THE 1987 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES – ARTICLE VI

Section 11:

A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall, in all offenses punishable by not more
than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No Member
shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in
any committee thereof.

Privilege of Speech and Debate : No Member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other
place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof.

Purpose: It is intended to protect members of congress against government pressure and intimidation
aimed at influencing the decision‐making prerogatives of Congress and its members.

The following requirements must be observed:

1. That the remarks must be made while the legislature or the legislative committee is functioning,
that is in session

2. That they must be made in connection with the discharge of official duties.

To invoke the privilege of speech, the matter must be oral and must be proven to be indeed privileged.

Speech or debate includes a vote or passage of a resolution, all the utterances made by Congressmen
in the performance of their functions such as speeches delivered, statements made, or votes casts in
the halls of Congress. It also includes bills introduced in Congress (whether or not it is in session) and
all the other utterances (made outside or inside the premises of Congress) provided they are made in
accordance with a legislative function.

 It is intended to protect members of congress against government pressure and intimidation

aimed at influencing the decision‐making prerogatives of Congress and its members.
 Moreover, a senator‐lawyer cannot be disbarred or disciplined by the Supreme Court for
statements made during a privilege speech. The senator‐lawyer’s privilege speech is not
actionable criminally or in a disciplinary proceeding under the Rules of Court.

BETWEEN LAWYER AND CLIENT

Rules of Court, Rule 130, Section 24 (b): An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be
examined as to any communication made by the client to him, or his advice given thereon in the
course of, or with a view to, professional employment, nor can an attorney's secretary, stenographer,
or clerk be examined, without the consent of the client and his employer, concerning any fact the
knowledge of which has been acquired in such capacity.

II. REASON: The rule is grounded on public policy and the proper administration of justice. It is to
encourage clients to make a full disclosure of all facts relative to a problem for which he sought the
professional services of a lawyer, without fear or reservation that these facts will later be revealed
especially if the nature of the facts are such that they might adversely affect his rights, property or
reputation. This is to inspire confidence and thus it is also to enable the lawyer to give the appropriate
advice or to undertake such action that will best serve the interest of the client.
III. REQUIREMENTS

1. There must be a lawyer-client relationship

 The term “lawyer” refers to:

(a). a member of the Philippine Bar in good standing acting in such a capacity, whether in
active practice or not

(b). non-lawyers allowed by law to appear as counsel pursuant to section 7 of Rule 118. ( But
in localities where such members of the bar are not available, the court may appoint any person,
resident of the province and of good repute for probity and ability, to defend the accused.)

(c). Non-lawyers who misrepresent themselves as members of the bar in order to obtain the
confidence of a person and believed as such by the latter.

 The relationship maybe created by mutual consent at the initiative of the client, or is created
by Order of the Court as in the case of a counsel de officio.

a). the relationship exists whenever the client consults with a lawyer in relation to a matter
which needs the professional services of the lawyer be it for advice or representation in a future or
present legal action.

b). it does not matter that no fee was paid, or that the lawyer later refused to represent the
client or that he withdrew from the action.

c). however the rule does not cover situations where the lawyer was consulted merely as a
notary

2. There must be a communication by the client to the lawyer or advice given thereon by the
lawyer.

 The communication must be for the purpose of creating a lawyer-client relationship or was
given in the course of such relationship.
 The term communication includes the following:

a). Any data or information supplied by the client personally or through confidential agents,
either to the lawyer or to the lawyer’s employees. This may have been supplied through any form of
oral or written communication.

b). All documents, objects or thing delivered to the lawyer except those the existence and/or
contents of which are or maybe known.

Thus titles to land, contracts, reply-communications, bank pass books, dishonored checks, cannot
be considered as confidential.

c). Acts or conduct by the client, such as physical demonstration of actions or events, or
giving a sample of his handwriting to show he is not the falsifier.
 d).The advice given by the lawyer to the client orally or through any mode of written
communication.

e).The identity of the client. As a matter of public policy a lawyer may not invoke the
privilege and refuse to divulge the name or identity of the client except in the situation when the
client’s name has an independent significance such that disclosure would reveal the client’s
confidences.

 The identity may not be disclosed in the following situations:

1. where a strong probability exists that revealing the client’s name would implicate the client in
the very activity for which he sought the lawyer’s advise

2. Where the disclosure would open the client to civil liability

3. Where the government prosecutors have no case against the client and compelling the lawyer
to reveal his client’s name would furnish the only link that would form a chain of testimony
necessary to convict the client of a crime.

