established or confirmed the prior substantial
right of a tenant to indemnification before he is finally ejected from
his holding."
Issue:
WON petitioner’s counsel is guilty of direct contempt by citing
fictitious authority, violating Canon 22 of Canons of Professional
Ethics?
Held & Rationale
No. Petitioner's counsel obviously had in mind this Court's
decision in Paz Ongsiako, Inc. vs. Celestino Abad, L-12147, July 30,
1957. Although he cites as docket number L-121447 instead of L-
12147, the same is plainly but a slight typographical mistake not
sufficient to place him in contempt, especially because the names of
the parties were given correctly. As to said counsel's interpretation
of this Court's decision in said case, or of what the ruling therein "in
effect" created, established or confirmed, the same are mere
arguments fully within the bounds of earnest debate, rather than a
deception urged upon this Court. The first petition for contempt is
therefore without merit.
Surigao Mineral Reservation v. Cloribel
FACTS:
After a decision adverse to respondent MacArthur International
Minerals Co., disrespectful statements purportedly made by its
counsels, Vicente Santiago and Jose Beltran Sotto (both members of
the Bar) were brought to this Court with the suggestion of
disciplinary action. Atty. Sotto, in his statements in his memoranda,
he attacks the petitioners in that case (including the Executive
Secretary) of having made wild, false and ridiculous statements in a
desperate attempt to prejudice the courts against his client. Further
averring that their proposition is corrupt on its face and lays bare
the immoral arrogant attitude of the petitioners. Even further
declaring that the petitioners in that case were opportunistically
changing their claims and stories from case to case. Atty. Santiago,
in his third motion for reconsideration, he pictures petitioners as
―vulturous executives,‖ and goes on to describe the court as
―civilized, democratic tribunal,‖ only to later question the
soundness of said decision of the same tribunal.
He filed for a motion to inhibit the Chief Justice and a justice from
judging the case. He depicts the judicial authorities as acting like
messengers of God and that their judgment would seem to be
ordained by the Almighty. He questions the ―unjudicial favoritism‖
for the petitioners of that case by the Court.
ISSUE/S: 1. WON Santiago‘s language in his pleadings can be
equated to contempt. 2. WON Sotto‘s charges against the adverse
litigants cannot be considered in the present case for they are not
the offended parties in the same.
HELD: 1.Yes. The Court finds the language he used that is not
expected from an officer of the courts. Atty. Santiago is guilty of
contempt of court. 2. No. There shall be no doubt in the power of
the Court to punish Atty. Sotto for contempt under the
circumstances. Such language is not protected; it surfaces the of
feeling of contempt towards a litigant; it offends the court in which
it is made. He is guilty of contempt.
RATIO: (1) Atty. Santiago‘s accusations has no basis in fact and in
law. He did limit his slurs to the Chief Justice and Justice Castro, but
the whole court, pleading all who have received favors from any of
those connected to the petitioners of that cse to inhibit themselves.
There is the not too well concealed effort on the part of a losing
litigant‘s attorney to downgrade the court. Counsel‘s words are
intended to create an atmosphere of distrust. A lawyer is an officer
of this court; he is, ―like the court itself, an instrument or agency to
advance the ends of justice.‖ Atty. Santiago justifies his language
stating that it was necessary for the defense of his client.
A client‘s cause does not permit an attorney to cross the line
between liberty and license. Discipline and self-restraint on the part
of the bar even under adverse conditions are necessary for the
orderly administration of justice.
The Court finds in the language of Atty. Santiago a style that
undermines and degrades the administration of justice. (2) A
lawyer‘s language should be dignified in keeping with the dignity of
the legal profession. It is Sotto‘s duty as a member of the Bar ―to
abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact
prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless
required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged.‖
In 1968, the Supreme Court promulgated a unanimous decision (24
SCRA 491; G.R. No. L-27072) which was not favorable to MacArthur
International Minerals Co. The latter’s lawyer, Atty. Vicente
Santiago then filed a motion for reconsideration. Eventually, a third
motion for reconsideration was submitted by him where the
following paragraph was stated:
6. Unfortunately for our people, it seems that many of our judicial
authorities believe that they are the chosen messengers of God in all
matters that come before them, and that no matter what the
circumstances are, their judgment is truly ordained by the Almighty
unto eternity. Some seem to be constitutionally incapable of
considering that any emanation from their mind or pen could be the
product of unjudicial prejudice or unjudicial sympathy or favoritism
for a party or an issue. Witness the recent absurdity of Judge
Alikpala daring to proceed to judge a motion to hold himself in
contempt of court — seemingly totally oblivious or
uncomprehending of the violation of moral principle involved — and
also of Judge Geraldez who refuses to inhibit himself in judging a
criminal case against an accused who is also his correspondent in
two other cases. What is the explanation for such mentality? Is it
outright dishonesty? Lack of intelligence? Serious deficiency in moral
comprehension? Or is it that many of our government officials are
just amoral?
Scattered in his motion were other statements where he attacked
the 1968 decision of the Supreme Court as false, erroneous, and
illegal.
In another motion, Atty. Santiago sought the inhibition of two
Justices: Justice Fred Castro, because allegedly, he is the brother of
the vice president of the opposing party. And Chief Justice Roberto
Concepcion because immediately after the 1968 decision, his son
was appointed to a significant position in the government. (Here
Atty. Santiago implied that the justices were not fair and that their
decision was influenced).
In his defense, Atty. Santiago said that he originally deleted the
above paragraph and was only included due to inadvertence. But
that any rate, he averred that the language he used was necessary
to defend his client.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Vicente Santiago is guilty of contempt.
HELD: Yes. Lawyers are administrators of justice, oath-bound
servants of society, their first duty is not to their clients, as many
suppose, but to the administration of justice; to this, their clients’
success is wholly subordinate; and their conduct ought to and must
be scrupulously observant of law and ethics. Thus, Santiago’s
defense is not tenable.
A lawyer must avoid language that tend to create an atmosphere of
distrust, of disbelief in the judicial system. A lawyer’s duties to the
Court have become common place. Really, there could hardly be
any valid excuse for lapses in the observance thereof.
Section 20(b), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, in categorical terms,
spells out one such duty: ‘To observe and maintain the respect due
to the courts of justice and judicial officers.’
It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the Courts a
respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of
the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme
importance.
Atty. Santiago was fined for his infractions.
Munoz v. CA and Delia Sutton the Supreme Court. (Cesica v. Villaseca, G.R. No. L-9590, April 30,
1957)
Topic:
Rule 10.02 – A lawyer shall not knowingly misquotes or 4. SC set a hearing requiring all lawyers-partners in the firm to be
misrepresent the contents of a paper, the language or the argument present. Sutton appeared. While her demeanor was respectful, it
of opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or authority, or was obvious that she was far from contrite.
knowingly cite as law a provision already rendered inoperative by
5. Sutton was subjected to intensive questioning by several
repeal or amendment, or assert as a fact that which has not been
members of the Court, yet she was not budged from such an
proved.
untenable position. It was as if she was unconcerned, oblivious of
Facts: the unfavorable reaction to which her evasive answers gave rise.
1. Delia Sutton, a member of the Philippine bar, was the defense
6. Atty Sedfrey Ordoñez (law firm partner) expressly acknowledged
lawyer in the case Vicente Muñoz vs PP and CA. She was also
that what happened in the petition for certiorari prepared by Sutton
connected to Salonga, Ordoñez, Yap, Parlade, and Associates law
did misrepresent what is set forth in the CA decision and was
firm.
reprehensible. He was humble enough to make the necessary
2. Supreme Court found out that the defense submitted an expression of regret.
unbelievable version of the case, attributing to the CA that its
7. Delia Sutton and Atty. Ordoñez filed a ”Joint Apology to the
decision was made upon facts different from what actually
Supreme Court,” seeking to make amends.
transpired.
Issue:
Defense Theory: Muñoz’s boat was rammed out by the
Whether or not Sutton must be held accountable in connect to a
complainant.
duty she owes to the Tribunal as a counsel.
Truth: Muñoz’s boat hit the left frontal outrigger of the
complainant’s boat where the complainant was seated, thereby Decision: YES, she must be held accountable.
hitting him on the back and causing his death. 1. While expressing regret and offering apology, there was lacking
that frank admission that what was done by her should not be
Muñoz’s motorboat had suffered very little damage which would
characterized merely as "errors" consisting as they do of "inaccurate
have been considerable had it been rammed by the offended
statements." If there were a greater sincerity on her part, the
party’s boat.
offense should have been acknowledged as the submission of
3. The Court resolved to deny the petition upon the ground that it is deliberate misstatements.
mainly factual and for lack of merit. Where the findings of fact of
2. As set forth in the applicable Canon of Legal Ethics: "Nothing
the Court of Appeals [are conflicting], the same [are not binding] on
operates more certainly to create or to foster popular prejudice
against lawyers as a class, and to deprive the profession of that full
measure of public esteem and confidence which belongs to the
proper discharge of its duties than does the false claim, often set up
by the unscrupulous in defense of questionable transactions, that it
is the duty of the lawyer to do whatever may enable him to succeed
in winning his client's cause." What is more, the obligation to the
bench, especially to this Court, for candor and honesty takes
precedence. It is by virtue of such considerations that punishment
that must fit the offense has to be meted out to respondent Delia T.
Sutton.
particular paragraph. He reasoned that it was his secretary who
was at fault.
3. His secretary attached an Affidavit supporting the explanation
made by Dacanay and admitted that it was her who committed
the error.
ISSUE:
WON Atty. Dacanay should be disbarred for intercalating a material
fact in a judicial decision.

