Case Digest: Nacar v.

Gallery Frames
G.R. No. 189871 : August 13, 2013

DARIO NACAR, Petitioner, v. GALLERY FRAMES AND/OR FELIPE BORDEY, JR., Respondents.

PERALTA,J.:

FACTS:

On October 15, 1998, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decisionin favor of petitioner and found that he was dismissed from
employment without a valid or just cause. Thus, petitioner was awarded backwages and separation pay in lieu of
reinstatement in the amount ofP158,919.92.

Respondents appealed to the NLRC, but it was dismissed for lack of merit. Accordingly, the NLRC sustained the decision of
the Labor Arbiter. Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied. Dissatisfied, respondents filed a Petition
for Review on Certiorari before the CA but it was likewise denied. Respondents then sought relief before the Supreme Court.
Finding no reversible error on the part of the CA, this Court denied the petition in the Resolution dated April 17, 2002.

An Entry of Judgment was later issued certifying that the resolution became final and executory on May 27, 2002. The case
was, thereafter, referred back to the Labor Arbiter for execution. Petitioner filed a Motion for Correct Computation, praying
that his backwages be computed from the date of his dismissal on January 24, 1997 up to the finality of the Resolution of the
Supreme Court on May 27, 2002. Upon recomputation, the Computation and Examination Unit of the NLRC arrived at an
updated amount in the sum ofP471,320.31.

Respondents filed a Motion to Quash Writ of Execution, arguing, among other things, that since the Labor Arbiter awarded
separation pay ofP62,986.56 and limited backwages ofP95,933.36, no more recomputation is required to be made of the said
awards. They claimed that after the decision becomes final and executory, the same cannot be altered or amended anymore.
LA denied the motion but the decision was reversed by the NLRC on appeal.

Petitioner appealed to the CA but was denied, stating that since petitioner no longer appealed the October 15, 1998 Decision
of the Labor Arbiter, which already became final and executory, a belated correction thereof is no longer allowed. The CA
stated that there is nothing left to be done except to enforce the said judgment. Consequently, it can no longer be modified in
any respect, except to correct clerical errors or mistakes. Thus, petitioner filed this petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not a re-computation in the course of execution of the labor arbiter's original computation of the awards
made is legally proper.

HELD: Yes. Labor Law- computation of backwages

A source of misunderstanding in implementing the final decision in this case proceeds from the way the original labor arbiter
framed his decision. The decision consists essentially of two parts.

The first is that part of the decision that cannot now be disputed because it has been confirmed with finality. This is the
finding of the illegality of the dismissal and the awards of separation pay in lieu of reinstatement, backwages, attorney's fees,
and legal interests. The second part is the computation of the awards made.

Clearly implied from this original computation is its currency up to the finality of the labor arbiter's decision. As we noted
above, this implication is apparent from the terms of the computation itself, and no question would have arisen had the parties
terminated the case and implemented the decision at that point.

However, the petitioner disagreed with the labor arbiter's findings on all counts - i.e., on the finding of illegality as well as on
all the consequent awards made. Hence, the petitioner appealed the case to the NLRC which, in turn, affirmed the labor
arbiter's decision. By law, the NLRC decision is final, reviewable only by the CA on jurisdictional grounds.

The petitioner appropriately sought to nullify the NLRC decision on jurisdictional grounds through a timely filed Rule 65
petition for certiorari. The CA decision, finding that NLRC exceeded its authority in affirming the payment of 13th month
pay and indemnity, lapsed to finality and was subsequently returned to the labor arbiter of origin for execution.

It was at this point that the present case arose. Focusing on the core illegal dismissal portion of the original labor arbiter's
decision, the implementing labor arbiter ordered the award re-computed; he apparently read the figures originally ordered to
be paid to be the computation due had the case been terminated and implemented at the labor arbiter's level. It was at this
point that the present case arose. Focusing on the core illegal dismissal portion of the original labor arbiter's decision, the
implementing labor arbiter ordered the award re-computed; he apparently read the figures originally ordered to be paid to be
the computation due had the case been terminated and implemented at the labor arbiter's level.

Thus, the labor arbiter re-computed the award to include the separation pay and the backwages due up to the finality of the
CA decision that fully terminated the case on the merits. Unfortunately, the labor arbiter's approved computation went
beyond the finality of the CA decision (July 29, 2003) and included as well the payment for awards the final CA decision had
deleted - specifically, the proportionate 13th month pay and the indemnity awards. Hence, the CA issued the decision now
questioned in the present petition.

We see no error in the CA decision confirming that a re-computation is necessary as it essentially considered the labor
arbiter's original decision in accordance with its basic component parts as we discussed above. To reiterate, the first part
contains the finding of illegality and its monetary consequences; the second part is the computation of the awards or
monetary consequences of the illegal dismissal, computed as of the time of the labor arbiter's original decision.

By the nature of an illegal dismissal case, the reliefs continue to add up until full satisfaction, as expressed under Article 279
of the Labor Code. The recomputation of the consequences of illegal dismissal upon execution of the decision does not
constitute an alteration or amendment of the final decision being implemented. The illegal dismissal ruling stands; only the
computation of monetary consequences of this dismissal is affected, and this is not a violation of the principle of
immutability of final judgments. That the amount respondents shall now pay has greatly increased is a consequence that it
cannot avoid as it is the risk that it ran when it continued to seek recourses against the Labor Arbiter's decision.

CA Decision reversed and set aside.

PEOPLE vs DELA CRUZ Case Digest

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LEOSON E. DELA CRUZ
G.R. No. 171272 June 7, 2007

FACTS: Two informations charged the accused with Murder and Frustrated Murder committed by means of treachery, evident
premeditation, taking advantage of superior strength, using disguise, fraud and craft to enter the dwelling and with insult to or
in disregard of the respect due on account of rank, age and sex. In the course of the trial, the prosecution alleged that appellant
Dela Cruz presented an I.D. with the name Allan B. Reyes to Sgt. Esgana, the guard-on-duty at Gate 3 of the Cinco Hermanos
Subdivision. Upon reaching the house of Pelagio, Dela Cruz was let in by Rebecca, Pelagio's daughter. Dela Cruz went straight
to the kitchen.

According to Pelagio, Dela Cruz was a messenger in his law firm who got fired based on his secretary's recommendation that
Dela Cruz had been absent without leave at least three times. He said that he would write Dela Cruz a recommendation letter
which the latter could pick up from the office. As he escorted Dela Cruz out towards the garage gate, the latter suddenly stabbed
him at the back and kept on stabbing him until he lost his balance. When he managed to turn and face Dela Cruz, the latter kept
on stabbing him frontally. He tried to put his arms around Dela Cruz but his attacker shook him off. As he ran towards the
kitchen, Dela Cruz chased and kept on stabbing him at the back of his left shoulder. At this point, Juliana appeared and rushed
to him begging, "Leo, tama na, tama na, tama na." Dela Cruz dropped the knife and ran towards the garage.

As Juliana was attending to her husband, Dela Cruz suddenly reappeared and stabbed her at the back with a letter opener. As
she jerked backward, she received another stab below the left shoulder. She tried to ward off the letter opener with her left
hand, but again was stabbed at the back of her left arm. Pelagio shouted, "Huwag Leo, si Julie yan." When the letter opener
broke, Dela Cruz dropped the instrument and rushed outside where he was apprehended. Juliana died as a result.

ISSUE: In a case, can all aggravating circumstances alleged be appreciated?

HELD: No. When treachery is present, an allegation of abuse of superior strength can no longer be appreciated as an
independent aggravating circumstance. The same holds true with the circumstance of disregard of the respect on account of
rank, age or sex, which in this case could not be aggravating. In like manner, we do not find that disguise, fraud or craft attended
the commission of the crimes. Also, we find no intellectual trickery nor cunning resorted to by appellant to lure his victims into
a trap and conceal his identity.

However, the Court agrees that dwelling aggravated the commission of the crimes. Appellant's greater perversity was revealed
when he deliberately entered the victims' domicile, at the pretext of soliciting help from its owners. The garage, where the
incidents took place, is undoubtedly an integral part of the victims' residence.

Cleary, the presence of the attending circumstances of this case qualified the killing of Juliana to murder. As to the attack on
Pelagio, the crime committed was frustrated murder as appellant performed all acts of execution which would have claimed
the life of Pelagio but because of the prompt medical intervention, a cause independent of the appellant’s will, Pelagio survived.

Criminal Case: People vs. Gutierrez G.R. No. 188602, February 4, 2010
People vs. Gutierrez G.R. No. 188602, February 4, 2010

Self-defense- the burden of proof is on the accused

Facts:

On August 15, 2003, five (5) separate Informations for murder, frustrated murder and three (3) counts of attempted murder
were filed against appellant.

When arraigned, appellant, with the assistance of counsel de oficio, entered a plea of not guilty to the charges. Trial on the
merits then ensued.

Not finding credence in appellant's claim of self-defense, the RTC convicted him of murder, frustrated murder and attempted
murder on three (3) counts.

Appellant assails the trial court and the CA for giving credence to the prosecution’s evidence. He admits having killed Regis
and wounding Dalit, but insists that he did so in self-defense.

Issue: Did the accused act in self-defense?

Ruling: No. Self-defense is an affirmative allegation and offers exculpation from liability for crimes only if satisfactorily
proved. It requires (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed by the
accused to repel it; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on his part.

In People of the Philippines v. Bienvenido Mara, we explained:

One who admits killing or fatally injuring another in the name of self-defense bears the burden of proving: (1) unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the person claiming self-defense. By invoking self-defense, the burden is placed on the
accused to prove its elements clearly and convincingly. While all three elements must concur, self-defense relies first and
foremost on proof of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. If no unlawful aggression is proved, no self-defense may
be successfully pleaded.

In this case, appellant utterly failed to discharge the burden of proving unlawful aggression. His version of the events was
uncorroborated, and his testimony was found to be less credible by the trial court. On the other hand, the surviving victims
were unanimous that appellant suddenly fired at them, without any provocation on their part. The credibility of the
prosecution witnesses had been weighed by the trial court, and it found their testimonies to be more convincing. As a rule, the
appellate court gives full weight and respect to the determination by the trial court of the credibility of witnesses, since the
trial judge has the best opportunity to observe their demeanor. While this rule admits of exceptions, none of such exceptions
obtains in this case.

In Razon v. People, we held:

Self-defense cannot be justifiably appreciated when uncorroborated by independent and competent evidence or when it is
extremely doubtful by itself. Indeed, in invoking self-defense, the burden of evidence is shifted and the accused claiming
self-defense must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution.

The trial court and the CA cannot, therefore, be faulted for rejecting appellant’s plea of self-defense.

This Court also agrees with the trial court in appreciating treachery as a qualifying circumstance. The essence of treachery is
the sudden and unexpected attack by the aggressor on unsuspecting victims, depriving the latter of any real chance to defend
themselves, thereby ensuring its commission without risk to the aggressor, and without the slightest provocation on the part
of the victims.

The pieces of evidence gleaned by the trial court, the facts, are enough to show that treachery was employed by appellant.
The attack was sudden, as testified to by the witnesses, and unexpected. Provocation on the part of the victims was not
proven, and appellant’s testimony that the victims were about to attack him cannot be given credence. The victims had no
inkling that an attack was forthcoming and had no opportunity to mount a defense. Thus, treachery was correctly appreciated
as a circumstance to qualify the crime to murder.

Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, the penalty imposed for the crime of murder is reclusion
perpetua to death. There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance, the penalty imposed on appellant is reclusion
perpetua, pursuant to Article 63, paragraph 223 of the RPC. The prison term imposed by the trial court in Criminal Case No.
03-3639 is correct.

We also affirm the CA ruling that appellant is guilty of attempted murder, not of frustrated murder, in Criminal Case No. 03-
3640 for the injury sustained by Dalit. No convincing proof was offered to show that the wound inflicted on Dalit was fatal
and would have caused his death had medical help not been provided. It is well settled that where the wounds inflicted on the
victim are not sufficient to cause his death, the crime is only attempted murder, as the accused had not performed all the acts
of execution that would have brought about the victim's death.

