G.R. Nos.

94929-30 March 18, 1992

PORT WORKERS UNION OF THE PHILIPPINES (PWUP), petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE UNDERSECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA,
ATTY. ANASTACIO L. BACTIN, MED-ARBITER NCR-DOLE, Public Respondents; INTERNATIONAL
CONTAINER TERMINAL SERVICES, INC., (ICTSI) and ASSOCIATED PORT CHECKERS AND WORKERS
UNION (APCWU), Private Respondents; SANDIGAN NG MANGGAGAWA SA DAUNGAN (SAMADA) and
PORT EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION AND LABOR UNION (PEALU), Nominal Private
Respondents, respondents.

CRUZ, J.:

There was muffled excitement among the workers of the International Container Terminal Services, Inc. (ICTSI)
because its collective bargaining agreement with private respondents Associate Port Checkers and Workers
Union (APCWU), the incumbent union, was due to expire on April 14, 1990. Other unions were seeking to
represent the laborers in the negotiation of the next CBA and were already plotting their moves.

The first challenge to APCWU was hurled on March 14, 1990, when the Sandigan ng Manggagawa sa Daungan
(SAMADA) filed a petition for certification election. The consent signatures of at least 25% of the employees in
the bargaining unit were submitted on March 26, 1990, or eleven days after the petition.

On April 2, 1990, herein petitioner Port Workers Union of the Philippines (PWUP) filed a petition for intervention.

Still another petition for certification election was filed by the Port Employees Association and Labor Union
(PEALU), on April 6, 1990. The consent signatures were submitted on May 11, 1990, or thirty-five days after the
filing of the petition.

The petitions of SAMADA and PEALU were consolidated for joint decision. On April 26, 1990, APCWU filed a
motion to dismiss them on the ground that they did not comply with the requirement set forth in Section 6, Rule
V, Book V of the Implementing Rules, quoted in part as follows:

In a petition involving an organized establishment or enterprise where the majority status of the
incumbent collective bargaining union is questioned through a verified petition by a legitimate
labor organization, the Med-Arbiter shall immediately order the certification election by secret
ballot if the petition is filed during the last sixty (60) days of the collective bargaining agreement
and supported by the written consent of at least twenty-five percent (25%) of all the employees in
the bargaining unit. Any petition filed before or after the sixty-day freedom period shall be
dismissed outright. The twenty-five percent (25%) requirement shall be satisfied upon the filing of
the petition, otherwise the petition shall be dismissed. (Emphasis supplied.)

Specifically, APCWU faulted both petitions for non-compliance with the requirement for the 25% consent
signatures at the time of filing. This contention was upheld by the Med-Arbiter in an order dated June 5, 1990,
dismissing the consolidated petitions. 1

PWUP appealed to the Secretary of Labor on June 28, 1990, arguing that Article 256 of the Labor Code did not
require the written consent to be submitted simultaneously with the petition for certification election. The principal
petitioners did not appeal. On August 21, 1990, DOLE Undersecretary Bienvenido Laguesma affirmed the order
of the Med-Arbiter and dismissed PWUP's appeal. 2

Thereafter, ICTSI and APCWU resumed negotiations for a new collective bargaining agreement, which was
concluded on September 28, 1990. This was ratified on October 7, 1990, by a majority of the workers in the
bargaining unit, i.e., 910 out of the 1,223 members, and subsequently registered with the DOLE.

PWUP is now before us, claiming grave abuse of discretion on the part of the public respondent in the
application of Article 256 of the Labor Code. The article provides in part as follows:

Art. 256. Representation issue in organized establishments. — In organized establishments,

when a verified petition questioning the majority status of the incumbent bargaining agent is filed
before the Department of Labor and Employment within the sixty-day period before the expiration
 of the collective bargaining agreement, the Med-Arbiter shall automatically order an election by
secret ballot when the verified petition is supported by the written consent of at least twenty-five
(25%) percent of all the employees in the bargaining unit to ascertain the will of the employees in
the appropriate bargaining unit. . . .

The petitioner argues that under this article, the Med-Arbiter should automatically order election by secret ballot
when the petition is supported by at least 25% of all employees in the bargaining unit. SAMADA and PEALU
substantially complied with the law when they submitted the required consent signatures several days after filing
the petition. The petitioner complains that the dismissal of the petitions for certification election, including its own
petition for intervention, had the effect of indirectly certifying APCWU as the sole and exclusive bargaining
representative of the ICTSI employees.

Private respondent ICTSI maintains that the dismissal was based on Article 256 of the Labor Code as
implemented by Section 6, Rule V, Book V of the Implementing Rules, quoted above. Moreover, under Section
10, Rule V, Book V of the Implementing Rules, decisions of the Secretary in certification election cases shall be
final and unappealable.

ICTSI also cites the following ruling of this Court in Tupas v. Inciong: 3

We find no merit in the petition. As observed by the Solicitor General, while the petition of
TUPAS for a certification election may have the written support of 30 per cent of all the workers
of the bargaining unit, it is also an undisputed fact that UMI (the rival union of TUPAS) has a
clear majority of the said workers, as shown by the fact that 499 workers out of the total working
force of 641 have not only ratified the collective bargaining agreement concluded between UMI
and LUSTEVECO, but also affirmed their membership in UMI so that there is no more need for
holding a certification election. (Emphasis supplied.)

For its part, APCWU questions PWUP's personality in these proceedings in view of the lack of consent
signatures in its petition, and argues as well that the petitioner has no authority to represent SAMADA or
PEALU, which had not appealed. The private respondent also invokes Tupas and maintains that the ratification
of the new CBA by the majority of the workers was an affirmation of their membership in the union that
negotiated that agreement.

In his own Comment, the Solicitor General agrees with the petitioner that there has been substantial compliance
with the requirements of the law. He submits that Article 256 should be liberally interpreted pursuant to Article 4
of the Labor Code, stating as follows:

Art. 4. Construction in favor of labor. — All doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the
provisions of this Code including its implementing rules and regulations, shall be resolved in
favor of labor.

The Court has deliberated on the arguments of the parties in their respective pleadings and finds for the
petitioner.

