G.R. No.

152072 January 31, 2006

ROMEO G. ROXAS and SANTIAGO N. PASTOR, Petitioners,

vs.
ANTONIO DE ZUZUARREGUI, JR., ENRIQUE DE ZUZUARREGUI, PACITA JAVIER, ELIZABETH R. GONZALES, JOSEFINA R. DAZA, ELIAS REYES,
NATIVIDAD REYES, TERESITA REYES, JOSE REYES and ANTONIO REYES, Respondents.

x----------------------------------x

G.R. No. 152104 January 31, 2006

ANTONIO DE ZUZUARREGUI, JR., ENRIQUE DE ZUZUARREGUI, PACITA JAVIER, ELIZABETH R. GONZALES, JOSEFINA R. DAZA, ELIAS REYES,
NATIVIDAD REYES, TERESITA REYES, JOSE REYES and ANTONIO REYES, Petitioners,
vs.
THE NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, JOSE B. H. PEDROSA, ROMEO G. ROXAS and SANTIAGO N. PASTOR, Respondents.

The instant cases had their beginnings in 1977 when the National Housing Authority (NHA) filed expropriation proceedings against the
Zuzuarreguis, petitioners in G.R. No. 152104, for parcels of land belonging to the latter situated in Antipolo, Rizal, with a total land area of
1,790,570.36 square meters, more or less. This case was lodged before the RTC, Branch 141, Municipality of Makati,5 docketed therein as Civil
Case No. 26804 entitled, "National Housing Authority v. Pilar Ibañez Vda. De Zuzuarregui, et al."

On 25 May 1983, said case was ordered archived6 by Branch 141.

About a month before the aforecited case was ordered archived, the Zuzuarreguis engaged the legal services of Attys. Romeo G. Roxas and
Santiago N. Pastor, to represent them in Civil Case No. 26804. This was sealed by a Letter-Agreement dated 22 April 1983, which is partly
reproduced hereunder:

April 22, 1983

Mr. Antonio de Zuzuarregui, Jr.

Mrs. Pacita Javier (as heir to the late Jose de Zuzuarregui)
Mr. Antonio de Zuzuarregui ( as heir to the late Pilar Y. vda. De Zuzuarregui)

Dear Sir and Madam:

This is to confirm in writing our verbal negotiations for us to represent you in the expropriation proceedings filed by the National Housing
Authority against your goodselves before the Court of First Instance of Rizal (now the Regional Trial Court) and docketed as Civil Case No. 26804.
Our representation shall also include the areas taken over by the Ministry of Public Works and Highways which now formed part of the Marcos
Highway at Antipolo, Rizal.

The areas affected are the following:

xxxx

We shall endeavor to secure the just compensation with the National Housing Authority and other governmental agencies at a price of ELEVEN
PESOS (P11.00) or more per square meter. Any lower amount shall not entitle us to any attorney’s fees. At such price of P11.00 per square
meter or more our contingent fee[s] is THIRTY PERCENT (30%) of the just compensation.

The other terms and conditions of our proposal are:

xxxx

5. You are willing to accept NHA 5-year bonds as part payment up to 75% of the total compensation. In the event of your desire to discount the
bonds, we shall assist to have them discounted at 75% of its face value.

6. Our lawyer’s fees shall be in the proportion of the cash/bonds ratio of the just compensation. Likewise our fees are subject to 10%
withholding tax.

xxxx

Should the above proposal be acceptable to your goodselves, kindly signify your formal acceptance as (sic) the space hereunder provided.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.)
SANTIAGO N. PASTOR
Lawyer (Sgd.)
ROMEO G. ROXAS
Lawyer
CONFORME:
(Sgd.)
ANTONIO DE ZUZUARREGUI, JR. (Sgd.)
PACITA JAVIER
In my behalf and
as heir to the late Pilar Y. vda. De Zuzuarregui as heir to the late Jose De Zuzuarregui7
A Motion to Set Case for Hearing,8 dated 14 February 1984, was filed by Attys. Roxas and Pastor in Civil Case No. 26804, praying that the case be
revived and be set for hearing by the court at the earliest date available in its calendar.

The appropriate proceedings thereafter ensued. On 29 October 1984, a Partial Decision was rendered by Branch 141 in Civil Case No. 26804
fixing the just compensation to be paid to the Zuzuarreguis at P30.00 per square meter.

The NHA filed a Motion for Reconsideration9 dated 23 November 1984 praying that the Partial Decision be reconsidered and set aside, and a
new one rendered lowering the amount of just compensation in accordance with applicable laws. Pending resolution thereof, a Joint Special
Power of Attorney was executed by Antonio De Zuzuarregui, Jr., Enrique De Zuzuarregui and Pacita Javier, in favor of Attys. Roxas and Pastor,
viz:

JOINT SPECIAL POWER OF ATTORNEY

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:

That We, ANTONIO DE ZUZUARREGUI, JR., ENRIQUE DE ZUZUARREGUI and PACITA JAVIER, all of legal age, …, do hereby appoint, name and
constitute ATTYS. ROMEO G. ROXAS and SANTIAGO PASTOR, to be our true and lawful attorneys to act in our names and on our behalves to do
and execute all or any of the following acts and deeds subject to our approval:

xxxx

(2) To represent us in the negotiations for a compromise with the National Housing Authority for our properties subject of the above case;

(3) To negotiate for and in our behalves for the settlement of the just compensation of our properties payable in cash or in bonds;

(4) To sign and prepare all papers relative to the preparation of a Compromise Agreement or any papers and communications which shall
eventually bear our signatures; and

(5) That this Special Power of Attorney is enforce (sic) as long as ATTYS. ROMEO G. ROXAS AND SANTIAGO PASTOR are our lawyers in Civil Case
No. 26804 before the Regional Trial Court, Makati, Branch CXLI.

HEREBY GIVING AND GRANTING unto our said attorneys full power and authority whatsoever requisite or necessary or proper to be done in or
about the premises, as fully to all intents and purposes as we might or could lawfully do if personally present, and hereby ratifying and
confirming all that our said attorneys shall do or cause to be done under and by virtue of these presents.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, We have hereunto set our hands this 26th day of August, 1985, in Makati, M. M., Philippines.

(Sgd.)
ANTONIO DE ZUZUARREGUI, JR.1avvph!l.ne+

(Sgd.)
ENRIQUE DE ZUZUARREGUI

(Sgd.)
PACITA JAVIER10

On 22 November 1985, a Special Power of Attorney was executed by Beatriz Zuzuarregui vda. De Reyes in favor of Attys. Romeo G. Roxas,
Santiago Pastor and Basilio H. Toquero, quoted as follows:

SPECIAL POWER OF ATTORNEY

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:

That I, BEATRIZ ZUZUARREGUI VDA. DE REYES, Filipino, of legal age, widow, and a resident of E. Rodriguez Ave., Quezon City, Philippines do
hereby appoint, name and constitute ATTYS. ROMEO G. ROXAS, SANTIAGO PASTOR and BASILIO H. TOQUERO, to be my true and lawful
attorneys … :

1. To represent me in the negotiation for a Compromise with the National Housing Authority for my properties subject to my approval in CIVIL
CASE No. 26804, entitled "National Housing Authority vs. Pilar Ibañez de Zuzuarregui, et al., before the Regional Trial Court, Makati, Branch
CXLI;

2. To negotiate for and in my behalf for the settlement of the just compensation of my properties payable in cash or in bond, subject to my
approval;

3. To sign and prepare all papers relative to the preparation of a Compromise Agreement or any papers and communications which shall
eventually bear my signature;

4. To accept for and in my behalf payments for my properties after the Compromise Agreement is duly approved by the Court, the actual
receipts of which payments shall be signed by me.

HEREBY GIVING AND GRANTING unto my said attorneys full power and authority whatsoever requisite, necessary or proper … to be done under
and by virtue of these presents.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this 22nd day of November 1985, in the City of Manila, Philippines.

(Sgd.)
BEATRIZ ZUZUARREGUI VDA. DE REYES11

On 10 December 1985, a Letter-Agreement was executed by and between Antonio Zuzuarregui, Jr., Pacita Javier and Enrique De Zuzuarregui, on
the one hand, and Attys. Romeo G. Roxas and Santiago Pastor, on the other. The said Letter-Agreement reads:

December 10, 1985

Atty. Romeo G. Roxas

Atty. Santiago Pastor
Makati Executive Center
Salcedo Village, Makati

Dear Atty. Roxas & Atty. Pastor:

This will confirm an amendment to our agreement regarding your attorney’s fees as our lawyers and counsels for the Zuzuarregui’s properties
expropriated by National Housing Authority covering ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY-NINE (179) HECTARES, more or less, covered by TCT Nos. 138340,
85633 and 85634 and filed as Civil Case No. 26804.

We hereby confirm and agree that we are willing to accept as final and complete settlement for our 179 hectares expropriated by NHA a price of
SEVENTEEN PESOS (P17.00) per square meter, or for a total of THIRTY MILLION FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P30.4 Million), all payable in
NHA Bonds.

We also agree and confirm that for and in consideration of your services as our lawyers and counsels in the said expropriation case, we commit
and bind ourselves to pay to you, your heirs or assignees-in-interest, as your contingent attorney’s fees any and all amount in excess of the
SEVENTEEN PESOS (P17.00) per square meter payable in NHA bonds as mentioned above.

This Letter Agreement serves also as your authority to collect directly from NHA the amount pertaining to you as your contingent attorney’s
fees.

This Letter Agreement hereby amends and supersedes our previous agreement regarding your attorney’s fees as our lawyers and counsels in the
above-mentioned expropriation case.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) ANTONIO DE ZUZUARREGUI, JR.

In my behalf as heir to the late Pilar I. vda. de Zuzuarregui

(Sgd.)PACITA JAVIER
As heir to the late Jose De Zuzuarregui

(Sgd.)
ENRIQUE DE ZUZUARREGUI

CONFORME:
(Sgd.)ATTY. ROMEO G. ROXAS

(Sgd.)ATTY. SANTIAGO PASTOR12

Resolution No. 117413 dated 16 December 1985 was issued by the NHA stating that the Zuzuarregui property would be acquired at a cost of
P19.50 per square meter; that the Zuzuarreguis would be paid in NHA Bonds, subject to the availability of funds; and that the yield on the bonds
to be paid to the Zuzuarreguis shall be based on the Central Bank rate at the time of payment.

As a result of the aforesaid NHA Resolution, a Compromise Agreement was executed between the Zuzuarreguis and the NHA in Civil Case No.
26804. The Compromise Agreement, stipulated among other things, that the just compensation of the Zuzuarregui properties would be at
P19.50 per square meter payable in NHA Bonds. In a Decision dated 20 December 1985, the RTC, Branch 141, Makati, approved the Compromise
Agreement submitted by the parties.

On 27 December 1985, the NHA Legal Department, through Atty. Jose B. H. Pedrosa, released to Atty. Romeo G. Roxas, in behalf of the
Zuzuarreguis, the amount of P20,000,000.00 in NHA Bearer Bonds as "partial payment for several parcels of land with a total area of
1,790,570.36 square meters located in Antipolo, Rizal."14 On even date, Atty. Romeo G. Roxas delivered NHA Bonds to Antonio De Zuzuarregui
in the amount of P15,000,000.00.15 On 04 February 1986, the amount of P34,500,000.00 in Bearer Bonds was again released by the NHA to
Atty. Romeo G. Roxas in behalf of the Zuzuarreguis.16 On 14 February 1986, the Zuzuarreguis issued a receipt17 for receiving the amount of
P30,070,000.00. This receipt included the P15,000,000.00 given to them last 27 December 1985. Again on 17 February 1986, the Zuzuarreguis,
through Beatriz Zuzuarregui vda. De Reyes, issued another receipt for the amount of P450,000.00 in NHA bonds.18 The total amount in NHA
bonds released to Atty. Romeo G. Roxas in behalf of the Zuzuarreguis amounted to P54,500,000.00. Out of this amount, the records show that
the amount turned over to the Zuzuarreguis by Atty. Roxas amounted to P30,520,000.00 in NHA bonds.

Computed at P19.50 per square meter, the 1,790,570.36 square meters property of the Zuzuarreguis was expropriated at a total price of
P34,916,122.00. The total amount released by the NHA was P54,500,000.00. The difference of P19,583,878.00 is, undoubtedly, the yield on the
bonds.

On 25 August 1987, a letter19 was sent by the Zuzuarreguis’ new counsel, Jose F. Gonzalez, to Attys. Roxas and Pastor, demanding that the
latter deliver to the Zuzuarreguis the yield corresponding to bonds paid by the NHA within a period of 10 days from receipt, under pain of
administrative, civil and/or criminal action.