3. WHEREFORE, respondent Delia T. Sutton is severely censured. HELD:

Adez Realty, Inc. v. Court of Appeals YES. It is the bounden duty of lawyers to check, review and recheck
the allegations in their pleadings, more particularly the quoted
FACTS: portions, and ensure that the statements therein are accurate and
the reproductions faithful, down to the last word and even
1. In a SC resolution, it directed Atty. Benjamin Dacanay counsel
punctuation mark. The legal profession demands that lawyers
for petitioner Adez Realty, Inc., to "SHOW CAUSE within 5 days
thoroughly go over pleadings, motions and other documents
from notice why he should not be disciplinary dealt with for
dictated or prepared by them, typed or transcribed by their
intercalating a material fact in the judgment of the court a quo
secretaries or clerks, before filing them with the court. If a client is
thereby altering and modifying its factual findings with the
bound by the acts of his counsel, with more reason should counsel
apparent purpose of misleading the SC in order to obtain a
be bound by the acts of his secretary who merely follows his orders.
favorable judgment, and thus failing to live up to the standards
expected of a member of the Bar. The distortion of facts committed by counsel, with the willing
assistance of his secretary, is a grave offense and should not be
2. In his defense, he humbly submitted to the court and threw
treated lightly, not only because it may set a dangerous precedent
himself at its mercy. He explained that whenever he prepares
but, rather, because it is a clear and serious violation of one’s oath
pleadings, he dictates to his secretary and if portions of the
as a member of the Bar. Rule 10.02, Canon 10, Chapter III, of the
decision or order to be appealed from have to be quoted, he
Code of Professional Responsibility directs that “[a] lawyer shall not
simply instructs his said secretary to copy the particular pages
knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of a paper, the
of the said decision or order. In the case at bar, he did instruct
language or the argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a
his secretary to copy the corresponding pages in the decision of
decision or authority, or knowingly cite as a law a provision already
the CA. Somehow, however, some words were intercalated on a
rendered inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert as a fact
that which has not been proved.”
Misquoting or intercalating phrases in the text of a court decision
constitutes willful disregard of the lawyer’s solemn duty to act at all
times in a manner consistent with the truth. A lawyer should never
venture to mislead the court by false statements or quotations of
facts or laws. Thus, in Bautista v. Gonzales, We suspended
respondent for six (6) months for, among others, submitting to the
lower court falsified documents, representing them to be true
copies. In Chavez v. Viola, We suspended respondent counsel for
five (5) months after he filed an Amended Application for Original
Registration of Title which contained false statements.
WHEREFORE, We find ATTY. BENJAMIN M. DACANAY, counsel for
petitioner, guilty of intercalating a material fact in a judicial Decision
elevated to Us on certiorari, thereby altering its factual findings with
the apparent purpose, and no other, of misleading the Court in
order to obtain a favorable judgment, and thus miserably failing to
live up to the standards expected of him as a member of the
Philippine Bar. Consequently, ATTY. BENJAMIN M. DACANAY is
hereby DISBARRED effective immediately from the practice of law.
Aguinaldo v. Aguinaldo
Any effort on the litigant to delay, if not to defeat, the enforcement of a final
judgment, executory in character, by raising an objection that at best hardly rises
to the level of a technicality is not likely to elicit the sympathy of this Court or any
court for that matter. Yet, in effect, that is what the move taken by the defendants
in his case amounted to. The lower court as was but proper did not lend its
approval. Still undeterred, they would appeal. They ought to have known better.
There is no reason to refuse affirmance to the order of the lower court complained
of, appointing appellants as legal representatives of the deceased defendant and
substituted in his place pursuant to the Rules of Court in order that the execution
that ought that have taken place long since could at long last be effected.
There is no dispute as to the antecedents. On January 14, 1965, the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan, Branch II through its clerk issued a writ of execution reciting
that as far back as March 31, 1958, it rendered a decision in favor of plaintiffs,1 now
appellees, requiring one of the defendants therein, Segundo Aguinaldo, to
reconvey one-fourth (¼) pro-indiviso of the property in litigation to appellees, and
to pay the latter the amount of P300.00 yearly beginning with the year 1955. There
was an appeal. The decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals on May 23, 1965.
It was further set forth therein that on January 5, 1965, a motion for its execution
was granted. Hence the writ of execution. On February 13 of the same year, one
Cecilio Aguinaldo filed an urgent ex parte manifestation and motion to quash such
writ of execution based primarily on the allegation that defendant Segundo
Aguinaldo died on August 7, 1959 during the pendency of such appeal. There was
an opposition to such motion on February 25, 1965, inviting attention to Sec. 16,
Rule 3 of the Rules of Court to the effect that in the event of the death of a party to
a pending case, it is the duty of his attorney to give the name and residence of his
executor, administrator, guardian, or their legal representative and alleging that
there was a failure on the part of the counsel to comply with the above provision.
The prayer was for the denial of the motion of Cecilio Aguinaldo and for an order
requiring counsel for the defendants to furnish the court the names as well as the
residences of the heirs or the legal representatives of the deceased in order that
they could be substituted in his stead so as not to render nugatory a decision, final
and executory in character. On March 4, 1965, the lower court, then presided by
the Hon. Ricardo C. Puno gave counsel of record up to March 22, 1965 within which
to submit the name and residence of the executor, administrator, guardian or
other legal representative of the deceased Segundo Aguinaldo. The aforesaid
counsel in turn merely manifested on March 23, 1965 that he had ceased to be
such as of May 31, 1956, and that such a pleading be considered sufficient
compliance with the aforesaid order. Considering the turn of events, plaintiffs, in
order that such a decision in their favor be not rendered nugatory by the above
technicality, had no choice but to ask the court in a motion of April 7, 1965 to have
the heirs of the deceased Segundo Aguinaldo, defendants Cecilio, Anastasia,
Simplicio and Domingo, all bearing the surname of Aguinaldo being the legitimate
children, and one Felicitas Bagawisan, a granddaughter, substituted as defendants.
On October 5, 1965, the lower court, this time presided by Judge Andres Sta.
Maria, granted the aforesaid motion and substituted defendants in place of the
deceased Segundo Aguinaldo.
Hence this appeal to the Court of Appeals, which in turn by resolution of February doubt as to our disapproval of such a practice. The aim of a lawsuit is to render
17, 1969 certified the matter to this Court, the question involved being one of law. justice to the parties according to law. Procedural rules are precisely designed to
As noted at the outset, we find for appellees. accomplish such a worthy objective. Necessarily, therefore, any attempt to pervert
the ends for which they are intended deserves condemnation. We have done so
1. It would be the height of unreason to impute error to the lower court precisely before. We do so again.
for embodying in the order complained of what is set forth in the Rules of Court.
Thus: "Whenever a party to a pending case dies, becomes incapacitated or WHEREFORE, the order of October 5, 1965 is affirmed.
incompetent, it shall be the duty of his attorney to inform the court promptly of
such death, incapacity or incompetency, and to give the name and residence of his This decision is immediately executory. Treble costs against defendants.
executor, administrator, guardian or other legal representative."2Had the
Canlas v. Court of Appeals
defendant, thereafter deceased, seen to it that a new counsel was appointed, then
upon his death there could be compliance with the above provision. To cause
FACTS:
plaintiffs to suffer for such neglect of duty is to cast an underserved reflection on
the law. It is equally vital to remember that the judgment had become final and the Francisco Herrera executed a mortgage over his 8 parcels of land in
stage of execution reached. Defendants cannot be heard to allege that it is much
favor of L&R Corporation as a security for the several loans which he
too late now to apply the above rule. That would be to set at naught the principle
consistently adhered to by this Court. obtained from the financing institution. Upon his failure to pay, L&R
extrajudicially foreclosed the said lots. The lands were disposed of
It was succinctly put in Amor v. Jugo3 in these words: "And with more compelling
in a public auction and L&R was the highest bidder.
reason the respondent court cannot refuse to issue such writ, or quash it or order
its stay, when the judgment had been reviewed and affirmed by an appellate court,
Pending redemption, with Atty. Canlas as his counsel, Herrera was
for it cannot review or interfere with any matter decided on appeal, or give other
or further relief, or assume supervisory jurisdiction to interpret or reverse the able to obtain a preliminary injunction against L&R to prevent it
judgment of the higher court."4 What was said by us in Li Kim Tho v. Sanchez5 is from consolidating the title in the corporation’s name.
worth recalling: "Litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and
it is essential to an effective and efficient administration of justice that, once a Two years later, the parties entered into a compromise agreement
judgment has become final, the winning party be not, through a mere subterfuge, where L&R gave Herrera another year to redeem the foreclosed
deprived of the fruits of the verdict. Courts must therefore guard against any properties subject to payment of P600,000. They also stipulated
scheme calculated to bring about that result. Constituted as they are to put an end
that Canlas shall be entitled to attorney’s fees of 100k. The court
to controversies, courts should frown upon any attempt to prolong them."6 An
excerpt from Villaflor v. Reyes7 is equally relevant: "There should be a greater approved the compromise.
awareness on the part of litigants that the time of the judiciary, much more so of
However, Herrera, due to his financial difficulties, was still unable to
this Court, is too valuable to be wasted or frittered away by efforts, far from
commendable, to evade the operation of a decision final and executory, especially pay neither the several loans nor the attorney’s fees which he owed
so, where, as shown in this case, the clear and manifest absence of any right calling to Canlas. Canlas moved for execution insofar as his fees were
for vindication, is quite obvious and indisputable."8 concerned which the court granted although he was not really able
2. This appeal, moreover, should fail, predicated as it is on an insubstantial to collect the fees.
objection bereft of any persuasive force. Defendants had to display ingenuity to
conjure a technicality. From Alonso v. Villamor,9 a 1910 decision, we have left no
Subsequently, Canlas and Herrera met to discuss the relief for
Herrera with respect to his liability to L&R on the one hand, and his
obligation to Canlas on the other. Canlas contends that Herrera
earnestly begged him to redeem the properties. However, Herrera
maintains that it was Canlas who offered to advance the money
provided that they executed a transfer of mortgage over the
properties in Canlas’ favor. (SC believes Herrera’s contention more)
They executed a Deed of Sale and Transfer of Rights of Redemption
and/or to Redeem, a document that enabled Canlas to redeem the
parcels of land and to register the same in his name. Herrera only
discovered that the said lawyer registered the lots under his name
when he was about to secure a loan from a bank to finance a wet
market project. Herrera contends that the said document was
falsified. The original document only transferred the rights of
Herrera to redeem the property whereas the falsified document
stated that he was transferring all of his rights of the real properties.
Herrera filed for an action for reconveyance of the said lots and a
petition to reform the said document to reflect the true agreement
between him and Canlas.
TC ruled in favor of Canlas. CA reversed.
ISSUE:
W/n Herrera should have filed a petition for certiorari rather than a
pleading for annulment of judgment
W/n the attorney’s fees that Canlas charged Herrera was
reasonable
HELD:
Yes.
Judgments can only be annulled if there was a showing that there is
extrinsic fraud. In the case at bar, extrinsic fraud was not proved.
(Herrera contends that The judge in the trial court colluded with
Canlas in order for him to sell his land to Canlas.)
However, the Court was still unable to find merit in his petition/ The
court cannot overlook the unseemlier side of the proceeding in
which a member of the bar would exploit his mastery of procedural
law to score a technical knowckout over his client, of all people.
No.
Even Canlas himself admitted that his client lacks paying capacity
and no financing entity wanted to extend him a loan. This
circumstance should have tempered his demand for his fees.
Lawyering is not a money-making venture and lawyers are not
merchants. Canlas’ claim of attorney’s fees in the sum of P100,000
was unreasonable. The extent of the services he rendered in the
case is not impressive to justify payment of such amount. The case
itself did not involve complex question fact or law that would have
required substantial effort as to research or leg work for the Canalas
to support his demand. The fatc that the properties subject thereof
commanded quite handsome prices in the market should not be a
measure of the importance or non-importance of the case. The
petitioner’s stature does not support such claim. The Court reduced
the petitioner’s fees on a quantum merit basis, to P20,000.00
***the contract is not void for it is not covered by the ban
(remember sales?) but it is voidable because Canlas exerted undue
influence over Herrera (moral ascendancy of the attorney.)
***however, the property was already in the possession of an IPFV
so Canlas was only held liable for actual damages. BUT…Herrera
should still pay for the redemption price that Canlas paid plus
attorney’s fees so this will be set-off against the damages that
Canlas has to pay.
Facts:
The private respondent own several parcels of land located in
Quezon City for which he is the registered owner. He secured loans
from L and R corporations and executed deeds of mortgage over the
parcels of land for the security of the same. Upon the maturity of
said loans, the firm initiated an extrajudicial foreclosure of the
properties in question after private respondent failed to pay until
maturity. The private respondent filed a complaint for injunction
over the said foreclosure and for redemption of the parcels of land.
Two years after the filing of the petition, private respondent and L
and R corporation entered into a compromise agreement that
renders the former to be insured another year for the said
properties. Included in the stipulations were the attorney’s fees
amounting to Php 100,000.00. The private respondent however,
remained to be in turmoil when it came to finances and was
apparently unable to pay and secure the attorney’s fees, more so
the redemption liability. Relief was discussed by petitioner and
private respondent executed a document to redeem the parcels of
land and to register the same to his name.
Allegations were made by the private respondent claiming the
parcels of land to his name but without prior notice, the properties
were already registered under the petitioner’s name. The private
respondent calls for a review and for the court to act on the said
adverse claim by petitioner on said certificates for the properties
consolidated by the redemption price he paid for said properties.
The private respondent filed a suit for the annulment of judgment in
the Court of appeals which ruled over the same.
Issue: whether the petitioner is on solid ground on the reacquisition
over the said properties.
Ruling:
By Atty. Canlas' own account, "due to lack of paying capacity of
respondent Herrera, no financing entity was willing to extend him
any loan with which to pay the redemption price of his mortgaged
properties and petitioner's P100,000.00 attorney's fees awarded in
the Compromise Judgment," a development that should have
tempered his demand for his fees. For obvious reasons, he placed
his interests over and above those of his client, in opposition to his
oath to "conduct himself as a lawyer ... with all good fidelity ... to
[his] clients." The Court finds the occasion fit to stress that
lawyering is not a moneymaking venture and lawyers are not
merchants, a fundamental standard that has, as a matter of judicial
notice, eluded not a few law advocates. The petitioner's efforts
partaking of a shakedown" of his own client are not becoming of a
lawyer and certainly, do not speak well of his fealty to his oath to
"delay no man for money."
We are not, however, condoning the private respondent's own
shortcomings. In condemning Atty. Canlas monetarily, we cannot
overlook the fact that the private respondent has not settled his
liability for payment of the properties. To hold Atty. Canlas alone
liable for damages is to enrich said respondent at the expense of his
lawyer. The parties must then set off their obligations against the
other.
Eternal Gardens v. Court of Appeals
Facts: The case started on May 18, 1981 when private respondent-
spouses Jose Seelin and Lilia Sevilla Seelin filed a complaint against
Central Dyeing & Finishing Corporation (Central Dyeing for brevity)
for quieting of title and for declaration of nullity of Transfer
Certificate of Title issued in the name of said corporation, before
the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City.
On August 24, 1989, the trial court rendered judgment, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
Declaring the defendant's Certificate of Title No. 205942 null and
void.
Dismissing counterclaim of defendant without pronouncement as to
costs."
The aforesaid decision was affirmed by respondent Court of Appeals
and eventually upheld by this Court.
The RTC decision, having become final and executory, private
respondents moved for execution which was granted by the lower
court. Accordingly, a writ of execution of the decision was issued.
Subsequently, private respondents filed an Urgent Manifestation
and Motion for an Immediate Writ of Possession/Break Open Order.
The motion was opposed by herein petitioner Eternal Gardens
Memorial Park Corporation contending that it is not submitting to
the jurisdiction of the trial court; that it is completely unaware of
the suit between private respondents and Central Dyeing; that it is
the true and registered owner of the lot having bought the same
from Central Dyeing; and that it was a buyer in good faith.
On July 1, 1992, the trial court granted private respondents motion.
Another Order was issued on August 18, 1992 by the trial court
holding that the judgment was binding on petitioner, being the
successor-in-interest of defendant Central Dyeing pursuant to Rule
39, Section 48(b) of the Revised Rules of Court.
Petitioner went to the Court of Appeals in a petition for certiorari.
On September 30, 1992 the Court of Appeals rendered judgment
dismissing the petition.
Indeed, since petitioner admits that it bought the property from
Central Dyeing and Finishing Corporation, petitioner is bound by the
decision rendered therein by respondent Judge.
Under Section 20, Rule 3, Revised Rules of Court, a transferee
pendente lite does not have to be included or impleaded by name in
order to be bound by the judgment because the action or suit may
be continued for or against the original party or the transferor and
still be binding on the transferee.
The motion for reconsideration was also denied by the Court of
Appeals.
On further appeal to this Court, petitioners petition for review on
certiorari, was denied.
Thereafter, private respondents filed another motion for the
issuance of a second writ of execution before the trial court which
was granted.
Not willing to give up, petitioner sought a reconsideration.
Petitioners motion was initially granted by the trial court thru Judge
Arturo Romero. However, upon motion of private respondents, the
said order was reconsidered by Judge Emilio L. Leachon, Jr., who
succeeded Judge Romero. Forthwith, alias writs of execution were
issued.
Desperately needing a favorable judgment, Petitioner, for the
second time, filed a petition for certiorari with respondent Court of
Appeals, arguing inter alia: that the judgment cannot be executed
against it because it was not a party to Civil Case; that the decision
of the trial court in said case never mandated Central Dyeing to
deliver possession of the property to the private respondents; that
certain facts and circumstances which occurred after the finality of
the judgment will render the execution highly unjust, illegal and
inequitable; that the issuance of the assailed writ of execution
violates the lot buyers freedom of religion and worship; and that
private respondents title is being questioned in another case.
On September 29, 1995, the respondent court rendered judgment
dismissing the petition for certiorari on the ground that the lower
court's decision in Civil Case had long become final and executory.
Held: The petition must fail.
It is a settled rule that once a court renders a final judgment, all the
issues between or among the parties before it are deemed resolved
and its judicial functions with respect to any matter related to the
controversy litigated come to an end.
Petitioners argument that the trial court cannot order it and the one
hundred (100) memorial lot owners to surrender and/or deliver
possession of the property in dispute on the ground that they were
never parties to the case between private respondents and Central
Dyeing, has long been resolved by respondent Court of Appeals.
Under Section 20, Rule 3, Revised Rules of Court, a transferee
pendente lite does not have to be included or impleaded by name in
order to be bound by the judgment because the action or suit may
be continued for or against the original party or the transferor and
still be binding on the transferee.
A note of caution. This case has again delayed the execution of a
final judgment for seventeen (17) years to the prejudice of the
private respondents. In the meantime that petitioner has thwarted
execution, interment on the disputed lot has long been going on, so
that by the time this case is finally terminated, the whole lot shall
have already been filled with tombstones, leaving nothing for
private respondents, the real owners of the property. This is a
