Pedestrian Escort Final

LG US 244327: Provide pedestrian escort to designated persons within a close protection environment.
LEARNER GUIDE
UNIT STANDARD 244327

PROVIDE PEDESTRIAN ESCORT TO
DESIGNATED PERSONS WITHIN A CLOSE
PROTECTION ENVIRONMENT
Unit Standard 244327: Provide pedestrian escort to designated persons within a close protection environment.
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LG US 244327: Provide pedestrian escort to designated persons within a close protection environment. ©
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Table of Contents
Unit Standard.............................................................................................................. 8
LEARNER PROGRAM GUIDE ................................................................................. 14
Introduction ........................................................................................................... 14
Purpose of this learning program .......................................................................... 14
Standards and qualifications ................................................................................. 14
Assessments......................................................................................................... 14
Range statements ................................................................................................. 15
The learner guide .................................................................................................. 15
Icons ..................................................................................................................... 16
Preparation of summative assessment ................................................................. 16
RPL assessment ................................................................................................... 16
Roles and responsibilities ..................................................................................... 17
Facilitator/instructor ........................................................................................... 17
The role of the assessor .................................................................................... 17
The role of the Learner ...................................................................................... 17
Chapter 1: Plan a Pedestrian Escort ........................................................................ 18
Collate and Assess Information to Select a Pedestrian Escort Formation ............ 19
Collate information on the Risk Profile .............................................................. 19
The 7P’s Of Principal Profiling ........................................................................... 19
Keeping the Principal away from Danger .......................................................... 21
Full co-operation of the Principal ....................................................................... 21
Principal’s preferences ...................................................................................... 21
Assessing the Resources...................................................................................... 22
Human Resources ............................................................................................. 22
Skills Profiles of Close Protection Officers......................................................... 23
Skills required .................................................................................................... 23
Logistical Resources ......................................................................................... 24
Equipment used when working in formations .................................................... 24
Budget Financial Resources ................................................................................. 26
What is a pedestrian escort formation? ............................................................. 26
Assessing the Operational Structure ................................................................. 26
Main factors of operation ................................................................................... 26
Key areas of operations..................................................................................... 27
Planning The Operation..................................................................................... 27
Planning The Protection Detail .......................................................................... 29
Communications ................................................................................................ 29
Operations ......................................................................................................... 29
Debriefing .......................................................................................................... 29
Draft a Pedestrian Escort Plan ................................................................................. 30
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Options to consider in foot formations ............................................................... 30

Assigning of individual positions within a pedestrian escort .................................. 31
Low, medium and high risk situations ................................................................ 31
The function of a formation ................................................................................ 32
Different positions and responsibilities of CPO’s................................................... 33
Advance team ................................................................................................... 34
The Foot Protection Team Plan ............................................................................ 35
Examine Potential Threats That Could Impact On The Operation ........................ 37
Internal Point of View......................................................................................... 37
Murphy’s Law .................................................................................................... 38
Code Of Conduct ............................................................................................... 38
Alertness ........................................................................................................... 38
Operational Contingencies ................................................................................ 40
Close Quarter Attack ......................................................................................... 40
Sabotage ........................................................................................................... 41
Extortion ............................................................................................................ 41
Blackmail ........................................................................................................... 42
Ambush ................................................................................................................. 42
Explosives ......................................................................................................... 42
Sniper ................................................................................................................ 42
History of Assassinations .................................................................................. 43
Medical emergencies......................................................................................... 44
Fire emergencies ............................................................................................... 44
Natural Surveillance .......................................................................................... 45
Observation checks ........................................................................................... 46
Computer-enabled surveillance ......................................................................... 46
Biographical Data .............................................................................................. 47
Specific Data ..................................................................................................... 47
Non-Specific Threat Data .................................................................................. 48
Disclosed and Undisclosed threats ................................................................... 48
Disclosed threat ................................................................................................. 48
Undisclosed threat ............................................................................................. 49
Capability of the Threat Source............................................................................. 49
Levels of Threat .................................................................................................... 50
Aiming to achieve .............................................................................................. 50
Primary And Alternate Pedestrian Routes For Safe Passage................................... 51
Safe Passage .................................................................................................... 51
SAP (Special Advance Party) Team Planning ................................................... 51
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Route Selection Phases .................................................................................... 52

Routes and alternative routes............................................................................ 53
Route planning .................................................................................................. 53
Reconnoitring routes and alternative routes ...................................................... 56
Pursuit on foot ................................................................................................... 56
Common surveillance errors.............................................................................. 56
Chapter 2: Provide body cover to a principal whilst implementing pedestrian foot
formations. ................................................................................................................ 58
The Functions of the Selected Foot Formations ................................................... 59
The Single Protection Escort................................................................................. 59
An open position ................................................................................................ 60
A closed position ............................................................................................... 60
A golden position ............................................................................................... 60
The Open V Formation ...................................................................................... 61
Inverted V Formation ......................................................................................... 62
Open Box Formation ......................................................................................... 63
Closed Box Formation ....................................................................................... 65
The All Round Formation................................................................................... 66
Walking Drill Variations...................................................................................... 67
A Flexible Two Man Formation .......................................................................... 68
The Three Man Formation ................................................................................. 68
Transition Between Selected Foot Formations Within Changing Physical
Environments ........................................................................................................ 69
Fence line formation movement ........................................................................ 70
Moving between 2 buildings, corridor and passage .............................................. 72
Escalators ............................................................................................................. 73
Staircases ............................................................................................................. 74
Lifts – Demonstration 6 ......................................................................................... 75
Negotiating Blind Corners and Stairways .......................................................... 76
Situational Awareness In The Pedestrian Escort Formation Environment ............ 77
Observation and Awareness ............................................................................. 77
Types of Observation ........................................................................................ 77
Circular Sector – An ARC .................................................................................. 78
Observation post ................................................................................................... 78
Communication Plan Within The Pedestrian Escort.............................................. 80
Briefing .............................................................................................................. 80
Communication Methods and Procedures......................................................... 81
Phonetic Alphabet ............................................................................................. 81
Radio calls ......................................................................................................... 81
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Difference between multiple calls and all stations calls ..................................... 82

Multiple calls ...................................................................................................... 82
All stations call................................................................................................... 82
Relaying a message .......................................................................................... 82
Station Message ................................................................................................ 82
Emergency Calls ............................................................................................... 83
Principles of Radio Procedure ........................................................................... 83
Common words and phrases............................................................................. 83
Radio calls and single calls ............................................................................... 84
Do's and don'ts of radio procedure .................................................................... 85
Security of communications............................................................................... 85
Vigilance ............................................................................................................ 85
Chapter 3: manage threats and or attacks on the principal whilst on foot. ............... 86
Possible Threats Are Drawn From The Risk Analysis And Prioritised Within The
Pedestrian Escort Formation & Measured ............................................................ 87
Identifying Risks ................................................................................................ 87
Categories of Risk ............................................................................................. 88
The Threat ......................................................................................................... 88
Threat assessment ............................................................................................ 89
Key elements of threat assessment .................................................................. 90
Vulnerability of target ......................................................................................... 90
Visibility of target ............................................................................................... 90
Value of the target ............................................................................................. 91
Intelligence ........................................................................................................ 92
Brainstorming .................................................................................................... 92
Ten golden rules for risk analysis ...................................................................... 93
The possible responses to risks ........................................................................ 93
Responses To The Potential Threats Are Determined In Line With Current Legal
Prescripts And Protocol Requirements ................................................................. 94
Requirements for a valid act of private defence ................................................ 94
Putative self-defence ......................................................................................... 94
Necessity ........................................................................................................... 95
Difference between private defence and necessity ........................................... 95
Law .................................................................................................................... 97
Criminal Law...................................................................................................... 98
Legality .............................................................................................................. 99
Immediate Action Drills Are Applied During A Simulated Hostile Attack ............... 99
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Actions And Reactions ...................................................................................... 99

Fast, Decisive Action ......................................................................................... 99
Priorities ............................................................................................................ 99
Well Practised Drills........................................................................................... 99
Types Of Hostile Attacks ..................................................................................... 100
The Nuisance Attack ....................................................................................... 100
The Unarmed Physical Attack ......................................................................... 101
The Knife And Handgun Attack ....................................................................... 101
The Explosive And Grenade Attack................................................................. 102
The Sniper Attack ............................................................................................ 102
The Vehicle Attack .......................................................................................... 102
Disarming of weapons ..................................................................................... 102
Impact weapons .............................................................................................. 103
Chemical weapons .......................................................................................... 104
Edged weapons ............................................................................................... 104
Ballistic weapons ............................................................................................. 105
Electrical weapons .......................................................................................... 106
ESCORT FORMATION IS MAINTAINED DURING A MEDICAL EMERGENCY ... 107
Practical demonstration....................................................................................... 107
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Unit Standard
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SOUTH AFRICAN QUALIFICATIONS AUTHORITY

REGISTERED UNIT STANDARD:
Provide pedestrian escort to designated persons within a close protection environment

SAQA US ID UNIT STANDARD TITLE
244327 Provide pedestrian escort to designated persons within a close protection
environment
ORIGINATOR REGISTERING PROVIDER
SGB Security
FIELD SUBFIELD
Field 08 - Law, Military Science and Security Safety in Society
ABET BAND UNIT STANDARD TYPE NQF LEVEL CREDITS
Undefined Regular Level 5 15
REGISTRATION REGISTRATION START REGISTRATION END SAQA DECISION
STATUS DATE DATE NUMBER
Registered 2007-08-16 2010-08-16 SAQA 0572/07
LAST DATE FOR ENROLMENT LAST DATE FOR ACHIEVEMENT
2011-08-16 2014-08-16
This unit standard does not replace any other unit standard and is not replaced by any other unit
standard.
PURPOSE OF THE UNIT STANDARD

The purpose of this unit standard is to enable learners to plan and provide close body cover and
protection to designated persons whilst on foot. Learners will be able to take into account all
influencing factors during the planning phase of providing a pedestrian escort, they will also be able to
use their bodies and equipment to protect a designated person while on foot. These learners will also
have the competencies and skills to manage threats to and attacks on designated persons whilst on
foot. The unit standard enables learners to create and maintain a secure environment within which
the designated person can move on foot free of threat, harassment and embarrassment.
A person credited with this unit will be able to:
• Plan a pedestrian escort.

