G.R. No.
L-67485 April 10, 1992 union had been certified as the sole collective bargaining agent, for over a year
NATIONAL CONGRESS OF UNIONS IN THE SUGAR INDUSTRY OF THE
PHILIPPINES (NACUSIP)-TUCP, petitioner,
vs.
DIR. CRESENCIANO B. TRAJANO, Bureau of Labor Relations, Ministry of
Labor and Employment, Manila, FEDERATION OF UNIONS OF RIZAL
(FUR)-TUCP, and CALINOG REFINERY CORPORATION
(NASUREFCO), respondents.
This petition for certiorari seeks to annul and set aside the decision rendered
by the respondent Director Cresenciano B. Trajano of the Bureau of Labor
Relations, Ministry of Labor and Employment, dated November 18, 1983
affirming the order of Med-Arbiter Demetrio Correa dated May 2, 1983 giving
due course to the petition for certification election filed by private respondent
Federation of Unions of Rizal (FUR)-TUCP; and the order dated March 21,
1984 denying the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Petitioner National Congress of Unions in the Sugar Industry of the Philippines
(NACUSIP)-TUCP is the certified exclusive bargaining representative of the
rank and file workers of Calinog Refinery Corporation. Private respondent
Federation of Unions of Rizal (FUR)-TUCP is a labor organization duly
registered with the Department of Labor and Employment while private
respondent Calinog Refineries Employees Union (CREU)-NACUSIP is the
certified exclusive bargaining representative of the rank and file workers of the
private respondent Calinog Refinery Corporation by virtue of the certification
election held on March 30, 1981.
On June 21, 1982, petitioner union filed a petition for deadlock in collective
bargaining with the Ministry of Labor and Employment (now Department of
Labor and Employment). In order to obviate friction and tension, the parties
agreed to submit the petition for deadlock to compulsory arbitration on July 14,
1982 and was docketed as RAB Case No. VI-0220-82.
On July 21, 1982, private respondent FUR-TUCP filed with the Regional Office
No. VI, MOLE (now DOLE), Iloilo City a petition for certification election among
the rank and file employees of private respondent company, alleging that: (1)
about forty-five percent (45%) of private respondent company's employees had
disaffiliated from petitioner union and joined private respondent union; (2) no
election had been held for the past twelve (12) months; and (3) while petitioner
it failed to conclude a collective bargaining agreement with private respondent
company. Petitioner union filed a motion to intervene in the petition for
certification election filed by private respondent union.
By order dated July 23, 1982, the Acting Med-Arbiter Pacifico V. Militante
dismissed the petition for certification election for lack of merit since the
petition is barred by a pending bargaining deadlock.
On August 25, 1982, private respondent union filed an appeal to the Bureau of
Labor Relations, Manila.
The Bureau of Labor Relations through respondent Director Cresenciano B.
Trajano rendered a decision on September 30, 1982 setting aside the order of
the Acting Med-Arbiter and remanding the case to Regional Office VI, Iloilo
City for hearing and reception of evidence.
On May 2, 1983, Honorable Med-Arbiter Demetrio Correa issued an order in
LRD Case No. 4293 giving due course to the petition of private respondent
FUR-TUCP and ordering that an election be held within 20 days from receipt of
the order.
From the order of Med-Arbiter Correa, petitioner interposed an appeal to the
Bureau of Labor Relations.
During the pendency of the appeal or on September 10, 1983, a collective
bargaining agreement was entered and executed by the management of the
National Sugar Refineries Co., Inc. and petitioner union and was subsequently
ratified by a majority of the rank and file employees. On the basis of the
concluded CBA, the Honorable Executive Labor Arbiter Celerino Grecia II
issued an award dated September 12, 1983 adopting the submitted agreement
as the CBA between the parties.
On November 18, 1983, respondent Director Trajano rendered a decision
affirming with qualification the order of Med-Arbiter Correa dated May 2, 1983,
the pertinent portions of which provide as follows:
It appears that the Calinog Refinery Employees, Union-
NACUSIP-TUCP no longer commands the support of the
majority of the employees. This observation is buttressed by
the fact that more than seventy five percent (75%) of the
 workers have disaffiliated from the intervenor and joined the
ranks of the petitioner. Thus, intervenor's status as sole and
exclusive bargaining representative is now of doubtful validity.
For the above-mentioned reason, we stand obliged to resort to
the most expeditious, practical and democratic option open to
us, that is, the conduct of a certification election. Through this
forum, the true sentiments of the workers as to which labor
organization deserves their loyalty can be fairly ascertained. In
any event, it is our view that the 10 September 1983 collective
agreement should be respected by the union that shall prevail
in the election not only because it is an arbitration award but
also because substantial benefits are provided thereunder.
Otherwise stated, the winning union shall administer said
agreement. In passing, it may be pointed out that CAREFCO
has been included as one of the contending parties in the
election. We feel that it is error for the acting Med-Arbiter to do
so considering that the company is a mere bystander in this
representation dispute.
WHEREFORE, as above qualified, the Order dated 2 May
1983 is affirmed.
SO DECIDED. (Rollo, pp. 40-41)
From the decision of respondent Director Trajano, petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration dated December 6, 1983.
The respondent Director in his order dated March 21, 1984 denied the motion
for reconsideration for lack of merit and affirmed the Bureau's decision of
November 18, 1983.
Hence, this petition.
This Court in a resolution dated December 10, 1984 resolved to grant the
urgent motion of petitioner for the issuance of a restraining order and issued a
temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents from conducting and
holding the certification election on December 17, 1984 among the rank and
file employees of respondent company (see Rollo, p. 99).
Petitioner maintains that respondent Director Trajano committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it rendered a decision
affirming the order of Med-Arbiter Correa finding that the deadlock is "nothing
but a mere subterfuge to obstruct the exercise of the workers of their legitimate
right to self-organization, a last minute maneuver to deny the workers the
exercise of their constitutional rights" (Rollo, p. 28) and ordering a certification
election among the rank and file workers of respondent company.
Furthermore, petitioner stresses that the finding that the contract (deadlock)
bar rule has no room for application in the instant case, runs counter to the
provision of Section 3 of the Rules Implementing Batas Pambansa Blg. 130
which prohibits the filing of a petition for certification election during the
pendency of a bargaining deadlock.
In conformity with the petitioner's contentions, the Solicitor General insists that
the respondent Director has acted arbitrarily in issuing the assailed decision
and order. In addition, it argues that the CBA concluded on September 10,
1983 has a life span of three (3) years and constitutes a bar to the petition for
certification election pursuant to Section 3 of the Rules Implementing Batas
Pambansa Blg. 130.
The pivotal issue therefore, is whether or not a petition for certification election
may be filed during the pendency of a bargaining deadlock submitted to
arbitration or conciliation.
After a careful review of the records of this case, the Court finds the petition
meritorious and holds that the respondent Director gravely abused his
discretion when he affirmed the order of Med-Arbiter Correa calling for a
certification election among the rank and file workers of private respondent
company.
The law on the matter is Section 3, Book V, Rule V of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Labor Code, to wit:
Sec. 3. When to file. — In the absence of a collective
bargaining agreement duly registered in accordance with
Article 231 of the Code, a petition for certification election may
be filed at any time. However, no certification election may be
held within one year from the date of issuance of a final
certification election result. Neither may a representation
question be entertained if, before the filing of a petition for
certification election, a bargaining deadlock to which an
 incumbent or certified bargaining agent is a party had been
submitted to conciliation or arbitration or had become the
subject of valid notice or strike or lockout.
If a collective bargaining agreement has been duly registered in
accordance with Article 231 of the Code, a petition for
certification election or a motion for intervention can only be
entertained within sixty (60) days prior to the expiry date of
such agreement.
The clear mandate of the aforequoted section is that a petition for certification
election may be filed at any time, in the absence of a collective bargaining
agreement. Otherwise put, the rule prohibits the filing of a petition for
certification election in the following cases:
(1) during the existence of a collective bargaining agreement except within the
freedom period;
(2) within one (1) year from the date of issuance of declaration of a final
certification election result; or
(3) during the existence of a bargaining deadlock to which an incumbent or
certified bargaining agent is a party and which had been submitted to
conciliation or arbitration or had become the subject of a valid notice of strike
or lockout.
The Deadlock Bar Rule simply provides that a petition for certification election
can only be entertained if there is no pending bargaining deadlock submitted to
conciliation or arbitration or had become the subject of a valid notice of strike
or lockout. The principal purpose is to ensure stability in the relationship of the
workers and the management.
In the case at bar, a bargaining deadlock was already submitted to arbitration
when private respondent FUR-TUCP filed a petition for certification election.
The same petition was dismissed for lack of merit by the Acting Med-Arbiter in
an order dated July 23, 1982 on the sole ground that the petition is barred by a
pending bargaining deadlock. However, respondent Director set aside the
same order and subsequently affirmed an order giving due course to the
petition for certification election and ordering that an election be held.
The law demands that the petition for certification election should fail in the
presence of a then pending bargaining deadlock.
A director of the Bureau of Labor Relations, by the nature of his functions, acts
in a quasi-judicial capacity. We find no reason why his decision should be
beyond this Court's review. Administrative officials, like the director of the
Bureau of Labor Relations are presumed to act in accordance with law but this
Court will not hesitate to pass upon their work where there is a showing of
abuse of authority or discretion in their official acts or when their decisions or
orders are tainted with unfairness or arbitrariness.
Noteworthy is the fact that a certification was issued by Executive Labor Arbiter
Celerino Grecia II on October 21, 1982 certifying that the petition for deadlock
in RAB Case No. VI-0220-82 was forwarded to the Executive Labor Arbiter for
compulsory arbitration (see Rollo, p. 19). The respondent Director erred in
finding that the order issued by the Med-Arbiter dismissing the petition for
certification election was irregular and was merely based on information.
All premises considered, the Court is convinced that the assailed decision and
order of the respondent Director is tainted with arbitrariness that would amount
to grave abuse of discretion.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED; the decision dated November 18,
1983 and order dated March 21, 1984 of the respondent Director Cresenciano
B. Trajano are hereby nullified and the order of Med-Arbiter Militante dated
July 23, 1982 dismissing the petition for certification election is hereby
reinstated.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 75810 September 9, 1991
KAISAHAN NG MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO (KAMPIL-
KATIPUNAN), petitioner,
vs.
HON. CRESENCIANO B. TRAJANO in his capacity as Director, Bureau of
Labor Relations, and VIRON GARMENTS MFG., CO., INC., respondents.
The propriety of holding a certification election is the issue in the special civil
action of certiorari at bar.
By virtue of a Resolution of the Bureau of Labor Relations dated February 27,
1981, the National Federation of Labor Unions (NAFLU) was declared the
exclusive bargaining representative of all rank-and-file employees of Viron
Garments Manufacturing Co., Inc. (VIRON).
More than four years thereafter, or on April 11, 1985, another union, the
Kaisahan ng Manggagawang Pilipino KAMPIL Katipunan filed with the Bureau
of Labor Relations a petition for certification election among the employees of
VIRON. The petition allegedly counted with the support of more than thirty
percent (30%) of the workers at VIRON.
NAFLU opposed the petition, as might be expected. The Med-Arbiter however
ordered, on June 14, 1985, that a certification election be held at VIRON as
prayed for, after ascertaining that KAMPIL had complied with all the
requirements of law and that since the certification of NAFLU as sole
bargaining representative in 1981, no collective bargaining agreement had
been executed between it and VIRON.
NAFLU appealed. It contended that at the time the petition for certification
election was filed on April 11, 1985, it was in process of collective bargaining
with VIRON; that there was in fact a deadlock in the negotiations which had
prompted it to file a notice of strike; and that these circumstances constituted a
bar to the petition for election in accordance with Section 3, Rule V, Book V of
the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, reading as follows:
1
SEC. 3. When to file. — In the absence of a collective bargaining
agreement submitted in accordance with Article 231 of the Code, a
petition for certification election may be filed at any time. However, no
certification election may be held within one year from the date of
issuance of declaration of a final certification election result. Neither
may a representation question be entertained if, before the filing of a
petition for certification election, a bargaining deadlock to which an
incumbent or certified bargaining agent is a party had been submitted
to conciliation or arbitration or had become the subject of a valid notice
of strike or lockout.
If a collective bargaining agreement has been duly registered in
accordance with Article 231 of the Code, a petition for certification
election or a motion for intervention can only be entertained within sixty
(60) days prior to the expiry date of such agreement.
Finding merit in a NAFLU's appeal, the Director of Labor Relations rendered a
Resolution on April 30, 1986 setting aside the Med-Arbiter's Order of June 14,
1985 and dismissing KAMPIL's petition for certification election. This
disposition is justified in the Resolution as follows:
... While it may be true that the one-year period (mentioned in Section
3 above quoted) has long run its course since intervenor NAFLU was
certified on February 27, 1981, it could not be said, however, that
NAFLU slept on its right to bargain collectively with the employer. If a
closer look was made on the history of labor management relations in
the company, it could be readily seen that the delay in the negotiations
for and conclusion of a collective agreement — the object of the one-
year period — could be attributed first, on the exhaustion of all legal
remedies in the representation question twice initiated in the company
before the filing of the present petition and second, to management
who had been resisting the representations of NAFLU in collective
bargaining.
The one-year period therefore, should not be applied literally to the
present dispute, especially considering that intervenor had to undergo
a strike to bring management to the negotiation table. ...
KAMPIL moved for reconsideration, and when this was denied, instituted in
this Court the present certiorari action.
It is evident that the prohibition imposed by law on the holding of a certification
election "within one year from the date of issuance of declaration of a final
certification election result' — in this case, from February 27, 1981, the date of
the Resolution declaring NAFLU the exclusive bargaining representative of
rank-and-file workers of VIRON — can have no application to the case at bar.
That one-year period-known as the "certification year" during which the
The respondents advert to a strike declared by NAFLU on October 26, 1986
for refusal of VIRON to bargain and for violation of terms and conditions of
employment, which was settled by the parties' agreement, and to another
strike staged on December 6, 1986 in connection with a claim of violation of
said agreement, a dispute which has since been certified for compulsory
arbitration by the Secretary of Labor & Employment. Obviously, however,
4

