CLARITA DEPAKAKIBO GARCIA,
Petitioner
VS
SANDIGANBAYAN and REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES
Respondents
VELASCO, JR., J.:
FACTS: To recover unlawfully acquired
funds and properties in the aggregate
amount of PhP 143,052,015.29 that
retired Maj. Gen. Carlos F. Garcia, his
wife, herein petitioner Clarita, children Ian
Carl, Juan Paulo and Timothy Mark had
allegedly amassed and acquired, the
Republic, through the Office of the
Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan
on October 29, 2004 a petition for the
forfeiture of those properties.
 Another forfeiture case was filed
this time to recover funds and properties
amounting to PhP 202,005,980.55.
 Prior to the filing of Forfeiture II,
but subsequent to the filing of Forfeiture I,
the OMB charged the Garcias and three
others with Plunder which has a value of
PhP 303,272,005.99.
 After the filing of Forfeiture I, the
following events transpired in relation to
the case:
 (1) The corresponding summons
was issued and all served on Gen.
Garcia at his place of
detention. Per the Sheriffs Return
dated November 2, 2005, the
summons was duly served on
respondent Garcias.
 Instead of an answer, the Garcias
filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground of the SBs lack of
jurisdiction over separate civil
actions for forfeiture. The OMB
countered with a motion to
expunge and to declare the
Garcias in default. To the OMBs
motion, the Garcia’s interposed an
opposition in which they
manifested that they
have meanwhile repaired to the
Court on certiorari to nullify the writ
of attachment SB issued in which
case the SB should defer action on
the forfeiture case as a matter of
judicial courtesy.
 The SB denied the motion to
dismiss; The same
resolution declared the Garcias in
default.
 Another resolution denied the
Garcias motion for reconsideration
and/or to admit answer, and set a
date for the ex-parte presentation
of the Republics evidence.
 A second motion for
reconsideration was also denied
on February 23, 2005, pursuant to
the prohibited pleading rule.
 Despite the standing default order,
the Garcias moved for the transfer
and consolidation of Forfeiture I
with the plunder case which were
respectively pending in different
divisions of the SB. contending
that such consolidation is
mandatory under RA 8249
(SANDIGANBAYAN).
 On May 20, 2005, the SB
4th Division denied the motion for
the reason that the forfeiture case
is not the corresponding civil
action for the recovery of civil
liability arising from the criminal
case of plunder.
 (4) On July 26, 2005, the Garcias
filed another motion to dismiss
and/or to quash Forfeiture I
on, inter alia, the following
grounds: (a) the filing of the
plunder case ousted the SB
4th Division of jurisdiction over the
forfeiture case; and (b) that the
 consolidation is imperative in order
to avoid possible double jeopardy
entanglements.
 By Order of August 5,
2005, the SB merely noted
the motion in view of
movants having been
declared in default which
has yet to be lifted.
ISSUE: For lack of proper and valid
service of summons, W/N the [SB]
4th Division could not have acquired
jurisdiction over petitioners, [and her
children], persons, much less make them
become the true parties-litigants,
contestants or legal adversaries in
forfeiture
HELD: On the issue of lack of jurisdiction,
petitioner argues that the SB did not
acquire jurisdiction over her person and
that of her children due to a defective
substituted service of summons. There is
merit in petitioners contention.
Sec. 7, Rule 14 of the 1997 Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure clearly provides
for the requirements of a valid substituted
service of summons, thus:
SEC. 7. Substituted service. If the
defendant cannot be served within a
reasonable time as provided in the
preceding section [personal service on
defendant], service may be effected (a) by
leaving copies of the summons at the
defendants residence with some person of
suitable age and discretion then residing
therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at
defendants office or regular place of
business with some competent person in
charge thereof.
It is basic that a court must acquire
jurisdiction over a party for the latter to be
bound by its decision or orders. Valid
service of summons, by whatever mode
authorized by and proper under the Rules,
is the means by which a court acquires
jurisdiction over a person.
 In the instant case, it is undisputed
that summons for Forfeitures I and II were
served personally on Maj. Gen. Carlos
Flores Garcia, who is detained at the
PNP Detention Center, who
acknowledged receipt thereof by affixing
his signature. It is also undisputed that
substituted service of summons for both
Forfeitures I and II was made on petitioner
and her children through Maj. Gen. Garcia
at the PNP Detention Center. However,
such substituted services of summons
were invalid for being irregular and
defective
 In Manotoc v. Court of
Appeals,[23] we broke down the
requirements to be
(1) Impossibility of prompt
personal service, i.e., the party relying on
substituted service or the sheriff must
show that defendant cannot be served
promptly or there is impossibility of prompt
service within a reasonable
time. Reasonable time being so much
time as is necessary under the
circumstances for a reasonably prudent
and diligent man to do, conveniently, what
the contract or duty requires that should
be done, having a regard for the rights
and possibility of loss, if any[,] to the other
party.[24] Moreover, we indicated therein
that the sheriff must show several
attempts for personal service of at least
three (3) times on at least two (2) different
dates.
(2) Specific details in the
return, i.e., the sheriff must describe in the
Return of Summons the facts and
circumstances surrounding the attempted
personal service.
(3) Substituted service effected on
a person of suitable age and discretion
residing at defendants house or
residence; or on a competent person in
charge of defendants office or regular
place of business.

