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Fire Safety of Naval Vessels made of Composite

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 NATO UNCLASSIFIED

Fire Safety of Naval Vessels made of Composite Materials:

Fire Safety Philosophies, Ongoing Research and
State-of-the-Art Passive Fire Protection

Dag McGeorge Bjørn Høyning

Det Norske Veritas AS FiReCo AS
Veritasveien 1 Mosseveien 39b
N-1322 Høvik N-1600 Fredrikstad
NORWAY NORWAY

SUMMARY
For both military and commercial vessels, fire hazards are of great concern and hence have an important
impact on design and operation.

The behaviour of structures composed of composite materials in fire is quite different from the behaviour
of those composed of steel. For civilian vessels, particular requirements are specified for composite
structure to take these differences into account. In fire scenarios of particular relevance for naval
vessels, the differences in fire behaviour of steel and composite structures are even more profound.
Hence, suitable strategies to control fire hazards are needed for naval composite structures that differ
both from the established ones for civilian composite vessels and those for naval steel vessels.

This paper first challenges some common preconceived opinions about composite structures and
continues with a summary of the major differences between a composite structure and a steel structure.
On this basis, key elements of an efficient fire fighting strategy are outlined covering both active and
passive measures. Then a method to rationally compare the fire survivability of a composite structure to
that of a traditional steel structure is outlined. How an ongoing research project, EUCLID RTP3.21
Survivability, durability and performance of naval composite structures, contributes to filling the
knowledge gaps is explained and the key remaining issues to allow rational comparison between the fire
survivability of a composite structure to that of a steel structure are identified.

This leads to the following conclusions:

1. Effective measures can be implemented to control the risks associated with fires in composite
structures.
2. Current state of the art does not allow to determine a rational measure of the survivability of a
structure to fire, whether steel or composite, and hence does not allow a rational comparison
between them.
3. Despite implementation of all cost effective measures to reduce fire vulnerability, one can imagine
extremely severe fire scenarios where the combustible composite structure would be exposed and
contribute to the fire. However, in many of the more likely scenarios, the composite structure will
be less vulnerable than the steel structure. This advantage is likely to more than outweigh the
disadvantage in the extremely severe scenarios.
4. Traditional steel structures have been taken into use without quantitative knowledge of their fire
survivability.

Paper presented at the RTO AVT Specialists’ Meeting on “Fire Safety and Survivability”,
held in Aalborg, Denmark, 23-26 September 2002, and published in RTO-MP-103.

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5. If adopting a composite structure, this will as for current steel structures, have to be without
quantitative knowledge of its fire survivability. However, it is likely that it will be less vulnerable
than a traditional steel structure to fire, given that adequate measures are taken as outlined
herein.

On this basis, it is recommended that the combustible nature of composite materials is not used as an
argument to not use composites in warships. To fully understand the trade-offs between composite and
steel structures, the above fire aspects need to be considered alongside with such aspects as strength,
weight, whole life costs, reparability, blast and fragment resistance.

THE BEHAVIOUR OF A COMPOSITE SANDWICH STRUCTURE IN WEAPON

INDUCED FIRES

Challenging Some Common Preconceived Opinions

The first preconceived opinion challenged is: “Unlike steel, composites burn and are therefore unsuitable
for construction of warship structures”. This view is commonly encountered, not only for naval
applications, it also appears to be reflected in international regulations for civilian ships and may to some
extent reflect aversion or resistance to change. The underlying logic seems to be that fires are dangerous,
therefore, combustible materials should not be used in the structure. Why this logic is not rational can be
illustrated by using the same type of logic to support the conclusion (that has long been proven wrong):
steel is an unsuitable structural material for ships because steel sinks:

Old idea, proven to be good: Replace wood with
steel as structural material for ships.
Premise: Risks of sinking should be minimised.
Fallacious logic: Don’t use steel because steel
sinks.
Rational logic: Steel ships can sink, but so can
wooden ships because they normally carry
equipment and cargo that would make them
sink if flooded with water.
Solution: Measures that manage the risks of
sinking of steel ships are included in regulations.
New idea, not yet accepted: Replace steel with
composite as structural material for ships
Premise: Fire risks should be minimised.
Fallacious logic: Don’t use composites because
composites can burn.
Rational logic: A composite ship can burn, but
so can a steel ship because there are plenty of
combustible materials present in most areas.
These include everything from paints and
surface liners via cables and furniture to fuel
tanks and munitions.
Solution: Measures can be taken to reduce the
vulnerability of composite ships to fire. This
report identifies such measures.

This demonstrates that the first preconceived opinion is wrong. The second preconceived opinion to be
challenged is: “Steel retains its strength at elevated temperatures and is incombustible and is therefore the
best material for construction of warship structures”.

It is true that the steel structure will never itself burn in a fire onboard a ship. However, as explained
above, there is plenty of fuel for a fire in a steel ship, so the use of steel as structural material does not
eliminate the fire risks. But, despite being incombustible, steel has a property that represents serious
challenges in fires: its high thermal conductivity. An unprotected steel panel conducts heat from a side
exposed to a fire to the opposite side almost instantly, causing the fire to propagate through intact
structural panels. Hence, if not insulated well, a steel panel alone is unsuitable as a fire barrier.

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The traditional way to deal with this in steel structures is to define fire zones, the boundaries of which
are well insulated. Major fires are likely to be difficult to enclose within unprotected steel panels.
Therefore, a major fire is likely to destroy a complete fire zone.

Even worse is the case if the steel is protected on its unexposed side. The temperature in the steel will
increase rapidly and may cause severe structural distortion or collapse. This may be the case in a weapon
induced fire originating outside a major fire hazard zone. A relevant case would be a missile propellant
fire in an area adjacent to the helicopter hangar in a superstructure. In that case, the unexposed side facing
the inside of the hangar would be insulated, whereas the exposed side is most likely not.

The above discussion suggests that, in some relevant fire scenarios, the use of a structural material that
itself provides thermal insulation would result in a smaller fire zone than would be possible with a
steel structure. Hence, adoption of a composite structure would reduce the vulnerability to fire in
these scenarios. This paper outlines how such an inherently insulating material, GRP composite sandwich,
can be used to achieve this. Hence, the second preconceived opinion is not justified.

It is worth noting in passing that the thermal conductivity of steel, the source of a major drawback, is also
exploited as an advantage in fire fighting strategies for steel structures: it allows effective boundary
cooling, if there is capacity for this (sufficient fire water, equipment, personnel).

Characteristics of Composite Structures Contrasted with Steel

The above discussion highlighted some key differences in the characteristics of a traditional steel structure
and of a composite sandwich structure. A more complete and concise record of these differences is given
in Table 1.