We have held that pursuant to the constitutional provision guaranteeing workers the right to self-organization
and collective bargaining, "the constant and unwavering policy of this Court" has been "to require a certification
election as the best means of ascertaining which labor organization should be the collective bargaining
representative." 4

The certification election is the most democratic and expeditious method by which the laborers can freely
determine the union that shall act as their representative in their dealings with the establishment where they are
working. 5 As we stressed in Belyca Corporation vs. Ferrer-Calleja, 6 the holding of a certification election is a
statutory policy that should not be circumvented.

This Court also held in Western Agusan Workers Union-Local 101 of the United Lumber and General Workers of
the Philippines vs. Trajano: 7

. . . it has long been settled that the policy of the Labor Code is indisputably partial to the holding
of a certification election so as to arrive in a manner definitive and certain concerning the choice
of the labor organization to represent the workers in a collective bargaining unit. Conformably to
said basic concept, this Court recognized that the Bureau of Labor Relations in the exercise of
sound discretion, may order a certification election notwithstanding the failure to meet the 30%
 requirement. (Scout Ramon V. Albano Memorial College v. Noriel, 85 SCRA 494 [1978]; Vicmico
Industrial Wokers Asso. v. Noriel, 131 SCRA 569 [1984])

In line with the policy, we feel that the administrative rule requiring the simultaneous submission of the 25%
consent signatures upon the filing of petition for certification election should not be strictly applied to frustrate the
determination of the legitimate representative of the workers. Significantly, the requirement in the rule is not
found in Article 256, the law it seeks to implement. This is all the more reason why the regulation should at best
be given only a directory effect. Accordingly, we hold that the mere filing of a petition for certification election
within the freedom period is sufficient basis for the issuance of an order for the holding of a certification
election, 8 subject to the submission of the consent signatures within a reasonable period from such filing.

This interpretation is consonant with Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions v. Bureau of Labor
Relations,9where we declared:

. . . even conceding that the statutory requirement of 30% of the labor force asking for a
certification election had not been strictly complied with, respondent Director is still empowered
to order that it be held precisely for the purpose of ascertaining which (of the contending labor
organizations) shall be the exclusive collective bargaining representative. (National Mines and
Allied Workers Union v. Luna, et al., 83 SCRA 607)

It is not denied that the petition to intervene filed by PWUP did not carry the 25% consent signatures, but that the
requirement is in fact not applicable to a petition in intervention. We so held in PAFLU v. Ferrer-Calleja thus: 10

It is crystal clear from the said provisions that the requisite written consent of at least 20% of the
workers in the bargaining unit applies to petitioners for certification election only and not to
motions for intervention. . . . As long as the motion for intervention has been properly and timely
filed and the intervention would not cause any injustice to anyone, it should not be denied and
this is so even if the eventual purpose of the Motion for Intervention is to participate in the
Certification Election. After all, the original applicant had already met the 20% requirement.

The contention that the petitioners had no right to represent the principal petitioners which had not appealed the
dismissal order is also not acceptable. We repeat that the certification election is not litigation but a mere
investigation of a non-adversary character where the rules of procedure are not strictly applied. 11 Technical rules
and objections should not hamper the correct ascertainment of the labor union that has the support of
confidence of the majority of the workers and is thus entitled to represent them in their dealings with
management.

The above-quoted decision affirms the right of PWUP to call for the holding of the election although it was
initially only an intervenor. That recognition should not be defeated by the circumstance that the other petitioning
unions have not seen fit to appeal the dismissal of their petitions even if such dismissal was questionable and is
in fact being reversed here. The petition for intervention was viable at the time it was filed because the principal
petitions had complied with the requirement for the consent signatures as specified by Article 256. Hence, its
intervention should not be disallowed simply because of the withdrawal or failure to appeal of SAMADA and
PEALU.

It is correct to say that as a matter of strict procedure, a petition for intervention should be deemed automatically
dismissed where the principal petition itself fails. However, that technical rule should be allowed to prevent a
correct determination of the real representative of the workers in line with their constitutional rights to self-
organization and collective bargaining.

Regarding the invocation of Inciong by the private respondents, the Court has modified that decision
in Associated Labor Unions vs. Calleja, 12 where we held:

Finally, the petitioner assails the decision of the respondent Director on the ground that "the
ratification of the collective bargaining agreement renders the certification election moot and
academic."

This contention finds no basis in law.

The petitioner was obviously referring to the contract-bar rule where the law prohibits the holding
of certification elections during the lifetime of the collective bargaining agreement. Said
agreement was hastily and prematurely entered into apparently in an attempt to avoid the holding
of a certification election.
Deviation from the contract-bar rule is justified only where the need for industrial stability is clearly shown to be
imperative. 13 Subject to this singular exception, contracts where the identity of the authorized representative of
the workers is in doubt must be rejected in favor of a more certain indication of the will of the workers. As we
stated in Philippine Association of Free Labor Union vs. Estrella, 14 any stability that does not establish the type
of industrial peace contemplated by the law must be subordinated to the employees' freedom to choose their
real representative.

The private respondents contend that the overwhelming ratification of the CBA is an affirmation of their
membership in the bargaining agent, rendering the representation issue moot and academic and conclusively
barring the holding of a certification election thereon. That conclusion does not follow. Even Tupas did not say
that the mere ratification of the CBA by the majority of the workers signified their affirmation of membership in
the negotiating union. That case required, first, ratification of the CBA, the second, affirmation of membership in
the negotiating union. The second requirement has not been established in the case at bar as the record does
not show that the majority of the workers, besides ratifying the new CBA, have also formally affiliated with
APCWU.

Section 4, Rule V, Book V of the Omnibus Rules implementing the Labor Code provides that the representation
case shall not be adversely affected by a collective agreement submitted before or during the last 60 days of a
subsisting agreement or during the pendency of the representation case. As the new CBA was entered into at
the time when the representation case was still pending, it follows that it cannot be recognized as the final
agreement between the ICTSI and its workers.

On the allegation that the decision of the Secretary of Labor on certification election is final and inappealable,
this Court held in San Miguel Corp. v. Secretary of Labor 15 that:

It is generally understood that as to administrative agencies exercising quasi-judicial or legislative

power there is an underlying power in the courts to scrutinize the acts of such agencies on
questions of law and jurisdiction even though no right of review is given by statute. (73, C.J.S.
506, note 56). . . . judicial review is proper in case of lack of jurisdiction, grave abuse of
discretion. error of law, fraud or collusion (Timbancaya v. Vicente, 82 O.G. 9424; Macatangay v.
Secretary of Public Works and Communication, 63 O.G. 11236; Ortua v. Singson Encarnacion,
59 Phil. 440).