certified union is required to negotiate with the employer, and certification these activities took place after the initiation of the certification election case by
election is prohibited — has long since expired.
2
KAMPIL, and it was grave abuse of discretion to have regarded them as
precluding the holding of the certification election thus prayed for.
Thus the question for resolution is whether or not KAMPIL's petition for
certification election is barred because, before its filing, a bargaining deadlock WHEREFORE, it being apparent that none of the proscriptions to certification
between VIRON and NAFLU as the incumbent bargaining agent, had been election set out in the law exists in the case at bar, and it was in the premises
submitted to conciliation or arbitration or had become the subject of a valid grave abuse of discretion to have ruled otherwise, the contested Resolution of
notice of strike or lockout, in accordance with Section 3, Rule V, Book V of the the respondent Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations dated April 30, 1986
Omnibus Rules above quoted. in BLR Case No. A-7-139-85 (BZEO-CE-04-004-85) is NULLIFIED AND SET
ASIDE. Costs against private respondent.
Again it seems fairly certain that prior to the filing of the petition for election in
this case, there was no such "bargaining deadlock ... (which) had been SO ORDERED
submitted to conciliation or arbitration or had become the subject of a valid
notice of strike or lockout." To be sure, there are in the record assertions by
NAFLU that its attempts to bring VIRON to the negotiation table had been
unsuccessful because of the latter's recalcitrance and unfulfilled promises to
bargain collectively; but there is no proof that it had taken any action to legally
3

coerce VIRON to comply with its statutory duty to bargain collectively. It could
have charged VIRON with unfair labor practice; but it did not. It could have
gone on a legitimate strike in protest against VIRON's refusal to bargain
collectively and compel it to do so; but it did not. There are assertions by
NAFLU, too, that its attempts to bargain collectively had been delayed by
continuing challenges to the resolution pronouncing it the sole bargaining
representative in VIRON; but there is no adequate substantiation thereof, or of
how it did in fact prevent initiation of the bargaining process between it and
VIRON.

The stark, incontrovertible fact is that from February 27, 1981 — when NAFLU
was proclaimed the exclusive bargaining representative of all VIRON
employees — to April 11, 1985 — when KAMPIL filed its petition for
certification election or a period of more than four (4) years, no collective
bargaining agreement was ever executed, and no deadlock ever arose from
negotiations between NAFLU and VIRON resulting in conciliation proceedings
or the filing of a valid strike notice.

G.R. No. 118915 February 4, 1997
CAPITOL MEDICAL CENTER OF CONCERNED EMPLOYEES-UNIFIED
FILIPINO SERVICE WORKERS, (CMC-ACE-UFSW), petitioners,
vs.
HON. BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA, Undersecretary of the Department of
Labor and Employment; CAPITOL MEDICAL CENTER EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION-ALLIANCE OF FILIPINO WORKERS AND CAPITOL
MEDICAL CENTER INCORPORATED AND DRA. THELMA CLEMENTE,
President, respondents.
This petition for certiorari and prohibition seeks to reserves and set aside the
Order dated November 18, 1994 of public respondent Bienvenido E.
Laguesma, Undersecretary of the Department of Labor and Employment in
Case No. OS.-A-136-94 which dismissed the petition for certification election
1
filed by petitioner for lack of merit and further directed private respondent
hospital to negotiate a collective bargaining agreement with respondent union,
Capitol Medical Center Employees Association-Alliance of Filipino Workers.
The antecedent facts are undisputed.
On February 17, 1992, Med-Arbiter Rasidali C. Abdullah issued an Order
which granted respondent union's petition for certification election among the
rank-and-file employees of the Capitol Medical Center. Respondent CMC
2
appealed the Order to the Office of the Secretary by questioning the legal
status of respondent union's affiliation with the Alliance of Filipino Workers
(AFW). To correct any supposed infirmity in its legal status, respondent union
registered itself independently and withdrew the petition which had earlier
been granted. Thereafter, it filed another petition for certification election.
On May 29, 1992, Med-Arbiter Manases T. Cruz issued an order granting the
petition for certification election. Respondent CMC again appealed to the Office
3
of the Secretary which affirmed the Order of the Med-Arbiter granting the
4
certification election.
On December 9, 1992, elections were finally held with respondent union
garnering 204 votes, 168 in favor of no union and 8 spoiled ballots out of a
total of 380 votes cast. Thereafter, on January 4, 1993, Med-Arbiter Cruz
issued an Order certifying respondent union as the sole and exclusive
bargaining representative of the rank and file employees at CMC. 5
Unsatisfied with the outcome of the elections, respondent CMC again
appealed to the Office of the Secretary of Labor which appeal was denied on
February 26, 1993. A subsequent motion for reconsideration filed by
6
respondent CMC was likewise denied on March 23, 1993. 7
Respondent CMC's basic contention was the supposed pendency of its
petition for cancellation of respondent union's certificate of registration in Case
No. NCR-OD-M-92211-028. In the said case, Med-Arbiter Paterno Adap issued
an Order dated February 4, 1993 which declared respondent union's certificate
of registration as null and void. However, this order was reversed on appeal by
8
the Officer-in-Charge of the Bureau of Labor Relations in her Order issued on
April 13, 1993. The said Order dismissed the motion for cancellation of the
certificate of registration of respondent union and declared that it was not only
a bona fide affiliate or local of a federation (AFW), but a duly registered union
as well. Subsequently, this case reached this Court in Capitol Medical Center,
Inc. v. Hon. Perlita Velasco, G.R. No. 110718, where we issued a Resolution
dated December 13, 1993, dismissing the petition of CMC for failure to
sufficiently show that public respondent committed grave abuse of
discretion. The motion for reconsideration filed by CMC was likewise denied in
9
our Resolution dated February 2, 1994. Thereafter, on March 23, 1994, we
10
issued an entry of judgment certifying that the Resolution dated December 13,
1993 has become final and executory. 11
Respondent union, after being declared as the certified bargaining agent of the
rank-and-file employees of respondent CMC by Med-Arbiter Cruz, presented
economic proposals for the negotiation of a collective bargaining agreement
(CBA). However, respondent CMC contended that CBA negotiations should be
suspended in view of the Order issued on February 4, 1993 by Med-Arbiter
Adap declaring the registration of respondent union as null and void. In spite of
the refusal of respondent CMC, respondent union still persisted in its demand
for CBA negotiations, claiming that it has already been declared as the sole
and exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of the hospital.
Due to respondent CMC's refusal to bargain collectively, respondent union filed
a notice of strike on March 1, 1993. After complying with the other legal
requirements, respondent union staged a strike on April 15, 1993. On April 16,
1993, the Secretary of Labor assumed jurisdiction over the case and issued an
order certifying the same to the National Labor Relations Commission for
compulsory arbitration where the said case is still pending. 12
It is at this juncture that petitioner union, on March 24, 1994, filed a petition for
certification election among the regular rank-and-file employees of the Capitol
Medical Center Inc. It alleged in its petition that: 1) three hundred thirty one
(331) out of the four hundred (400) total rank-and-file employees of respondent
CMC signed a petition to conduct a certification election; and 2) that the said
employees are withdrawing their authorization for the said union to represent
them as they have joined and formed the union Capitol Medical Center
Alliance of Concerned Employees (CMC-ACE). They also alleged that a
certification election can now be conducted as more that 12 months have
lapsed since the last certification election was held. Moreover, no certification
election was conducted during the twelve (12) months prior to the petition, and
no collective bargaining agreement has as yet been concluded between
respondent union and respondent CMC despite the lapse of twelve months
from the time the said union was voted as the collective bargaining
representative.
On April 12, 1994, respondent union opposed the petition and moved for its
dismissal. It contended that it is the certified bargaining agent of the rank-and-
file employees of the Hospital, which was confirmed by the Secretary of Labor
and Employment and by this Court. It also alleged that it was not remiss in
asserting its right as the certified bargaining agent for it continuously
demanded the negotiation of a CBA with the hospital despite the latter's
avoidance to bargain collectively. Respondent union was even constrained to
strike on April 15, 1993, where the Secretary of Labor intervened and certified
the dispute for compulsory arbitration. Furthermore, it alleged that majority of
the signatories who supported the petition were managerial and confidential
employees and not members of the rank-and-file, and that there was no valid
disaffiliation of its members, contrary to petitioner's allegations.
Petitioner, in its rejoinder, claimed that there is no legal impediment to the
conduct of a certification election as more than twelve (12) months had lapsed
since respondent union was certified as the exclusive bargaining agent and no
CBA was as yet concluded. It also claimed that the other issues raised could
only be resolved by conducting another certification election.
In its surrejoinder, respondent union alleged that the petition to conduct a
certification election was improper, immoral and in manifest disregard of the
decisions rendered by the Secretary of Labor and by this Court. It claimed that
CMC employed "legal obstructionism's" in order to let twelve months pass
without a CBA having been concluded between them so as to pave the way for
the entry of petitioner union.
On May 12, 1994, Med-Arbiter Brigida Fadrigon, issued an Order granting the
petition for certification election among the rank and file
employees. It ruled that the issue was the majority status of respondent
13
union. Since no certification election was held within one year from the date of
issuance of a final certification election result and there was no bargaining
deadlock between respondent union and the employees that had been
submitted to conciliation or had become the subject of a valid notice of strike or
lock out, there is no bar to the holding of a certification election.
14
Respondent union appeared from the said Order, alleging that the Med-Arbiter
erred in granting the petition for certification election and in holding that this
case falls under Section 3, Rule V Book V of the Rules Implementing the Labor
Code. It also prayed that the said provision must not be applied strictly in
15
view of the facts in this case.
Petitioner union did not file any opposition to the appeal.
On November 18, 1994, public respondent rendered a Resolution granting the
appeal. He ratiocinated that while the petition was indeed filed after the lapse
16
of one year form the time of declaration of a final certification result, and that
no bargaining deadlock had been submitted for conciliation or arbitration,
respondent union was not remiss on its right to enter into a CBA for it was the
CMC which refused to bargain collectively. 17
CMC and petitioner union separately filed motions for reconsideration of the
said Order.
CMC contended that in certification election proceedings, the employer cannot
be ordered to bargain collectively with a union since the only issue involved is
the determination of the bargaining agent of the employees.
Petitioner union claimed that to completely disregard the will of the 331 rank-
and-file employees for a certification election would result in the denial of their
substantial rights and interests. Moreover,it contended that public respondent's
"indictment" that petitioner "capitalize (sic) on the ensuing delay which was
caused by the Hospital, . . ." was unsupported by the facts and the records.
On January 11, 1995, public respondent issued a Resolution which denied the
two motions for reconsideration hence this petition. 18
The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not public respondent committed
grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petition for certification election,
and in directing the hospital to negotiate a collective bargaining agreement
with the said respondent union.
Petitioner alleges that public respondent Undersecretary Laguesma denied it
due process when it ruled against the holding of a certification election. It
further claims that the denial of due process can be gleaned from the manner
by which the assailed resolution was written, i.e., instead of the correct name
of the mother federation UNIFIED, it was referred to as UNITED; and that the
respondent union's name CMCEA-AFW was referred to as CMCEA-AFLO.
Petitioner maintains that such errors indicate that the assailed resolution was
prepared with "indecent haste."
We do not subscribe to petitioner's contention.
The errors pointed to by petitioner can be classified as mere typographical
errors which cannot materially alter the substance and merit of the assailed
resolution.
Petitioner cannot merely anchor its position on the aforementioned erroneous'
names just to attain a reversal of the questioned resolution. As correctly
observed by the Solicitor General, petitioner is merely "nit-picking vainly trying
to make a monumental issue out of a negligible error of the public
respondent." 19
Petitioner also assails public respondents' findings that the former "capitalize
(sic) on the ensuing delay which was caused by the hospital and which
resulted in the non-conclusion of a CBA within the certification year.'' It further
20
argues that the denial of its motion fro a fair hearing was clear case of denial of
its right to due process.
Such contention of petitioner deserves scant consideration.
A perusal of the record shows that petitioner failed to file its opposition to
oppose the grounds for respondent union's appeal.
It was given an opportunity to be heard but lost it when it refused to file an
appellee's memorandum.
Petitioner insists that the circumstances prescribed in Section 3, Rule V, Book
V Of the Rules Implementing the Labor Code where a certification election
should be conducted, viz: (1) that one year had lapsed since the issuance of a
final certification result; and (2) that there is no bargaining deadlock to which
the incumbent or certified bargaining agent is a party has been submitted to
conciliation or arbitration, or had become the subject of a valid notice of strike
or lockout, are present in this case. It further claims that since there is no
evidence on record that there exists a CBA deadlock, the law allowing the
conduct of a certification election after twelve months must be given effect in
the interest of the right of the workers to freely choose their sole and exclusive
bargaining agent.
While it is true that, in the case at bench, one year had lapsed since the time of
declaration of a final certification result, and that there is no collective
bargaining deadlock, public respondent did not commit grave abuse of
discretion when it ruled in respondent union's favor since the delay in the
forging of the CBA could not be attributed to the fault of the latter.
A scrutiny of the records will further reveal that after respondent union was
certified as the bargaining agent of CMC, it invited the employer hospital to the
bargaining table by submitting its economic proposal for a CBA. However,
CMC refused to negotiate with respondent union and instead challenged the
latter's legal personality through a petition for cancellation of the certificate of
registration which eventually reached this Court. The decision affirming the
legal status of respondent union should have left CMC with no other recourse
but to bargain collectively; but still it did not. Respondent union was left with no
other recourse but to file a notice of strike against CMC for unfair labor practice
with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board. This eventually led to a
strike on April 15, 1993.
Petitioner union on the other hand, after this Court issued an entry of judgment
on March 23, 1994, filed the subject petition for certification election on March
24, 1994, claiming that twelve months had lapsed since the last certification
election.
Was there a bargaining deadlock between CMC and respondent union, before
the filing of petitioner of a petition for certification election, which had been
submitted to conciliation or had become the subject of a valid notice of strike or
lockout?
In the case of Divine Word University of Tacloban v. Secretary of Labor and
Employment, we had the occasion to define what a deadlock is, viz:\
21
A "deadlock" is . . . the counteraction of things producing entire
stoppage; . . . . There is a deadlock when there is a complete
blocking or stoppage resulting from the action of equal and
opposed forces . . . . The word is synonymous with the word
impasse, which . . "presupposes reasonable effort at good faith
bargaining which, despite noble intentions, does not conclude
in agreement between the parties."
Although there is no "deadlock" in its strict sense as there is no "counteraction"
of forces present in this case nor "reasonable effort at good faith bargaining,"
such can be attributed to CMC's fault as the bargaining proposals of
respondent union were never answered by CMC. In fact, what happened in
this case is worse than a bargaining deadlock for CMC employed all legal
means to block the certification of respondent union as the bargaining agent of
the rank-and-file; and use it as its leverage for its failure to bargain with
respondent union. Thus, we can only conclude that CMC was unwilling to
negotiate and reach an agreement with respondent union. CMC has not at any
instance shown willingness to discuss the economic proposals given by
respondent union. 22
As correctly ratiocinated by public respondent, to wit:
For herein petitioner to capitalize on the ensuing delay which
was caused by the hospital and which resulted in the non-
conclusion of a CBA within the certification year, would be to
negate and render a mockery of the proceedings undertaken
before this Department and to put an unjustified premium on
the failure of the respondent hospital to perform its duty to
bargain collectively as mandated in Article 252 of the Labor
Code, as amended, which states".
"Article 252. Meaning of duty to bargain collectively — the
duty to bargain collectively means the performance of a mutual obligation to
meet and convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of
negotiating an agreement with respect to wages, hours of work and all other
terms and conditions of employment including proposals for adjusting any
grievance or questions arising under such agreement and executing a contract
incorporating such agreements if requested by either party but such duty does
not compel any party to agree to a proposal or to make any concession."
The duly certified bargaining agent, CMCEA-AFW, should not
be made to further bear the brunt flowing from the respondent
hospital's reluctance and thinly disguised refusal to bargain. 23
If the law proscribes the conduct of a certification election when there is a
bargaining deadlock submitted to conciliation or arbitration, with more reason
should it not be conducted if, despite attempts to bring an employer to the
negotiation table by the "no reasonable effort in good faith" on the employer
certified bargaining agent, there was to bargain collectively.
In the case of Kaisahan ng Manggagawang Pilipino vs. Trajano 201 SCRA 453
(1991), penned by Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa, the factual milieu of which
is similar to this case, this Court allowed the holding of a certification election
and ruled that the one year period known as the "certification year" has long
since expired. We also ruled, that:
. . . prior to the filing of the petition for election in this case,
there was no such "bargaining deadlock . . (which) had been
submitted to conciliation or arbitration or had become the
subject of a valid notice of strike or lockout." To be sure, there
are in the record assertions by NAFLU that its attempts to bring
VIRON to the negotiation table had been unsuccessful
because of the latter's recalcitrance, and unfulfilled promises to
bargain collectively; but there is no proof that it had taken tiny
action to legally coerce VIRON to comply with its statutory duty
to bargain collectively. It could have charged VIRON with unfair
labor practice; but it did not. It could have gone on a legitimate
strike in protest against VIRON's refusal to bargain collectively
and compel it to do so; but it did not. There are assertions by
NAFLU, too, that its attempts to bargain collectively had been
delayed by continuing challenges to the resolution pronouncing
it the sole bargaining representative in VIRON; but there is no
adequate substantiation thereof, or of how it did in fact prevent
initiation of the bargaining process between it and VIRON. 24
Although the statements pertinent to this case are merely obiter, still the fact
remains that in the Kaisahan case, NAFLU was counselled by this Court on
the steps that it should have undertaken to protect its interest, but which it
failed to do so.
This is what is strikingly different between the Kaisahan case and the case at
bench for in the latter case, there was proof that the certified bargaining agent,
respondent union, had taken an action to legally coerce the employer to
comply with its statutory duty to bargain collectively, i.e., charging the employer
with unfair labor practice and conducting a strike in protest against the
employer's refusal to bargain. It is only just and equitable that the
25