Table 1: Key Differences between a Traditional Steel Structure and a Composite Sandwich Structure

Composite
Combustible, most composite systems must be
provided with a surface liner that provides acceptable
fire reaction properties. Structure may contribute
substantially to a fire if capacity of fire protection is
exceeded.
Insulates well
• provides a fire barrier even if not insulated
• does not conduct heat away from fire, cooling in
area of fire becomes essential
• boundary cooling not effective
Looses strength at relatively low temperatures
• The good insulation provided by the material
helps reduce the rate of temperature rise in the
material.
• At a certain fire exposure, the structural strength
will degrade. Measures to reduce fire exposure
and prevent collapse as a consequence of strength
degradation are essential.
Steel
Non-combustible, but typical paints and surface liners
do not pass the requirements for composites in the
HSC-code [1,3].
Conducts heat well
• if not insulated, fires may rapidly propagate
through an intact panel
• conducts heat away from fire, cooling inside area
on fire less critical
• boundary cooling very effective if done properly
Retains strength up to high temperatures
• High conductivity can cause very rapid
temperature increase e.g. if insulated on the
unexposed side.
• If heat is conducted away rapidly enough
(e.g. with the aid of boundary cooling),
the structure will not collapse and a viable
strategy could be to wait for the fire to burn out
before entering the fire area.

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Composite
Fire fighting requires limited number of personnel
because boundary cooling is not required. This can be
used to make the organisation robust in case of loss of
personnel or to reduce the number of personnel and
hence life cycle costs.
Steel
Large fire fighting team required to maintain fire
boundary by boundary cooling. This makes the
organisation vulnerable to loss of personnel and the
associated costs would be significant.

For a composite sandwich structure, the key to low vulnerability to weapon-induced fires can be
summarised by:
• Take advantage of the good capabilities of composite sandwich panels to enclose fires.
• Take effective measures to prevent exposure of the combustible composite material to fire.
• Take measures to provide forced access such that fire fighting can start inside area on fire without
delay even if automatic systems are disabled.

RECOMMENDED APPROACH TO CONTROL FIRE HAZARDS IN

COMPOSITE STRUCTURES
Without a general capability to identify the most cost effective combination of fire fighting and protection
measures, it is recommended to adopt all active and passive measures subjectively deemed necessary in
view of relevant fire scenarios to a) respond to the hazards originating from the use of composite
sandwich construction and to b) exploit the most obvious advantages of such structures. Typical fire
types and a provisional set of fire vulnerability reduction measures are proposed below. Thereafter,
some complementary measures are summarised. Adoptions of these are recommended considered on basis
of expert judgement. It is assumed that the vessel is expected to survive weapon-induced fires and
designed accordingly.

Types of Weapon-Induced Fires

The development of a fire depends crucially on the early stages of fire: what was ignited and what is
present nearby the fire. Typical fire ignition sources are listed in Table 2 indicating the categories of fire
that may result.

Table 2: Types of Weapon-Induced Fires

Causes of fire
I Fragment hitting equipment
that catches fire.
II Shock that damages
equipment that catches fire.
III Hollow charge.
IV Ignition of external
structural panel by direct
exposure to air blast and
subsequent collapse of
external panel.
V Residual propellant fire.
Severity of fire
Minor Major Pyrotechnic
Local fire Ignition in Ignition of munitions.
in electrical • hydrocarbons (fuel store,
equipment or filter stations etc.)
structure. • pressurised pipes
Limited fire Fire in many compartments. Ignition of munitions.
in affected Ignition of hydrocarbons
compartments. (fuel store, filter stations etc.).
– – Initial phase determined
by amount of residual
propellant and subsequent
phase on contents of room.

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Factors Influencing the Vulnerability to Fire

The following factors influence the vulnerability to fire:
• Passive measures: structural fire reaction and fire resistance
• Active measures: manual and automatic
• Combustible items in area of fire
• Damage to structure and damage to active and passive systems. Typical modes of damage are
listed in Table 3.

Table 3: Typical Modes of Weapon-Induced Damage

Damage Origin of damage

Fire protection lost
Holes in fire protection and structure
Weapon entry and exit hole
Open hatches, doors etc
Collapse of structural elements
Automatic fire fighting system disabled or
degraded
Manual fire fighting system disabled or degraded
Air blast, motions from shock, torn off by
fragments from a detonating warhead
Fragments from a detonating warhead
Shell or missile penetrating the structure
Blast pressures from a detonating warhead
Blast pressures from a detonating warhead, indirect
loads from underwater shock, subsequent fire
Direct exposure to air blast, shock motions,
fragment damage
Personnel injured or killed by air blast, fragments
or fire, water supply failed, portable equipment
damaged or inaccessible

Fire Fighting Strategies

A fire fighting strategy should be designed for each ship reflecting the general arrangement of rooms,
systems and equipment, and of course the design threat levels. It is recommended that the strategy include
the following key elements:
• Detect fire and confirm situation upon detection.
• If fire is small: enter and extinguish manually without delay.
• Stop ventilation in area on fire (run at full capacity in other areas to remove smoke and toxic and
flammable fumes).
• If access is difficult or manual systems considered insufficient: start automatic fire fighting
systems.
• Enter and extinguish fire if possible.
• Establish and secure boundary of area on fire.
• Force access of fire fighting means into fire area.
• Monitor state of fire.
• Prepare areas to which fire may propagate as deemed necessary (remove hazardous items, restore
damaged protection, repair damage etc.).

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The fire fighting means should be appropriate for the types of fires that may occur in the area:
• Manual water based systems for minor fires.
• Cool major fires with water, water with AFFF1 or foam if hydrocarbon fire.
• In pyrotechnic fires:
a) When pyrotechnic material burns in the initial phase, cool with water spray or, if area is
reasonably enclosed, water mist.
b) When pyrotechnic material consumed, fight fire as a major fire.

Minimum Requirements
The following minimum requirements are recommended:
• All surfaces should have a surface with documented good fire reaction properties.
• Passive fire protection systems should be resistant to blast loading and fragments.
• Automatic fire detection should be installed in all rooms.
• Fire zones should be designed with protection level reflecting contents and importance of room.
A protection level of H30 in high-risk areas has been proposed, but no general agreement or
generally accepted requirements exist.
• Manual systems should be capable of extinguishing local fires without delay.
• Automatic systems should be installed in areas with difficult access or high fire risk.
• Means should be installed for stopping ventilation in area on fire but allow it to run at full
capacity in other areas to remove smoke and toxic and flammable fumes in those areas.
• Means should be installed for monitoring fire state (temperature gauge).
• Means should be installed for quick and appropriate forced intervention to provide access of fire
fighting means in fire area. This may include special tools and marking of intervention locations
on panels.
• Means should be installed for establishing and securing fire boundary.
• Water supply should be redundant.
• Procedures should be specified for preparing areas to which fire may propagate as deemed
necessary (e.g. remove hazardous items, repair damaged protection, structure and systems).
• Means should be installed for obtaining warning prior to structural collapse.
• Wetting system should allow for use to fight external fires and prevent ignition of external
surfaces.
• Means should be provided for temporary repair after fire has been extinguished.