4. Where it is the identity of the client which is sought to be confidential

5. Those covered by the “Doctrine of Work Product”. The pleadings prepared by the lawyer or
his private files containing either facts and data obtained by him or resulting from his own
investigation or by any investigator hired by him; and/or his impressions or conclusions
whether reduced in writing or not, about the client or the clients cause.

The following communications are not covered and the lawyer may reveal them:

a). those intended to be made public

b). or intended to be communicated to a third person

c). intended for an unlawful purpose or for a future crime or act

d). received from a third person not acting in behalf or as agent of the client

e). those made in the presence of third persons

f). those which are irrelevant

g). the effects of a crime as well as weapons or instruments of a crime.

h). opinions on abstract questions or hypothetical questions of law

3. The communication was confidential

4. The consent of the client to the disclosure was not obtained

IV. Duration and Waiver:

A. The duration is perpetual even after the lawyer-client relationship has already ceased.

B. The rule maybe waived by the client alone, or by his representatives in case of his death, expressly
or by implication.

Exceptions:

1. If he is a party to a case and his lawyer was called as a witness by his opponent, by failure of the
client to object to the questions concerning the privileged communications or having objected on
direct, the client cross-examines on the privileged communications.

2. When the client presents evidence on the privileged communication, the opposing party may call on
the lawyer to rebut the evidence.

3. When the client calls on the lawyer to testify on the privileged communication

4. In case of a suit by and between the lawyer and the client, the rule does not apply

5. When the lawyer is accused of a crime in relation to the act of the client which was the subject of
their professional relationship, he may reveal the privileged communications to prove he had nothing
to do with the crime.

V. Liability:

If the lawyer, as witness to a case which does not involve the client, divulges confidential
communication without the prior consent of the client, he may be liable criminally, civilly and
administratively.

Rules of Court, Rule 7, Section 3. Signature and address. — Every pleading must be signed by the
party or counsel representing him, stating in either case his address which should not be a post office
box.

The signature of counsel constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading; that to the best
of his knowledge, information, and belief there is good ground to support it; and that it is not
interposed for delay.

An unsigned pleading produces no legal effect. However, the court may, in its discretion, allow such
deficiency to be remedied if it shall appear that the same was due to mere inadvertence and not
intended for delay. Counsel who deliberately files an unsigned pleading, or signs a pleading in
violation of this Rule, or alleges scandalous or indecent matter therein, or fails promptly report to the
court a change of his address, shall be subject to appropriate disciplinary action.

Significance of the Signature of Counsel:

1. He has read the pleading;

2. That to the best of his knowledge, information or belief , there is good ground to support it,
and
 3. It is not interposed for delay.

Cases where a counsel is subject to disciplinary action:

1. Deliberately files an unsigned pleading;

2. Signs a pleading in violation of the Rules;
3. Alleges in the pleading scandalous or indecent matter or
4. Fails to promptly report to the court a change of his address

Utterances made in the course of judicial proceedings, including all kinds of pleadings, petitions and
motions belong to the class of communication that are absolutely privileged.

The requirement of materiality and relevancy is imposed so that the protection given to individuals in
the interest of an efficient administration of justice may not be abused as a cloak from beneath which
private malice may be gratified.

[ A.C. NO. 6711, July 03, 2007 ]

MA. LUISA HADJULA, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. ROCELES F. MADIANDA,

RESPONDENT.

Facts: Hadjula claimed that she asked legal advice from her friend, Atty. Madianda. She disclosed
confidential information during that period. However, after the confidential information was given by
Hadjula, Atty. Madianda referred her to another lawyer.

Hadjula filed a complaint against Atty. Madianda because of this, claiming the lawyer just
wanted to hear her secrets. In answering the complaint, Atty. Madianda filed a counter complaint
against Hadjula for falsification of public documents and immorality – using the disclosures as basis
for the charges.

Issue: whether or not there is a violation of the rule on confidentiality.

Held: Yes, The moment complainant approached the then receptive respondent to seek legal advice, a
veritable lawyer-client relationship evolved between the two. Such relationship imposes upon the
lawyer certain restrictions circumscribed by the ethics of the profession. Atty. Madianda should have
kept the information secret and confidential, under the attorney-client privilege rule.