Attys. Roxas and Pastor answered via a letter dated 21 September 1987 explaining their side of the story. They stated therein, among other
things, that the amount that they got seems huge from the surface, but it just actually passed their hands, as it did not really go to them.20

On 29 September 1987, a letter21 was sent by the Zuzuarreguis through Antonio De Zuzuarregui, Jr., to Attys. Romeo G. Roxas and Santiago N.
Pastor, informing the latter that their services as counsels of the Zuzuarreguis (except Betty) in the expropriation proceedings filed by the NHA,
docketed as Civil Case No. 26804, was being formally terminated.

Apparently unsatisfied with the explanation of Attys. Roxas and Pastor, the Zuzuarreguis filed a civil action for Sum of Money and Damages on
14 November 1989 before the RTC, Quezon City, Branch 98, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-89-4013, against the NHA, Jose B. H. Pedrosa, Atty.
Romeo G. Roxas and Atty. Santiago N. Pastor. The Zuzuarreguis demanded that the yield on the NHA bonds be turned over to them.

After due hearing, a Decision22 in Civil Case No. Q-89-4013 was rendered on 03 January 1994, dismissing the Complaint. The dispositive portion
reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing consideration[s], judgment is hereby rendered ordering the dismissal of the complaint against all the
defendants; and, further ordering plaintiffs, jointly and solidarily, to:

1. Pay each of the defendants Romeo G. Roxas, Santiago Pastor and Jose B. H. Perdosa, the amount of P200,000.00, P200,000.00 and
P100,000.00, respectively, as moral damages;

2. Pay each of the defendants Roxas, Pastor and Pedrosa, the amount of P50,000.00, P50,000.00, and P25,000.00, respectively as exemplary
damages;

3. Pay attorney’s fees to defendants Roxas and Pastor in the amount of P20,000.00; and

4. Pay the costs of this suit.

A Notice of Appeal23 dated 10 February 1994 was filed by the Zuzuarreguis. Subsequently, on 26 April 1995, the Zuzuarreguis filed their appeal
brief with the Court of Appeals. The case was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 45732.

A Decision24 was eventually promulgated by the Fifteenth Division of the Court of Appeals on 25 June 2001, reversing and setting aside the
ruling of Branch 98, viz:
Therefore, We find that the amount of P4,476,426.275 is, in the opinion of this Court, commensurate to the services rendered by defendants-
appellees. This amount has been arrived at by giving to defendants-appellees P2.50 per square meter of the 1,790,570.51 square meter
expropriated properties of herein plaintiffs-appellants.

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision dated January 3, 1994 of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region,
Branch 98, Quezon City in Civil Case No. 89-4013 entitled "Antonio Zuzuarregui, Jr., et al. versus National Housing Authority, et al." for "Sum of
Money and Damages," is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Defendants-Appellees Roxas and Pastor are hereby ordered to return to plaintiffs-
appellants the amount of P12,596,696.425, the balance from the P17,073,122.70, received as yield from NHA bonds after deducting the
reasonable attorney’s fees in the amount of P4,476,426.275.25

Attys. Roxas and Pastor filed a Motion for Reconsideration26 on 25 July 2001. The Zuzuarreguis also filed a Motion for Reconsideration27 on 30
July 2001, not having been satisfied with the award, while the NHA and Pedrosa filed their Motions for Reconsideration28 on 03 August 2001.

In a Resolution dated 06 February 2002, the Court of Appeals denied for lack of merit all the Motions for Reconsideration.

On 05 March 2002, Attys. Roxas and Pastor filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari29 assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals, docketed as
G.R. No. 152072. Likewise, on 21 March 2002, the Zuzuarreguis filed their own Petition for Review on Certiorari30 assailing the same Decision,
docketed as G.R. No. 152104.1avvph!l.ne+

ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS

Attys. Roxas and Pastor, petitioners in G.R. No. 152072, assign as errors the following:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN HOLDING THAT THE LETTER-AGREEMENT DATED DECEMBER
10, 1985 CANNOT BE ALLOWED TO STAND AS THE LAW BETWEEN THE PARTIES; and

II

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN HOLDING THAT DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS, HEREIN
PETITIONERS, CONCEALED TO THE PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES, HEREIN RESPONDENTS, THE YIELD OF THE NHA BONDS31

The Zuzuarreguis, petitioners in G.R. No. 152101, on the other hand, assign as errors the following:

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AWARDING TO PETITIONERS THE PRINCIPAL AMOUNT OF ONLY P12,596,696.425 AND NOT P17,073,122.70
MAKING A DIFFERENCE OF P4,476,426.28

II

THE RESPONDENTS SHOULD BE HELD LIABLE FOR INTEREST FROM THE DATE OF THE FILING OF THE COMPLAINT UNTIL FULLY PAID

III

THE RESPONDENTS SHOULD BE HELD LIABE FOR MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY’S FEES

IV

THE RESPONDENTS NHA AND JOSE B.H. PEDROSA ARE JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH RESPONDENTS ROXAS AND PASTOR32

ISSUE FOR RESOLUTION

Drawn from the above assignment of errors, it is patent that the principal issue that must be addressed by this Court is:

WHETHER OR NOT THE LETTER-AGREEMENT DATED 10 DECEMBER 1985, EXECUTED BY THE ZUZUARREGUIS, AND ATTYS. ROXAS AND PASTOR,
FIXING THE EXACT AMOUNT THAT MUST GO TO THE FORMER, SHOULD STAND AS LAW BETWEEN THE PARTIES.

THE COURT’S RULING

Attys. Roxas and Pastor, petitioners in G.R. No. 152072, contend in the main that the Zuzuarreguis are only entitled to the amount of P17.00 per
square meter for the 1,790,570.36 square meters expropriated by the government. This was, according to them, embodied in the Letter-
Agreement dated 10 December 1985, wherein the Zuzuarreguis agreed to accept the price of P17.00 per square meter. Besides, Attys. Roxas and
Pastor contend that the price of P17.00 was even way above the P11.00 that the Zuzuarreguis were willing to accept for their properties under
the Letter of Engagement executed by the parties earlier on 22 April 1983. Computed at P17.00 per square meter, they stress that the amount
that should go to the Zuzuarreguis for their 1,790,570.36 square meters property should be P30,439,696.10, and that in fact the Zuzuarreguis
have received P30,520,000.00. The Letter-Agreement dated 10 December 1985 should thus stand as law between the parties. Since this Letter-
Agreement, which was "as plain and simple as can be such that there is no need for any further construction," already fixed the amount that
would go to the Zuzuarreguis (P17.00 per square meter), then it should be so.

Attys. Roxas and Pastor further assert that the receipts issued by the Zuzuarreguis dated 14 February 1986 and 17 February 1986 indicated that
the amounts received by the latter were in "full and final payment" for the subject properties.

The NHA, for its part, insists that there was no conspiracy between Attys. Roxas and Pastor on the one hand, and the NHA and Atty. Pedrosa on
the other, on the application of yields from NHA bonds.33 The Zuzuarreguis, according to the NHA, "miserably failed to substantiate and
establish conspiracy" between them.

The Zuzuarreguis, for their part, though they were triumphant in the Court of Appeals, insist that the amounts awarded them were not enough.
According to them, the P12,596,696.425 awarded by the Court of Appeals was not correct. They should have been awarded the amount of
P17,073,122.70. Quoting the Zuzuarreguis:

Respondents Roxas and Pastor retained for themselves the amount of P3,980,000.00 which represented the agreed attorney’s fees of Roxas and
Pastor at P2.50 per square meter. The amount of P20,000,000.00 representing the yield of all the bearer bonds was, in the words of the Court of
Appeals, "deliberately hidden" by respondents Roxas and Pastor from petitioners. By mathematical computation, the P20,000,000.00 yield
should be proportionately divided at the ratio of P17.00 (petitioners’) and P2.50 (share of respondents Roxas and Pastor). Following this ratio of
division, of the P20,000,000.00 yield, P17,073,122.70 should pertain to petitioners and the balance of P2,926,877.30 to respondents Roxas and
Pastor. Add this amount to the total of P3,980,000.00 at the agreed rate of P2.50 per square meter, the total attorney’s fees of respondents
Roxas and Pastor should be P6,906,877.30, not bad, again in the words of the Court of Appeals, for handling "a simple expropriation case which
ended up in a compromise agreement." It was, therefore, in error to still deduct the amount of P4,476,426.28 from petitioners share in the yield
in the amount of P17,073,122.70 leaving then only P12,596,696.42.

What was done, however, is that the product of 1,790,570.36 sq m. (area of the expropriated land of petitioners) and P2.50 which is
4,476,426.28 was again deducted from the P17,073,122.70 which is the corresponding share of the petitioners out of the total yield of
P20,000,000.00. If this were a criminal case, petitioners were being sentenced twice for the same offense.34

The Zuzuarreguis further insist that legal interest on the amount of P17,073,122.70 be imposed from the date of the filing of the complaint,
including moral and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees.

We sustain the Court of Appeals, but with modification in the computation.

A contract is a meeting of the minds between two persons whereby one binds himself, with respect to the other, to give something or to render
some service.35 Contracts shall be obligatory, in whatever form they may have been entered into, provided all the essential requisites for their
validity are present.36

Under Article 1318 of the Civil Code, there are three essential requisites which must concur in order to give rise to a binding contract: (1)
consent of the contracting parties; (2) object certain which is the subject matter of the contract; and (3) cause of the obligation which is
established.37

All these requisites were present in the execution of the Letter-Agreement.

Consent is manifested by the meeting of the offer and the acceptance upon the thing and the cause which are to constitute the contract.38 The
Zuzuarreguis, in entering into the Letter-Agreement, fully gave their consent thereto. In fact, it was them (the Zuzuarreguis) who sent the said
letter to Attys. Roxas and Pastor, for the purpose of confirming all the matters which they had agreed upon previously. There is absolutely no
evidence to show that anybody was forced into entering into the Letter-Agreement. Verily, its existence, due execution and contents were
admitted by the Zuzuarreguis themselves.39

The second requisite is the object certain. The objects in this case are twofold. One is the money that will go to the Zuzuarreguis (P17.00 per
square meter), and two, the money that will go to Attys. Roxas and Pastor (any and all amount in excess of P17.00 per square meter). There was
certainty as to the amount that will go to the Zuzuarreguis, and there was likewise certainty as to what amount will go to Attys. Roxas and
Pastor.

The cause is the legal service that was provided by Attys. Roxas and Pastor. In general, cause is the why of the contract or the essential reason
which moves the contracting parties to enter into the contract.40

It is basic that a contract is the law between the parties.41 Obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the contracting
parties and should be complied with in good faith. Unless the stipulations in a contract are contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order
or public policy, the same are binding as between the parties.42

In Licudan v. Court of Appeals,43 we did not allow the Contract for Professional Services between the counsel and his client to stand as the law
between them as the stipulation for the lawyer’s compensation was unconscionable and unreasonable. We said:

Although the Contract for Professional Services dated August 30, 1979 was apparently voluntarily signed by the late Aurelio Licudan for himself
and on behalf of his daughter, petitioner Cristina Licudan-Campos and by the petitioner Wilfredo Licudan who both manifested in open court
that they gave their free and willing consent to the said contract, we cannot allow the said contract to stand as the law between the parties
involved considering that the rule that in the presence of a contract for professional services duly executed by the parties thereto, the same
becomes the law between the said parties is not absolute but admits an exception – that the stipulations therein are not contrary to law, good
morals, good customs, public policy or public order.44

Under the contract in question, Attys. Roxas and Pastor are to receive contingent fees45 for their professional services. It is a deeply-rooted rule
that contingent fees are not per se prohibited by law. They are sanctioned by Canon 13 of the Canons of Professional Ethics, viz:

13. Contingent Fees. –

A contract for contingent fee, where sanctioned by law, should be reasonable under all the circumstances of the case including the risk and
uncertainty of the compensation, but should always be subject to the supervision of a court, as to its reasonableness.

and Canon 20, Rule 20.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,46 viz:

CANON 20 – A LAWYER SHALL CHARGE ONLY FAIR AND REASONABLE FEES.

Rule 20.01. – A lawyer shall be guided by the following factors in determining his fees:

(a) The time spent and the extent of the services rendered or required;

(b) The novelty and difficulty of the question involved;

(c) The importance of the subject matter;

(d) The skill demanded;

(e) The probability of losing other employment as a result of acceptance of the proffered case;

(f) The customary charges for similar services and the schedule of fees of the IBP chapter to which he belongs;

(g) The amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client from the service;

(h) The contingency or certainty of compensation;

(i) The character of the employment, whether occasional or established; and

(j) The professional standing of the lawyer.