mockery of justice.
We note that while lawyers owe entire devotion to the interest of
their clients and zeal in the defense of their client's right, they
should not forget that they are officers of the court, bound to exert
every effort to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of
justice. They should not, therefore, misuse the rules of procedure to
defeat the ends of justice or unduly delay a case, impede the
execution of a judgment or misuse court processes.
As officers of the court, lawyers have a responsibility to assist in the
proper administration of justice. They do not discharge this duty by
filing pointless petitions that only add to the workload of the
judiciary, especially this Court, which is burdened enough as it is. A
judicious study of the facts and the law should advise them when a
case such as this, should not be permitted to be filed to merely
clutter the already congested judicial dockets. They do not advance
the cause of law or their clients by commencing litigations that for
sheer lack of merit do not deserve the attention of the courts.
CANON 11
In Re:Sotto
Atty. Vicente Sotto was required to reason why he should not be
punished for contempt in connection with his written statement of
the Supreme Court's decision in the matter of Angel Parazo's case,
which was published in Manila Times and in other newspapers in
the locality.
Sotto was given ten days besides the five days originally given to
him to file his answer, and although his answer was filed after the
expiration of the period of time given him the said answer was
admitted. He does not deny the authenticity of the statement as it
has been published. He nevertheless, asserts that under Sec 13,
Article VIII of the Constitution, which confers upon the Supreme
Court the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice,
and procedure, the Supreme Court has no power to impose
correctional penalties upon the citizens, and it can only impose fines
and imprisonment by virtue of a law, and has to be promulgated by
Congress with the approval of the Chief Executive. He also alleges in
his answer that "in the exercise of the freedom of speech
guaranteed by the Constitution, Sotto made his statement in the
press with the utmost good faith and with no intention of offending
any of the majority of the members of this high Tribunal, who he
thinks, erroneously decided Parazo‘s case; but he has not attacked,
or intended to attack the honesty or integrity of any one.
ISSUE/S: WON Sotto is guilty for contempt of court hence punished
HELD: Yes, Sotto is found guilty for knowingly publishing false
imputations against the members of the court.
RATIO: As a member of the bar and an officer of the courts Atty.
Vicente Sotto is in duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of
this Court, to which he owes fidelity according to the oath he has
taken as such attorney, and not to promote distrust in the
administration of justice. An attorney as an officer of the court is
under special obligation to be respectful in his conduct and
communication to the courts; he may be removed from office or
stricken from the roll of attorneys as being guilty of flagrant
misconduct. Atty. Sotto is fined PHP 1,000 with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency and he is also required to show
cause why he should not be disbarred.
In Re: Almacen
FACTS:
Atty. Almacen was the counsel of one Virginia Yaptinchay in a civil
case. The trial court, after due hearing, rendered judgment against
his client, but Almacen filed a Motion for Reconsideration. He
notified the opposing party of said motion but he failed to indicate
the time and place of hearing of said motion. Hence, his motion was
denied. He then appealed but the Court of Appeals denied his
appeal as it agreed with the trial court with regard to the motion for
reconsideration. Eventually, Almacen filed an appeal on certiorari
before the Supreme Court which also denied his appeal in a minute
resolution. Almacen called such minute resolutions as
unconstitutional. He then filed before the Supreme Court a petition
to surrender his lawyer‘s certificate of title as he claimed that it is
useless to continue practicing his profession when members of the
high court are men who are calloused to pleas for justice, who
ignore without reasons their own applicable decisions and commit
culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity.
He further alleged that due to the minute resolution, his client was
made to pay P120, 000 without knowing the reasons why and that
he became ―one of the sacrificial victims before the altar of
hypocrisy.‖ He also stated ―that justice as administered by the
present members of the Supreme Court is not only blind, but also
deaf and dumb.‖ The Supreme Court did not immediately act on
Almacen‘s petition as the Court wanted to wait for Almacen to
actually surrender his certificate. Almacen did not surrender his
lawyer‘s certificate though as he now argues that he chose not to.
Almacen then asked that he may be permitted ―to give reasons
and cause why no disciplinary action should be taken against him . .
. in an open and public hearing.‖ He said he preferred this
considering that the Supreme Court is ―the complainant,
prosecutor and Judge.‖ Almacen was however unapologetic.
ISSUE/S: WON Almacen should be disciplined.
HELD: Yes. He was suspended indefinitely.
RATIO: The Supreme Court first clarified that minute resolutions are
needed because the Supreme Court cannot accept every case or
write full opinion for every petition they reject otherwise the High
Court would be unable to effectively carry out its constitutional
duties. The proper role of the Supreme Court is to decide ―only
those cases which present questions whose resolutions will have
immediate importance beyond the particular
Zaldivar v. Gonzales
FACTS: Zaldivar was the governor of Antique. He was charged
before the Sandiganbayan for violations of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act. Gonzalez was the then Tanodbayan who was
investigating the case. Zaldivar filed before the Supreme Court a
petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus assailing the
authority of the Tanodbayan to investigate graft cases. The
Supreme Court rendered decision in favor of Zaldivar and ordered
Gonzalez to cease and desist from investigating. Gonzales however
proceeded with the investigation and he filed criminal information
against Zaldivar. Gonzalez even had a newspaper interview where
he stated that the ―rich and influential persons get favorable
actions from the Supreme Court, [while] it is difficult for an ordinary
litigant to get his petition to be given due course.‖ Zaldivar then
filed a Motion for Contempt against Gonzalez. The Supreme Court
then ordered Gonzalez to explain his side. After hearing his side, the
Supreme Court held that Gonzalez is guilty of contempt of court.
Gonzalez‘ counsel filed a Motion for Reconsideration raising the
following issues:
ISSUE/S:
1. WON the Supreme Court erred in charging Gonzalez with indirect
contempt and convicting him of direct contempt
2. WON the Supreme Court erred to charge Gonzalez under Rule
139 (b) and not 139 of the Revised Rules of Court
3. WON the Supreme Court erred in applying the visible tendency
rule rather than the clear and present danger rule in disciplinary and
contempt charges
4. WON the Supreme Court erred in holding that intent is irrelevant
in charges of misconduct
5. WON the Supreme Court erred in punishing Gonzalez for
contempt for out of court publications
6. WON the imposition of indefinite suspension against Gonzalez
constitutes cruel, degrading, or inhuman punishment.
HELD (In its entirety, Motion for Reconsideration was denied)
1. No. The SC held that Gonzalez is guilty of both ―contempt of
court in facie curiae and gross misconduct as an officer of the court
and member of the bar.‖ The word ―in facie curiae‖ is not
equivalent of direct contempt. Rather, the court used the term to
signify a ―frontal assault‖ upon the integrity of the Court and the
entire judicial system. The SC also noted that it did not impose
punishment for Gonzalez‘ acts under direct contempt.
2. No. Rules 139 talks about the referral of SC to IBP or OSG while
Rule 139(b) states that reference to IBP and/or OSG is not
mandatory. The SC did not err in not referring the case to IBP or
OSG. The SC held that there is no need to refer the case to the OSG
because the Court itself has initiated the case against Gonzalez. In
addition to this, the SC said that there is no need for further
investigation of facts in the present case because it was not
disputed by Gonzalez that he uttered or wrote certain statements
attributed to him.
3. No. The SC explained that the ―visible tendency rule‖ penalizes
any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede,
obstruct or degrade the administration of justice while the ―clear
and present danger rule‖ is a method of marking out the
appropriate limits of freedom of speech and of assembly in certain
contexts. The SC held that the clear and present danger test is not
the only test which is recognized and is applicable to courts. Also,
invoking this test would not dissolve the problem because the
statements made by Gonzalez are of such nature as to transcend
the permissible limits of free speech. Hence, visible tendency rule
and not clear and present danger shall be applied.
4. No. The SC explained that human intent can only be shown by
examining one‘s acts and statements. Gonzalez‘ disclaimer of intent
to attack the Court cannot prevail over the plain import of what he
did say and do. Gonzalez cannot negate the clear import of his acts
and statements by simply pleading a secret intent or state of mind
incompatible with his acts or statements.
5. No. Respondent‘s counsel asked the SC to follow what he
presented as alleged modern trends in UK and US concerning the
law of contempt. The SC held that the text he cites is not applicable
in Philippine courts.
6. No. Indefinite suspension has the effect of placing the key to the
restoration of his rights and privileges as a lawyer in his own hands.
The sanction has the effect of giving Gonzalez the chance to purge
himself in his own good time.
Wicker v. Arcangel
Facts: Kelly Wicker brought suit in the Regional Trial Court of Makati
against the LFS Enterprises, Inc. and others, for the annulment of
certain deeds by which a house and lot at Forbes Park, which the
plaintiffs claimed they had purchased, was allegedly fraudulently
titled in the name of the defendant LFS Enterprises and later sold by
the latter to codefendant Jose Poe. Thereafter, Wicker’s counsel,
Atty. Orlando A. Rayos, filed a motion seeking the inhibition of
respondent judge from the consideration of the case. They alleged
that Judge Capulong who had full grasp of this case was eased out
of his station and that the Acting Presiding Judge Arcangel was
personally recruited by Atty. Benjamin Santos and/or his wife, Atty.
Ofelia Calcetas-Santos. In one hearing, the Acting Presiding Judge
had not yet reported to his station and in that set hearing, counsel
for defendant LFS Enterprises, Inc. who must have known that His
Honor was not reporting did not likewise appear while other
counsels were present. This resulted to doubts on the partiality and
integrity of the Presiding Judge and complainants assert that he
should immediately move for his inhibition. Considering the
allegations to be malicious, derogatory and contemptuous,
respondent judge ordered both counsel and client to appear
before him. Atty. Rayos claimed that the allegations in the motion
did not necessarily express his views because he merely signed the
motion in a representative capacity, in other words, just lawyering,
for Kelly Wicker, who said in a note to him that a young man
possibly employed by the Court had advised him to have the case
reraffled. Finding petitioners explanation unsatisfactory, respondent
judge held them guilty of direct contempt and sentenced each to
suffer imprisonment for five (5) days and to pay a fine of P100.00.
Issues: Whether or not petitioner and his counsel should be held
guilty of contempt
Held: Yes. The allegations are derogatory to the integrity and honor
of respondent judge and constitute an unwarranted criticism of the
administration of justice in this country. They suggest that lawyers,
if they are well connected, can manipulate the assignment of judges
to their advantage. The truth is that the assignments of Judges
Arcangel and Capulong were made by this Court, by virtue of
Administrative Order No. 154-93, precisely in the interest of an
efficient administration of justice and pursuant to Sec. 5 (3), Art. VIII
of the Constitution. Atty. Rayos’ claims that he merely did what he
had been bidden to do by his client of whom he was merely a
mouthpiece is untenable. Based on Canon 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, Atty. Rayos bears as much responsibility
for the contemptuous allegations in the motion for inhibition as his
client. His duty to the courts is not secondary to that of his
client. The Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins him to
observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial
officers and to insist on similar conduct by others and not to
attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the record or have
materiality to the case.
However, the Court believes that consistent with the rule that the
power to cite for contempt must be exercised for preservative
rather than vindictive principle and the jail sentence on petitioners
may be dispensed with while vindicating the dignity of the court.
Therefore, the ruling against petitioners is modified by DELETING
the sentence of imprisonment for five (5) days and INCREASING the
fine from P 100.00 to P200.00 for each of the petitioners.
Montecillo v. Gica
Jorge Montecillo was accused by Francisco Gica of slander. Atty.
Quirico del Mar represented Montecillo and he successfully
defended Monteceillo in the lower court. Del Mar was even able to
win their counterclaim thus the lower court ordered Gica to pay
Montecillo the adjudged moral damages.
Gica appealed the award of damages to the Court of Appeals where
the latter court reversed the same. Atty. Del Mar then filed a
motion for reconsideration where he made a veiled threat against
the Court of Appeals judges intimating that he thinks the CA
justices “knowingly rendered an unjust decision” and “judgment
has been rendered through negligence” and that the CA allowed
itself to be deceived.
The CA denied the MFR and it admonished Atty. Del Mar from
using such tone with the court. Del Mar then filed a second MFR
where he again made threats. The CA then ordered del Mar to
show cause as to why he should not be punished for contempt.
Thereafter, del Mar sent the three CA justices a copy of a letter
which he sent to the President of the Philippines asking the said
justices to consider the CA judgment. But the CA did not reverse its
judgment. Del Mar then filed a civil case against the three justices
of the CA before a Cebu lower court but the civil case was
eventually dismissed by reason of a compromise agreement where
del Mar agreed to pay damages to the justices. Eventually, the CA
suspended Atty. Del Mar from practice.
The issue reached the Supreme Court. Del Mar asked the SC to
reverse his suspension as well as the CA decision as to the
Montecillo case. The SC denied both and this earned the ire of del
Mar as he demanded from the Clerk of the Supreme Court as to
who were the judges who voted against him.
The Supreme Court then directed del Mar to submit an explanation
as to why he should not be disciplined. Del Mar in his explanation
instead tried to justify his actions even stating that had he not been
“convinced that human efforts in [pursuing the case] will be
fruitless” he would have continued with the civil case against the CA
justices. In his explanation, del Mar also intimated that even the
Supreme Court is part among “the corrupt, the grafters and those
allegedly committing injustice”.
Del Mar even filed a civil case against some Supreme Court justices
but the judge who handled the case dismissed the same.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Del Mar should be suspended.
HELD: Yes. Atty. Del Mar, by his contemptuous acts is in violation
of his duties to the courts. As an officer of the court, it is his sworn
and moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily the
high esteem and regard towards the court so essential to the
proper administration of justice.
It is manifest that del Mar has scant respect for the two highest
Courts of the land when on the flimsy ground of alleged error in
deciding a case, he proceeded to challenge the integrity of both
Courts by claiming that they knowingly rendered unjust judgment.
In short, his allegation is that they acted with intent and malice, if
not with gross ignorance of the law, in disposing of the case of his
client.
Del Mar was then suspended indefinitely.
Sangalang v. IAC
Lawyer’s Act:
Atty. J. Cezar Sangco, counsel for the petitioners Spouses Jose and
Lutgarda Sangalang, allegedly used intemperate and accusatory
language in his motion for reconsideration. The Court finds Atty.
Sangco's remarks in his motion for reconsideration, particularly, “. . .
The Court not only put to serious question its own integrity
and competence but also jeopardized its own campaign against
graft and corruption undeniably pervading the judiciary . . .”
disparaging, intemperate, and uncalled-for.
Court’s Ruling:
His suggestions that the Court might have been guilty of graft and
corruption in acting on these cases are not only unbecoming, but
comes, as well, as an open assault upon the Court’s honor and
integrity.
Atty. Sangco is entitled to his opinion, but not to a license to insult
the Court with derogatory statements and recourses to argumenta
ad hominem. In that event, it is the Court’s duty "to act to preserve
the honor and dignity .. and to safeguard the morals and ethics of
the legal profession."
We sought to hold Atty. Sangco in contempt, specifically, for resort
to insulting language amounting to disrespect toward the Court
within the meaning of Section 1, of Rule 71, of the Rules of Court.
Clearly, however, his act also constitutes malpractice as the term is
defined by Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Atty. J. Cezar Sangco is (1) SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
three (3) months effective from receipt hereof, and (2) ORDERED to
pay a fine of P 500.00
Paragas v. Cruz
FACTS: Atty. Jeremias T. Sebastian, acting as counsel de parte for
petitioner Rosauro Paragas, stated in his written motion, that his
client petitioner Paragas prays for a reconsideration of the
resolution the Court has given on ground that it ―constitutes a
violation of the most important right in the Bill of Rights of the
Constitution of the Philippines, a culpable violation which is a
ground for impeachment‖ He also mentioned in his written motion,
―when the laws and the rules are violated, the victims resort,
sometimes, to armed force and to the ways of the cave-men! We do
not want Verzosa and Reyes repeated again and again, killed in the
premises of the Supreme Court and in those of the City Hall of
Manila.‖
Considering that the foregoing expressions are derogatory to the
dignity of the Court, the Court required Atty. Sebastian to answer
why he should not be punished. Atty. Sebastian said that he did not
intend to file an impeachment against the Justices and that it is a
―herculean‖ task which only exceptional men can do. He also said
that it is only ―a statement of fact and of their wish. That based on
observation, when the laws and the rules are violated, the victims,
sometimes, resort to armed force and to the ways of the cavemen.‖
He finally contended that he is just against repetition of these acts
of subversion and hate. ISSUE/S: WON Atty. Sebastian is liable for
contempt due to the derogatory things that he said HELD: Yes. Atty
Sebastian is liable for contempt due to the derogatory things that
he said. RATIO: Counsel should conduct himself towards the judges
who try his cases with that courtesy all have a right to expect. As an
officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and
not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards the
courts so essential to the proper administration of justice.Atty.
Sebastian failed to observe this. The expressions contained in the
written motion of Atty. Sebastian are plainly contemptuous and
disrespectful, and reference to the recent killing of two employees
is but a covert threat upon the members of the Court. That such
threats and disrespectful language contained in a pleading filed in
Courts are constitutive of direct contempt. Counsel's disavowal of
any offensive intent is of no avail, for it is a well-known and
established rule that defamatory words are to be taken in the
ordinary meaning attached to them by impartial observers.
People v. Carillo
In Re: Aguas
FACTS:
From the record during the progress of the trial before the Court of
first instance in Pampanga, the court had occasion to
caution Angel Alberto, a witness in the case, not to look
at the attorney for the defendant but to fix his attention on the
judge who was at the time examining him. The witness did not
give heed of the warning, thereupon the judge arose from his
seat and approach the witness, seized him by the shoulders and
using the expression “lingon ang mucha” (look at me) either
shook him, as insisted by the attorney of the defendant, or only
turned him about, as claimed by the judge and others. Whether the
witness was shaken or not, at all events” seizing him” brought the
action and protest against the action of the judge as coercive of the
witness and demanded that a record be made of the occurrence
and that the further hearing of the case be postponed. Two days
after the clerk of court entered a record a recital of the
incident and a statement that on other and prior occasion, the
attorney, Marcelino Aguas had been wanting in respect to the court
by making use of “improper phrases” and by interrupting the
opposing counsel in the examination of the witness. The lower court
adjudged the attorney to be in contempt of court and suspended
him from practice of his profession for a period of 20 days.
The attorney appealed but his appeal has been denied by the
lower court, he asked to be heard in justification which was granted.
ISSUE:
1. WON the attorney is disrespectful to the court or offensive to to
dignity?
2. WON the attorney had the right to protest and to demand that
the incident be made a matter of record?
HELD: the opinion of the court that the action of the judge in
seizing Alberto Aguas by the shoulder and turning him about was
unwarranted and an interference with that freedom from unlawful
personal violence to which every witness is entitled while giving
testimony in a court of justice. Against such conduct the appellant
had the right to pretest and to demand that the incident be made a
matter of record. That he did so was not contempt, providing
protest and demand were respectfully made and with due regard
for the dignity of the court XXXX
*** While lawyers are prohibited to attribute motives to a
judge not supported by the record, lawyers must however be
courageous enough to expose arbitrariness and injustices of
courts and judges
Maceda v. Ombudsman
FACTS: Petitioner Bonifacio Sanz Maceda, Presiding Judge of Branch
12 of the Regional Trial Court of Antique, seeks the review of the
