SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 183053. June 16, 2010.]

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF CRISTINA

AGUINALDO-SUNTAY; EMILIO A.M. SUNTAY III , petitioner, vs . ISABEL
COJUANGCO-SUNTAY , respondent.

DECISION

NACHURA , J : p

Unlike Pope Alexander VI 1 who, faced with the impasse between Spain and
Portugal, deftly and literally divided the exploration, or more appropriately, the riches of
the New World by issuing the Inter Caetera, 2 we are confronted with the dif cult, albeit,
all too familiar tale of another family imbroglio over the estate of a decedent. 3
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 74949, 4 reversing
the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan, in Special
Proceeding Case No. 117-M-95. 5
Before anything else, we disentangle the facts.
On June 4, 1990, the decedent, Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay (Cristina), married to
Dr. Federico Suntay (Federico), died intestate. In 1979, their only son, Emilio Aguinaldo
Suntay (Emilio I), predeceased both Cristina and Federico. At the time of her death,
Cristina was survived by her husband, Federico, and several grandchildren, including
herein petitioner Emilio A.M. Suntay III (Emilio III) and respondent Isabel Cojuangco-
Suntay.
During his lifetime, Emilio I was married to Isabel Cojuangco, and they begot
three children, namely: herein respondent, Isabel; Margarita; and Emilio II, all surnamed
Cojuangco-Suntay. Emilio I's marriage to Isabel Cojuangco was subsequently annulled.
Thereafter, Emilio I had two children out of wedlock, Emilio III and Nenita Suntay
Tañedo (Nenita), by two different women, Concepcion Mendoza and Isabel Santos,
respectively.
Despite the illegitimate status of Emilio III, he was reared ever since he was a
mere baby, nine months old, by the spouses Federico and Cristina and was an
acknowledged natural child of Emilio I. Nenita is an acknowledged natural child of
Emilio I and was likewise brought up by the spouses Federico and Cristina. EIDaAH

As previously adverted to, the marriage between Emilio I and Isabel was annulled.
6 Consequently, respondent and her siblings Margarita and Emilio II, lived with their
mother on Balete Drive, Quezon City, separately from their father and paternal
grandparents.
Parenthetically, after the death of Emilio I, Federico led a petition for visitation
rights over his grandchildren: respondent Isabel, Margarita, and Emilio II. Although the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court in Quezon City granted the petition and allowed
Federico one hour of visitation monthly, initially reduced to thirty minutes, it was
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 altogether stopped because of a manifestation led by respondent Isabel, articulating
her sentiments on the unwanted visits of her grandparents.
Signi cantly, Federico, after the death of his spouse, Cristina, or on September
27, 1993, adopted their illegitimate grandchildren, Emilio III and Nenita. 7
On October 26, 1995, respondent led a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration in her favor, containing the following allegations:
[A]t the time of [the decedent's] death, [she] was a resident of the Municipality of
Hagonoy, Province of Bulacan; that the [decedent] left an estate of real and
personal properties, with a probable gross value of P29,000,000.00; that the
names, ages and residences of the surviving heirs of the [decedent] are: (1)
Federico C. Suntay, 89 years old, surviving spouse and a resident of . . .; (2) Isabel
Cojuangco-Suntay, 36 years old, legitimate granddaughter and a resident of . . .;
(3) Margarita Cojuangco-Suntay, 39 years old, legitimate granddaughter and a
resident of . . .; and (4) Emilio Cojuangco-Suntay, 35 years old, legitimate
grandson and a resident of . . .; and that as far as [respondent] knew, the decedent
left no debts or obligation at the time of her death. 8

Disavowing the allegations in the petition of his grandchild, respondent Isabel,

Federico filed his opposition on December 21, 1995, alleging, among others, that:
[B]eing the surviving spouse of Cristina, he is capable of administering her estate
and he should be the one appointed as its administrator; that as part owner of the
mass of conjugal properties left by Cristina, he must be accorded legal preference
in the administration thereof; that Isabel and her family had been alienated from
their grandparents for more than thirty (30) years; that the enumeration of heirs in
the petition was incomplete as it did not mention the other children of his son[,]
namely: Emilio III and Nenita S. Tañedo; that he is better situated to protect the
integrity of the estate of Cristina as even before the death of his wife[,] he was
already the one who managed their conjugal properties; that the probable value of
the estate as stated in the petition was grossly overstated (sic) ; and that Isabel's
allegation that some of the properties are in the hands of usurpers is untrue. 9