However, in cases where contingent fees are sanctioned by law, the same should be reasonable under all the circumstances of the case, and
should always be subject to the supervision of a court, as to its reasonableness,47 such that under Canon 20 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, a lawyer is tasked to charge only fair and reasonable fees.

Indubitably entwined with the lawyer’s duty to charge only reasonable fees is the power of this Court to reduce the amount of attorney’s fees if
the same is excessive and unconscionable.48 Thus, Section 24, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court partly states:

SEC. 24. Compensation of attorneys; agreement as to fees. – An attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from his client no more than a
reasonable compensation for his services, with a view to the importance of the subject matter of the controversy, the extent of the services
rendered, and the professional standing of the attorney. x x x. A written contract for services shall control the amount to be paid therefore
unless found by the court to be unconscionable or unreasonable.

Attorney’s fees are unconscionable if they affront one’s sense of justice, decency or reasonableness.49 It becomes axiomatic therefore, that
power to determine the reasonableness or the, unconscionable character of attorney's fees stipulated by the parties is a matter falling within
the regulatory prerogative of the courts.50

In the instant case, Attys. Roxas and Pastor received an amount which was equal to forty-four percent (44%) of the just compensation paid
(including the yield on the bonds) by the NHA to the Zuzuarreguis, or an amount equivalent to P23,980,000.00 of the P54,500,000.00.
Considering that there was no full blown hearing in the expropriation case, ending as it did in a Compromise Agreement, the 44% is, undeniably,
unconscionable and excessive under the circumstances. Its reduction is, therefore, in order. This is in accordance with our ruling in the earlier
case of Tanhueco v. De Dumo51, where we reduced the amount of attorney’s fees from sixty percent (60%) to fifteen percent (15%), for being
excessive and unreasonable.
It is imperative that the contingent fees received by Attys. Roxas and Pastor must be equitably reduced. In the opinion of this Court, the yield
that corresponds to the percentage share of the Zuzuarreguis in the P19.50 per square meter just compensation paid by the NHA must be
returned by Attys. Roxas and Pastor.1avvph!l.ne+

The yield on the NHA bonds amounted to P19,583,878.00. This amount must therefore be divided between the Zuzuarreguis, on the one hand,
and Attys. Roxas and Pastor, on the other. The division must be pro rata. The amount of P17.00 that should go to the Zuzuarreguis represents
87.18% of the P19.50 per square meter just compensation, The P2.50 per square meter that was to go to Attys. Roxas and Pastor, on the other
hand, represents 12.82%.

The Zuzuarreguis are entitled to the yield equal to 87.18% of the P19,583,878.00, while Attys. Roxas and Pastor are entitled to 12.82% of said
amount. The amount corresponding to 87.17% of P19,583,878.00 is P17,073,224.84. This is the yield that the Zuzuarreguis are entitled to. Attys.
Roxas and Pastor, on the other hand, are entitled to P2,510,653.16.

Attys. Roxas and Pastor, in the opinion of this Court, were not shortchanged for their efforts for they would still be earning or actually earned
attorney’s fees in the amount of P6,987,078.75 (P4,476,425.59 + P2,510,653.16).

The amount of P17,073,224.84 must therefore be returned by Attys. Roxas and Pastor to the Zuzuarreguis. They can take this out from the yield
in the amount of P19,583,878.00 which they have appropriated for themselves.

On the issue of moral and exemplary damages, we cannot award the same for there was no direct showing of bad faith on the part of Attys.
Roxas and Pastor, for as we said earlier, contingency fees are not per se prohibited by law. It is only necessary that it be reduced when excessive
and unconscionable, which we have already done.

We likewise cannot hold the NHA and Atty. Pedrosa jointly and severally liable to the Zuzuarreguis for there is no evidence to show conspiracy
between them.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 25 June 2001 and 06
February 2002, respectively, are AFFIRMED but with the MODIFICATION that Attys. Romeo G. Roxas and Santiago N. Pastor are hereby ordered
to return to the Zuzuarreguis the amount of P17,073,224.84. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

[A.M. No. 10-1-13-SC : March 20, 2012]

RE: SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM DATED JANUARY 11, 2010 OF ACTING DIRECTOR ALEU A. AMANTE, PIAB-C, OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN.

[A.M. NO. 10-9-9-SC]

RE: ORDER OF THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN REFERRING THE COMPLAINT OF ATTYS. OLIVER O. LOZANO AND EVANGELINE J. LOZANO-
ENDRIANO AGAINST CHIEF JUSTICE REYNATO S. PUNO [RET.].

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

We resolve the separate successive letter-petitions[1] of Atty. Oliver O. Lozano, addressed to the Supreme Court en banc, for the lifting of the
indefinite suspension from the practice of law imposed by the Court in its Resolution of June 15, 2010.

In our Resolution of June 15, 2010, we found Atty. Lozano and Atty. Evangeline Lozano-Endriano guilty of grave professional misconduct when they
misquoted or misused constitutional provisions in their pleadings[2] in order to impute unjust acts to members of this Court. Subsequently, we
have reinstated Atty. Lozano-Endriano in our August 23, 2011 Resolution, because of circumstances indicating lesser culpability on her part.

Professional misconduct involving the misuse of constitutional provisions for the purpose of insulting Members of this Court is a serious breach of
the rigid standards that a member of good standing of the legal profession must faithfully comply with. Thus, the penalty of indefinite suspension
was imposed. However, in the past two years during which Atty. Lozano has been suspended, he has repeatedly expressed his willingness to admit
his error, to observe the rules and standards in the practice of law, and to serve the ends of justice if he should be reinstated. And in these two
years, this Court has not been informed of any act that would indicate that Atty. Lozano had acted in any unscrupulous practices unsuitable to a
member of the bar.

While this Court will not hesitate to discipline its erring officers, it will not prolong a penalty after it has been shown that the purpose for imposing
it had already been served. From Atty. Lozano’s letters-petitions, we discern that his suspension had already impressed upon him the need for care
and caution in his representations as an officer of this Court.

Under these circumstances, this Court decides to grant Atty. Lozano’s letters-petitions with the expectation that he shall now avoid going to the
extreme of employing contortions of and misusing legal provisions and principles to justify his positions, and instead focus his energies and talents
towards a lawyer’s primary aim of promoting the speedy and efficient administration of justice.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby LIFT the indefinite suspension from the practice of law of Atty. Oliver Lozano and REINSTATE him to
the status of a member in good standing in so far as the suspension imposed him by this Court is concerned.

SO ORDERED.

Corona, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Brion, Peralta, Bersamin, Abad, Villarama, Jr., Perez, Mendoza, Sereno, Reyes, and Perlas-
Bernabe, JJ., concur.
Del Castillo, J., on leave.

AGUIRRE VS RANA

EN BANC[ B.M. No. 1036, June 10, 2003 ]

DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE, COMPLAINANT,
VS.
EDWIN L. RANA, RESPONDENT

Facts:

Rana was among those who passed the 2000 Bar Examinations. before the scheduled mass oath-taking, complainant Aguirre filed against
respondent a Petition for Denial of Admission to the Bar.

The Court allowed respondent to take his oath. Respondent took the lawyer’s oath on the scheduled date but has not signed the Roll of Attorneys
up to now.

Complainant alleges that respondent, while not yet a lawyer, appeared as counsel for a candidate in an election.

On the charge of violation of law, complainant claims that respondent is a municipal government employee, being a secretary of the Sangguniang
Bayan of Mandaon, Masbate. As such, respondent is not allowed by law to act as counsel for a client in any court or administrative body.

On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, complainant accuses respondent of acting as counsel for vice mayoralty candidate
George Bunan without the latter engaging respondent’s services. Complainant claims that respondent filed the pleading as a ploy to prevent the
proclamation of the winning vice mayoralty candidate.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and thus does not deserve admission to the Philippine Bar

Ruling:

the Court held that “practice of law” means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge,
training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform acts which are usually performed by members of the legal profession.
Generally, to practice law is to render any kind of service which requires the use of legal knowledge or skill.

The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a privilege. It is limited to persons of good moral character with special
qualifications duly ascertained and certified. The exercise of this privilege presupposes possession of integrity, legal knowledge, educational
attainment, and even public trust since a lawyer is an officer of the court. A bar candidate does not acquire the right to practice law simply by
passing the bar examinations. The practice of law is a privilege that can be withheld even from one who has passed the bar examinations, if the
person seeking admission had practiced law without a license.

True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and took the lawyer’s oath. However, it is the signing in the Roll of Attorneys that finally
makes one a full-fledged lawyer. The fact that respondent passed the bar examinations is immaterial. Passing the bar is not the only qualification to
become an attorney-at-law. Respondent should know that two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his
lawyer’s oath to be administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys.

FORMOSO V PNB
Records show that on October 14, 1989, Nellie Panelo Vda. De Formoso (Nellie) and her children namely: Ma. Theresa Formoso-Pescador, Roger
Formoso, Mary Jane Formoso, Bernard Formoso, and Benjamin Formoso, executed a special power of attorney in favor of Primitivo Malcaba
(Malcaba) authorizing him, among others, to secure all papers and documents including the owners copies of the titles of real properties pertaining
to the loan with real estate mortgage originally secured by Nellie and her late husband, Benjamin S. Formoso, from Philippine National Bank, Vigan
Branch (PNB) on September 4, 1980.

On April 20, 1990, the Formosos sold the subject mortgaged real properties to Malcaba through a Deed of Absolute Sale. Subsequently, on March
22, 1994, Malcaba and his lawyer went to PNB to fully pay the loan obligation including interests in the amount of ₱2,461,024.74.

PNB, however, allegedly refused to accept Malcabas tender of payment and to release the mortgage or surrender the titles of the subject
mortgaged real properties.

On March 24, 1994, the petitioners filed a Complaint for Specific Performance against PNB before the Regional Trial Court of Vigan, Ilocos Sur (RTC)
praying, among others, that PNB be ordered to accept the amount of ₱2,461,024.74 as full settlement of the loan obligation of the Formosos.

After an exchange of several pleadings, the RTC finally rendered its decision[3] on October 27, 1999 favoring the petitioners. The petitioners prayer
for exemplary or corrective damages, attorneys fees, and annual interest and daily interest, however, were denied for lack of evidence.

PNB filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied for failure to comply with Rule 15, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. PNB then
filed a Notice of Appeal but it was dismissed for being filed out of time.

The petitioners received their copy of the decision on November 26, 1999, and on January 25, 2001, they filed their Petition for Relief from
Judgment[4] questioning the RTC decision that there was no testimonial evidence presented to warrant the award for moral and exemplary
damages. They reasoned out that they could not then file a motion for reconsideration because they could not get hold of a copy of the transcripts
of stenographic notes. In its August 6, 2001 Order, the RTC denied the petition for lack of merit.[5]

On September 7, 2001, the petitioners moved for reconsideration but it was denied by the RTC in its Omnibus Order of September 26, 2001.[6]

Before the Court of Appeals

On November 29, 2001, the petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the CA challenging the RTC Order of August 6, 2001 and its Omnibus
Order dated September 26, 2001.

In its January 25, 2002 Resolution, the CA dismissed the petition stating that:

The verification and certification of non-forum shopping was signed by only one (Mr. Primitivo Macalba) of the many petitioners. In Loquias v.
Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 139396, August 15, 2000, it was ruled that all petitioners must be signatories to the certification of non-forum
shopping unless the one who signed it is authorized by the other petitioners. In the case at bar, there was no showing that the one who signed was
empowered to act for the rest. Therefore, it cannot be presumed that the one who signed knew to the best of his knowledge whether his co-
petitioners had the same or similar claims or actions filed or pending. The ruling in Loquias further declared that substantial compliance will not
suffice in the matter involving strict observance of the Rules. Likewise, the certification of non-forum shopping requires personal knowledge of the
party who executed the same and that petitioners must show reasonable cause for failure to personally sign the certification. Utter disregard of the
Rules cannot just be rationalized by harping on the policy of liberal construction.

Aggrieved, after the denial of their motion for reconsideration, the petitioners filed this petition for review anchored on the following

GROUNDS

THE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN RULING THAT ALL THE PETITIONERS MUST SIGN THE VERIFICATION AND CERTIFICATION OF NON-
FORUM SHOPPING IN A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI WHEREIN ONLY QUESTIONS OF LAW ARE INVOLVED.

ALTERNATIVELY, THE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN DISMISSING THE WHOLE PETITION WHEN AT THE VERY LEAST THE PETITION INSOFAR
AS PETITIONER MALCABA IS CONCERNED BEING THE SIGNATORY THEREOF SHOULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN DUE COURSE.