There was indeed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of public
respondents when they dismissed the petitions for certification election because the consent signatures had not
been submitted simultaneously with the petition. The issue of majority representation thus remains open and
awaits settlement. Following the rulings above-quoted, we hereby declare that the newly-concluded CBA cannot
constitute a bar to the holding of a certification election.

It is possible that the APCWU will prevail in the certification election, in which event the new CBA it concluded
with ICTSI will be upheld and recognized. It is also possible that another union will be chosen, in which event it
will have to enter into its own negotiations with ICTSI that may result in the adoption of a new CBA. In the
meantime, however, the old CBA having expired, it is necessary to lay down the rules regulating the relations of
the workers with the management. For this reason, the Court hereby orders that the new CBA concluded by
ICTSI and APCWU shall remain effective between the parties, subject to the result and effects of the certification
election to be called.

The certification election is the best method of determining the will of the workers on the crucial question of who
shall represent them in their negotiations with the management for a collective bargaining agreement that will
best protect and promote their interests. It is essential that there be no collusion against this objective between
an unscrupulous management and a union covertly supporting it while professing its loyalty to labor, or at least
that the hopes of labor be not frustrated because of its representation by a union that does not enjoy its approval
and support. It is therefore sound policy that any doubt regarding the real representation of the workers be
resolved in favor of the holding of the certification election. This is preferable to the suppression of the voice of
the workers through the prissy observance of technical rules that will exalt procedure over substantial justice.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The challenged order dated August 21, 1990, is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and the public respondent is DIRECTED to schedule and hold certification election among the workers of
the International Container Terminal Services, Inc., this to be done with all possible dispatch. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-50874 October 23, 1981

SAMAHAN NG MANGGAGAWA SA UNION INDUSTRIES, INC., JOSE VALENZUELA, and TOMAS

SENA, petitioners,
vs.
DIRECTOR CARMELO NORIEL, BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS, PHILIPPINE TRANSPORT AND
GENERAL WORKERS ORGANIZATION, FEDERATION OF FREE WORKERS, and UNION INDUSTRIES,
INC., respondents.

FERNANDO, C.J.:

It is quite manifest that the reliance of petitioner organization and its two officials 1 in this certiorari, prohibition,
and mandamus proceeding is on the constitutional right to freedom of association 2 as well as the constitutional
mandate of protection to labor, more specifically insofar as it assures unionization and collective
bargaining. 3 The Solicitor General 4 on behalf of respondent Director Noriel of the Bureau of Labor Relations
would view the matter in a narrower perspective. For him, what is primarily involved is the authority of such
official to order the holding of a referendum through secret ballotting to ascertain the alleged disaffiliation of the
workers from one union to join a new labor organization, that of petitioner, then still in the process of registration.
He pointed out that such a power must be conceded. The Court is of the opinion that the inquiry into the alleged
failure to respect what is ordained by the Constitution deserves priority. In that context, the petition is impressed
with merit. To put an end to a festering labor controversy, the challenged order is set aside, its prohibition
enjoined, and mandamus is granted so that a certification election could be forthwith conducted.

According to the petition, on October 12, 1978, petitioner Jose Valenzuela filed an application for a certificate of
registration of petitioner union composed of the rank and file employees and workers of the respondent company
at its place of business in Oliveros Drive, corner of Epifanio de los Santos Avenue. 5 There was an opposition
filed on October 17, 1978 by respondent Philippine Transport and General Workers Organization. 6 On
December 22, 1978, a certificate of registration of petitioner union was approved by the Ministry of Labor, hence
it was ready for issuance or release. 7 It came as a surprise, therefore, when petitioner Valenzuela learned on
December 26, 1978 that such issuance or release was withheld by respondent Director. 8 The first conference
was called by respondent Director on January 4, 1979.) 9 A conference was scheduled on January 9,
1979. 10 Respondent Director then, on January 25, 1979, issued an order for a
referendum. 11 Petitioner union filed a Motion for Reconsideration on February 9, 1979, praying among the
release of the certificate of registration. 12 Respondent Director denied the motion on May 8, 1979. 13 A
complicating factor was the notice of a commencement of a strike on June 16, 1979, at respondent company's
glass division by members of respondent Federation of Free workers by virtue of a notice of strike filed on May
17, 1979 to compel the negotiation of a collective bargaining agreement for a group of rank-and-file employees
at the glass division constituting a minority of the rank-and-file employees of the respondent company, allegedly
to the prejudice and detriment of petitioner union. 14

Private respondent Philippine Transport and General Workers Organization would justify the order as it had a
"certified collective bargaining agreement" in existence. 15 As to the facts set forth in the petition, there was the
claim that the solicitation of the signatures for disqualification was attended by "deception, force, and
intimidation." 16 It asserted, however, that the issuance of a certificate of registration is not an absolute right and
is, therefore, not mandatory being subject to regulatory police power of the State. 17 Private respondent Union
Industries Workers Association affiliated with the Federation of Free Workers disclaimed interest in the litigation,
maintaining that it "should not be drawn into this case. It should not be included] as party respondent [as it] is the
bargaining agent by majority choice of another bargaining unit of the company concerned (Union Industries,
Inc.). On the basis of the facts, that the bargaining unit petitioners seek to represent being different, separate
and apart from the bargaining unit that private respondent FFW has been representing, we firmly submit that the
petition must necessary fail. 18Public respondents, in the answer filed by Solicitor General Mendoza, is equally of
the view that the issuance of a certification of registration is "not an absolute right but one which is subject to the
regulatory power of the State. 19 It argued that there was no abuse of discretion, secret ballotting being the "most
efficacious and fairest mode of ascertaining the membership of the contending unions. 20

As set forth at the outset, the petition is impressed with merit.