• Provide body cover to a principal whilst implementing a pedestrian escort.
• Manage threats and/or attacks on the principal.
LEARNING ASSUMED TO BE IN PLACE AND RECOGNITION OF PRIOR LEARNING

• Communication at NQF Level 4.
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• Mathematical Literacy at NQF Level 4.

• ID 119649: "Handle and use a handgun".
• ID 123515: "Handle and use a handgun for business purpose".
• ID 120486: "Demonstrate physical defensive restraining techniques".
UNIT STANDARD RANGE

• For the purpose of this unit standard venue operation centre may include but is not limited to a
static, mobile or temporary venue operations centre.
• The term: "principal" refers to designated persons (such as clients) to be protected.
• The term: "risk" also includes but is not limited to specific and non- specific threats.
• The term: "counter surveillance" only refers to the detection and deterrence of illicit observation of
the principal with the purpose of forwarding any information gathered to the applicable authorities.
Specific Outcomes and Assessment Criteria:
SPECIFIC OUTCOME 1
Plan a pedestrian escort.
OUTCOME RANGE
Planning includes consideration of procedures applicable to the pedestrian aspects of the operation.
ASSESSMENT CRITERIA
ASSESSMENT CRITERION 1
Information on the principals risk profile, profile preference, environment and resources are collated
and assessed to select a pedestrian escort formation.
A pedestrian escort plan is drafted to reflect specific roles and areas of observation and possible
interventions.
Potential threats that could impact on the operation are examined and communicated to formulate
requisite contingency plans.
ASSESSMENT CRITERION RANGE
Threats refer to both specific and non-specific threats.
Primary and alternate pedestrian routes are identified and selected to ensure safe passage.
SPECIFIC OUTCOME 2
Provide body cover to a principal whilst implementing pedestrian foot formations.
ASSESSMENT CRITERIA
Positions within the selected foot formation are explained in terms of their functions.
Transition between selected foot formations is demonstrated within changing physical environments.
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Physical environments include but are not limited to greeting lines, hostile crowds, narrow passages,
escalators, lifts, underground parking areas and stairwells.
Situational awareness is demonstrated in the pedestrian escort formation environment.
Situational awareness must include vigilance within the arcs of observation and intervention. Vigilance
within the arcs of observation and intervention is manifested either physically or verbally within the
pedestrian escort formation environment.
The use of a communication plan within the pedestrian escort is demonstrated for information sharing
purposes.
SPECIFIC OUTCOME 3
Manage threats and or attacks on the principal whilst on foot.
ASSESSMENT CRITERIA
Possible threats are drawn from the risk analysis and prioritized within the pedestrian escort
formation.
Responses to the potential threats are determined in line with current legal prescripts and protocol
requirements.
Immediate action drills are applied during a simulated hostile attack.
ASSESSMENT CRITERION NOTES
The following simulations must be assessed:
Simulation must include the disarming of the following classes of weapons:
• Impact weapons (such as, but is not limited to hands, feet and batons).
• Chemical weapons (such as, but is not limited to maces and pepper sprays).
• Edged weapons (such as, but is not limited to knives, blades and bottles).
• Ballistic weapons (such as, but is not limited to projectile weapons, firearms).
• Electrical weapons (such as, but is not limited to Tazers).
Simulation must include a combination of the following:
• Sighting of threats (sounds off).

• Interception and neutralizing of threats.
• Body cover of principal.
• Evacuation to cover or transport.
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Escort formation is maintained during a medical emergency.

Medical emergency refers to simulated emergencies.
Possible threats within the pedestrian formation environment are identified and measured response is
implemented.
UNIT STANDARD ACCREDITATION AND MODERATION OPTIONS

• An individual wishing to be assessed (including through RPL) against this Unit Standard may apply
to an assessment agency, assessor or provider institution accredited by the relevant ETQA, or an
ETQA that has a Memorandum of Understanding with the relevant ETQA.
• Anyone assessing a learner against this Unit Standard must be registered as an assessor with the
relevant ETQA or with an ETQA that has a Memorandum of Understanding with the relevant ETQA.
• Any institution offering learning that will enable achievement of this Unit Standard or assessing this
Unit Standard must be accredited as a provider with the relevant ETQA or with an ETQA that has a
Memorandum of Understanding with the relevant ETQA.
• Moderation of assessment will be conducted by the relevant ETQA at its discretion.
UNIT STANDARD ESSENTIAL EMBEDDED KNOWLEDGE

Plan includes:
• Risk profile.
• Environment.
• Resources (human, logistics and financial).
• Principal`s preferences (choice of high, low, covert pedestrian profiles).
• Pedestrian routes (primary, alternative and ad-hoc).
• Verbal and non-verbal communication.
• Private security domain/liaison.
• Drafting a pedestrian escort plan (foot formation).
• Assigning of individual positions within a pedestrian escort (Personal Protection Officers and Close
Protection Officers).
• Amenities (ablutions, holding room, preparation room and business centre).
• Counter surveillance.
• Counter sniping.
Pedestrian escort section includes:
• Form-up foot formations according to a pedestrian escort plan.

• Tasking of Close Protection Officers (CPOs) according to their skills profiles.
• Arcs of observation and intervention.
• Deployment of logistical resources within a foot formation/pedestrian escort sections.
• Testing of equipment and communication codes.
Protective foot formations may include:
• One on one right formation.

• One on one Left formation.
• Two man/CPO formation.
• Three man/CPO formation.
• Four man/CPO formation.
• Five man/CPO formation.
• Six man/CPO formation.
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• Seven man/CPO formation.

• Defensive circle.
• Greeting lines.
Managing threats includes:
• Assigning generic roles and responsibilities during an attack on principal:

> Sighting of threats (sounds off).
> Interception and neutralizing of threats.
> Body cover of principal.
> Evacuation to cover or transport.
• Assigning code words relating to an attack on the principal.
• Decide on requisite reactions to emergencies (fire, medical, natural, physical [armed and
unarmed],verbal and hostage survival).
• Responsibility to interpret and comprehend a pedestrian escort plan in relation to the total
operational plan and to execute it`s content.
• Restraining measures to incapacitate or overwhelm a suspect/attacker.
Principles and procedures relating to:
• Emergency/non-emergency incidents and procedures.

• Client relations.
• Lethal/non-lethal confrontations within the transit environment.
• Lawful arresting and restraining techniques.
• Search and seizure.
• Observational techniques.
• Counter surveillance techniques.
• A broad understanding of threat/risk assessment.
Current sections of the following Acts as amended:
• Constitution, Chapter Two, Bill of Rights.

• Firearms Control Act, 2000 (Act 60 of 2000) sections dealing with storage and transport of firearms
and ammunition as well as the carrying of firearms in a public place. Section dealing with firearm free
zones.
• Criminal Procedures Act, 1977 (Act 51 of 1977) sections dealing with search and seizure, arrest and
restraining and use of force.
• Dangerous Weapons Act,1968 (Act 71 of 1968) sections dealing with the prohibition of possession
of dangerous weapons, firearms and certain other objects
• National Key Points Act, 1980 (Act 102 of 1980) sections dealing with identification of Key Points
and prohibitions at Key Points.
• PSIRA Act, 2001 (Act 56 of 2001) sections dealing with registration of close protection
officers/security service providers, exemptions pertaining to close protection officers, code of conduct
and relevant penalties.
• Control of Access to Public Premises and Vehicles Act, 1985 (Act 53 of 1985) sections dealing with
access and exemptions of certain persons to public premises.
• Occupational Health and Safety Act, 1993 (Act 85 of 1993) sections dealing with general duties of
employers and other persons, duty to inform, duties of employees in the workplace and duty not to
interfere or misuse of safety equipment.
Common Law principles pertaining to:
• Common criminal law principles pertaining to private defense, necessity, spontaneous agency.
• Moral and humanitarian considerations (proportionality of force).
• Vicarious liability.
• Civil liability.
Standards and procedures relating to:
• Minimum Information Security Standards (M.I.S.S).

• Safety equipment (Personal Protection Equipment).
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UNIT STANDARD DEVELOPMENTAL OUTCOME

N/A
UNIT STANDARD LINKAGES

N/A
Critical Cross-field Outcomes (CCFO):
UNIT STANDARD CCFO IDENTIFYING

Identify and solve problems related to the relevant pedestrian protection operations of the principal.
UNIT STANDARD CCFO WORKING

Work effectively with others as a member of a pedestrian escort section.
UNIT STANDARD CCFO ORGANISING

Organize oneself and one`s activities so that all requirements are met in achieving effective protection
of designated persons whilst on foot.
UNIT STANDARD CCFO COLLECTING

Collect, analyze, validate, organize and incorporate information related to the pedestrian escort plan
which indicate probable occurrences that could impact on the inner-perimeter protection of the
principal whilst on foot.
UNIT STANDARD CCFO COMMUNICATING

Communicate effectively when dealing with confrontations with both clients and public respectively in
line with accepted protocol.
QUALIFICATIONS UTILISING THIS UNIT STANDARD:

ID QUALIFICATION TITLE LEVEL STATUS END DATE
Core 58696 National Certificate: Close Protection Level 5 Registered 2010-08-16
Elective 61729 National Diploma: Policing Level 6 Registered 2011-06-25
All qualifications and unit standards registered on the National Qualifications Framework are public property. Thus the
only payment that can be made for them is for service and reproduction. It is illegal to sell this material for profit. If the
material is reproduced or quoted, the South African Qualifications Authority (SAQA) should be acknowledged as the
source.
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LEARNER PROGRAM GUIDE

Introduction
This learning program is part of a complete qualification. For more details
concerning the complete qualification please contact your service provider or
alternatively the office of the SASSETA.
Purpose of this learning program

On completion of this training program, the learner will be able to:
1. Plan a pedestrian escort.