G.R. No. 124354 Case Digest

G.R. No. 124354, December 29, 1999
Rogelio Ramos and Erlinda Ramos (as guardians) vs. Court of Appeals
Ponente: Kapunan

Issue:
The court is called upon to rule whether a surgeon, an anesthesiologist and a hospital should be made liable for the unfortunate
comatose condition of a patient scheduled for cholecystectomy.

Facts:
Erlinda Ramos experiencing a discomfort allegedly caused by the stone in her gall bladder sought professional advice. She was
advised to undergo an operation for the removal of a stone in her gall bladder. She underwent series of examination and was
declared fit for surgery. Through the intercession Dr. Buenviaje, Erlinda and her husband met Dr. Hosaka and agreed to have
the operation on June 17, 1985.
 On the day of the operation, (according to Dr. Hosaka) something went wrong during the intubation. Rogelio, the husband
reminded the doctor that the condition of his wife would not have happened, had he looked for a good anesthesiologist. Due to
such, Erlinda stayed at the ICU for a month.

The petitioners filed a civil case for damages with the RTC of Quezon City against the respondents alleging negligence in the
management and care of Erlinda Ramos. During the trial, the plaintiff presented the testimonies of Dean Herminda Cruz and
dr. Gavino (present during the operation) to prove that the sustained by Erlinda was due to lack of oxygen in her brain caused
by the faulty management of her airway by the respondent during the anesthesia phase. Respondent relied on the expert
testimony of Dr. Jamora, a pulmonologist, to the effect that the cause of brain damage was Erlinda’s allergic reaction to the
anesthetic agent.

After considering the evidences, RTC rendered judgment in favor of petitioners. Private respondents interposed an appeal to
the Court of Appeals. CA rendered a decision reversing the findings of the RTC. The decision of the CA was mistakenly
received and has caused for the expiration of the reglementary period for the petitioners. The petitioners then filed for a motion
for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration, however the CA denied the motion for extension.

In aid of a new counsel, the petitioners were granted extension of 30 days. The petitioners alleged the following issues: (a) CA
erred in putting much reliance on the testimonies of respondents DR. Guttierrez, Dr. Calderon and Dr. Jamora; (b) in finding
that the negligence of the respondents did not cause the unfortunate comatose condition of the petitioner; (c) in not applying
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor [the thing speaks for itself]

Held:
(1) The denial of reglementary period is erroneous, because the delay is attributable to the fact that the decision was not sent to
the counsel on records of the petitioners. It is elementary that when a party is represented by counsel, all notices should be sent
to the party’s lawyer at his given address.
(2) Res ipsa loquitor is a maxim for the rule that the fact of the occurrence of an injury, taken with the surrounding circumstances,
may permit an inference or raise a presumption of negligence, or make out a plaintiff’s prima facie case and present a question
of fact for defendant to meet an explanation. This maxim is not applicable for substantive law thus mere invocation and
application of the doctrine does not dispense with the requirement of proof of negligence. Before the doctrine may be applied,
the following requisites must be present: (a) the accident is a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone’s
negligence; (b) it is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant of defendants; (c) the possibility
of contributing conduct which would make the plaintiff responsible is eliminated. [The control must be shown especially].
Medical malpractice does not escape from the application of this doctrine. Applying the maxim, we find that the damage caused
by Erlinda is attributable to the negligence of her doctors.
(3) As to the testimonies relied by the CA, we disagree. We hold that private respondents were unable to disprove the presumption
of negligence on their part in the care of Erlinda and their negligence was the proximate cause of her piteous condition. Dr.
Jamora does not qualify as an expert witness based on the standard set by the rules of evidence [Sec. 49. Opinion of expert
witness – the opinion of a witness on a matter requiring special knowledge, skill, experience or training which he is shown to
possess, may be received in evidence.]. The alleged allergic reaction has no proof as well.
(4) The court believes that the faulty intubation is the proximate cause of the comatose condition of the patient. Proximate cause
is a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces injury, and without which the
result would not have occurred.

The doctors as well as the hospital was held liable for the injury incurred by Erlinda, due to their negligence in the operation
and management for the hospital.

G.R. No. 177763 July 3, 2013

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
GARY VERGARA y ORIEL and JOSEPH INOCENCIO1 y PAULINO, Accused-Appellants.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

Before this Court is an appeal of the March 30, 2007 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No.
023873 affirming with modification the December 29, 2001 Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 116, Pasay
City in Crim. Case No. 01-0275, entitled People of the Philippines v. Gary Vergara y Oriel alias "Gary" and Joseph Inocencio
y Paulino alias "Joseph, " finding accused-appellants Gary Vergara (Vergara) and Joseph Inocencio (Inocencio) guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of murder as principal and accomplice, respectively.

On February 13, 2001, an Information for the crime of murder qualified by treachery was filed against accused-appellants.

On March 12, 2001, upon arraignment, accused-appellants pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.5 Trial on the merits
ensued.
The prosecution established that at around midnight of February 10, 2001, accused-appellants were causing a ruckus on
Libertad-Colayco Streets, Pasay City by throwing water bottles at passers-by. At around 2:00 a.m., the victim, Miguelito
Alfante, who was seemingly drunk, walked down the street. Vergara approached Alfante and told him: "Pare, mukhang high
na high ka." Alfante retorted: "Anong pakialam mo?" At this juncture, Vergara threw his arm around Alfante’s shoulder,
received a knife from Inocencio, and suddenly stabbed Alfante. Vergara then said "Taga rito ako." Thereafter, Vergara and
Inocencio ran from the scene but were pursued by several witnesses. Alfante, meanwhile, was brought to the Pasay City
General Hospital where he died.6

The autopsy report conducted on the cadaver of the victim revealed that Alfante sustained eight stab wounds: five located on
the chest area and three on the left forearm. The victim sustained two fatal wounds: one which severed the left ventricle of the
heart and another wound puncturing the lower lobe of the left lung. The Autopsy Report N-01-1517 signed by Dr. Dominic
Agbuda, medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation who conducted the autopsy, stated that:

CAUSE OF DEATH: MULTIPLE STAB WOUNDS, CHEST, LEFT ARM.

The common-law wife of the victim, Gina Alfante,8 testified that she incurred the following expenses in connection with the
death and burial of Alfante:

a) ₱17,000.00 for the coffin

b) ₱3,000.00 for the nicho

c) ₱250.00 for the mass

d) ₱15,000.00 for food and drinks for the wake; and

e) ₱16,000.00 for the burial lot.

Gina further testified that Alfante had been working as a mason prior to his death earning ₱500.00 a day.9

In his defense, Vergara denied the version of the prosecution. He testified that on February 10, 2001, at around midnight, he
and Inocencio went to a convenience store to buy salted eggs for "baon" the following day. When they passed by Libertad
corner Colayco Streets in Pasay City to go to the 7-11 convenience store, they saw Alfante together with nine other persons.
Contrary to the testimony of prosecution witnesses, it was Alfante who approached Vergara, knife in hand and proceeded to
stab him. He was able to evade the attack and grappled with Alfante for possession of the knife and, in the course of their
struggle, Alfante sustained his injuries. Inocencio stood by his side for the duration of the incident. 10 Thereafter, he fled the
scene. He went to the nearest police station and was subsequently brought to the Ospital ng Maynila for treatment for the
injury on his right palm sustained during the tussle. 11

Dr. Oliver Leyson, Medical Officer III of the Ospital ng Maynila, testified to his medical examination and treatment of
Vergara’s injury caused by a bladed weapon which he sustained on February 11, 2001. 12

After evaluating the respective evidence of the contending parties, on December 29, 2001, the RTC found accused-appellants
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder as defined under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. The decretal
portion of the Decision stated:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing premises and considerations, this Court hereby renders judgment finding the
accused GARY VERGARA Y ORIEL alias GARY and JOSEPH INOCENCIO Y PAULINO alias JOSEPH both GUILTY
as principal and accomplice, respectively, for the crime of Murder, as this felony is defined and penalized by Article 248 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 7659, and appreciating in favor of the accused Gary Vergara y Oriel alias Gary
the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender without any aggravating circumstance to offset the same, the Court hereby
sentences said accused Gary Vergara y Oriel alias Gary to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and the other accused
Joseph Inocencio y Paulino alias Joseph to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from Eight (8) Years and
One (1) Day of Prision Mayor, as minimum, to Fourteen (14) Years, Eight (8) Months and One (1) Day of Reclusion
Temporal, as maximum, and for them to pay, jointly and severally the Heirs of the deceased Miguelito Alfante the sums of
Php51,250.00, as actual damages, Php1,020,000.00, as indemnity for loss of earnings of the same deceased, Php250,00.00 as
moral damages, plus costs (sic).13

Accused-appellants filed their notice of appeal on February 5, 2002 to the Supreme Court. 14 The appeal was accepted by this
Court in its Resolution15 dated September 4, 2002 but was subsequently transferred to the Court of Appeals pursuant to
People v. Mateo.16

As in the Court of Appeals, accused-appellants challenge the court a quo’s finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. They
averred that the elements of the crime of murder were not proven.17 On March 30, 2007, the Court of Appeals affirmed with
modification as to the award of damages the Decision of the RTC. The Court of Appeals thus disposed of the appeal in the
following manner:
WHEREFORE, premises considered the Decision dated December 29, 2001, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), National
Capital Judicial Region, Branch 116, Pasay City is AFFIRMED with

MODIFICATION in that the accused-appellants are jointly and severally held liable to pay the heirs of the victim, to the
exclusion of his common-law-wife, the following amount, to wit:

a. ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnification;

b. ₱50,000.00 as moral damages; and

c. ₱51,250.00 as actual damages.18

Hence, this appeal.19 Accused-appellants’ confinement was confirmed by the Bureau of Corrections on April 11, 2007. 20

The appellee21 manifested that it would not file a supplemental brief.

On May 13, 2008, accused-appellant Joseph P. Inocencio filed a motion to withdraw his appeal stating that he is no longer
interested to pursue an appeal.22 This Court, in a Resolution dated June 25, 2008, granted the motion of appellant Inocencio
and declared the case terminated as far as he is concerned.23

Due to the failure of accused-appellant Vergara’s counsel to file a supplemental brief, the Court, in a Resolution dated
November 19, 2008, resolved to dispense with its filing. 24

We affirm the March 30, 2007 decision of the Court of Appeals with modification respecting the award of damages.

The pertinent provision in this case is Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:

Article 248. Murder. - Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill another, shall be guilty of
murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:

1) With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken the
defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity. (Emphasis added.)

Jurisprudence is consistent in reiterating that the trial court is in a better position to adjudge the credibility of witnesses
especially if it is affirmed by the Court of Appeals.25 People v. Clores26 reminds us that:

When it comes to the matter of credibility of a witness, settled are the guiding rules some of which are that (1) the Appellate
court will not disturb the factual findings of the lower Court, unless there is a showing that it had overlooked, misunderstood
or misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight and substance that would have affected the result of the case, which
showing is absent herein; (2) the findings of the Trial Court pertaining to the credibility of a witness is entitled to great
respect since it had the opportunity to examine his demeanor as he testified on the witness stand, and, therefore, can discern if
such witness is telling the truth or not; and (3) a witness who testifies in a categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and frank
manner and remains consistent on cross-examination is a credible witness. (Citations omitted.)

The rationale for these guidelines is that, having heard the witnesses themselves and having observed firsthand their
deportment and manner of testifying under grueling examination, the trial courts are in a better position to decide the question
of credibility.27 On the other hand, this Court is far detached from the details and drama during trial and relies only on the
records of the case in its review. On the matter of credence and credibility of witnesses, therefore, this Court admits to its
limitations and acknowledges the advantage of the trial court whose findings we give due deference.