[G.R. Nos. 115439-41. July 16, 1997]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN,

MANSUETO V. HONRADA, CEFERINO S. PAREDES, JR. and GENEROSO S. SANSAET,
respondents.
Facts: A case of perjury against was filed against respondent Ceferino Paredes, Jr. for fraudulent
misrepresentations in his application for a free patent over a vast trat of land. However, the same was
dismissed on the ground of prescription. Then again, another case was filed against him for violation
of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) for using his former position as Provincial
Attorney to influence and induce the Bureau of Lands officials to favourably act on his application for
patent. In all these cases, Paredes was represented by respondent Atty. Sansaet, a practicing attorney.

Respondent Paredes contends that he has already been charged under the same set of facts and the
same evidence where such complaint (perjury case where he was already arraigned) has already been
dismissed. Hence, double jeopardy has already attached. In support hereof, Paredes presented court
records and transcripts as proof of his arraignment in the perjury case.

However, the documents were found to be falsified, in conspiracy with Paredes’ counsel and the clerk
of court where the perjury case was filed. One Teofilo Gelacio claims that no notice of arraignment
was ever received by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal. Hence, another case was filed for
falsification of judicial records. It was then that respondent Sansaet offered to testify as a state witness
against his client Paredes, claiming that the latter contrived and induced him to have the graft case
dismissed on the ground of double jeopardy by having him and co-respondent prepare and falsify the
subject documents.

But the Sandiganbayan denied the motion on the ground of attorney-client privilege since the lawyer
could not testify against his own client. In view of such relationship, confidential matters must have
been disclosed by Paredes, as client, to accused Sansaet, as his lawyer, in his professional capacity,
and therefore privileged.

ISSUE: Whether or not the testimony of respondent Sansaet, as proposed state witness, is barred by
attorney-client privilege.

HELD: No, There is no privileged communication rule to talk about. The privilege applies only if the
information was relayed by the client to the lawyer respecting a past crime. The reckoning point is
when the communication was given, not when the lawyer was made to testify.

The attorney-client privilege cannot apply in these cases as the facts thereof and the actuations of both
respondents therein constitute an exception to the rule.

The announced intention of a client to commit a crime is not included within the confidences which
his attorney is bound to respect. Here, the testimony sought to be elicited from Sansaet as state
witness are the communications made to him by physical acts and/or accompanying words of Paredes
at the time he and Honrada were about to falsify the documents. Clearly, therefore, the confidential
communications thus made by Paredes to Sansaet were for purposes of and in reference to the crime
of falsification which had not yet been committed in the past by Paredes but which he, in confederacy
with his present co-respondents, later committed. Having been made for purposes of a future offense,
those communications are outside the pale of the attorney-client privilege.

It is well settled that communication between a lawyer and his client, to be privileged, must be for a
lawful purpose or in furtherance of a lawful end. The existence of an unlawful purpose prevents the
privilege from attaching. In fact, the prosecution of the honorable relation of attorney and client will
not be permitted under the guise of privilege, and every communication made to an attorney by a
client for a criminal purpose is a conspiracy or attempt at a conspiracy which is not only lawful to
divulge, but which the attorney under certain circumstances may be bound to disclose at once in the
interest of justice.

To prevent a conniving counsel from revealing the genesis of a crime which was later committed
pursuant to a conspiracy, because of the objection thereto of his conspiring client, would be one of the
worst travesties in the rules of evidence and practice in the noble profession of law.

[ A.C. No. 7399, August 25, 2009 ]

ANTERO J. POBRE, COMPLAINANT, VS. SEN. MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO,

RESPONDENT.

Facts: Petitioner, Antero Pobre made aware to the court the contents of Senator Miriam Defensor-
Santiago’s speech delivered on the senate floor. According to Pobre, the words of the lady senator
were disrespectful and requested that the latter be disbarred or be subjected to disciplinary action.

Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago argued that the statements she made were covered by the
constitutional provision on parliamentary immunity, being part of a speech she delivered in the
discharge of her duty as member of Congress or its committee. She claims to have made those
comments to expose anomalies with regard to the selection process of the Judicial Bar Council for the
next Chief Justice. The argument of the respondent is based on Article VI Section 11 of the 1987
Constitution.

Issue: whether or not respondent can be charged for her comments on the Judiciary.

Held: No, The court ruled in favor of Defensor-Santiago in this case. The plea of Senator Santiago for
the dismissal of the complaint for disbarment or disciplinary action is well taken. Indeed, her privilege
speech is not actionable criminally or in a disciplinary proceeding under the Rules of Court.

