PALE 3.13 Quirante vs.

IAC, 169 SCRA 769 (1989)

FACTS: This appeal by certiorari seeks to set aside the judgment1 of the former Intermediate Appellate Court.
In said decision, the trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiff by rescinding the contract; ordering GUERRERO
and PHILAMGEN to pay the plaintiff actual damages in the amount of P129,430.00, moral damages in the
amount of P50,000.00, exemplary damages in the amount of P40,000.00 and attorney’s fees in the amount of
P30,000.00.

Not satisfied with the decision of the trial court, PHILAMGEN filed a notice of appeal but the same was not
given due course because it was allegedly filed out of time. The trial court thereafter issued a writ of execution.7

On June 18, 1983, herein petitioner Quirante filed a motion in the trial court for the confirmation of his
attorney’s fees. According to him, there was an oral agreement between him and the late Dr. Casasola with regard
to his attorney’s fees, which agreement was allegedly confirmed in writing by the widow, Asuncion Vda. de
Casasola, and the two daughters of the deceased, namely Mely C. Garcia and Virginia C. Nazareno. Petitioner
avers that pursuant to said agreement, the attorney’s fees would be computed as follows:

1. fees of the undersigned counsel (Atty. Quirante) shall be P30,000.00.

2. B.In case the Honorable Court awards damages in excess of the P120,000.00 bond, it shall be divided
equally between the Heirs of I. Casasola, Atty. John C. Quirante and Atty. Dante Cruz.

The trial court granted the motion for confirmation in an order dated March 20, 1984, despite an opposition
thereto. It also denied the motion for reconsideration of the order of confirmation in its second order dated May
25, 1984. These are the two orders which are assailed in this case.

ISSUE: W/N the confirmation of attorney’s fees is premature

HELD: These are the two orders which are assailed in this case. Well settled is the rule that counsel’s claim for
attorney’s fees may be asserted either in the very action in which the services in question have been rendered, or
in a separate action.
In filing the motion for confirmation of attorney’s fees, petitioners chose to assert their claims in the same
action. This is also a proper remedy under our jurisprudence. Nevertheless, we agree with the respondent court
that the confirmation of attorney’s fees is premature. As it correctly pointed out, the petition for review on
certiorari filed by PHILAMGEN in this Court “may or may not ultimately result in the granting to the Isasola
(sic) family of the total amount of damages” awarded by the trial court. This especially true in the light of
subsequent developments in G.R. No. 64334. In a decision promulgated on May 21, 1987, the Court rendered
judgment setting aside the decision of May 4, 1983 of the Intermediate Appellate Court and ordering the
respondent Regional Trial Court of Manila to certify the appeal of PHILAMGEN from said trial court’s decision
to the Court of Appeal. Said decision of the Court became final and executory on June 25, 1987.
Since the main case from which the petitioner’s claims for their fees may arise has not yet become final, the
determination of the propriety of said fees and the amount thereof should be held in abeyance. This procedure
gains added validity in the light of the rule that the remedy for recovering attorney’s fees as an incident of the
main action may be availed of only when something is due to the client.

WHEREFORE, with the foregoing observation, the decision of the respondent court subject of the present
recourse is hereby AFFIRMED

PALE 4.13 Tanhueco vs. de Dumo, 172 SCRA 760 (1989)

Facts: Hilaria Tanhueco filed a petition for disbarment against Atty. Justiniano de Dumo for his refusal to remit
her money collected from debtors and refusal to return documents entrusted to him as a counsel in certain
collection cases. Tanhueco allegedly offered De Dumo 15% of what he may be able to collect from debtors but
De Dumo responded that in their agreement he gets 50% of what he may be able to collect as contingent fee. De
Dumo also admitted he did not turn over the P 12, 000.00 he collected and applying it instead as part of his
attorney’s fee.

Issue: Whether or not De Dumo’s contingent fee is grossly excessive.