Meanwhile, after a failed attempt by the parties to settle the proceedings

amicably, Federico led a Manifestation dated March 13, 1999, nominating his adopted
son, Emilio III, as administrator of the decedent's estate on his behalf, in the event he
would be adjudged as the one with a better right to the letters of administration. HcDaAI

Subsequently, the trial court granted Emilio III's Motion for Leave to Intervene
considering his interest in the outcome of the case. Emilio III led his Opposition-In-
Intervention, which essentially echoed the allegations in his grandfather's opposition,
alleging that Federico, or in his stead, Emilio III, was better equipped than respondent to
administer and manage the estate of the decedent, Cristina. Additionally, Emilio III
averred his own quali cations that: "[he] is presently engaged in aquaculture and
banking; he was trained by the decedent to work in his early age by involving him in the
activities of the Emilio Aguinaldo Foundation which was established in 1979 in memory
of her grandmother's father; the signi cant work experiences outside the family group
are included in his curriculum vitae; he was employed by the oppositor [Federico] after
his graduation in college with management degree at F.C.E. Corporations and Hagonoy
Rural Bank; . . . ." 1 0
In the course of the proceedings, on November 13, 2000, Federico died.
After the testimonies of both parties' witnesses were heard and evidence on their
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 respective allegations were adduced, the trial court rendered a decision on November
9, 2001, appointing herein petitioner, Emilio III, as administrator of decedent Cristina's
intestate estate, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the petition of Isabel Cojuangco[-]Suntay is DENIED and the
Opposition[-]in[-]Intervention is GRANTED.

Accordingly, the Intervenor, Emilio A.M. Suntay, III is hereby appointed

administrator of the estate of the decedent Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay, who shall
enter upon the execution of his trust upon the ling of a bond in the amount of
P200,000.00, conditioned as follows:

(1) To make and return within three (3) months, a true and complete
inventory;

(2) To administer the estate and to pay and discharge all debts,
legatees, and charge on the same, or dividends thereon;

(3) To render a true and just account within one (1) year, and at any
other time when required by the court, and

(4) To perform all orders of the Court.

Once the said bond is approved by the court, let Letters of Administration be
issued in his favor.

SO ORDERED. 1 1

Aggrieved, respondent led an appeal before the CA, which reversed and set
aside the decision of the RTC, revoked the Letters of Administration issued to Emilio III,
and appointed respondent as administratrix of the intestate estate of the decedent,
Cristina, to wit:
WHEREFORE , in view of all the foregoing, the assailed decision dated November
9, 2001 of Branch 78, Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan in SPC No. 117-M-
95 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the letters of administration issued by
the said court to Emilio A.M. Suntay III, if any, are consequently revoked. Petitioner
Isabel Cojuangco[-]Suntay is hereby appointed administratrix of the intestate
estate of Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay. Let letters of administration be issued in her
favor upon her ling of a bond in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand
(P200,000.00) Pesos. cDAISC

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED. 1 2

The motion for reconsideration of Emilio III having been denied, he appeals by
certiorari to this Court, raising the following issues:
A. IN THE APPOINTMENT OF AN ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE UNDER
SECTION 6 OF RULE 78 OF THE RULES OF COURT, WHETHER ARTICLE 992 OF
THE CIVIL CODE APPLIES; and

B. UNDER THE UNDISPUTED FACTS WHERE HEREIN PETITIONER WAS

REARED BY THE DECEDENT AND HER SPOUSE SINCE INFANCY, WHETHER
ARTICLE 992 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE APPLIES SO AS TO BAR HIM FROM
BEING APPOINTED ADMINISTRATOR OF THE DECEDENT'S ESTATE. 1 3
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 In ruling against the petition of herein respondent, the RTC ratiocinated, thus:
Evidence objectively assessed and carefully evaluated, both testimonial and
documentary, the court opines that it is to the best interest of the estate of the
decedent and all claimants thereto, that the Intervenor, Emilio A.M. Suntay III, be
appointed administrator of the estate in the above-entitled special proceedings.
Based on the evidence and demeanor of the parties in court, [respondent's
immediate] family and that of the decedent are apparently estranged. The root
cause of which, is not for this court to ascertain nor is this the right time and the
proper forum to dwell upon. What matters most at this time is the welfare of the
estate of the decedent in the light of such unfortunate and bitter estrangement.
The Court honestly believes that to appoint the petitioner would go against the
wishes of the decedent who raised [Emilio III] from infancy in her home in Baguio
City as her own child. Certainly, it would go against the wishes of the surviving
spouse . . . who nominated [Emilio III] for appointment as administrator.
As between [respondent] and the oppositor [Federico], the latter is accorded
preference as the surviving spouse under Sec 6(a), Rule 78, Rules of Court. On the
basis of such preference, he vigorously opposed the appointment of the petitioner
and instead nominated [Emilio III], his grandchild and adopted child. Such
nomination, absent any valid and justi able reason, should not be imperiously set
aside and insouciantly ignored, even after the oppositor [Federico] has passed
away, in order to give effect to the order of preference mandated by law.
Moreover, from the viewpoint of the estate, the nomination of [Emilio III] appear[s]
intrinsically meritorious. For the bene t of the estate and its claimants, creditors,
as well as heirs, the administrator should be one who is prepared, academically
and by experience, for the demands and responsibilities of the position. While
[respondent], a practicing physician, is not unquali ed, it is clear to the court that
when it comes to management of real estate and the processing and payment of
debts, [Emilio III], a businessman with an established track record as a manager
has a decided edge and therefore, is in a position to better handle the preservation
of the estate. 1 4 AEIcSa