2. Provide body cover to a principal whilst implementing a pedestrian
escort.
3. Manage threats and/or attacks on the principal.
Standards and qualifications
It is important that you as the learner understand and realize that this training
program is not presented in isolation, but that it was developed based upon nationally
recognized standards known as unit standards.
Unit standards are the “building blocks” of qualifications. All

qualifications are plotted on the National Qualifications
Framework (NQF).
Unit standards comprises of outcomes. An outcome is a statement that describes

the required competency that must be demonstrated by the learner on successful
completion of a training intervention.
Assessments
In order to assess whether a learner can actually demonstrate the desired outcomes,
assessment criteria are included in the unit standard. Each outcome has its own set
of assessment criteria.
The assessment criteria describe the evidence that is

needed that will show that the learner has demonstrated
the outcome correctly.
Kindly refer to the unit standard attached hereto for the assessment criteria.
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It is of utmost importance that the learner fully understands the assessment criteria
as listed in the unit standard, as it is the only way in which the learner will know what
he will be assessed against.
The final or summative assessment is the most important aspect of this training
program. It is during this process that the learner will be declared competent or not
yet competent.
The learner will know exactly how he will be assessed, and when and where he will
be assessed. All of these details must be obtained from the training provider where
the learner enrolled for his program.
Each of the modules consists of learner outcomes to be achieved during training and
development interventions, work related experience or at your own time. The learner
outcomes will enable you to achieve the required level of confidence and
competence in order to undergo the summative (final evaluations) assessment.
Range statements
Also included in the unit standard are the range statements in support of the
assessment criteria.
The range statements indicate detailed requirements of the

assessment criteria.
The learner guide

The learner guide is included in this material under various learning units. The
learner guide has been designed in such a manner that the learner is guided in a
logical way through the learning material and requirements of the unit standard.
On completion of this skill program, the learner will be assessed against the
assessment criteria as stipulated in the unit standard.
The learner needs to assess his own knowledge and skill throughout the training
process by completing the learner workbook. With the completion of the workbook
you start collecting evidence to proof your competence. The learner workbook will be
assessed (FORMATIVE ASSESSMENT)
The learner guide will remain the property of the learner once the LEARNING
PROGRAM has been completed.
The best results will be obtained if you start with Study Unit 1 in the Learner Guide,
and work your way through it, study unit by study unit.
All learning outcomes are vital and must be studied (and exercised for all practical
requirements) thoroughly to ensure that enough evidence for all specific outcomes is
generated.
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Icons
Indicates activities that needs to be done by the learner.
Indicates where there is a definition of a concept that needs to be

understood by the learner.
Indicates an example that is used.
Indicates an important concept that the learner needs to master before

continuing to the next part.
Indicates an interesting fact that will enhance the learning experience

for the learner.
Indicates were in the learning material an assessment criteria is

covered.
Preparation of summative assessment

After you have worked through the LEARNER GUIDE and you are satisfied that all
theoretical and practical requirements/ evidence, as stipulated by the UNIT
STANDARD, can be met, you need to make your own necessary arrangements with
the assessor and/or facilitator. The training establishment will then arrange a suitable
date for you to attend your pre-assessment meeting and then arrange for a suitable
date to complete the final assessment.
RPL assessment
The assessment of RPL learners will be conducted in the same way as for those of
new learners. The assessment pack is exactly the same and will therefore be used
for new learners as well as RPL Learners. It must however be noted that learners
who are applying for RPL must provide proof of previous learning and subject related
experience prior to the assessment.
This proof or evidence can be in the format of certified copies (certificates) of

previous learning programs that have been attended.
All the evidence will be assessed and authenticated before a learner will be allowed
to enroll for an RPL program.
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Roles and responsibilities
Facilitator/instructor
Prepare to facilitate.
Transfer of knowledge and skills
The role of the assessor
Plan for the assessment

Prepare the learner for the assessment
Adhere to the policy of HJN Training
The role of the Learner
Prepare for assessment.

Accept the responsibility of learning.
Accept the responsibility to produce/deliver evidence.
Adhere to the policy of HJN Training
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Chapter 1: Plan a Pedestrian Escort
Outcomes and Objectives
Outcomes:
On completion of this module the learner must be able to plan a pedestrian escort.
Assessment Criteria:
• Information on the principals risk profile, profile preference, environment and

resources are collated and assessed to select a pedestrian escort formation. .
• A pedestrian escort plan is drafted to reflect specific roles and areas of
observation and possible interventions. .
• Potential threats that could impact on the operation are examined and
communicated to formulate requisite contingency plans.
• Primary and alternate pedestrian routes are identified and selected to ensure
safe passage.
Introduction
No matter how well the planning for any close protection service is done, the principal
will always need to walk a certain distance, whether it being inside a building or on
the street in the public eye.
This creates an opportunity for an attack. To minimise that risk to the principal it is
important that the CPO 1 understands and applies that correct methods of pedestrian
escort.
One of the most recent attacks that occurred on a principal while on foot is the attack
on the American Presifdent, Ronald Reagan. Although POTUS 2 is one of the most
secure persons in the world, John Whinkley had the opportunity to attack him.
Was it not for the well drilled foot detail this attack could have ended in the death of
Reagan.
SO1 AC1
1 CPO Refers to Close Protection Officer

2 POTUS refers to The President of the United States
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Collate and Assess Information to Select a

Pedestrian Escort Formation
It is very important to have relevant information

on the principal’s risk profile, environment in
which he/she operates and the people he/she
comes in contact with. The CPO should
assess the situation carefully and make a
decision on the type of formation in a
pedestrian escort. A potential risk is described
as a situation where an exposure to a potential
loss exists. Alternately, risk can be defined as
the uncertainty surrounding the sign of danger
or a threat surrounding any resulting loss.
Collate information on the Risk Profile
The 7P’s Of Principal Profiling
Alongside the personal interview of the

principal you need to remember the “7 P’s of
principal profiling”.
1. People:
2. Personalities;
3. Places;
4. Prejudices;
5. Personal history;
6. Politics and religion; and
7. Personal lifestyle
Figure 1: The attack on Ronald Reagan
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People Personality Places Prejudices Personal History Politics and Religion Personal Lifestyle
•Relationships; •Managerial style; •Work; •Political; •Names; •ANC, Cosatu, •Recluse;
•Marital status; and •Leisure; •Racial; •Title; •NP, Muslim, •Family person;
•Family; •Personal style •Father/mother land; •Ethnic; •Date of birth; Christian etc •Drinking habits;
•Friends; •and geographical life •Status; •Place of birth; •Smoking habits;
•Family circles; style •Religious; and •Residence; •Gambling activities;
•Employees; •Gender. •Languages; •Driver;
•Known enemies; and •Military background •Workaholic; and
•Business contacts. •Education; •Socialiser.
•Decorations Awards;
•Medical history;
•Marital status;
•Hobbies/sports
•Associations;
•Politics; and
•Religious affiliation
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Keeping the Principal away from Danger
The best way to protect your principal is to keep him or her out of harm. Always
remember that meticulous planning and forethought will prevent problems and
enhance your reputation as a professional. One of your best tools to protect your
principal is secrecy. The ability to keep your principal’s routine as unroutine as
possible is critical. The less other people know about the activities of your principal
the safer he or she will be. It is critically important for those who need to know have
information about your principal and his or her itinerary. All information regarding
your Principal should be considered valuable and confidential. Avoid unnecessary
conversation with everyone about your principal and his or her family and associates,
you reduce the chance that vital information inadvertently given out.
Full co-operation of the Principal
There are three main areas to concentrate on to ensure the full co-operation of the
principal. These areas are:-
Identifiers;
Background; and
Life style
Principal’s preferences
The PES team will make a decision from their professional experience and will plan
ahead the choice of the pedestrian formation. The plan will be discussed with the
principal in advance to whom preferences will be recommended. The question is
“how are you going to escort the principal in a PES formation?” Is it high, low or
covert pedestrian escorting?
1. High pedestrian escorting refers to many CPO’s in a team, protecting the

principal in a high density formation.
2. Low pedestrian escorting refers to a few CPO’s or a very loose formation.
3. Covert pedestrian escorting means “under cover” which means that the
principal is escorted by CPO’s who are not obviously visible but who are near
the principal and are continually watching for a threat or danger situation.
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Figure 2: Pedestrian Escort on the move.
Assessing the Resources

Human Resources
Select manpower for operation. Examples of manpower are; PES team, advance
team, back up team etc. It all depends on the need of the principal. The type of foot
formation will be selected according to the “need”. In order to ensure the optimal use
of limited resources to protect a principal who is under threat, these resources should
be deployed selectively.
Firstly, the close protection team must carry out an accurate threat assessment. This
is especially important in the sensitive area of foreign protection operations.
Depending on the protocol category accorded to a foreign dignitary's visit, protective
support from the host country may be limited.
Accurate risk assessment is crucial for the determination of the volume of resources
that should be deployed on a foreign protection operation. It is extremely difficult to
deploy additional resources once a foreign visit has commenced. Because of the
exceptionally high costs involved, the close protection team must also be careful not
to over deploy resources.
22
Skills Profiles of Close Protection Officers
Tasking of Close Protection Officers (CPOs) should be assigned

according to their skills profiles. The CPO must have three types of
attributes. They are:
Physical attributes required
be physically fit, without any disabilities;

be neat and professional in appearance;
be of a similar build and height to the principal (especially PES members);
maintain a healthy lifestyle; and
be physically capable of working long hours under adverse conditions and
coping with frequent unplanned absences from home.
Social attributes required
have a broad general knowledge;

be socially skilled and adaptable, well spoken, a good communicator;
be familiar with protocol and etiquette
maintain a sober lifestyle, both on and off duty;
be punctual and courteous; and
be diplomatic and trustworthy.
Skills required
be familiar with the legal issues regarding the protection profession

be able to co-ordinate and plan protection
operations;
be trained in most of the following close
protection disciplines:
identification of explosives
protection theory and practices
advanced driving techniques
unarmed combat
surveillance and counter-intelligence
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Logistical Resources
Logistical resources includes all the elements you need during the operations of the
assigned task to protect the principal. Logistical resources may include:
• All equipment,
• Contacts,
• Arrangements,
• Purchasing important items
Equipment used when working in formations
There is a product specially designed for bodyguards

named LEGION SPECS which allow the CPO to be
ahead of a potential attacker. The legion specs are
designed to move your eyes to the corners of the frame,
looking into a mirror observing all the activities behind
you with out turning your head and is this is less obvious
for the potential attacker. The advantage of this product
is to observe 360 degrees surrounded without the
attacker realising that he/she is under surveillance.
The CPO must be ready for any situation. An ASP baton

can be used for self defense as well to break glass. It is
an important step in the use of force. It is light weight
and can be carried in a concealed manner.
Lightweight body armour provides protection from hand

gun fire, knife attacks and open handed attacks. It can
be worn under the cloths without being detected. It give
the CPO extra protection.
Communication is a vital tool that can be used by the