Complementary Measures and their Adoption

The following complementary measures should be considered for adoption considering the intended
mission profile of the ship:
• If feasible: Use of structural composites with better fire reaction and resistance properties
(e.g. phenolic resins).

1
Aqueous film forming foam.

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• Increase insulation of selected boundaries.

• Adopt measures to increase the redundancy of the structure.
• Provide means for clogging fragment holes.
• Provide means for temporary repair of larger openings (weapon entry and exit holes, damaged
hatches and doors etc.).
• Provide means for establishing temporary support of panels prior to exceeding capacity of fire
protection.
• Allow for local application of automatic fire extinguishing systems at high risk spots.

Adoption of these measures should preferably be decided on the basis of a cost benefit assessment. In lieu
of such assessment, adoption should be based on expert opinions. In either case, all relevant factors that
influence fires should be accounted for. The costs of the various vulnerability reduction measures should
be considered with the aim to maximise the effect of the investments made. Relevant factors that influence
costs include:
• Personnel requirements.
• Acquisition costs.
• Costs of operation.
• Maintenance needs and repairs.
• Needs for training and exercises.

WHAT IT TAKES TO COMPARE PERFORMANCE OF ALTERNATIVE

DESIGNS
The above discussion has highlighted the differences between steel and composite. Both show advantages
and disadvantages. But what is best of steel and composite construction? The answer depends on the
fire vulnerability reduction measures adopted and motivates to establish a method to rationally
compare alternative solutions. With such a method, another interesting comparison can also be made:
between alternative fire fighting arrangements, one placing emphasis on active fire fighting systems and
another on passive systems.

A cost benefit assessment method has been developed (ref. [2]) and used with success for ranking
alternative structural designs in terms of survivability to weapon-induced mechanical loading.
This method assumes as input a specification of the threat environment to be assumed for the particular
ship. For example, for external blast, the considered range of variation of charge weights and standoff
distances are specified. Theoretical modelling and experiments provide estimates of the survival limit of
the structure. This allows to is estimate the structure’s survivability to this type of loading.

If this procedure is carried out for two candidate design solutions, and furthermore, the costs of these
candidates are estimated, the cost efficiency of the two solutions can be compared and the most cost
effective one chosen.

In principle, this method can be used also for fire threats, e.g. to compare a composite sandwich structure
with a traditional steel structure. This is difficult, however, because one needs to estimate the capacity of
the ship to resist failures caused by fires. Unlike capacity to mechanical loads, this capacity does not only
depend on the characteristics of the structure. The chance of surviving a fire scenario depends also on such
factors as detection time, capacity of passive fire protection systems and any damage to it, combustible
items present in fire area, effects of automatic and manual fire fighting systems, structural damage etc.

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The influence of these factors are neither readily predicted by simulation nor represented by affordable
tests. Because the cost benefit assessment method requires estimation of the chance of survival in typical
threat scenarios, this prevents simple application of it to optimising cost efficiency of fire vulnerability
reduction strategies.

Another potential use of the cost benefit assessment method is to compare alternative fire fighting systems
in the same structure. Systematic use of such a method would allow to identify the appropriate balance
between passive and active systems and to establish the optimum configuration of the various systems
such as the optimum insulation thickness, the optimum capacity of a sprinkler system etc.

Unfortunately, application of the cost benefit assessment method as outlined above is beyond the current
state of the art.

ONGOING RESEARCH: THE EUCLID RTP3.21 PROJECT

The EUCLID RTP3.21 project “Survivability, durability and performance of naval composite structures”
is a large European co-operative project with 24 partners from 6 European countries. The overall objective
of this project is to strengthen the technological basis for the large-scale application of fibre-reinforced
composite materials to naval vessels and structures. The superstructure of a frigate-sized naval vessel with
a traditional steel hull has been chosen as the application case, and the major threats to such a structure are
considered. These include internal and external blast and weapon-induced fires. Major advantages offered
by a composite superstructure construction include reduced weight, reduced signatures and higher
payload. To benefit from these advantages, some challenges must be overcome.

The IMO requirements [1] to fire reaction of the surface materials have been adopted for comparison of
promising systems. This also allows the use of commercial off the shelf fire protection systems and
provides a level of safety in peacetime operations not inferior to that of civilian vessels. Examples of such
systems are described in the following sections. In addition to assessing the fire resistance of a protected
structure subject to typical industrial fires as required by the IMO code, also the resistance to a typical
hydrocarbon fire is assessed. Furthermore, the effect of typical damage from blast and fragments from a
detonating warhead on the fire resistance is investigated. This will shed light on whether particular
measures to repair such damage need be integrated in the fire fighting strategy.

To provide some basis for comparison between steel and composite structures, the propagation of a severe
fire in a realistic structure will be studied experimentally by a full-scale fire tests on a composite corridor
and a typical steel corridor. A quite relevant scenario with a severe fire in one end of the corridor will be
adopted. After completion of the corridor fire tests, the fires will be extinguished to provide information
on the efficiency of typical fire fighting measures.

Altogether, these activities will identify adequate passive fire protection systems and provide information
about phenomena of particular relevance for naval ships. The ultimate goal is to establish a design with the
passive systems evaluated in the RTP3.21 project that is not more vulnerable to blast, fragments and
potentially long lasting fires than a traditional steel structure. This requires that adequate active measures
are adopted. However, to demonstrate this rationally requires, as explained above, use of a cost benefit
assessment method using simulation methods that properly account for all the important factors that
influence a fire scenario. This is beyond the scope of the EUCLID RTP3.21 project.

STATE OF THE ART PASSIVE FIRE PROTECTION FOR COMPOSITE

VESSELS
For naval vessels, there are currently no international fire regulations. Numerous test standards and
acceptance criteria are used in the various Navies, but many tests methods are not made for and hence not

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suitable for testing of composite materials. However, some navies look to the International Maritime
Organisation (IMO) Code of Safety for High Speed Craft (HSC-code) [1] for fire reaction requirements
for composite structures (heat release, smoke etc.). The following sections summarize the state of the art
for passive fire protection of composite structures, and give practical examples on how the HSC-code
criteria can be fulfilled in a rational and cost efficient way. These sections also summarize 10 years of
research and product development related to passive fire protection of composite vessels.

Fire protection and structural efficiency must be evaluated as a total concept, not as individual parts.
This is important, as selection of fire protection of a composite vessel is heavily influenced by the thermo-
mechanical and fire reaction properties of the structural materials [3,4].