Ruling: De Dumo’s contingent fee is grossly excessive because 50% is more than half of the total amount due
from Tanhueco’s debtors. His action is believed to be fraudulent because he took advantage of his client who is
an old and sickly woman. Canon 20 of the CPR states that: A lawyer shall charge only fair and reasonable fees.
Attorney’s fee which is found out to be unconscionable or unreasonable is subject to court’s modification. A
lawyer as an officer of the court has the duty to assist in the impartial administration of justice between parties,
and hence, the fees should be subject to judicial control. Thus, De Dumo is suspended from the practice of law
for six months and the attorney’s fee is reduced to 15% of the total amount collected by him. He is also ordered
to return the P 10, 200.00 net amount of the P 12, 000.00 he collected and entitled of 15% attorney’s fee in case
he made any other collection from Tanhueco’s debtor.

PALE 5.13 Albano vs. Coloma, 21 SCRA 411 (1967)

FACTS: This proceeding for disbarment was filed by complainant Angel Albano against respondent.
Complainant alleged that during the Japanese occupation his mother, Delfina Aquino, and he retained the services
of respondent as counsel for them as plaintiffs in a civil case. Complainant alleged that respondent failed to
expedite the hearing and termination of the case, as a result, they were represented by another lawyer. Respondent
intervened in the case to collect her attorney's fees. Respondent presented in exhibit a document showing that
plaintiffs promised to pay her a contingent fee of 33-¹/3% of whatever could be recovered whether in land or
damages. A copy of such document was attached to the letter. The more serious charge was that the signature
therein appearing, purportedly that of the complainant, and the writing after the name of his mother were not
made by them.

Complainant stated that being a poor man, he could hardly pay for the services of a lawyer to assist him in the
disbarment proceedings. When required to answer, respondent denied the allegations. In the opinion of the Court
of Appeals penned by Justice Sanchez, now a member of this Court, an evaluation of her service was made thus:
"Appellee served as plaintiffs' counsel for a period of about seven years. The record shows that she was diligent
in her work.

Respondent concluded by saying that "during her practice of law for more than twenty (20) years [she] has strictly
adhered to the ethics of the profession and has always been guided by the principles of justice, fairness and respect
for individual rights and that as a public official, [she] has never used her influence to corrupt public servants or
ordinary citizens, and all the people of Ilocos Norte well know that complainant has no sense of justice, no
integrity to preserve, no honor to treasure and no future to build. On the other hand, the people of said province
have faithfully supported [her] in her aspirations, first as councilor and then as board member with overwhelming
majorities. Said support speaks of vindication and means full faith and credit to [her] integrity, ability and
honesty." She further submitted as affirmative defenses the cause of action being barred by (1) prior judgment
and (2) by the statute of limitations. She prayed for the dismissal of the complaint against her.

ISSUE: Whether the case against respondent should be dismissed

RULING: Yes. No falsification was proven in this case as the same was investigated by the NBI. The Solicitor
General assert that if there was anyone guilty of bad faith in this case "it is complainant and his co-plaintiffs who,
after benefiting from the valuable services of respondent in said case, tried to renege on their agreement for the
payment of the latter's contingent attorney's fees by dismissing her as their counsel after she had already won for
them said case in the trial court and the Court of Appeals, and later, by attempting to impugn the authenticity and
genuineness of their written agreement for the payment of attorney's fees, . . . ."
Counsel, any counsel, who is worthy of his hire, is entitled to be fully recompensed for his services. With his
capital consisting solely of his brains and with his skill, acquired at tremendous cost not only in money but in the
expenditure of time and energy, he is entitled to the protection of any judicial tribunal against any attempt on the
part of a client to escape payment of his fees. Certainly, this is not to say that if a case were presented showing
nonfeasance or malfeasance on the part of a lawyer, appropriate disciplinary action would not be taken. This is
not such a case however. Respondent, as has been so clearly shown, was in no wise culpable; there is no occasion
for the corrective power of this Court coming into play.

PALE 6.13 Metropolitan Bank vs. CA, 181 SCRA 367 (1990)

FATCS:

1. Petitioner Metrobank filed a petition for review on certiorari after the Court of Appeals ruled that
petitioner should pay the certain amount based on the charging lien on the civil case filed against them
which resulted to dismissal.

2. In the dismissed case, private respondent filed a motion to fix its attorney’s fees, based on quantum meruit,
which precipitated an exchange of arguments between the parties. Petitioner manifested that it had fully
paid private respondent, Arturo Alafriz and Associates (AAA)

3. Private respondent countered and attempted to arrange a compromise with petitioner in order to avoid suit,
but the negotiations were unsuccessful.