CPO. Although the CPO will be in radio contact a
situation may arise where the security on the radio
channels have been breached, in this situation the CPO
can make use of cell phones. Cell phones also have the
other advantage that its range are much larger that a
radio.
24
The two way radio will be the main source of

communication between the CPO’s while on a foot
patrol. Each CPO should have a radio equipped with a
remote ear piece and PTT.
The CPO, depending on the risk, regulatory framework,

the needs and whishes of the principal. Should be armed
with a handgun. Handguns must be worn in accordance
with the regulators appropriate to the area in which they
function. At this point it has to be stressed that no CPO
is above the law, and that they should obey all laws
regarding the use of firearms.
Having a multi tool gives the CPO a tool kit that can be
used in an emergency to fix something or to get out of
tricky situations.
Documentation is a must. The CPO must have all his/her

important documents with him/her at all times. This
include;
 Identification documents
 Drivers license
 Firearm license; and
 Travel documents.
A reliable watch. As the movements of the principal is a

well orchestrated maneuver timing is of the essence.
25
Mace or Pepper Spray is an important part of the CPO’s

equipment. It is small and compact and can be easily
concealed. Some forms of mace or pepper spray can be
used very effectively against attacks from animals.
Table 1: Equipment used by the CPO on Foot Formations
Budget Financial Resources
The budget will determine up to what extend the requirements of operation can be
accommodated.
Ensure that the financial resources (Company or person contracting you) are reliable
in terms of contractual payment and ensure the % deposit to be well in advance.
What is a pedestrian escort formation?
Pedestrian escort refers to somebody who is

travelling on foot. Foot formations are one of the
skills that should be well known to the CPO, as this
provide body cover to the Principal. A foot formation
is also what the public see mostly. There are
different types of foot formations. Each formation is
selected according to the specific need of the
Principal.
Figure 3:Example two man foot formation.

Assessing the Operational Structure
Don't look towards the principal, but at the environment around the principal. The
environment is the place in which the CPO and team operates.
Main factors of operation
Operation of the protection team depends on four main factors:

Who you are protecting.
Where you are carrying out the operation.
26
The perceived level of threat; and

What the client requires.
Key areas of operations
Operations can be broken down into four key areas:-
Communications
Planning Operations
Debriefing
Figure 4: The Four Key Areas of Operation
Planning The Operation
There are certain preparations and functions that need to be carried out before
commencing any operation:-
• Intelligence gathering and assessment;

• Pre-security and logistical evaluation preparation;
27
• Route recce and planning;
28
• Advance searches;
• Personnel selection; and
• Principal profiling.
•
Planning The Protection Detail
Several factors will effect this preparation including:-
• Number and size of detail;

• Organisational structure;
• Equipment required;
• Staff gender requirements;
• Perceived level nature of threat;
• Principal’s profile;
• Resource availability; and
• Materials and finance.
Communications
• Selection of equipment;
• Equipment testing; and
• Control room preparation.
Operations
• Man power planning;

• Equipment;
• Operational briefing;
• Logistics; and
• Intel gathering.
Debriefing
• Operations evaluation;
• Client debriefing;
• Manpower evaluation;
• Forward planning; and
• Full equipment checks.
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SO1 AC2
Draft a Pedestrian Escort Plan
A Pedestrian escort plan is drafted to reflect specific roles and areas of observation
and possible interventions. To understand a formation there are some basic rules to
be implemented to be successful. They are:
To place yourself between the threat and the principal.

Deny access within the team parameter.
Constant scanning (360 degrees) divided by the team members.
To inform the team of identified threat.
Know the exit points and the emergency equipment location.
Immediate option selection by deciding when to execute which option in
terms of evasion of threat.
Acknowledge instructions of team leader.
Slow down attacker to give principal time to be moved to a safe place.
These options should be considered during foot formations: Acceleration,
Takedown, Diversion and Evacuation
Options to consider in foot formations
The options of foot formations should be considered when drafting a pedestrian

escort plan toward possible threat situations.
The team leader should take a split second decision and at the same time instruct
the team members to execute one of the options available to him/her. (See Figure 5)
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•To avoid collision with •As above but also used when
oncoming or crossing a suspicious object is
persons or objects within observed in surrounded area
team parameter. where team must pass
through or placed directly in
their way.
Acceleration Diversion
Evacuation Take Down
•When vehicle building or •Where evacuation is not an

place of safety is close option, for example no
enough to escape to object or vehicle to give fire
over, or building to escape
to, and also where direction
of gunshot is not identified.
Figure 5: Foot Patrol Reaction Options
Assigning of individual positions within a pedestrian escort
Low, medium and high risk situations
Formations can be used in an open or a closed position. Principal protection is

normally low- or medium-risk, but could right away become high risk if there were a
direct threat to the Principal. In an event of a threat, CPOs would immediately
transform into a closed position.
The CPO’s will respond according to the different situations.
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High Risk
•The CPO’s should
walk in a closed
Medium Risk formation only if an
immediate threat is
•If there is a possible detected.
threat the CPOs
should use a closed
formation. Rather be
safe than sorry.
Low Risk
•Principals face no
immediate threat.
CPOs walk in open
formations. They can
immediately
transform into the
closed formation if
the need arises.
Figure 6: Levels of Risk
The function of a formation
The function of a formation is to

form a human shield around a
person who needs protection, with a
visual capacity of 360°. All closed
formations look similar, but in their
open position they all vary in
appearance. Which formation you
use is mainly a matter of
preference. They all provide the
same purpose and this is to protect.
The success of a formation
depends on the number of CPOs
used. In a normal, 'no-risk' situation,
numbers will be unimportant. Only
when you are attacked and move to the closed position will you know whether the
selected formation is being effective.
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Different positions and responsibilities of CPO’s
It is important to know what each CPO is responsible for and what type of action they
should take during a formation. The following should also be outlined in the
pedestrian escort plan.
Observation post
The observation post is a security function with the responsibility to observe a

specific area and activities in that area. The purpose of an observation post is:
• to observe a specific area;

• to observe people, vehicles and goods in that area; and
• to report all valid information to the control centre.
The PES Team
The close protection operatives that accompany the principal during all movements,
from point one to point two and back to point one. These CPO’s are called the
personal escort section (PES) team. It is their task to cover and evacuate the
principal in the event of an attack or other emergency. Usually the principal may not
move without them. The team may comprise 2 to 18 members, but usually has from
5 to 9 members. cover, PES team members need practical skills, such as unarmed
combat skills, which you'll learn in your practical training. They must be prepared to
die for the principal! All team members have equal skills and status. To be promoted
beyond the team, members must complete an advanced course. The PES team
includes the bodyguard and a team leader.
The Bodyguard or main bodyguard
The bodyguard, or 'main' bodyguard, usually the biggest member of the PES team,
never leaves the principal's side during an operation. He or she drives together with
the principal, and along with the team leader directs the efforts of the team, radioing
the leader with updates of the principal's movements and to ask for clearance.
Close Protection Team Leader
The team leader (TL) is responsible for leading a close protection or PES team, and
supervising the team's tasks and activities during a protective operation (using two-
way radios). For instance, the TL gives the bodyguard clearance to proceed from a
car or building. Team members may take turns at being TL (except for the
bodyguard, who always stays with the principal).
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The TL must establish a sound working relationship with principals, so as to assess

their needs and to inform them of protection measures.
The number of members in the PES team will vary widely and depend on the risk
factor and the client's finances. For example, in a low-risk situation, just one
bodyguard, say to protect a businessperson, could be sufficient. If the Principal
received a direct physical threat, this would constitute a medium- to high-risk threat,
and the team should include at least between two and six CPOs. If the Principal is a
very high-profile person who had received a recent death threat, the team should
comprise between seven and twelve members. As a general rule, you will always be
safe with a seven-person team.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Advance team
The advance team makes out a member or members of the close protection team
who go ahead of the PES team to secure a venue that the principal will visit. A useful
team size is five members. The advance team is responsible for planning and
implementing
effective close protection measures at the venue, 'sweeping' or examining the
building and keeping it 'sterile' or safe.
All team members of the PES team have equal status. For example, a hotel
placement with a six-person advance team would proceed as follows. After the
clearance process, also known as sweeping, one CPO would check the hotel room,
one CPO the level above the principal room, one CPO the lift, passage and top of the
stairway, one CPO the ground floor, lift and stairway, one CPO the lobby and
34
reception desk, and one CPO would sweep the hotel entrance and parking area and
then wait outside for the Principal.
When they arrive at the venue, the advance team will
secure the venue, making sure that no cars park at
the main entrances to the venue, securing toilets and
other rooms, and so on, and searching for bombs,
snipers, bugging devices and escape routes. The
advance team will receive and support the PES team
when it arrives and keep the venue sterile until after it
has left.
During the planning phase of an operation, the
advance team will visit all venues that the principal
may visit, a day or a few hours in advance. They will
plan and familiarise themselves with all pedestrian
routes that the principal's may take, including
contingency routes. They will map out and study every
detail of the operation together with management and
staff at the office.
(source: SA Bodyguard Academy)
The Foot Protection Team Plan
The foot protection team plan will take a lot of “detailed planning” from all the different
teams. When planning the pedestrian escort plan the foot protection team should
especially include the following in the pedestrian escort plan:
Will decoy protectors be used?