circumstances in this case should be considered as similar in nature to a

"bargaining deadlock" when no certification election could be held. This is also
to make sure that no floodgates will be opened for the circumvention of the law
by unscrupulous employers to prevent any certified bargaining agent from
negotiating a CBA. Thus, Section 3, Rule V, Book V of the Implement Rules
should be interpreted liberally so as to include a circumstance, e.g. where a
CBA could not be concluded due to the failure of one party to willingly perform
its duty to bargain collectively.

The order for the hospital to bargain is based on its failure to bargain
collectively with respondent union.

WHEREFORE, the Resolution dated November 18, 1994 of public respondent

Laguesma is AFFIRMED and the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED
 On August 16, 1991, Samahang Manggagawa sa Permex-Philippine
Integrated Industries Labor Union (SMP-PIILU), wrote the respondent
company requesting recognition as the sole and exclusive bargaining
representative of employees at the Permex Producer. On October 19, 1991
Permex Producer recognized SMP-PIILU and, on December 1, entered into a
collective bargaining agreement with it. The CBA was ratified between
December 9 and 10, 1991 by the majority of the rank and file employees of
G.R. No. 107792 March 2, 1998
Permex Producer. On December 13, 1991, it was certified by the DOLE.
SAMAHANG MANGGAGAWA SA PERMEX (SMP-PIILU-TUCP), petitioners,
On February 25, 1992, respondent NFL filed a petition for certification election,
vs.
but it was dismissed by Med-Arbiter Edgar B. Gongalos in an order dated
THE SECRETARY OF LABOR, NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR,
August 20, 1992. Respondent NFL then appealed the order to the Secretary of
PERMEX PRODUCER AND EXPORTER CORPORATION, respondents.
Labor and Employment. On October 8, 1992, the Secretary of Labor, through
Undersecretary Bienvenido Laguesma, set aside the order of the Med-Arbiter
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision, dated October 8, 1992 and ordered a certification election to be conducted among the rank and file
and order dated November 12, 1992, of Undersecretary of Labor and employees at the Permex Producer, with the following choices:
Employment Bienvenido Laguesma, ordering a certification election to be
conducted among the employees of respondent company.
1. National Federation of Labor
The facts of the case are as follows. On January 15, 1991, a certification election
2. Samahang Manggagawa sa Permex
was conducted among employees of respondent Permex Producer and Exporter
Corporation (hereafter referred to as Permex Producer). The results of the 3. No union
elections were as follows:
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration but its motion was denied in an order
National Federation of Labor 235 dated November 12, 1992. Hence, this petition.
(NFL)
Two arguments are put forth in support of the petition. First, it is contended that
No Union 466 petitioner has been recognized by the majority of the employees at Permex
Producer as their sole collective bargaining agent. Petitioner argues that when
Spoiled Ballots 18 a group of employees constituting themselves into an organization and
claiming to represent a majority of the work force requests the employer to
Marked Ballots 9 bargain collectively, the employer may do one of two things. First, if the
employer is satisfied with the employees' claim the employer may voluntarily
Challenged Ballots 7
recognize the union by merely bargaining collectively with it. The formal written
confirmation is ordinarily stated in the collective bargaining agreement.
However, some employees of Permex Producer formed a labor organization Second, if on the other hand, the employer refuses to recognize the union
known as the Samahang Manggagawa sa Permex (SMP) which they voluntarily, it may petition the Bureau of Labor Relations to conduct a
registered with the Department of Labor and Employment on March 11, 1991. certification election. If the employer does not submit a petition for certification
The union later affiliated with the Philippine Integrated Industries Labor Union election, the union claiming to represent the employees may submit the
(PIILU). petition so that it may be directly certified as the employees' representative or
a certification election may be held.
The case of Ilaw at Buklod ng Manggagawa v. Ferrer-Calleja, 1 cited by the
Solicitor General in his comment filed in behalf of the NLRC, is
particularly apropos. There, the union also requested voluntary recognition by
the company. Instead of granting the request, the company petitioned for a
certification election. The union moved to dismiss on the ground that it did not
ask the company to bargain collectively with it. As its motion was denied, the
union brought the matter to this Court. In sustaining the company's stand, this
Court ruled:
. . . Ordinarily, in an unorganized establishment like the
Calasiao Beer Region, it is the union that files a petition for a certification
election if there is no certified bargaining agent for the workers in the
establishment. If a union asks the employer to voluntarily recognize it as
the bargaining agent of the employees, as the petitioner did, it in effect
asks the employer to certify it as the bargaining representative of the
employees — A CERTIFICATION WHICH THE EMPLOYER HAS NO
AUTHORITY TO GIVE, for it is the employees' prerogative (not the
employer's) to determine whether they want a union to represent them,
and, if so, which one it should be. (emphasis supplied)
In accordance with this ruling, Permex Producer should not have given its
voluntary recognition to SMP-PIILU-TUCP when the latter asked for
recognition as exclusive collective bargaining agent of the employees of the
company. The company did not have the power to declare the union the
exclusive representative of the workers for the purpose of collective
bargaining,
Indeed, petitioner's contention runs counter to the trend towards the holding of
certification election. By virtue of Executive Order No. 111, which became
effective on March 4, 1987, the direct certification previously allowed under the
Labor Code had been discontinued as a method of selecting the exclusive
bargaining agents of the workers. 2 Certification election is the most effective
and the most democratic way of determining which labor organization can truly
represent the working force in the appropriate bargaining unit of a company. 3
Petitioner argues that of the 763 qualified employees of Permex Producer, 479
supported its application for registration with the DOLE and that when
petitioner signed the CBA with the company, the CBA was ratified by 542
employees. Petitioner contends that such support by the majority of the
employees justifies its finding that the CBA made by it is valid and binding.
But it is not enough that a union has the support of the majority of the
employees. It is equally important that everyone in the bargaining unit be given
the opportunity to express himself. 4
This is especially so because, in this case, the recognition given to the union
came barely ten (10) months after the employees had voted "no union" in the
certification election conducted in the company. As pointed out by respondent
Secretary of Labor in his decision, there can be no determination of a
bargaining representative within a year of the proclamation of the results of the
certification election. 5 Here the results, which showed that 61% of the
employees voted for "no union," were certified only on February 25, 1991 but
on December 1, 1991 Permex Producer already recognized the union and
entered into a CBA with it.
There is something dubious about the fact that just ten (10) months after the
employees had voted that they did not want any union to represent them, they
would be expressing support for petitioner. The doubt is compounded by the
fact that in sworn affidavits some employees claimed that they had either been
coerced or misled into signing a document which turned out to be in support of
petitioner as its collective bargaining agent. Although there were retractions,
we agree with the Solicitor General that retractions of statements by
employees adverse to a company (or its favored union) are oftentimes tainted
with coercion and intimidation. For how could one explain the seeming flip-
flopping of position taken by the employees? The figures claimed by petitioner
to have been given to it in support cannot readily be accepted as true.
Second. Petitioner invokes the contract-bar rule. They contend that under Arts.
253, 253-A and 256 of the Labor Code and Book V, Rule 5, §3 of its
Implementing Rules and Regulations, a petition for certification election or
motion for intervention may be entertained only within 60 days prior to the date
of expiration of an existing collective bargaining agreement. The purpose of
the rule is to ensure stability in the relationships of the workers and the
management by preventing frequent modifications of any collective bargaining
agreement earlier entered into by them in good faith and for the stipulated
original period. Excepted from the contract-bar rule are certain types of
contracts which do not foster industrial stability, such as contracts where the
identity of the representative is in doubt. Any stability derived from such
contracts must be subordinated to the employees' freedom of choice because
it does not establish the kind of industrial peace contemplated by the
law. 6 Such situation obtains in this case. The petitioner entered into a CBA
with Permex Producer when its status as exclusive bargaining agent of the
employees had not been established yet.
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision and order of the respondent Secretary
of Labor are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-8138 August 20, 1955
PLDT EMPLOYEES' UNION, petitioner,
vs.
PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY FREE
TELEPHONE WORKERS' UNION, (PAPLU),respondents.
On September 30, 1953, the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, a
public utility corporation locally organized, filed in the Court of Industrial
Relations a petition for certificate under section 12 of Republic Act No. 875. It
alleged that, a week before, it received from the Free Telephone Workers'
Union notice of its desire to bargain collectively; that until the receipt of such
notice, the Company believed the only legitimate labor organization existing
therein was the PLDT Employees Union with which it had signed a collectively
bargaining agreement still in operation; and that said Company was in no
position to determine which of the two Unions represented the majority of the
workers. Therefore it requested that an investigation be conducted for the
purpose of determining the proper collective bargaining agency for its
employees, and in the event such investigation fails to determine the proper
agency that an order be issued requiring the holding of a certification election.
Upon its petition, the PLDT Employees Union was allowed to intervene, and on
October 21, 1953 it submitted a motion to dismiss, which as amended, claimed
that it had a collective bargaining agreement in force until September 14, 1954,
and that a favorable action by the Court on the petition would permit another
labor organization in the same establishment to present to the employer
another set of demands and compel said employer to bargain with it during the
lifetime of an existing bargaining agreement, thereby infringing the
constitutional provision against impairment of contracts.
The Free Telephone Workers' Union-hereafter designated respondent—
asserting that it represented the preponderant majority of the employees,
manifested its willingness to let the investigation proceed; and answering the
Employees' Union's motion to dismiss, it contended that the existing collective
bargaining agreement constituted no legal objection, inasmuch as no
certification election had been held within the preceding twelve months. As to
the alleged impairment of the existing collective contract, it argued there was
no such impairment, because 'the contract is between the company and the
employees represented by the intervenor union who are the principals and can
change their agent at will" by a majority which it is desired to ascertain.
After considering the pleadings and the arguments, the Hon. Arsenio Roldan,
Presiding Judge, dismissed the petition in December 1953 principally for the
reason that the collective bargaining agreement between the intervenor and
the company will expire on September 14, 1954, and that before such date it
may not be changed nor amended.
The respondent Workers' Union asked for reconsideration, which the
intervenor opposed. On August 9, 1954 the Court of Industrial Relations in
banc, by majority vote, set aside the order of dismissal and remanded the case
for "determination of the appropriate collective bargaining unit, (agency) after
which the holding of a certification election in accordance with law should be
ordered", (if necessary).
Hence this petition for review—which takes the place of an appeal from the
order of the Court of Industrial Relations.
It is the general rule that only final judgments or orders are appealable to this
Court. An interlocutory order may not be appealed. (Rule 41 sec. 2) "An order
or judgment is deemed final when it finally disposes of the pending action so
that nothing more can be done with it in the trial court. In other words, a final
order is that which gives an end to the litigation . . . when the order or
judgment does not dispose of the case completely but leaves something to be
done upon the merits, it is merely interlocutory. For instance an order denying
a motion of dismissal founded on lack of jurisdiction . . .is merely
interlocutory,"1 and is not appealable.
It would seem from the foregoing that this petition for review or appeal of the
intervenor is premature, the order denying its motion to dismiss not being a
final order. The Industrial Court still had to determine the proper bargaining
agency or direct a certification election. There was something to be done in the
Industrial Court.
We are aware, of course, that the law permitting appeals to this Court from
"any order" of the Court of Industrial Relations does not in any line employ the
word "final". But it is reasonable to suppose that Congress did not intend to
disregard such well-known rule of orderly procedure, which is based partly
upon the convenience of the appealing party itself, in the sense of forestalling
useless appeals. In this case for example, if instead of appealing, the
intervenor allowed the investigation to continue, and later it is declared to be
the proper bargaining agency, then this appeal would have been useless. If it
is not so declared—then perhaps 2 it is time to appeal; not before. Before that
time it may not claim to be aggrieved by the order remanding the case for
ascertainment of the labor union which represents the majority.
The assertion that the appealed order impairs petitioner's collective bargaining
agreement is unfounded, because the tenor of the order precisely
contemplates that any bargaining agreement between the Telephone
Company and the newly-found bargaining agency will have effect only after
September 14, 1954 when the (then) existing collective agreement could be
properly terminated.
On this point petitioner insists the respondent Court could not say the contract
would expire on September 14, 1954, in view of the following stipulation in the
bargaining agreement:
that it is hereby mutually agreed upon by the parties that the duration
of this Agreement shall be for a period of one year, counting from the
date of its signing by said parties, with the understanding that it shall
be considered renewed or extended from year to year thereafter,
unless it is terminated by any one of the parties in writing to the other
at least thirty days before it is proposed to expire.
Petitioner takes the position that, far from automatically ceasing on September
14, 1954, the contract is automatically renewed—unless it is denounced by
one of the parties. Yet when the court mentioned September 14, 1954, it
merely meant that according to the contract on that date it may be denounced
or substituted by one of the parties; and the Telephone Company by filing the
petition obviously and foresightedly manifested its intention to terminate such
contract with petitioner, if and when, it is found that said petitioner no longer
represented the majority of the Company's employees. 3 Furthermore, as
explained by the Industrial Court.
"If a certification election is not held immediately, the agreement may be
renewed with or without modification by the parties thereto and again it may be
used as an argument to bar the subsequent holding of a certification election.
The result would be to deprive entirely the Free Telephone Workers' Union
(PAFLU) of an opportunity to prove that it, and not the PLDT Employees Union,
has the majority status and, therefore, entitled to represent all the employees
of the Company for collective bargaining purposes.
It is interesting to note in this regard that in the United States, where we copied
the present Industrial Peace Act an existing collective bargaining contract with
a union is a bar to subsequent certification election when . . . it has a definite
and reasonable period to run and has not been in existence for too long a
period (history, industry and customs may affect reasonablesness of the
contract term . . ..) (Werne Law of Labor Relations p. 27 citing U. S. Finishing
Co. 63 NLRB 575.) Normally, the National Labor Relations Board is inclined to
regard long-term contracts, which have been in existence for more than two
years, as no obstacle to determining bargaining representatives. (Werne op. cit
pp. 28-29 citing several cases.)
A contract which provides for automatic renewal in the absence of
notice by one of the contracting parties of intention to alter, modify or
terminate it prior to a specified period preceding the termination date,
will operate as a bar to an election. However, this rule does not apply
where a contesting union has given timely notice to the employer or
filed a petition with the Board reasonably prior to the specified date for
automatic renewal. (Werne, op. cit p. 29 citing several Labor Board
cases.)
Explaining its position in detail, the National Labor Relations Board said in the
case of Reed Roller Bit Co. 72 N. L. R. B. 927:
Whenever a contract is urged as a bar, the Board is faced with the
problem of balancing two separate interests of employees and society
which the Act was designed to protect: the interest in such stability as
is essential to encourage effective collective bargaining, and the
sometimes conflicting interest in the freedom of the employees to
select and change their representatives. In furtherance of the purposes
of the Act, we have repeatedly held that employees are entitled to
change their representatives, if they so desire, at reasonable intervals;
or conversely, that a collective bargaining contract may preclude a
determination of representatives for a reasonable period.
In the light of our experience in administering the Act, we believe that a
contract for a term of 2 years cannot be said to be of unreasonable
 duration. We have already held that 2-year contracts are presumptively Anent the alleged impairment of its contract, petitioner should keep in mind the
of reasonable duration. In applying this rule, we have not discovered modern concept embodied in the New Civil Code, that labor contracts being
any compelling conditons which indicate that such agreements unduly impressed with common interest are subject to the special laws on labor
limit the right of employees to change their representatives. Moreover, unions, collective bargaining, strikes, lockouts etc. (Art. 1700.)
in entertaining rival petitions several months before the expiration of
the numerous 1-year contracts which are made, we have found in In view of the foregoing, this petition for review should be denied. To avoid
many instances the contracting parties, having composed their misunderstandings however, it should be made clear that the next step is for
differences and executed collective bargaining contracts after the the court a quo to determine after a speedy and appropriate hearing upon
expenditure of much time, effort and money, can feel truly secure in notice, the labor union that represents the majority of the such majority, then
their respective positions only for the brief period of approximately 8 to said court may order a cetification election in accordance with legal provisions.
9 months.
Petition denied with costs.
For large masses of employees collective bargaining has but recently
emerged from a stage of trial and error, during which its techniques
and full potentialities were being slowly developed under the
encouragement and protection of the Act. To have insisted in the past
upon prolonged adherence to a bargaining agent, once chosen, would
have been wholly incompatible with this experimental and transitional
period. It was especially necessary, therefore, to lay emphasis upon
the right of workers to select and change their representatives. Now,
however, the emphasis, can better be placed elsewhere. We think that
the time has come when stability of industrial relations can be better
served, without unreasonably restricting employees in their right to
change representatives, by refusing to interfere with bargaining
relations secured by collective agreements of 2 years' duration.
(Mathews, Labor Relations And The Law (1953) p. 191-192.)

Now then, as this contract between the Company and the petitioner was
signed December 1, 1951, it had been in operation more than two years in
August 1954 when the certification election was ordered. It is therefore no bar
to the certification even under American labor views.

By the way, this is not to hold that as a matter of law in this jurisdiction the two-
year period is a definite term within which bargaining contracts are not to be
disturbed. Indeed, the statute providing that certification elections shall not be
ordered oftener than once a year, (Sec. 12 (b) R. A. 875) might give ground to
the argument that a collective bargaining agreement between the employer
and a labor union representing the majority of the laborers may be terminated,
after a year, by a new majority organization. The quotations are herein made
merely to exhibit some considerations that have influenced or may influence
the courts in the exercise of their discretion in the matter.