ISSUE: Whether or not the legal fees charged by AAA are reasonable.

RULING: No. On the matter of attorney's liens Section 37, Rule 138 provides:
. . . He shall also have a lien to the same extent upon all judgments for the payment of money, and executions
issued in pursuance of such judgments, which he has secured in a litigation of his client, from and after the time
when he shall have caused a statement of his claim of such lien to be entered upon the records of the court
rendering such judgment, or issuing such execution, and shall have caused written notice thereof to be delivered
to his client and to the adverse party; and he shall have the same right and power over such judgments and
executions as his client would have to enforce his lien and secure the payment of his just fees and disbursements.

Consequent to such provision, a charging lien, to be enforceable as security for the payment of attorney's fees,
requires as a condition sine qua non a judgment for money and execution in pursuance of such judgment secured
in the main action by the attorney in favor of his client. A lawyer may enforce his right to fees by filing the
necessary petition as an incident in the main action in which his services were rendered when something is due
his client in the action from which the fee is to be paid.

In the case at bar, the civil cases below were dismissed upon the initiative of the plaintiffs "in view of the frill
satisfaction of their claims." 8 The dismissal order neither provided for any money judgment nor made any
monetary award to any litigant, much less in favor of petitioner who was a defendant therein. This being so,
private respondent's supposed charging lien is, under our rule, without any legal basis. It is flawed by the fact that
there is nothing to generate it and to which it can attach in the same manner as an ordinary lien arises and attaches
to real or personal property.

PALE 7.13 Roxas vs. de Zuzuarregui, 481 SCRA 250 (2006)

FACTS: The Zuzuarreguis engaged the legal services of Attys. Romeo G. Roxas and Santiago N. Pastor, to
represent them in the case. This was sealed by a Letter-Agreement, wherein it was contained that the attorneys
would endeavor to secure just compensation with the NHA and other government agencies at a price of 11pesos
or more per square meter, and that any lower amount shall not entitle them to any atty’s fees. They also stipulated
that in the event they get it for 11pesos per square meter, their contingent fee shall be 30% of the just
compensation. They also stipulated that their lawyer’s fees shall be in proportion to the cash/bonds ratio of the
just compensation.

A Compromise Agreement was executed between the Zuzuarreguis and the NHA. The Compromise
Agreement, stipulated among other things, that the just compensation of the Zuzuarregui properties would be at
P19.50 per square meter payable in NHA Bonds. In a Decision dated 20 December 1985, the RTC, approved the
Compromise Agreement submitted by the parties.
The total amount in NHA bonds released to Atty. Romeo G. Roxas in behalf of the Zuzuarreguis amounted
to P54,500,000.00. Out of this amount, the records show that the amount turned over to the Zuzuarreguis by Atty.
Roxas amounted to P30,520,000.00 (representing the actual just compensation, although this amount is bigger)
in NHA bonds.
Computed at P19.50 per square meter, the 1,790,570.36 square meters property of the Zuzuarreguis was
expropriated at a total price of P34,916,122.00. The total amount released by the NHA was P54,500,000.00. The
difference of P19,583,878.00 is, undoubtedly, the yield on the bonds.
On 25 August 1987, a letter was sent by the Zuzuarreguis’ new counsel, Jose F. Gonzalez, to Attys. Roxas
and Pastor, demanding that the latter deliver to the Zuzuarreguis the yield corresponding to bonds paid by the
NHA within a period of 10 days from receipt, under pain of administrative, civil and/or criminal action.

ISSUE: The honorable court of appeals gravely erred on a question of law in holding that the letter-agreement
re: contingent fees cannot be allowed to stand as the law between the parties