MATERIALS FOR PASSIVE FIRE PROTECTION OF COMPOSITE

STRUCTURES
During the early stages of a fire, the fire reaction properties (heat release, spread of flame, smoke
production, etc.) of the materials surrounding the initial fire are of highest importance. Easily ignitable
materials will reduce the time to a possible flashover, usually produce much smoke, and hence decrease
the chance of extinguishing the fire. This is especially important for weapon-induced fires, as the
temperature/flux rise on surfaces can be rather instant and have high levels.

If the fire is not extinguished before flashover condition, the fire should be kept within a fire zone by
fire-resisting divisions that in addition to fire insulation and smoke tightness, often also must maintain
load-bearing integrity.

Test Method and Requirements to Fire Reaction according to IMO

The HSC-code has specific requirements to fire reaction properties for a Fire Restricting Material (FRM).
To qualify as a FRM, the material or material combination must have the following properties
(chapter 7.2.2 of the code):
“ 1. They should have low flame spread characteristics;
2. Limited heat flux, due regard being paid to the risk of ignition of furniture in the compartment;
3. Limited rate of heat release, due regard being paid to the risk of spread of flame to an adjacent
compartment; and
4. Gas and smoke should not be emitted in quantities that could be dangerous to the occupants of
the craft. ”

The test method for bulkheads, walls and ceiling liner materials is the ISO 9705 “Fire tests – Full scale
room test for surface products” – often named the “Room-Corner”-test. The test room is a typical full
sized cabin 3.6 x 2.4 x 2.4 m (l x w x h). The test specimen covers all surfaces except the wall with the
“doorway” (Figure 1). A propane burner is located on the floor in one corner, and gives a heat output of
100 kW for 10 minutes, followed by 300 kW for 10 minutes. The product to be tested must be in
“end use” condition, i.e. joints, fixation etc. must be representative to the mounting in the vessel, and,
of very high importance, the surface must be as installed on the vessel in service.

IMO HSC-code criteria are given in Resolution MSC.40(64) – “Standard for Qualifying Marine Materials
for High Speed Craft as Fire-Restricting Materials”. Limits are given for peak and average heat release,
peak and average smoke production, spread of flame, and flaming “drops or debris”.

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Figure 1: The ISO 9705 “Room-Corner”-test. The propane gas burner in the corner
runs at 100 kW in 10 minutes and then another 10 minutes at 300 kW.

A test method that uses the same measuring techniques as the ISO 9705, is the small-scale test method
ISO 5660 – the Cone Calorimeter test. This method is ideal for screening of fire reaction properties, as
the samples are 100 x 100 mm, not 32 m2 as for the Room Corner test. Flashover predictions in the
“Room-Corner” test can be performed if results form the Cone is fed into the computer code “Cone Tools”
[5]. In the following, this technique is used to compare materials and systems, and many of the results are
verified also in full scale.

Methods and Materials for Improving the Fire Reaction Behaviour of Composite Structures
There are three main methods available for design of composite structures with good fire reaction
behaviour:
• Use “normal” structural materials and add surface protection.
• Use fire retarded versions of “normal” structural materials.
• Use structural materials with inherently good fire reaction properties.

Use “Normal” Structural Materials and Add Surface Protection

Normal structural materials, like glass or carbon reinforced polyester, vinylester or epoxy, with or without
normal cores like PVC, Balsa etc., have no chance of fulfilling the requirements [3].

The most obvious next step is to try to coat the construction with existing flame retardant paints,
intumescing paints/mastics etc. This improves the fire reaction behaviour significantly, as shown in
Table 4. A thin topcoat paint layer is added on top of the intumescent-coated systems, as this is needed for
appearance, cleaning and prevention of water absorption. The topcoat usually decreases time to ignition
and thereby time to flashover. The results in Table 4 are a synthesis of a number of the best systems of
intumescent coatings and topcoats tested.

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Table 4: Sandwich specimens with and without intumescing paint/topcoat on surface

tested in accordance to ISO 5660 (cone calorimeter) at 50 kW/m2. Tig = Time to ignition,
Peak Heat = Peak heat release rate, Total Smoke = Total smoke production, averaged,
Flashover = Predicted time to flashover in full scale test (ISO 9705).

Core/face Surface Tig Peak Heat Total smoke Flashover

laminate resin protection (s) (kW/m2) (m2/sec) (min)
PVC*/polyester none 30-45 350-400 0.1 2- 3 min
PVC/ Polyester Intumescent paint 29/215** 93 0.013 9-10.5
+ topcoat
PMI/ Polyester Intumescent paint 28/190** 110 0.007-0.013 9-12
+ topcoat
FR-PVC/F Intumescent paint 28/176** 75 0.0042-0.005 10-11
R-Polyester + topcoat
* Also tested in full scale Room-Corner test: Flashover after 2 min.
** Several ignition times: First ignition is the top-coat, which usually burns for a short time. Second ignition is the
resin in the face laminate.

The conclusion from this is that more protection is needed. Systems suitable for this are presented in the
section on application examples.

Use Fire Retarded Versions of “Normal” Structural Materials

Improving the fire reaction behaviour of polymer materials by using various additives and fillers are well
known methods used for decades. Halogenated systems, phosphor additives and filled systems (ATH etc.)
are available also to the marine composite industry. Table 5 shows a synthesis of results from testing on
laminates with various fillers and additives.

Table 5: Laminates tested in accordance to ISO 5660 (cone calorimeter) at 50 kW/m2.

Tig = Time to ignition (N.I = No Ignition), Peak Heat = Peak heat release rate averaged
over 60 sec, Peak Smoke = Peak Smoke production averaged over 60 sec,
Flashover = Predicted time to flashover in full scale test (ISO 9705).

Laminate type: Tig Peak Heat Peak smoke Flashover

2 2
(s) (kW/m ) (m /sec) (min)
Unmodified Polyester/glass 30-50 200-350 0.1-0.15 <5
Fire Retarded Polyester/glass – ATH-filled 45-85 150-250 0.05-0.12 5-10
Fire Retarded Polyester/glass – 40-50 120-170 0.15-0.2 5-10
halogenated/ant. trioxide
Synolite 5001 (300phr ATH) 126 132 0.028 12.5
(2.2 mm lam, sample made by DSM Comp.
Resin)

To the author’s knowledge, no “fire retarded” systems are developed that fulfil the HSC-code criteria.

Another important aspect with the filled systems is the poor mechanical properties compared to the
unmodified systems. This makes most of the filled systems unsuitable for highly loaded weight critical
structures.