Where would which foot formation be used?
How many CPO`S is needed for operation?
How many teams and number of CPO`s in teams will be needed?
What will the dress code be?
The team should be properly informed and briefed
Stress the fact that info should be kept safe
Identify a safe house
Identify the closest hospitals in the area
Draw up a list of all relevant cell phone numbers (Back up for
communications)
Check all Radios for communication - Be sure batteries are fully charged and
taken with.
Examine the medical kit
Check and take your bullet proof vests
Decide on the type of weapons for specific application
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Select the ammo for weapons
An example of a drafted plan of a pedestrian escort plan
The following scketch indicate a layout of the street in which the principal will be
escorted by foot. The team must draw up a plan in advance to identify possible
threats and decide what formation is suitable according to the layout.
(X) Crossing the street. Danger. Possible

ambush or sniper in building.
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Examine Potential Threats That Could Impact On The Operation SO1 AC3
Potential threats that could impact on the operation must be examined and
communicated immediately to formulate contingency plans. We focus mainly on
external threats but what about internal threats? The CPO and team are entrusted
with information that is highly confidential. This confidential information is all laid out
in the operational plan. We will focus on the “code of conduct” and expected
protocol. After we mastered this we will then focus on specific and non specific
threats.
Internal Point of View
The first part of your code is commitment. When protecting your principal’s life and
moral welfare you must show total commitment to them.
Confidentiality is the second part of your code. Whilst protecting your principal and,
possibly their family members, you may be privy to confidential or sensitive
information. You must treat any information received in the strictest confidence.
Some information may even be subject to privacy legislation or even secrecy and it
may be an offence to disclose the information.
The final part of the code is loyalty; to the principal, to the job and to yourself. Close
protection is more a way of life than a job and not something to be entered into
lightly.
Commitment Confidentiality Loyalty
Close Protection Officers must learn to be objective when performing their duties.
You will have to learn very quickly to keep that barrier of objectivity between yourself
and your principal. That barrier is what will save yours and their life. Not having that
barrier is what may get you both killed.
This is the first lesson that you must learn and live by.
37
The second and just as important rule to remember is that circumstances will
change, so although you will live by rules you must be flexible and quick witted to
react accordingly.
Alertness Awareness Diplomacy
Murphy’s Law
Consider this law at all times and you will become an effective operative. Murphy’s
Law says: ‘ If something can go wrong, it will’
Code Of Conduct
In conclusion remember loyalty, commitment, confidentiality, awareness, and

diplomacy are all key attributes of a true professional. Executive protection cannot
be learnt in the classroom. Yes, it is very important to have good underpinning
knowledge when you first start but the true professional has had years of experience.
Do not expect to start at the top protecting rich and famous people and heads of
states. These positions are few and far between and teams have been built over
long periods of time. Learning the nuts and bolts of the job from the ground up will
hold you in good standing later in life.
Alertness
When executing the operational plan the CPO and team should always be alert when
escorting the principal. The following points are important during observation for any
threats:
Always be on the look out for the following signs:
People wearing long coats

People wearing jackets on a warm day
Persons with parcels
Pay attention to eyes and hands especially when hands are concealed.
Unnatural movements and positions.
Stalkers
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Face
Concealed
Long or
Bulky Jacket
on a sunny
day
Hands
Concealed
Package that
may hide
weapons,
bombs ect.
Figure 7: Example of Suspicious Persons
Figure 8: Example Suspicious persons Form
39
The suspicious persons form can be used to gather further information. As soon as
the principal is safe at his/ her location CPO’s can complete these forms to enhance
their suspicious person’s data base.
Operational Contingencies
Operational contingencies 3 should include contingency plans and procedures in case

of an emergency or a possible threat that may be detected. Planning should include
the following:
Physical attack/ threat on or to Principal and Close Quarter Attack

Sabotage
Ambush
Explosives
Sniper
Surveillance
Fire
Medical emergencies
Power failure
Close Quarter Attack
When the PES team escort the principal to a venue they should always be alert for
anyone who may want to attack the principal. A close quarter attack may take many
forms such as physical attack, attacking with a knife, or a weapon, suicide bomber
etc. Remember you are there to protect the principle at all times. The following
information may assist you during an attack.
If an attack does occur, trust yourself and stay as calm as possible. Think rationally
and evaluate your options. There is no single right way to respond to a confrontation,
because each situation is different. Your response should depend on the
circumstances: the location of the attack, your personal resources, the characteristics
of your attacker and the presence of weapons. There are many strategies that are
effective, but you must rely on your own judgment to choose the best one.
No resistance:
Not resisting can be the proper choice in a given situation. An attacker with a gun or
a knife may put you in a situation where you think it is safer to do what he or she
says. If someone tries to rob you, give up your property, not your life.
3 Contingency: an event that might occur in the future, especially a problem, emergency, or expense
that might arise unexpectedly and therefore must be prepared for.
40
Stalling for time:

Appear to go along with the attacker. This might give you time to assess the
situation.
Distraction and then flight:

Obviously you should try to get away, but whether you can depends on many things,
including your shoes and clothing, physical stamina, the terrain and your proximity to
your attacker.
Verbal assertiveness:
If someone is coming toward you, hold out your hands in front of you and yell STOP
or STAY BACK. Criminals have been known to leave a victim alone if he or she
yelled or showed that he or she was not afraid to fight back.
Physical resistance:
If you decide to respond physically, remember that your first response should be to
flee the area. Act quickly and decisively to throw the attacker off guard. The
principal’s safety is your first priority. Property can be replaced, but the value of the
principal’s life and health is beyond measure. Also, you should familiarise yourself
with the laws concerning self-defence, including the issue of what is proper or
improper use of force to defend the principal during an attack.
Observation:
Be sure to make an effort to get an accurate description of the attacker. Even the
smallest details may give authorities a clue to finding the suspect.
Sabotage
Sabotage is a deliberate action aimed at weakening an enemy, oppressor or

employer through subversion, obstruction, disruption, and/or destruction. Let us
differentiate between extortion and blackmail.
Extortion 4
Extortion is the taking of an innocent hostage to make a loved one or associate of the
victim do something, e.g. a child is taken hostage to force the principal to “do
something in return for the life of his/her child”; the term originates from the usually
long preceding observation, like a tiger does on its prey.
Extortion sometimes leads to more dangerous illicit activities which raise concerns
with law enforcement agencies.
4 Extortion: criminal law the crime of obtaining something such as money or information from
somebody by using force, threats, or other unacceptable methods
41
Blackmail 5
It may happen that the “enemy” blackmail the principal for example. This is a criminal
offence, which occurs, when a person unlawfully obtains money, property, or services from a
person, entity, or institution, through intimidation.
Ambush6
The PES Team will be escorting

the principal on foot. During this
process the necessary formation
will be around the principal. In
order to avoid a surprise attack the
PES must have
Members position to observe the situation ahead of the
Figure 9: Police inspecting
the van used to ambush formation. For example: If the PES
Charles De Gualle
Has to round a corner there should be elements of the PES
properly positioned to see the situation around the corner before the formation turns
the corner. A typical example would be attackers waiting in a mini van around the
corner preparing to attack the formation, seize the principal, and kidnap him or her.
Explosives
The advance team must know what they are

searching for. They must be able to locate and
recognise anything that may pose a threat to the
principal, for example explosives or electronic
devices. Once the advance team has searched an
Figure 10: An example of a suspect area, the area must be secured. While the PES
vehicle. team and principal are on foot explosive devices
can be hidden in different areas such as a dustbin, post box, car, motor bike etc. The
terrorist can use a remote explosive device with the push of a button. Always be
aware.
Sniper
5 Blackmail refers to the act of forcing somebody to pay money or do something by threatening to
reveal shameful or incriminating facts about him or her or unfair threatening or incriminating of
somebody, as a way of achieving a result
6 Ambush refers to an unexpected attack from a concealed position or one or more people concealed
in order to make a surprise attack or to attack somebody or to attack somebody or something

suddenly from a concealed position
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A sniper is an individual who specialises in shooting targets with high precision rifles
from very long distances, usually from a concealed location. Most are skilled in
carrying out camouflage tactics on a field zone. Professional snipers are also adept
at carrying out methods of reconnaissance (investigations) and observation
techniques. The following are evidence that assassinations are happening and is
therefore imperative for the Advance Team and the PES team to expect the worst at
all times. Let us see how the following assassinations could have been prevented by
“good body guarding”.
Figure 11: Possible hiding places for explosives
History of Assassinations
The assassinations of HF Verwoerd in parliament in Cape Town (stabbed) and

Robert Kennedy in the USA (shot) show the
importance of venue protection. Apart from
shooting or stabbing, the contingencies
below could occur at venues:
• sniper or armed penetration attacks;

• bomb threats or attacks;
• a fire;
• chemical or gas attacks; and
• volatility of participants at political meetings, or an over-enthusiastic
response from supporters.
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Medical emergencies
A medical emergency is an injury or an illness that poses an

immediate risk to a person's life or long term health. These
emergencies may require help from another person, who should
ideally be suitably qualified to do so although some of these
emergencies can be dealt with by the victim themselves. It all
depends on the severity of the emergency, and the quality of any treatment given.
The injury or illness may require the participation of multiple levels of care, from a
first aider to an emergency physician through to specialist surgeons. Any response
to an emergency medical situation will depend mainly on the situation and the
casualty involved and availability of resources to help them.
It is important to ask for help from medical emergency services available at an event
to assist in this regard. Can you see how important it is to have a list of people who
are at the event who assist in medical emergencies?
Fire emergencies
Other emergencies do not threaten any people, but do threaten peoples' property. An
example of this would be a fire in a venue which has been evacuated. The situation
is treated as an emergency as the fire may spread to other buildings, or may cause
sufficient damage to make the business unable to continue.
Many agencies categorise property emergency as the lowest priority, and may not
take as many risks in dealing with it. For example fire-fighters are unlikely to enter a
burning building which they know to be empty, as the risk is unjustified, whereas they
are more possibly to enter a building where people are reported as trapped.
Fire fighting services are provided in most developed areas to extinguish or contain
uncontrolled fires.
Fire prevention is intended to reduce sources of ignition, and is partially focused on

programs to educate people from starting fires. Buildings, especially schools and tall
buildings, often conduct fire drills to inform and prepare citizens on how to react to a
building fire.
Purposely starting destructive fires constitutes s a criminal offense in most

jurisdictions.
44
Model building codes require fire protection systems to minimise damage resulting
from a fire. The most common form of active fire protection is fire sprinklers.
The following fire emergency signs and equipment are important during a fire. When
you face a situation where you need to assist you have to take note of the following
signs and take action.
The sign indicate that there is a fire extinguisher to use in case

of a fire.
This is an evacuation plan in order for people to know where

they are situated in the venue and to see where the emergency
exit door is to escape the fire.
Whenever you see this sign “Exit” it means that the door is
especially designed with an indoor handle to escape the fire.
This is used by someone who received fire fighting training and

know how to use this in a fire.
Natural Surveillance
Natural surveillance is a term used in "Crime Prevention through Environmental