RULING: A contract is a meeting of the minds between two persons whereby one binds himself, with respect to
the other, to give something or to render some service. Contracts shall be obligatory, in whatever form they may
have been entered into, provided all the essential requisites for their validity are present. The Zuzuarreguis, in
entering into the Letter-Agreement, fully gave their consent thereto. In fact, it was them (the Zuzuarreguis) who
sent the said letter to Attys. Roxas and Pastor, for the purpose of confirming all the matters which they had agreed
upon previously. There is absolutely no evidence to show that anybody was forced into entering into the Letter-
Agreement. Verily, its existence, due execution and contents were admitted by the Zuzuarreguis themselves.
In the presence of a contract for professional services duly executed by the parties thereto, the same
becomes the law between the said parties is not absolute but admits an exception – that the stipulations therein
are not contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy or public order.
Under the contract in question, Attys. Roxas and Pastor are to receive contingent fees for their professional
services. It is a deeply-rooted rule that contingent fees are not per se prohibited by law. They are sanctioned by
Canon 13 of the Canons of Professional Ethics.
A contract for contingent fee, where sanctioned by law, should be reasonable under all the circumstances
of the case including the risk and uncertainty of the compensation, but should always be subject to the supervision
of a court, as to its reasonableness.
Indubitably entwined with the lawyer’s duty to charge only reasonable fees is the power of this Court to
reduce the amount of attorney’s fees if the same is excessive and unconscionable.
Attorney’s fees are unconscionable if they affront one’s sense of justice, decency or reasonableness. It
becomes axiomatic therefore, that power to determine the reasonableness or the, unconscionable character of
attorney's fees stipulated by the parties is a matter falling within the regulatory prerogative of the courts.
In the instant case, Attys. Roxas and Pastor received an amount which was equal to forty-four percent
(44%) of the just compensation paid (including the yield on the bonds) by the NHA to the Zuzuarreguis, or an
amount equivalent to P23,980,000.00 of the P54,500,000.00. Considering that there was no full blown hearing in
the expropriation case, ending as it did in a Compromise Agreement, the 44% is, undeniably, unconscionable and
excessive under the circumstances. Its reduction is, therefore, in order.
It is imperative that the contingent fees received by Attys. Roxas and Pastor must be equitably reduced.
In the opinion of this Court, the yield that corresponds to the percentage share of the Zuzuarreguis in the P19.50
per square meter just compensation paid by the NHA must be returned by Attys. Roxas and Pastor.
The yield on the NHA bonds amounted to P19,583,878.00. This amount must therefore be divided between the
Zuzuarreguis, on the one hand, and Attys. Roxas and Pastor, on the other. The division must be pro rata. Attys.
Roxas and Pastor, in the opinion of this Court, were not shortchanged for their efforts for they would still be
earning or actually earned attorney’s fees in the amount of P6,987,078.75
On the issue of moral and exemplary damages, we cannot award the same for there was no direct showing of bad
faith on the part of Attys. Roxas and Pastor, for as we said earlier, contingency fees are not per se prohibited by
law. It is only necessary that it be reduced when excessive and unconscionable, which we have already done.

PALE 8.13 Masmud vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 183385, February 13, 2009

FACTS: Evangelina Masmud’s husband, the late Alexander Masmud, filed a complaint against First Victory
Shipping Services and Angelakos S.A. for non-payment of permanent disability benefits, medical expenses,
sickness allowance, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees. Alexander engaged the services of Atty.
Rolando B. Go, Jr. as his counsel. In consideration of Atty. Go’s legal services, Alexander agreed to pay attorney’s
fees on a contingent basis, as follows: twenty percent (20%) of total monetary claims as settled or paid and an
additional ten percent (10%) in case of appeal. It was likewise agreed that any award of attorney’s fees shall
pertain to respondent’s law firm as compensation.

Later, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision granting the monetary claims of Alexander. Alexanders employer
filed an appeal before the NLRC. During the pendency of the proceedings, Alexander died. After explaining the
terms of the lawyer’s fees to Evangelina, Atty. Go caused her substitution as complainant. The appeal was then
dismissed. On appeal before the CA, the decision of the LA was affirmed.

Atty. Go then moved for the execution of the decision. The LA directed the NLRC Cashier to release the amount
of P3,454,079.20 to Evangelina. Out of the said amount, Evangelina paid Atty. Go the sum of P680,000.
Dissatisfied, Atty. Go filed a motion to record and enforce the attorney’s lien alleging that Evangelina reneged
on their contingent fee agreement. Evangelina paid only the amount of P680,000.00, equivalent to 20% of
the award as attorney’s fees, thus, leaving a balance of 10%, plus the award pertaining to the counsel as attorney’s
fees.