1. According to U.E. Automotive Employees and Workers UnionTrade Unions of the Philippines v. Noriel: 21 "Nor
is the different outcome caned for just because at the time of the challenged order, there was as yet no
registration of petitioner Union. If at all, that is a circumstance far from flattering as far as the Bureau of Labor
Relations is concerned. It must be remembered that as admitted in the comment of respondent Director, the
application for registration was filed on July 19, 1974. The challenged order was issued seven months later.
There is no allegation that such application suffered from any infirmity. Moreover, if such were the case, the
attention of petitioner should have been caused so that it could be corrected. Only thus may the right to
association be accorded full respect. As far back as Umali v. Lovina a 1950 decision, it was held by this Court
that under appropriate circumstances, mandamus lies to compel registration. * * * In the absence of any fatal
defect to the application for registration, there is no justification for withholding it from petitioner to enable it to
exercise fully its constitutional right to freedom of association. * * * What is decisive is that the members of
petitioner Union did exercise their fundamental right to self-organization and did win in a fair and honest
election. 22 Such a doctrine calls for application. Moreover, considering the long period that had elapsed, it would
not suffice just to compel registration. It is even more essential that thereafter a certification election be
conducted. This approach dictated by equity no less than by the authoritative doctrines has recommended itself
to the Court.

2. Respondent Director of Labor Relations, in the memorandum of authorities submitted by Solicitor General
Mendoza, objected to the characterization of his order as constituting a grave abuse of discretion. Litex
Employees Association v. Eduvela 23 can be cited in support of such a stand. For in that case, under the facts
disclosed, this Court held that the competence of respondent Director under Article 226 of the Labor Code to
order the holding of a referendum election among the members of a labor union on the question of disaffiliation
was conceded. As stated at the beginning of this opinion, however, the right to freedom of association is a
preferred right and permits of no further denial where as is so clearly shown, because of the intra-union rivalry,
no certification election had been held for some time. To permit further delay could, under the circumstances,
defeat two of the prime objectives of the protection to labor mandate, namely the right to self-organization and
the right to collective bargaining by the union that would emerge triumphant in a certification election.

WHEREFORE, certiorari is granted declaring without force and effect the challenged order as well as the denial
for the motion for reconsideration. Prohibition, therefore, lies against the enforcement thereof. mandamus is
likewise available to compel the registration and thereafter the holding of the certification election in the
appropriate bargaining unit of respondent company. This decision is immediately executory.

[G.R. No. 51337. March 22, 1984.]

UNITED CMC TEXTILE WORKERS UNION, Petitioner, v. BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS, HON.
CARMELO NORIEL, PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR UNIONS, (JULY
CONVENTION), Respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; LABOR LAWS; BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS; PENDENCY OF
UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE CASE, A PREJUDICIAL QUESTION TO CERTIFICATION ELECTION; CASE AT
BAR. — Under settled jurisprudence, the pendency of a formal charge of company domination is a prejudicial
question that, until decided, bars proceedings for a certification election, the reason being that the votes of the
members of the dominated union would not be free. The ULP Case herein was filed on August 31, 1978, or
anterior to the Certification Case, which was presented on September 5, 1978. The pendency of the charge was
known to respondent public official by virtue of the Motion to Dismiss filed by petitioner as intervenor in the
Certification Case. No allegation has been made that said ULP Case was instituted in bad faith to forestall the
Certification Case.

DECISION

The question to resolve is whether or not public respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion in affirming the
Order of the Med-Arbiter calling for a certification election despite: (a) the pendency of an unfair labor practice
case filed by petitioner charging respondent PAFLU as being company-dominated; (b) the existence of a
deadlock in negotiations for renewal of the collective bargaining agreement between petitioner and the Central
Textile Mills, Inc. (CENTEX, for short); and (c) a reasonable doubt as to whether the 30% requirement for
holding a certification election has been met.
Petitioner is a legitimate labor organization, the incumbent collective bargaining representative of all rank and file
workers of CENTEX since 1956. Respondent PAFLU is also a legitimate labor organization seeking
representation as the bargaining agent of the rank and file workers of CENTEX.chanrobles virtualawlibrary
chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph

On August 31, 1978, petitioner filed a complaint for Unfair Labor Practice (R4-LRD-C-8-1493-78) (the ULP Case,
for brevity) against CENTEX and PAFLU alleging that CENTEX had "helped and cooperated in the organization
of the Central Textile Mills, Inc. Local PAFLU by allowing the organizing members of the PAFLU to solicit
signatures of employees of the company who are members of the complainant union to disaffiliate from
complainant union and join the respondent PAFLU, during company time and inside the company premises on
August 21, 1978 and the following days thereafter." 1

While the ULP Case was pending, PAFLU, on September 5, 1978, filed a Petition for Certification Election (R4-
LRD-M-9432-78) (the Certification Case, for short) among the rank and file workers of CENTEX, alleging that: 1)
there has been no certification election during the 12 months period prior to the filing of the petition; 2) the
petition is supported by signatures of 603 workers, or more than 30% of the rank and file workers of CENTEX; 3)
the collective bargaining agreement between CENTEX and petitioner will expire on October 31, 1978; 4) the
petition is filed within the 60-day-freedom-period immediately preceding the expiration of the CBA, and 6) there
is no legal impediment to the filing of the petition. 2

Petitioner intervened in the Certification Case and filed a Motion to Dismiss on September 27, 1978 on the
grounds that: 1) the ULP Case charging that PAFLU is a company-dominated union is a prejudicial question and
bars the holding of the certification election; and 2) PAFLU failed to comply with the 30% requirement for
mandatory certification election since only 440 of the 603 are valid signatures and that 719 signatories are
required as constitutive of 30% of the rank and file workers totalling 2,397 and not 1,900 as alleged by PAFLU.
3

On October 16, 1978, petitioner filed a Notice of Strike with the Bureau of Labor Relations for deadlock in the
CBA negotiations with CENTEX. The parties having failed to effect a conciliation, the Labor Minister assumed
jurisdiction on November 9, 1978 in Case No. AJML-033-78 4 (referred to hereafter as the Deadlock
Case)cralawnad

A Supplemental Motion to Dismiss in the Certification Case was filed by petitioner on December 7, 1978 alleging
that the Labor Minister had already taken cognizance of the deadlock in the CBA negotiations and constituted an
impediment to the holding of a certification election. 5