THE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN GIVING MORE WEIGHT ON TECHNICALITIES WHEN THE PETITION BEFORE IT WAS CLEARLY
MERITORIOUS.[7]

The petitioners basically argue that they have substantially complied with the requirements provided under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on
Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping. The petitioners are of the view that the rule on Verification and Certification of Non-Forum
Shopping that all petitioners must sign should be liberally construed, since only questions of law are raised in a petition for certiorari and no factual
issues that require personal knowledge of the petitioners.

The petitioners further claim that they have a meritorious petition because contrary to the ruling of the RTC, their Petition for Relief clearly showed
that, based on the transcript of stenographic notes, there was enough testimonial evidence for the RTC to grant them damages and attorneys fees
as prayed for.

On the other hand, PNB counters that the mandatory rule on the certification against forum shopping requires that all of the six (6) petitioners
must sign, namely: Nellie Vda. De Formoso and her children Ma. Theresa Formoso-Pescador, Roger Formoso, Mary Jane Formoso, and Bernard
Formoso, and Primitivo Malcaba. Therefore, the signature alone of Malcaba on the certification is insufficient.

PNB further argues that Malcaba was not even a party or signatory to the contract of loan entered into by his co-petitioners. Neither was there
evidence that Malcaba is a relative or a co-owner of the subject properties. It likewise argues that, contrary to the stance of the petitioners, the
issue raised before the CA, as to whether or not the petitioners were entitled to moral and exemplary damages as well as attorneys fees, is a
factual one.

Finally, PNB asserts that the body of the complaint filed by the petitioners failed to show any allegation that Macalba alone suffered damages for
which he alone was entitled to reliefs as prayed for. PNB claims that the wordings of the complaint were clear that all the petitioners were asking
for moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees.

OUR RULING

The petition lacks merit.

Certiorari is an extraordinary, prerogative remedy and is never issued as a matter of right. Accordingly, the party who seeks to avail of it must
strictly observe the rules laid down by law.[8] Section 1, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari.- When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess
of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts
with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such
incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.

The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and
documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of Section 3, Rule
46. [Emphasis supplied]

Under Rule 46, Section 3, paragraph 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, petitions for certiorari must be verified and accompanied
by a sworn certification of non-forum shopping.

SECTION 3. Contents and filing of petition; effect of non-compliance with requirements. The petition shall contain the full names and actual
addresses of all the petitioners and respondents, a concise statement of the matters involved, the factual background of the case, and the grounds
relied upon for the relief prayed for.

In actions filed under Rule 65, the petition shall further indicate the material dates showing when notice of the judgment or final order or
resolution subject thereof was received, when a motion for new trial or reconsideration, if any, was filed and when notice of the denial thereof was
received.

It shall be filed in seven (7) clearly legible copies together with proof of service thereof on the respondent with the original copy intended for the
court indicated as such by the petitioner, and shall be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or certified true copy of the judgment,
order, resolution, or ruling subject thereof, such material portions of the record as are referred to therein, and other documents relevant or
pertinent thereto. The certification shall be accomplished by the proper clerk of court or his duly authorized representative, or by the proper officer
of the court, tribunal, agency or office involved or by his duly authorized representative. The other requisite number of copies of the petition shall
be accompanied by clearly legible plain copies of all documents attached to the original.

The petitioner shall also submit together with the petition a sworn certification that he has not theretofore commenced any other action involving
the same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency; if there is such other
action or proceeding, he must state the status of the same; and if he should thereafter learn that a similar action or proceeding has been filed or is
pending before the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency, he undertakes to promptly
inform the aforesaid courts and other tribunal or agency thereof within five (5) days therefrom.
The petitioner shall pay the corresponding docket and other lawful fees to the clerk of court and deposit the amount of P500.00 for costs at the
time of the filing of the petition.

The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition.
[Emphases supplied]
The acceptance of a petition for certiorari as well as the grant of due course thereto is, in general, addressed to the sound discretion of the court.
Although the Court has absolute discretion to reject and dismiss a petition for certiorari, it does so only (1) when the petition fails to demonstrate
grave abuse of discretion by any court, agency, or branch of the government; or (2) when there are procedural errors, like violations of the Rules of
Court or Supreme Court Circulars.[9] [Emphasis supplied]

In the case at bench, the petitioners claim that the petition for certiorari that they filed before the CA substantially complied with the requirements
provided for under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping.

The Court disagrees.

Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provide:

SEC. 4. Verification. Except when otherwise specifically required by law or rule, pleadings need not be under oath, verified or accompanied by
affidavit.

A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleadings and that the allegations therein are true and correct of his personal
knowledge or based on authentic records.

A pleading required to be verified which contains a verification based on information and belief or upon knowledge, information and belief or lacks
a proper verification, shall be treated as an unsigned pleading.

SEC. 5. Certification against forum shopping. The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading
asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore
commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge,
no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status
thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within
five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.

Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall
be cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after hearing. The submission of a false
certification or non-compliance with any of the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to the
corresponding administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping,
the same shall be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause for administrative sanctions.
x x x.

In this regard, the case of Oldarico S. Traveno v. Bobongon Banana Growers Multi-Purpose Cooperative,[10] is enlightening:

Respecting the appellate courts dismissal of petitioners appeal due to the failure of some of them to sign the therein accompanying verification and
certification against forum-shopping, the Courts guidelines for the bench and bar in Altres v. Empleo, which were culled from jurisprudential
pronouncements, are instructive:

For the guidance of the bench and bar, the Court restates in capsule form the jurisprudential pronouncements already reflected above respecting
non-compliance with the requirements on, or submission of defective, verification and certification against forum shopping:

1) A distinction must be made between non-compliance with the requirement on or submission of defective verification, and non-compliance with
the requirement on or submission of defective certification against forum shopping.

2) As to verification, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein does not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. The Court may order
its submission or correction or act on the pleading if the attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the Rule may be dispensed
with in order that the ends of justice may be served thereby.

3) Verification is deemed substantially complied with when one who has ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the complaint
or petition signs the verification, and when matters alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct.
4) As to certification against forum shopping, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein, unlike in verification, is generally not curable by its
subsequent submission or correction thereof, unless there is a need to relax the Rule on the ground of substantial compliance or presence of
special circumstances or compelling reasons.

5) The certification against forum shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs or petitioners in a case; otherwise, those who did not sign will be
dropped as parties to the case. Under reasonable or justifiable circumstances, however, as when all the plaintiffs or petitioners share a common
interest and invoke a common cause of action or defense, the signature of only one of them in the certification against forum shopping
substantially complies with the Rule.

6) Finally, the certification against forum shopping must be executed by the party-pleader, not by his counsel. If, however, for reasonable or
justifiable reasons, the party-pleader is unable to sign, he must execute a Special Power of Attorney designating his counsel of record to sign on his
behalf.

The petition for certiorari filed with the CA stated the following names as petitioners: Nellie Panelo Vda. De Formoso, Ma. Theresa Formoso-
Pescador, Roger Formoso, Mary Jane Formoso, Bernard Formoso, Benjamin Formoso, and Primitivo Malcaba.
Admittedly, among the seven (7) petitioners mentioned, only Malcaba signed the verification and certification of non-forum shopping in the
subject petition. There was no proof that Malcaba was authorized by his co-petitioners to sign for them. There was no special power of attorney
shown by the Formosos authorizing Malcaba as their attorney-in-fact in filing a petition for review on certiorari. Neither could the petitioners give
at least a reasonable explanation as to why only he signed the verification and certification of non-forum shopping. In Athena Computers, Inc. and
Joselito R. Jimenez v. Wesnu A. Reyes, the Court explained that:
The verification of the petition and certification on non-forum shopping before the Court of Appeals were signed only by Jimenez. There is no
showing that he was authorized to sign the same by Athena, his co-petitioner.
Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules states that a pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations therein
are true and correct of his knowledge and belief. Consequently, the verification should have been signed not only by Jimenez but also by Athenas
duly authorized representative.
In Docena v. Lapesura, we ruled that the certificate of non-forum shopping should be signed by all the petitioners or plaintiffs in a case, and that
the signing by only one of them is insufficient. The attestation on non-forum shopping requires personal knowledge by the party executing the
same, and the lone signing petitioner cannot be presumed to have personal knowledge of the filing or non-filing by his co-petitioners of any action
or claim the same as similar to the current petition.
The certification against forum shopping in CA-G.R. SP No. 72284 is fatally defective, not having been duly signed by both petitioners and thus
warrants the dismissal of the petition for certiorari. We have consistently held that the certification against forum shopping must be signed by the
principal parties. With respect to a corporation, the certification against forum shopping may be signed for and on its behalf, by a specifically
authorized lawyer who has personal knowledge of the facts required to be disclosed in such document.
While the Rules of Court may be relaxed for persuasive and weighty reasons to relieve a litigant from an injustice commensurate with his failure to
comply with the prescribed procedures, nevertheless they must be faithfully followed. In the instant case, petitioners have not shown any reason
which justifies relaxation of the Rules. We have held that procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed simply because their non-observance
may have prejudiced a partys substantive rights. Like all rules, they are required to be followed except for the most persuasive of reasons when
they may be relaxed. Not one of these persuasive reasons is present here.
In fine, we hold that the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the petition for certiorari in view of the procedural lapses committed by
petitioners.[11] [Emphases supplied]

Furthermore, the petitioners argue that the CA should not have dismissed the whole petition but should have given it due course insofar as
Malcaba is concerned because he signed the certification. The petitioners also contend that the CA should have been liberal in the application of
the Rules because they have a meritorious case against PNB.

The Court, however, is not persuaded.

The petitioners were given a chance by the CA to comply with the Rules when they filed their motion for reconsideration, but they refused to do so.
Despite the opportunity given to them to make all of them sign the verification and certification of non-forum shopping, they still failed to comply.
Thus, the CA was constrained to deny their motion and affirm the earlier resolution.[12]

Indeed, liberality and leniency were accorded in some cases.[13] In these cases, however, those who did not sign were relatives of the lone
signatory, so unlike in this case, where Malcaba is not a relative who is similarly situated with the other petitioners and who cannot speak for them.
In the case of Heirs of Domingo Hernandez, Sr. v. Plaridel Mingoa, Sr.,[14] it was written:

In the instant case, petitioners share a common interest and defense inasmuch as they collectively claim a right not to be dispossessed of the
subject lot by virtue of their and their deceased parents construction of a family home and occupation thereof for more than 10 years. The
commonality of their stance to defend their alleged right over the controverted lot thus gave petitioners xxx authority to inform the Court of
Appeals in behalf of the other petitioners that they have not commenced any action or claim involving the same issues in another court or tribunal,
and that there is no other pending action or claim in another court or tribunal involving the same issues.
Here, all the petitioners are immediate relatives who share a common interest in the land sought to be reconveyed and a common cause of action
raising the same arguments in support thereof. There was sufficient basis, therefore, for Domingo Hernandez, Jr. to speak for and in behalf of his
co-petitioners when he certified that they had not filed any action or claim in another court or tribunal involving the same issues. Thus, the
Verification/Certification that Hernandez, Jr. executed constitutes substantial compliance under the Rules. [Emphasis supplied]
The same leniency was accorded to the petitioner in the case of Oldarico S. Traveno v. Bobongon Banana Growers Multi-Purpose Cooperative,[15]
where it was stated:

The same leniency was applied by the Court in Cavile v. Heirs of Cavile, because the lone petitioner who executed the certification of non-forum
shopping was a relative and co-owner of the other petitioners with whom he shares a common interest. x x x[16]

Considering the above circumstances, the Court does not see any similarity at all in the case at bench to compel itself to relax the requirement of
strict compliance with the rule regarding the certification against forum shopping.

At any rate, the Court cannot accommodate the petitioners request to re-examine the testimony of Malcaba in the transcript of stenographic notes
of the April 25, 1999 hearing concerning his alleged testimonial proof of damages for obvious reasons.

Primarily, Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court categorically states that the petition filed shall raise only questions of law, which must be
distinctly set forth. A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a question of fact
when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a question to be one of law, the same must not involve an examination of
the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides
on the given set of circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact.[17]

In this case, the petition clearly raises a factual issue. As correctly argued by PNB, the substantive issue of whether or not the petitioners are
entitled to moral and exemplary damages as well as attorneys fees is a factual issue which is beyond the province of a petition for review on
certiorari.