We see no need to depart from the aforestated rules. A careful review of the records reveals that accused-appellant Vergara
failed to negate the findings of the trial court with concrete evidence that it had overlooked, misconstrued or misapplied some
fact or circumstance of weight and substance that would have affected the result of the case. We agree with the Court of
Appeals when it stated that:

The death of the victim, Miguelito Alfante, is directly caused by the stab wounds inflicted by [appellant Vergara] when he
placed his left arm on the shoulder of the victim and stabbed him repeatedly in his chest and left forearm with a knife handed
to him by [appellant Inocencio]. This is an overwhelming evidence, and in stark contrast, all [appellant Vergara] could offer
are denial and self-defense. Denial is an intrinsically weak defense, which the accused must buttress with strong evidence of
non-culpability to merit credibility. Having failed to satisfy, the denial must necessarily fail. 28 (Citation omitted.)

Anent accused-appellant Vergara’s claim of self-defense, the following essential elements had to be proved: (1) unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and
(3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person resorting to self-defense.29 A person who invokes self-defense has
the burden of proof. He must prove all the elements of self-defense. However, the most important of all the elements is
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. Unlawful aggression must be proved first in order for self-defense to be
successfully pleaded, whether complete or incomplete.30
Unlawful aggression is an actual physical assault, or at least a threat to inflict real imminent injury, upon a person. In case of
threat, it must be offensive and strong, positively showing the wrongful intent to cause injury. It "presupposes actual, sudden,
unexpected or imminent danger - not merely threatening and intimidating action." It is present "only when the one attacked
faces real and immediate threat to one’s life."31

In the present case, the element of unlawful aggression is absent. By the testimonies of all the witnesses, the victim’s
actuations did not constitute unlawful aggression to warrant the use of force employed by accused-appellant Vergara. The
records reveal that the victim had been walking home albeit drunk when he passed by accused-appellants. However, there is
no indication of any untoward action from him to warrant the treatment that he had by accused-appellant Vergara’s hands. As
succinctly stated by the RTC:

The victim was just walking, he was neither uttering invectives words nor provoking the appellants into a fight. Appellant
Vergara was the unlawful aggressor. He was the one who put the life of the victim in actual peril. This can be inferred from
the wounds sustained by the victim." 32

It is thus clear that there being no unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, the act of accused-appellant Vergara of
taking a knife and stabbing the victim was not made in lawful self-defense.

We also agree with the RTC and the Court of Appeals that the acts of accused-appellant Vergara constituted treachery
qualifying the crime committed to murder. As we have previously ruled upon, treachery is present when the offender
commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution, which tend directly and
specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party might make. 33

Here, accused-appellant Vergara after exchanging words with the victim, threw his arm around the victim’s shoulder and
proceeded to stab him. The victim was totally unaware of the evil that would befall him. The number and severity of the
wounds received by the victim indicated that he was rendered immobile and without any real opportunity to defend himself
other than feebly raising his arm to ward off the attack. We, thus, sustain the trial court and the Court of Appeals in finding
that the qualifying circumstance of treachery is present in the commission of the crime.

Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, provides for the penalty of reclusion perpetua
to death for the crime of murder. Though there was an appreciation of voluntary surrender as a mitigating circumstance,
following the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the RTC, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, properly imposed the penalty of
reclusion perpetua, pursuant to Article 63, paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal Code. 34

However, to conform to existing jurisprudence the Court must modify the amount of indemnity for death and exemplary
damages awarded by the courts a quo.

Anent the award of damages, when death occurs due to a crime, the following may be recovered: (1) civil indemnity ex
delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary damages; (5)
attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation; and (6) interest, in proper cases.35

We agree with the Court of Appeals that the heirs of the victim was able to prove before the trial court, actual damages in the
amount of ₱51,250.00 based on the receipts36 they submitted to the trial court.1âwphi1

We also agree with the Court of Appeals when it removed the RTC’s award respecting the indemnity for the loss of earning
capacity. As we have already previously ruled that:

Damages for loss of earning capacity is in the nature of actual damages, which as a rule must be duly proven by documentary
evidence, not merely by the self-serving testimony of the widow.

By way of exception, damages for loss of earning capacity may be awarded despite the absence of documentary evidence
when (1) the deceased is self-employed earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws, and judicial notice
may be taken of the fact that in the deceased’s line of work no documentary evidence is available; or (2) the deceased is
employed as a daily wage worker earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws. 37 (Citations and emphasis
omitted.)

In this case, we are constrained to uphold the ruling of the Court of Appeals since no documentary evidence was presented to
buttress the claim for the loss of earning capacity of the victim as claimed by his common-law wife. Neither was it shown
that the victim was covered by the exceptions mentioned in the above-quoted case. The Court of Appeals stated:

Settled is the rule that actual damages, inclusive of expected earnings lost caused by the crime, must be proved with a
reasonable degree of certainty and on the best evidence to prove obtainable by the injured party. The prosecution failed to
meet this criteria, no witness was presented to support the contention of the common-law-wife of the victim that the latter is a
self-employed mason earning ₱500.00 a day. Hence, this Court cannot rely on the uncorroborated testimony of the common-
law-wife of the victim which lacks specific details or particulars on the claimed loss earnings.38 (Citation omitted.)

Moreover, we deem it proper that an award for exemplary damages be made. We have ruled as follows:
Unlike the criminal liability which is basically a State concern, the award of damages, however, is likewise, if not primarily,
intended for the offended party who suffers thereby. It would make little sense for an award of exemplary damages to be due
the private offended party when the aggravating circumstance is ordinary but to be withheld when it is qualifying. Withal, the
ordinary or qualifying nature of an aggravating circumstance is a distinction that should only be of consequence to the
criminal, rather than to the civil, liability of the offender. In fine, relative to the civil aspect of the case, an aggravating
circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, should entitle the offended party to an award of exemplary damages within the
unbridled meaning of Article 2230 of the Civil Code.39(Emphasis omitted.)

We, thus, award exemplary damages in the amount of ₱30,000.00 to conform to existing jurisprudence.40

We increase the award for mandatory civil indemnity to ₱75,000.00 to conform to recent jurisprudence. 41

Lastly, we sustain the RTC’s award for moral damages in the amount of ₱50,000.00 even in the absence of proof of mental
and emotional suffering of the victim’s heirs.42 As borne out by human nature and experience, a violent death invariably and
necessarily brings about emotional pain and anguish on the part of the victim’s family. 43 While no amount of damages may
totally compensate the sudden and tragic loss of a loved one it is nonetheless awarded to the heirs of the deceased to at least
assuage them.

In addition, and in conformity with current policy, we also impose on all the monetary awards for damages interest at the
legal rate of 6% per annum from date of finality of this Decision until fully paid. 44

WHEREFORE, the March 30, 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 02387 is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Appellant Gary Vergara y Oriel alias "Gary" is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of murder, and
is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Appellant is further ordered to pay the heirs of Miguelito Alfante the
amounts of ₱51 ,250.00 as actual damages, ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱30,000.00 as
exemplary damages. All monetary awards for damages shall earn interest at the legal rate of 6o/o per annum from date of
finality of this Decision until fully paid.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

FILOMENA R. BENEDICTO, Petitioner, vs. ANTONIO VILLAFLORES, Respondent.

G.R. No. 185020 October 6, 2010 SECOND DIVISION

FILOMENA R. BENEDICTO, Petitioner, vs. ANTONIO VILLAFLORES, Respondent.

Facts

In 1980, Maria Villaflores (Maria) sold a portion of Lot 2-A to her nephew, respondent Antonio Villaflores (Antonio). Antonio
then took possession of the portion sold to him and constructed a house thereon. Twelve (12) years later, or on August 15,
1992, Maria executed in favor of Antonio a Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan covering the entire Lot 2-A. However, Antonio did
not register the sale or pay the real property taxes for the subject land.

On August 31, 1994, Maria sold the same Lot 2-A to Filomena, evidenced by a Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan. Filomena
registered the sale on September 6, 1994. Since then Filomena paid the real property taxes for the subject parcel of land.

After trial, the RTC sustained Filomena’s ownership who was the one who registered the sale in good faith. It rejected Antonio’s
allegation of bad faith on the part of Filomena because no sufficient evidence was adduced to prove it. This finding was affirmed
by the CA.

Issue

Whether Antonio is a possessor in good faith.

Ruling

The Court sustained the finding that Antonio is a builder in good faith.

Under Article 448, a landowner is given the option to either appropriate the improvement as his own upon payment of the
proper amount of indemnity, or sell the land to the possessor in good faith. Anent to this, Article 546 provides that a builder in
good faith is entitled to full reimbursement for all the necessary and useful expenses incurred; it also gives him right of retention
until full reimbursement is made. The objective of Article 546 of the Civil Code is to administer justice between the parties
involved. Guided by this precept, it is therefore the current market value of the improvements which should be made the basis
of reimbursement.

However, in spite of its finding of good faith on the part of Antonio by the RTC it did not order the reimbursement of the
necessary and useful expenses he incurred. Hence, the CA correctly ordered the remand of the case for further proceedings.
 G.R. No. 170942, August 28, 2013 ]

COMSAVINGS BANK (NOW GSIS FAMILY BANK), PETITIONER, VS. SPOUSES DANILO AND ESTRELLA
CAPISTRANO, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:
A banking institution serving as an originating bank for the Unified Home Lending Program (UHLP) of the Government
owes a duty to observe the highest degree of diligence and a high standard of integrity and performance in all its transactions
with its clients because its business is imbued with public interest.

The Case

Comsavings Bank (now GSIS Family Bank) seeks the review and reversal of the decision promulgated on November 30,
2005,[1] whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed with modifications the decision rendered on April 25, 2003 by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 135, in Makati City finding it liable for damages to respondents. [2]

Antecedents

Respondents were the owners of a residential lot with an area of 200 square meters known as Lot 8 of Block 4 of the Infant
Jesus Subdivision situated in Bacoor, Cavite, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 316885 of the Register
of Deeds of Cavite. Desirous of building their own house on the lot, they availed themselves of the UHLP implemented by
the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC). On May 28, 1992, they executed a construction contract with
Carmencita Cruz-Bay, the proprietor of GCB Builders, for the total contract price of P265,000.00 with the latter undertaking
to complete the construction within 75 days. To finance the construction, GCB Builders facilitated their loan application with
Comsavings Bank, an NHFMC-accredited originator. As proof of their qualifications to avail themselves of a loan under the
UHLP and to comply with the conditions prescribed for the approval of their application, they submitted their record of
employment, the amount of their income, and a clearance from the Social Security System (SSS) to the effect that they had
no existing loans, among others. On May 28, 1992, they executed in favor of GCB Builders a deed of assignment of the
amount of the P300,000.00 proceeds of the loan from Comsavings Bank.

On July 2, 1992, Comsavings Bank informed respondent Estrella Capistrano that she would have to sign various documents
as part of the requirements for the release of the loan. Among the documents was a certificate of house completion and
acceptance. On the same date, Comsavings Bank handed Estrella a letter addressed to GCB Builders informing the latter that
respondents had complied with the preliminary requirements of the UHLP, and were qualified to avail themselves of the loan
amounting to P303,450.00 payable within 25 years at 16% per annum, subject to the following terms and conditions, namely:
the signing of mortgage documents, 100% completion of the construction of the housing unit, original certificate of
occupancy permit and certification of completion, and submission of house pictures signed by the borrower at the back.

On August 10, 1992, Comsavings Bank informed respondents of the approval of an interim financing loan of P260,000.00
payable within 180 days, which amount was to be paid out of the proceeds of the loan from NHMFC. By October 9, 1992,
GCB Builders received from Comsavings Bank the total sum of P265,000.00 as construction cost in four releases, to wit:

August 7, 1992 - P39,210.00

August 19, 1992 - P112,181.00

September 3, 1992 - P53,565.00

October 9, 1992 - P24,779.25[3]

In late September 1992, after Comsavings Bank had released the total of P265,000.00 to GCB Builders as construction cost,
respondents inquired from GCB Builder when their house would be completed considering that their contract stipulated a
completion period of 75 days. Cruz-Bay gave various excuses for the delay, such as the rainy season, but promised to finish
the construction as soon as possible. The year 1992 ended with the construction of the house unfinished.[4]

In February 1993, respondents demanded the completion of the house. In reply, Cruz-Bay told them to give the further
amount of P25,000.00 to finish the construction. They requested a breakdown of the amounts already spent in the
construction considering that the P303,450.00 that Comsavings Bank had been paid by NHMFC on their loan had been more
than the contract price of the contract. Instead of furnishing them the requested breakdown, GCB Builders' counsel sent a
demand letter for an additional construction cost of P52,511.59.