following orders of the Office of the Ombudsman: (1) the Order
dated September 18, 1991 denying the ex-parte motion to refer to
the Supreme Court filed by petitioner; and (2) the Order dated
November 22, 1951 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration
and directing petitioner to file his counter-affidavit and other
controverting evidences. In his affidavit-complaint dated April 18,
1991 filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, respondent
Napoleon A. Abiera of the Public Attorney's Office alleged that
petitioner had falsified his Certificate of Service 1 dated February 6,
1989, by certifying "that all civil and criminal cases which have been
submitted for decision or determination for a period of 90 days
have been determined and decided on or before January 31, 1998,"
when in truth and in fact, petitioner knew that no decision had been
rendered in five (5) civil and ten (10) criminal cases that have been
submitted for decision. Respondent Abiera further alleged that
petitioner similarly falsified his certificates of service for the months
of February, April, May, June, July and August, all in 1989; and the
months beginning January up to September 1990, or for a total of
seventeen (17) months. On the other hand, petitioner contends that
he had been granted by this Court an extension of ninety (90) days
to decide the aforementioned cases.
Petitioner also contends that the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction
over said case despite this Court's ruling in Orap vs. Sandiganbayan,
since the offense charged arose from the judge's performance of his
official duties, which is under the control and supervision of the
Supreme Court. Furthermore, the investigation of the Ombudsman
constitutes an encroachment into the Supreme Court's
constitutional duty of supervision over all inferior courts. ISSUE/S:
WON the investigation made by the Ombudsman constitutes an
encroachment into the SC‘s constitutional duty of supervision over
all inferior courts.
HELD: Yes.
RATIO: The Court disagrees with the first Part of petitioner's basic
argument. There is nothing in the decision in Orap that would
restrict it only to offenses committed by a judge unrelated to his
official duties. A judge who falsifies his certificate of service is
administratively liable to the Supreme Court for serious misconduct
and inefficiency under Section 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and
criminally liable to the State under the Revised Penal Code for his
felonious act.
However, The Court agrees with petitioner that in the absence of
any administrative action taken against him by this Court with
regard to his certificates of service, the investigation being
conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the Court's power
of administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel, in
violation of the doctrine of separation of powers. Article VIII, section
6 of the 1987 Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme Court
administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from
the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals down to the lowest
municipal trial court clerk. By virtue of this power, it is only the
Supreme Court that can oversee the judges' and court personnel's
compliance with all laws, and take the proper administrative action
against them if they commit any violation thereof. No other branch
of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul
of the doctrine of separation of powers.
The Ombudsman cannot justify its investigation of petitioner on the
powers granted to it by the Constitution, 3 for such a justification
not only runs counter to the specific mandate of the Constitution
granting supervisory powers to the Supreme Court over all courts
and their personnel, but likewise undermines the independence of
the judiciary. Thus, the Ombudsman should first refer the matter of
petitioner's certificates of service to this Court for determination of
whether said certificates reflected the true status of his pending
case load, as the Court has the necessary records to make such a
determination.
The Ombudsman cannot compel this Court, as one of the three
branches of government, to submit its records, or to allow its
personnel to testify on this matter, as suggested by public
respondent Abiera in his affidavit-complaint. In fine, where a
criminal complaint against a Judge or other court employee arises
from their administrative duties, the Ombudsman must defer action
on said complaint and refer the same to this Court for
determination whether said Judge or court employee had acted
within the scope of their administrative duties. Under 11.05 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility which provides: A lawyer shall
submit grievances against a Judge to the proper authorities only.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The
Ombudsman is hereby directed to dismiss the complaint filed by
public respondent Atty. Napoleon A. Abiera and to refer the same
to this Court for appropriate action.
Fernandez v. De Ramos-Villalon
FACTS:
In 2004, Palacios, a lot owner in Makati, sought the help of
Fernandez to help him in a land grabbing case. Palacios won the
case and he allegedly agreed to pay Fernandez 2M. In 2005, Palacios
bumped into one Mrs. Lirio and to his surprise, he found out that
Fernandez was trying to sell HIS Makati property. Fernandez has for
his basis an alleged deed of donation that Palacio executed in favor
of Fernandez. Palacios, with the help of Atty. Villalon, filed a
complaint in order to nullify the deed of donation. Fernandez
answered that he had an Absolute Deed of Sale in his favor from
Palacios. Thereafter, Villalon was charged by Palacios for violation of
rules 10.01, 10.02, 10.03 among others. He claims that Villalon
suppressed and excluded in the complaint the existence of an
unregistered but notarized deed of absolute sale. Villalon counters
that as counsel of Palacios she is under no duty to include the fact
that there existed a deed of sale because only her client’s operative
facts and not other evidentiary facts needed to be included n the
complaint. The deed of sale was a matter of defense that
Fernandez, as defendant could raise as a matter of defense.
ISSUE:
Did the non-inclusion of the deed of sale in the complaint
amount to a violation of 10.01, 02, 03?
HELD:
No. A lawyer has the duty to be truthful in all his dealings,
however this duty does not require him to advance matters of
defense on behalf of his or her client’s opponent. Villalon was not
duty bound to build the case for Fernandez. The cause of action
chosen by Palacios was for the annulment of the deed of donation.
Palacios had told her that the deed of sale was void for lack of
consideration. It was not a necessary fact for his case. Only the
client’s operative facts and not the other evidentiary facts need to
be included in the Complaint. It is correct for the respondent to
argue that pointing out the existence of the January 12 Deed of
Absolute Sale was a matter of defense which the defendant in said
civil case can freely point out to the trial judge through his own
pleadings. It cannot be argued that there was suppression of
evidence on the part of the respondent as she is not the only person
who had access or possession of the said Deed of Absolute Sale. It
was a document readily available to the general public through the
Notarial Office. Moreover, it was a document which was fully known
to herein complainant as he was supposed to be a party to the said
Deed of Absolute Sale. In other words, a person cannot possibly
suppress the existence of a document which everyone else,
especially the opposing party-litigant, knows about.
Rivera v. Corral
Facts:
Jose Rivera, a Baptist pastor, filed a Complaint for Disbarment
against Atty. Napoleon Corral. The complaint charges Atty. Corral
with Malpractice and Conduct Unbecoming a Member of the
Philippine Bar. According to Rivera, Atty. Corral tampered with court
records by manually changing the entries of a Decision without the
Court”s knowledge and permission. Justice Ybanez wrote the
Decision (civil case — ejectment) on February 12, 1990. Atty.
Corral”s secretary received the Decision on February 23, 1990. On
March 13, 1990, Atty. Corral filed a Notice of Appeal. The
succeeding day, Atty. Corral went to the Office of the Clerk of Court,
Branch 7, Bacolod City and changed the date from February 23,
1990 to February 29, 1990. However, Atty. Corral soon realized that
there was no February 29, 1990. As a result, he filed a Reply to
Plaintiff”s Manifestation claiming that he actually received the
Decision on February 28, 1990.
Atty. Corral claimed that he corrected the papers in the presence
and with the approval of the Clerk of Court. He attributed the
correction to a typographical error.
The Court referred the case to the IBP for investigation, report and
recommendation. They found Atty. Corral guilty and recommended
his suspension for 6 months. Atty. Corral filed a motion for
reconsideration of the IBP”s decision but this was denied. Atty.
Corral filed a motion for reconsideration before the SC. He claimed
that there was no due process or hearing.
Issues:
1. W/N the penalty of suspension for 6 months is sufficient.
Held/Ratio:
1. NO.
The primary objective of administrative cases against lawyers is to
punish and discipline erring lawyers and to safeguard the
administration of justice by protecting the courts and the public
from the misconduct of lawyers. If it is evident that a lawyer lacks
moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor or is
unworthy to continues as an officer of the court, he may be
suspended or disbarred.
A lawyer must constantly “uphold the integrity and dignity of the
legal profession. He can do this by faithfully performing his duties to
society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients.” Every lawyer
should act and comport himself in such manner that would promote
public confidence in the integrity of the profession.
Atty. Corral violated his solemn oath as a lawyer by engaging in
unlawful, dishonest or deceitful conduct.
He committed an act of dishonesty by altering the material dates on
the Notice of Appeal. He made it seem that it was timely filed within
the period prescribed. He deceived his client into thinking that it
was filed on time. This constitutes as grave misconduct upon the
court. Further, his act is a “disgraceful indictment on his moral fiber
and personal fitness to his calling as a lawyer.” It is an
embarrassment to the members of the Bar. Atty. Corral is
suspended for one year and sternly warned that a repetition will
warrant a more severe penalty.
Johnny Ng v. Alar Adm. Case No. 7252
FACTS
Atty. Benjamin Alar is the counsel for the complainants in a labor
case filed with the Labor Arbiter which dismissed the complaint. On
appeal, NLRC’s First Division upheld the dismissal. In his Motion for
Reconsideration with Motion to Inhibit (MRMI), Atty. Alar used
improper and abusive language full of diatribes castigating the
Labor Arbiter and the ponente of the NLRC decision. Johnny Ng, one
of the respondents, filed a disbarment case against Alar before the
IBP Commission on Bar Discipline for such misbehavior.
Alar contended, inter alia, that the Rules of Court/Code of
Professional Responsibility applies only suppletorily at the NLRC
when the NLRC Rules of Procedure has no provision on disciplinary
matters for litigants and lawyers appearing before it and that Rule X
of the NLRC Rules of Procedure provides for adequate sanctions
against misbehaving lawyers and litigants appearing in cases before
it. Finally he asserted that the Rules of Court/Code of Professional
Responsibility does not apply to lawyers practicing at the NLRC, the
latter not being a court and that LAs and NLRC Commissioners are
not judges nor justices and the Code of Judicial Conduct similarly do
not apply to them, not being part of the judiciary.
ISSUE
Is a lawyer’s misbehavior before the NLRC susceptible of the
provisions of the Code of Professional Conduct?
HELD
The MRMI contains insults and diatribes against the NLRC, attacking
both its moral and intellectual integrity, replete with implied
accusations of partiality, impropriety and lack of diligence.
Respondent used improper and offensive language in his pleadings
that does not admit any justification.
The assertion that the NLRC not being a court, its commissioners,
not being judges or justices and therefore not part of the judiciary
and that consequently, the Code of Judicial Conduct does not apply
to them, is unavailing. In Lubiano v. Gordolla, the Court held that
respondent became unmindful of the fact that in addressing the
NLRC, he nonetheless remained a member of the Bar, an oath-
bound servant of the law, whose first duty is not to his client but to
the administration of justice and whose conduct ought to be and
must be scrupulously observant of law and ethics.
Respondent has clearly violated Canons 8 and 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. His actions erode the public’s
perception of the legal profession.
Fudot v. Cattleya Land
FACTS:
De La Serna requested that Justice Tinga, the ponente in the
Fudot case, be inhibited because it was alleged that he received 10
million pesos from Chan in exchange for a favorable decision. De La
Serna suggests that Tinga abandoned the doctrine in Lim v. Jorge to
accommodate Chan. He also said that Tinga prioritized the case and
that Chan already knew of the outcome of the case before the
decision was promulgated. Chan related that he approached De La
Serna for the purpose of amicably settling the case, and offered him
to be their retainer in Bohol. He denied having said to De La Serna
that he had already spent so much money for the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Serna is guilty of indirect contempt.
HELD:
Yes. Contempt is defined as a disobedience to the court by
setting up opposition to its authority, justice and dignity. It is not
only a willful disregard or disobedience of the court’s orders but it
also brings authority of the court and administration of law into
disrepute or in some manner impedes the due administration of
justice. Indirect contempt is one committed out of or not in the
presence of the court but tends to be little, degrade obstruct or
embarrass the court and justice. Improper conduct tending to
directly or indirectly impede obstruct or degrade the administration
of justice is also indirect contempt. A lawyer is first and foremost an
officer of the court and it is his duty to maintain the respect due to
the courts and judicial officers. While he is expected to bring forth
irregular and questionable practices of those sitting in court it is
important that this criticism shall be bona fide and shall not spill
over the walls of decency and propriety. His statements bear badges
of falsehood because the version of the witnesses disputes his
statements. He maliciously made these declarations irresponsibly.
The libelous attack on the integrity and credibility of Justice Tinga
degrade the dignity of the court and erode public confidence in it.
He is hereby fined P 3,000.00.
Facts:
De La Serna requests for the inhibition of Associate Justice Tinga,
claiming he received P10 Million from Johnny Chan in exchange for
a favorable decision in a land dispute. He relates that sometime in
2006, Chan informed him that he had already bought the interest of
Cattleya Land, Inc. (Cattleya) over a property adjacent to the
property subject of the case and that he was interested in putting
up a resort/hotel in the property. He wanted to purchase Fudot”s
interest in the property as well to put an end to the litigation.
They did not reach an agreement on the purchase price. In 2007, a
certain Atty. Petralba also had advanced knowledge of the decision.
According to De La Serna, Chan also told him that all negotiations
for the purchase of his clients rights were off and that he had
already given out P10 million to Tinga in exchange for a favorable
Decision, De La Serna a legal retainer and a monthly fee to act as his
lawyer in Bohol.
In his pleadings, De La Serna reiterated that the decision in this case
was a “rogue decision” and “like a mad dog, it should be slain at
right.” He also finds it surprising that the instant case was decided
less than 2 years after it was submitted for resolution when the
Oppus has been pending for 10 years before the Court. Also, out of
20,000 other cases, why was this instant case selected and decided
upon in such a short time? The Court charged Atty. De La Serna with
indirect contempt. At the hearing, De La Serna reiterated his
arguments which was corroborated by his son. Chan admitted that
he approached De La Serna for the purpose of amicably settling
their case with Cattleya, and offered him to be their retainer in
Bohol. However, he denied having said to De La Serna that he had
already spent so much money for the Supreme Court. He and Atty.
Petralba added that the hearing was
the first time that they saw all the justices.
Issue:
1. W/N De La Serna should be charged with indirect contempt
Held/Ratio:
1. YES. An accusation of bribery is easy to concoct and difficult to
disprove, the complainant must present panoply of evidence in
support of such an accusation. It will take more than the
uncorroborated and independent statements of Atty. De La Serna to
cast an aura of credibility to his accusations.
The decision was promulgated on Sept. 13, 2007. Decisions of the
Court are posted in its website a few days after their promulgation.
In this case, the decision was published in the web on Sept. 19, or
before the decision was posted in the Manila Central Post Office on
Sept. 27. However, Mr. Chan stated that he learned of the decision
only sometime in October of 2007, after Atty. Petralba had told him
about it. It would be irrational for Chan to meet further with De La
Serna and when he had already paid for P10 Million pesos for a
favorable decision when he already had advanced knowledge.
Also, the Supreme Court is mandated by the Constitution to decide
cases within 2 years from the date of submission. As for the Oppus
case, it is no longer pending as it was already been disposed of and
was decided by another ponente. As pointed out by Justice Carpio,
there are no more than ten thousand cases pending in the Supreme
Court at any one time.
Claiming that De La Serna had been informed that a member of the
Court was involved in bribery, yet he chose to remain silent in the
meantime and to divulge the information long after he had come to
know that he lost the case.
He failed to inform the Court of this matter waited until Nov. 4,
2007 before he divulged the alleged bribery in his Request for
Inhibition which he did not even alleged in his prior Motion for
Reconsideration. While admitting that he did not even verify from
other sources if Mr. Chan”s statement had any factual basis, De La
Serna offers another feeble explanation for his delayed reaction in
that he could not just go to the Supreme Court and request for
investigation, as he could not even pass through the guards. A
lawyer of De La Serna”s caliber and experience would know that
there is a proper way of lodging a formal complaint for
investigation, including sending it by registered mail.
De La Serna is found guilty of indirect contempt of court.
Bondoc v. Judge Simbulan
Facts: Juan Pablo P. Bondoc (complainant) charged Judge Divina Luz
P. Aquino-Simbulan (respondent) with partiality, gross ignorance of
the law and gross misconduct in the handling the Criminal Case of
"People of the Philippines v. Salvador Totaan and Flordeliz Totaan.
The complainant alleged that during the initial pre-trial conference
on June 16, 2003, the respondent asked the lawyers of the parties
"to approach the bench and suggested that the cases be settled
because she did not want the accused (the spouses Totaan) to be
administratively suspended. The complainant further alleged that
the respondent strongly requested the complainant’s counsel to
exert all efforts to convince the complainant and his family to settle
the cases. Also, the complainant claimed that aside from showing
partiality, bias, concern, sympathy and inclination in favor of the
accused, the respondent humiliated Atty. Lanee David (wife of
Private Prosecutor Stephen David, was co-counsel for complainant
in the criminal cases) in open court. Lastly, the complainant alleged
that the bias, partiality, prejudice and inclination of the respondent
for the accused culminated in her order on the demurrer to
evidence dismissing the charges against the accused despite the fact
that the prosecution was able to prove by testimonial and
documentary evidence the irregularities committed by the accused,
Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer Salvador Totaan and Senior
Agrarian Reform Technologist Flordeliz Totaan; they processed and
approved the applications of at least thirteen (13) persons who
were not qualified to become farmer-beneficiaries as they were
neither farmers nor residents of the barangay or the municipality
where the subject property is located.
The respondent submitted her comment and pointed out that an
examination of the complaint would readily show that it was
prepared by the private prosecutors. She denied brokering a
settlement of the cases and fast-tracking the hearing of the cases in
favor of the accused as her only objective was to have a weekly
hearing. The respondent likewise denied the charge of partiality for
her failure to act on the suspension of the accused, contending that
it was the duty of the private prosecutors to file a motion to cite the
responsible heads of the government agencies for indirect
contempt for their failure to implement lawful orders of the court.
She claimed that in the absence of such motion, she assumed that
the accused had already been preventively suspended.
Issues: Whether or not Attys. Stephen David and Lanee David be
held liable for contempt of court
Held: Yes. The allegations in the complaint were unfounded and
baseless and should be dismissed. Other than the bare allegations
of the complainant, no proof was presented to corroborate the
charge that the respondent sought to have the criminal cases
settled; neither was there a showing that the respondent fast
tracked the cases to favor the accused. Canon 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility states that A lawyer shall observe and
maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and
should insist on similar conduct by others. While the complaint was
filed in the name of former Representative Juan Pablo P. Bondoc, he
never really appeared in court and it is reasonable to conclude that
the two lawyers crafted the complaint and incorporated therein all
the unfounded accusations against the respondent in order to
conceal their inadequacies in the handling of their client’s cases.
The defense of Attys. Stephen and Lanee David that what they did is
just a consequence of their commitment to their client can hardly
exculpate them as a client’s cause does not permit an attorney to
cross the line between liberty and license. Lawyers must always keep
in perspective that since they are administrators of justice, oath-
bound servants of society, their first duty is not to their clients, as
many suppose, but to the administration of justice. As a lawyer, he is
an officer of the court with the duty to uphold its dignity and
authority and not promote distrust in the administration of justice