Secondly, even if the Court glosses over the technical defects, the petition for relief cannot be granted. A perusal of the Petition for Relief of
Judgment discloses that there is no fact constituting fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence which are the grounds therefor. From the
petition itself, it appears that the petitioners counsel had a copy of the transcript of stenographic notes which was in his cabinet all along and only
discovered it when he was disposing old and terminated cases.[18] If he was only attentive to his records, he could have filed a motion for
reconsideration or a notice of appeal in behalf of the petitioners.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED

G.R. No. 191388 March 9, 2011

ASIA UNITED BANK, CHRISTINE T. CHAN, and FLORANTE C. DEL MUNDO, Petitioners,
vs.
GOODLAND COMPANY, INC., Respondent.

Factual Antecedents

Respondent Goodland Company, Inc. (Goodland) executed a Third Party Real Estate Mortgage (REM) over two parcels of land located in the
Municipality of Sta. Rosa, Laguna and covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 3216725 and 3216736 in favor of petitioner Asia United
Bank (AUB). The mortgage secured the obligation amounting to ₱250 million of Radiomarine Network, Inc. (RMNI), doing business as Smartnet
Philippines, to AUB. The REM was duly registered on March 8, 2001 in the Registry of Deeds of Calamba, Laguna.7

Goodland then filed a Complaint8 docketed as Civil Case No. B-6242 before Branch 25 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Biñan, Laguna for the
annulment of the REM on the ground that the same was falsified and done in contravention of the parties’ verbal agreement (Annulment Case).

While the Annulment Case was pending, RMNI defaulted in the payment of its obligation to AUB, prompting the latter to exercise its right under
the REM to extrajudicially foreclose the mortgage. It filed its Application for Extrajudicial Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage under Act No. 3135,
as amended with the Office of the Executive Judge of the RTC of Biñan, Laguna on October 19, 2006.9 The mortgaged properties were sold in public
auction to AUB as the highest bidder. It was issued a Certificate of Sale, which was registered with the Registry of Deeds of Calamba on November
23, 2006.

Before AUB could consolidate its title, Goodland filed on November 28, 2006 another Complaint10 docketed as Civil Case No. B-7110 before Branch
25 of the RTC of Biñan, Laguna, against AUB and its officers, petitioners Christine Chan and Florante del Mundo. This Complaint sought to annul the
foreclosure sale and to enjoin the consolidation of title in favor of AUB (Injunction Case). Goodland asserted the alleged falsified nature of the REM
as basis for its prayer for injunction.

A few days later, AUB consolidated its ownership over the foreclosed properties and obtained new titles, TCT Nos. T-65703111 and 657032,12in its
name from the Registry of Deeds of Calamba.

Petitioners then filed on December 11, 2006 a Motion to Dismiss with Opposition to a Temporary Restraining Order in the Injunction Case.13 They
brought to the trial court’s attention Goodland’s forum shopping given the pendency of the Annulment Case. They argued that the two cases both
rely on the alleged falsification of the real estate mortgage as basis for the reliefs sought.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court (Injunction Case)

On March 15, 2007, the trial court acted favorably on petitioners’ motion and dismissed the Injunction Case with prejudice on the grounds of forum
shopping and litis pendentia.14 The trial court explained that the Injunction Case and the Annulment Case are both founded on the same
transactions, same essential facts and circumstances, and raise substantially the same issues. The addition of the application for a writ of
preliminary injunction does not vary the similarity between the two cases. The trial court further noted that Goodland could have prayed for
injunctive relief as ancillary remedy in the Annulment Case. Finally, the trial court stated that any judgment in the Annulment Case regarding the
validity of the REM would constitute res judicata on the Injunction Case.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals15 (Injunction Case)

Goodland appealed16 the same to the CA.

Meanwhile, AUB filed an Ex-Parte Application for Writ of Possession on December 18, 2006, which was granted on March 15, 2007. The writ was
issued on March 26, 2007 and AUB obtained possession of the foreclosed properties on April 2, 2007.

On June 5, 2009, the CA promulgated its assailed Decision, which ruled in favor of Goodland and ordered the reinstatement of the Injunction Case
in the trial court.17

The CA rejected petitioners’ contention that Goodland’s appeal raised pure questions of law,18 which are within the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court under Rule 45.19 Instead, it found Goodland’s Rule 41 appeal to be proper because it involved both questions of fact and of law. The CA held
that a question of fact existed because petitioners themselves questioned in their Brief the veracity of Goodland’s Certification of Non-Forum
Shopping.20

The CA conceded that Goodland’s Brief failed to comply with the formal requirements, which are all grounds for the dismissal of the appeal,21 e.g.,
failure of the appellant to serve and file the required number of copies of its brief on all appellees and absence of page references to the record.
However, it relaxed the rules so as to completely resolve the rights and obligations of the parties. The CA, however, warned Goodland that its
future lapses will be dealt with more severely.22

The CA further ruled against petitioners’ argument that the delivery of the foreclosed properties to AUB’s possession has rendered Goodland’s
appeal moot. It explained that the Injunction Appeal involving the annulment of extrajudicial foreclosure sale can proceed independently of
petitioners’ application for a writ of possession.23

The CA then concluded that Goodland was not guilty of forum shopping when it initiated the Annulment and Injunction Cases. The CA held that the
reliefs sought in the two cases were different. The Annulment Case sought the nullification of the real estate mortgage, while the Injunction Case
sought the nullification of the foreclosure proceedings as well as to enjoin the consolidation of title in favor of petitioners.24 The CA further held
that aside from the difference in reliefs sought, the two cases were independent of each other because the facts or evidence that supported their
respective causes of action were different. The acts which gave rise to the Injunction Case (i.e., the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings) occurred
long after the filing of the Annulment Case.25

The appellate court also held that any decision in either case will not constitute res judicata on the other. It explained that the validity of the real
estate mortgage has no "automatic bearing" on the validity of the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings.26

Moreover, according to the CA, the fact that Goodland stated in its Certification of Non-Forum Shopping in the Injunction Case that the Annulment
Case was pending belied the existence of forum shopping.27

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration28 on July 2, 2009, which was denied in the assailed Resolution of February 17, 2010.29

Hence, the instant petition.

Ruling in G.R. No. 190231 (Annulment Case)

Contemporaneously with the proceedings of the Injunction Case, the earlier Annulment Case (Civil Case No. B-6242) was also dismissed by the trial
court on the ground of forum shopping on August 16, 2007.30

Goodland filed an appeal31 of the dismissal to the CA, which appeal was granted. The CA ordered on August 11, 2009 the reinstatement of the
Annulment Case in the trial court.32

AUB then filed with this Court a Petition for Review,33 docketed as G.R. No. 190231 and entitled Asia United Bank and Abraham Co v. Goodland
Company, Inc.

On December 8, 2010, the Court’s First Division reversed the CA ruling and resolved the appeal in AUB’s favor.34 The sole issue resolved by the
Court was whether Goodland committed willful and deliberate forum shopping by filing Civil Case Nos. B-6242 (Annulment Case) and B-7110
(Injunction Case).lavvphil The Court ruled that Goodland committed forum shopping because both cases asserted non-consent to the mortgage as
the only basis for seeking the nullification of the REM, as well as the injunction of the foreclosure. When Goodland did not notify the trial court of
the subsequent filing of the injunction complaint, Goodland revealed its "furtive intent to conceal the filing of Civil Case No. B-7110 for the purpose
of securing a favorable judgment." Thus, the Court concluded that the trial court was correct in dismissing the annulment case with prejudice. The
dispositive portion of the said Resolution reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The August 11, 2009 decision and November 10, 2009 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR
CV No. 9126[9] are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The August 16, 2007 and December 5, 2007 orders of the Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna,
Branch 25 in Civil Case No. B-6242 are REINSTATED.35

Goodland filed a Motion for Reconsideration36 but the same was denied with finality in the Court’s Resolution dated January 19, 2011.

Issue37

The parties present several issues for the Court’s resolution. Most of these address the procedural infirmities that attended Goodland’s appeal to
the CA, making such appeal improper and dismissible. The crux of the case, however, lies in the issue of whether the successive filing of the
Annulment and Injunction Cases constitute forum shopping.

Petitioners’ Arguments

Petitioners maintain that Goodland is guilty of forum shopping because it sought in the Annulment Case to annul the REM on the ground that it
was falsified and unlawfully filled-out; while in the Injunction Case, Goodland wanted to nullify the foreclosure sale arising from the same REM on
the ground that the REM was falsified and unlawfully filled-out. Clearly, Goodland’s complaints rise and fall on the issue of whether the REM is
valid. This requires the presentation of the same evidence in the Annulment and Injunction Cases.38

Goodland’s Arguments

Goodland counters that it did not commit forum shopping because the causes of action for the Injunction and Annulment Cases are different. The
Annulment Case is for the annulment of REM; while the Injunction Case is for the annulment of the extrajudicial foreclosure sale. Goodland argues
that any judgment in the Annulment Case, regardless of which party is successful, would not amount to res judicata in the Injunction Case.39

Our Ruling
THERE IS FORUM SHOPPING PRESENT
We grant the petition.

There is forum shopping "when a party repetitively avails of several judicial remedies in different courts, simultaneously or successively, all
substantially founded on the same transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues either
pending in or already resolved adversely by some other court."40 The different ways by which forum shopping may be committed were explained
in Chua v. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company:41

Forum shopping can be committed in three ways: (1) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and with the same prayer, the
previous case not having been resolved yet (where the ground for dismissal is litis pendentia); (2) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of
action and the same prayer, the previous case having been finally resolved (where the ground for dismissal is res judicata); and (3) filing multiple
cases based on the same cause of action, but with different prayers (splitting causes of action, where the ground for dismissal is also either litis
pendentia or res judicata).

Common in these types of forum shopping is the identity of the cause of action in the different cases filed. Cause of action is defined as "the act or
omission by which a party violates the right of another."42

The cause of action in the earlier Annulment Case is the alleged nullity of the REM (due to its allegedly falsified or spurious nature) which is
allegedly violative of Goodland’s right to the mortgaged property. It serves as the basis for the prayer for the nullification of the REM. The
Injunction Case involves the same cause of action, inasmuch as it also invokes the nullity of the REM as the basis for the prayer for the nullification
of the extrajudicial foreclosure and for injunction against consolidation of title. While the main relief sought in the Annulment Case (nullification of
the REM) is ostensibly different from the main relief sought in the Injunction Case (nullification of the extrajudicial foreclosure and injunction
against consolidation of title), the cause of action which serves as the basis for the said reliefs remains the same — the alleged nullity of the REM.
Thus, what is involved here is the third way of committing forum shopping, i.e., filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action, but with
different prayers. As previously held by the Court, there is still forum shopping even if the reliefs prayed for in the two cases are different, so long
as both cases raise substantially the same issues.43

There can be no determination of the validity of the extrajudicial foreclosure and the propriety of injunction in the Injunction Case without
necessarily ruling on the validity of the REM, which is already the subject of the Annulment Case. The identity of the causes of action in the two
cases entails that the validity of the mortgage will be ruled upon in both, and creates a possibility that the two rulings will conflict with each other.
This is precisely what is sought to be avoided by the rule against forum shopping.

The substantial identity of the two cases remains even if the parties should add different grounds or legal theories for the nullity of the REM or
should alter the designation or form of the action. The well-entrenched rule is that "a party cannot, by varying the form of action, or adopting a
different method of presenting his case, escape the operation of the principle that one and the same cause of action shall not be twice litigated."44
The CA ruled that the two cases are different because the events that gave rise to them are different. The CA rationalized that the Annulment Case
was brought about by the execution of a falsified document, while the Injunction Case arose from AUB’s foreclosure based on a falsified document.
The distinction is illusory. The cause of action for both cases is the alleged nullity of the REM due to its falsified or spurious nature. It is this nullity
of the REM which Goodland sought to establish in the Annulment Case. It is also this nullity of the REM which Goodland asserted in the Injunction
Case as basis for seeking to nullify the foreclosure and enjoin the consolidation of title. Clearly, the trial court cannot decide the Injunction Case
without ruling on the validity of the mortgage, which issue is already within the jurisdiction of the trial court in the Annulment Case.

The recent development in Asia United Bank v. Goodland Company, Inc.,45 which involved substantially the same parties and the same issue is
another reason for Goodland’s loss in the instant case. The issue that Goodland committed deliberate forum shopping when it successively filed the
Annulment and Injunction Cases against AUB and its officers was decided with finality therein. This ruling is conclusive on the petitioners and
Goodland considering that they are substantially the same parties in that earlier case.