On May 30, 1993, respondents received a letter from NHMFC advising that they should already start paying their monthly
amortizations of P4,278.00 because their loan had been released on April 20, 1993 directly to Comsavings Bank. On June 1,
1993, Estrella Capistrano went to the construction site and found to her dismay that the house was still unfinished. She noted
that there were no doorknobs; that the toilet bath floor was not even constructed yet because the portion of the house was still
soil; that there were no toilet and bathroom fixtures; that the toilet and bath wall tiles had no end-capping; that there were
cracks on the wall plastering; that the kitchen sink had no plumbing fixtures; and that the main door installed was a flush-type
instead of the sliding door specified in the approved plans.

On July 5, 1993, respondents wrote to NHMFC protesting the demand for amortization payments considering that they had
not signed any certification of completion and acceptance, and that even if there was such a certification of completion and
acceptance, it would have been forged.

On July 14, 1993, respondents again wrote to NHMFC requesting an ocular inspection of the construction site.

On November 11, 1993, Atty. Ruben C. Corona, the Manager of the Collateral Verification & External Examination
Department of NHMFC, informed the counsel of respondents that the inspection of the construction site conducted on August
4, 1993 showed the following:

1) That the subject unit is being occupied by tenant, a certain Mr. Mark Inanil;

2) That the toilet/bath and kitchen counter are not installed with Plumbing fixtures;

3) That there are no door knobs on bedroom and no handles on Kitchen cabinet;

4) That the toilet bath has no concrete flooring and the tiles has no end/corner cappings; and

5) That there are hairline cracks on flooring.[5]

On July 12, 1993, respondents sued GCB Builders and Comsavings Bank for breach of contract and damages, [6] praying that
defendants be ordered jointly and severally liable: (1) to finish the construction of the house according to the plans and
specifications agreed upon at the price stipulated in the construction contract; and (2) to pay them P38,450.00 as the
equivalent of the mortgage value in excess of the contract price; P25,000.00 as actual damages for the expenses incurred by
reason of the breach of contract; P200,000.00 as moral damages; P30,000.00 as attorney's fees; and P50,000.00 as exemplary
damages.

Respondents amended their complaint to implead NHMFC as ab additional defendant. Aside from adopting the reliefs under
the original complaint, they prayed that NHMFC be directed to hold in abeyance its demand for amortization payment until
the case had been finally adjudged; that NHMFC, GCB Builders and Comsavings Bank be ordered to pay moral and
exemplary damages, and attorney's fees; and that GCB Builders and Comsavings be directed to pay P4,500.00 as monthly
rental from the filing of the complaint until the house was turned-over and accepted by them.[7]

In their respective answers,[8] GCB Builders, Comsavings Bank and NHMFC asserted that the complaint as amended stated
no cause of action against them. On its part, GCB Builders claimed that the construction of the house had been completed a
long time ago; that respondent had failed, despite demand, to occupy the house and to pay a balance of P46,849.94 as of
August 23, 1993; and that it had received only P239,355.30 out of the P303,000.00 loan, inasmuch as the balance went to
interim interest, originator fee, service charge and other bank charges. Comsavings Bank averred that respondents were
estopped from assailing their signing of the certificate of house acceptance/completion on July 2, 1992 considering that they
had the option not to pre-sign the certificate; and that it did not make any representation as to the conditions and facilitation
of the loan with NHMFC when it submitted the certificate of house acceptance/completion to NHMFC after the completion
of the house on April 20, 1993 because such representations were normal and regular requirements in loan processing of the
conduit banks of NHMFC. Lastly, NHMFC alleged that it administered the UHLP of the Government by granting financing
to qualified home borrowers through loan originators, like Comsavings Bank in this case; and that respondents had applied
and had been granted a housing loan, and, as security, they had executed a loan and mortgage agreement and promissory note
for P303,450.00 dated July 2, 1992.

Decision of the RTC

On April 25, 2003, after trial, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondents. [9] Specifically, it found that although the
proceeds of the loan had been completely released, the construction of the house of respondents remained not completed; that
the house had remained in the possession of GCB Builders, which had meanwhile leased it to another person; that GCB
Builders did not comply with the terms and conditions of the construction contract; and that NHMFC approved the loan in
the gross amount of P303,450.00, and released P289,000.00 of that amount to Comsavings Bank on April 20, 1993. It
concluded that respondents were entitled to recover from all defendants actual damages of P25,000.00; moral damages for
their mental anguish and sleepless night in the amount of P200,000.00; exemplary damages of P100,000.00; and P30,000.00
as attorney's fees. It ruled, however, that only GCB Builders was liable for the monthly rental of P4,500.00 because GCB
Builders was alone in renting out the house; and that NHMFC was equally liable with the other defendants by reason of its
having released the loan proceeds to Comsavings Bank without verifying whether the construction had already been
completed, thereby indicating that NHMFC had connived and confederated with its co-defendants in the irregular release of
the loan proceeds to Comsavings Bank.

The RTC disposed thusly:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering:

1. Defendants GCB Builder, COMSAVINGS BANK, and NATIONAL HOUSING FINANCE MORTGAGE
CORPORATION (sic) jointly and severally:

1.1 To complete the construction of the house of plaintiff Spouses DANILO and ESTRELLA CAPISTRANO
within thirty [30] days;

1.2 To pay said plaintiffs:

1.2.1 P25,000.00 in actual damages;

1.2.2 P200,000.00 in moral damages;
1.2.3 P100,000.00 in exemplary damages;
1.2.4 P30,000.00 as attorney's fees.

2. Defendant GCB Builder to pay the plaintiffs the amount of P4,500.00, as rentals from the date of the filing of the
Complaint until the construction of the house is completed, turned over to and accepted by the plaintiffs;

3. Defendants NHMFC to hold in abeyance the collection of the amortizations until 30 days from the completion and
acceptance by the plaintiffs of the house in question.

SO ORDERED.[10]
GCB Builders, Comsavings Bank and NHMFC appealed to the CA.

Decision of the CA

GCB Builders assigned the following errors to the RTC, namely:

1. IN FINDING THAT THE HOUSE IN QUESTION WAS NOT COMPLETED.

2. IN FINDING THAT GCB BUILDERS DID NOT COMPLY WITH THE TERM AND CONDITIONS OF THE
CONSTRUCTION.

3. IN NOT FINDING THAT THE PLAINTIFFS ARE LIABLE TO PAY DEFENDANT GCB THE AMOUNT OF
P45,000.00.

4. IN RENDERING WITHOUT LEGAL AND FACTUAL BASIS THE DECISION, THE DISPOSTIVE PORTION
OF WHICH READS, AS FOLLOWS:

xxxx

5. IN NOT GRANTING THE RELIEFS PRAYED FOR IN THE COUNTERCLAIM;

6. IN NOT DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT.[11]

Comsavings Bank phrased its assignment of error thuswise:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT DEFENDANT-APPELLANT COMSAVINGS BANK IS JOINTLY
AND SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH THE OTHER DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS GCB BUILDERS AND NATIONAL
HOME MORTGAGE FINANCE CORPORATION TO PAY PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES ACTUAL, MORAL AND
EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AS WELL AS ATTORNEY'S FEES.[12]
NHMFC ascribes to the RTC the following errors, to wit:

I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT DEFENDANT-APPELLANT NATIONAL HOME MORTGAGE
FINANCE CORPORATION IS JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH THE OTHER DEFENDANT-
APPELLANTS GCB BUILDERS AND COMSAVINGS BANK TO PAY PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES ACTUAL, MORAL
AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AS WELL AS ATTORNEY'S FEES.

II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT DEFENDANT-APPELLANT NATIONAL HOME MORTGAGE
FINANCE CORPORATION SHOULD HOLD IN ABEYANCE THE COLLECTION OF AMORTIZATION UNTIL 30
DAYS FROM THE COMPLETION AND ACCEPTANCE BY THE PLAINTIFFS OF THE HOUSE IN QUESTION.[13]

On November 30, 2005, the CA promulgated the appealed decision, [14] affirming the RTC subject to the modification that
NHMFC was absolved of liability, and that the moral and exemplary damages were reduced, viz:

xxxx

The Court a quo held appellant Comsavings Bank jointly and severally liable with appellant GCB Builders since it likewise
committed misrepresentations in obtaining the mortgage loan from the NHMFC in the name of the appellees. We concur. The
records show that it was appellant Comsavings Bank which called up the appellee Estrella Capistrano and had her sign
various documents as part of the documentary requirements for the release of the construction loan. One of these documents,
was the Certificate of House Completion and Acceptance, which, upon appellant Bank's representation was signed by the
appellees even if the construction of the house had not yet started. On July 2, 1992, Comsavings Bank informed appellant
GCB Builders that appellees had provisionally complied with the preliminary requirements under the Unified Home Lending
Program of appellant NHMFC and qualified for a loan in the amount of P303,450.00 payable in twenty-five (25) years at an
interest of 16% per annum. One condition for the approval of the loan was "100% completion of the construction of the
housing unit located on the property described plus: Original Certificate of Occupancy Permit and Certification of
Completion and Submission of House pictures signed at the back by the borrower. However, the loan documents which
appellant Bank submitted to appellant NHMFC were false. Appellant Comsavings Bank in order to show that the
construction of the subject house had been completed, submitted a photograph of a toilet/bath with plumbing and fixtures
installed when in the truth, as admitted by appellant GCB Builders, the plumbing fixtures had not (been) installed as the
appellees were still indebted to GCB. Comsavings Bank also submitted photographs of wall tiles of the toilet/bath showing
them to be brown or mustard, but the color of the wall tiles actually installed was white per testimony of appellee Estrella
Capistrano and corroborated by appellant GCB Builders' witness Leopoldo Arnaiz. The appellees complained to appellant
NHMFC that the house which they bought was unfinished on the basis of which NHMFC conducted an inspection of the
housing unit and found the complaint to be true.

By submitting false or forged documents to the NHMFC, appellant Comsavings Bank violated the warranties contained in the
purchase of the loan agreement with appellant NHMFC. On the strength of such warranties, NHMFC issued Check No.
425824 in the amount of P1,382,806.63 that include the mortgage loan of the appellees. It must be recalled that the agreement
provided among others that "the housing loan extended to the appellees would be released to and received by Comsavings
Bank, and the latter warrants the genuineness of all loan documents it submitted to NHMFC. Incidentally, Carmencita B.
Cruz, owner and proprietor of appellant GCB Builders admitted that she is even not an accredited builder of housing units
under the Unified Home Lending Program (UHLP) of the NHMFC in the area. Appellant Comsavings Bank in allowing
appellant GCB Builders to participate in the UHLP program undermined and defeated its real purpose, to help low income
families build their own homes, to the damage and prejudice of the appellees. [15]

xxxx

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. The
dispositive portion finding the NHMFC jointly and severally liable with the other appellants for the payment of actual, moral
and exemplary damages, is hereby deleted; the awards of moral and exemplary damages are reduced to P100,000.00 and
P50,000.00, respectively, and the amount of rentals to be paid by GCB Builders is to be reckoned from August 4, 1993.

SO ORDERED.[16]

Hence, this further appeal by Comsavings Bank.

Issue
Comsavings Bank submits the lone issue of:

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING PETITIONER BANK JOINTLY AND
SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH GCB BUILDERS TO PAY RESPONDENT ACTUAL, MORAL AND EXEMPLARY
DAMAGES, AS WELL AS ATTORNEY'S FEES.[17]

Comsavings Bank insists on its non-liability, contending that it committed no misrepresentation when it made respondents
sign the certificate of house acceptance/completion notwithstanding that the construction of the house had not yet started;
that they agreed to pre-sign the certificate, although they had the option not to; that it made them sign the certificate to enable
them to avoid the inconvenience of returning back and forth just to sign the certificate; that it made clear to them during the
pre-signing that the certificate would be submitted to NHMFC only after the completion of the house; that it submitted the
certificate to NHMFC after the completion of the construction of the house on April 23, 2003; that they had thus been
informed beforehand of the conditions in pre-signing the certificate; that choosing to pre-sign the certificate estopped them
from questioning the procedural aspect of the documentation; and that the practice of pre-signing documents was not
expressly prohibited considering that they were not induced to pre-sign the certificate.[18]

Ruling

The appeal has no merit. 1.