ISSUE: Whether the attorney’s fees being claimed by respondent is reasonable

RULING: Yes. Contingent fee contracts are subject to the supervision and close scrutiny of the court in order
that clients may be protected from unjust charges. The amount of contingent fees agreed upon by the parties is
subject to the stipulation that counsel will be paid for his legal services only if the suit or litigation prospers. A
much higher compensation is allowed as contingent fees because of the risk that the lawyer may get nothing if
the suit fails. The Court finds nothing illegal in the contingent fee contract between Atty. Go and Evangelina’s
husband. The CA committed no error of law when it awarded the attorney’s fees of Atty. Go and allowed him to
receive an equivalent of 39% of the monetary award.

Considering that Atty. Go successfully represented his client, it is only proper that he should receive adequate
compensation for his efforts. A lawyer is as much entitled to judicial protection against injustice or imposition of
fraud on the part of his client as the client is against abuse on the part of his counsel. The duty of the court is not
alone to ensure that a lawyer acts in a proper and lawful manner, but also to see that a lawyer is paid his just fees.
With his capital consisting of his brains and with his skill acquired at tremendous cost not only in money but in
expenditure of time and energy, he is entitled to the protection of any judicial tribunal against any attempt on the
part of his client to escape payment of his just compensation. It would be ironic if after putting forth the best in
him to secure justice for his client, he himself would not get his due.

PALE 9.13 Urban Bank vs. Pena, 364 SCRA 597 (2001)
FACTS: Complainant Urban Bank vs. Pena bought a parcel of land from the Isabela Sugar Company (ISC). One
of the conditions of the sale was for ISC to cause the eviction of all the occupants found in said property. To fully
implement the abovementioned condition, ISC engaged the services of herein Respondent Atty. Magdaleno M.
Peña. This was communicated by ISC to Respondent in a Memorandum and relayed to Complainant in a Lette.
Respondent accepted the engagement of his services by ISC and he proceeded to take the necessary steps
to evict the occupants of the property subject of the sale.
During the eviction process, Complainant was informed by ISC and Respondent about the necessity of a
letter of authority in favor of the latter, granting him the authority to represent Complainant in maintaining
possession of the aforesaid property and to represent Complainant in any court action that may be instituted in
connection with the exercise of said duty.
Complainant acceded to the request and issued a letter of authority but only after making it very clear to
the Respondent that it was ISC which contracted his services and not Complainant.
Subsequently however, Respondent requested for a modification of said letter of authority by furnishing
Complainant with a draft containing the desired wordings and asking Complainant to modify the previous letter
by issuing a new one similarly worded as his draft.
If only to expedite and facilitate matters, Complainant willingly obliged and re-issued a new letter of
authority to Respondent, this time incorporating some of Respondent’s suggestions.
Eventually, the eviction of the occupants of the property in question was successfully carried out.
Respondent filed a collection suit against herein Complainant "for recovery of agent’s compensation and expenses
damages and attorney’s fees", on the strength of the letter of authority

FINDINGS OF THE INVESTIGATING COMMISSIONER

The complainant never contested the actuation done by the respondent to rid its property from tenants and
intruders; and even executed a letter of authority in favor of respondent; otherwise complainant should have
engaged the services of other lawyers.
Nevertheless, it is not for this Office to determine who should pay the respondent for this is a matter not
within its jurisdiction but for the proper court to do so.

IBP BOARD OF GOVERNORS

IBP Board of Governors passed a Resolution DISMISSING the Complaint.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent committed malpractice, deceit and gross misconduct in the practice of his
profession as member of the bar.

RULING: No. It is clear from the above that what respondent was trying to enforce were the terms and conditions
of the contract. The letter, from the his own admission, just served to officially confirm a done deal. It was, hence,
utilized solely as documentary evidence to buttress respondent’s assertion regarding the existence of the agency
agreement. In fact, the amount of compensation (to the tune of 10% of the market value of the property) he was
recovering in the action was never mentioned in the letter, but apparently settled in the course of an oral
conversation. Indeed, respondent, with or without the letter, could have instituted a suit against the complainant.
There is no gainsaying that a verbal engagement is sufficient to create an attorney-client relationship.
In sum, we find that, under the premises, respondent can hardly be faulted and accused of deceit,
malpractice and gross misconduct for invoking the aid of the court in recovering recompense for legal services
which he claims he undertook for the complainant, and which the latter does not deny to have benefited from.
Indeed, what he did was a lawful exercise of a right.