Design" CPTED and "Defensible Space" models for crime prevention. These models
rely on the ability to influence offender decisions preceding criminal acts. Research
into criminal behaviour demonstrates that the decision to offend or not to offend is
more influenced by signals to the perceived risk of being caught than by signals to
45
reward or ease of entry. Consistent with this research CPTED based strategies
emphasise enhancing the perceived risk of detection and apprehension.
Natural surveillance limits the opportunity for crime by taking steps to increase the
perception that people can be seen.
Natural surveillance occurs by designing the placement of physical features,

activities, and people in such a way as to maximize visibility and foster positive social
interaction. Potential offenders feel increased scrutiny and limitations on their escape
routes. It is typically free of cost; however its effectiveness to deter crime varies with
the individual offender.
Observation checks
Observation checks include different types of surveillances. Nowadays the

surveillance cameras are the “eyes” and the ‘ears” of security systems because they
can monitor more activities at once than an individual.
Surveillance is art of keeping an eye on the object. In the past decades there has
been a huge technical advancement and as a result of which today surveillance is
carried out mainly with the help of digitised instruments such as Close Circuit
Televisions, Electronic Trails, Photography, tapping of telephone s and mobiles, and
other surveillance devices such as “bugs”, radio transmitters etc.
Computer-enabled surveillance
Surveillance is the monitoring of behaviour. Systems

surveillance is the process of monitoring the behaviour of
people, objects or processes within systems for conformity to
expected or desired norms in trusted systems for security or
social control.
Surveillance cameras are useful during events especially when
there is a big crowd of people.
When collecting information it is important that the interviewer collects information

with regards to;
• Biographical Data
• Specific data
• Non-Specific Threat Data
46
In identifying these types of data, a more holistic view can be achieved and thus a
better threat assessment can be done.
Biographical Data
Biographical data refers to information containing, consisting

of, or relating to the facts or events in a person's life.
As can be deduced from the definition biographical information will be sourced from
the principal asking questions with regards to his/her private life.
Examples of biographical information include the following;
 Name;
 Race;
 Gender;
 Identification Number
 Blood type;
 Place of birth; and
 Residential Address.
Specific Data
Specific threat data can be defined as
Data that can be directly linked to the principal, his action or

involvements be it business or private interests.
Specific threat indicators
 “Specific threat indicators include the following:

 dissention along socio-political or ethnic lines, possibly triggered by large-
scale changes in these areas;
 formation of or activities by radical groups;
 meetings, rallies or demonstrations in which provocative speeches are made
and violence objectively or subjectively;
 encouraged, especially if incidents of violence occur after or during a meeting
or rally;
 anti-government agitation, particularly when aimed at specific members of
government;
 anti-government posters or pamphlets, or posters or pamphlets criticising an
organisation or cause;
 organised civil disobedience aimed at the target's department or organisation;
foreign support or influence to extremist groups or persons;
 political violence, particularly when aimed at individuals in semi-leadership
positions;
47
 threatening phone calls, correspondence or 'strange happenings' involving the

target;
 identification of surveillance or intelligence collection on the target;
 target's involvement in controversial issues;
 intelligence reports;
 attacks on associated targets;
 previous attacks on the target;
 attacks on non-associated targets in similar circumstances (for example,
attackers could have compared similarities between the circumstances under
which Rabin functioned and President Mandela functioned); and
 wealth (for example, Oppenheimer and Gates) (VIP)”.
Non-Specific Threat Data
Non-specific threats are “threats” that are not always predictable. The following are
threat indicators for non-specific threats.
Political: an unpopular or oppressive government;

Social: discrimination against specific groups (race, gender, creed), a high
crime rate;
Economic: a high rate of unemployment, an imbalance between 'haves and
have-nots';
Ideological: powerful opposition from groups opposed to the current political
situation;
Geopolitical: large groups of legal or illegal foreigners in the country, or
border conflicts with neighbouring countries (for example, the Egypt-Sudan
border dispute);
Religious: religions encourage or condone violence, for example radical,
rightwing churches and Muslim fundamentalism;
Socio-Political: civil conflict, mass action, or civil disobedience – large-scale
or regionally restricted; and personal; or any combination of the above.
Disclosed and Undisclosed threats
There is a somewhat academic aspect involoved in threat analysis concerning

whether a threat is Disclosed or Undisclosed. This doesn’t figure much in most BG
threat Evaluation Studies, but an understanding of this principle can be quite
important in understanding threat management and terrorism.
Let us assume that a terrorist gang decides to assassinate a dissident figure where
the intention may, or may not become known. Lets us discuss the possibilities;
Disclosed threat
48
Knowledge of the intended attack can become known (disclosed) by various ways
the most common are;
 The statements issued by the would be attackers which can take the form of a;
Hit List that they publish;
A “Jihad”
A “Fatwah”
 Intelligence Services gaining information on the attackers intentions by means
of;
Penetrating Agents;
SIGINT; and
Informers
Undisclosed threat
In this case, no prior information of the intended attack or planning has been picked
up.
Once an attack has been disclosed then protection should be available unitl the
threat has been removed. This doesn’t always happen, however, as police and
intelligence resources are limited, and it can be an aim of the attacker/s to stretch
protective services to the limit.
Because of the limits on police resources it is often the commercial protector who is
brought in to deal with DIRECT/DISCLOSED threats. In the absence of professional
protection, a DIRECT/UNDISCLOSED threat is seldom survived.
Capability of the Threat Source
When determining the seriousness of a threat, CPOs must take into account the
potential ability of the source of the threat to actually carry out a direct or indirect
threat against the target. They should ask the following questions:
Does the threat source have access to weapons or explosives?

Does the source have access to the necessary expertise to enable him or
her to use weapons or explosives?
Does the threat source have the human resources, finances, logistics and
support systems to launch an attack?
Does the threat source have the necessary mindset and determination to
carry out an attack?
Does the threat source have the necessary intelligence sources?
49
Figure 12: Levels of Risk
Levels of Threat
Threat can be classified into three main levels. The following are examples:
Aiming to achieve
Achieving this end is not always possible but you will minimise the risk by:-
Surveillance;
Preliminary precautions at home and the workplace;
Training of the principal;
Training of family members;
Training of employees;
Preparing route plans;
Identifying escape routes;
Planning safe houses;
Pre surveys; and
Risk assessments.
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SO1 AC4
Primary And Alternate Pedestrian Routes For Safe Passage

Primary and alternate pedestrian routes should be identified and selected by the PES
team to ensure safe passage of the principal.
Statistics reveal that it is while moving between locations that the principle is most
vulnerable, as this is when an attack is most likely. The CPO and team should work
out a primary, alternative and if necessary an escape route when a threat is detected
while on foot.
Let us distinguish between the three.
Primary route Alternative route Escape route

The route that will be The second best route if This route is not going to
used during the operation the primary route is not lead you to your
available. destination, but is used to
escape from an
emergency situation
Safe Passage
The PES team may temporarily halt the operation of a safe passage route or modify
the passage arrangements while ensuring that one of the routes is kept open for safe
passage. for security or safety reasons, Notice of such temporary closure or
modification shall be communicated to the team, through agreed channels, as far in
advance as the circumstances will allow. Maximum efforts will be made to maintain
the dignity of the principal using safe passage
Persons using safe passage under these arrangements shall neither break their
journey nor depart from the designated routes, and shall complete the passage within
the designated time, unless a delay is caused by a medical emergency or a technical
breakdown.
SAP (Special Advance Party) Team Planning
The SAP Team contributes effectively in any operation and planning phase by doing
the advance preparation. Advance preparation will include the following:
51
Physically inspect all venue’s, routes and area which will be visited by
Principal
Gather information by means of interviews/ questioning
Investigate all relevant matters concerning the operation
Every aspect of the investigations/ inspections should be documented,
which means all findings should be recorded by means of the following;
 In writing and drawings
 Typing
 Electronically - Audio/ Visual
Route Selection Phases
Phase 1 – Selection
Carry out a general map study in the first instance. Include the use of aerial
photographs and computer generated routes where possible.
Phase 2 – Reconnaissance
Physically check main and alternative routes. Divide the route in sections and time
each one which will act as check points. When carrying out the physical check use
the same type of vehicle that will be used for the operation. Carry out the checks at
the same time of day when the proposed operation will take place and also on the
same day i.e. if the operation takes place on a Monday do your reconnaissance on a
Monday.
Phase 3 - Preparation and Planning
Having selected the routes now carry out the fine details i.e. embus, debus,
vulnerable locations, safe locations, escape routes and danger areas. It is important
to check your communications during this phase and identify any black spots where
communication is poor.
Phase 4 - Security Organisation
This phase includes liaising with all the outside agencies that might be involved or
used as backup during the operation.
Phase 5 - The Journey
Having prepared make sure that all the procedures and timings are adhered to at all
times.
52
Communication methods and procedures
Allocate call signs to the team members and relevant parties involved. Eg
Team Leader`s - call sign
could be, Tango Lima
Voice procedures/ Bass and RSVP Principals etc
Determine what type of net to use - Will Repeaters be needed/ will simplex
be sufficient
Routes and alternative routes
During the planning phase of an operation, the advance team will visit all venues that
the principal may visit, a day or a few hours in advance. They will plan and familiarise
themselves with all routes that the principal's vehicle may take, including contingency
routes.
The advance team will map out and study every detail of the operation together with
management and staff at the office.
Arrival points, times, and routes used inside the building should be altered every day.
(They may take the stairs for a change, for instance.)
Route planning
There are different ways and methods to plan the

routes. They are discussed below:
Routes.
A technique is to paint routes and terrain features
on a large piece of canvas. This allows the model
to be moved. It also allows the advance team to
walk the route prior to departure.
Routes.
Each major route will have checkpoints at each major road intersection a
start point (SP) and a release point (RP). PES team members will walk in
formations with radio communications capability.
53
Hot spots.
Identify the hot spots terrain when planning the route and alternative route.
Route planning is a prerequisite for the prevention of an attack on a principal
in transit.
When the principal travel on foot regularly between two points, for
instance between residence and office, the team must plan, number and code
several routes. These routes must be changed daily so that no pattern is
formed. Also change routes at unexpected times.
Departure and arrival times must be varied. Through the use of two simple
graphs, the protector can observe the use of routes, departure and arrival
times, and at the same time ensure that they are changed regularly, avoiding
a pattern.
Have accurate timing on record but only give approximate times to any
assisting agencies, on a strict need-to know basis.
Pay particular attention to the debus area.
Using maps and other aids to work out times or distances, including
alternative routes.
Reconnoitre intended routes on the same day on which the journey is
planned. Identify black spots and vulnerable points, and double-check
possible ambush or debus points.
Record registration numbers of cars.
Always plan for the worst situation.
Don't take any risks!
Route Checklist
(Take note: A route check-list is most effective if it is prepared in conjunction with

a map upon which features may be marked. Computer programs now allow the
generation of maps, to which comments, alternate routes and potential problem
areas may be added)
54
Date and time route will be travelled:

Distance to be covered:
Driving time based on advance team travelling the route
Mark factories, offices, schools and other buildings that increase traffic at N Y
certain times during the day
Locations of police stations N Y
Locations of hospitals with emergency centres. N Y
Locations of overpasses N Y
Locations of bridges N Y
Locations of tunnels N Y
Points where road construction may cause slow-downs N Y
Other traffic check points N Y
If an official motorcade, note whether police can control traffic lights to speed N Y
progress
Note any parades or other events scheduled that will affect traffic N Y
One-way streets and the direction of the flow N Y
Wooded areas including parks N Y
Buildings that other particularly good shooting positions for snipers N Y
Mark particularly dangerous sites for a command detonated explosive devices N Y
Pedestrian areas, especially where crowds are likely N Y
Communication dead zones N Y
Areas where loud noises may occur, especially if they could be mistaken for N Y
gunfire or explosions
Note potential alternate routes at critical points N Y
Note speed limits N Y
Will a local police or office/s be assigned to a motorcade? N Y
How many cars will comprise the VIP motorcade N Y
Are several cars of the same type available N Y
Mark entrance to be used at destination N Y
(If a map generation program is used or an overlay added to a standard street map, it may
be useful to colour-code the route, alternate routes and other key features)
(source: SA Bodyguard Training Academy)
55
Reconnoitring routes and alternative routes
Survey includes:
Principal’s instruction in preparation of the route.
Relevant threat information on the route gained to date.
Relevant information available on the means of transport to be utilized.
Route Reconnaissance
Wherever possible it is best practice to carry out a reconnaissance of your intended

route. In the real world that unfortunately is not always possible. To overcome that
hurdle getting a sound geographical knowledge of the areas of operation is a useful
practice. When given a fixed itinerary then the accompanying problems are
drastically reduced but you should still complete a route reconnaissance. Check for:-
Safe areas ;
Danger areas;
Alternative routes;
Radio black spots;
Safe pick up points; and
Backup locations.
Pursuit on foot
If you are being pursued on foot, remember the following:
Pedestrian pursuit usually involves a team of three or more people.

This type of pursuit is very difficult to detect. Protectors should take careful
note of all people in their or the principal's immediate vicinity.
Try to develop your instinctive memory of faces.
Be aware of how the pursuer may behave when detected.
Suddenly slip into a shop.
Unexpectedly go round a street corner and then stand still.
Suddenly jump into a taxi and drive away.
Common surveillance errors
The CPO’s should be able to detect when people are pursuing them on foot. Look
out for
common surveillance errors (and avoid making them yourself): They are:
leaving the vehicle when the principal arrives;
56
turning away when looking at the principal;

hesitating or looking around when entering a building;
leaving the venue at the same time as the principal;
moving or stopping when the principal moves or stops;
standing on street corners or in lobbies, reading newspapers or magazines;
and
dressing inappropriately for the venue.
57
Chapter 2: Provide body cover to a principal whilst

implementing pedestrian foot formations.
Outcomes:
On completion of this module the learner must be able to provide body cover to a
principal whilst implementing pedestrian foot formations.
• Positions within the selected foot formation are explained in terms of their
functions. .
• Transition between selected foot formations is demonstrated within changing
physical environments. .
• Situational awareness is demonstrated in the pedestrian escort formation
environment.
• The use of a communication plan within the pedestrian escort is demonstrated
for information sharing purposes.
Introduction
Positions within the selected foot formation are explained in terms of their functions.
Transition between selected foot formations is demonstrated within changing physical
environments. Situational awareness is demonstrated in the pedestrian escort formation
environment. The use of a communication plan within the pedestrian escort is demonstrated
for information sharing purposes.
Let us first discuss the functions of the selected foot formations.
58
The Functions of the Selected Foot Formations SO2 AC1
There are going to be occasions when the principal will have reason to walk from one
point to another. It might be from the vehicle to the office or home or a so -called
walk about. Whatever the circumstances, the protection team must be well versed in
foot drills and the formations. Obviously, the style of operation will be dictated by the
threat level, staffing levels and client requirement, but in every instance the key word
is flexibility. We do not use the term “bodyguard” in this context although the
diagram illustrations include terms such as bodyguard and protector. This
refers to the CPO’s.
In the past we have seen high profile, body saturation cover and in the right situation
that is the correct method. The trend is leaning towards low profile but without
compromising security. In this module we will be discussing both styles. Whatever
the formation decided upon will be dictated by circumstances:-
Principal preference;
Threat level;
Location;
Natural hazards;
Numbers of team; and
Equipment carried or used.
In the ideal situation a principal should always be escorted by a minimum of two
specialists.
The Single Protection Escort
There may be times that only one personal protection specialist is required. Although
the term bodyguard has not been used as a generic term in this training package it
refers to the specialist whose sole responsibility is to remain at all times in close
contact with the principal. In some circles its known as the “bullet stopper”. The
position of the protection specialist in respect to the principal is governed by several
factors:
If wearing an earpiece (The radio needs to be on the opposite side to the

principal);
If you are armed (you need your free arm nearest the principal);
The threat level (The higher the threat, the closer you are); and
The final governing factor is the Principal’s preference.
59
It is most important to remain no more than an arms length from the principal so that
in the event of any form of attack you are near enough to be affective.
An open position
Your team would use an open position in normal circumstances, when they are
escorting the principal in a no-risk situation.
Each CPO will be an arm's length away from the next CPO, as in the diagram that
follows.
A closed position
Your team will use a closed position when the situation is dangerous, and they must
cover and evacuate the principal to safety, or break through a crowd. On command
of the team leader, who will shout 'close', all CPOs will form a closed circle around
the principal, with their arms interlinking at the inside of the elbow where the arm
bends. Again, the main bodyguard acts independently. He or she will grab the VIP,
with one hand on the VIP's belt and the other hand on the collar of the VIP's jacket
behind his or her neck. At the shout of 'left', team members will all begin to run,
starting with the left foot. They will run for cover at a place that will have been
arranged during the planning process.
A golden position
Your team will use a golden position when in the direct line of fire. Refer to the
diagram above. At the first sound of gunfire, the main bodyguard takes down his or
her VIP.
In the take-down procedure, the main bodyguard will cover the VIP by lying on top of
the VIP, with his or her right leg between the VIP's legs, in a leopard crawl position.
The bodyguard will hook one of his or her feet around the VIP's ankle, and then move
off in a leopard crawl, all the while supporting and covering the VIP. At the same time
the other CPOs will make a 180° turn and kneel around the VIP without changing
their relative positions, so that they can determine the direction of fire and return
cover fire. Until they determine the direction of fire, point (the CPO in front) will clear
the way to the vehicle, and the team leader will assist the main bodyguard to bring
the VIP to safety. The other CPOs will provide cover until the evacuation is complete.
This system may vary according to the number of CPOs in the formation.
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The Open V Formation
A reasonably good formation for both image and adaptability. The formation can be
closed quickly and has the advantage of 1 and 2 being close to the principal. The
following diagram depicts a five man team formation.
Figure 13: Example Open V formation
Always remember that any of the formations are purely starting points and as the
situation changes so will the formation. If one member of the team drifts from position
the team member next to him must cover the gap created.
61
Inverted V Formation
The following diagram depicts a variation in the open V formation giving far more
cover to the rear of the detail. Gives poor protection but is good for image. Used in
low threat situation and where there is a low density of people allowing them to pass
through without any threat.
Figure 14: Example Inverted V
62
Open Box Formation
People can be allowed to pass through the formation as it appears to be non-

aggressive in style.
3
2
1
Protectors
Principal
Body Guard
Figure 15: Example Open Box Formation
63
A 4 man box
A 4 man formation
diamond
formation
A 4 man
inverted V
formation
Protectors
Principal
Body Guard
Figure 16: Example of variations on 4 man formations.
64
Closed Box Formation
This formation affords good all round security and where 1 and 2 can deter
pedestrians from
entering the box. Used when the risk is of a higher level and a higher crowd density.
It affords protection where the vetting of oncoming pedestrians is difficult. If the
threat dictates anybody should be deterred from entering the box. The team is taking
a much tighter formation around the principal.
2 3
1
Protectors
Principal
Body Guard
65
The All Round Formation
This formation is similar to the V formation but CPO3 and CPO 4 have taken a much
closer location. It does give an aggressive image but is ideal when attempting to
move through heavy crowds.
One thing that we have not discussed is “Pace” that is the speed of formation as you
walk through crowds. Under normal circumstances the pace is dictated by the speed
of the principal. Obviously in the event of an attack then the team dictates the pace.
If you need to get the principal away in a hurry you may well be dragging or pushing
them.
Figure 17: The 7 Man All Around Method
66
Walking Drill Variations
A good general formation for most events, you are close

enough to get closer if needed but has the draw back
that there are times when you have a blind spot to the
front.
Figure 18: Example Two man

Protective Formation
If you take up closer formation alongside the

principal it gives you better vision and EP 1 does not
appear to be part of the group, especially if you are
in conversation with the principal. An advantage of
surprise.
Figure 19: Example of the variation of

a Two man formation
67
A Flexible Two Man Formation
This formation allows the advance member of the team to assess potential problems
as they approach. The dotted circles indicate alternative positioning as you react to a
given situation.
Something Else To Consider
Always where possible make use of natural cover

for your principal. If whilst walking you have solid
walls to one side use them, but do not forget
alleyways or doorways as the lead team member
will need to cover them.
The Three Man Formation Figure 20: Example of the flexibility of

the Two man Formation.
Finally the classic three man team formation. Whilst open to the front you have close
contact and can give immediate body cover if needed. The style is aggressive by
nature and if walking on narrow pavements can be problematic.
Figure 21: Example Three Man Formation
68
SO2 AC2
Transition Between Selected Foot Formations Within Changing Physical

Environments
Physical environments may include different environment in which the principal and
PES Team move in. There are important formations while on foot such as: doors,
between crowds, between buildings, corridors or passages, escalators, stair cases
and lifts.
We will demonstrate the various formations within a physical environment.
L/CPO
L/CPO
VIP
M/CPO
R/CPO
R/CPO
Figure 22: Example of Entering through doors.
When approaching a door, the lead CPO on the side on which the door is hinged will
open the door, allowing the other lead CPO to enter and clear on his/her side, The
main CPO will then hold the door for the principal to move past him/her. The 2 rear
CPO’s should give body cover to the principal and main CPO.
69
Fence line formation movement
BG 1
BG 2
BG 4
VIP
M/CPO
BG 3
Figure 23: Example of a Line Formation
The Principal is moving down a fence line and in the process he/she greets
the spectators.
The no 1 CPO walks in advance of the principal observing ahead for threats
The no 2 CPO will move just ahead of the principal watching the next person
the principal will greet.
The no 3 CPO follows the principal observing the crowd, and when a person
holding the hand of the principal too long during a handshake, no 3 will free
the hand of the principal in order to move on.
The no 4 CPO will in his/her position have a broad view of the crowd.
The Team leader is placed right behind the principal, ready to pivot him/her
away from threat and give body cover.
70
BG 1
BG 2
VIP
M/CPO
BG 3
BG 4
Figure 24: Example variation of Line Method
71
Moving between 2 buildings, corridor and passage
L/CPO
VIP
M/CPO
R/CPO
Figure 25: Movement Between Buildings and Down Corridors
Lead CPO should clear and give the clear signal for team to proceed.
As team walk between the 2 buildings, one of the rear CPO’s will stay behind
and position himself/herself at the entrance of the 2 buildings as the team
passes the corner.
The main CPO will position himself/herself on the side where there might be
a greater threat. For example: windows and doors.
One of the lead CPO’s will accelerate to clear the exit or blind corners for
team to follow lead CPO should clear and give the clear signal for team to
proceed.
The one rear CPO should stay put till signal is received from the lead CPO,
when all is clear they will proceed.
72
Escalators
Up
Figure 26: Movement Up Escalators
• The CPO closest to bottom will check the landing.