G.R. No. 97020 June 8, 1992
CALIFORNIA MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE UNDERSECRETARY OF LABOR BIENVENIDO E.
LAGUESMA, ABD FEDERATION OF FREE WORKERS (FFW),
CALIFORNIA MFG. CORP. SUPERVISORS UNION CHAPTER
(CALMASUCO), respondents.
This is a petition for review on certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction
and/or temporary restraining order seeking to annul and set aside the (a)
resolution * of the Department of Labor and Employment dated October 16,
1990 in OS-A-10-283-90 (NCR-OD-M-90-05-095) entitled "In Re: Petition for
Certification Election Among the Supervisors of California Manufacturing
Corporation, Federation of Free Workers (FFW) California Mfg. Corp.
Supervisors Union Chapter (CALMASUCO), petitioner-appellee, California
Manufacturing Corporation, employer-appellant" which denied herein
petitioner's appeal and affirmed the order of Med-Arbiter Arsenia Q. Ocampo
dated August 22, 1990 directing the conduct of a certification election among
the supervisory employees of California Manufacturing Corporation, and (b)
the Order ** of the same Department denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
As culled from the records, the following facts appear undisputed:
On May 24, 1990, a petition for certification election among the supervisors of
California Manufacturing Corporation (CMC for brevity) was filed by the
Federation of Free Workers (FFW) — California Manufacturing Corporation
Supervisors Union Chapter (CALMASUCO), alleging inter alia, that it is a duly
registered federation with registry certificate no. 1952-TTT-IP, while FFW-
CALMASUCO Chapter is a duly registered chapter with registry certificate no.
1-AFBI-038 issued on May 21, 1990 (Annex "A", Rollo, p. 63); that the
employer CMC employs one hundred fifty (150) supervisors; that there is no
recognized supervisors union existing in the company; that the petition is filed
in accordance with Article 257 of the Labor Code, as amended by Republic Act
No. 6715; and that the petition is nevertheless supported by a substantial
member of signatures of the employees concerned (Annexes "E" and "F", Ibid.,
pp. 28-29).
In its answer, CMC, now petitioner herein, alleged among others, that the
petition for the holding of a certification election should be denied as it is not
supported by the required twenty-five percent (25%) of all its supervisors and
that a big number of the supposed signatories to the petition are not actually
supervisors as they have no subordinates to supervise, nor do they have the
powers and functions which under the law would classify them as supervisors
(Annex "D", Ibid., P. 25).
On July 24. 1990, FFW—CALMASUCO filed its reply maintaining that under
the law, when there is no existing unit yet in a particular bargaining unit at the
time a petition for certification election is filed, the 25% rule on the signatories
does not apply; that the "organized establishment" contemplated by law does
not refer to a "company"per se but rather refers to a "bargaining unit" which
may be of different classifications in a single company; that CMC has at least
two (2) different bargaining units, namely, the supervisory (unorganized) and
the rank-and-file (organized); that the signatories to the petition have been
performing supervisory functions; that since it is CMC which promoted them to
the positions, of supervisors. it is already estopped from claiming that they are
not supervisors; that the said supervisors were excluded from the coverage of
the collective bargaining agreement of its rank-and-file employees; and that
the contested signatories are indeed supervisors as shown in the "CMC
Master List of Employees" of January 2, 1990 and the CMS Publication (Annex
"G", Ibid., p 30).
On August 12, 1990, the Med-Arbiter issued an order, the decretal portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby ordered that
a certification election be conducted among the supervisory employees
of California Manufacturing Corporation within twenty (20) days from
receipt hereof with the usual pre-election conference of the parties to
thresh out the mechanics of the election The payroll of the company
three (3) months prior to the filing of the petition shall be used as the
basis in determining the list of eligible voters.
The choices are:
 1. Federation of Free Workers (FFW) California
Manufacturing Corporation Supervisors Union Chapter (CALMASUCO);
and
2. No union.
SO ORDERED. (Annex "H" Ibid., p. 33).
CMC thereafter appealed to the Department of Labor and Employment which,
however, affirmed the above order in its assailed resolution dated October 16,
1990 (Annex, "B", Ibid, a 18) CMC's subsequent motion for reconsideration
was also denied in its order dated November 17, 1990 (Annex "A", Ibid., p. 15),
hence, his petition.
a) whether or not the term "unorganized establishment' in
Article 257 of the tabor Code refers to a bargaining unit or a
business establishment;
b) whether or not non-supervisors can participate in a
supervisor's certification election; and
c) whether or not the two (2) different and separate plants of
herein petitioner in Parañaque and Las Piñas can be treated as
a single bargaining unit.
The petition must be denied.
The Court has already categorically ruled that Article 257 of the Labor code is
applicable to unorganized labor organizations and not to establishments where
there exists a certified bargaining agent which had previously entered into a
collective bargaining agreement with the management (Associated Labor
Unions [ALU] v. Calleja, G.R. No. 85085, November 6, 1989, 179 SCRA 127)
(Emphasis supplied). Otherwise stated, the establishment concerned must
have no certified bargaining agent (Associated Labor Unions [ALU] v. Calleja
G.R. No. 82260, July 19, 1989, 175 SCRA 490). In the instant case, it is
beyond cavil that the supervisors of CMC which constitute a bargaining unit
separate and distinct from that of the rank-and-file, have no such agent. thus
they correctly filed a petition for certification election thru union FFW-
CALMASUCO, likewise indubitably a legitimate labor organization. CMC's
insistence on the 25% subscription requirement, is clearly immaterial. The
same has been expressly deleted by Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6715 and
is presently prescribed only in organized establishments, that is, those with
existing bargaining agents. Compliance with the said requirement need not
even be established with absolute certainty. The Court has consistently ruled
that "even conceding that the statutory requirement of 30% (now 25%) of the
labor force asking for a certification election had not been strictly compiled
with, the Director (now the Med-Arbiter) is still empowered to order that it be
held precisely for the purpose of ascertaining which of the contending labor
organizations shall be the exclusive collective bargaining agent (Atlas Free
Workers Union (AFWU)-PSSLU Local v. Noriel, G.R. No. L-51905, May 26,
1981, 104 SCRA 565). The requirement then is relevant only when it
becomes mandatory to conduct a certification election. In all other instances,
the discretion, according to the rulings of this Tribunal, ought to be ordinarily
exercised in favor of a petition for certification (National Mines and Allied
Workers Union (NAMAWU-UIF) v. Luna, et al., G.R. No. L-46722, June 15,
1978, 83 SCRA 607).
In any event, CMC as employer has no standing to question a certification
election (Asian Design and Manufacturing Corporation v. Calleja, et al., G.R.
No. 77415, June 29, 1989, 174 SCRA 477). Such is the sole concern of the
workers. The only exception is where the employer has to file the petition for
certification election pursuant to Article 259 (now 258) of the Labor Code
because it was requested to bargain collectively. Thereafter, the role of the
employer in the certification process ceases. The employer becomes merely a
bystander. Oft-quoted is the pronouncement of the Court on management
interference in certification elections, thus:
On matters that should be the exclusive concern of labor, the
choice of a collective bargaining representative, the employer
is definitely an intruder, His participation, to say the least,
deserves no encouragement. This Court should be the last
agency to lend support to such an attempt at interference with
purely internal affair of labor. (Trade Unions of the Philippines
and Allied Services (TUPAS) v. Trajano. G.R. No. L-61153
January 17, 1983, 120 SCRA 64 citing Consolidated Farms,
Inc. v. Noriel, G.R No. L-47752 July 31, 1978, 84 SCRA 469,
473).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is DISMISSED for utter lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 102350 June 30, 1994
TRADE UNIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES AND ALLIED SERVICES WORLD
FEDERATION OF TRADE UNIONS (TUPAS-WFTU), petitioners,
vs.
HON. BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA, in his capacity as Undersecretary of
Labor & Employment and NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR UNIONS
(NAFLU), respondents.
The records reveal that the rank-and-file employees of the Philippine
Development and Industrial Corporation (PDIC), represented by petitioner
Trade Unions of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS), entered into a
collective bargaining agreement with said company. The CBA expired on April
31, 1991.
On March 8, 1991, PDIC received a letter from the president of petitioner’s
local chapter union. The company was informed that the union had resolved to
disaffiliate from petitioner and affiliate with private respondent National
Federation of Labor Unions (NAFLU). PDIC entertained reservations about the
validity of the disaffiliation. It was not clear whether the union’s board
resolution to disaffiliate was ratified by the majority of its members.
Furthermore, PDIC had received reports that some employees were coerced
to support the disaffiliation.
On April 24, 1991, within the 60-day freedom period, PDIC and private
respondent NAFLU filed separate petitions for certification election with the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), Regional Office No. 3 in San
Fernando, Pampanga. Both petitions prayed for the holding of a certification
election between NAFLU and petitioner TUPAS, to determine the collective
bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees in PDIC’s plant and quarry.
The two petitions were consolidated and docketed as Case No. R033-9104-
RU-006, with petitioner TUPAS as compulsory intervenor.
On May 14, 1991, petitioner TUPAS filed an Urgent Motion To Refer Case To
LACC Fraternal Relations Committee, citing paragraph 1(b) of the LACC
(Labor Advisory Consultative Council) Code of Ethics which provides:
1. Non-Union raiding
xxx xxx xxx
b. Where company is organized.
All organized local affiliates or unions of any
LACC member must be discouraged from disaffiliating from their incumbent
labor federations/national union affiliation. However, LACC recognizes the
ultimate authority and right of the local unions to decide for themselves during
the freedom period. In the event that said local unions intend to disaffiliate
from any LACC member and to affiliate with another member, the latter must
inform the former about the intention of their said local union and to settle the
matter by themselves. If not so settled, the matter will be brought to the
attention of the Fraternal Relations Committee of the LACC for final
determination or settlement. 1
Said Code of Ethics was adopted and signed by four base organizations,
namely: Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), to which private respondent NAFLU is
affiliated; Federation of Free Workers (FFW); Lakas ng Manggagawa Labor
Center (LMLC); and Philippine World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU)
Affiliates, which includes petitioner TUPAS. Petitioner urged the DOLE to
2
"give its imprimatur and uphold the binding effect of the Code among the
LACC members." 3
Despite the Urgent Motion, Med-Arbiter Antonio R. Cortez, on June 3, 1991,
issued an Order with the following dispositive portion:
ACCORDINGLY, let a certification election be conducted
among the regular rank-and-file employees of the Philippine Development
and Industrial Corporation, with the following choices, to wit:
1. National Federation of Labor Unions (NAFLU);
2. Trade Unions of the Philippines Allied Services
(TUPAS); and
 3. No Union.
The January 1991 payrolls shall be used as the basis to
determine the qualified voters in this election.
A pre-election conference intended to thresh out the mechanics
of the aforesaid election will be called by this Office after ten (10) days from
receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.
The Order was appealed to the Secretary of Labor and Employment, and the
case was docketed as OS-MA-A-7-212-91. On August 15, 1991, the Secretary
of Labor and Employment affirmed the Order. Labor Undersecretary
Laguesma held, viz.:
The Code of Ethics being invoked by TUPAS is internal to the
Labor Advisory and Consultative Council (LACC). In other
words, it behooves on the signatories to the Code to comply
and respect its provisions. This Office, therefore, can only take
cognizance of the Code and recognize its provisions if the
parties thereto fully and mutually respect the same Otherwise,
we are left with no other recourse but to dispose of the instant
case on the basis of existing and applicable laws and rules.
It appears that total reliance on the Code of Ethics is
misplaced. It must be pointed out that no less than the
aforequoted provision of the Code of Ethics recognizes the
"ultimate authority and right of the local unions to decide for
themselves during the freedom period." Necessarily, the Code
of Ethics itself does not sanction any act that would curtail the
right of the workers to institute petitions for certification election
during the freedom period, as in the case at bar.
The emphasis given by the Code of Ethics on the right of the
local unions to decide for themselves during the freedom
period is in accordance with the provision of the Labor Code
which allows another union to question the majority status of
the incumbent bargaining agent within the sixty-day freedom
period. This is embodied in Article 256 of the Labor code, as
amended by RA 6715, to wit:
"Art. 256. Representation
issue in organized establishments. In organized establishments, when
a verified petition questioning the majority status of the incumbent
bargaining agent is filed before the Department of Labor and
Employment within the sixty-day period before the expiration of a
collective bargaining agreement, the Med-Arbiter shall automatically
order an election by secret ballot when the verified petition is
supported by the written consent of at least twenty-five per cent (25%)
of all the employees in the bargaining unit to ascertain the will of the
employees in the appropriate bargaining unit."
It being not disputed that the petition of NAFLU is sufficient in
form and in substance, a certification election is indeed
warranted. 4
On October 7, 1991, respondent undersecretary denied petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.
On October 27, 1991, a certification election was conducted among the rank-
and-file workers of PDIC at Iba, Meycauayan, Bulacan. One hundred eighteen
(118) of the one hundred thirty-six (136) qualified voters participated in the
elections. Petitioner garnered six (6) votes, while private respondent got one
hundred twelve (112). On November 5, 1991, Med-Arbiter Antonio R. Cortez
issued an Order certifying private respondent as the sole and exclusive
bargaining agent of all rank-and-file workers of PDIC. 5
Thus, on November 6, 1991, petitioners filed this original action
for Certiorari and Mandamus with Prayer for the Issuance of Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction, "seeking to ANNUL the
questioned Resolution dated August 15, 1991, and the Order dated October 7,
1991." 6
On November 18, 1991, we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining
respondents from enforcing the impugned Resolution and Order.
We find no merit in the petition.
Public respondent did not act with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction in affirming the Med-Arbiter’s Order, dated June 3,
1991. The order for the holding of a certification election among the rank-and-
file employees of PDIC finds legal warrant in Art. 256 of the amended Labor
Code, as earlier quoted. Under said provision, the Med-Arbiter
shall automatically order a certification election by secret ballot in an organized
establishment such as PDIC, provided the following requisites are met: (1) that
a petition questioning the majority status of the incumbent bargaining agent is
filed before the DOLE within the sixty-day freedom period; (2) that such
petition is verified; and (3) that the petition is supported by the written consent
of at least twenty-five (25%) per cent of all employees in the bargaining unit. It
is undisputed that all these requirements were met by private respondent
NAFLU in its petition before the DOLE Regional Office No. 3, in San Fernando,
Pampanga. Thus, Med-Arbiter Cortez, acting in accordance with Art. 256 of the
Labor Code, as amended, had no recourse but to automaticallyorder the
holding of a certification election at PDIC.
agent. This democratic decision deserves utmost respect, especially since it
was not attended by any legal infirmity. Again, it bears stressing that labor
legislation seeks in the main to protect the interest of the members of the
working class. It should never be used to subvert their will.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The
Resolution dated August 15, 1991, and the Order dated October 7, 1991 of
respondent Department of Labor and Employment Undersecretary Bienvenido
E. Laguesma in OS-MA-A-7-212-91 is hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO.
SO ORDERED.

It bears stressing that no obstacle must be placed to the holding of certification

elections, for it is a statutory policy that should not be circumvented. We
7 8

have held that whenever there is doubt as to whether a particular union

represents the majority of the rank-and-file employees, in the absence of a
legal impediment, the holding of a certification election is the most democratic
method of determining the employees’ choice of their bargaining
representative. It is the appropriate means whereby controversies and
disputes on representation may be laid to rest, by the unequivocal vote of the
employees themselves. Indeed, it is the keystone of industrial democracy.
9

Art. 256 of the Labor Code cannot be supplanted by the Code of Ethics of the
LACC. Said Code cannot amend or repeal a law. And, as correctly observed
by the Office of the Solicitor General, it merely provides for a voluntary
mechanism to settle intra-union disputes. It only applies when both parties to
the dispute seek the mediation of said Committee. However, when one of the
parties decides to avail of the remedy provided for under Art. 256 of our Labor
Code and files the proper petition with the DOLE, jurisdiction over the dispute
is exclusively acquired by and cannot be wrenched away from the Med-Arbiter.
It is familiar learning that jurisdiction is vested by law, and not by agreement
between or among the parties. Moreover, labor disputes involve public interest,
and hence any private agreement on their settlement cannot prevail over what
is provided for by our laws.