DISPOSITION: the disbarment complaint against respondent Atty. Magdaleno M. Peña is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit.

PALE 10.13 Corpus vs. CA, 98 SCRA 424 (1980)

PALE 11.13 Malvar v. Kraft Foods, G.R. No. 183952, September 9, 2013
PALE 12. 13 Balingit v. Cervantes & Delarmente, A.C. No. 11059, November 9, 2016

FACTS: Complainant's two (2) sons, Jose Antonio, Jr. and Carlo Balingit, who were on board their respective
motorcycles, figured in a head-on collision with the car driven by David. Carlo sustained serious physical injuries,
while Jose Antonio, Jr. was pronounced dead on arrival at the hospital. Kristopher, Jose Antonio Jr.'s passenger,
also suffered physical injuries. As a result, an information for criminal negligence was filed against David with
the MTCC.
Subsequently, complainant together with Kristopher, Carlo, and the heirs of Jose Antonio, Jr engaged the
legal services of respondents in filing a separate civil suit for damages and an administrative case with the PRC
against David, who recently passed the physician board exam at that time. Thus, Atty. Cervantes sent a demand
letter to David for payment of P2,000,000.00 plus 25% thereof as attorney's fees. Also, Atty. Cervantes sent a
letter to the PRC informing the latter of the pending criminal case against David and requesting that the issuance
of David's license to practice medicine be deferred or suspended until the termination of David's criminal case.
The PRC replied and informed Atty. Cervantes of the requirements in order to file an administrative case against
David.
Meanwhile, Atty. Cervantes prepared and signed an Agreement embodying the terms of respondents'
engagement. Addressed to Kristopher, Carlo, and the heirs of Jose Antonio, Jr., the Agreement provided:
1. Acceptance Fee of P30,000.00;
2. Appearance Fee of P4,000.00;
3. Success Fee of 20% of any amount that may be actually collected;
4. Official and other Fees, such as docket fees, transcript of stenographic notes, expenses for
messengerial, mailing, photocopying services and expenses for representation shall be for your
account.
Kristopher, Carlo, and the heirs of Jose Antonio, Jr. did not sign the Agreement. Just the same,
complainant paid the sum of P45,000.00 as partial acceptance fee for the filing of the civil suit for damages. In
addition, Atty. Cervantes allegedly received P10,000.00 from Imelda, complainant's daughter-in-law, without
issuing any receipt. However, despite respondents' receipt of the P45,000.00 and complainant's submission to
respondents of the necessary documents, when the present complaint was filed, and until today, respondents have
failed to institute the separate civil suit for damages agreed upon.

Meanwhile, the criminal case was referred to mediation by the trial court for possible settlement of the civil aspect
of the case. Atty. Cervantes, upon discovering that complainant entered into a Compromise Agreement, attended
the hearing and demanded 10% of the amount of the compromise as attorney's fees and P5,000.00 as appearance
fee from complainant. Complainant refused on the ground that the compromise was entered into before the
mediator.
Atty. Cervantes sent a demand letter to complainant seeking payment of P100,000.00 as attorney's fees,
representing 10% of the amount of the compromise, and appearance fee of P5,000.00 for his attendance in the
hearing. As complainant still refused to pay, Atty. Cervantes filed a criminal complaint for estafa against
complainant, his wife, and his sons.
Complainant filed the present disbarment case against respondents before the IBP-CBD.

ISSUE: Is it proper for a lawyer to impose additional professional fees upon his client which were never
mentioned nor agreed upon at the time of the engagement of his services.

RULING: No. Atty. Cervantes demanded payment of P5,000.00 appearance fee and 10% of the settlement as
success fee even though the hearing was for the criminal case and the Compromise Agreement was entered in the
course of the criminal proceedings; thus, outside the scope of respondents’ engagement. Indeed, it is highly
improper for a lawyer to impose additional professional fees upon his client which were never mentioned nor
agreed upon at the time of the engagement of his services.
DISPOSITION: Atty. Teodoro B. Delarmente and Atty. Renato M. Cervantes are hereby SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for six (6) months. Both are STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts
shall be dealt with more severely. They are also DIRECTED to return to complainant the amount of P45,000.00.
Finally, respondents are DIRECTED to report to this Court the date of their receipt of this Decision to enable this
Court to determine when their suspension shall take effect.