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Use Structural Materials with Inherent Good Fire Reaction Properties

This represents the ultimate goal for all designers – a good structural composite material with inherently
good fire reaction properties. There are a few polymer materials with these properties available, and the
US Navy and others [7,8] have put a lot of effort in characterization of these. Examples of systems that
can have good chance of passing the HSC-code requirements to fire reaction are:
Thermoset resins: Polyimide (PI), cyanate ester (and silicones), various phenolic resin based systems
(note that variations between systems are large!).
Thermoplastic systems: Polyether ether ketone (PEEK), Polyeter ketone ketone (PEKK), Phatlonitrile
(PN), Polyaryl sulfone (PAS), and polyphenylene sulfide (PPS).

However, there are many requirements for materials to be used in large scale for commercial and naval
vessels: Material cost, processing properties, repair, environmental resistance, availability etc. Of the
materials listed above, only phenolic resins are believed to cost efficient for large naval structures today.
Hopefully, research programmes initiated by the US Navy and others will provide additional alternatives
in the near future.

Even phenolic systems have clear drawbacks compared to unmodified polyesters and vinylester resin
systems: Processing cost (heat curing needed for most systems), weight increase due to significantly lower
resin dominated mechanical properties, more complicated secondary bonding, and environmental issues
(incl. health and safety matters). However, for components like internal decks, bulkheads, interior
components, etc., phenolic resin systems might provide an attractive option today. Performance of
phenolic-based sandwich structures is given in Table 6. This shows clearly that phenolic-based systems
can fulfil the HSC-code requirements, both non-coated and with intumescing paint. However, when
topcoat is applied for appearance, cleaning etc, the time to ignition drops significantly and the flashover
predictions shows a scatter. This confirms that the fire reaction properties of surface are very critical
parameters, even if the backing is very good.

Table 6: Sandwich specimens with glass reinforced phenolic laminates (approx 2mm) with various
protection/finish layers tested in accordance to ISO 5660 (cone calorimeter) at 50 kW/m2. Tig = Time to
ignition, Peak Heat = Peak heat release rate, Total Smoke = Total smoke production, averaged,
Flashover = Predicted time to flashover in full scale test (ISO 9705), N.F. = No Flashover prediction

Core/face Surface Tig Peak Heat Total smoke Flashover

laminates protection (s) (kW/m ) 2 2
(m /sec) (min)
Balsa/Phenolic non 120- 170 50-80 0.001 N.F.
Balsa/Phenolic Intumescing paint 140-170 45 0.003 N.F.*
Phenolic/Phenolic Intumescing paint 26/480** 58 0.001 14-NF
+ topcoat
* Results confirmed by ISO9705 (Room-Corner test) [6].
** Several time to ignition: First ignition is the top-coat, which usually burns for a short time. Second
ignition is the resin in the face laminate.

Test Method and Requirements to Fire Resistance according to IMO

The IMO HSC-code specifies fire-resisting divisions (FRD) around areas/rooms of “Major”
and “Moderate fire hazard”, 60 and 30 min rating, respectively. Often these divisions have to carry load
during fire.

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Test method, test procedures and classification/criteria for FRDs are given in IMO Resolution MSC45(65)
“Test procedures for Fire Resisting Divisions of High Speed Craft”. MSC45(65) is using the Resolution
A.754(18) “Recommendation on Fire Resistance Test for “A”, “B” and “F” Class Divisions” as a basis.
For load carrying structures, load during test is prescribed, see Figure 2.

7.0 kN/m
3.5 kN/m2

Figure 2: Loading during test of load carrying bulkheads and decks according to IMO Resolution
MSC45(65) “Test procedures for Fire Resisting Divisions of High Speed Craft”.

Methods for Improving the Fire Resistance of Composite Structures

In the following, focus is placed on sandwich structures, as this is the most representative construction
method for weight critical structures. Typical dimensions are shown in Figure 3. This paper does not
consider thick laminates where endothermic properties are important [9], simply because this is not
relevant for high-speed crafts or other highly weight critical structures. There are two main methods
available for design of composite structures with good fire resistance:
• Use structural materials with inherent good fire resistance properties
• Use standard structural materials with added surface protection

0.5-7 mm skin laminates of glass or carbon reinforced

polyester, vinylester, epoxy, phenolic, (high fiber content,
high elongation to break fibers and resins)

30-60 mm structural core, 80 – 250 kg/m3, PVC, PMI,

PEI, Balsa, Alu Honeycomb, Nomex Honeycomb,…

Figure 3: Typical Sandwich Construction for Large Load Carrying Structures.

Structural Materials with Inherent Good Fire Resistance Properties

The IMO Res.A.754(18) specifies a standard cellulose fire. It reaches 600°C after a few minutes, around
850°C after 30 min and approx 950°C after 60 min. It is obvious that if one of the skins of the sandwich
construction in Figure 3 is subjected to such heat, the exposed laminate will loose its mechanical
properties after a few minutes, even if high temperature resins are used. However, both the exposed

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laminate and the core can have significant fire insulation capacities also during a fire. The unexposed skin
can be undamaged for a long time, as the temperature rise here is slow. This makes an un-insulated
sandwich construction superior in terms of fire insulation compared to un-insulated structures in
aluminium and steel, but the loss of mechanical properties must be accounted for. For bulkheads,
with loading as shown in Figure 2, this can be provided by e.g. stiffeners on the cold side of the division.

However, if care is not taken the requirements to fire reaction of the structure can be violated.
This excludes many resin systems as shown in previous sections. Today phenolic resins seem to represent
the only commercially available resin systems that can fulfil both cost and structural requirements.
Recently a structure with phenolic/glass laminates on balsa core has passed a full-scale 60 min test as load
bearing bulkhead [4]. The only protection was an intumescing paint.

There are also other reports on very good fire insulation capacities of unprotected and moderately
protected balsa cored sandwich structures [7]. However, for structures with bending loads on the sandwich
and the stiffeners on the hot side, ref. deck test on Figure 2, there is to the author’s knowledge no load
carrying systems available without significant protection.

Use Standard Structural Materials with Added Protection

There are many good reasons for choosing to add fire protections to a “standard” structure instead of using
other materials in order to meet all fire requirements. The single most important is complexity – it is a
general perception in the marine composite industry that the number of structural materials and processes
at the yards should be kept as low as possible to limit costs.

Another important element is noise requirements: Around machinery, there is usually a need for sound
insulation and absorption in addition to the fire insulation. Suitable materials here are often the same
materials as on steel and aluminium structures in such areas: Non-combustible insulation of Rockwool or
ceramic/silica wool, fastened with pins or similar, and covered with a foil, fabric or metallic sheet. A large
number of such systems have been qualified according to the HSC-code requirements for 30 and 60 min
fire resisting divisions, where the structures have been glass or carbon reinforced polyester or vinylester
laminates with cores of PMI, PVC or balsa. Also phenolic-based composite protection systems is
developed and used in both naval and offshore applications.