The court also recognizes the fact that the certification election sought to be
stopped by petitioner is now fait accompli, and the rank-and-file employees of
PDIC have articulated their choice as to who shall be their collective
bargaining agent in no uncertain terms. In the certification election legally held
before we issued our temporary restraining order in the case, the PDIC
workers voted, 112 to 6 (with 18 qualified voters not participating in the
election), to make private respondent their sole and exclusive bargaining

G.R. No. 97020 June 8, 1992
CALIFORNIA MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE UNDERSECRETARY OF LABOR BIENVENIDO E.
LAGUESMA, ABD FEDERATION OF FREE WORKERS (FFW),
CALIFORNIA MFG. CORP. SUPERVISORS UNION CHAPTER
(CALMASUCO), respondents.
This is a petition for review on certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction
and/or temporary restraining order seeking to annul and set aside the (a)
resolution * of the Department of Labor and Employment dated October 16,
1990 in OS-A-10-283-90 (NCR-OD-M-90-05-095) entitled "In Re: Petition for
Certification Election Among the Supervisors of California Manufacturing
Corporation, Federation of Free Workers (FFW) California Mfg. Corp.
Supervisors Union Chapter (CALMASUCO), petitioner-appellee, California
Manufacturing Corporation, employer-appellant" which denied herein
petitioner's appeal and affirmed the order of Med-Arbiter Arsenia Q. Ocampo
dated August 22, 1990 directing the conduct of a certification election among
the supervisory employees of California Manufacturing Corporation, and (b)
the Order ** of the same Department denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
As culled from the records, the following facts appear undisputed:
On May 24, 1990, a petition for certification election among the supervisors of
California Manufacturing Corporation (CMC for brevity) was filed by the
Federation of Free Workers (FFW) — California Manufacturing Corporation
Supervisors Union Chapter (CALMASUCO), alleging inter alia, that it is a duly
registered federation with registry certificate no. 1952-TTT-IP, while FFW-
CALMASUCO Chapter is a duly registered chapter with registry certificate no.
1-AFBI-038 issued on May 21, 1990 (Annex "A", Rollo, p. 63); that the
employer CMC employs one hundred fifty (150) supervisors; that there is no
recognized supervisors union existing in the company; that the petition is filed
in accordance with Article 257 of the Labor Code, as amended by Republic Act
No. 6715; and that the petition is nevertheless supported by a substantial
member of signatures of the employees concerned (Annexes "E" and "F", Ibid.,
pp. 28-29).
In its answer, CMC, now petitioner herein, alleged among others, that the
petition for the holding of a certification election should be denied as it is not
supported by the required twenty-five percent (25%) of all its supervisors and
that a big number of the supposed signatories to the petition are not actually
supervisors as they have no subordinates to supervise, nor do they have the
powers and functions which under the law would classify them as supervisors
(Annex "D", Ibid., P. 25).
On July 24. 1990, FFW—CALMASUCO filed its reply maintaining that under
the law, when there is no existing unit yet in a particular bargaining unit at the
time a petition for certification election is filed, the 25% rule on the signatories
does not apply; that the "organized establishment" contemplated by law does
not refer to a "company"per se but rather refers to a "bargaining unit" which
may be of different classifications in a single company; that CMC has at least
two (2) different bargaining units, namely, the supervisory (unorganized) and
the rank-and-file (organized); that the signatories to the petition have been
performing supervisory functions; that since it is CMC which promoted them to
the positions, of supervisors. it is already estopped from claiming that they are
not supervisors; that the said supervisors were excluded from the coverage of
the collective bargaining agreement of its rank-and-file employees; and that
the contested signatories are indeed supervisors as shown in the "CMC
Master List of Employees" of January 2, 1990 and the CMS Publication (Annex
"G", Ibid., p 30).
On August 12, 1990, the Med-Arbiter issued an order, the decretal portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby ordered that
a certification election be conducted among the supervisory
employees of California Manufacturing Corporation within
twenty (20) days from receipt hereof with the usual pre-election
conference of the parties to thresh out the mechanics of the
 election The payroll of the company three (3) months prior to
the filing of the petition shall be used as the basis in
determining the list of eligible voters.
The choices are:
1. Federation of Free Workers (FFW) California
Manufacturing Corporation Supervisors Union
Chapter (CALMASUCO); and
2. No union.
SO ORDERED. (Annex "H" Ibid., p. 33).
CMC thereafter appealed to the Department of Labor and Employment which,
however, affirmed the above order in its assailed resolution dated October 16,
1990 (Annex, "B", Ibid, a 18) CMC's subsequent motion for reconsideration
was also denied in its order dated November 17, 1990 (Annex "A", Ibid., p. 15),
hence, his petition.
a) whether or not the term "unorganized establishment' in
Article 257 of the tabor Code refers to a bargaining unit or a
business establishment;
b) whether or not non-supervisors can participate in a
supervisor's certification election; and
c) whether or not the two (2) different and separate plants of
herein petitioner in Parañaque and Las Piñas can be treated as
a single bargaining unit.
The petition must be denied.
The Court has already categorically ruled that Article 257 of the Labor code is
applicable to unorganized labor organizations and not to establishments where
there exists a certified bargaining agent which had previously entered into a
collective bargaining agreement with the management (Associated Labor
Unions [ALU] v. Calleja, G.R. No. 85085, November 6, 1989, 179 SCRA 127)
(Emphasis supplied). Otherwise stated, the establishment concerned must
have no certified bargaining agent (Associated Labor Unions [ALU] v. Calleja
G.R. No. 82260, July 19, 1989, 175 SCRA 490). In the instant case, it is
beyond cavil that the supervisors of CMC which constitute a bargaining unit
separate and distinct from that of the rank-and-file, have no such agent. thus
they correctly filed a petition for certification election thru union FFW-
CALMASUCO, likewise indubitably a legitimate labor organization. CMC's
insistence on the 25% subscription requirement, is clearly immaterial. The
same has been expressly deleted by Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6715 and
is presently prescribed only in organized establishments, that is, those with
existing bargaining agents. Compliance with the said requirement need not
even be established with absolute certainty. The Court has consistently ruled
that "even conceding that the statutory requirement of 30% (now 25%) of the
labor force asking for a certification election had not been strictly compiled
with, the Director (now the Med-Arbiter) is still empowered to order that it be
held precisely for the purpose of ascertaining which of the contending labor
organizations shall be the exclusive collective bargaining agent (Atlas Free
Workers Union (AFWU)-PSSLU Local v. Noriel, G.R. No. L-51905, May 26,
1981, 104 SCRA 565). The requirement then is relevant only when it
becomes mandatory to conduct a certification election. In all other instances,
the discretion, according to the rulings of this Tribunal, ought to be ordinarily
exercised in favor of a petition for certification (National Mines and Allied
Workers Union (NAMAWU-UIF) v. Luna, et al., G.R. No. L-46722, June 15,
1978, 83 SCRA 607).
In any event, CMC as employer has no standing to question a certification
election (Asian Design and Manufacturing Corporation v. Calleja, et al., G.R.
No. 77415, June 29, 1989, 174 SCRA 477). Such is the sole concern of the
workers. The only exception is where the employer has to file the petition for
certification election pursuant to Article 259 (now 258) of the Labor Code
because it was requested to bargain collectively. Thereafter, the role of the
employer in the certification process ceases. The employer becomes merely a
bystander. Oft-quoted is the pronouncement of the Court on management
interference in certification elections, thus:
On matters that should be the exclusive concern of labor, the
choice of a collective bargaining representative, the employer
is definitely an intruder, His participation, to say the least,
deserves no encouragement. This Court should be the last
agency to lend support to such an attempt at interference with
purely internal affair of labor. (Trade Unions of the Philippines
and Allied Services (TUPAS) v. Trajano. G.R. No. L-61153
January 17, 1983, 120 SCRA 64 citing Consolidated Farms,
Inc. v. Noriel, G.R No. L-47752 July 31, 1978, 84 SCRA 469,
473).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is DISMISSED for utter lack of
merit.SO ORDERED
G.R. No. L-24993 December 18, 1968
UNITED RESTAUROR'S EMPLOYEES & LABOR UNION-PAFLU, petitioner,
vs.
HON. GUILLERMO E. TORRES, as Presiding Judge of Branch VIII, Court
of First Instance of Rizal, 7th Judicial District, and the DELTA
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.
Certiorari to annul the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the Court of First
Instance of Rizal ordering United Restauror's Employees & Labor Union-
PAFLU (Union, for short), its attorneys, representatives, agents and any
person assisting it to "REFRAIN from picketing on the property of plaintiff Delta
Development Corporation within the Makati Commercial Center."
The case arose from a verified complaint for injunction with prayer for
preliminary injunction filed by Delta Development Corporation (Delta), against
the Union on January 16, 1965. 1 It is there averred that: Delta is the owner of
the Makati Commercial Center situated at Makati, Rizal. It is in the business of
leasing portions thereof. The center has its own thoroughfares, pedestrian
lanes, parking areas for the benefit of customers and clients of its lessees. On
the other hand, the Union is an association of some employees of Sulo
Restaurant, a lessee of Delta. On January 8, 1965, the Union sought
permission from Delta to conduct picketing activities "on the private property of
plaintiff surrounding Sulo Restaurant." On January 11, Delta denied the
request because it "may be held liable for any incident that may happen in the
picket lines, since the picketing would be conducted on the private property
owned by plaintiff." Despite the denial, the Union picketed on Delta's property
surrounding Sulo Restaurant on January 16 and continued to conduct said
activity. Such act of the Union is violative of the property rights of, and would
cause great and irreparable injury to, Delta. No employer-employee
relationship exists between Delta and the Union members. Delta then prayed
that a writ of preliminary injunction issue and that, after hearing, such
injunction be made permanent.
As aforesaid, respondent judge issued a writ of preliminary injunction. The
Union's move to reconsider was denied on January 26, 1965.
On January 19, 1965, the Union filed a motion to dismiss on the ground, inter
alia, that the court had no jurisdiction to try the case.
Without awaiting resolution of its motion to dismiss the Union commenced in
this Court the present original petition for certiorari on September 18, 1965,
claiming that respondent judge acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction in
issuing the injunctive writ "as no restraining order could be validly issued
against the right to picket as part of freedom of speech"; that respondent judge
issued the questioned writ "without the benefit of a previous hearing"; that it
was issued in violation of Section 9(d) of Republic Act 875; that jurisdiction
over the case rests with the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) "for the same
involves acts of unfair labor practice under Sec. 4(a) of Republic Act 875 in
connection with Sec. 5(a) thereof"; and that there is no appeal nor any plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
On September 29, 1965, this Court issued a writ of preliminary injunction upon
the Union's P1,000.00-bond.
On October 12, 1965, Delta answered. It alleged, amongst others, that
respondent judge validly issued the injunctive writ in question because the
same "never enjoined petitioner from picketing against the Sulo-D & E, Inc. but
only from doing their picketing on the private property of respondent who is not
in any way privy to the relationship between Sulo-D & E, Inc. and petitioner";
that Republic Act 875 is not applicable to the case involving as it does an
action to protect Delta's property rights; that it has no labor relation or dispute
of any kind with the Union; and that the injunctive writ was issued after due
hearing on January 19, 1965. Delta asked that the present petition be denied.
After the submission of the parties' memoranda in lieu of oral argument, Delta
moved to dismiss the proceeding at bar on the ground that it has become moot
and academic. It averred that the Union lost in the consent election conducted
by the Department of Labor on October 4, 1965 in CIR Cases 1455-MC and
1464-MC, and thereby also lost its right to picket; and that in said election
cases, a rival union — Sulo Employees Labor Union (SELU, for short) was —
certified by CIR as the exclusive bargaining representative of all the
employees of Sulo Restaurant pursuant to CIR's order of December 23, 1965.
The Union opposed. It argued that the picketing was conducted on or about
January 16, 1965, that is, around 8 months before the consent election on
October 4, 1965; and that the issues that triggered the Union's labor strike of
January 16, 1965 are entirely distinct and foreign to the issues in Cases 1455-
MC and 1464-MC.
The petition must be dismissed. Really, the case before us has become moot
and academic.
When the Union struck and picketed on January 16, 1965, it might have been
true that the Union commanded a majority of Sulo's employees. Without need
of certification, it could, under such circumstances, conclude a collective
bargaining agreement with Sulo. 2 But it is not disputed that on October 4,
1965, i.e., shortly after this case was filed on September 18, 1965, a consent
election was held. Not controverted, too, is the fact that, in that consent