On December 18, 1978, in the Deadlock Case, the Deputy Minister of Labor released a Decision directing
petitioner and CENTEX to execute and sign a CBA to take effect on November 1, 1978 up to October 30, 1981
based on the guidelines enumerated therein, and to furnish the Office of the Minister of Labor with a signed copy
of the renewed agreement not later than January 31, 1979. 6

On January 23, 1979, in the Certification Case, the Med-Arbiter issued an Order for the holding of a certification
election among CENTEX rank and file workers, whereby qualified voters could choose either PAFLU or
petitioner as the collective bargaining representative or No Union at all. 7 This was affirmed by respondent
Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations on appeal, in the challenged Resolution, dated May 25, 1979, stating
that: 1) the Bureau has discretion to order certification election where several unions are contending for
representation and when there is doubt as to whether the 30% requirement has been met; and 2) to preclude the
filing of a petition for certification election the notice of strike for deadlock in CBA negotiations must occur prior to
the petition. 8

A Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner was denied for lack of merit in the Resolution of August 20, 1979
9 , also assailed herein.

Hence, this petition, on the general proposition that public respondent has committed serious error of law and
acted with grave abuse of discretion, and that petitioner has no plain and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.

We issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the conduct of the certification election, and eventually gave
the Petition due course.

The issues raised are: (1) is the pendency of the ULP Case charging a participating union in the certification
election proceedings as company-dominated a prejudicial question to the conduct of the election? (2) Does the
decision in the Deadlock Case directing the parties to execute a CBA have the effect of barring the certification
election? (3) Does respondent Director have the discretion to call for a certification election even if the 30%
consent requirement is lacking?

The case can be resolved on the basis of the first issue alone, which must be answered in the affirmative. Under
settled jurisprudence, the pendency of a formal charge of company domination is a prejudicial question that, until
decided, bars proceedings for a certification election 10 , the reason being that the votes of the members of the
dominated union would not be free. 11 The ULP Case herein was filed on August 31, 1978, or anterior to the
Certification Case, which was presented on September 5, 1978. The pendency of the charge was known to
respondent public official by virtue of the Motion to Dismiss filed by petitioner as intervenor in the Certification
Case. No allegation has been made that said ULP Case was instituted in bad faith to forestall the Certification
Case. The following ruling is thus squarely in point:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"There is no assertion that such complaint was flimsy, or made in bad faith or filed purposely to forestall the
certification election. So, no reason existed for the Industrial Court to depart from its established practice of
suspending the election proceeding. And this seems to be accepted rule in the law of labor relations, the reason
being, in the words of Mr. Justice Montemayor, `if there is a union dominated by the company, to which some of
the workers belong, an election among workers and employees of the company would not reflect the true
sentiment and wishes of the said workers and employees because the votes of the members of the dominated
union would not be free.’ (Manila Paper Mills Employees v. Court of Industrial Relations, 104 Phil. 10)

"And we have held, through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, that such charge of company domination is a prejudicial
question that until decided, shall suspend or bar proceedings for certification election. (Standard Cigarette
Workers’ Union v. Court of Industrial Relations, 101 Phil. 126)

"Indeed, if as a result of the Pelta’s complaint in Case No. 255-ULP, the Workers Union should be ordered
dissolved as a company dominated union, any election held in the meantime would be a waste of energy and
money to all parties concerned." 12

The rationale for the suspension of the election proceedings has been further amplified as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"What is settled law, dating from the case of Standard Cigarette Workers’ Union v. Court of Industrial Relations
(101 Phil. 126), decided in 1957, is that if it were a labor organization objecting to the participation in a
certification election of a company-dominated union, as a result of which a complaint for an unfair labor practice
case against the employer was filed, the status of the latter union must be first cleared in such a proceeding
before such voting could take place. In the language of Justice J.B.L. Reyes as ponente: `As correctly pointed
out by Judge Lanting in his dissenting opinion on the denial of petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, a
complaint for unfair labor practice may be considered a prejudicial question in a proceeding for certification
election when it is charged therein that one or more labor unions participating in the election are being aided, or
are controlled, by the company or employer. The reason is that the certification election may lead to the
selection of an employer-dominated or company union as the employees’ bargaining representative, and when
the court finds that said union is employer-dominated in the unfair labor practice case, the union selected would
be decertified and the whole election proceedings would be rendered useless and nugatory.’ (Ibid., 128). The
next year, the same jurist had occasion to reiterate such doctrine in Manila Paper Mills Employees and Workers
Association v. Court of Industrial Relations (104 Phil. 10 [1958]), thus: `We agree with the CIR on the reasons
given in its order that only a formal charge of company domination may serve as a bar to and stop a certification
election, the reason being that if there is a union dominated by the Company, to which some of the workers
belong, an election among the workers and employees of the company would not reflect the true sentiment and
wishes of the said workers and employees from the standpoint of their welfare and interest, because as to the
members of the company dominated union, the vote of the said members in the election would not be free. It is
equally true, however, that the opposition to the holding of a certification election due to a charge of company
domination can only be filed and maintained by the labor organization which made the charge of company
domination, because it is the entity that stands to lose and suffer prejudice by the certification election, the
reason being that its members might be overwhelmed in the voting by the other members controlled and
dominated by the Company,’ (Ibid., 15). It is easily understandable why it should be thus. There would be an
impairment of the integrity of the collective bargaining process if a company-dominated union were allowed to
participate in a certification election. The timid, the timorous, and the faint-hearted in the ranks of labor could
easily be tempted to cast their votes in favor of the choice of management. Should it emerge victorious, and it
becomes the exclusive representative of labor at the conference table, there is a frustration of the statutory
scheme. It takes two to bargain. There would be instead a unilateral imposition by the employer. There is need
therefore to inquire as to whether a labor organization that aspires to be the exclusive bargaining representative
is company-dominated before the certification election." 13

With the suspension of the certification proceedings clearly called for by reason of a prejudicial question, the
necessity of passing upon the remaining issues is obviated.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library
WHEREFORE, the Resolution of August 20, 1979 issued by public respondent affirming the Order of the Med-
Arbiter, dated January 23, 1979, calling for a certification election is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Temporary Restraining Order heretofore issued by this Court shall continue to be in force and effect until the
status is cleared of respondent Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions (July Convention) in Case No. R4-
LRD-M-9-432-78 entitled "In the Matter of Certification Election Among Rank and File Workers of Central Textile
Mills, Inc., Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions, Petitioner, United CMC Textile Workers Union,
Intervenor."cralaw virtua1aw library

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 128067 June 5, 1998

SAMAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA FILSYSTEMS (SAMAFIL-NAFLU-KMU), petitioner,

vs.
HON. SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT and FILSYSTEMS, INC., respondents.