IMPORTANT DIFFERENCES IN FIRE SAFETY STRATEGY BETWEEN

NAVAL AND COMMERCIAL VESSELS
There are major differences between naval and commercial crafts that have significant impact on fire
safety strategy:
• Crew and passengers
• Mission and criteria for evacuation
• Threats and fire scenarios

A commercial passenger vessel has a large number of passengers and a limited crew, with limited
training and equipment for fire fighting. Due to the limited capability for the crew and passengers to carry
out active fire fighting, the automatic systems should be capable of detecting and extinguish a fire in
“major” and “moderate fire hazard areas”. If this fails, the passive fire protection should ensure enough
time for safe evacuation. In areas without automatic extinguishing systems, i.e. in areas of “minor fire
hazard” like the accommodation/passenger decks, a local fire shall be prevented from developing
assuming very simple fire fighting, e.g. with hand held equipment. For this reason, the requirements to a
“fire restricting material” in the IMO HSC-code are very strict.

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The mission for a passenger/cargo vessel is obviously to carry passengers/cargo from A to B.

However, in case of a fire passenger and crew safety is of priority one. In case of a fire that is not
extinguished by the automatic systems or by the limited crew, evacuation is the only alternative.

For a commercial vessel, most fires starts in areas of “Major” and “Moderate” fire hazard areas. This is
e.g. main engine rooms, auxiliary engine rooms, electrical switchboards, galleys, etc. These areas are
protected accordingly, usually covered by both active and passive measures. The goal is to keep a fire
within the defined cell, and preferably extinguish it without evacuation. Fires outside these areas are less
probable, usually small, and are taken care of by requirements to fire reaction, i.e. restricted use of
combustible materials.

On a naval vessel all crewmembers are trained for fire situations, and special team(s) are equipped
and trained for fire fighting. Hence, active fire fighting can be relied on to an appreciable extent. Today’s
naval vessels have usually considerably less fire insulation than an IMO vessel (SOLAS or HSC-code).
It is of course important that time is available to activate manual or automatic systems and/or the fire
fighting teams before a developing fire becomes too large (e.g. flashover in a number of compartments).
The time available is of course dependent on the fire scenarios and design threats.

For a naval vessel, the safety of the crew is of course also important, but to carry out the mission and
rescue the ship with its special “cargo” has higher priority, at least in a combat situation. Evacuation is the
last option, and much effort will be put in active fire fighting even after the “lifetime” of the fire resisting
divisions is exceeded. An example is the fight to rescue the US Navy frigate “USS Stark” that was hit by
two missiles during the Gulf War. The fire that followed the residual missile propellant burning was
extinguished after 36 hours, with a considerable loss of lives.

In peace time the fire hazards for a naval vessel is similar to those of commercial vessels, except in special
areas like magazines, aviation fuel stores and at locations of weapon systems which require special
attention also in peace time.

For naval vessels in combat situations, the number of possible fire scenarios increase dramatically.
The possibility of a fire is large. More than 80 % of loss of ships in modern conflicts is due to fire [10].
It is impossible to decide where an enemy induced fire will start. Fire can start due to a missile hit, a
terrorist attack, etc. The whole ship is therefore a possible area of “Major fire hazard”, if the IMO terms is
used, and instead of protecting the whole vessel, it is often divided into so called NBCD-zones
(Nuclear, Biological, Chemical Damage control zones) that are fire and blast resistant. Larger ships shall
be capable of operating up to a certain level even if one of the zones is damaged by e.g. fire or blast,
or both, and the fire should be kept within the zone. The zones are usually vertical, but more and more
navies are now specifying also the decks as fire divisions.

There is a large range of naval vessels, with a corresponding large range of mission and capability to
withstand a certain threat. It does not make sense and it is not realistic to protect a small vessel like a fast
patrol boat, minesweeper/minehunter or corvette to the same threat levels as a destroyer or aircraft carrier.
This is true for most types of wartime threats like e.g. internal and external blast resistance etc. Due to the
large variation in mission and design threat levels, it is very difficult to establish a “code” such as the
SOLAS or the HSC-code for military vessels. As mentioned in previous sections: A fire safety case should
be established for each vessel. Guidelines for selection of design threats as a function of ship size are
given in e.g. ref [11].

However, it could be possible to develop some general requirements:

• For fire reaction, the HSC-code requirements for composite structures have proven to be very
strict, also compared to requirements to surface materials on steel ships [1]. This can be used as a
general requirement for the interior for all vessels. This is an approach many navies seems to

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prefer [5], as this provides some equivalency to the commercial vessels, and test methods and
acceptance criteria are already developed and internationally accepted.
For selection of method for fire passive fire protection, it is very important to decide if the vessel is
expected to survive a hit by an exploding missile, shell or projectile. If the answer is “yes”, there are
(at least) two alternative methods for passive fire protection to fulfil fire reaction requirements:
• Normal structural composite with an added protection that survives the blast that can precede a
fire. If the added fire protection does not survive, the readily combustible structural composite
will be exposed and contribute to the fire and make fire fighting more difficult, not only because
of fire growth rate, but also due to smoke development. Design blast level is dependent on ship
size.
• Composite structure with inherently good fire reaction behaviour. This structure does not need
much added protection, and if destroyed in e.g. a blast, there will be limited contribution to smoke
production and heat release.

The same main methods can be used to fulfil fire resistance requirements, but of course different
scantlings and/or protection systems are needed to cope with a fully developed fire.

APPLICATION EXAMPLES
In this section, recent installations of passive fire protection systems on two modern naval vessels will be
presented briefly. Unfortunately, due to the confidential nature of such projects, not all performance
requirements and solutions can be provided. The examples highlight the methods that can be used,
and presents some of the systems that have been used for improving the passive fire safety.

The Norwegian Navy’s new FPB “KNM Skjold”

In 1999 the Royal Norwegian Navy (RNoN) took the delivery of the new pre-series fast patrol
boat/missile launch vessel, “KNM Skjold”, which is a twin hull surface effect ship (SES) entirely made of
FRP/sandwich composites, see Figure 4. The vessel is 47m long, 13.5m wide, she has a displacement of
270 ton, is capable of a speed in excess of 55 knots, and is a “stealth” structure. The vessel was built by
the yard Umoe Mandal AS in Norway. A series of 5 more vessels is planned.

Figure 4: The Stealth SES vessel “KNM Skjold”.

The SES concept is very weight sensitive, and much effort was put into the structural design, materials
selection, fire requirements and fire protection systems. This is vessel not large enough to survive a direct

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hit from a shell or a missile, and therefore the fire hazards are very much the same as for a commercial
vessel, with exception of the pyrotechnic materials. All the different methods and most materials/systems
presented in previous sections were evaluated in terms of fire performance, cost/weight-performance,
and fabrication aspects.

The option of using “normal” structural materials with added protection was selected. Even if the added
protection can be considered a “parasitic” material, the total weight of structure and protection is still less
than the weight of the fire retarded systems (due to their low mechanical performance) and the alternative
with inherently good fire reaction properties.