PALE 13.13 Domingo vs. Aquino, 38 SCRA 472 (1971)

FACTS:

CFI of Pangasinan rendered judgment approving the money claim of respondent Pedro A. Aquino against the
petitioner estate by ordering the then special administratrix, Asuncion Domingo Sta. Maria, “to pay from the
available funds of the estate the sum of P20,000.00 with 12% interest per annum, from June 10, 1954 to Pedro
A. Aquino.”

Both parties appealed from the said judgment to the CA, affirmed the CFI’s decision with modification.

The estate’s counsel of record in the appellate court, Atty. Jose A. Unson, did not receive the notice and copy of
the appellate court’s judgment sent to him by registered mail; but the estate’s attorneys in the intestate
proceedings pending in the lower court, Attys. Primicias, Del Castillo and Macaraeg, were verbally informed by
respondent’s counsel of the judgment rendered on appeal by the appellate court.

Pursuant to said information, petitioner caused to be filed on March 9, 1967, with the appellate court an
“Appearance with Motions for Substitution and to be served with a copy of the Judgment,” XXX appellate
court denied XXX.

No further move was made by petitioner thereafter until almost five months later XXX a petition was filed, one
of the representations was that Atty Unson has ceased to be the counsel because the the administrator Luis
Domingo Jr was also removed.

ISSUE: WN such representation in the petition,that Atty Unson was no longer the counsel fo the petitioner, is
tenable.

RULING:
No.
Atty. Unson continued on record in the appellate court as counsel for the estate as appellant therein and did not
file therein any withdrawal as counsel and neither did the petitioner inform said court of any change of counsel
or of party-administrator, as required by Rule 138, section 26 of the Rules of Court. More so, no appearance of
any new counsel for the estate was ever filed with the appellate court.

PALE 1.14 Montano vs. IBP, 358 SCRA 1 (2001)

PALE 2.14 Obando vs. Figueras, 322 SCRA 148

FACTS:

1. Obando was appointed as respondent Eduardo’s co-administrator of the joint estate of Jose and Dona
Alegria Figueras.

2. Obando and several other members of the Obando clan was allegedly bequeathed a will of the properties
left by the Figueras couple including two parcels of land in Gilmore Avenue, New Manila, Quezon City.
 3. Upon insistence of the respondent that the alleged will was a forgery, the will was submitted to the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for examination and found that the signatures were not made by
the same person which led to the indictment and conviction of Obando for estafa through falsification of
a public document.

4. Eduardo sold the lots to Amigo Realty Corporation on the strength of an Order issued by the probate court
on May 15, 1991. On June 4, 1992, Petitioner Obando, in his capacity as co-administrator and universal
heir of Doña Alegria, filed a Complaint against Eduardo and Amigo Realty for the nullification of the sale
to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 79.

5. In Special Proceeding Nos. 61567 and 123948, the probate court in its order dated December 17, 1997
removed Obando from his office as co-administrator of the estate. Consequently, on January 27, 1998 the
respondents filed a Joint Motion to Dismiss on the civil case to which the trial court granted the motion.
Obando then filed a Motion for Reconsideration to no avail. Then his Petition for Certiorari and
Mandamus was dismissed and the dismissal order of the RTC was affirmed.

6. Petitioner then argues before the Supreme Court that the motion to dismiss was invalid since at the time
of the filing, Atty. Yuseco no longer represented the respondents, as shown by Eduardo’s Manifestation
and Motion dated January 8, 1998, dispensing with said counsel’s services in the proceedings in view of
a Compromise Agreement with Petitioner Obando.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Yuseco ceased to be the defendant’s Counsel.