In marked contrast, the CA zeroed in on Emilio III's status as an illegitimate child

of Emilio I and, thus, barred from representing his deceased father in the estate of the
latter's legitimate mother, the decedent. On the whole, the CA pronounced that Emilio
III, who was merely nominated by Federico, and which nomination hinged upon the
latter's appointment as administrator of the decedent's estate, cannot be appointed as
the administrator of the decedent's estate for the following reasons: 1 5
1. The appointment of Emilio III was subject to a suspensive condition,
i.e., Federico's appointment as administrator of the estate, he being
the surviving spouse of Cristina, the decedent. The death of Federico
before his appointment as administrator of Cristina's estate rendered
his nomination of Emilio III inoperative;
2. As between the legitimate offspring (respondent) and illegitimate
offspring (Emilio III) of decedent's son, Emilio I, respondent is
preferred, being the "next of kin" referred to by Section 6, Rule 78 of
the Rules of Court, and entitled to share in the distribution of Cristina's
estate as an heir;
3. Jurisprudence has consistently held that Article 992 1 6 of the Civil
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 Code bars the illegitimate child from inheriting ab intestato from the
legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother. Thus, Emilio
III, who is barred from inheriting from his grandmother, cannot be
preferred over respondent in the administration of the estate of their
grandmother, the decedent; and
4. Contrary to the RTC's nding, respondent is as much competent as
Emilio III to administer and manage the subject estate for she
possesses none of the disquali cations speci ed in Section 1, 1 7 Rule
78 of the Rules of Court.
The pivotal issue in this case turns on who, as between Emilio III and respondent,
is better qualified to act as administrator of the decedent's estate.
We cannot subscribe to the appellate court's ruling excluding Emilio III in the
administration of the decedent's undivided estate. Mistakenly, the CA glosses over
several undisputed facts and circumstances:
1. The underlying philosophy of our law on intestate succession is to
give preference to the wishes and presumed will of the decedent,
absent a valid and effective will;
2. The basis for Article 992 of the Civil Code, referred to as the iron
curtain bar rule, 1 8 is quite the opposite scenario in the facts obtaining
herein for the actual relationship between Federico and Cristina, on
one hand, and Emilio III, on the other, was akin to the normal
relationship of legitimate relatives;
3. Emilio III was reared from infancy by the decedent, Cristina, and her
husband, Federico, who both acknowledged him as their grandchild;
aTEAHc

4. Federico claimed half of the properties included in the estate of the

decedent, Cristina, as forming part of their conjugal partnership of
gains during the subsistence of their marriage;
5. Cristina's properties forming part of her estate are still commingled
with that of her husband, Federico, because her share in the conjugal
partnership, albeit terminated upon her death, remains undetermined
and unliquidated; and
6. Emilio III is a legally adopted child of Federico, entitled to share in the
distribution of the latter's estate as a direct heir, one degree from
Federico, not simply representing his deceased illegitimate father,
Emilio I.
From the foregoing, it is patently clear that the CA erred in excluding Emilio III
from the administration of the decedent's estate. As Federico's adopted son, Emilio
III's interest in the estate of Cristina is as much apparent to this Court as the interest
therein of respondent, considering that the CA even declared that "under the law,
[Federico], being the surviving spouse, would have the right of succession over a
portion of the exclusive property of the decedent, aside from his share in the
conjugal partnership ." Thus, we are puzzled why the CA resorted to a strained legal
reasoning — Emilio III's nomination was subject to a suspensive condition and rendered
inoperative by reason of Federico's death — wholly inapplicable to the case at bar.
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 Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court lists the order of preference in the
appointment of an administrator of an estate:
SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. — If no executor
is named in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust,
or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or
both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or
wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;

(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or
the person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or
widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to
apply for administration or to request that administration be granted to some
other person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if
competent and willing to serve;

(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be

granted to such other person as the court may select.