For fire resisting divisions, special fire insulation systems were developed for the engine rooms, lift fan
machinery, protection of control stations, galley and around rooms with munitions. Sound insulation
and sound absorption was also important. In order to save weight on the fire insulation, high temperature
core was used in the fire resisting divisions. Balsa core was considered to heavy, even the new “special
selection” lightweight grades, and PMI foams were selected for fire insulated decks and bulkheads.

Thin lightweight panels of phenolic composites with decorative surfaces protect a major part of the
interior, which is regarded as “Minor Fire Hazard” area. The Royal Norwegian Navy and NDRE
(Norwegian Defence and Research Establishment) evaluated the threat situation and crew situation in
different operation phases, and established realistic fire scenarios. The conclusion was that the IMO
HSC-code requirements were unnecessary strict for this vessel, as the reaction time from detection to a
fire fighting team is ready is lower than the 20 min before flashover in the full scale “Room-Corner”
test required by the HSC-code. 10 minutes was considered sufficient. The rest of the requirements were
kept (heat release, smoke production, flame spread, integrity). Solutions were worked out in cooperation
with the Norwegian Navy’s Materiel Command (NAVMATCOMNOR) and the Umoe Mandal yard.
Test results from “Room-Corner”-tests are given in Table 5 for two versions of the protection:
• FIRELINER FPG (3 mm) has an insulating phenolic core and a phenolic laminate with decorative
foil facing for use in areas where wear and tear is significant, e.g. corridors. This is seen outside
the door on the photo in the middle of Figure 5. The weight is 1.1 kg/m2.
• FIRELINER CF-Colour (3mm) is used in areas with lower requirements to the mechanical
properties of the surface, e.g. in cabins. This is a 3 mm phenolic core, covered with a glass textile
with a thin colour coating, see left photo on Figure 5. The weight is 0.85 kg/m2.

Figure 5: Photos of passive fire protection in the interior of “Skjold”. From left: FIRELINER CF Colour
in the mess, FIRELINER CF Colour in the cabin and FIRELINER FPG in the corridor (outside the door),
and last the FIREFOAM PFG sound absorption and fire protection in the ceilings.

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A tailor made profile system is used for simple screw or break stem rivet mounting of the panels.

In the ceilings, a polyimide foam with perforated glass cloth was used, FIREFOAM PFG, for the sound
absorption and fire protection effect. This was also qualified in full-scale fire reaction tests in addition to
sound absorption tests. A photo of this is also given in Figure 5 (right).

The Royal Swedish Navy new Corvette “VISBY”/YS2000

The 72 m “VISBY” is a 600 tons monohull, multipurpose vessel with stealth requirements. The vessels are
under construction at Karlskronavarvet, Kockums AB in Karlskrona, Sweden – the first vessel is already
finished. It is an all carbon fibre sandwich structure with PVC foam. Figure 6 shows a picture where she
touches water for the first time, and an animation.

Figure 6: The Royal Swedish Navy 72 m all carbon/sandwich stealth

vessel “VISBY” (Photos courtesy of Peter Nilsson, Kockums AB.
Animated pictures by the Swedish Armed Forces, Image Gallery/Stefan Hörberg).

FMV (Swedish Defence Materiel Administration), the designer of “VISBY”, decided that the HSC-code
requirements to fire reaction should be used for escape routes, i.e. “Fire Restricting Material” according to
IMO MSC. 40(64). Several such systems have been developed, and most of them have DNV approval
today. These systems are based on a 12 mm lightweight composite core with various facings: Aluminium,
decorative laminates, stainless steel, and various coated textiles. In addition, an upgraded ceiling
protection/sound absorption system was developed, FIRELINER CFFP, which has an appearance as
shown on Figure 5 (photo on the right).

All the products listed above is “add on” protections with combined fire protection and interior finish,
and the weight starts at 1.9 kg/m2 for the cloth faced versions, 2.6 kg/m2 for the version with decorative
laminates, and 3.6 kg/m2 for the lightest metallic sheet faced version. A photo from the mounting and
testing in the “Room Corner” for one of the versions, FIRELINER AL, is shown in Figure 7. Test results
from full scale testing are given in Table 7.

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Figure 7: Photos from the Mounting and Testing of the FIRELINER AL.

Table 7: Performance of various liners for composite structures tested in the full scale ISO 9705
“Room-Corner” test, compared to the HSC-code criteria to a “Fire Restricting Material” (IMO Res. MSC.40(64)

Product: FIRELINER FIRELINER FIRELINER FIRELINER FIRELINER HSC-

FPG 3mm CF-colour CFFP AL FPG MKII code
3mm (0.7/12.7) (0.5/12.7) criteria
Product Decorative Colour Perforated Stove painted Decorative --
description foil faced coated glass white dyed aluminium foil faced
laminate on cloth on fire glass cloth on sheets on fire laminate on
fire insulating insulating sound insulating fire
backing – backing – absorbing backing – insulating
3mm 3 mm and fire 12.7 mm backing –
insulating 12.7 mm
backing
Protection 1.1 0.85 1.9 3.6 2.6 --
weight
(kg/m2)
Time to 13:20 min 10:30 N.F N.F N.F N.F.
flashover (RNoN req. (RNoN req. (during
>10 min) >10 min) 20 min)
Peak Heat 57* 29* 158 87.8 274.6 500
Release (kW)
Average Heat 17* 8* 20 17.7 64.6 100
Release (kW)
Peak Smoke 1,0* 1.41* 1,7 1.1 3.4 8,3
Prod. (m2/s)
Average 0,3* 0.44* 0,3 0.4 0.8 1,4
Smoke Prod.
+-(m2/s)
* Requirement was min 10 minutes to flashover. Heat and smoke values are given for the first 10 minutes.
The FIRELINER products are from the composite panel manufacturer XFIRE™ of Norway.

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Summary on State-of-the-Art Fire Protection of Composite Vessels

The selection of philosophies and methods for ensuring passive fire protection of a modern naval
composite vessel is dependent on the vessels mission and threats; there is significant difference in fire
safety and fire fighting philosophies between different naval vessels.

Systems that fulfil the IMO HSC-code for fire resistance and fire reaction are developed and are
commercially available. These systems can be used on naval vessels that are not supposed to survive large
weapon induced fires.

Up to now, the most promising method for passive fire protection of commercial vessels and moderate
size naval platforms is to protect “normal” structural materials with fire resistant systems. For the interior
of a ship, such system can combine the fire protection with the interior finish required. By combining
these two functions, weight and cost is saved.