RULING: No. Representation continues until the court dispenses with the services of counsel in accordance with
Section 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. Counsel may be validly substituted only if the following requisites
are complied with: (1) new counsel files a written application for substitution; (2) the client’s written consent is
obtained; and (3) the written consent of the lawyer to be substituted is secured, if it can still be; if the written
consent can no longer be obtained, then the application for substitution must carry proof that notice of the motion
has been served on the attorney to be substituted in the manner required by the Rules. In this case, Eduardo did
not dismiss Attorney Yuseco. In fact, the former manifested that he had been tricked by Petitioner Obando into
signing the aforesaid Manifestation and Motion and Compromise Agreement. Besides, the filing of the Motion to
Dismiss was not prejudicial but beneficial to the said respondent; hence, he had no reason to complain. Therefore,
it cannot be said that Atty. Yuseco has been validly dismissed.

PALE 3.14 Caoile vs. Macaraeg, A.C. No. 720, June 17, 2015

FACTS: Alleging that his lawyer’s neglect and dereliction of duty caused the dismissal of his appeal, complainant
Francisco Caoile filed on August 16, 1966 a Complaint1for disbarment against Atty. Marcelino Macaraeg.

Francisco, and four others, engaged the services of Atty. Macaraeg to represent them in an action for recovery
of ownership. After the CFI rendered judgment against them, Francisco and his codefendants decided to appeal
their case before the Court of Appeals (CA).

Accordingly, Atty. Macaraeg filed a notice of appeal. Thrice he moved for extension of time to file appellants’
brief. In his last motion for extension,2 he alleged that he was already in the process of doing the finishing touches
on the brief and just needed to have it printed. Yet, the extended period expired without Atty. Macaraeg filing
any brief. Hence, upon motion of the opposing party, the CA dismissed the appeal.3 The dismissal became final
and executory.

Francisco averred that they were unaware of the dismissal of their appeal until they were served with the CFI’s
writ of execution5 and a notice of sale at public auction6 of their property in 1965. After confirming with the CA
that they indeed lost the case, Francisco confronted Atty. Macaraeg who informed him that they lost the case
because they failed to pay him in full. Anent the pacto de retro sale which Francisco and his wife executed in his
favor supposedly to cover the balance of his professional fees, Atty. Macaraeg claimed that it was Francisco who
insisted on its execution, and that, contrary to Francisco’s claim, it was intended as payment for his services while
representing Francisco before the CFI, and not as payment for his services in filing the appeal

Report and Recommendation of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines: suspension from the practice of law for
a period of two years.

IBP Board of Governors: reduced to a suspension of one year.

HELD: While Atty. Macaraeg attributed the non-filing of the brief to his clients’ failure to give the amount
necessary for filing the same, he should have, as aptly stated by Commissioner Cachapero, shown a more mindful
and caring attitude towards the cause of his clients by advancing the payment. Besides, the facts of this case show
that his clients were making partial payments in their efforts to comply with their obligation to him and were not
deliberately refusing to pay him. In fact, as claimed by Atty. Macaraeg himself, Francisco even insisted that they
enter into a pacto de retro sale in order for them to fully pay him for the services he rendered in connection with
their civil case in the CFI. In fact, if Atty. Macaraeg truly believed that the necessary funds from his clients were
not forthcoming, he could have excused himself from the case. The Code of Professional Responsibility allows a
counsel to withdraw his services for a good cause, including the client’s failure to comply with the retainer
agreement.

Nevertheless, while the actuation of Atty. Macaraeg warrants the imposition of a penalty, supervening
circumstances call for the dismissal of this administrative case.
The Supreme Court Law List shows that Atty. Macaraeg was admitted to the Bar on November 6,
1933.25 Records reveal that he was already 60 years old when the hearings in this disbarment case were held in
1967. Hence, he would have been 108 years old by this time. It is also noteworthy that the subpoena issued by
the Solicitor General in 1972 contains a handwritten note that Atty. Macaraeg had already died. Thereafter,
nothing more was heard from either party despite notice. Under these circumstances, it is safe to assume that the
complainant had already lost interest in pursuing this disbarment case against Atty. Macaraeg and that there is
truth in the handwritten notation in the return of the subpoena that Atty. Macaraeg had already passed away.
In Apiag v. Cantero,26 the Court dismissed the administrative case against therein respondent and no longer
imposed any sanction against him in view of his death during the pendency of said case.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Complaint for Disbarment against Atty. Marcelino Macaraeg is
hereby DISMISSED.