Given our ruling above that the Injunction Case ought to be dismissed for forum shopping, there is no need to rule further on the procedural
infirmities raised by petitioners against Goodland’s appeal.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED. The June 5, 2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals and its February 17, 2010
Resolution in CA-G.R. CV No. 90114 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The March 15, 2007 Order of Branch 25 of the Regional Trial Court of
Biñan, Laguna DISMISSING Civil Case No. B-7110 is hereby REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

CAMARINES SUR IV ELECTRIC G.R. No. 167691

COOPERATIVE, INC.,
Petitioner,
Present:
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
CARPIO,
- v e r s u s - CORONA,
AZCUNA and
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ.

EXPEDITA L. AQUINO,
Respondent.

This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to set aside the January 5, 2005 decision[1] and March 22, 2005
resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 81666.

Respondent Expedita L. Aquino bought several personal computers and leased a commercial building in Tigaon, Camarines Sur for purposes of
establishing a computer gaming business. She had the electrical service in the building restored because the former tenant, a certain Mrs.
Paglinawan,[3] had it disconnected when she gave up the occupancy thereof. Respondent paid the reconnection fee as well as the fee
corresponding to the electric consumption covering the period of April 17, 2002 to May 16, 2002 to petitioner Camarines Sur IV Electric
Cooperative, Inc. in Mrs. Paglinawans name. However, respondent failed to pay the electric bills in the succeeding months.

Because of adverse reports, petitioner conducted an inspection of the electrical wiring of the leased building, took pictures thereof and gave
respondents overseer a report of pilferage of electricity with the notation:
Disconnected w/light/illegal tapping.

Petitioner alleged that respondent violated RA 7832[4] and required her to pay the differential billing and penalty within 48 hours; otherwise, the
electric service would be disconnected. A conciliatory conference between the parties was held where petitioner presented respondent with two
options: deposit the differential billing of P3,367.00 to avoid disconnection during the pendency of the criminal action to be filed by petitioner or
pay the amount of the differential billing and the penalty of P15,000.00, in which case the matter would be considered closed and the filing of a
criminal case dispensed with.

Respondent refused to choose any of the options as she felt that to do so would be tantamount to an admission of guilt. Consequently, her
electrical service was permanently disconnected on January 23, 2003.

Respondent filed a complaint for damages against petitioner in the Regional Trial Court (RTC). She alleged that due to the disconnection of
electrical services, her business operation was interrupted causing her damages in the form of unrealized income, rentals paid for the premises she
was unable to use and renovation costs of the leased building.
Petitioner filed an answer with affirmative defenses. It alleged, among others, that the complaint failed to state a cause of action. According to
petitioner, no contract to supply electricity was entered into between them. Thus, respondents complaint had no basis and should be dismissed.
Respondent subsequently amended her complaint. Petitioner still insisted on moving for its dismissal, reiterating that the complaint stated no
cause of action.

The trial court initially denied the motion to dismiss in an order dated July 10, 2003. It held that, as respondent was in possession of the premises
to which petitioner supplied electricity, there was, in a way, a contract between the parties.

When petitioner moved for reconsideration, the court a quo, in its December 22, 2003 order, made a turnaround and ruled in petitioners favor
(second RTC order).[5] It stated that respondents payment of the reconnection fee did not suffice to create a new contract between the parties as
the same was made in Mrs. Paglinawans name, whose contract with petitioner was terminated upon the disconnection of the electrical service.
Respondent received a copy of the second RTC order on December 23, 2003 and moved for reconsideration thereof on January 5, 2004.
Respondent mailed a copy of her motion for reconsideration (with notice of hearing) to petitioners counsel only on the same date. The notice of
hearing indicated that the hearing of the motion was set on January 9, 2004. Petitioner filed an opposition thereto, alleging, among others, that the
motion should be denied as respondent did not comply with the 3-day rule (as provided in the Rules of Court).

On February 3, 2004, the trial court denied respondents motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.[6] However, it was silent on the motions non-
compliance with the 3-day rule.

Respondent filed an appeal in the CA on February 5, 2004, insisting that the complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action for damages. For its part,
petitioner reiterated its stand on the issue. It also called the CAs attention to the alleged flaw in respondents motion for reconsideration in the
RTC. It argued that the motion was a pro forma motion (since it violated the 3-day rule) which should have been dismissed outright by the trial
court. Furthermore, it did not stop the running of the 15-day period for respondent to appeal which should have been reckoned from her receipt of
the second RTC order on December 23, 2003. Consequently, her February 5, 2004 notice of appeal (which was filed 44 days after she received a
copy of the second RTC order) was filed late.
The appellate court held that the RTC erred in dismissing the complaint as indeed a cause of action existed. The CA ruled that the matter of
whether or not a contract, express or implied, existed between the parties was a matter of defense that must be resolved in a trial on the merits. It
stated that such issue was not relevant in a motion to dismiss based on failure to state a cause of action. However, it did not pass upon the issue
relative to the timeliness of respondents appeal.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. It was denied. Hence, this petition.

The issues before us are: (1) whether or not respondents complaint for damages stated a cause of action against petitioner and (2) whether or not
respondents appeal in the CA was filed on time.
There is a cause of action when the following elements are present: (1) the legal right of the plaintiff; (2) the correlative obligation of the defendant
and (3) the act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right.[7] In determining the presence of these elements, only the facts alleged
in the complaint must be considered. The test is whether the court can render a valid judgment on the complaint based on the facts alleged and
the prayer asked for,[8] such that the facts alleged in the complaint, if true, would justify the relief sought. Only ultimate facts, not legal
conclusions or evidentiary facts, are considered for purposes of applying the test.[9]

Based on the allegations in the amended complaint, we hold that respondent stated a cause of action for damages. Respondent was in possession
of the property supplied with electricity by petitioner when the electric service was disconnected. This resulted in the alleged injury complained of
which can be threshed out in a trial on the merits. Whether one is a party or not in a contract is not determinative of the existence of a cause of
action. Participation in a contract is not an element in considering whether or not a complaint states a cause of action[10] because even a third
party outside the contract can have a cause of action against either or both contracting parties.
Be that as it may, respondents appeal in the CA should have been denied outright for having been filed out of time.

In its petition in this Court, petitioner insisted that respondent mailed a copy of her motion for reconsideration (with notice of hearing) to its
(petitioners) counsel only on January 5, 2004, although the motion was already scheduled for hearing on January 9, 2004. Respondent should have
foreseen that the registered mail, which originated from Naga City, would not be able to reach the law office of petitioners counsel in Manila at
least 3 days before said date. As expected, the mail did not reach petitioners counsel on time. In fact, he received it only on the day of the hearing
itself.[11] Thus, respondents motion for reconsideration was fatally flawed for failure to comply with the 3-day rule under Section 4, Rule 15 of the
Rules of Court. It did not toll the reglementary period for respondent to appeal the RTCs decision.

We note that respondents comment did not even touch on the issues of the perceived deficiency in her motion for reconsideration and the
timeliness of her appeal in the CA. Although her memorandum briefly discussed these issues, the same was insufficient as it merely reiterated the
statement of facts in her appellants brief in the CA (specifically, as to when she filed said motion in the RTC). No discussion was proffered regarding
the date of mailing of a copy of the assailed motion to petitioners counsel. Furthermore, as if admitting her failure to comply with the mandatory
rule on notice of hearing, respondent invoked the much abused exhortation of losing litigants on the primacy of substantial justice over mere
technicalities.

Respondents arguments have no merit.

Section 4, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 4. Hearing of Motion. Except for motions which the court may act upon without prejudicing the rights of the adverse party, every motion shall
be set for hearing by the applicant.
Every written motion required to be heard and the notice of hearing thereof shall be served in such a manner as to ensure its receipt by the other
party at least three (3) days before the date of hearing, unless the court for good cause sets the hearing on shorter notice. (Emphasis supplied)
Time and again, we have held that non-compliance with Section 4 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court is a fatal defect. A motion which fails to comply
with said Rule is a mere scrap of paper. If filed, such motion is not entitled to judicial cognizance.[12] The fact that the RTC took cognizance of a
defective motion, such as requiring the parties to set it for hearing and denying the same for lack of merit, did not cure the defect of said
motion.[13] It did not suspend the running of the period to appeal.[14]

Based on the foregoing, respondents defective motion for reconsideration did not stop the running of her period to appeal. Thus, the appeal in the
CA should have been dismissed outright as the decision of the RTC had by then already become final and executory.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The January 5, 2005 decision and March 22, 2005 resolution of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED
and SET ASIDE and CA-G.R. CV No. 81666 is ordered DISMISSED.

PCGG V SANDIGANBAYAN

FACTS

In 1976 the General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) encountered financial difficulties. GENBANK had extended considerable financial support
to Filcapital Development Corporation causing it to incur daily overdrawings on its current account with Central Bank. Despite the mega loans
GENBANK failed to recover from its financial woes. The Central Bank issued a resolution declaring GENBANK insolvent and unable to resume
business with safety to its depositors, creditors and the general public, and ordering its liquidation. A public bidding of GENBANK’s assets was held
where Lucio Tan group submitted the winning bid. Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza filed a petition with the CFI praying for the assistance and
supervision of the court in GENBANK’s liquidation as mandated by RA 265. After EDSA Revolution I Pres Aquino established the PCGG to recover
the alleged ill-gotten wealth of former Pres Marcos, his family and cronies. Pursuant to this mandate, the PCGG filed with the Sandiganbayan a
complaint for reversion, reconveyance, restitution against respondents Lucio Tan, at.al. PCGG issued several writs of sequestration on properties
allegedly acquired by them by taking advantage of their close relationship and influence with former Pres. Marcos. The abovementioned
respondents Tan, et. al are represented as their counsel, former Solicitor General Mendoza. PCGG filed motions to disqualify respondent Mendoza
as counsel for respondents Tan et. al. with Sandiganbayan. It was alleged that Mendoza as then Sol Gen and counsel to Central Bank actively
intervened in the liquidation of GENBANK which was subsequently acquired by respondents Tan et. al., which subsequently became Allied Banking
Corporation. The motions to disqualify invoked Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which prohibits former government lawyers
from accepting “engagement” or employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in the said service. The
Sandiganbayan issued a resolution denyting PCGG’s motion to disqualify respondent Mendoza. It failed to prove the existence of an inconsistency
between respondent Mendoza’s former function as SolGen and his present employment as counsel of the Lucio Tan group. PCGGs recourse to this
court assailing the Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan.

ISSUE

Whether Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to respondent Mendoza. The prohibition states: “A lawyer shall not, after
leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in the said
service.”

HELD

The case at bar does not involve the “adverse interest” aspect of Rule 6.03. Respondent Mendoza, it is conceded, has no adverse interest problem
when he acted as SOlGen and later as counsel of respondents et.al. before the Sandiganbayan. However there is still the issue of whether there
exists a “congruent-interest conflict” sufficient to disqualify respondent Mendoza from representing respondents et. al. The key is unlocking the
meaning of “matter” and the metes and bounds of “intervention” that he made on the matter. Beyond doubt that the “matter” or the act of
respondent Mendoza as SolGen involved in the case at bar is “advising the Central Bank, on how to proceed with the said bank’s liquidation and
even filing the petition for its liquidation in CFI of Manila. The Court held that the advice given by respondent Mendoza on the procedure to
liquidate GENBANK is not the “matter” contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. ABA Formal Opinion No. 342 is clear
in stressing that “drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations and laws, or briefing abstract principles of law
are acts which do not fall within the scope of the term “matter” and cannot disqualify. Respondent Mendoza had nothing to do with the decision of
the Central Bank to liquidate GENBANK. He also did not participate in the sale of GENBANK to Allied Bank. The legality of the liquidation of
GENBANK is not an issue in the sequestration cases. Indeed, the jurisdiction of the PCGG does not include the dissolution and liquidation of banks.
Thus, the Code 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility cannot apply to respondent Mendoza because his alleged intervention while SolGen
is an intervention on a matter different from the matter involved in the Civil case of sequestration. In the metes and bounds of the “intervention”.
The applicable meaning as the term is used in the Code of Professional Ethics is that it is an act of a person who has the power to influence the
subject proceedings. The evil sought to be remedied by the Code do not exist where the government lawyer does not act which can be considered
as innocuous such as “ drafting, enforcing, or interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or laws or briefing abstract principles of
law.” The court rules that the intervention of Mendoza is not significant and substantial. He merely petitions that the court gives assistance in the
liquidation of GENBANK. The role of court is not strictly as a court of justice but as an agent to assist the Central Bank in determining the claims of
creditors. In such a proceeding the role of the SolGen is not that of the usual court litigator protecting the interest of government.
Petition assailing the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan is denied.
Relevant Dissenting Opinion of Justice Callejo:
Rule 6.03 is a restatement of Canon 36 of the Canons of Professional Ethics: “ A lawyer, having once held public office or having been in the public
employ, should not after his retirement accept employment in connection with any matter which he has investigated or passed upon while in such
office or employ.”
Indeed, the restriction against a public official from using his public position as a vehicle to promote or advance his private interests extends
beyond his tenure on certain matters in which he intervened as a public official. Rule 6.03 makes this restriction specifically applicable to lawyers
who once held public office.” A plain reading shows that the interdiction 1. applies to a lawyer who once served in the government and 2. relates to
his accepting “engagement or employment” in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in the service

RE: ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 44 OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH IV, TAGBILARAN CITY, AGAINST ATTY. SAMUEL C. OCCEA.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:

Membership in the bar is in the category of a mandate to public service of the highest order. A lawyer is an oath-bound servant of society whose
conduct is clearly circumscribed by inflexible norms of law and ethics, and whose primary duty is the advancement of the quest for truth and
justice, for which he has sworn to be a fearless crusader.[1] These were the eloquent words of the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro in exalting the
sacred and honorable legal profession. But he laments the pathetic and deplorable fact that, many a law practitioner, forgetting his sacred mission
as a sworn public servant and his exalted position as an officer of the court, has allowed himself to become an instigator of controversy and a
predator of conflict instead of a mediator for concord and a conciliator for compromise, a virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of litigation
instead of a true exponent of the primacy of truth and moral justice, a mercenary purveying the benefits of his enlightened advocacy in direct
proportion to a litigants financial posture instead of a faithful friend of the courts in the dispensation of equal justice to rich and poor alike.[2] Here,
Atty. Samuel C. Occea, as later shown by his disgraceful and outrageous conduct, is one such lawyer who has become an apostate to his exalted
position as an officer of the court. He thus deserves to be weeded out from the legal profession to protect its sanctity and nobility.