Assailed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court are the Resolution and Order 1 of the public respondent,
dated June 28, 1996 and November 18, 1996, respectively, dismissing petitioner's petition for
certification election.

It appears that petitioner Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Filsystems (SAMAFIL-NAFLU-KMU) is a

registered labor union with Certificate of Registration No. NCR-UR-10-1575-95 issued by the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) on October 25, 1995. On November 6, 1995, petitioner
union filed a Petition for Certification Election among the rank-and-file employees of private respondent
FILSYSTEMS, Inc. before the DOLE — National Capital Region (NCR).2 Attached as annexes to the
petition are the Certificate of Registration issued by the DOLE, copies of union membership signed by
thirty three (33) rank-and-file employees of respondent company, the Charter Certificate showing its
affiliation with the National Federation of Labor Unions (NAFLU-KMU), the list of union officers, the
certification of the union secretary of the minutes of the general membership meeting, the Books of
Accounts and its Constitution and By-Laws.3

Private respondent opposed the petition. It questioned the status of petitioner as a legitimate labor
organization on the ground of lack of proof that its contract of affiliation with the NAFLU-KMU has been
submitted to the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) within thirty (30) days from its execution.4

In reply, petitioner averred that as a duly registered labor union, it has "all the rights and privileges . . . to
act as representative of its members for the purpose of collective bargaining with employers."5

On January 12, 1996, Med-Arbiter Paterno D. Adap dismissed the petition for certification election. He
ruled that petitioner, as an affiliate of NAFLU-KMU, has no legal personality on account of its failure to
comply with paragraphs (a), (b) and (e) of Section 3, Rule II of the Implementing Rules of Book V of the
Labor Code,6 viz:

xxx xxx xxx

In matters of affiliation of an independently registered union, the rules provide that the latter shall
be considered an affiliate of a labor federation after submission of the contract or agreement of
affiliation to the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) within thirty (30) days after its execution.

Likewise, it mandates the federation or national union concerned to issue a charter certificate
indicating the creation or establishment of a local or chapter, copy of which shall be submitted to
the Bureau of Labor Relations within thirty (30) days from issuance of such certificate.

A close examination of the records of the case does not reveal that the federation and the
independent union have executed a contract or agreement of affiliation, nor had it shown that it
 has submitted its charter certificate to the Bureau of Labor Relations, within thirty (30) days from
issuance of such charter certificate as amended by the rules.

Petitioner argued that it has complied with all the requirements for certification election pursuant
to the mandate of Sec. 2, Rule V of Book V of the Implementing Rules of the Labor Code; that
the rule cited by respondent is not included in the Rule citing the requirements for certification
election.

We disagree with petitioner's contention. The rule cited by the petitioner, Sec. 2, Rule V, Book V,
sub-paragraphs A, B, C, D, E, F and G, refers to an independently registered labor organization
which has filed a petition for certification election.

In the case at bar, an independently registered union has affiliated with a federation, hence, strict
compliance with the requirements embodied in Sec. 3, paragraphs A, B and E of Rule II, Book V
of the Rules and Regulations implementing the Labor Code should be complied with.

Record discloses that petitioner has not shown to have executed a contract or agreement of
affiliation nor has it established that is has submitted its charter certificate to the Bureau of Labor
Relations (BLR) within thirty (30) days from its execution.

Thus, petitioner in this case having failed to comply with the mandatory requirement, there was
no valid affiliation. Consequently, petitioner has no legal personality because the union failed to
attain the status of legitimacy for failure to comply with the requirements of law.

Petitioner appealed to the Office of the Secretary of Labor and Employment. It reiterated its contention
that as an independently registered union, it has the right to file a petition for certification election
regardless of its failure to prove its affiliation with NAFLU-KMU.7

On February 26, 1996, private respondent opposed the appeal. It argued that petitioner should have filed
its petition for certification election as an independently registered union and not as a union affiliated with
NAFLU-
KMU.8

Meanwhile or on February 7, 1996, another union, the Filsystems Workers Union (FWU), filed a Petition
for Certification Election in the same bargaining unit. On March 22, 1996, the Med-Arbitration — NCR
Branch granted the petition. The certification election held on April 19, 1996, was won by FWU which
garnered twenty six (26) votes out of the forty six (46) eligible voters. The FWU was certified on April 29,
1996, as the exclusive bargaining agent of all rank-and-file employees of private respondent. Eventually,
FWU and the private respondent negotiated a CBA.9

On June 11, 1996, the private respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal of petitioner as it has become
moot and academic. It also invoked Section 3, Rule V of the Implementing Rules of Book V of the Labor
Code stating that "once a union has been certified, no certification election may be held within one (1)
year from the date of issuance of a final certification election [result]."10

In opposing the Motion to Dismiss Appeal, petitioner contended that its appeal is not moot as the
certification election held on April 19, 1996, was void for violating Section 10, Rule V of the Implementing
Rules of Book V of the Labor Code,11 viz:

Sec. 10. Decision of the Secretary final and inappealable. — The Secretary shall have fifteen
(15) calendar days within which to decide the appeal from receipt of the records of the case. The
filing of the appeal from the decision of the Med-Arbiter stays the holding of any certification
election. The decision of the Secretary shall be final and inappealable.

Petitioner further argued that the CBA executed between the FWU and the private respondent could not
affect its pending representation case following Section 4, Rule V of the Implementing Rules of Book V
of the Labor Code12 which states:

Sec. 4. Effects of early agreements. — The representation case shall not, however, be adversely
affected by a collective bargaining agreement registered before or during the last 60 days of the
subsisting agreement or during the pendency of the representation case.
On June 28, 1996, respondent Secretary dismissed the appeal interposed by petitioner on the ground
that it has been rendered moot by the certification of FWU as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of
the rank-and-file workers of respondent company. Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was denied in
an Order dated November 18, 1996.13

Before this Court, petitioner contends:

Public respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to acting without or in excess
of jurisdiction in holding that the pending appeal in the representation case was rendered moot
and academic by a subsequently enacted collective bargaining agreement in the company.