From the foregoing requisites, it is

apparent that no valid substituted service
of summons was made on petitioner and
her children, as the service made through
Maj. Gen. Garcia did not comply with the
first two (2) requirements mentioned
above for a valid substituted service of
summons. Moreover, the third
requirement was also not strictly complied
with as the substituted service was made
not at petitioner’s house or residence but
in the PNP Detention Center where Maj.
Gen. Garcia is detained, even if the latter
is of suitable age and discretion. Hence,
no valid substituted service of summons
was made.

Insofar as they pertain to petitioner

and her three children, is VOID for lack of
jurisdiction over their persons.

BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,
Petitioner,
VS
SPS. IRENEO M. SANTIAGO and
LIWANAG P. SANTIAGO, CENTROGEN,
INC., REPRESENTED BY
EDWIN SANTIAGO, Respondent.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
FACTS:
 Respondent (Centrogen) is a
domestic corporation engaged in
pharmaceutical business, represented by
its President, Edwin Santiago, son of
private respondents Spouses Ireneo M.
Santiago and Liwanag P. Santiago.
 Private respondent Centrogen
obtained loans from Far East Bank and
Trust Company reaching the sum of P4,
650,000.00, as evidenced by promissory
notes executed by Edwin Santiago.
 Ireneo M. Santiago executed a
Real Estate Mortgage over a parcel of
land registered under his name and
located at Sta Cruz, Laguna to secure the
loan.
 The same property secured
another loan obligation in the amount
of P1,504,280.00.
 Centrogen incurred default and
therefore the loan obligation became due
and demandable.
 Meanwhile, FEBTC merged with
the BPI. As a result, BPI assumed all the
rights, privileges and obligations of
FEBTC.
 BPI filed an Extra-Judicial
Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage over
the subject property.
 Spouses Santiago and Centrogen
filed a Complaint seeking the issuance of
a TRO and Preliminary and Final
Injunction, for the annulment of the Real
Estate Mortgage with BPI.
 The complaint alleged that the
initial loan obligation in the amount
of P490,000.00, including interest thereon
has been fully paid. Such payment
notwithstanding, the amount was still
included in the amount of computation of
the arrears as shown by the document of
Extra-Judicial Foreclosure of Real Estate
Mortgage filed by the latter. Moreover, the
Spouses Santiago and Centrogen
contended that the original loan
agreement was for the amount of 5
Million but only 2 Million was released by
petitioner and as a result, the squalene
project failed and the company groped for
funds to pay its loan obligations.
 On 27 February 2003, BPI was
summoned to file and serve its Answer
and on the same day, summons was
served on the Branch Manager of
BPI. Instead of filing an Answer, BPI filed
a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant and other procedural infirmities
attendant to the filing of the complaint.
 BPI claimed that the Branch
Manager of its Sta. Cruz, Laguna Branch,
was not one of those authorized by
Section 11, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules
of Court to receive summons on behalf of
the corporation. The summons served
upon its Branch Manager, therefore, did
not bind the corporation. Also, alleged
lack of authority of the person who signed.
 On 6 March 2003, the RTC
ordered the service of new summons to
BPI in accordance with the provisions of
the Revised Rules of Court.
 In compliance with the aforesaid
Order, the Branch Clerk of Court caused
the issuance of a new summons on 7
March 2003, a copy of which was served
upon the Office of the Corporate
Secretary of the BPI on March 11, 2003.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC acquired
jurisdiction over the person of BPI when
the original summons was served upon
the branch manager of its Sta. Cruz,
Laguna Branch.
HELD: Sec. 11, Rule 14. Service upon
domestic private juridical entity – When
the defendant is a corporation, partnership
or association organized under the laws of
the Philippines with a juridical personality
service may be made on the president,
managing partner, general manager,
corporate secretary, treasurer or in-house
counsel.
Applying the aforestated principle in the
case at bar, we rule that the service of
summons on BPI’s Branch Manager did
not bind the corporation for the branch
manager is not included in the
enumeration of the statute of the persons
upon whom service of summons can be
validly made in behalf of the corporation.
Such service is therefore void and
ineffectual.
However, upon the issuance and the
proper service of new summons on 11
March 2003, before the Writ of Preliminary
Injunction was issued on 20 March
2003, whatever defect attended the
service of the original summons, was
promptly and accordingly cured.
The Order granting the application for Writ
of Preliminary Injunction was issued, the
RTC already acquired jurisdiction over the
person of BPI by virtue of the new
summons validly served on the Corporate
Secretary. The fact that the original
summons was invalidly served is of no
moment since jurisdiction over BPI was
subsequently acquired by the service of a
new summons.
It bears stressing, that on 7 March 2003,
the Branch Clerk of Court issued a new
summons which was properly served
upon BPI’s Corporate Secretary on 11
March 2003, as evidenced by the Sheriff’s
Return.
The ultimate test on the validity and
sufficiency on service of summons is
whether the same and the attachments
thereto where ultimately received by the
corporation under such circumstances
that no undue prejudice is sustained by it
from the procedural lapse and it was
afforded full opportunity to present its
responsive pleadings. This is but in
accord with the entrenched rule that the
ends of substantial justice should not be
subordinated to technicalities and, for
which purpose, each case should be
examined within the factual milieu peculiar
to it.