Thus, Attys. Stephen L. David and Lanee S. Cui-David GUILTYof

Indirect Contempt and accordingly impose on each of them the
FINE of P2,500.00 with the STERN WARNING that a commission of a
similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.
CANON 12
People v. Jardin
FACTS:
The criminal prosecutions originated from a letter-
complaint of the Provincial Auditor of Quezon requesting the
Provincial Fiscal to file the necessary criminal action under Article
217 of the Revised Penal Code against Demetrio Jardin for
malversation of public funds thru falsification of public documents
on six counts. The cases were assigned to Assistant Fiscal Meliton V.
Angeles who set them for preliminary investigation. The accused
moved to postpone the investigation four times but the accused
and his counsel failed to appear every time. Inspire of their absence,
the preliminary investigation was conducted and shortly afterwards,
the six information’s were filed against the accused before the
Court of First Instance of Quezon City. The arraignment was set for
May 9, 1967. On the records it was show that from May 9, 1967, the
arraignment was re-set for June 6; then re-set for June 26; then
from August 16, the same was re-set for September 5, all because of
the motions for postponement filed at the instance of the accused.
When the arraignment of the accused was called on September 5,
1967, counsel for the accused verbally moved for reinvestigation on
the ground that the accused was not given the opportunity to
present his defense during the preliminary investigation. This was
granted by the court and the first reinvestigation was set on
November 24, 1967. Accused moved to postpone many times, failed
still to appear. When he finally appeared with his counsel, they
asked for 15 days to file memorandum. The memorandum was
never filed, so the investigating fiscal filed a manifestation before
the court that the records of these cases be returned and the trial
on the merits of the same be set. The court transferred the case to
new branch of CFI Quezon without acting on manifestation.
Arraignment date was set but more postponements was filed at the
instance of accused; moved for reinvestigation again. Arraignment
finally happened on Sept 8, 1970. Accused pleaded NOT GUILTY and
asked for trial to be postponed. On postponed date, accused asked
for another postponement.
ISSUE:
Whether the acts of the accused and his counsel obstruct
the administration of justice.
HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled that the dilatory tactics of the
defense counsel and the failure of both judge and the fiscal to take
effective counter measures to obviate the delaying acts constitute
obstruction of justice. An attorney as an officer of the court is called
upon to assist in the due administration of justice. Like the court
itself, he is an instrument to advance its cause. For this reason, any
act on the part of a lawyer that obstructs perverts or impedes the
administration of justice constitutes misconduct and justifies
disciplinary action against him.
Acts which amount to obstruction in the administration of justice
may take many forms. They include such acts as instructing a
complaining witness in a criminal action not to appear at the
scheduled hearing so that the case against the client, the accused,
would be dismissed. asking a client to plead guilty to a crime which
the lawyer knows his client did not commit, advising a client who is
detained for a crime to escape from prison prosecuting clearly
frivolous cases or appeals to drain the resources of the other party
and compel him to submit out of exhaustion and filing multiple
petitions or complaints for a cause that has been previously
rejected in the false expectation of getting favorable action.
Cabagui v. Court of Appeals
FACTS:
Under its Resolution of November 20, 1974, the Court,
acting on a third petition for review of a Court of Appeals decision
affirming petitioner’s conviction of the crime of malversation of
public funds, as filed on November 13, 1974 by his attorney,
Eugenio M. Millado, with address at Koronadal, South Cotabato,
ordered that said petition be expunged from the records and
required “Atty. Eugenio Millado to show cause within ten (10) days
from notice hereof why disciplinary action should not be taken
against him for trifling with the Court by filing this third petition
despite previous resolutions of this Court.” In its previous
Resolution of May 8, 1974 referring to the first two petitions filed by
respondent Millado on behalf of the same petitioner, the Court had
dismissed the secondpetition (filed on March 18, 1974) by
respondent Millado in the guise of a new petition for certiorari with
preliminary injunction but which merely raised again the same
questions in his first petition (filed on January 9, 1974) seeking to
set aside petitioner’s conviction for malversation of public funds, by
decision of the court of first instance of Misamis Oriental dated June
20, 1963 as affirmed with modification by the Court of Appeals’
decision dated June 8, 1973, for alleged lack of jurisdiction and
praying for reversal of the conviction or for a reduction of his
criminal liability by finding appellant-petitioner guilty of technical
malversation only for the amount of P1,161.65.
Said first petition had been denied on January 15, 1974 by virtue of
the petition having been filed late by 4 months and 25 days beyond
the last date for filing which fell due since August 15, 1973.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Respondent Millado is guilty of violating
Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
HELD:
The Court finds respondent, Attorney Eugenio M. Millado,
guilty of gross negligence in not having complied with a “show
cause” resolution and of abusing the right of recourse to the Court
by filing multiple petitions for the same cause in the false
expectation of getting favorable action from one division as against
the adverse action of the other division. The Court deems his
suspension from the practice of law since February, 1975 as
sufficient penalty and now lifts his suspension with the warning that
the commission in the future by respondent of the same or other
infractions shall be dealt with severely.
Casals v. Cusi Jr.
FACTS:
December 8, 1972, Atty. Leonido C. Delante as counsel for
respondents states that while he received notice of the Court's
resolution "no accompanying copy of the petition has been
attached hence the counsel would not be able to prepare the
comments filed his first motion for a ten-day extension of time to
submit respondents' comment. The Court granted first motion for
extension.
December 14, 1972, Atty. Primo O. Orellan on behalf of Delante,
Orellan & Associates as counsel for respondents filed a
second motion for extension of ten days to submit respondents'
comment on the ground that Atty. L.C. Delante, counsel of record,
got sick and that Atty. Delante has just recovered from his ailment.
December 28, 1972, Atty. Leonido C. Delante filed a third motion for
"a last extension of fifteen days to submit the comment, stating the
undersigned counsel already prepared the final draft but due to
pressure of work in his office and matters occasioned by the
Christmas season, the same has not been finalized and typed out
in a clean copy for filing.
The Court granted the said extensions totalling twenty-five days.
Having noted respondents' failure to file their comment
notwithstanding the numerous extensions, the Court resolved to
require Atty. Delante to explain and show cause why they failed to
file the required comment.
Atty. Delante in his explanation claimed that in view of his pressing
professional commitments, he requested his clients to have the
answer prepared by another lawyer Atty. Antonio Fernandez. It was
only upon receipt of the Court's resolution requiring his explanation
that he learned that Atty. Fernandez underwent a surgical
operation.
ISSUE: WON Atty. Delante’s explanation deserves credence?
HELD: NO.
In his previous motions for extension, he never mentioned his
belated allegation now that another lawyer had been retained.
In his second motion for extension, supra, Atty. Delante's law office
cited as reason the fact that he had gotten sick.
In his third motion for a last 15-day extension, Delante assured the
Court that he has already prepared the final draft and cited pressure
of work in his office and the Christmas Season for not having
finalized and typed out the comments in a clean copy.
His present explanation is not even borne out by Atty. Fernandez'
medical certificate which shows that he was confined in the hospital
for sinusitis only from December 23-26. Hence he had sufficient
time and opportunity to submit the comments by the extended
deadline.
He submits no explanation for his gross neglect in not seeing to it,
assuming that Atty. Fernandez was to prepare the required
comment, that the required comment was filed within the last
extension secured by him from the Court on his assurance that the
final draft was ready. His inaction unduly prevented and delayed for
a considerable period the Court's prompt disposition of the petition.
His unsatisfactory explanation evinces a willful disregard of his
solemn duty as an attorney to employ in the conduct of a case
"such means only as are consistent with truth and honor, and
never seek to mislead" the courts.
Court has in several instances suspended lawyers from the practice
of law for failure to file appellants' briefs in criminal cases despite
repeated extensions of time obtained by them, with the reminder
that "the trust imposed on counsel in accordance not only with the
canons of legal ethics but with the soundest traditions of the
profession would require fidelity on their part.”
The Court has ever stressed that a lawyer must do his best to honor
his oath, as there would be a great detriment to, if not a failure of
the administration of justice if courts could not rely on the
submissions and representations made by lawyers in the conduct
of a case.
The Court hereby suspends Atty. Leonido C. Delante from the
practice of law for a period of THREE (3) MONTHS effective from
his receipt of notice hereof, with the warning that repetition of the
same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
Roxas v. Court of Appeals
National Bank v. Uy Teng Piao
FACTS:
On September 9, 1924, the CFI of Manila rendered a judgment in
favor of PNB and against Uy Teng Piao in a civil case for the sum of
P17, 232.42 with interest at 7% from June 1, 1924, plus 10% of the
sum amount for attorney's fees and costs. The court ordered Uy
Teng Piao to deposit the amount with the clerk of the court within 3
months from the date of the judgment. In case of his failure to do
so, the 2 mortgaged properties described in TCT Nos. 7264 and
8274 should be sold at public auction in accordance with the law
and the proceeds applied to the payment of the judgment. Uy Teng
Piao failed to comply with the order of the court, and the sheriff of
the City of Manila sold the two parcels of land at public auction to
PNB for P300 and P1, 000 respectively. On February 11, 1925, PNB
secured from Uy Teng Piao a waiver of his right to redeem the
property described in TCT No. 8274. On the same date, the bank
sold said property to Mariano Santos for P8, 600. The other parcel
of land was subsequently resold by the bank for P2,700, because
the account of Uy Teng Piao was credited with the sum of P11, 300.
The bank credited Uy Teng Piao with the full amount.
The bank brought the present action to revive the judgment for the
balance of P11, 574.33, with interest at 7% per annum from August
1, 1930. Uy Teng Piao alleged that he waived his right to redeem the
land described in the TCT of the first parcel of land, in consideration
of an understanding between him and the bank that it would not
collect from him the balance of the judgment. It was on this ground
that the trial court absolved Uy Teng Piao from the complaint.
ISSUE/S:
1. WON there is an agreement between Uy Teng Piao and the bank
not to collect from him the remainder of the judgment
2. WON the appearance of one of the lawyers of PNB as a witness is
recognized
HELD:
1. None. Uy Teng Piao has failed to prove that there was an
agreement.
2. No. He must not testify as a witness for his client, unless it is
necessary as provided by the Code of Professional Responsibility
RATIO:
Uy Teng Piao has failed to prove any valid agreement on the part of
the bank not to collect from him the remainder of the judgment.
The alleged agreement rests upon the uncorroborated testimony of
the defendant. When asked on cross-examination if Pecson was not
in Iloilo at the time of the execution of Uy Teng Piao's waiver of his
right to redeem, he answered that he did not know; asked when
Pecson had spoken to him about the matter, he replied that he did
not remember. One of the attorneys for PNB testified that Uy Teng
Piao renounced his right to redeem the parcel of land in Calle
Ronquillo, because his friend (Mariano Santos) was interested in
buying it. The bank ought to have presented Pecson as a witness, or
his deposition if he was not residing in Manila at the time of the
trial. With respect to the testimony of the bank's attorney, although
the law does not forbid an attorney to be a witness and at the same
time an attorney in a cause, the courts prefer that counsel should
not testify as a witness unless it is necessary, and that they should
withdraw from the active management of the case.
Canon 19 of the Code of Legal Ethics:When a lawyer is a witness for
his client, except as to merely formal matters, such as the
attestation or custody of an instrument and the like, he should leave
the trial of the case to other counsel. Except when essential to the
ends of justice, a lawyer should avoid testifying in court in behalf of
his client. Uy Teng Piao's testimony as to the alleged agreement is
very uncertain. There is no mention as to such an agreement on the
part of the bank. It only provides the land in Calle Ronquillo.
If Pecson had made any such agreement as Uy Teng Piao claims, he
would have required Uy Teng Piao, a Chinese business man, to
waive his right to redeem both parcels of land, and that he would
have insisted upon some evidence of the agreement in writing. Uy
Teng Piao waived his right to redeem the land in Calle Ronquillo,
because a friend of his wished to purchase it and was willing to pay
P8, 600, and the bank agreed to credit Uy Teng Piao with the full
amount of the sale. If it be conceded that there was such an
understanding between Pecson and Uy Teng Piao, it is not shown
that Pecson was authorized to make any such agreement for the
bank. Only the board of directors or the persons empowered by the
board of directors could bind the bank by such an agreement. There
is no merit in the contention that since the bank accepted the
benefit of the waiver it cannot now repudiate the alleged
agreement. The fact that the bank after having bought the land for
P1, 000 resold it for P8,600 and credited the Uy Teng Piao with the
full amount of the resale was a sufficient consideration for the
execution of defendant's waiver of his right to redeem.
Berbano v. Barcelona
Doctrines:
• A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the
legal profession. The trust and confidence necessarily reposed by
clients require in the attorney a high standard and appreciation of
his duty to his clients, his profession, the courts and the public. The
bar should maintain a high standard of legal proficiency as well as of
honesty and fair dealing. Generally speaking, a lawyer can do honor
to the legal profession by faithfully performing his duties to
society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. To this end,
nothing should be done by any member of the legal fraternity which
might tend to lessen in any degree the confidence of the public in
the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the profession.
Facts:
Berbano seeks the disbarment of Atty. Barcelona for Malpractice
and Gross Misconduct Unbecoming a Lawyer, Dereliction of Duty
and Unjust Enrichment. Barcelona is one of the heirs of Hilapo.
Hilapo owns a lot in Alabang which is being claimed by Filinvest in a
case. The heirs of Hilapo appointed Mr. Daen as their attorney-in-
fact giving him authority to prosecute their case. Mr. Daen was
arrested on the strength of an expired warrant of arrest and he was
detained in jail. Since Mr. Daen needed the assistance of a lawyer
for his release, Atty. Barcelona was recommended. Atty. Barcelona
arrived in jail and Mr. Daen engaged his services to get him out.
Atty. Barcelona told Berbano that if they could produce FIFTY
THOUSAND pesos he will cause the release of Mr. Daen the
following day.
Since it was late in the evening, Berbano couldn”t produce 50k.
Atty. Barcelona insisted that he must pay even just a little so
Berbano gave him 15k. Atty. Barcelona went to ChowKing and
received the money there. Before he left, he asked Berbano to meet
him at Max”s Resto at around 12 noon. Atty. Barcelona left because
according to him, he would go see a justice from the SC who could
help the release of Mr. Daen.
The next day, Berbano went to Max”s Resto. He told Berbano that
he just came from the SC and that he “fixed” the case of Mr. Daen.
Berbano was surprised because he did not have with him any single
document at the time. Berbano handed him a “pay-to-cash” check
for 24k. Atty. Barcelona said that Justices of the SC do not accept
checks but he accepted it saying that he will have the check
rediscounted. The next morning, Atty. Barcelona called Berbano and
said that he was not able to rediscount the check and Berbano must
produce the amount of 5k and give it to him in Max”s Resto at 12
noon. Atty. Barcelona did not show up. Atty. Barcelona then called
their house and moved their meeting to Mcdo. He was not there.
His wife called Berbano to move the meeting to their house. In their
house, they gave 10k. They again met up with Atty. Barcelona and
gave him another 15k and 1k for gas.
A week after, Daen was still not released. When they called Atty.
Barcelona”s house he allegedly boarded a private plane to attend a
peace talk with the Muslims. Another week passed, Berbano saw
Atty. Barcelona and said that he will return the entire amount of
64k. But he never showed up and never returned their calls.
Issues:
1. W/N Atty. Barcelona should be disbarred?
Held/Ratio:
1. YES. Atty. Barcelona is guilty of culpable violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility:
CANON 1 — A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of
the land and promote respect for law and for legal processes.
CANON 7 — A lawyer shall at all times upholds the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession, and support the activities of the
integrated bar.
CANON 11 — A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due
to the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar
conduct by others.
CANON 16 — A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and
properties of his client that may
come into his possession.
Rule 16.01 — A lawyer shall account for all money or property
collected or received for or
from the client.
Atty. Barcelona has demonstrated a penchant for misrepresenting
to clients that he has the proper connections to secure the relief
they seek, and thereafter, ask for money, which will allegedly be
given to such connections. In this case, he misrepresented to
Berbano that he could get the release of Mr. Porfirio Daen through
his connection with a Supreme Court Justice. Not only that, he even
had the audacity to tell Berbano that the Justices of the Supreme
Court do not accept checks.
It”s also not his first time to be charged with and found guilty of
conduct unbecoming a lawyer. In a case filed by Gil Aquino, Atty.
Barcelona misrepresented that he could secure the restructuring of
a loan though his connection with a legal assistant named Gonzalo
in PNB. He got 60k from Aquino but there was no such employee by
the name of Gonzalo. (nawalan na ng pera na foreclose pa ang
property)
The Judiciary has been besieged enough with accusations of
corruption and malpractice. For a member of the legal profession to
further stoke the embers of mistrust on the judicial system with
such irresponsible representations is reprehensible and cannot be
tolerated. Atty. Barcelona made a mockery of the Judiciary and
further eroded public confidence in courts and lawyers.
Sebastian v. Bajar
Doctrines:
• An important factor in determining the existence of forum-
shopping is the vexation caused to the courts and the parties-
litigants by the filing of similar cases to claim substantially the same
reliefs.
• “While a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client, it should
not be at the expense of truth and administration of justice.”
Facts:
Bajar worked for the Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance (BALA) of
the Department of Agrarian Reform. She represented Tanlioco, an
agricultural lessee in a land owned, and respondent in an ejectment
case filed, by petitioner Sebastian”s wife. The RTC rendered
judgment against Tanlioco on the basis of a conversion order
converting the land use from agricultural to residential. The CA and
SC affirmed the ejectment.
Bajar, despite the finality of the ejectment order, filed with the RTC
a complaint for specific performance to produce the conversion
order. The RTC dismissed on the ground of res judicata and lack of
cause of action. Bajar then filed another case for maintenance of
possession, now with the DAR-Adjudication Board (DARAB).
Sebastian now filed an administrative case with the SC for
disbarment against Bajar for violation of Rule 10.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility since she misused the rules of
procedure through forum-shopping to obstruct the administration
of justice. Bajar filed a comment with the court alleging (1) that
Sebastian had no personality to file a complaint because he was not
the real party in interest and (2) that she only filed the cases to avail
of all the legal remedies attributed by the law to her client.
Sebastian submitted a reply alleging that Bajar did not confront the
issue on disbarment but merely passed upon the issues which were
already passed upon in the cases decided above.
(Not Really Important) The SC ordered Bajar to file a Rejoinder, but
Bajar only did so a year after because the Court ordered the NBI to
arrest and detain her. The SC forwarded the case with the IBP for
comment and the IBP recommended that Bajar be suspended
indefinitely because she clearly violated the rule against forum
shopping for purposes of delay. The Supreme Court noted the IBP”s
recommendation and the Court Administration issued a circular
regarding the notation. However, the IBP found out that despite
their recommendation Bajar still performed her duties as a lawyer.
The IBP recommended her disbarment.
Issues:
1. W/N complainant Sebastian had legal standing to file a complaint
against Bajar
2. (TOPIC) W/N Bajar was guilty of violating Rule 10.3 regarding
the misuse of rules of procedure toobstruct the administration of
justice.
3. W/N Bajar was guilty of disobedience to the SC for not complying
with their orders
4. W/N Bajar should be disbarred for violating the recommendation
by the IBP and subsequent “noting” of the SC
Held/Ratio:
1. YES. Administrative proceedings against lawyers are sui generis or
a class of its own. In a disbarment proceeding, the complainant
need not be a party-in-interest because the real party in interest is
the public. The complainant is merely an informant of the
wrongdoing of the lawyer.
2. YES. The fact that she merely availed of all the legal remedies
“available” to her client is not an excuse. While lawyers owe their
entire devotion to the interest of their clients and zeal in the
defense of their client”s rights, they should not forget that they are
first and foremost, officers of the court, bound to exert every
effort to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of
justice. Bajar”s act of filing cases with identical issues in other
venues despite the final ruling, affirmed by the Court of Appeals and
the Supreme Court, is beyond the bounds of the law.
3. YES. The SC”s orders to submit a reply and a rejoinder are not
mere requests. A Court”s Resolution is not to be construed as a
mere request, nor should it be complied with partially,
inadequately, or selectively. Bajar”s disobedience to these orders
shows her disrespect for the Court.
4. NO. The IBP”s recommendation, even though noted by the SC is
not tantamount to an order by the SC.
Therefore, prior to the resolution of this case, the suspension
recommended is ineffectual and Bajar is still entitled