election, SELU defeated the Union, petitioner herein. Because of this, SELU
was certified to the Sulo management as the "collective bargaining
representative of the employees ... for collective bargaining purposes as
regards wages, hours of work, rates of pay and/or such other terms and
conditions of employment allowed them by law." 3
The consent election, it should be noted, was ordered by CIR pursuant to the
Union's petition for direct certification docketed as Case 1455-MC and a similar
petition for certification filed by SELU docketed as Case 1464-MC. Verily, the
Union can no longer demand collective bargaining. For, it became the minority
union. As matters stand, said right properly belongs to SELU, which
commands the majority. By law, the right to be the exclusive representative of
all the employees in an appropriate collective bargaining unit is vested in the
labor union "designated or selected" for such purpose "by the majority of the
employees" in the unit concerned. 4 SELU has the right as well as the obligation
to hear, voice out and seek remedies for the grievances of all Sulo employees,
including employees who are members of petitioner Union, regarding the
"rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of
employment."
Indeed, petitioner Union's concerted activities designed to be recognized as
the exclusive bargaining agent of Sulo employees must come to a
halt.5 Collective bargaining cannot be the appropriate objective of petitioning
Union's continuation of their concerted activities. The record before us does
not reveal any other legitimate purpose. To allow said Union to continue
picketing for the purpose of drawing the employer to the collective bargaining
table would obviously be to disregard the results of the consent election. To
further permit the Union's picketing activities would be to flaunt at the will of the
majority.
The outcome of a consent election cannot be rendered meaningless by a
minority group of employees who had themselves invoked the procedure to
settle the dispute. Those who voted in the consent election against the labor
union that was eventually certified are hidebound to the results thereof. Logic
is with this view. By their very act of participating in the election, they are
deemed to have acquiesced to whatever is the consequence of the election.
As to those who did not participate in the election, the accepted theory is that
they "are presumed to assent to the expressed will of the majority of those
voting."6
Adherence to the methods laid down by statute for the settlement of industrial
strife is one way of achieving industrial peace; one such method is certification
election.7 It is the intent and purpose of the law that this procedure, when
adopted and availed of by parties to labor controversies, should end industrial
disputes, not continue them.8 Pertinent is the following observation to which we
fully concur: "Before an election is held by the Board 9 to determine which of
two rival unions represents a majority of the employees, one of the unions may
call a strike and demand that the employer bargain with it. A labor dispute will
then exist. Nothing in the statute makes it illegal for a minority to strike and
thereby seek to obtain sufficient strength so as to become the sole bargaining
agent. But after the Board certifies the bargaining representative, a strike by a
minority union to compel an employer to bargain with it is unlawful. No labor
dispute can exist between a minority union and an employer in such a case."10
Upon the law then, the Union's right to strike and consequently to picket
ceased by its defeat in the consent election. That election occurred during the
pendency before this Court of this original petition for certiorari lodged by the
Union the thrust of which is to challenge the power of the Court of First
Instance to enjoin its picketing activities. The Union may not continue to picket.
The object of the case before us is lost.
WE, ACCORDINGLY, vote to dismiss the petition for certiorari as moot and
academic, and to dissolve the writ of preliminary injunction we heretofore
issued herein, for being functus oficio.
No costs. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-56902 September 21, 1982
CONFEDERATION OF CITIZENS LABOR UNIONS (CCLU) and REDSON
EMPLOYEES AND LABORERS ASSOCIATION, petitioners,
vs.
Hon. CARMELO C. NORIEL, Officer-in-Charge of the Bureau of Labor
Relations, MARGARITA C. ENRIQUEZ, Election Supervisor of the Ministry
of Labor and Employment, ASSOCIATED LABOR UNIONS (ALU) and
REDSON TEXTILE MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, respondents.
These special civil actions of certiorari and prohibition deal with the alleged
irregular holding of a certification election.
Petitioner Confederation of Labor Unions (CCLU) was one of the four unions
wanting to be certified as the collective bargaining representative of the
employees in the Redson Textile Manufacturing Corporation with place of
business at Brixton Hill Street, Capitolyo, Pasig, Metro Manila. Its co-petitioner,
the Redson Employees and Laborers Association, is a CCLU local in the said
corporation.
The other unions aspiring to become the collective bargaining representative
were the National Union of Garments Textile and General Workers of the
Philippines (GATCORD) the National Trade Union (NATU) and the Associated
Labor Unions (ALU).
On August 7, 1980, a certification election was held in the premises of the
corporation from eight-twenty in the morning to five-thirty in the afternoon. Out
of the 831 votes cast, CCLU garnered 356 votes; ALU 338 votes; NATU, 82
votes and GATCORD 42 votes. Eight votes were spoiled and five votes were
challenged or segregated.
As no union obtained a majority vote, CCLU and ALU, which had the two
largest number of votes, agreed in a pre-election conference on September 2,
1980 that a run-off election would be held on November 6, 1980 from six
o'clock in the morning to six o'clock in the evening. CCLU requested that the
certification election be conducted for two days but ALU objected to that
request.
On November 6, 1980, Margarita C. Enriquez, Reynaldo F. de Luna and one
Francisco, three election supervisors from the Ministry of Labor and
Employment, arrived at around seven o'clock in the morning near the Redson
Textile compound but they were not allowed by the security guard to enter the
company premises in spite of the heavy rain. So, after consulting through the
phone with their chief, a certain Attorney Padilla. the said election supervisors
decided to hold the certification election "outside the premises of the company
in a small store outside of the annex building" (Annex C, Rollo, p. 27). They
used as ballot box "an improvised carton box." The union representatives did
not object to the improvised polling place and ballot box.
Voting started at eleven o'clock. During the election and just before it was
closed at six-thirty in the evening, the ALU representative, Sebastian P. Taneo,
executed a written protest or manifestation, alleging that the management of
Redson Textile did not allow the run-off election to be held within its premises;
that the company prevented fifty percent of the workers from voting by not
allowing them to get out of the company premises and inducing them to work
overtime; that its security guards "manhandled" the ALU vice-president and
that their "active intervention" caused "chaos and confusion" for around thirty
minutes; that the company refused to furnish election paraphernalia like the
polling place and the ballot box and that the election supervisors declared the
election closed in spite of ALU's objection.
Taneo prayed that the votes should not be counted, that another day be
scheduled for the continuation of the election and that the company be ordered
to allow its workers to vote (Rollo pp. 29-35).
At around seven-thirty in the evening, the votes cast were canvassed. Of the
692 votes cast, ALU got 366 votes as against CCLU's 313 votes, or a margin
of 53 votes. There were 1,010 voters. Because ALU won, its representative,
Taneo, withdrew his protest or manifestation by writing on the minutes of the
proceeding that his protest or manifestation was withdrawn "before the close of
the proceedings". On the other hand, the CCLU representatives refused to
sign the minutes of the election.
On the following day, November 7, CCLU through its representative, Juan L.
Fresnoza filed with the Bureau of Labor Relations a protest wherein he prayed
that the November 6 certification election as well as the "continuation of the
election" on November 7 be annulled.
Fresnoza alleged that the previous day's certification election was irregular and
disorderly because (a) no booths were provided for by the company; (b) the
election started much later than the hour agreed upon by the parties, and (c)
ALU distributed white T-shirts printed with "ALU TAYO", gave free tricycle rides
to ALU voters and hired around fifteen husky men and around twenty-five
women who "forced" voters to vote for ALU.
According to Fresnoza, when he and Oscar Sanchez, the acting president of
Redson Employees and Laborers Association (RELA-CCLU), protested
against those activities before election supervisor Margarita C, Enriquez, the
latter allegedly retorted, "Wala akong magagawa, magagalit na naman si Mr.
Taneo" (,Rollo, pp. 36-37).
On November 10, 1980, Fresnoza and Sanchez filed with the Bureau of labor
Relations a joint affidavit attesting to what transpired during the certification
election as alleged in the aforesaid protest and added therein that when they
protested before the election supervisors, the latter told them to "place their
protest in writing so that they (supervisors) could consolidate the protests in
their election report" (Rollo, pp. 38-39).
On February 19, 1981, CCLU informed the Bureau of Labor Relations that the
election was conducted without regard to the provisions of section 6, Rule VI,
Book V of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code.
Carmelo C. Noriel, Officer-in-Charge of the Bureau of Labor Relations, in his
resolution of February 26, 1981, dismissed CCLU's protest for lack of merit. He
observed that CCLU failed to submit the pleadings and evidences required in
the hearing on January 19, 1981 and that CCLU failed to file a protest either
"before or during the election proceeding" and, therefore, pursuant to section
3, Rule VI, Book V of the aforementioned rules, CCLU is deemed to have
waived its right to protest.
Noriel in his resolution of March 26, 1981, denying CCLU's motion for
reconsideration, certified ALU as the exclusive bargaining representative of the
employees in Redson Textile Manufacturing Corporation.
On June 6, 1981 CCLU and RELA-CCLU filed the instant petition for certiorari
and prohibition to annul the certification election. They complained that the
certification election was conducted in violation of the following provisions of
Rule VI, Book V of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code:
SEC. 6. Duties of representation officer.— Before the actual voting
commences the representation officer shall inspect the polling place, the ballot
boxes, and the polling booths to insure secrecy of balloting. The parties shall
be given opportunity to witness the inspection proceedings. After the
examination of the ballot box, the representation officer shall lock it with three
keys one of which he shall keep and the rest forthwith given one each to the
employer's representative and the representative of the labor organization. If
more than one union is involved, the holder of the third shall be determined by
drawing of lots. The key shall remain in the possession of the representation
officer and the parties during the entire proceedings and thereafter until all the
controversies concerning the conduct of the election shall have been definitely
resolved.
The Solicitor General in his comment contends that the certification election
should be upheld because CCLU, by not filing a protest with the election
supervisor before the close of the election proceeding, waived its right to
protest (Sec. 3, Rule VI, Book V of Implementing Rules and Regulations).
We hold that the certification election is invalid because of certain irregularities
such as that (1) the workers on the night shift (ten p.m. to six a.m.) and some
of those in the afternoon shift were not able to vote, so much so that out of
1,010 voters only 692 voted and about 318 failed to vote (p. 88, Rollo); (2) the
secrecy of the ballot was not safeguarded; (3) the election supervisors were
remiss in their duties and were apparently "intimidated" by a union
representative and (4) the participating unions were overzealous in wooing the
employees to vote in their favor by resorting to such tactics as giving free
tricycle rides and T-shirts.
The purpose of a certification election is to give the employees "true
representation in their collective bargaining with an employer" (51 C.J.S. 969).
That purpose was not achieved in the run-off election because many
employees or union members were not able to vote and the employer, through
apathy or deliberate intent, did not render assistance in the holding of the
election.
It should be noted that ALU's written protest (later withdrawn) was based on
the same grounds invoked by CCLU in its protest. That fact alone should have
alerted Noriel to disregard the technicality that CCLU's protest was not filed on
time.
WHEREFORE, the resolutions of the Officer-in-Charge of the Bureau of Labor
Relations dated February 26 and March 19, 1981 are hereby set aside.
Another run-off certification election should be conducted inside the premises
of Redson Textile Manufacturing Corporation. The management is ordered to
allow all its employees to participate in the certification election and to assist in
the holding of an orderly election. The election supervisors or representation
officers are also enjoined to fulfill their duties under the Labor Code and the
rules and regulations implementing the same.
The facts of the case are as follows:
On November 12, 1988, a certification election was conducted among the
rank-and-file employees of the Hijo Plantation, Inc. resulting in the choice of
"no union." However, on July 3, 1989, on allegations that the company
intervened in the election, the Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations
nullified the results of the certification election and ordered a new one to be
held.
The new election was held on August 20, 1989 under the supervision of the DOLE
Regional Office in Davao City with the following results:
Total Votes cast 1,012
Associated Trade Unions (ATU) 39