Comsaving Bank's liability was not based on its purchase of loan agreement with NHMFC but on Article 20 and
Article 1170 of the Civil Code

The CA rightfully declared Comsavings Bank solidarily liable with GCB Builders for the damages sustained by respondents.
However, we point out that such liability did not arise from Comsavings Bank's breach of warranties under its purchase of
loan agreement with NHMFC. Under the purchase of loan agreement, it undertook, for value received, to sell, transfer and
deliver to NHMFC the loan agreements, promissory notes and other supporting documents that it had entered into and
executed with respondents, and warranted the genuineness of the loan documents and the "construction of the residential
units."[19] Having made the warranties in favor of NHMFC, it would be liable in case of breach of the warranties to NHMFC,
not respondents, eliminating breach of such warranties as a source of its liability towards respondents.

Instead, the liability of Comsavings Bank towards respondents was based on Article 20 and Article 1170 of the Civil
Code, viz:

Article 20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter
for the same.

Article 1170. Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay, and those who in
any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages.

Based on the provisions, a banking institution like Comsavings Bank is obliged to exercise the highest degree of diligence as
well as high standards of integrity and performance in all its transactions because its business is imbued with public
interest.[20] As aptly declared in Philippine National Bank v. Pike:[21] "The stability of banks largely depends on the
confidence of the people in the honesty and efficiency of banks."

Gross negligence connotes want of care in the performance of one's duties; [22] it is a negligence characterized by the want of
even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and
intentionally, with a conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may be affected. [23] It evinces a
thoughtless disregard of consequences without exerting any effort to avoid them.[24]

There is no question that Comsavings Bank was grossly negligent in its dealings with respondents because it did not comply
with its legal obligation to exercise the required diligence and integrity. As a banking institution serving as an originator
under the UHLP and being the maker of the certificate of acceptance/completion,[25] it was fully aware that the purpose of the
signed certificate was to affirm that the house had been completely constructed according to the approved plans and
specifications, and that respondents had thereby accepted the delivery of the complete house. Given the purpose of the
certificate, it should have desisted from presenting the certificate to respondents for their signature without such conditions
having been fulfilled. Yet, it made respondents sign the certificate (through Estrella Capistrano, both in her personal capacity
and as the attorney-in-fact of her husband Danilo Capistrano) despite the construction of the house not yet even starting. Its
act was irregular per se because it contravened the purpose of the certificate. Worse, the pre-signing of the certificate was
fraudulent because it was thereby enabled to gain in the process the amount of P17,306.83 in the form of several deductions
from the proceeds of the loan on top of other benefits as an originator bank. [26] On the other hand, respondents were
prejudiced, considering that the construction of the house was then still incomplete and was ultimately defective.
Compounding their plight was that NHMFC demanded payment of their monthly amortizations despite the non-completion
of the house. Had Comsavings Bank been fair towards them as its clients, it should not have made them pre-sign the
certificate until it had confirmed that the construction of the house had been completed.

Comsavings Bank asserts that it submitted the certificate to NHMFC after the construction of the house had been completed
on April 23, 2003. The assertion could not be true, however, because Atty. Corona of NHMFC testified that he had inspected
the house on August 4, 1993 and had found the construction to be incomplete and defective. [27]

Contrary to the claim of Comsavings Bank, the records contain no showing that respondents had been given the option not to
pre-sign the certificate of acceptance/completion; that Comsavings Bank had made respondents sign the certificate so that
they would not be inconvenienced in going back and forth just to sign the certificate; and that it made clear to them during
the pre-signing that the certificate would be submitted to NHMFC only after the completion of the house. Felicisima M.
Miranda, the loan officer of Comsavings Bank and its sole witness during trial, did not attest to such option not to pre-sign.
Also, Estrella Capistrano (Estrella) mentioned nothing about it during the trial, testifying only that after signing several
documents, including the certificate, she was told by Comsavings Bank's personnel that the documents would be needed for
the processing of the loan.[28] Clearly, the supposed option was Comsavings Bank's lame justification for the pre-signing of
the certificate.

The submission of pictures of the fully-constructed house bearing the signatures of respondents on the dorsal sides was a
requirement for the release of the loan by Comsavings Bank to GCB Builders, and for the Comsavings Bank's reimbursement
of the loan from NHMFC.[29]The signatures were ostensibly for authentication of the pictures. In its compliance, GCB
Builders submitted pictures of a different house sans the signatures of respondents on the dorsal sides.[30] Ignoring the glaring
irregularity, Comsavings Bank accepted the unsigned (hence, unauthenticated) pictures, released the loan to GCB Builders,
and turned over the pictures to NHMFC for the reimbursement of the loan. Had Comsavings Bank complied with its duty of
observing the highest degree of diligence, it would have checked first whether the pictures carried the signatures of
respondents on their dorsal sides, and whether the house depicted on the pictures was really the house of respondents, before
releasing the proceeds of the loan to GCB Builders and before submitting the pictures to NHMFC for the reimbursement.
Again, this is an indication of Comsavings Bank's gross negligence.

2.
Comsavings Bank is liable for damages
As to the damages that should be awarded to respondents, moral and exemplary damages were warranted.

Under Article 2219 of the Civil Code, moral damages may be recovered for the acts or actions referred to in Article 20 of
the Civil Code. Moral damages are meant to compensate the claimant for any physical suffering, mental anguish, fright,
serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and similar injuries unjustly
caused.[31]

In their amended complaint, respondents claimed that the acts of GCB Builders and Comsavings Bank had caused them to
suffer sleepless nights, worries and anxieties. The claim was well founded. Danilo worked in Saudi Arabia in order to pay the
loan used for the construction of their family home. His anxiety and anguish over the incomplete and defective construction
of their house, as well as the inconvenience he and his wife experienced because of this suit were not easily probable. On her
part, Estrella was a mere housewife, but was the attorney-in-fact of Danilo in matters concerning the loan transaction. With
Danilo working abroad, she was alone in overseeing the house construction and the progress of the present case. Given her
situation, she definitely experienced worries and sleepless nights. The award of moral damages of P100,000.00 awarded by
the CA as exemplary damages is proper.

With respect to exemplary damages, the amount of P50,000.00 awarded by the CA as exemplary damages is sustained.
Relevantly, we have held that:

The law allows the grant of exemplary damages to set an example for the public good. The business of a bank is affected with
public interest; thus, it makes a sworn profession of diligence and meticulousness in giving irreproachable service. For this
reason, the bank should guard against injury attributable to negligence or bad faith on its part. The banking sector must at all
times maintain a high level of meticulousness. The grant of exemplary damages is justified by the initial carelessness of
petitioner, aggravated by its lack of promptness in repairing its error. [32]

However, the award of actual damages amounting to P25,000.00 is not warranted. To justify an award for actual damages,
there must be competent proof of the actual amount of loss. Credence can be given only to claims duly supported by
receipts.[33] Respondents did not submit any documentary proof, like receipts, to support their claim for actual damages.

Nonetheless, it cannot be denied that they had suffered substantial losses. Article 2224 of the Civil Code allows the recovery
of temperate damages when the court finds that some pecuniary loss was suffered but its amount cannot be proved with
certainty. In lieu of actual damages, therefore, temperate damages of P25,000.00 are awarded. Such amount, in our view, is
reasonable under the circumstances.

Article 2208 of the Civil Code allows recovery of attorney's fees when exemplary damages are awarded or where the plaintiff
has incurred expenses to protect his interest by reason of defendant's act or omission. Considering that exemplary damages
were properly awarded here, and that respondents hired a private lawyer to litigate its cause, we agree with the RTC and CA
that the P30,000.00 allowed as attorney's fees were appropriate and reasonable.

A defendant who did not appeal may be benefitted by the judgment in favor of the other defendant who appealed. [34] Thus,
the foregoing modifications as to the nature and amount of damages inures to the benefit of GCB Builders although it did not
appeal the ruling of the CA.

WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the decision promulgated by the Court of Appeals on November 30, 2005, subject to
the MODIFICATIONS that Comsavings Bank and GCB Builders are further ordered to pay, jointly and severally, to the
Spouses Danilo and Estrella Capistrano the following amounts: (1) P25,000.00 as temperate damages; (2) P30,000.00 as
attorney's fees; (3) interest of 6% per annum on all the amounts of damages reckoned from the finality of this decision; and
(4) the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 120921. January 29, 1998]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FELIPE BALLESTEROS, CESAR GALO and ALVIN
BULUSAN, accused-appellants.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:

This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bangui, Ilocos Norte, Branch 19, finding the accused
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder, qualified by treachery, as charged under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, to wit:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds the three accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder, qualified by treachery, as
charged, defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and applying Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code hereby sentences them to reclusion perpetua, with all the accessory penalties provided by law, and
further sentencing them to pay jointly and solidarily -

1. The heirs of Jerry Agliam compensatory damages in the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00),
moral damages in the amount of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00), and actual damages in the
amount of THIRTY-FIVE THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED FIFTY-FIVE PESOS (P35,755.00), with
interest;

2. The heirs of the late Eduardo Tolentino, Sr., compensatory damages in the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND
PESOS (P50,000.00), moral damages in the amount of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00), and
actual damages in the total amount of SIXTY-ONE THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED EIGHTY-FIVE
PESOS (P61,785.00), with interest;

3. Carmelo Agliam, actual damages in the amount of TWO THOUSAND AND THREE PESOS AND FORTY
CENTAVOS (P2,003.40), and moral damages in the amount of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00),
with interest;

4. Vidal Agliam Jr., Robert Cacal and Ronnel Tolentino, moral damages in the amount of FIVE THOUSAND
PESOS (P5,000.00) each, with interest.

5. The costs.

The accused shall be credited in the service of their sentence the full time during which they had undergone preventive
imprisonment, if they agreed voluntarily in writing to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners,
otherwise, they shall be credited in the service thereof with only four-fifths of the time during which they had undergone
preventive imprisonment.[1]

In the warm summer evening of May 28, 1991, Carmelo Agliam, his half-brother Eduardo Tolentino, Ronnel Tolentino,
Vidal Agliam, his brother Jerry Agliam, Robert Cacal, Raymundo Bangi and Marcial Barid converged at a carinderia owned
by Ronnel Tolentino at Ganayao, Pasuquin, Ilocos Norte. They proceeded to the barangay hall at Carusipan to attend a
dance. The group did not tarry for long at the dance because they sensed some hostility from Cesar Galo and his companions
who were giving them dagger looks. In order to avoid trouble, especially during the festivity, they decided to head for home
instead of reacting to the perceived provocation of Galo and his companions.
The group had barely left when, within fifty meters from the dance hall, their owner jeep was fired upon from the rear.
Vidal Agliam was able to jump out from the eastern side of the topdown jeep and landed just beside it. He scurried to the side
of the road and hid in the ricefield. His younger brother Jerry also managed to jump out, but was shot in the stomach and
died.[2] Carmelo Agliam, Robert Cacal and Ronnel Tolentino sustained injuries in the right foot, back of the right thigh, and
legs and thighs, respectively.[3]The stunned Eduardo Tolentino was not even able to move from his seat and was hit with a
bullet which punctured his right kidney.[4] He did not survive. The precipitate attack upon the jeep left two people dead and
four others injured.
Based upon the affidavits of Carmelo and Vidal Agliam, warrants for the arrest of Ballesteros, Galo and Bulusan were issued.
Charged with the crime of double murder with multiple frustrated murder, an information was filed as follows:

That on or about (sic) May 28, 1991, in the Municipality of Pasuquin, Ilocos Norte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
the Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, nighttime purposely sought, with evident premeditation and treachery,
confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there, with intent to kill, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack and shot Eduardo Tolentino Sr., Jerry Agliam, Vidal Agliam, Carmelo Agliam, Robert Cacal and Ronnel Tolentino,
with the use of firearms which caused the death of Eduardo Tolentino Sr. and Jerry Agliam and thereby inflicting gunshot
wounds to Vidal Agliam, Carmelo Agliam, Robert Cacal and Ronnel Tolentino having performed all the acts which would
have produced the crime of Murder, but which did not by reason of causes independent of the will of the defendant, namely
the able and timely medical assistance given to said Vidal Agliam, Carmelo Agliam, Robert Cacal and Ronnel Tolentino
which prevented their death.