to perform her duties.
BAJAR WAS MERELY SUSPENDED FOR THREE YEARS.
Hegna v. Paderanga
Doctrine:
• A lawyer ought to have known that he cannot acquire the
property of his client which is in litigation. A thing is said to be in
litigation not only if there is some contest or litigation over it in
court, but also the moment that becomes subject to the judicial
action of the judge.
Facts:
Hegna leased a portion of land, which was owned by the heirs of
Sabina Baclayon for 10 years. Hegna filed a case against the
Panaguinip spouses alleging that they entered the vacant portion of
the leased premises and then built a shop without his consent.
Despite his demands, they refused to comply with his demands. The
MTCC rendered a Decision in favor of Hegna, ordering the spouses
to vacate the leased premises.
Subsequently, Atty. Paderanga filed an Affidavit of Third-Party Claim
before Sheriff Suarin, the sheriff executing the judgment in the said
civil case. He claimed that he was the owner of another parcel of
land and a FUSO (Canter series) vehicle, which he bought from the
spouses, both of which could be erroneously levied by a writ of
execution issued in the civil case. he filed for Annulment of
Judgment with prayer for the issuance of an injunction and
temporary restraining order (TRO) with damages against Hegna,
Judge Rosales and Suarin.
Hegna sent a letter-complaint to the Office of the Bar Confidant
(OBC) against Paderanga for deliberately falsifying documents,
which caused delay in the execution of the decision, arguing that
the third-party claim was full of irregularities, one of which was that
the transfer of the properties were not registered with the Register
of Deeds.
Paderange replied that he did not bother to register such properties
for “estate-planning purposes” and that he had planned to re-sell
the properties.
The Court referred the administrative complaint to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP). The IBP found that there was a
multitude of irregularities surrounding the execution of the Affidavit
and, coupled with the letter sent by the Panaguinip spouses left
unrebutted by Paderanga, there is substantial evidence that the
Affidavit of Third Party Claim was purposely filed to thwart the
enforcement of the decision in the forcible entry case. This was also
adopted by the IBP Board of Governors who suspended Paderange
for 1 year.
Issue:
1. W/N Paderanga violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Held/Ratio:
1. YES. Although Paderange denied having acted as counsel for the
Panaguinips in the forcible entry case filed by complainant, his
involvement in the said case was still highly suspect. After the writ
of execution had been issued, he went with them to amicably settle
with Hegna on two separate occasions, ostensibly to protect his
own interests. He actually led Hegna to believe that he was, in fact,
the counsel for defendants-spouses. It was only after the meetings
had transpired that he received the affidavit of a third-party claim
executed by Paderange, stating that the he was the owner of the
property and motor vehicle.
The Court is more inclined to believe that when Hegna and the
Panaguinips failed to reach an agreement, Paderange came forward
as a third-party claimant to prevent the levy and execution of said
properties. He, therefore, violated Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which provides that a lawyer shall not
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. This
conduct has been construed not to pertain exclusively to the
performance of a lawyer”s professional duties.
In addition, while the act of registration of a document is not
necessary in order to give it legal effect as between the parties,
requirements for the recording of the instruments are designed to
prevent frauds and to permit and require the public to act with the
presumption that a recorded instrument exists and is genuine.
While Paderange”s acts may not be considered as falsification, he
had shown intent to defraud the government, which had the right
to collect revenue from him.
Plus Builders v. Revilla
FACTS:
A Petition for Disbarment was filed by Plus Builders Inc. and
Edgardo C. Garcia before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
against Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr. for committing a willful and
intentional falsehood before the court; misusing court procedure
and processes to delay the execution of a judgment; and
collaborating with non-lawyers in the illegal practice of law.
On November 15, 1999, a decision was rendered by the
Provincial Adjudicator of Cavite (PARAD) in favor of complainant,
Plus Builders, Inc. and against the tenants/farmers Leopoldo de
Guzman, et. al., who were the clients of respondent Atty. Anastacio
E. Revilla, Jr. The PARAD found that respondent’s clients were mere
tenants and not rightful possessors/owners of the subject land. The
case was elevated all the way up to the Supreme Court, with this
Court sustaining complainant’s rights over the land. Continuing to
pursue his clients’ lost cause, respondent was found to have
committed intentional falsehood; and misused court processes with
the intention to delay the execution of the decision through the
filing of several motions, petitions for temporary restraining orders,
and the last, an action to quiet title despite the finality of the
decision. Furthermore, he allowed non-lawyers to engage in the
unauthorized practice of law – holding themselves out as his
partners/associates in the law firm.
Respondent denied all allegations and believes that the
courses of action he took were valid and proper legal theory
designed to protect the rights and interests of Leopoldo de Guzman,
et. al. The lawyer-client relationship with the former lawyer was
terminated because Leopoldo de Guzman, et. al. felt that their
former counsel did not explain/argue their position very well,
refused to listen to them and, in fact, even castigated them. As the
new counsel, respondent relied on what the tenants/farmers told
him in the course of his interview. He avers that he merely
exhausted all possible remedies and defenses to which his clients
were entitled under the law. He submitted that if he was indeed
guilty of violating the rules in the courses of action he took in behalf
of his clients, he apologizes and supplicates the Court for kind
consideration, pardon and forgiveness.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent guilty of violating the attorney’s
oath, Canon 9 and Rule 9.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
HELD:
The Court held that Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr. is hereby found
guilty of gross misconduct. Taking the cudgels from the former
lawyer in this case is rather commendable, but respondent should
not forget his first and foremost responsibility as an officer of the
court. In support of the cause of their clients, lawyers have the duty
to present every remedy or defense within the authority of the law.
This obligation, however, is not to be performed at the expense of
truth and justice. This is the criterion that must be borne in mind in
every exertion a lawyer gives to his case. Under the Code of
Professional Responsibility, a lawyer has the duty to assist in the
speedy and efficient administration of justice, and is enjoined from
unduly delaying a case by impeding execution of a judgment or by
misusing court processes. After a careful consideration of herein
respondent’s motion for reconsideration and humble
acknowledgment of his misfeasance, the Court was persuaded to
extend a degree of leniency towards the respondent by reducing his
suspension period from two years to six months.
Fil-Garcia Inc. v. Hernandez
Fact
Filomeno Garcia, president of Fil-Garcia Inc., after losing his
case in the CA for a sum of money, secured the serviced of Atty.
Fernando Hernandez, who received the denied resolution for Garcia
as counsel, and was given 15 days to appeal.
Instead of filing the appeal, Hernandez filed for a Motion for
Extension the day before the expiration of the period to file the
appeal,, alleging that he was counsel for a mayoralty candidate and
a senatorial candidate, and he was also needed in the canvassing of
votes, so the urgency of the nature of his work will not allow him
the limited time to file the appeal, thus asked for 30 days extension.
30 days later, Hernandez again filed his 2nd Motion for
Extension, this time, because he fell ill, and his physical state will
not allow him to file the appeal on time, thus asking for 20 days
extension.
20 days later, the 3rd Motion for Extension was filed, with
the grand excuse that because he fell ill the last time, his work load
piled up, thus requiring him more time to conclude on the work
load he missed when he was ill, plus the appeal, hence the request
for 10 days extension, to which 10 days later, he did actually file the
appeal. (Finally!)
Of course, afterwards, Hernandez learned that all three
Motions for Extensions were denied by the court, and to his dismay,
received a copy of the resolution denying the appeal all together.
However, instead of informing his client, Fil-Garcia, he decides to
forward the resolution of denial of the appeal some 7 months later,
which greatly angered his client, pushing him to file for his
disbarment.
Issue
Is Hernandez liable for malpractice, gross misconduct,
tantamount to violation of his oath as a lawyer, which warrant his
disbarment?
Held
Yes, to gross negligence, but no to disbarment.
The filing of 3 motions for extension on the careless
assumption that each motion will be granted by the Court, and
without taking care of informing himself of the Court's action
thereon, constitutes inexcusable negligence. Moreover, respondent
knowingly referred to Rule 65 in the petition he belatedly filed as an
afterthought in his desperate attempt to salvage the appeal.
Rule 12.04 enjoins a lawyer not to "unduly delay a case, impede the
execution of judgment or misuse court proceedings." While
pressure of work or some other unavoidable reasons may constrain
a lawyer to file a motion for extension of time to file pleadings, he
should not presume that his motion for extension of time will be
granted. Motions for extension of time to file a pleading are not
granted as a matter of course but lie in the sound discretion of the
court. It is thus incumbent on any movant for extension to exercise
due diligence to inform himself as soon as possible of the Court's
action on his motion, by timely inquiry from the Clerk of Court.
Should he neglect to do so, he runs the risk of time running out on
him, for which he will have nobody but himself to blame.
A lawyer who finds it impracticable to continue as counsel should
inform the client and ask that he be allowed to withdraw from the
case to enable the client to engage the services of another counsel
who can study the situation and work out a solution.
To make matters worse, it took respondent 7 months from the time
he received a copy of the Court's resolution to inform complainant
of the same.
He was merely suspended for 6 months, considering that
respondent humbly admitted his fault in not immediately informing
complainant of the status of the case.
De Espino v. Atty. Presquito
De espino vs atty presquito
Mrs. Linda Vda. de Espino filed a letter-complain charging
respondentt"having employed fraud, trickery and dishonest means
in refusing to honor and pay late husband Virgilio Espino, when he
was still alive, the sum of P763,060.00" Respondent issues post
dated checks as payment. The 8 post-dated checks issued by
respondent were all dishonored. Mr. Espino made repeated
demands for payment from respondent but the latter refused. The
land was eventually titled in the name of respondent and Mrs ares
Defense:
Respondent denied any wrongdoing, "fraud,trickery and dishonest
means" with the late Mr. Espino were totally false and baseless but
does not deny the issuance of 8 check. .Respondents claim that he
and Mr. Espino, agreed that Mr Espino will not encash the checks
until the right of way problem has been resolved. In addition,
respondent claims that the balance would be offset with the cost he
incurred when he defended Mr. Espino’s son in a criminal case.
Ruling:
Having no legal defense to refuse payment of the eight dishonored
checks, respondent’s indifference to complainant’s entreaties for
payment was conduct unbecoming of a member of the bar and an
officer of the court. Respondent violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility by his unlawful, dishonest and deceitful conduct
towards complainant and her late husband, first by allowing the
eight (8) checks he issued to bounce, then by ignoring the repeated
demands for payment until complainant was forced to file this
complaint, and finally by deliberately delaying the disposition of this
case with dilatory tactics. Considering that the property of
complainant and her late husband is already in respondent and Mrs.
Ares’ name, the injustice of respondent’s different maneuvers to
evade payment of the eight checks - due and unpaid since 1996 -
becomes more manifest.
It should be stressed that respondent issued eight (8) worthless
checks, seemingly without regard to its deleterious effects to public
interest and public order. the issuance of worthless checks
constitutes gross misconduct, and puts the erring lawyer’s moral
character in serious doubt, though it is not related to his
professional duties as a member of the bar. ATTY. PEPITO C.
PRESQUITO is found guilty of gross misconduct and is hereby
suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year, and ordered to
immediately account with complainant regarding the sale of the
piece of land, which has been subdivided in the name of respondent
and his business partner.
Atty. Vaflor-Fabroa v. Atty. Paguinto
FACTS:
On October 10, 2001, complainant, who was Chairperson of
the General Mariano Alvarez Service Cooperative, Inc. (GEMASCO),
received a Notice of Special General Assembly of GEMASCO on
October 14, 2001 to consider the removal of four members of the
Board of Directors (the Board), including her and the General
Manager. The notice was signed by respondent. At the October 14,
2001 Special General Assembly presided by respondent and PNP Sr.
Supt. Angelito L. Gerangco (Gerangco), who were not members of
the then current Board, Gerango, complainant’s predecessor, as
Chair of the GEMASCO board, declared himself Chair, appointed
others to replace the removed directors, and appointed respondent
as Board Secretary.
On October 15, 2001, respondent and his group took over the
GEMASCO office and its premises, the pump houses, water facilities,
and operations. On even date, respondent sent letter-notices to
complainant and the four removed directors informing them of
their removal from the Board and as members of GEMASCO, and
advising them to cease and desist from further discharging the
duties of their positions.Complainant thus filed on October 16, 2001
with the Cooperative Development Authority (CDA)-Calamba a
complaint for annulment of the proceedings taken during the
October 14, 2001 Special General Assembly.
The CDA Acting Regional Director (RD), by Resolution of February
21, 2002, declared the questioned general assembly null and void
for having been conducted in violation of GEMASCO’s By-Laws and
the Cooperative Code of the Philippines. The RD’s Resolution of
February 21, 2002 was later vacated for lack of jurisdiction of CDA.
Thus, complainant files a disbarment case against respondent.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent is liable for violation of Canon
10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
HELD:
Respondent’s cavalier attitude in repeatedly ignoring the
orders of the Supreme Court constitutes utter disrespect to the
judicial institution. Respondent’s conduct indicates a high degree of
irresponsibility. A Court’s Resolution is "not to be construed as a
mere request, nor should it be complied with partially,
inadequately, or selectively". Respondent’s obstinate refusal to
comply with the Court’s orders "not only betrays a recalcitrant flaw
in her character; it also underscores her disrespect of the Court’s
lawful orders which is only too deserving of reproof.
Lawyers are called upon to obey court orders and processes and
respondent’s deference is underscored by the fact that willful
disregard thereof will subject the lawyer not only to punishment for
contempt but to disciplinary sanctions as well. In fact, graver
responsibility is imposed upon a lawyer than any other to uphold
the integrity of the courts and to show respect to their processes.
The Court notes that respondent had previously been
suspended from the practice of law for six months for violation of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, he having been found to
have received an acceptance fee and misled the client into believing
that he had filed a case for her when he had not. It appears,
however, that respondent has not reformed his ways. A more
severe penalty this time is thus called for.
Wherefore, respondent, Atty. Oscar P. Paguinto, is
SUSPENDED for two years from the practice of law for violation of
Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the
Lawyer’s Oath, effective immediately.
An Information for Estafa was filed, As the joint affidavit-complaint
did not indicate the involvement of complainant, complainant filed
a Motion to Quash the Information which the trial court granted.
complainant, who was Chairperson of the General Mariano Alvarez
Service Cooperative, Inc. (GEMASCO) was removed from the
position. respondent and his group took over the GEMASCO office
and its premises, the pumphouses, water facilities, and operations
and advising them to cease and desist from further discharging the
duties of their positions. both parties were ordered to submit
position papers. Complainant filed hers, but respondent, despite
grant, on his motion, of extension of time, did not file any position
paper.
Ruling:
Respondent's cavalier attitude in repeatedly ignoring the orders of
the Supreme Court constitutes utter disrespect to the judicial
institution. Respondent's conduct indicates a high degree of
irresponsibility. A Court's Resolution is "not to be construed as a
mere request, nor should it be complied with partially,
inadequately, or selectively". Respondent's obstinate refusal to
comply with the Court's orders "not only betrays a recalcitrant flaw
in her character; it also underscores her disrespect of the Court's
lawful orders which is only too deserving of reproof.
Lawyers are called upon to obey court orders and processes and
respondent's deference is underscored by the fact that willful
disregard thereof will subject the lawyer not only to punishment for
contempt but to disciplinary sanctions as well. In fact, graver
responsibility is imposed upon a lawyer than any other to uphold
the integrity of the courts and to show respect to their processes.
The Court notes that respondent had previously been suspended
from the practice of law for six months for violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, he having been found to have received
an acceptance fee and misled the client into believing that he had
filed a case for her when he had not. It appears, however, that
respondent has not reformed his ways. A more severe penalty this
time is thus called for.
WHEREFORE, respondent, Atty. Oscar P. Paguinto, is SUSPENDED for
two years from the practice of law
Bugaring and RBBI v. Hon. Espanol
FACTS:
On December 5, 1996, an incident subject of the petition occurred
during a hearing for Annulment of Sale and Certificates of Title
before respondent Judge Dolores S. Español of the Regional Trial
Court of Cavite, Imus, and Cavite. The trial court issued an order on
February 27, 1996 directing the Register of Deeds of the Province of
Cavite to annotate at the back of certain certificates of title a notice
of lis pendens. Before the Register of Deeds of the Province of
Cavite could comply with said order, the defendant Spouses
Alvaran, filed a motion to cancel lis pendens. On July 19, 1996,
petitioner, the newly appointed counsel of Royal Bechtel Builders,
Inc., filed an opposition to the motion to cancel lis pendens. On
August 16, 1996, the motion to cancel lis pendens was granted by
the court. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was
opposed by the defendants. On November 5, 1996, petitioner filed
an Urgent Motion to Resolve, and on November 6, 1996, filed a
Rejoinder to Opposition and Motion for Contempt of Court. During
the hearing of this case, plaintiffs and counsel were present
together with one (1) operating a video camera who was taking
pictures of the proceedings of the case while counsel, Atty. Rexie
Efren Bugaring was making manifestation to the effect that he was
ready to mark his documentary evidence pursuant to his Motion to
cite (in contempt of court) the Deputy Register of Deeds of Cavite,
Diosdado Concepcion.
The Court called the attention of said counsel who explained that he
did not cause the appearance of the cameraman to take pictures;
however, he admitted that they came from a function, and that was
the reason why the cameraman was in tow with him and the
plaintiffs. Notwithstanding the flimsy explanation given, the counsel
sent out the cameraman after the Court took exception to the fact
that although the proceedings are open to the public and that it
being a court of record and since its permission was not sought,
such situation was an abuse of discretion of the Court. When the
respondent, Deputy Register of Deeds Concepcion manifested that
he needed the services of counsel and right then and there
appointed Atty. Elpidio Barzaga to present him, the case was ISSUE/S: WON the appellate court committed error in affirming the
allowed to be called again. On the second call, Atty. Burgaring assailed order of the trial court
started to insist that he be allowed to mark and present his
HELD: Yes. The appellate court committed error in the affirmation
documentary evidence in spite of the fact that Atty. Barzaga was
of the trial court order
still manifesting that he be allowed to submit a written pleading for
his client, considering that the Motion has so many ramifications RATIO: Behaving without due regard or deference to his fellow
and the issues are complicated. counsel who at the time he was making representations in behalf of
the other party, was rudely interrupted by the petitioner and was
At this point, Atty. Bugaring was insisting that he be allowed to
not allowed to further put a word in edgewise is violative of Canon
mark his documentary evidence and was raring to argue as in fact
8 of the Code of Professional Ethics which obliges a lawyer to
he was already perorating despite the fact that Atty. Barzaga has
conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his
not yet finished with his manifestation. As Atty. Bugaring appears to
professional colleagues. Indeed, the conduct of petitioner in
disregard orderly procedure, the Court directed him to listen and
persisting to have his documentary evidence marked to the extent
wait for the ruling of the Court for an orderly proceeding. While
of interrupting the opposing counsel and the court showed
claiming that he was listening, he would speak up anytime he felt
disrespect to said counsel and the court, was defiant of the court's
like doing so. Thus, the Court declared him out of order, at which
system for an orderly proceeding, and obstructed the
point, Atty. Bugaring flared up the uttered words insulting the
administration of justice. The power to punish for contempt is
Court; such as: 'that he knows better than the latter as he has won
inherent in all courts and is essential to the preservation of order in
all his cases of certiorari in the appellate Courts, that he knows
judicial proceedings and to the enforcement of judgments, orders,
better the Rules of Court; that he was going to move for the
and mandates of the court, and consequently, to the due
inhibition of the Presiding Judge for allegedly being antagonistic to
administrative of justice.
his client,' and other invectives were hurled to the discredit of the
Court. Thus, in open court, Atty. Bugaring was declared in direct Sambajon et al v. Atty. Suing
contempt and order the Court's sheriff to arrest and place him
under detention. To clear his name in the legal circle and the Complainants have sought the disbarment of Atty. Jose A. Suing
general public, petitioner filed a petition before the Court of (respondent) on the grounds of deceit, malpractice, violation of
Appeals praying for the annulment of the Order. Lawyers Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility.[2]