RUST KILUSAN 5
SO ORDERED
National Federation of Labor (NFL) 876
G.R. No. 104556 March 19, 1998
Southern Philippines Federation of Labor 4
NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR (NFL), petitioner,
vs. SANDIGAN 6
THE SECRETARY OF LABOR OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
UFW 15
AND HIJO PLANTATION INC., (HPI), respondents.
No Union 55
Petitioner NFL (National Federation of Labor) was chosen the bargaining agent
of rank-and-file employees of the Hijo Plantation Inc. (HPI) in Mandaum, Invalid 13
Tagum, Davao del Norte at a certification election held on August 20, 1989.
Protests filed by the company and three other unions against the results of the
election were denied by the Department of Labor and Employment in its The Trust Union Society and Trade Workers-KILUSAN (TRUST-Kilusan), the
resolution dated February 14, 1991 but, on motion of the company (HPI), the United Lumber and General Workers of the Philippines (ULGWP), the Hijo
DOLE reconsidered its resolution and ordered another certification election to Labor Union and the Hijo Plantation, Inc. sought the nullification of the results
be held. The DOLE subsequently denied petitioner NFL's motion for of the certification election on the ground that it was conducted despite the
reconsideration. pendency of the appeals filed by Hijo Labor Union and ULGWP from the order,
dated August 17, 1989, of the Med-Arbiter denying their motion for
intervention. On the other hand, HPI claimed that it was not informed or
The present petition is for certiorari to set aside orders of the Secretary of
properly represented at the pre-election conference. It alleged that, if it was
Labor and Employment dated August 29, 1991, December 26, 1991 and
represented at all in the pre-election conference, its representative acted
February 17, 1992, ordering the holding of a new certification election to be
beyond his authority and without its knowledge. Private respondent also
conducted in place of the one held on August 20, 1989 and, for this purpose,
alleged that the certification election was marred by massive fraud and
reversing its earlier resolution dated February 14, 1991 dismissing the election
irregularities and that out of 1,692 eligible voters, 913, representing 54% of the
protests of private respondent and the unions.
rank-and-file workers of private respondent, were not able to vote, resulting in
a failure of election.
On January 10, 1990, Acting Labor Secretary Dionisio dela Serna directed the
Med-Arbiter, Phibun D. Pura, to investigate the company's claim that 54% of
the rank-and-file workers were not able to vote in the certification election.
In his Report and Recommendation, dated February 9, 1990, Pura stated:
1. A majority of the rank-and-file workers had been disfranchised in the election
of August 20, 1989 because of confusion caused by the announcement of the
company that the election had been postponed in view of the appeals of
ULGWP and Hijo Labor Union (HLU) from the order denying their motions for
intervention. In addition, the election was held on a Sunday which was non-
working day in the company.
2. There were irregularities committed in the conduct of the election. It was
possible that some people could have voted for those who did not show up.
The election was conducted in an open and hot area. The secrecy of the ballot
had been violated. Management representatives were not around to identify
the workers.
3. The total number of votes cast, as duly certified by the representation officer,
did not tally with the 41-page listings submitted to the Med-Arbitration Unit. The
list contained 1,008 names which were checked or encircled (indicating that
they had voted) and 784 which were not, (indicating that they did not vote), or
a total of 1,792. but according to the representation officer the total votes cast
in the election was 1,012.
Med-Arbiter Pura reported that he interviewed eleven employees who claimed
that they were not able to vote and who were surprised to know that their
names had been checked to indicate that they had voted.
But NFL wrote a letter to Labor Secretary Ruben Torres complaining that it had
not been informed of the investigation conducted by Med-Arbiter Pura and so
was not heard on its evidence. For this reason, the Med-Arbiter was directed
by the Labor Secretary to hear interested parties.
The Med-Arbiter therefore summoned the unions. TRUST-Kilusan reiterated its
petition for the annulment of the results of the certification election. Hijo Labor
Union manifested that it was joining private respondent HPI's appeal, adopting
as its own the documentary evidence presented by the company, showing
fraud in the election of August 20, 1989. On the other hand, petitioner NFL
reiterated its contention that management had no legal personality to file an
appeal because it was not a party to the election but was only a bystander
which did not even extend assistance in the election. Petitioner denied that
private respondent HPI was not represented in the pre-election conference,
because the truth was that a certain Bartolo was present on behalf of the
management and he in fact furnished the DOLE copies of the list of
employees, and posted in the company premises notices of the certification
election.
Petitioner NFL insisted that more than majority of the workers voted in the
election. It claimed that out of 1,692 qualified voters, 1,012 actually voted and
only 680 failed to cast their vote. It charged management with resorting to all
kinds of manipulation to frustrate the election and make the "Non Union" win.
In a resolution dated February 14, 1991, the DOLE upheld the August 20, 1989
certification election. With respect to claim that election could not be held in
view of the pendency of the appeals of the ULGWP and Hijo Labor Union from
the order of the Med-Arbiter denying their motions for intervention, the DOLE
said: 1
. . . even before the conduct of the certification election on 12
November 1988 which was nullified, Hijo Labor Union filed a motion for
interventions. The same was however, denied for being filed
unseasonably, and as a result it was not included as one of the choices
in the said election. After it has been so disqualified thru an order
which has become final and executory, ALU filed a second motion for
intervention when a second balloting was ordered conducted. Clearly,
said second motion is proforma and intended to delay the proceedings.
Being so, its appeal from the order of denial did not stay the election
and the Med-Arbiter was correct and did not violate any rule when he
proceeded with the election even with the appeal. In fact, the Med-
Arbiter need not rule on the motion as it has already been disposed of
with finality.
The same is true with the motion for intervention of ULGWP. The latter
withdrew as a party to the election on September 1988 and its motion
to withdraw was granted by the Med-Arbiter on October motion for
intervention filed before the conduct of a second balloting where the
choices has already been pre-determined.
 Let it be stressed that ULGWP and HLU were disqualified to participate
in the election through valid orders that have become final and
executory even before the first certification election was conducted.
Consequently, they may not be allowed to disrupt the proceeding
through the filing of nuisance motions. Much less are they possessed
of the legal standing to question the results of the second election
considering that they are not parties thereto.
The DOLE gave no weight to the report of the Med-Arbiter that the certification
election was marred by massive fraud and irregularities. Although affidavits
were submitted showing that the election was held outside the company
premises and private vehicles were used as makeshift precincts, the DOLE
found that this was because respondent company did not allow the use of its
premises for the purpose of holding the election, company guards were
allegedly instructed not to allow parties, voters and DOLE representation
officers to enter the company premises, and notice was posted on the door of
the company that the election had been postponed.
Nor was weight given to the findings of the Med-Arbiter that a majority of the
rank-and-file workers had been disfranchised in the August 20, 1989 election
and that the secrecy of the ballot had been violated, first, because the NFL
was not given notice of the investigation nor the chance to present its evidence
to dispute this finding and, second, the Med Arbiter's report was not supported
by the minutes of the proceedings nor by any record of the interviews of the
315 workers. Moreover, it was pointed out that the report did not state the
names of the persons investigated, the questions asked and the answers
given. The DOLE held that the report was "totally baseless."
The resolution of February 14, 1991 concluded with a reiteration of the rule
that the choice of the exclusive bargaining representative is the sole concern
of the workers. It said: "If indeed there were irregularities committed during the
election, the contending unions should have been the first to complain
considering that they are the ones which have interest that should be
protected." 2
Accordingly, the Labor Secretary denied the petition to annul the election filed
by the ULGWP, TRUST-KILUSAN, HLU and the HPI and instead certified
petitioner NFL as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of the rank-
and-file employees of private respondent HPI.
However, on motion of HPI, the Secretary of Labor, on August 29, 1991,
reversed his resolution of February 14, 1991. Petitioner NFL filed a motion for
reconsideration but its motion was denied in an order, dated December 26,
1991. Petitioner's second motion for reconsideration was likewise denied in
another order dated February 17, 1992. Hence, this petition.
First. Petitioner contends that certification election is the sole concern of the
employees and the employer is a mere bystander. The only instance wherein
the employer may actively participate is when it files a petition for certification
election under Art. 258 of the Labor Code because it is requested to bargain
collectively. Petitioner says that this is not the case here and so the DOLE
should not have given due course to private respondent's petition for
annulment of the results of the certification election.
In his resolution of August 29, 1991, the Secretary of Labor said he was
reversing his earlier resolution because "workers of Hijo Plantation, Inc. have
deluged this Office with their letter-appeal, either made singly or collectively
expressing their wish to have a new certification election conducted" and that
as a result "the firm position we held regarding the integrity of the electoral
exercise had been somewhat eroded by this recent declaration of the workers,
now speaking in their sovereign capacity."
It is clear from this, that what the DOLE Secretary considered in reversing its
earlier rulings was not the petition of the employer but the letter-appeals that
the employees sent to his office denouncing the irregularities committed during
the August 20, 1989 certification election. The petition of private respondent
was simply the occasion for the employees to voice their protests against the
election. Private respondent HPI attached to its Supplemental Appeal filed on
September 5, 1989 the affidavits and appeals of more or less 784 employees
who claimed that they had been disfranchised, as a result of which they were
not able to cast their votes at the August 20, 1989 election. It was the protests
of employees which moved the DOLE to reconsider its previous resolution of
February 14, 1991, upholding the election.
Nor is it improper for private respondent to show interest in the conduct of the
election. Private respondent is the employer. The manner in which the election
was held could make the difference between industrial strife and industrial
harmony in the company. What an employer is prohibited from doing is to
interfere with the conduct of the certification election for the purpose of
influencing its outcome. But certainly an employer has an abiding interest in
seeing to it that the election is clean, peaceful, orderly and credible.
Second. The petitioner argues that any protest concerning the election should
be registered and entered into the minutes of the election proceedings before it
can be considered. In addition, the protest should be formalized by filing it
within five (5) days. Petitioner avers that these requirements are condition
precedents in the filing of an appeal. Without these requisites the appeal
cannot prosper. It cites the following provisions of Book V, Rule VI of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor Code:
Sec. 3. Representation officer may rule on any on-the-spot question.
— The Representation officer may rule on any on-the-spot question
arising from the conduct of the election. The interested party may
however, file a protest with the representation officer before the close
of the proceedings.
Protests not so raised are deemed waived. Such protests shall be
contained in the minutes of the proceedings.
Sec. 4. Protest to be decided in twenty (20) working days. — Where
the protest is formalized before the med-arbiter within five (5) days
after the close of the election proceedings, the med-arbiter shall decide
the same within twenty (20) working days from the date of its
formalization. If not formalized within the prescribed period, the protest
shall be deemed dropped. The decision may be appealed to the
Bureau in the same manner and on the same grounds as provided
under Rule V.
In this case, petitioner maintains that private respondent did not make any
protest regarding the alleged irregularities (e.g., massive disfranchisement of
employees) during the election. Hence, the appeal and motions for
reconsideration of private respondent HPI should have been dismissed
summarily.
The complaint in this case was that a number of employees were not able to
cast their votes because they were not properly notified of the date. They could
not therefore have filed their protests within five (5) days. At all events, the
Solicitor General states, that the protests were not filed within five (5) days, is
a mere technicality which should not be allowed to prevail over the workers'
welfare. 3 As this Court stressed in LVN Pictures, Inc. v. Phil. Musicians
Guild, 4 it is essential that the employees must be accorded an opportunity to
freely and intelligently determine which labor organization shall act in their
behalf. The workers in this case were denied this opportunity. Not only were a
substantial number of them disfranchised, there were, in addition, allegations
of fraud and other irregularities which put in question the integrity of the
election. Workers wrote letters and made complaints protesting the conduct of
the election. The Report of Med-Arbiter Pura who investigated these
allegations found the allegations of fraud and irregularities to be true.
In one case this Court invalidated a certification election upon a showing of
disfranchisement, lack of secrecy in the voting and bribery. 5 We hold the
same in this case. The workers' right to self-organization as enshrined in both
the Constitution and Labor Code would be rendered nugatory if their right to
choose their collective bargaining representative were denied. Indeed, the
policy of the Labor Code favors the holding of a certification election as the
most conclusive way of choosing the labor organization to represent workers in
a collective bargaining unit. 6 In case of doubt, the doubt should be resolved in
favor of the holding of a certification election.
Third. Petitioner claims that the contending unions, namely, the Association of
Trade Union (ATU), the Union of Filipino Workers (UFW), as well as the
representation officers of the DOLE affirmed the regularity of the conduct of the
election and they are now estopped from questioning the election.
In its comment, ATU-TUCP states,
. . . The representative of the Association of Trade Unions really attest
to the fact that we cannot really identify all the voters who voted on that
election except some workers who were our supporters in the absence
of Hijo Plantation representatives. We also attest that the polling
precinct were not conducive to secrecy of the voters since it was
conducted outside of the Company premises. The precincts were (sic)
the election was held were located in a passenger waiting shed infront
of the canteen across the road; on the yellow pick-up; at the back of a
car; a waiting shed near the Guard House and a waiting shed infront of
the Guard House across the road. Herein private respondents also
observed during the election that there were voters who dictated some
voters the phrase "number 3" to those who were casting their votes
and those who were about to vote. Number 3 refers to the National
Federation of Labor in the official ballot.
ATU-TUCP explains that it did not file any protest because it expected workers
who had been aggrieved by the conduct of the election would file their protest
since it was in their interests that they do so.
Fourth. Petitioner points out that the letter-appeals were written almost two
years after the election and they bear the same dates (May 7 and June 14,
1991); they are not verified; they do not contain details or evidence of
intelligent acts; and they do not explain why the writers failed to vote. Petitioner
contends that the letter-appeals were obtained through duress by the
company.