This administrative case stemmed from the settlement of the estate of testator William C. Ogan which has since been pending in the Court of First
Instance (CFI), now Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 4, Tagbilaran City, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 423. In 1976, Judge Fernando S. Ruiz
took over the case from Judge Paulino S. Marquez who, in turn, inherited it from Judge Antonio Beldia. Noting that the proceedings have been
pending for thirteen (13) years, Judge Ruiz then inquired into the principal causes of the delay. He found out, as will be shown later in detail, that
Atty. Samuel C. Occea caused the delay by disobeying lawful court orders and by willfully prolonging the litigation through his various maneuvers,
in gross violation of his oath as a lawyer that he will not willingly sue any groundless, false, or unlawful suit, or delay any mans cause for money or
malice.

Going back to Special Proceedings No. 423, under the terms of the Last Will and Testament of the late William C. Ogan, his residuary estate was
divided among his seven children. One of them, Necitas Ogan-Occea, was named in the will as executrix of the estate. As such, she retained her
husband, Atty. Samuel C. Occea, as her lawyer.

The estate consists of bank deposits, securities (both here and in the United States of America), and real estate in Cebu City and in Ohio, U.S.A. The
deceased left no debt. Thus, the settlement of the estate should have been simple and speedy. However, since the death of the testator on
February 1, 1963, the settlement of his estate has not yet been terminated owing largely to the dilatory tactics of Atty. Occea.

Looking into the causes of the delay, Judge Ruiz learned that the executrix, Necitas Ogan-Occea, filed a project of partition on August 4, 1967. On
September 22, 1967, the probate court approved the project except certain portions. The executrix then interposed an appeal. In view of the delay
caused by the pendency of the appeal, the other heirs filed several motions praying that the estates remaining P250,000.00 cash as well as its
shares of stocks in the Philippines and in the United States be distributed among all the heirs. The executrix, through her husband Atty. Occea,
vehemently opposed the motions, asserting that the P250,000.00 cash had already been earmarked for her husbands attorneys fee and other
expenses, and that the shares of stocks could not be distributed among the heirs because the stock certificates were not in her possession. The
dispute between the executrix, on the one hand, and the other heirs, on the other, which delayed the proceedings, centered mainly on the
P250,000.00 cash and the shares of stocks.

Records also show that the executrix, through Atty. Occea, interposed numerous appeals from the orders of the probate court. For their part, the
heirs repeatedly prayed in their motions for the release of the shares of stocks and the remaining cash. But the executrix and Atty. Occea opposed
the same, thus prolonging the proceedings. In CA-GR No. 48716-R (December, 1974), the Court of Appeals, in remanding the case to the probate
court, had this to say:

It is, however, earnestly hoped, and the parties are urged, to settle their differences with the view to closing the estate which has been pending
since 1963. The executrix, the heirs, and the lawyers, are reminded that the prolongation of administrative proceedings can only benefit the
executor or administrator or the counsels for the contending parties. It always results in the diminution of the share of each of the heirs because
the estate is burdened with the expenses of the administration proceedings, the heir must have to pay attorneys fee and the longer the
proceedings the bigger the attorneys fee.[3]

Obviously, the main causes of the delay in the probate proceedings were Atty. Occeas claim for attorneys fee in the amount of P250,000.00 and the
executrixs refusal, through her husband, to account for the shares of stocks belonging to the estate which, according to her, were not in her
possession. The other heirs could not accept that explanation because as executrix, she was charged with the responsibility of collecting all the
assets of the estate.

Thus, on August 8, 1977, Judge Ruiz issued an order directing the executrix to comment why the securities were not in her possession. She filed her
comment, through her husband, that some Philippine and American securities were not in her possession. To determine which securities were in
her possession, Judge Ruiz on October 22, 1977, issued an order requiring her to submit within 30 days the latest inventory of all the securities of
the estate. However, she failed to comply with the order. Judge Ruiz then issued another order on February 6, 1978, directing her to take
possession of all certificates of stocks or their replacements belonging to the estate and to make an up-to-date inventory thereof with a statement
of their nature and their value. Again, she did not comply with the order.

Determined to block the release of the P250,000.00 to the heirs, the executrix, through Atty. Occea, appealed the numerous interlocutory orders of
the probate court to the Court of Appeals, hence, adding to the delay. Because of the propensity of the executrix, through Atty. Occea, to elevate
interlocutory orders to the Court of Appeals, Judge Ruiz issued an order on June 16, 1978 directing her to refrain from instituting any action or
proceeding without first informing the court. The executrix and her husband disobeyed this order. In fact, he filed six cases with the Court of
Appeals and one with this Court.

On August 15, 1979, Judge Ruiz issued an order authorizing Nancy Ogan-Gibson, one of the heirs, to go to Vinton County, Ohio, U.S.A., to take
proper action on the five parcels of land owned by the estate and to submit a report to the probate court. To provide money for the purpose, the
court ordered the executrix to release to Nancy Ogan-Gibson the sum of $1,000.00 from the estate fund, the same to be liquidated with supporting
receipts upon her submission of her report on or before September 30, 1979. The executrix assailed the order before the Court of Appeals in a
petition for prohibition and certiorari, docketed therein as CA-G. R. No. SP-10326. Dismissing the petition on January 13, 1981 for lack of merit, the
Court of Appeals said:

Indeed it is surprising why petitioner as executrix should oppose such an order of the court which is and would be for the benefit of the estate and
the heirs. All the other heirs completely agreed with what the trial court did. xxx

Thus, rather than accuse respondent judge of grave abuse of discretion in issuing the questioned orders he should be complimented in finding ways
and means of promptly and expeditiously determining the assets of the estate to be ultimately distributed among the heirs.

On May 12, 1981, Judge Ruiz cited the executrix for contempt of court for her failure to obey the orders of October 22, 1977, December 8, 1977,
February 6, 1978 and October 16, 1979 and directed her to report to the court which securities were and were not in her possession and to give
the reason therefor.

On February 11, 1982, the executrix and Atty. Occea were held in contempt of court and fined P250.00 each for disobeying the court order of
August 15, 1979 requiring the executrix to release $1,000.00 to Nancy Ogan-Gibson. Both were given the chance to explain their failure to comply
with the order, but they did not submit any explanation. On January 13, 1981, this order was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. No. SP-
10326. It bears emphasis that this incident delayed the proceedings for four (4) years.

On October 16, 1979, the probate court issued an order requiring the executrix to distribute immediately among the heirs all the shares of stocks of
the estate in the Batangas-Laguna Transportation Co., the Masonic Hall, Inc. and the Motor Service Co.; to report her compliance within 10 days
from notice; and within the same period, to file a written report to the court stating (a) what other certificates of stocks belonging to the estate are
in her possession; and (b) which certificates of stocks are not with her, giving the reasons therefor. Again, the executrix and her husband, Atty.
Occea, did not comply with the said order. The probate court thus ordered her to explain why she should not be punished for contempt of court.
After several postponements at her instance and that of her husband, the incident was set for hearing on April 20, 1981. But neither of them
appeared, thus delaying the proceedings for about a year and a half. Finding the executrix unfaithful in the performance of her duties, the probate
court, on May 12, 1981, adjudged her in contempt of court.

Forthwith, Atty. Occea and his wife, filed with the then CFI of Davao City, Civil Case No. 14456 for damages (P200,000.00 as moral damages and
expenses of litigation) against Judge Ruiz. But, on October 13, 1981, the court dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.

After the dismissal of Civil Case No. 14456, Atty. Occea filed with the Tanodbayan a letter-complaint against Judge Ruiz, charging him with
knowingly rendering unjust interlocutory orders, in that without prior notice and hearing, he punished the executrix for indirect contempt of court
and censured her for non-compliance with the probate courts order of October 16, 1979. For lack of merit, Atty. Occeas complaint was dismissed
by then Tanodbayan Bernardo P. Fernandez in a Resolution dated November 19, 1984.

On November 13, 1979, Atty. Occea filed with this Court Administrative Case No. 2345-CFI against Judge Ruiz for gross inefficiency and dishonesty.
In a Resolution dated October 11, 1982, this Court dismissed the complaint for failure of Atty. Occea to substantiate his charges during the
investigation.

Unhappy with what Judge Ruiz stated in his comment on the said administrative complaint, Atty. Occea and his wife filed with the CFI of Davao City
Civil Case No. 14957 for damages against the former. The couple alleged that they suffered damages upon reading the judges comment filed with
the Supreme Court. On June 11, 1982, the CFI dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action, the comment being an absolutely privileged
communication.

By filing the said civil actions, criminal charge, and administrative complaints, found to be groundless, Atty. Occea further delayed with malice the
probate proceedings and inflicted hardship and pain upon Judge Ruiz.

More telling is the fact that by deliberately delaying the proceedings, Atty. Occea has inflicted greater harm to the other heirs, with the executrix
herself as his willing partner.
From the start of the testate proceedings in 1963, no less than 13 petitions were filed with this Court and the Court of Appeals by Atty. Occea,
questioning the interlocutory orders of the probate court. But most, if not all, were without merit.

Aside from Judge Ruiz, his predecessor, the late Judge Antonio Beldia, in the same probate proceedings, was also harassed by Atty. Occea with
groundless administrative charges and suits, both criminal and civil. These cases, while pending, were then utilized by Atty. Occea in securing
restraining orders from the Court of Appeals or as grounds for the judges inhibition.

Pursuant to Section 28, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court providing inter alia that the CFI may suspend an attorney from the practice of law for
cause, Judge Ruiz, on May 26, 1982, filed with the same probate court Administrative Case No. 44 charging Atty. Occea with gross misconduct,
violation of his oath as a lawyer and willful disobedience of lawful court orders. Instead of filing an answer, he submitted a motion praying for the
inhibition of Judge Ruiz. This motion was denied. Atty. Occea was then directed to file his answer within 15 days from notice which was extended
to another 15 days upon his motion. Still, he did not file an answer. What he submitted was a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction. But it was denied for lack of merit.

Administrative Case No. 44 was set for hearing on December 2 and 3, 1982, morning and afternoon. Upon Atty. Occeas motion, he was given an
extension of 15 days from November 3, 1982 within which to file his answer. However, he did not comply. Neither did he appear during the
hearing.

Eventually, further hearing of the case was suspended when this Court issued a temporary restraining order in G. R. No. 62453, Samuel Occea vs.
District Judge Fernando S. Ruiz, CFI-4, Bohol for prohibition. However, on August 15, 1983, this Court dismissed Atty. Occeas petition for lack of
merit. The hearing of the administrative case was set on January 30 and 31, 1984, but again, he did not appear.