The Court of Appeals found that from a thorough reading of the
transcript of stenographic notes of the hearing held on December 5,
1996, it was obvious that the petitioner was indeed arrogant, at
times impertinent, and too argumentative, to the extent of being
disrespectful, annoying and sarcastic towards the court.
Sambajon, et al. are parties to a previous labor case in which the
Atty. Jose Suing is the counsel of their employer Microplast, Inc. A
judgment in favor of them was rendered by the Labor Arbiter and a
writ of execution was issued against Microplast, Inc.
Four of the seven who purportedly executed the Release Waiver
and Quitclaims, denied having signed and sworn to before the
Labor Arbiter the said documents or having received the
considerations therefor. They subsequently filed an administrative
complaint alleging that respondent, acting in collusion with his
clients Johnny and Manuel Rodil, ―frustrated‖ the implementation
of the Writ of Execution by presenting before the Labor Arbiter the
spurious documents. A Complaint seeking the disbarment of Atty.
Jose A. Suing on the grounds of deceit, malpractice, violation of
Lawyer’s Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility was also
filed.
During the administrative hearings before the IBP Commissioner, it
was apparent that Atty. Suing was coaching his client to prevent
himself from being incriminated. It was also revealed that the
Release Waiver and Quitclaims allegedly signed were not the same
documents originally presented to the employees to be signed.
client with diligence by adopting that norm of practice expected of
men of good intentions. He thus owes entire devotion to the
interest of his client, warm zeal in the defense and maintenance of
his rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning, skill, and ability to
ensure that nothing shall be taken or withheld from him, save by
the rules of law legally applied. It is axiomatic in the practice of law
that the price of success is eternal diligence to the cause of the
client.
As an officer of the court, a lawyer is called upon to assist in the
administration of justice. He is an instrument to advance its cause.
Any act on his part that tends to obstruct, perverts or impedes the
administration of justice constitutes misconduct. While the
Commission on Bar Discipline is not a court, the proceedings therein
are nonetheless part of a judicial proceeding, a disciplinary
action being in reality an investigation by the Court into
the misconduct of its officers or an examination into his character.

ISSUE: Whether or not the acts of Respondent Atty. Suing is an act

arguably violative of the Lawyers’ Code of Ethics

HELD: Atty. Jose A. Suing, is found GUILTY of negligence and gross

misconduct and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period
of Six (6) Months

The practice of law does not require extraordinary diligence

(exactissima diligentia) or that ―extreme measure of care and
caution which persons of unusual prudence and circumspection use
for securing and preserving their rights. All that is required is
ordinary diligence (diligentia) or that degree of vigilance expected of
a bonus pater familias.