We find the allegations to be without merit. The records shows that as early as
August 22 and 30, 1989, employees already wrote letters/affidavits/
manifestoes alleging irregularities in the elections and disfranchisement of
workers. 7 As the Solicitor General says in his Comment, 8 these affidavits and
manifestoes, which were attached as Annexes "A" to "CC" and Annexes "DD"
to "DD-33" to private respondent's Supplemental Petition of September 5,
1989 — just 16 days after the August 20, 1989 election. It is not true therefore
that the employees slept on their rights.

As to the claim that letters dated May 7, 1991 and June 14, 1991 bear these
same dates because they were prepared by private respondent HPI and
employees were merely asked to sign them, suffice it to say that this is plain
speculation which petitioner has not proven by competent evidence.

As to the letters not being verified, suffice it to say that technical rules of
evidence are not binding in labor cases.

The allegation that the letters did not contain evidence of intelligent acts does
not have merit. The earlier letters 9 of the workers already gave details of what
they had witnessed during the election, namely the open balloting (with no
secrecy), and the use of NFL vehicles for polling precinct. These letters
sufficiently give an idea of the irregularities of the certification election.
Similarly, the letters containing the signatures of those who were not able to
vote are sufficient. They indicate that the writers were not able to vote because
they thought the election had been postponed, especially given the fact that
the two unions had pending appeals at the time from orders denying them the
right to intervene in the election.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED and the questioned

orders of the Secretary of Labor and Employment are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.