The hearing was reset but once more, Atty. Occea failed to appear. Upon his telegraphic request, the hearing was reset on December 13 and 14,
1984. On December 7, 1984, he filed his Answer and Motion for Referral to the Solicitor General or the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. His motion
was denied. The hearing was reset on May 8 and 9, 1985. Upon another telegraphic request of Atty. Occea, the hearing was postponed to August
14 and 15, 1985. Again, he did not appear. Thus, in its order of August 15, 1985, the probate court considered his failure to appear as a waiver of
his right to present evidence.[4]

On November 14, 1985, based on the evidence presented ex parte, showing that Atty. Occea has abused, misused and overused the judicial
system,[5] Judge Ruiz rendered a decision suspending[6] him from the practice of law for three (3) years. The decision[7] unfolded a long list of his
administrative offenses, thus:

Willful disobedience of lawful orders of the court;

gross misconduct in office

During the probate proceedings, respondent Occea, on behalf of his wife executrix, filed with the Court of Appeals six (6) cases; and with the
Supreme Court one (1) case, assailing the order of the probate court directing the said executrix to provide Nancy Ogan, authorized to determine
the assets of the estate in the U.S., $1,000.00 to be taken from the estate; and the order ordering the same executrix to report to the probate court
the securities belonging to the estate. Atty. Occeas refusal to obey the said orders and elevating the same to the higher courts unnecessarily
delayed the probate proceedings.

II

Wittingly or willingly promoted or sued groundless

suits and gave aid or consent to the same; delayed
persons for money or malice

Respondent, together with his wife, filed against the judge of the probate court two actions for damages which were both dismissed for lack of
merit and lack of cause of action. Respondent also filed with the Tanodbayan a letter-complaint charging the judge of the probate court with
knowingly rendering unjust interlocutory orders. The complaint was likewise dismissed for lack of merit. Respondent also filed with this Court an
administrative complaint which was again dismissed for failure of respondent to substantiate the charge.

By filing the above-cited civil actions for damages, administrative complaint and criminal charge which were found to be groundless and
unsubstantiated, respondent unduly delayed the settlement of the estate proceedings by harassing Judge Ruiz who had to spend time, effort and
money to defend himself against said frivolous and unmeritorious cases.

In fact, respondents propensity to file groundless administrative charges, as well as civil and criminal suits, harassed not only Judge Ruiz but also
the previous judges who handled the case. As a measure of self defense, these judges were compelled to prepare and file pleadings or comments
thereby using time which could have been devoted to expediting the closure of the estate proceedings.

Finally, since the start of the testate proceedings in 1963, no less than 13 petitions were filed with the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals
questioning the interlocutory orders of the probate court. Most, if not all of these petitions, were determined to be groundless and without merit.
III

Disobeying the laws

Respondent violated his lawyers oath of office by flagrantly disobeying the clear provision of Rule 140, Section 6, Revised Rules of Court, entitled
Charges Against Judges of First Instance, which reads as follows:

Sec. 6. Confidential - Proceedings against judges of first instance shall be private and confidential.

During the pendency of the administrative complaint (Adm. Matter No. 23345-CFI, Exh. Z) filed by respondent against Judge Ruiz in the Supreme
Court, he violated the private and confidential nature thereof three (3) times, to wit:

1. On April 1, 1980, respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for prohibition and certiorari, entitled Estate of William C. Ogan, et al. vs.
Hon. Fernando S. Ruiz, et al., CA-G.R. No. SP-10604, questioning an interlocutory order of the probate court (No. 2, Exh. V) to which he attached as
Annex AW a complete copy of his aforesaid administrative complaint against Judge Ruiz albeit the same is completely immaterial to the issue raised
in said petition.

2. In another petition for prohibition and certiorari, entitled Estate of William C. Ogan, et al. vs. Hon. Fernando S. Ruiz, et al., CA-G.R. No. SP-13162
(No. 4, Exh. V), impugning an interlocutory order of the probate court, he attached as Annex C thereof a true and complete copy of the said
administrative complaint although not relevant to the question therein raised; and

3. On March 29, 1982, when respondent filed a letter-criminal complaint with the Tanodbayan (Exh. Y), he also attached as Annex A thereof a true
and complete copy of said administrative complaint against Judge Ruiz even if said administrative complaint is not germane to the charge (Page 2,
No. 1, Exh. Y).

By repeatedly violating said provision of the Rules of Court, respondent, as an officer of the court, put to naught one of the principal purposes
thereof which is to protect the personal and professional reputation of judges from the baseless charges of disgruntled, vindictive and irresponsible
clients, litigants and counsels (In re Abistado, 57 Phil. 668; Murillo vs. Superable, Adm. Case No. 341, March 23, 1960; Moran, Rules of Court, 1963
Ed., Vol. VI, page 260). Respondent committed gross misconduct in office and has not conducted himself as a lawyer according to the best of his
knowledge and discretion.

IV

Did falsehood and consented to the

doing of same in court.

In his complaint for damages against Judge Ruiz (Civil Case No. 14456 (Exh. W), respondent alleged in paragraph IV-7b thereof (Exh. W-1) that his
wife-executrix Necitas Ogan Occea was held in contempt and censured, without any hearing, for not obeying the probate courts order of October
16, 1979 (Exh. N).

However, the records of the Ogan estate proceedings (Sp. Proc. No. 423) would show that in the order of February 26, 1980, the probate court
directed said executrix to explain within 5 days from notice why she should not be cited for contempt (Exh. O). In the order of April 8, 1980, the
contempt charge was set for hearing on June 23, 1980, at 9:00 oclock in the morning (Exh. P) but was reset to October 22, 1980 after the lifting of
the restraining order of the Court of Appeals (Exh. Q). This was again reset to April 20, 1981, subsequent to the denial by the Supreme Court of the
respondents petition for review impugning the Court of Appeals decision. As stated in the order of May 12, 1981, page 2, paragraph 3 (Exh. R),
copies of the order setting the hearing of the contempt charge on said date (April 20, 1981) were received by the respondent and his wife-executrix
on March 24, 1981. On the date of the hearing, neither the executrix nor respondent appeared. The following day (April 21, 1981), the court
received executrixs motion for postponement of the hearing, which was denied for lack of merit. Subsequently, the order of May 12, 1981 (Exh. R)
was rendered holding the executrix in contempt and penalized with censure.

In fine, there was hearing with notice but the executrix and her counsel did not attend.

Meanwhile, respondent once more, committed falsehood when he subsequently alleged under oath in his letter-complaint to the Tanodbayan,
dated March 29, 1982, against Judge Ruiz (Exh. Y) that without prior notice and without any hearing, Judge Ruiz adjudged executrix Necitas Ogan
Occea guilty of contempt and censuring her (page 2, paragraph 2, Exh. Y-2; page 5, paragraph 9b, Exh. Y-3).

Furthermore, in order to avoid complying with the probate court order of August 15, 1979 (Exh. C), directing said executrix to remit immediately
the sum of $1,000.00 to her co-heir Nancy Ogan-Gibson with which to meet whatever necessary expenses that she might incur in inquiring into the
status of the 5 parcels of land owned by the estate at Vinton County, Ohio, U.S.A., respondent and his wife-executrix committed falsehood when
they stated in their petition filed with the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP-10326 that the said order was issued without hearing and thus a
violation of procedural due process. The Court of Appeals, in its decision which has become final (Exh. E), confirmed this falsehood when it held
that the petitioner-executrix was not deprived of her right to be heard when the respondent judge issued the two orders in question (Page 6, Exh.
E).
In accordance with the provisions of Section 29, Rule 138[8] and Section 9, Rule 139[9] of the Revised Rules of Court, Judge Ruiz, on November 26,
1985, transmitted to this Court a certified true copy of the order of suspension and a full statement of facts.[10]

On February 11, 1986, this Court, upon Atty. Occeas motion, restrained Judge Ruiz from enforcing his decision of November 14, 1985. The case
then has remained pending so that on May 30, 1989, this Court issued an Order[11] requiring the parties to move in the premises, by informing the
Court about the status of the decision or order suspending Atty. Samuel C. Occea from the practice of law, Judge Ruiz particularly indicating if he
still pursues the instant case, within ten (10) days from notice.

On June 2, 1989, Judge Ruiz filed a comment that he has been waiting for this Courts action on his decision suspending Atty. Occea.

On August 25, 1989, Atty. Occea filed an Explanation and Motion praying that the case be referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for
investigation and recommendation. This Court denied the motion and instead referred the case to Atty. Emilio Rebueno (now deceased), then Bar
Confidant, for evaluation, report and recommendation. After going over the records, he recommended that the temporary restraining order
enjoining Judge Fernando S. Ruiz from enforcing the decision dated November 14, 1985 suspending Atty. Samuel C. Occea from the practice of law
for a period of three years be forthwith LIFTED, and that Atty. Samuel C. Occea be DISBARRED from the practice of law for grave violation of his
oath of office as attorney; likewise, that his name be DROPPED from the roll of attorneys.

We sustain the evaluation, report and recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant, the same being supported by the facts on record.

Indeed, a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any misconduct showing any fault or deficiency in his moral character, honesty, probity or
good demeanor.[12] His guilt, however, cannot be presumed.[13] It must indicate the dubious character of the acts done, as well as the motivation
thereof. Furthermore, a disbarred lawyer must have been given full opportunity upon reasonable notice to answer the charges against him,
produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to be heard by himself and counsel.[14] All these requirements have been complied with in the case at
hand.

In fact, it was Atty. Occea who did not bother at all to appear in the hearing of the administrative case against him which was postponed by Judge
Ruiz so many times so that he could be accorded the full measure of due process. The court a quo, therefore, appropriately proceeded to hear the
case ex parte as Atty. Occea deliberately failed to appear and answer the accusations against him.

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court mandates that a member of the Bar may be disbarred or suspended by this Court for any (1)
deceit, (2) malpractice, (3) gross misconduct in office, (4) grossly immoral conduct, (5) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, (6) violation
of the lawyers oath, (7) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, and for (8) willfully appearing as an attorney for a party without
authority to do so. Not only did Atty. Occea commit deceit, malpractice, grossly immoral conduct and willful disobedience to a superior court.
Beyond these transgressions, he violated the lawyers oath whereby he imposed upon himself the following duties, thus:

I, __________________,of __________________,do
(place of birth)
solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; I will support its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal
orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willing
promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, or give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will
conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion, with all good fidelity as well to the court as to my clients; and I
impose upon myself these voluntary obligations without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God.

As shown by the records, Atty. Occea gravely violated his oath of office in his handling of Special Proceedings No. 423. The facts of the case
succinctly show that through his atrocious maneuvers, he successfully delayed the disposition of the case for the last thirty-eight (38) years, causing
untold hurt and prejudice, not only to the heirs, but also to Judges Ruiz and Beldia who heard the case. For respondents part and that of his wife,
such prolonged litigation obviously benefited them. As aptly declared by the Court of Appeals, the delay can only benefit the executor or
administrator and the longer the proceedings, the bigger the attorneys fees. But the more tragic reality is the fact that Atty. Occea has caused a
mockery of the judicial proceedings and inflicted injury to the administration of justice through his deceitful, dishonest, unlawful and grossly
immoral conduct. Indeed, he abused beyond measure his privilege to practice law.

This Court has held that a lawyer should not abuse his right of recourse to the courts for the purpose of arguing a cause that had been repeatedly
rebuffed. Neither should he use his knowledge of law as an instrument to harass a party nor to misuse judicial processes, as the same constitutes
serious transgression of the Code of Professional Responsibility. For while he owes fidelity to the cause of his client, it should not be at the expense
of truth and the administration of justice.[15]

The practice of law is a sacred and noble profession. It is a special privilege bestowed only upon those who are competent intellectually,
academically and morally.[16] A lawyer must at all times conduct himself, especially in his dealings with his clients and the public at large, with
honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach.[17] He must faithfully perform his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients.
A violation of the high standards of the legal profession subjects the lawyer to administrative sanctions by this Court which includes suspension and
disbarment.

Clearly, Atty. Occeas conduct has made him unfit to remain in the legal profession even for a single moment.
It is a time-honored rule that good moral character is not only a condition precedent to admission to the practice of law. Its continued possession is
also essential for remaining in the legal profession.[18] Atty. Occea has definitely fallen below the moral bar when he engaged in deceitful,
dishonest, unlawful and grossly immoral acts. This Court has repeatedly stressed the importance of integrity and good moral character as part of a
lawyers equipment in the practice of his profession,[19] because it cannot be denied that the respect of litigants for the profession is inexorably
diminished whenever a member of the Bar betrays their trust and confidence.[20] Thus, for his serious administrative offenses, punishable under
Section 27 of Rule 138, Atty. Occea deserves the ultimate penalty, that of expulsion from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers.

WHEREFORE, ATTY. SAMUEL C. OCCEA is DISBARRED from the practice of law. His name is STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys EFFECTIVE
IMMEDIATELY.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts throughout the country.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, and
Corona, JJ., concur.
Quisumbing, J., abroad (on leave).