All pleaded not guilty. Paraffin tests conducted on Galo and Ballesteros produced positive results. Bulusan was not tested
for nitrates.
In his testimony, Galo claimed that he did not even talk to Bulusan or any of his companions at the basketball court, as
alleged by the complainants. Having been found with gunpowder residue in his hands, Galo attempted to exculpate himself
from the results by confessing that he had been a cigarette smoker for the past ten years and had, in fact, just consumed eight
cigarette sticks prior to the test. He further asserted that paraffin tests are not infallible, and that his hand may have been
contaminated by a nitrogenous compound, the source of which is urine. Lastly, he said that he was not even present at the crime
scene when the firing incident took place; hence, he could not have been one of those who strafed the jeep. [5]
For his part, Ballesteros interposed the defense of alibi, narrating to the court that, on May 28, 1991, at around 7:00 oclock
in the evening, he went to a nearby store to purchase some cigarettes. He returned home within thirty minutes and cleaned his
garlic bulbs before retiring at 9:00 oclock. The next morning, he busied himself with some chores, which included fertilizing
his pepper plants with sulfate. He handled the fertilizers without gloves. To counter the finding of traces of nitrates on his left
hand, Ballesteros maintained that he uses his left hand in lighting cigarettes, as it was very painful for him to use his right
hand. He likewise informed the trial court that he had no motive to kill the victims. [6]
Bulusan echoed the defense of alibi of Galo and Ballesteros, stating that he saw only Galo on the evening of the dance
but did not talk to him. He denied joining the two later that night because after the dance, he went straight to the house of
Michael Viloria, where he spent the night until he went to work at 7:00 oclock in the morning of the following day. [7]
The trial court found the three accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder, qualified by treachery, as charged,
defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
The accused now come to the High Court on appeal, praying that the decision of the trial court be reversed and that a new
one be entered acquitting them of the charges.
The principal question to be resolved has to do with the merits of the decision of the lower court. Was it correct in finding
accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt? We answer in the affirmative.
Accused-appellants insist that the trial court erred in finding that Carmelo and Vidal Agliam recognized them as the
assailants. This claim is unmeritorious. In their testimonies, Carmelo and Vidal Agliam both described the area to be well
illumined by the moon. The shooting took place on a small road in the mountainous terrains of Ilocos Norte, where the air is
free from darkening elements and turbidity. It being a summer evening, there could not have been any fog to becloud the
atmosphere and hamper the vision of the victims, which would have prevented them from clearly seeing their assailants. They
pinpointed the location of the malefactors to be approximately three meters from where they stood. [8] Considering the
luminescence of the moon and the proximity between them, the victims could distinctly identify their assailants. It must be
noted that Carmelo was acquainted with Galo and his brother, a butcher, since he used to deal with them in his business of
buying and selling cattle.[9] Bulusan was a classmate of Vidal at Cadaratan School. Generally, people in rural communities
know each other both by face and name.[10] Bulusan and Agliam were, not only townmates, but former classmates as well. The
constant interaction between them through the years would necessarily lead to familiarity with each other such that, at the very
least, one would have been able to recognize the other easily.
That accused-appellants had no motive in perpetrating the offense is irrelevant. A distinction is herein timely made
between motive and intent. Motive is the moving power which impels one to action for a definite result. Intent, on the other
hand, is the purpose to use a particular means to effect such result.[11] Motive alone is not proof of a crime.[12]In order to tip the
scales in its favor, intent and not motive must be established by the prosecution. Motive is hardly ever an essential element of
a crime. A man driven by extreme moral perversion may be led to commit a crime, without a real motive but just for the sake
of committing it.[13] Along the same line, a man who commits a crime with an apparent motive may produce different results,
for which he is punished. As held in a line of cases, the rule is well-settled that the prosecution need not prove motive on the
part of the accused when the latter has been positively identified as the author of the crime. [14] Lack or absence of motive for
committing the crime does not preclude conviction thereof where there were reliable witnesses who fully and satisfactorily
identified the accused as the perpetrator of the felony.[15]
Accused-appellants attempt to offer wild excuses regarding the source of the gunpowder traces found on their hands is
futile. Experts confirm the possibility that cigarettes, fertilizers and urine may leave traces of nitrates, but these are minimal
and, unlike those found in gunpowder, may be washed off with tap water.
The hackneyed defense of alibi interposed by accused-appellants must likewise fail. As consistently enunciated by this
Court, the established doctrine is that, for the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove, not only that he was at some
other place at the time of the commission of the crime, but also that it was physically impossible for him to be at the locus
delicti or within its immediate vicinity.[16] This accused-appellants failed to satisfactorily prove. On the night of May 28, 1991,
Galo and Bulusan attended the dance at the barangay hall. After the dance, they went their separate ways but remained within
the barangay. Galo lingered in the premises. Bulusan slept over at the house of Michael Viloria, which was within walking
distance from the dance hall.
The defense of alibi must be established by positive, clear and satisfactory evidence, the reason being that it is easily
manufactured and usually so unreliable that it can rarely be given credence. [17] This is especially true in case of positive
identification of the culprit by reliable witnesses,[18] which renders their alibis worthless.[19] Positive identification prevails over
denials and alibis.[20]
Accused-appellants are under the common misconception that proof beyond reasonable doubt requires total freedom from
any quantum of doubt. This is not so. Under Section 2, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court,
(p)roof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof as, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute
certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.

Absolute certainty of guilt is not demanded by law to convict a person of a criminal charge. The doubt to the benefit of
which an accused is entitled in a criminal trial is a reasonable doubt, not a whimsical or fanciful doubt based on imagined but
wholly improbable possibilities and unsupported by evidence.[21] Reasonable doubt is that engendered by an investigation of
the whole proof and inability, after such investigation, to let the mind rest easy upon the certainty of guilt.[22] A precise example
would be the uncorroborated alibi of accused in the case at bar where accused-appellants individually interposed the wavering
defense of alibi. Galo failed to elucidate on his whereabouts after the dance, whereas Bulusan claimed to have slept in the house
of one Michael Viloria. Ballesteros attested that he was not at the dance hall at all. None of them, however, attempted to
corroborate their alibi through the testimony of witnesses. In fact, they never attempted to present as witnesses those who could
have testified to having seen them elsewhere on the night in question. Had they done so, the presentation of corroborative
testimony would have reenforced their defense of alibi. As held in People vs. Ligotan, [23]an alibi must be supported by credible
corroboration from disinterested witnesses, and where such defense is not corroborated, it is fatal to the accused.
The Court correctly ruled in finding that the offense was qualified by treachery. Under Paragraph 16, Article 14 of the
Revised Penal Code, (t)here is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person employing means,
methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution without risk to himself
arising from the defense which the offended party might make. The requisites of treachery are twofold: (1) (t)hat at the time of
the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (2) that the offender consciously adopted the particular means,
method or form of attack employed by him.[24] As regards the second requisite, the accused must make some preparation to kill
his victim in such a manner as to insure the execution of the crime or to make it impossible or hard for the person attacked to
defend himself or retaliate.[25] There must be evidence that such form of attack was purposely adopted by the accused.[26] Here,
it is obvious that the accused-appellants had sufficient opportunity to reflect on their heinous plan. The facts show that the
attack was well-planned and not merely a result of the impulsiveness of the offenders. Manifestations of their evil designs were
already apparent as early as the time of the dance. They were well-armed and approached the homebound victims, totally
unaware of their presence, from behind. There was no opportunity for the latter to defend themselves, the attack being so sudden
that Eduardo Tolentino was shot right where he sat.
The trial court was also correct in the award of damages to the heirs of the victims. Damages may be defined as the
pecuniary compensation, recompense, or satisfaction for an injury sustained, or as otherwise expressed, the pecuniary
consequences which the law imposes for the breach of some duty or the violation of some right.[27] Actual or compensatory
damages are those awarded in satisfaction of, or in recompense for, loss or injury sustained, [28] whereas moral damages may be
invoked when the complainant has experienced mental anguish, serious anxiety, physical suffering, moral shock and so forth,
and had furthermore shown that these were the proximate result of the offenders wrongful act or omission. [29] In granting actual
or compensatory damages, the party making a claim for such must present the best evidence available, viz., receipts, vouchers,
and the like,[30] as corroborated by his testimony.[31] Here, the claim for actual damages by the heirs of the victims is not
controverted, the same having been fully substantiated by receipts accumulated by them and presented to the
court.[32] Therefore, the award of actual damages is proper. However, the order granting compensatory damages to the heirs of
Jerry Agliam and Eduardo Tolentino Sr. must be amended. Consistent with the policy of this Court, the amount of fifty thousand
pesos (P 50,000.00) is given to the heirs of the victims by way of indemnity, and not as compensatory damages.[33] As regards
moral damages, the amount of psychological pain, damage and injury caused to the heirs of the victims, although
inestimable,[34] may be determined by the trial court in its discretion. Hence, we see no reason to disturb its findings as to this
matter.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 119311. October 7, 1998]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROMEO DIANOS, accused-appellant.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:

Romeo Dianos has taken an appeal to this Court questioning the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City,
Branch 6, which has found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of Murder, Frustrated and Attempted Murder,
after being indicted and tried in Criminal Cases Numbered 8524-R to 8528-R, inclusive. The five separate informations against
him read:

Criminal Case No. 8524-R "The undersigned accuses ROMEO DIANOS and JOHN DOE' of the crime of MURDER,
committed as follows:

"That on or about the 31st day of December, 1990, in the City of Baguio, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill and with treachery and evident premeditation, conspiring,
confederating and mutually aiding with each other, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and
fire at TERESITA ORTIZ y PABLO, with an armalite rifle, causing upon the latter, acute respiratory failure due to a
complete transection of the spinal cord at the level of the 2nd cervical vertebra due to a gunshot wound through the neck,
which directly caused her death.
"ALL CONTRARY TO LAW, and with the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and use of motor vehicle." [1]

Criminal Case No. 8525-R

"The undersigned accuses ROMEO DIANOS and JOHN DOE' of the crime of ATTEMPTED MURDER, committed as
follows:

"That on or about the 31st day of December, 1990, in the City of Baguio, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill and with treachery and evident premeditation, conspiring,
confederating and mutually aiding with each other, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attempt to kill
ZALDY ORTIZ, by firing an armalite rifle, causing injuries on his right leg, thus commencing the commission of the crime
directly by overt acts, but did not perform all the acts of execution which should have produced the crime of Murder, by
reason of causes other than their own spontaneous desistance.

"ALL CONTRARY TO LAW, and with the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and use of motor vehicle." [2]

Criminal Case No. 8526-R

"The undersigned accuses ROMEO DIANOS and `JOHN DOE' of the crime of ATTEMPTED MURDER, committed as
follows:

"That on or about the 31st day of December, 1990, in the City of Baguio, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill and with treachery and evident premeditation, conspiring,
confederating and mutually aiding with each other, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attempt to kill
VIRGILIO ORTIZ Y PINLAC, by firing an armalite rifle, causing injuries on his thigh, thus commencing the commission of
the crime directly by overt acts, but did not perform all the acts of execution which should have produced the crime of
Murder, by reason of causes other than their own spontaneous desistance, that is, by the timely arrival of people from the
neighborhood who extended assistance to the complainant.