Diligence is ―the attention and care required of a person in a given

situation and is the opposite of negligence.‖ A lawyer serves his
CANON 13
Austria v. Masaquel
FACTS:
Respondent Judge Masaquel rendered a decision declaring the
plaintiffs (one of them is Domingo Austria) the owners of the three
parcels of land in question located at San Carlos and Bayambang in
the province of Pangasinan. Pedro Bravo was ordered to vacate the
lands and pay the plaintiffs damages only with respect to the land
located at Bayambang. The plaintiffs filed a motion for the
immediate execution of the judgment — which motion was granted
by respondent Judge Masaquel and, upon the plaintiffs' having
posted a surety bond in the sum of P2,000.00, the sheriff placed
them in possession of the lands located at San Carlos. Atty. Mariano
C. Sicat, a former assistant or associate of Judge Masaquel, when
the latter was still in the practice of law before his appointment to
the bench, entered his appearance as the new counsel for
defendant Pedro Bravo.
Through Atty. Sicat, Bravo then filed a supersedeas bond to stay the
execution of the judgment, which was later on granted by Judge
Masaquel. Austria had asked for the appointment of a receiver over
the parcel of land located at Bayambang, which prayer was granted
by Judge Masaquel, but upon the filing of a bond by Bravo for the
non-appointment of a receiver, the order receivership was set
aside. Pending the approval of the defendant's amended record on
appeal, Atty. Sicat filed a motion for new trial. Judge Masaquel
granted the said motion. The hearing on the retrial was finally set.
Before the opening of the court's session, Atty. Daniel Macaraeg,
counsel for Austria and his co-plaintiffs, saw Judge Masaquel in his
chamber and verbally transmitted to him the request of Austria that
he (the Judge) inhibit himself from further hearing the case upon
the ground that the new counsel for the defendant, Atty. Mariano
C. Sikat, was his former associate. Judge Masaquel, however,
rejected the request because, according to him, the reason for the
request of his inhibition is not one of the grounds for
disqualification of a judge provided for in the Rules of Court.
Judge called Domingo Austria, and inquired from the latter if it was
true that he asked his lawyer Atty. Macaraeg to approach the Judge
in chambers and to ask him to disqualify himself from trying this
case because defendant's lawyer, Atty. Sicat was formerly
associated with the said Judge. Austria was also asked if he has lost
faith in the sense of fairness and justice of the Presiding Judge of
this Court simply because of Judge Masaquel‘s former association
with the defendant's lawyer. Domingo Austria answered both in the
affirmative. Judge Masaquel declared said plaintiff Domingo Austria
in direct contempt of court and he was ordered to pay a fine of
P50.00. Petitioner Domingo Austria, accordingly, paid the fine of
P50.00 under protest. He filed this instant petition for certiorari
before this Court.
ISSUE/S: WON Domingo Austria should be held in direct contempt
of court.
HELD: No. Austria is not guilty of direct contempt of court.
RATIO:
When the petitioner requested respondent Judge to inhibit himself
from further trying the case upon the ground that the counsel for
the opposite party was the former associate of the respondent
Judge, petitioner did so because he was impelled by a justifiable
apprehension which can occur in the mind of a litigant who sees
what seems to be an advantage on the part of his adversary; and
that the petitioner made his request in a manner that was not
disrespectful, much less insulting or offensive to the respondent
Judge or to the court.
The respondent Judge had decided the case in favor of petitioner
and his co-plaintiffs, and that upon plaintiffs' timely motion and
filing of bond they were already placed in possession of the lands in
question pending appeal. It was when Atty. Sicat took over as new
counsel for defendant that the latter was given back the properties,
upon a motion to stay the execution of the judgment which was
filed by said counsel and was granted by respondent Judge over the
opposition of petitioner's counsel. Again, when the same counsel
for defendant filed a motion for a new trial, said motion was
granted by respondent Judge in spite of the vigorous objection of
counsel for the petitioner and his co-plaintiffs.
And then the petitioner became aware of the fact that his
adversary, the defendant Pedro Bravo, had been boasting in San
Carlos that he was sure to win his case because of his new lawyer.
While it is true that respondent Judge may not be compelled to
disqualify himself, the fact that Atty. Sicat, admittedly his former
associate, was counsel for a party in the case being tried by him,
may constitute a just or valid reason for him to voluntarily inhibit
himself from hearing the case on a retrial, if he so decides, pursuant
to the provision of the second paragraph of Section 1 of the said
Rule 137.
Due process of law requires a hearing before an impartial and
disinterested tribunal, and that every litigant is entitled to nothing
less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. Moreover,
second only to the duty of rendering a just decision, is the duty of
doing it in a manner that will not arouse any suspicion as to its
fairness and the integrity of the Judge.
Gallo v. Cordero
Martelino v. Alejandro
FACTS:
This case presents another aspect of the court-martial proceedings
against the petitioner, Major Eduardo Martelino, alias Abdul Latif
Martelino, of the AFP, and the officers and men under him, for
violation of the Articles of War, as a result of the alleged shooting of
some Muslim recruits then undergoing commando training on the
island of Corregidor. At the hearing, petitioner Martelino sought the
disqualification of the President of the general court-martial,
following the latter's admission that he read newspaper stories of
the Corregidor incident which had come to be referred to as the
"Corregidor massacre". The petitioner's counsel referred to a news
item appearing in the July 29, 1969 issue of the Daily Mirror and
cited other news reports to the effect that "coffins are being
prepared for the President (of the Philippines) in Jolo," that
according to Senator Aquino "massacre victims were given sea
burial," and that Senator Magsaysay, opposition Vice President
candidate, had gone to Corregidor and "found bullet shells."
In addition the petitioners cite in this Court a Manila Times editorial
of August 26, 1969 which states that "The Jabidah [code name of
the training operations] issue was bound to come up in the course
of the election campaign. The opposition could not possibly ignore
an issue that is heavily loaded against the administration."
The petitioners argue that the case had received such an amount of
publicity in the press and other news media and in fact was being
exploited for political purposes in connection with the presidential
election as to imperil his right to a fair trial. The petitioners further
allege that the adverse publicity given in the mass media to the
Corregidor incident, coupled with the fact that it became an issue
against the administration in the 1969 elections, was such as to
unduly influence the members of the court-martial. In support of
their contention they invoke the rulings of the United States
Supreme Court in Irvin v. Dowd, Rideau vs. Louisiana, Estes v. Texas,
and Shepard v. Maxwell.
In their answer, the respondents as members of the general court-
martial assert that despite the publicity which the case had
received, no proof has been presented showing that the court-
martial's president's fairness and impartiality have been impaired.
ISSUE/S: WON the publicity given to the case against the petitioners
was such as to prejudice their right to a fair trial.
HELD:
No. The spate of publicity did not focus on the guilt of the
petitioners.
RATIO:
Rule 13.02 - A lawyer shall not make public statements in the media
regarding a pending case tending to arouse public opinion for or
against a party.
An examination of the cases cited, however, will show that they are
widely disparate from this case in a fundamental sense. In Irvin, for
instance, the Supreme Court found that shortly after the
petitioner's arrest in connection with six murders committed, the
prosecutor and police officials issued press releases stating that the
petitioner had confessed to the six murders and that "a barrage of
newspaper headlines articles, cartoons and pictures was unleashed
against him during the six or seven months preceding his trial." Irvin
marks the first time a state conviction was struck down solely on
the ground of prejudicial publicity. In the earlier case of Shepherd v.
Florida, which involved elements of publicity, the reversal of the
conviction was based solely on racial discrimination in the selection
of the jury, "It is hard to imagine a more prejudicial influence than a
press release by the officer of the court charged with defendants'
custody stating that they had confessed, and here just such a
statement unsworn to, unseen, uncross-examined and
uncontradicted, was conveyed by the press to the jury.
In Rideau, the petitioner, suspect in the robbery of a bank and in the
kidnapping of three of its employees, and in the killing of one of
them, was similarly given "trial by publicity." Thus, the day after his
arrest, a moving picture film was taken of him in an "interview" with
the sheriff. The "interview," consisted of interrogation by the sheriff
and admission by Rideau that he had perpetrated the bank robbery,
kidnapping and murder. The interview was seen and heard on
television by 24,000 people. His lawyers promptly moved for a
change of venue but their motion was denied and Rideau was
convicted and sentenced to death to the spectacle of Rideau
personally confessing in detail to the crimes with which he was later
to be charged.
In the third case, Estes, the Court voided a televised criminal trial for
being inherently a denial of due process. The state ... says that the
use of television in the instant case was "without injustice to the
person immediately concerned,". In Sheppard, the celebrated
murder case of Sam Sheppard, who was accused of the murder of
his wife Marilyn, the newsmen took over practically the entire
courtroom.
The Court held that from the unfair and prejudicial publicity from
the minds of the jurors, the trial courts must take strong measures
to ensure that the balance is never weighed against the accused. Of
course, there is nothing that proscribes the press from reporting
events that transpire in the courtroom. But where there is a
reasonable likelihood that prejudicial news prior to trial will prevent
a fair trial, the judge should continue the case until the threat
abates, or transfer it to another county not so permeated with
publicity.
If publicity during the proceeding threatens the fairness of the trial,
a new trial should be ordered. In the case at bar, the spate of
publicity did not focus on the guilt of the petitioners but rather on
the responsibility of the Government for what was claimed to be a
"massacre" of Muslim trainees. If there was a "trial by newspaper"
at all, it was not of the petitioners but of the Government. Absent
here is a showing of failure of the court-martial to protect the
accused from massive publicity encouraged by those connected
with the conduct of the trial either by a failure to control the release
of information or to remove the trial to another venue or to
postpone it until the deluge of prejudicial publicity shall have
subsided.
Indeed, the trial of the petitioners was being held under
circumstances which did not permit the observance of those
imperative decencies of procedure which have come to be
identified with due process. At all events, even granting the
existence of "massive" and "prejudicial" publicity, since the
petitioners here do not contend that the respondents have been
unduly influenced but simply that they might be by the "barrage" of
publicity, the Court thinks that the suspension of the court-martial
proceedings has accomplished the purpose sought by the
petitioners' challenge for cause, by postponing the trial of the
petitioner until calmer times have returned.
The atmosphere has since been cleared and the publicity
surrounding the Corregidor incident has so far abated that the court
believes that the trial may now be resumed in tranquility.
Cruz v. Salva
FACTS:
Manuel Monroy was killed in 1953 and a number of persons were
accused of such killing. These persons were found guilty sentenced
to the penalty of death. They all appealed. Pending the appeal,
President Magsaysay ordered a reinvestigation of the case which
was conducted by the intelligence agents of the Philippine
Constabulary and investigators of Malacanang. The result of the
reinvestigation also points to the convicted persons as the real
killers of Monroy. The counsel of the defendants wrote to Fiscal
Salva to conduct a reinvestigation of the case on the basis of the
affidavits and confessions obtained by the investigator of
Malacanang which was made available to him.
Salva formed a committee composed of himself as the chairman
and two assistant city attorneys. Salva subpoenaed Cruz to appear
at his office for the investigation. Atty. Baizas, counsel of Cruz,
questioned the jurisdiction of the committee to conduct the
investigation considering that the case was pending appeal in SC.
Salva contended that he subpoenaed Cruz et al because of their
request to do so and that were it not for his request, he would not
conduct the investigation. Although Cruz denied having made such
request, the SC believed that he indeed made a request of
reinvestigation.
However, the Supreme Court was interested in the manner to which
the investigation headed by Salva was conducted. The investigation
was made not in Salva‘s office but in the session hall of the
Municipal Trial Court to accommodate a big crowd that wanted to
witness the proceeding, including members of the press.
Microphones were installed. There were reporters everywhere and
photographers were busy taking pictures.
ISSUE: W/N Salva violated Rule 13.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
HELD: Yes. The way Salva conducted the investigation is
reprehensible. He publicized and sensationalized the case. He
committed what was regard a grievous error and poor judgment.
His actuations went well beyond the bounds of prudence,
discretion, and good taste. Salva was publicly reprehended and
censured for the uncalled for and wide publicity and sensationalism
he had given to and allowed in connection with his investigation
which is considered and found to be contempt of court.
Complaint:
Cruz filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction against Salva, in his capacity as City Fiscal, to restrain the
latter from continuing with the preliminary investigation he was
conducting, as the same was conducted not in Salva’s office, but in
the session hall of the Municipal Court evidently to accommodate
the big crowd that wanted to witness the proceeding, including
members of the press; a number of microphones were also
installed, reporters were everywhere and photographers were busy
taking pictures.
Defense:
The purpose of the investigation was only to acquaint himself with
and evaluate the evidence involved in the affidavits and confessions
of witnesses by questioning them.
Ruling:
Salva was publicly reprehended and censured for the uncalled for
and wide publicity and sensationalism that he had given to and
allowed in connection with his investigation, which the Court
considered and found to be contempt of court.
Salva could well have conducted the investigation in his office,
quietly, unobtrusively and without much fanfare, much less
publicity. He committed what was regarded a grievous error and
poor judgment for which the Court failed to find any excuse or
satisfactory explanation. His actuations went well beyond the
bounds of prudence, discretion and good taste.
It is bad enough to have such undue publicity when a criminal case
is being investigated by the authorities, even when it is tried in
court; but when said publicity and sensationalism is allowed, even
encouraged, when the case is on appeal and is pending
consideration by this Tribunal, the whole thing becomes
inexcusable, even abhorrent, and this Court, in the interest of
justice, is constrained and called upon to put an end to it and a
deterrent against its repetition by meting an appropriate
disciplinary measure, even a penalty to the one liable.
Bumanlag v. Bumanlag
FACTS
Atty Bumanlag filed his petition with the President by the fact that
his motions for reconsideration "were only denied by the Clerk of
Court without any comment whatsoever".
The petition is about promulgating a decree that the order of
suspension by the Supreme Court to be set aside and allow him to
become an active member of the New Society.
The Court per its Resolution of June 16, 1975 directed the Clerk of
Court "to furnish the Office of the President through Assistant
Executive Secretary Zamora with copies of the Court's decision of
September 24, 1973 wherein the Court in a spirit of liberality by
majority vote imposed a lesser penalty of two-year suspension
instead of disbarment (as voted by a minority composed of Justices
Castro and Makasiar) and of the Court's resolutions of November
20, 1973 and December 19, 1973 denying for lack of merit
respondent's two motions for reconsideration dated October 18,
1973 and December 12, 1973and further resolved "to require
respondent to show cause within ten (10) days from notice why he
should not be subjected to further disciplinary action for making
false statements and misrepresentations in his petition to the
President that he has been allegedly deprived of due process of law
contrary to the facts of record as stated in the Court's decision, and
for gross ignorance of the law and of the Constitution in asking the
President to set aside by decree this Court's decision imposing upon
him two-year suspension from the practice of law".
ISSUE
Whether or not the Atty. Bumanlag should not be subjected to
further disciplinary action for making false statements and
misrepresentations in his petition to the President that he has been
allegedly
HELD
The respondent is hereby administered a reprimand for gross
ignorance of the law and of the Constitution in having asked the
President to set aside by decree the Court's decision which
suspended him for two years from the practice of law, with warning
that the commission of any transgression in the future of his oath
and duties as a member of the bar will be severely dealt with. Rule
13.03- A lawyer shall not brook or invite interference by another
branch or agency of the government in the normal course of judicial
proccedings.
In the Court's decision of September 24, 1973, the Court found respondent
guilty of gross immoral conduct and ordered his suspension from the
practice of law for a period of two (2) years. Respondent filed several
motions for reconsideration, all of which were denied per the Court's
Resolutions of November 20, 1973, December 19, 1973, January 9, 1974
and October 30, 1974.
On March 31, 1975, the Clerk of Court received a 1st Indorsement dated
February 21, 1975 from then Assistant Executive Secretary Ronaldo B.
Zamora "requesting comment and/or appropriate action" on the therewith
enclosed petition of respondent to the President of the Philippines that he
"promulgate(s) a decree that the order of suspension by the Supreme
Court be set aside and that your humble self be allowed to become an
active member of the New Society".
The Court per its Resolution of June 16, 1975 directed the Clerk of Court
"to furnish the Office of the President through Assistant Executive
Secretary Zamora with copies of the Court's decision of September 24,
1973 wherein the Court in a spirit of liberality by majority vote imposed a
lesser penalty of two-year suspension instead of disbarment (as voted by a
minority composed of Justices Castro and Makasiar) and of the Court's
resolutions of November 20, 1973 and December 19, 1973 denying for lack
of merit respondent's two motions for reconsideration dated October 18,
1973 and December 12, 1973"; and further resolved "to require
respondent to show cause within ten (10) days from notice why he should
not be subjected to further disciplinary action for making false statements
and misrepresentations in his petition to the President that he has been
allegedly deprived of due process of law contrary to the facts of record as
stated in the Court's decision, and for gross ignorance of the law and of the
Constitution in asking the President to set aside by decree this Court's
decision imposing upon him two-year suspension from the practice of
law".
In a 2nd Indorserment of June 18, 1975 and received by the Clerk of Court
on the same day, then Assistant Executive Secretary Zamora forwarded
respondent's letter of the same date to the President stating that "(T)he
undersigned by now (has) come to realize that I made a big mistake by
making said letter to you, Your Excellency, because the Honorable
Supreme Court may believe that I may be challenging the decision which is
already final and executory and as such do not observe the doctrine of
protocol of separation of power(s)", and withdrawing and asking the
President to disregard his first letter.
Respondent in his Explanation of July 23, 1975 cited the fact that he had
"immediately" withdrawn his letter asking for the President's intervention
and that "lately, however, he has fully realized that the Chief Executive is
bereft (of) any authority to set aside or modify the decision of this
Honorable Supreme Court" and "with folded hands begs and asks an
apology from the members of this Honorable Court, with the full assurance
that nothing of this sort will be repeated by him in the future."
Clerk of Court who is duly authorized to do so. With the thousands of
resolutions approved monthly by the Court, it would unduly tax the time
and attention of the Chief Justice and members of the Court to the
prejudice of the administration of justice if all such papers, other than
decisions, could be released only upon their own signatures.
ACCORDINGLY, respondent is hereby administered a reprimand for gross
ignorance of the law and of the Constitution in having asked the President
to set aside by decree the Court's decision which suspended him for two
years from the practice of law, with warning that the commission of any
transgression in the future of his oath and duties as a member of the bar
will be severely dealt with.
SO ORDERED.
Makasiar, Muñoz-Palma, Concepcion, Jr. and Martin, JJ., concur.

Respondent served his two-year suspension, as duly noted in the Court's Rule 13.03- A lawyer shall not brook or invite interference by another
Resolution of November 7, 1975. Since respondent has apologized for his branch or agency of the government in the normal course of judicial
"big mistake" and now appreciates that under the fundamental principle of proccedings.
separation of powers enshrined in both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, a
decision of this Court may not be set aside by the President, the Court is
disposed to view his misconduct and/or ignorance with liberality and will
administer a reprimand with warning of severe action on any future
transgressions, considering respondent's unenviable record.

A final word is called for on respondent's statement in his Explanation

inferring that he was led to file his petition with the President by the fact
that his motions for reconsideration "were only denied by the Clerk of
Court without any comment whatsoever". As the Court has had occasion
to state in People vs. Catolico * and earlier cases, this remark of

respondent exposes his lack of appreciation or disregard of the time-

honored usage of the Court that minute resolutions, summons and
processes of the Court, upon being duly adopted and recorded are
transmitted to the interested parties by and upon the signature of the