For structures on a naval vessel that are supposed to resist e.g. internal and external blast from high
explosive weapon systems, the fire safety assessment must include also the blast resistance of the fire
protection itself. This is a part of the scope of the EUCLID RTP3.21 project. If such blast resistance is
difficult to achieve within acceptable cost and weigh frames, inherently fire resistant materials with good
fire reaction behaviour should be evaluated for fire divisions. However, it is believed that several
protections systems have considerable resistance to blast loading, and that fragments can penetrate without
severely compromising the efficiency of the protection.

NEEDS FOR FURTHER WORK

The basis for reducing vulnerability to fire is that effective means to protect against fires, enclose fires and
fight fires are available. Therefore, it is recommended that innovative ideas for such means be identified
and developed with particular attention to the characteristics of composite structures. Of particular interest
would be i) a device that provides forced access of fire fighting measures to an area on fire while
protecting the fire fighters, and ii) temporary repair devices.

Since application of the cost benefit assessment method is the key to identifying cost effective ways of
combining active and passive measures to efficiently reducing vulnerability to fire, there is a strong need
to fill the remaining gaps such that this method can be applied in the future. This would pave the ground
for rationally comparing the fire vulnerability of a composite structure to that of a traditional steel
structure. To achieve this, it is necessary to develop and verify simulation tools that allow to quantify the
effectiveness of combinations of alternative fire fighting measures in relevant scenarios.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The reported fire fighting philosophies and possible ways to deal with the fire onboard composite
vessels have emerged from discussions within the EUCLID RTP3.21 project. The ministries of defence
(MoD) in Denmark, France, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway and the UK and the industrial partners have
funded this project. This article would not have been possible without the inputs from Kristen
Opstad (Sintef), Edward Schaap (Royal Netherlands Navy), Joelle Gutierrez (DCN), Andrea Superbo
(Italian Navy), Christine Lallemand (CTSN), Jean-Paul Redon (French Navy), Isabelle l’Hoir
(DGA/SPN), Emanuelle Plessiet (DCE/GERBAM) and Hubert Galinier (DCE/GERBAM). This support is
gratefully acknowledged.

The results related to the passive fire protection systems presented in this paper are only made possible by
combining the knowledge and efforts from a number of previous programs and projects, and we would

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also like to give a special thanks to our colleagues at the Umoe Mandal yard, Kockums
AB/Karlskronavarvet, Röhm GmBH, Conoco Norway, Royal Norwegian Navy/NAVMATCOMNOR,
and the 5 nation MoD sponsored project EUCLID RTP3.8, with the main partners Det Norske Veritas
(DNV), DCN, DERA (now QinetiQ), TNO and Fincantieri.

REFERENCES
[1] International Maritime Organization: International Code of Safety for High-Speed Craft, Resolution
MSC.36(63), adopted on 20 May 1994.

[2] Hayman, B., Echtermeyer, A.T., McGeorge, D., “Use of Fibre Composites in Naval Ships”,
in proceedings of the International Symposium, WARSHIP2001 Future Surface Warships, RINA,
June 2001, London, UK.

[3] B. Høyning, and J. Taby, “Fire Performance of Composite Marine Structures in Relation to the IMO
High Speed Craft Code”, 1st International Conference on Composites in Fire, University of
Newcastle upon Tyne, 1999.

[4] J. Gutierrez, P. Parneix, R. Porcari, B. Høyning and H. Van de Weijgert, “Fire Resistance
Performance of Naval Composite Structures”, 5th Int. Conference on Sandwich Construction, 2000,
Zurich, Switzerland.

[5] Wickström, U., Göransson, U., 1992, “Full-scale/Bench-scale Correlation of Wall and Ceiling
Linings”, reprint from FIRE AND MATERIALS, vol. 16, 1992. Swedish National Testing and
Research Institute, Fire Technology, SP Report 1992:22, Borås, Sweden, ISBN 91-7848-340-9.

[6] “Full Scale Room-Corner Test Programme”, EUCLID RTP3.8 report TD-04512-9801,
SIR Industriale, Italy.

[7] U. Sorathia, G. Long, M. Blum, J. Ness, T. Gracik, “Screening Tests for Fire Safety of Composites
for Marine Applications”, 7th Int. Conference on Fire and Materials, 2001, San Francisco, USA.

[8] J.H. Koo, B. Muskopf, S. Venumbaka, P. Van Dine, B. Spencer and U. Sorathia, “Fire Performance
Polymer Matrix Composites for Marine Applications”, 7th Int. Conference on Fire and Materials,
2001, San Francisco, USA.

[9] N. Dodds, A.G. Gibson, “Characterisation and Modelling of Composites for Fire Performance in
Structural Applications”, 1st International Conference on Composites in Fire, University of
Newcastle upon Tyne, 1999.

[10] B. Høyning and J. Taby, “Warship Design: The Potential for Composites in Frigate Superstructures”,
RINA conference “Lightweight Construction Latest Developments”, London, 2000.

[11] Allied Nation Engineering Publication ANEP-43: “Ship Combat Survivability”, 1992
(NATO Confidential).

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SYMPOSIA DISCUSSION – PAPER NO: 22

Discusser’s Name: Dr Jagath Mawella
Question:
In your large-scale tests will you be using thermal insulation? Comment/suggestion: Mr Potter of ONR,
USA presented a similar Paper. I suggest discussions and exchange of information (if both parties willing)
for future European – American benefit.

Author’s Name: Hoyning and McGeorge

Author’s Response:
Yes the GRP and steel structure will be insulated in a manner representative of a GRP and a steel structure
respectively.

Discusser’s Name: Pat Potter

Question:
Do you use same fire protection for 30 & 60 minute divisions as for 10 & 20 minute divisions?

Author’s Name: Hoyning and McGeorge

Author’s Response:
A similar version as for fire reaction improvement (10 & 20 min in the “room corner” test) can be used for
30 and 60 min fire resisting divisions – the thickness of the insulating core (of the protection) will then be
increased. However this is dependent on the application area. In the engine room a “soft wool” insulation
is better due to sound absorption, with perforated plates on top.

Discusser’s Name: Lt Cdr De Grieve

Question:
How will hulls be protected in main machinery spaces where the shown protection coating is not a
solution?

Author’s Name: Hoyning and McGeorge

Author’s Response:
Main machinery space and other ‘noisy rooms’ will usually be protected by a combined sound and fire
insulation. Rockwool or silica/ceramic wool is commonly used and there exist a number of qualified
systems.

Discusser’s Name: A. Groves

Question:
1) Do you require an air gap?
2) Can fire insulation be applied at time of panel manufacture using resin infusion techniques to reduce
production costs?

Author’s Name: Hoyning and McGeorge

Author’s Response:
1) An airgap is not required. Air gaps tend to make systems more vulnerable for example to internal and
external blast.
2) This can be done, but will be very challenging due to joints and strength requirements there, as the
insulation can not be regarded as structural.

22 - 22 RTO-MP-103

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

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