"ALL CONTRARY TO LAW, and with the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and use of motor vehicle."[3]

Criminal Case No. 8527-R

"The undersigned accuses ROMEO DIANOS and `JOHN DOE' of the crime of FRUSTRATED MURDER, committed as
follows:

"That on or about the 31st day of December, 1990, in the City of Baguio, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill and with treachery and evident premeditation, conspiring,
confederating and mutually aiding with each other, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and
fire at LIZETTE ORTIZ, with an armalite rifle, thereby inflicting upon the latter, penetrating gunshot wound in her abdomen,
which wound would have caused or led to the death of the said LIZETTE ORTIZ, were it not for the timely and able medical
assistance extended to her, thus performing all the acts of execution which should have produced the crime of Murder as a
consequence, but nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the accused, that is, by the
timely medical assistance rendered to said LIZETTE ORTIZ, which prevented her death.

"ALL CONTRARY TO LAW, and with the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and use of motor vehicle."[4]

Criminal Case No. 8528-R

"The undersigned accuses ROMEO DIANOS and `JOHN DOE' of the crime of MURDER, committed as follows:

"That on or about the 31st day of December, 1990, in the City of Baguio, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill and with treachery and evident premeditation, conspiring,
confederating and mutually aiding with each other, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and
fire at RICARDO PABLO y PALUA, with an armalite rifle, causing upon the latter, hypovolemic shock secondary to
massive hemorrhage due to penetrating wounds of the heart, lungs, aorta and pulmonary vessels due to multiple gunshot
wounds on the chest, which directly caused his death.

"ALL CONTRARY TO LAW, and with the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and use of motor vehicle." [5]

At his arraignment, accused Dianos entered a plea of not guilty to all the charges. His co-accused remained at large.
The witnesses for the prosecution came up during the trial with accounts of the incidents brought up in the various
accusations.
Involved in the unfortunate saga were all residents of Cypress Point Village, Irisan, in Baguio City. The otherwise friendly
relationship among them was marred by a transaction apparently gone awry between Teresita Ortiz (Teresita) and Josie Ortiz
Santos (Josie), on the one hand, and accused Romeo Dianos, on the other hand, over a piece of land occupied by the latter. The
ensuing "bad blood" led to the fatal denouement.
 On 31 December 1990, at about five o'clock in the morning, Nancy Ortiz Dasudas (Nancy) saw the accused throw a hand
grenade near the house of her parents. Josie, who was standing near the site of the explosion was hit with a shrapnel on the left
leg. A grenade pin and several shrapnels were recovered from the scene.
Later that day, at around 9:30 in the evening, the accused, donned in military camouflage uniform and armed with an M-
16 armalite rifle, was seen traversing the Cypress Point Road. Following closely behind was his passenger jeepney with three
unidentified men on board.
Meanwhile, that same evening, Teresita, together with her husband, Virgilio Ortiz (Virgilio), her daughter, Corazon Ortiz
Ihanda (Corazon), her brother, Ricardo Pablo (Ricardo), and her son, Zaldy Ortiz (Zaldy), were on the terrace of their new
house waiting for the other Ortiz children to arrive in time for the New Year's eve celebration. The three men, Virgilio, Ricardo
and Zaldy, momentarily left the terrace, Virgilio to relieve himself by the side of the house, Zaldy to repair home and Ricardo
to go to the house of Nancy Ortiz Dasudas (Nancy) across the street. Ricardo met the accused near the waiting shed. Without
any warning, the latter suddenly struck Ricardo on the face with the butt of an armalite causing him to fall to the ground. The
accused then fired at Ricardo, hitting him on the chest and left arm. The accused then directed his armalite at Virgilio.The latter
was hit on the buttocks. The accused thereupon fired indiscriminately at the house of Zaldy. Zaldy received a bullet injury in
his right thigh, while his daughter, Lizette Ortiz (Lizette), was hit in her abdomen and wrist. The accused moved towards the
direction of the new house and fired at the terrace. Teresita took a bullet wound on the neck from the volley of shots,
while Corazon escaped unscathed.
The accused, right after the shooting, boarded his jeep and sped towards Baguio City.
In the aftermath, two were found dead, namely, Teresita and Ricardo, while three others, Virgilio, Zaldy and Lizette,
sustained injuries. The latter were all rushed to the Baguio General Hospital where they were treated for gunshot wounds.
P/Sgt. Albert Gaydowen of Sub-station 1, upon receiving the report on the incident, immediately dispatched Pat. Ruben
Forte (Pat. Forte), Pfc. Marianito Cosape (Pfc. Cosape) and Pat. Robert Credo (Pat. Credo) to the crime scene. Pfc. Cosape was
able to gather several pieces of spent cartridges from the waiting shed and surrounding areas. At the police station, Sgt. Danilo
Santos (Josie's husband) who tagged along with the investigating team from the crime scene, requested P/Sgt. Gaydowen to
contact Camp Bado Dangwa to intercept the passenger jeepney of the accused. P/Sgt. Gaydowen was yet searching for the
telephone number of Camp Dangwa when the accused's jeepney was seen near the sub-station coming in from Baguio City. It
was promptly met with a burst of gunfire. Somehow, the accused was able to escape.
Meanwhile, Zaldy and Virgilio were discharged from the hospital shortly after treatment. Having sustained lacerations
on her liver and large intestines, as well as multiple pilferages on her small intestines, Lizette had to be confined. The doctors
who attended to her testified that the gunshot wounds she had sustained were serious enough to cause her death had it not been
for the immediate surgical and medical attention given to her. She also sustained a fractured wrist which would leave her left
hand permanently disabled. She was treated for a total of thirty-three days in the hospital.
The post mortem report on the bodies of Teresita and Ricardo readily disclosed that their death were due to the gunshot
wounds they had sustained. Teresita had gunshot wounds on her neck and right side of the face that caused an acute respiratory
failure. Ricardo sustained gunshot wounds on his left chest and left upper arm. He died from hypovolemic shock secondary to
massive hemorrhage due to penetrating wounds in the heart, lungs, aorta and pulmonary vessels.
Anent the damages incurred by private complainants: Virgilio testified that he had spent P1,000 for medications for his
thigh injury. A riprap contractor, he was not able to work for seven months depriving him of his monthly income of P2,000 for
the period or the total amount of P14,000. He asserted that he had incurred P110,000.00 for funeral services for his wife
Teresita. Nenita Pablo (Nenita) said in her testimony that she had spent P15,000.00 for the autopsy and coffin of
Ricardo, P3,000.00, by way of doctor's fee and P8,000.00 for the wake. Zaldy testified that he had spent P500 for the treatment
of his injury.
The accused proffered the jaded apologia of denial. He disclaimed any knowledge of, or participation in, the grenade
throwing and shooting incidents. He recounted that while he was getting his passenger jeepney out from the carport, an
unidentified man poked a gun at his back and instructed him to proceed to Cypress Point Road to fetch a companion. When
they were near the waiting shed area, he saw the unidentified man's companion, a "military man," clad in military camouflage
uniform and armed with an M-16 armalite rifle, altercating with Ricardo. Moments later, he saw the gun-wielding man shoot
Ricardo and spray bullets at Zaldy's house and the "new" house before boarding the passenger jeepney. The accused was
ordered to proceed to La Trinidad, Benguet, where the "military man" alighted from the vehicle. The other fellow got down
from the vehicle in Puliwes Camp 7, Kennon Road. The accused proceeded to Sub-station 1 to report the incident but he was
met with a burst of gunfire. Sustaining an injury in his thigh, he then drove to Sub-station 2 to seek police assistance. Sgt.
Giovanni Gallardo (Sgt. Gallardo) and Pat. Edward Ayochok (Pat. Ayochok) took him to the St. Louis Hospital. On the way,
the accused had the chance to narrate to the two police officers the shooting incident in Irisan.
The RTC rendered its decision on 10 May 1994 finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes with
which he was charged; the trial court adjudged:

"WHEREFORE, Judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

"1. In Criminal case No. 8524-R, the Court finds accused Romeo Dianos Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Murder defined
and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences him to Reclusion Perpetua; to indemnify
the heirs of deceased Teresita Ortiz the sum of P50,000.00 for her death and the sum of P110,000.00 as Actual Damages for
expenses incurred for the wake, funeral and burial services, both indemnifications being without subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency and to pay the costs.
"The accused being a detention prisoner is entitled to a full credit of his preventive imprisonment in the service of his
sentence.

"2. In Criminal case No. 8525-R, the Court finds accused Romeo Dianos guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Attempted
Murder defined and penalized under Article 248 in relation to Article 6 and Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby
sentences him, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, to an imprisonment of 1 Year 7 months and 11 days of prision
correccional as Minimum to 6 years, 1 month and 11 days of prision mayor as Maximum, to indemnify Zaldy Ortiz the sum
of P 5,000.00 as Moral Damages for the injuries sustained by him without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and
to pay the costs.

"The accused being a detention prisoner is entitled to a full credit of his preventive imprisonment in the service of his
sentence.

"3. In Criminal Case No. 8526-R, the Court finds accused Romeo Dianos guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Attempted
Murder defined and penalized under Article 248 in relation to Articles 6 and 51 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby
sentences him, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, to an imprisonment of one year, 7 months and 11 days of prision
correccional as Minimum to 6 years, 1 month and 11 days of prision mayor as Maximum, to indemnify Virgilio Ortiz the
sum of P1,000.00 as actual damages for the expenses incurred for his medical treatment for the injuries sustained by him and
the sum of P14,000.00 as unearned income for 7 months at P2,000.00 a month for being unable to work as riprap contractor
during the treatment of his injuries and the sum of P5,000.00 as Moral Damages for the injuries sustained by him, both
indemnifications being without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.

"The accused being a detention prisoner is entitled to a full credit of his preventive imprisonment in the service of his
sentence.

"4. In Criminal case No. 8527-R, the Court finds accused Romeo Dianos guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Frustrated
Murder defined and penalized under Article 248 in relation to Articles 6 and 50 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby
sentences him to an imprisonment ranging from 6 years, 1 month and 11 days of prision mayor as Minimum to 12 years, 5
months and 11 days of Reclusion Temporal as maximum, to indemnify Lizette Ortiz the sum of P20,000.00 as Moral
Damages for the injuries sustained by her without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.

"The accused being a detention prisoner is entitled to a full credit of the preventive imprisonment in the service of his
sentence.

"5. In Criminal case No. 8528-R, the Court finds accused Romeo Dianos guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Murder defined
and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences him to reclusion perpetua; to indemnify the
heirs of deceased Ricardo Pablo the sum of P50,000.00 for his death and the sum of P23,000.00 as Actual Damages for
expenses incurred for the wake, funeral and burial services, both indemnifications being without subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency and to pay the costs.