However, the order of preference is not absolute for it depends on the attendant facts
and circumstances of each case. 1 9 Jurisprudence has long held that the selection of
an administrator lies in the sound discretion of the trial court. 2 0 In the main, the
attendant facts and circumstances of this case necessitate, at the least, a joint
administration by both respondent and Emilio III of their grandmother's, Cristina's,
estate. DHITcS

In the case of Uy v. Court of Appeals, 2 1 we upheld the appointment by the trial

court of a co-administration between the decedent's son and the decedent's brother,
who was likewise a creditor of the decedent's estate. In the same vein, we declared in
Delgado Vda. de De la Rosa v. Heirs of Marciana Rustia Vda. de Damian 2 2 that:
[i]n the appointment of an administrator, the principal consideration is the interest
in the estate of the one to be appointed. The order of preference does not rule out
the appointment of co-administrators, specially in cases where justice and equity
demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in the management of
the estates, a situation which obtains here.

Similarly, the subject estate in this case calls to the succession other putative
heirs, including another illegitimate grandchild of Cristina and Federico, Nenita Tañedo,
but who was likewise adopted by Federico, and the two (2) siblings of respondent
Isabel, Margarita and Emilio II. In all, considering the con icting claims of the putative
heirs, and the unliquidated conjugal partnership of Cristina and Federico which forms
part of their respective estates, we are impelled to move in only one direction, i.e., joint
administration of the subject estate.
One nal note. Counsel for petitioner meticulously argues that Article 992 of the
Civil Code, the successional bar between the legitimate and illegitimate relatives of a
decedent, does not apply in this instance where facts indubitably demonstrate the
contrary — Emilio III, an illegitimate grandchild of the decedent, was actually treated by
the decedent and her husband as their own son, reared from infancy, educated and
trained in their businesses, and eventually legally adopted by decedent's husband, the
original oppositor to respondent's petition for letters of administration.
We are not unmindful of the critiques of civilists of a con ict and a lacuna in the
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 law concerning the bone of contention that is Article 992 of the Civil Code, beginning
with the eminent Justice J.B.L. Reyes:
In the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 the right of representation was admitted only
within the legitimate family; so much so that Article 943 of that Code prescribed
that an illegitimate child can not inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children
and relatives of his father and mother. The Civil Code of the Philippines
apparently adhered to this principle since it reproduced Article 943 of the Spanish
Code in its own Art. 992, but with ne inconsistency, in subsequent articles (990,
995 and 998) our Code allows the hereditary portion of the illegitimate child to
pass to his own descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate. So that while Art.
992 prevents the illegitimate issue of a legitimate child from representing him in
the intestate succession of the grandparent, the illegitimates of an illegitimate
child can now do so. This difference being indefensible and unwarranted, in the
future revision of the Civil Code we shall have to make a choice and decide either
that the illegitimate issue enjoys in all cases the right of representation, in which
case Art. 992 must be suppressed; or contrariwise maintain said article and
modify Articles 995 and 998. The rst solution would be more in accord with an
enlightened attitude vis-Ã -vis illegitimate children. 2 3

Manresa explains the basis for the rules on intestate succession: TcADCI

The law [of intestacy] is founded . . . on the presumed will of the deceased . . .
Love, it is said, rst descends, then ascends, and, nally, spreads sideways. Thus,
the law rst calls the descendants, then the ascendants, and nally the
collaterals, always preferring those closer in degree to those of remoter degrees,
on the assumption that the deceased would have done so had he manifested his
last will . . . Lastly, in default of anyone called to succession or bound to the
decedent by ties of blood or affection, it is in accordance with his presumed will
that his property be given to charitable or educational institutions, and thus
contribute to the welfare of humanity. 2 4

Indeed, the factual antecedents of this case accurately re ect the basis of
intestate succession, i.e., love rst descends, for the decedent, Cristina, did not
distinguish between her legitimate and illegitimate grandchildren. Neither did her
husband, Federico, who, in fact, legally raised the status of Emilio III from an illegitimate
grandchild to that of a legitimate child. The peculiar circumstances of this case,
painstakingly pointed out by counsel for petitioner, overthrow the legal presumption in
Article 992 of the Civil Code that there exist animosity and antagonism between
legitimate and illegitimate descendants of a deceased.
Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that judicial restraint impels us to refrain
from making a nal declaration of heirship and distributing the presumptive shares of
the parties in the estates of Cristina and Federico, considering that the question on who
will administer the properties of the long deceased couple has yet to be settled.
Our holding in Capistrano v. Nadurata 2 5 on the same issue remains good law:
[T]he declaration of heirs made by the lower court is premature, although the
evidence suf ciently shows who are entitled to succeed the deceased. The estate
had hardly been judicially opened, and the proceeding has not as yet reached the
stage of distribution of the estate which must come after the inheritance is
liquidated.

Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court does not depart from the foregoing
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 admonition:
Sec. 1. When order for distribution of residue is made. — . . . . If there is a
controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person
or as to the distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the
controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.
No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations above
mentioned has been made or provided for, unless the distributees, or any of them,
give a bond, in a sum to be xed by the court, conditioned for the payment of said
obligations within such time as the court directs.

WHEREFORE , the petition is GRANTED . The Decision of the Court of Appeals in

CA-G.R. CV No. 74949 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE . Letters of Administration over
the estate of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay shall issue to both petitioner Emilio
A.M. Suntay III and respondent Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay upon payment by each of a
bond to be set by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan, in Special
Proceeding Case No. 117-M-95. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan
is likewise directed to make a determination and to declare the heirs of decedent
Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay according to the actual factual milieu as proven by the
parties, and all other persons with legal interest in the subject estate. It is further
directed to settle the estate of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay with dispatch. No
costs. cDCSTA

SO ORDERED .
Carpio, Peralta, Abad and Perez, * JJ., concur.

Footnotes

*Additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Jose C. Mendoza per Special Order No. 842
dated June 3, 2010.

1.Formerly Cardinal Rodrigo Borgia, before ascending to the religious title of Pope and
assuming the name Alexander VI.

2.The Papal Bull which drew a longitudinal line (one hundred leagues west of the Azores and
Cape Verde Islands) and bestowed all non-Christian lands west thereof to Spain, and
east of the line to Portugal.
3.In The Family , a book with a factual core on the Borgia family of 15th Century Rome, Mario
Puzo recounts that the ostensibly fair and just papal ruling actually favored Spain and
placed Portugal at a disadvantage because papal intervention and arbitration of the
matter was made at the behest of King Ferdinand of Spain. More importantly, Pope
Alexander VI was originally a Catalan who, at the start of his career as a cleric in Italy,
conveniently changed his name from the Spanish "Borja" to the Italian "Borgia" to gain
acceptance and credibility as an authentic Roman clergy.
4.Penned by Associate Justice Sesinando E. Villon, with Associate Justices Martin S. Villarama,
Jr. (now a member of this Court) and Noel G. Tijam, concurring; rollo, pp. 20-32.

5.Penned by Judge Gregorio S. Sampaga; rollo, pp. 35-60.

6.Rollo, p. 43.
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 7.Id. at 137-138.
8.Id. at 35.
9.Id. at 21-22.

10.Id. at 58.
11.Id. at 60.
12.Id. at 31-32.
13.Memorandum of petitioner; id. at 195.
14.Rollo, pp. 59-60.

15.Id. at 25-31.
16.Art. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children
and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the
same manner from the illegitimate child.

17.Sec. 1. Who are incompetent to serve as executors or administrators. — No person is

competent to serve as executor or administrator who:
(a) Is a minor;

(b) Is not a resident of the Philippines; and

(c) Is in the opinion of the court unfit to execute the duties of the trust by reason of
drunkenness, improvidence, or want of understanding or integrity, or by reason of
conviction of an offense involving moral turpitude.

18.Called as such because the law does not recognize the natural tie of blood and is based on
the presumed intervening antagonism and incompatibility between the legitimate and
illegitimate family of a deceased. See Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. L-
66574, June 17, 1987, 150 SCRA 645.
19.See Uy v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 167979, March 16, 2006, 484 SCRA 699; Gabriel v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 101512, August 7, 1992, 212 SCRA 413; Capistrano v. Nadurata, 46
Phil. 726 (1922).

20.See Uy v. Court of Appeals, supra; Gabriel v. Court of Appeals, supra; Capistrano v. Nadurata,
supra.
21.Supra note 19.
22.G.R. No. 155733, January 27, 2006, 480 SCRA 334, 360. (Citations omitted.)
23.Reflections on the Reform of Hereditary Succession, JOURNAL of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, First Quarter (1976), Vol. 4, No. 1, pp. 40-41; cited in Diaz v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, G.R. No. 66574, February 21, 1990, 182 SCRA 427, 434; and Diaz v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, supra note 18, at 651.
24.Cited in BALANE, Jottings and Jurisprudence (1998), p. 368.

25.Supra note at 19, at 728.

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