Despite this, the court feels that the lady senator has gone beyond the limits of decency and good
conduct for the statements made which were intemperate and highly improper in substance. The court
is not hesitant to impose some form of disciplinary sanctions on her, but the factual and legal
circumstances of this case, however, deter the Court from doing so, even without any sign of remorse
from her.

[ GR No. 59161, Jan 30, 1982 ]

MELQUIADES GUTIERREZ v. ENRIQUE H.R. ABILA

Facts: Plaintiff-appellant filed an action for damages against defendants Restituto Clemente, Manuel
Fransisco, Atty. Enrique H.R. Abila Assistant and Provincial Fiscal Eliseo de Guzman in the Court of
First Instance of Rizal(Caloocan City). Basis of the complaint was the answer filed by defendants.
Petitioner alleges that in the aforesaid answer wilfully, maliciously and malevolently recited false,
sham, redundant, scandalous, impertinent and irrelevant statements which served no purpose than to
put his character, personality and reputation in an utterly bad light and said act being contrary to law.

Upon motion of the defendants on the ground that aforesaid statements, even if defamatory, are
absolutely privileged, the trial court dismissed the complaint and from this order plaintiff filed an
appeal.

Issue: whether or not the pleadings in question are absolutely privileged.

Held: No. The court found that the aforementioned personal opinions of the defendants in their
answer, expressed in vituperative and intemperate language, are palpably devoid of any relation
whatever to the subject of inquiry and have no place in a pleading. In Anonymous vs. Trenkman et al,
the Court defined the restriction to the privilege enjoyed by pleadings thus:

The pleadings should contain but the plain and concise statements of the material facts and not the
evidence by which they are to be proved. ... If the pleader goes beyond the requirements of the statute
and alleges an irrelevant matter which is libellous, he loses his privilege.

The requirement of materiality and relevancy is imposed so that the protection given to individuals in
the interest of an efficient administration of justice may not be abused as a cloak from beneath which
private malice may be gratified.

[ GR No. L-29560, Mar 31, 1976 ]

MIGUEL CUENCO v. MANUEL CUENCO

Facts: Plaintiff, Miguel Cuenco is a well-known member of the bar for many years and a prominent
member of the House of Representatives, filed a complaint against defendants Manuel Cuenco, Jose
P. Velez, and Federico A. Reyes, president, secretary-treasurer, general manager, respectively, and
simultaneously members of the board of directors of the Bisaya Land Transportation Co., Inc.; and
Dioscoro B. Lazaro, as publisher and business manager of "The Republic Daily", a newspaper
published in Cebu City, with general circulation in the province of Cebu and other parts of the
Philippines. The complaint alleges that by conspiring and confederating among themselves defendants
caused the publication of a newspaper article containing false, untrue, and malicious and known to
defendants to be so, and their publication and circulation by defendants was made for no other
purpose than to put the reputation of plaintiff in a bad light and to impeach plaintiff's honesty and
integrity. Defendants contended that the questioned article consisted of the gist of the complaint in
Civil Case No. 5665 and that that the subject matter of the complaint in Civil Case No. 5665 is
identical to that of the counterclaim of the Bisaya corporation contained in its opposition to the
Motion of Atty. Miguel Cuenco (defendant in Civil Case No. 5665) for attorney's fees in the Bisaya-
Ivaran Case (Civil Case No. 3040) and in the latter case, the C.F.I. Cebu had already taken action, so
that the privileged character of the counterclaim in Civil Case No. 3040 can be extended to the
complaint in Civil Case No. 5665. The lower court did not consider defendants' contention
meritorious on the ground that the complaint in Civil Case No. 5665 is a distinct pleading.

Issue: whether or not the newspaper article in question is privileged.

Held: Yes. The reason for the rule that pleadings in judicial proceedings are considered privileged is
not only because said pleadings have become part of public record open to the public to scrutinize, but
also due to the undeniable fact that said pleadings are presumed to contain allegations and assertions
lawful and legal in nature, appropriate to the disposition of issues ventilated before the courts for the
proper administration of justice and, therefore, of general public concern. Moreover, pleadings are
presumed to contain allegations substantially true because they can be supported by evidence
presented in good faith, the contents of which would be under the scrutiny of courts and, therefore,
subject to be purged of all improprieties and illegal statements contained therein.

The court concluded that the published complaint in Civil Case No. 5665, although considered
libelous "per se", would fall under the protective mantle of privileged communication. It follows that
its author (defendant Lazaro) cannot be held liable for its publication.