"The accused being a detention (prisoner) is entitled to a full credit of his preventive imprisonment in the service of his
sentence."[6]

In the instant appeal, accused-appellant ascribes the following errors supposedly committed by the trial court:
I

"... IN ITS CONCLUSION THAT `IF REALLY ACCUSED HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH THE FIRINGS AND
KILLINGS, THE ASSAILANTS COULD VERY WELL USED OTHER VEHICLES' INSTEAD OF THE ACCUSED'S
VEHICLE;

II

"... [IN NOT TAKING] INTO CONSIDERATION THE VITAL AND VERY IMPORTANT EVIDENCE FOR THE
ACCUSED (not a single portion of the testimonies of Police Officers Gallardo and Ayochok, as well as those of the
prosecution's witnesses showing his lack of motive to perpetrate the offenses charged, were mentioned nor passed upon in the
decision) WHICH IF CONSIDERED IMPARTIALLY COULD HAVE RESULTED IN HIS ACQUITTAL;

"III

"... IN COMPLETELY IGNORING THE VERY CONVINCING EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE ACCUSED AS
WELL AS THOSE OF THE OTHER PROSECUTION WITNESSES THAT HE HAD NO MOTIVE TO PERPETRATE
SUCH A DASTARDLY ACT AGAINST THE VICTIMS SINCE WHATEVER DIFFERENCES HIS FAMILY HAD
WITH THEM HAD LONG BEEN SETTLED AND FORGOTTEN ACCORDING TO NO LESS THAN VIRGILIO
ORTIZ, THE FATHER OF JOSIE SANTOS AND HUSBAND OF THE LATE TERESITA ORTIZ;

"IV
"... IN COMPLETELY ADHERING TO THE RULE THAT POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION PREVAILS OVER
EVIDENCE OF LACK OF MOTIVE DESPITE THE FACT THAT THOSE WHO TESTIFIED AS HAVING POSITIVELY
IDENTIFIED THE ACCUSED ARE BIASED, HOSTILE AND HIGHLY PREJUDICED TO HIM;

"V

"... IN HOLDING THAT THE PARAFFIN EXAMINATION RESULT IS NOT IMPORTANT BECAUSE THE ACCUSED
MIGHT HAVE USED GLOVES OR KNOWS HOW TO REMOVE IT AND WASHED AWAY THE POWDER BURNS
AND THAT `THE EXAMINATION WAS DONE ONLY ON JANUARY 2, 1991 OR TWO (2) DAYS AFTER THE
INCIDENT; (AND)

"VI

"...IN HOLDING THAT IT IS `TOO MUCH TO BELIEVE' THAT ACCUSED WAS REALLY GOING TO REPORT THE
INCIDENT WITH THE PNP SUBSTATION 1 OF BAGUIO CITY ALONG NAGUILIAN ROAD INSTEAD OF
REPORTING THE SAME TO THE PNP HEADQUARTERS NEAR CITY HALL AND THAT SUCH ACT OF THE
ACCUSED IS A MERE `PRETENSIONS' ON HIS PART." [7]

Accused-appellant, verily, faults the court a quo for giving full faith and credit to the testimony of the prosecution
witnesses, on the one hand, and, on the other, for failing to accord any evidentiary value to the testimonies of Sgt. Gallardo and
Pat. Ayochok to whom he narrated the Irisan incident, and for disregarding the negative results of the paraffin test on him.
It is doctrinally entrenched, at least in this jurisdiction, that the issue on the credibility of witnesses is a question mainly
addressed to the trial court for it to gauge and to pass upon. Not only are its determination and findings accorded with great
respect,[8] but also even often treated with finality. Accused-appellant belabors the fact that all, but one, of the prosecution
witnesses are related to the victims. He asserts that such relationship taints their credibility. Mere relationship by a witness to
the victim, however, does not necessarily impair credibility. [9] The annals of our criminal justice system could be filled with
countless unresolved cases if courts were to hold otherwise. Not too infrequently, crimes are committed with just the relatives
of the victim being around. Verily, too, it is natural for the immediate members of the family of the victim to have a strong
urge to see the real culprit, not just anyone, penalized for a grave offense. Unless the Court is convinced that the witnesses are
clearly impelled by ulterior motives, it will not discard their testimony. No such strong ill-motive has been shown here to make
the Court conclude that the prosecution witness would thereby wish to have the wrong man callously sent to jail.
Accused-appellant argues that his "utterances" made in the presence of, and later testified to, by Sgt. Gallardo and Pat.
Ayochok on their way to the hospital should have been deemed constitutive of the res gestae and given due evidentiary
weight. Evidently, accused-appellant is under a misconception. Res gestae rules relate to the admissibility of evidence and not
to its weight or sufficiency.[10] By res gestae, exclamations and statements made by either the participants, victims, or spectators
to a crime, immediately before, during or immediately after the commission of the crime, when the circumstances are such
that the statements constitute nothing but spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion there
being no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false statement[11] become admissible in evidence against
the otherwise hearsay rule of inadmissibility. In order to admit such hearsay statements as part of res gestae, there must be
a confluence[12] of the following essential conditions: (1) that the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (2) the
statements are made before the declarant had the time to contrive or devise a falsehood; and (3) that the statement must concern
the occurrence in question and its immediate attending circumstances.
There is, of course, no hard and fast rule by which spontaneity may be determined although a number of factors have been
considered, including, but not always confined to, (1) the time that has lapsed between the occurrence of the act or transaction
and the making of the statement, (2) the place where the statement is made, (3) the condition of the declarant when the utterance
is given, (4) the presence or absence of intervening events between the occurrence and the statement relative thereto, and (5)
the nature and the circumstances of the statement itself.[13] The Court, in People vs. Manhuyod,[14] has explained the import of
the first four factors; thus:

"x x x (C)ases are not uniform as to the interval of time that should separate the occurrence of the startling event and the
making of the declaration. What is important is that the declarations were voluntarily and spontaneously made 'so nearly
contemporaneous as to be in the presence of the transaction which they illustrate or explain, and were made under such
circumstances as necessarily to exclude the ideas of design or deliberation.'

"As to the second factor, it may be stressed that 'a statement made, or an act done, at a place some distance from the place
where the principal transaction occurred will not ordinarily possess such spontaneity as would render it admissible.'

"Anent the third factor, '[a] statement will ordinarily be deemed spontaneous if, at the time when it was made, the conditions
of the declarant was such as to raise an inference that the effect of the occurrence on his mind still continued, as where he had
just received a serious injury, was suffering severe pain, or was under intense excitement.Conversely, a lack of spontaneity
may be inferred from the cool demeanor of declarant, his consciousness of the absence of all danger, his delay in making a
statement until witnesses can be procured, or from the fact that he made a different statement prior to the one which is offered
in evidence.'

"With regard to the fourth factor, what is to be considered is whether there intervened between the event or transaction and
the making of the statement relative thereto, any circumstance calculated to divert the mind of the declarant which would thus
restore his mental balance and afford opportunity for deliberation."
 The startling occurrence of consequence to this case is not when accused-appellant was fired upon at police substation 1
but the shooting at the Cypress Point Village. If at all, what might be so considered as part of the res gestae would be the
statements of appellant when he was shot at near the police station, but this incident is not at all the subject matter of the case
against him. Clearly, the fourth element, i.e., that there is no intervening event between the startling occurrence concerned and
the making of the statement relative thereto, is not here extant.
Accused-appellant capitalizes on the negative results of the paraffin test conducted on him. A paraffin test has never been
considered to be foolproof. On the contrary, it has been held to be highly unreliable. In People vs. Teehankee, Jr.,[15] this Court
has held:

"Appellant cannot also capitalize on the paraffin test showing he was negative of nitrates. Scientific experts concur in the
view that the paraffin test has 'x x x proved extremely unreliable in use. The only thing that it can definitely establish is the
presence or absence of nitrates or nitrites on the hand. It cannot be established from this test alone that the source of the
nitrates or nitrites was the discharge of a firearm. The person may have handled one or more of a number of substances which
give the same positive reaction for nitrates or nitrites, such as explosives, fireworks, fertilizers, pharmaceuticals, and
leguminous plants such as peas, beans, and alfalfa. A person who uses tabacco may also have nitrate or nitrite deposits on his
hands since these substances are present in the products of combustion of tabacco.' In numerous rulings, we have also
recognized several factors which may bring about the absence of gunpowder nitrates on the hands of a gunman, viz: when the
assailant washes his hands after firing the gun, wears gloves at the time of the shooting, or if the direction of a strong wind is
against the gunman at the time of the firing." [16]

Anent the actual damages, the uncorroborated testimonies of private complainants cannot suffice. Such damages to be
recoverable must not only be capable of proof but must actually be proved with reasonable degree of certainty. [17] In Fuentes,
Jr. vs. Court of Appeals,[18] the Court has ruled:

"Petitioner maintains that assuming that he committed the crime it is error to hold him answerable for P8,300.00 as actual
damages on the basis of the mere testimony of the victim's sister, Angelina Serrano, without any tangible document to
support such claim. This is a valid point. In crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant is liable for all damages which are the
natural and probable consequences of the act or omission complained of. To seek recovery for actual damages it is essential
that the injured party proves the actual amount of loss with reasonable degree of certainty premised upon competent proof
and on the best evidence available. Courts cannot simply rely on speculation, conjecture or guesswork in determining the fact
and amount of damages.

"The award by the court a quo of P8,300.00 as actual damages is not supported by the evidence on record. We have only the
testimony of the victim's elder sister stating that she incurred expenses of P8,300.00 in connection with the death of
Malaspina. However, no proof of the actual damages was ever presented in court. Of the expenses alleged to have been
incurred, the Court can only give credence to those supported by receipts and which appear to have been genuinely expended
in connection with the death of the victim. Since the actual amount was not substantiated, the same cannot be granted." [19]

There is, however, no doubt that injury was sustained by private complainants due to appellant's actions. In the absence
of competent proof on the specific amounts of actual damages suffered, private complainants are entitled to nominal
damages.[20] The Court deems the amounts of P15,000.00 in Criminal Case Nos. 8524-R and 8528-R, P10,000.00 in Criminal
Case No. 8527-R, and P5,000.00 in Criminal Case Nos. 8525-R and 8526-R to be reasonable given the circumstances.
Finally, in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence relative to Article 2206[21] of the Civil Code, the award of P50,000.00
indemnity for each of the death of Teresita Ortiz and Ricardo Pablo must be affirmed. Moral damages, in addition to the awards
made by the trial court in favor of the injured victims, are also recoverable under paragraph (3) of Article 2206, in relation to
Article 2217[22] and paragraph (1) of Article 2219,[23] of the Civil Code, which the Court hereby fixes at P30,000.00 for each
of the two deceased victims payable to their respective heirs.
On this score, the Court finds it opportune to clarify certain notions dealing on the recovery of these various damages.
There is a significant distinction, in the context of Book IV, Title XVIII, of the Civil Code on "Damages," between the
terms "damages" and "damage." Damages refer to the sum of money which the law awards or imposes as pecuniary
compensation, recompense, or satisfaction for an injury done or a wrong sustained as a consequence of either a breach of a
contractual obligation or a tortuous or illegal act, while damage pertains to the actionable loss, hurt or harm which results from
the unlawful act, omission or negligence of another. [24] In fine, damages are the amounts recoverable or that which can be
awarded for the damage done or sustained.
An award of actual or compensatory damages requires actual proof of pecuniary loss. An exception from the rule, pursuant
to Article 2206 of the Civil Code, are "damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict" which can be awarded forthwith
to the heirs of the victim by proof alone of such fact of death. No proof of pecuniary loss is likewise necessary in order that
moral, nominal, temperate, liquidated or exemplary damages may be adjudicated, [25] and it is quite enough that proof of damage
or injury is adduced.Being incapable of exact pecuniary estimation, the assessment of such damages, except for liquidated
damages which the parties themselves fix, is left to the sound discretion of the court.
Akin to, but not exactly in the same category as actual or compensatory damages, is the civil indemnity ex
delicto particularly so referred to in paragraph 3 of Article 104, in relation to Article 100, of the Revised Penal Code as
"indemnification for consequential damages." [26] These two species of damages differ basically in that civil indemnity ex
delicto can be awarded without need of further proof than the fact of commission of the felony itself while actual or
compensatory damages to be recoverable must additionally be established with reasonable degree of certainty (except, as
aforesaid, in the case of the indemnity for death under Article 2206 [27] of the Civil Code). In fine, the first species merely
requires proof of damage or injury (similar to that needed in an award of moral damages) to be recoverable; the second kind
requires, in addition, proof of damages or pecuniary loss in order to warrant recovery.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision is AFFIRMED with modifications in that the actual damages awarded to Virgilio
Ortiz, Nenita Pablo and Zaldy Ortiz are deleted and in lieu thereof nominal damages in the following amounts are hereby
awarded: P15,000.00 in Criminal Case No. 8524-R and No. 8528-R; P10,000.00 in Criminal Case No. 8527-R; and P5,000.00
in Criminal Case No. 8525-R and No. 8526-R. Moral damages in the amount of P30,000.00 are also hereby awarded to the
heirs of each of the two deceased victims.
The Court orders that copies of this decision be furnished the Department of Justice and the Department of Interior and
Local Governments which agencies are enjoined to take the lead in apprehending and bringing to justice the other accused who
have remained at large.
SO ORDERED.