II

Public respondent committed a serious legal error and gravely abused its discretion in failing to
hold that the legal personality of petitioner as a union having been established by its Certificate of
Registration, the same could not be subjected to collateral attack.

The petition is meritorious.

We shall first resolve whether the public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion when he
effectively affirmed the Resolution dated January 12, 1996 of the Med-Arbiter dismissing petitioner's
petition for certification election for failure to prove its affiliation with NAFLU-KMU.

The reasoning of the public respondent and the Med-Arbiter is flawed, proceeding as it does from a
wrong premise. Firstly, it must be underscored that petitioner is an independently registered labor union
as evidenced by a Certificate of Registration issued by the DOLE. As a legitimate labor organization,
petitioner's right to file a petition for certification election on its own is beyond question.14 Secondly, the
failure of petitioner to prove its affiliation with NAFLU-KMU cannot affect its right to file said petition for
certification election as an independent union. At the most, petitioner's failure will result in an ineffective
affiliation with NAFLU-KMU. Still, however, it can pursue its petition for certification election as an
independent union. In our rulings, we have stressed that despite affiliation, the local union remains the
basic unit free to serve the common interest of all its members and pursue its own interests
independently of the federation.15

In fine, the Med-Arbiter erred in dismissing petitioner's petition for certification election on account of its
non-submission of the charter certificate and the contract of affiliation with the NAFLU-KMU with the
BLR. The public respondent gravely abused his discretion in sustaining the Med-Arbiter's Resolution.

II

We shall now resolve the issue of whether the appeal filed by the petitioner was rendered moot and
academic by the subsequent certification election ordered by the Med-Arbiter, won by FWU and which
culminated in a CBA with private respondent.

Public respondent's ruling is anchored on his finding that there exists no pending representation case
since the petition for certification election filed by the petitioner was dismissed by the Med-Arbiter.
According to the public respondent, the legal effect of the dismissal of the petition was to leave the
playing field open without any legal barrier or prohibition to any petitioner; thus, other legitimate labor
organizations may file an entirely new petition for certification election.

We reject public respondent's ruling. The order of the Med-Arbiter dismissing petitioner's petition for
certification election was seasonably appealed. The appeal stopped the holding of any certification
election. Section 10, Rule V of the Implementing Rules of Book V of the Labor Code is crystal clear and
hardly needs any interpretation.

Accordingly, there was an unresolved representation case at the time the CBA was entered between
FWU and private respondent. Following Section 4, Rule V of the Implementing Rules of Book V of the
Labor Code, such CBA cannot and will not prejudice petitioner's pending representation case or render
 the same moot.16 This rule was applied in the case of Associated Labor Unions (ALU-TUCP)
v.Trajano 17 where we held that "[t]here should be no obstacle to the right of the proper time, that is,
within sixty (60) days prior to the expiration of the life of a certified collective bargaining agreement . . .,
not even by a collective agreement submitted during the pendency of the representation case." Likewise,
in Associated Labor Unions (ALU) v. Ferrer-Calleja,18 we held that a prematurely renewed CBA is not a
bar to the holding of a certification election.

Finally, we bewail private respondent's tenacious opposition to petitioner's certification election petition.
Such a stance is not conducive to industrial peace. Time and again, we have emphasized that when a
petition for certification election is filed by a legitimate labor organization, it is good policy for the
employer not to have any participation or partisan interest in the choice of the bargaining representative.
While employers may rightfully be notified or informed of petitions of such nature, they should not,
however, be considered parties thereto with an inalienable right to oppose it. An employer that involves
itself in a certification election lends suspicion to the fact that it wants to create a company union. Thus,
in Consolidated Farms, Inc. II v. Noriel,19 we declared that "[o]n a matter that should be the exclusive
concern of labor, the choice of a collective bargaining representative, the employer is definitely an
intruder. His participation, to say the least, deserves no encouragement. This Court should be the last
agency to lend support to such an attempt at interference with a purely internal affair of labor. . . . [While]
it is true that there may be circumstances where the interest of the employer calls for its being heard on
the matter, . . . sound policy dictates that as much as possible, management is to maintain a strictly
hands-off policy. For it is does not, it may lend itself to the legitimate suspicion that it is partial to one of
the contending unions. That is repugnant to the concept of collective bargaining. That is against the letter
and spirit of welfare legislation intended to protect labor and promote social justice. The judiciary then
should be the last to look with tolerance at such efforts of an employer to take part in the process leading
to the free and untrammeled choice of the exclusive bargaining representative of the workers."

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution and Order of the public
respondent are set aside. The Bureau of Labor Relations is ORDERED to hold a certification election in
respondent company with petitioner as a contending union. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

.R. No. 97020 June 8, 1992

CALIFORNIA MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE UNDERSECRETARY OF LABOR BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA, ABD FEDERATION OF
FREE WORKERS (FFW), CALIFORNIA MFG. CORP. SUPERVISORS UNION CHAPTER
(CALMASUCO), respondents.

This is a petition for review on certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order
seeking to annul and set aside the (a) resolution * of the Department of Labor and Employment dated October
16, 1990 in OS-A-10-283-90 (NCR-OD-M-90-05-095) entitled "In Re: Petition for Certification Election Among
the Supervisors of California Manufacturing Corporation, Federation of Free Workers (FFW) California Mfg.
Corp. Supervisors Union Chapter (CALMASUCO), petitioner-appellee, California Manufacturing Corporation,
employer-appellant" which denied herein petitioner's appeal and affirmed the order of Med-Arbiter Arsenia Q.
Ocampo dated August 22, 1990 directing the conduct of a certification election among the supervisory
employees of California Manufacturing Corporation, and (b) the Order ** of the same Department denying
petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

As culled from the records, the following facts appear undisputed:

On May 24, 1990, a petition for certification election among the supervisors of California Manufacturing
Corporation (CMC for brevity) was filed by the Federation of Free Workers (FFW) — California Manufacturing
Corporation Supervisors Union Chapter (CALMASUCO), alleging inter alia, that it is a duly registered federation
with registry certificate no. 1952-TTT-IP, while FFW-CALMASUCO Chapter is a duly registered chapter with
registry certificate no. 1-AFBI-038 issued on May 21, 1990 (Annex "A", Rollo, p. 63); that the employer CMC
employs one hundred fifty (150) supervisors; that there is no recognized supervisors union existing in the
company; that the petition is filed in accordance with Article 257 of the Labor Code, as amended by Republic Act
No. 6715; and that the petition is nevertheless supported by a substantial member of signatures of the
employees concerned (Annexes "E" and "F", Ibid., pp. 28-29).
In its answer, CMC, now petitioner herein, alleged among others, that the petition for the holding of a certification
election should be denied as it is not supported by the required twenty-five percent (25%) of all its supervisors
and that a big number of the supposed signatories to the petition are not actually supervisors as they have no
subordinates to supervise, nor do they have the powers and functions which under the law would classify them
as supervisors (Annex "D", Ibid., P. 25).

On July 24. 1990, FFW—CALMASUCO filed its reply maintaining that under the law, when there is no existing
unit yet in a particular bargaining unit at the time a petition for certification election is filed, the 25% rule on the
signatories does not apply; that the "organized establishment" contemplated by law does not refer to a
"company"per se but rather refers to a "bargaining unit" which may be of different classifications in a single
company; that CMC has at least two (2) different bargaining units, namely, the supervisory (unorganized) and
the rank-and-file (organized); that the signatories to the petition have been performing supervisory functions; that
since it is CMC which promoted them to the positions, of supervisors. it is already estopped from claiming that
they are not supervisors; that the said supervisors were excluded from the coverage of the collective bargaining
agreement of its rank-and-file employees; and that the contested signatories are indeed supervisors as shown in
the "CMC Master List of Employees" of January 2, 1990 and the CMS Publication (Annex "G", Ibid., p 30).

On August 12, 1990, the Med-Arbiter issued an order, the decretal portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby ordered that a certification election be

conducted among the supervisory employees of California Manufacturing Corporation within
twenty (20) days from receipt hereof with the usual pre-election conference of the parties to
thresh out the mechanics of the election The payroll of the company three (3) months prior to the
filing of the petition shall be used as the basis in determining the list of eligible voters.

The choices are:

1. Federation of Free Workers (FFW) California Manufacturing Corporation

Supervisors Union Chapter (CALMASUCO); and

2. No union.

SO ORDERED. (Annex "H" Ibid., p. 33).

CMC thereafter appealed to the Department of Labor and Employment which, however, affirmed the above
order in its assailed resolution dated October 16, 1990 (Annex, "B", Ibid, a 18) CMC's subsequent motion for
reconsideration was also denied in its order dated November 17, 1990 (Annex "A", Ibid., p. 15), hence, his
petition.

a) whether or not the term "unorganized establishment' in Article 257 of the tabor Code refers to
a bargaining unit or a business establishment;

b) whether or not non-supervisors can participate in a supervisor's certification election; and

c) whether or not the two (2) different and separate plants of herein petitioner in Parañaque and
Las Piñas can be treated as a single bargaining unit.

The petition must be denied.

The Court has already categorically ruled that Article 257 of the Labor code is applicable to unorganized labor
organizations and not to establishments where there exists a certified bargaining agent which had previously
entered into a collective bargaining agreement with the management (Associated Labor Unions [ALU] v. Calleja,
G.R. No. 85085, November 6, 1989, 179 SCRA 127) (Emphasis supplied). Otherwise stated, the establishment
concerned must have no certified bargaining agent (Associated Labor Unions [ALU] v. Calleja G.R. No. 82260,
July 19, 1989, 175 SCRA 490). In the instant case, it is beyond cavil that the supervisors of CMC which
constitute a bargaining unit separate and distinct from that of the rank-and-file, have no such agent. thus they
correctly filed a petition for certification election thru union FFW-CALMASUCO, likewise indubitably a legitimate
labor organization. CMC's insistence on the 25% subscription requirement, is clearly immaterial. The same has
been expressly deleted by Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6715 and is presently prescribed only in organized
establishments, that is, those with existing bargaining agents. Compliance with the said requirement need not
even be established with absolute certainty. The Court has consistently ruled that "even conceding that the
statutory requirement of 30% (now 25%) of the labor force asking for a certification election had not been strictly
compiled with, the Director (now the Med-Arbiter) is still empowered to order that it be held precisely for the
purpose of ascertaining which of the contending labor organizations shall be the exclusive collective bargaining
agent (Atlas Free Workers Union (AFWU)-PSSLU Local v. Noriel, G.R. No. L-51905, May 26, 1981, 104 SCRA
565). The requirement then is relevant only when it becomes mandatory to conduct a certification election. In all
other instances, the discretion, according to the rulings of this Tribunal, ought to be ordinarily exercised in favor
of a petition for certification (National Mines and Allied Workers Union (NAMAWU-UIF) v. Luna, et al., G.R. No.
L-46722, June 15, 1978, 83 SCRA 607).

In any event, CMC as employer has no standing to question a certification election (Asian Design and
Manufacturing Corporation v. Calleja, et al., G.R. No. 77415, June 29, 1989, 174 SCRA 477). Such is the sole
concern of the workers. The only exception is where the employer has to file the petition for certification election
pursuant to Article 259 (now 258) of the Labor Code because it was requested to bargain collectively.
Thereafter, the role of the employer in the certification process ceases. The employer becomes merely a
bystander. Oft-quoted is the pronouncement of the Court on management interference in certification elections,
thus:

On matters that should be the exclusive concern of labor, the choice of a collective bargaining
representative, the employer is definitely an intruder, His participation, to say the least, deserves
no encouragement. This Court should be the last agency to lend support to such an attempt at
interference with purely internal affair of labor. (Trade Unions of the Philippines and Allied
Services (TUPAS) v. Trajano. G.R. No. L-61153 January 17, 1983, 120 SCRA
64 citing Consolidated Farms, Inc. v. Noriel, G.R No. L-47752 July 31, 1978, 84 SCRA 469, 473).

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is DISMISSED for utter lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.