• The 2nd CPO should cover and scan escalator going up.
• The main CPO right next to the Principal should cover 180 degrees.
• The CPO behind the Principal should cover the rear and the side of the
escalator.
• The CPO at the top should cover the top of the escalator landing and the
escalator moving in opposite direction past him.
73
Staircases
Standard procedure should

be to first secure one level
below and at the same time
one level above the principal.
During ascend and descend
the formation should be kept
open to prevent tripping.
Number 1 covers the rear
and the entrance.
Number 2 & 3 and Main CPO
remains with the principal
allowing enough space
between them.
Number 4 has moved ahead
to secure the next landing.
Figure 27: Movement Up and Down Stairs
74
Lifts – Demonstration 6
VIP 4
BG
Position Inside the Lift
VIP
BG
1
3
2
Stepping out of the Lift

Figure 28: Position Inside a Lift and Exiting the Lift.
75
Formations in lifts will be explained below.

In a situation where a lifts is used , a CPO will be sent to the destination floor
to clear.
The remaining team will stay put until they receive an all clear signal from
above mentioned CPO.
Number 1 and 2 will exit the lift first to give cover but will move out far
enough to make space for the remaining formation to exit the lift.
The formation will then form around principal and start moving.
All formations can be used in an open or a closed position. In a low-risk situation, you
would use an open formation.
In a high-risk formation, you would use a closed formation. Never move further than
an arm's length away from the next CPO and the principal, unless the situation
permits you to. If you need to close and cover for evacuation, you should need to
take only one step to your principal.
Negotiating Blind Corners and Stairways
Look at the diagram on the left,

showing how a five-person box
formation changes to negotiate a
blind corner. Note that whoever is
at the front of the formation is
known as 'point', and that the
number 4 position is the main
bodyguard, who will never leave
the principal's side. All the other
members of the team will rotate
around the bodyguard as
explained below.
Number 1 (who begins as 'point')
accelerates to take up the position
marked in the diagram, to clear
the way ahead. Number 5 takes
up the position vacated by
number 1, and numbers 2 and 3
each move up a position. The
formation will rotate past point,
with each CPO taking turns to
'leap-frog' ahead, in other words
to accelerate ahead of the team,
76
as they move. Remember that number 4 (the main bodyguard) won't rotate, but will
stick close to the principal.
SO2 AC3
Situational Awareness In The Pedestrian Escort Formation Environment
We will discuss situational awareness within the arcs of observation and intervention.
Vigilance within the arcs of observation and intervention is manifested either
physically or verbally within the pedestrian escort formation environment.
There are various factors influencing various decisions and reactions of CPO’s. The
safety and security of the transition area should be clear and always be at the look
out for unsuspicious behaviour. The CPO must be aware of the “current” and
“potential” situation of any threats that may be targeted at the Principal. Let us
discuss the outline of situational awareness.
Observation and Awareness
Observation and awareness is the ability to …
Identify and recall a situation accurately,

Completely and
Clearly results in efficient observation.
Our aptitude to observe can be enhancing by experience and education. Always

beware of making exceptionally subjective observations.
Types of Observation
Sporadic observation:
This is a spot-check observation. It happens on an occasional or regular basis, rather
than a fixed or continuous basis.
Continuous observation:
This is a continuous process. It include the observation of people and places on a
fixed, continuous basis.
Observing objects
When the CPO observes objects the following information will apply:
their general characteristics;

their distinguishing features;
77
details regarding their specific order; and

details that vary.
Observing vehicles
When observing vehicles, take note of:
their make and model;

their colour;
any damages or shortcomings.
their registration number
Observing people
When observing people take note of the following:
their height (relative to your own);

their build and apparent age; and
their physical characteristics (such as birthmarks, shape of head, style of
walking, signs of violent encounters such as scars).
Circular Sector – An ARC
The following diagram illustrates the curved boundary of length. For example: The
PES team are assigned to observe all round defence of the inner and outer perimeter
within the circular arc. The following diagram illustrates the covered perimeter area
during observation for threats.
A circular sector shaded in green. Its

curved boundary of length L is a circular
arc.
Observation post
The observation post is a security function with the responsibility to observe a

specific area and activities in that area. The purpose of an observation post is:
78
to observe a specific area;

to observe people, vehicles and goods in that area; and
to report all valid information to the control centre.
The diamond formation position can be classified as an ARC during foot formations.
The following diagram illustrates the circular sector in the shame of a “diamond”
formation.
Tail L/F
= CPO’s
= Principal
M/BG
R/F P
Point
Function of team members
1. To give body cover to principal 360 degrees.

2. Tail– should cover rear of principal and also scan 180 degrees to the rear.
The CPO of the PES team will then automatically cover 45 degrees of left and
right flanks.
3. Ensuring a double scanning process in open areas as pointed out above with
arrows.
4. Left flank-should cover left of principal also cross scanning with tail and point
45 degrees.
5. Right flank– should cover right hand side of principal also scanning 180
degrees on right, crossing 45 degrees with tail and point.
6. Point-should cover 180 degrees in front of principal and cross 45 degrees with
7. Left flank and right flank, to create a double scanning process
(source: SA Bodyguard Training Academy)
79
Communication Plan Within The Pedestrian Escort SO2 AC4
The PES and advance team will communicate frequently while on foot with the
principal. As discussed earlier it is important to discuss the routes and alternative
routes in case a threat has been detected. Let us discuss the information which
should be included in the communication plan within the pedestrian escort.
It is important that whatever formation the team adopts that it remains flexible and
fluid moving and covering each other and the principal as the situation changes. All
round vision and developing a good communication system is an important factor if
you want to remain effective. Each member must have a specific task and each of
them needs to be able to take over the role of another without thinking.
Briefing
The CPO’s must have a communication session with all people involved, as well as
the principal. It is important to communicate the sequence of events so that
everyone knows what is expected. They are:
Notification of task;
Initial meetings;
Initial advances;
Intelligence gathering;
Threat assessment;
Appreciation and contingency planning;
SOP (Standard operating procedures) development;
Team briefings;
Team reconnaissance;
Final briefings; and
OPERATION.
All the above will be of no avail if you do not get the co-operation of the principal. Part
of the intelligence gathering process is the client interview and this must be carried
out in a professional manner. The purpose is this interview is to ascertain the
following information and, because the principal might well see this as time wasted, it
is important that it be done quickly and efficiently.
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Communication Methods and Procedures
Allocate call signs to the team members and relevant parties involved. E.g.
Team Leader`s - call sign could be, Tango Lima
Voice procedures/ Bass and RSVP Principals etc
Determine what type of net to use - Will Repeaters be needed/ will simplex
be sufficient
Phonetic Alphabet
In order to ensure that the receiver will understand a message containing call signs,
codes, difficult words or names, a phonetic alphabet is used to spell out the word
concerned. This International Phonetic Alphabet is common to the police and the
defence force.
All radio users must know this phonetic alphabet.
A Alpha N November
B Bravo O Oscar
C Charlie P Papa
D Delta Q Quebec
E Echo R Romeo
F Foxtrot S Sierra
G Golf T Tango
H Hotel U Uniform
I India V Victor
J Juliet W Whisky
K Kilo X X-Ray
L Lima Y Yankee
M Mike Z Zulu
Table 2: The Phonetic Alphabet
Radio calls
We will discuss radio calls according to multiple calls; all station calls; relaying a
message; and emergency calls.
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Difference between multiple calls and all stations calls

Radio calls can be multiple calls or all stations calls.
Multiple calls
In multiple calls, the control station calls several outstations on the net. The operator
at control uses his or her own call sign to identify himself or herself, and after that the
call signs of the stations that he or she is calling.
Example
ZRA 3154 Roger Over

ZRA 3157 Roger Over
ZRA 3164 Roger Over
All stations call
In all stations calls, the control station calls all the stations on the net.
Example
ZRA 3131 for all stations over

Stations will respond according to the order of the numerical sequence of call signs.
The all stations call will normally be used only on a small net.
Relaying a message
When one station cannot communicate directly with another station, it may be
possible to relay the message through a third station, as illustrated below.
Example
Station Message
ZRA 3131 ZRA 3131 for ZRA 3154 relay message to
ZRA 3183. over
ZRA 3154 ZRA 3154 (or ACS). Roger over
ZRA 3154 ZRA 3154 for ZRA 3183 message from
ZRA 3131. Over
ZRA 3183 ZRA 3131 (or ACS). Roger over
ZRA 3154 ZRA 3154 for ZRA 3131 message relayed to ZRA 3183. over
ZRA 3131 ZRA 3131 (or ACS). Roger out
252
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Emergency Calls
Emergency calls are designed to stimulate the attention of all stations. Emergency
procedures must be pre-planned.
Example
Station Message
ZRA 3154 ZRA 3154 (or ACS) May Repeat Mayday. Over
Control Control call sign ZRA 3154. Roger Out
Principles of Radio Procedure
In this section we'll discuss useful ways
BASS and RSVP
One of the easiest ways to remember the principles of good radio procedure is to use
the key words:
'BASS'; and
'RSVP'.
Every radio user must memorise these principles, shown below.
BASS
 B BRIEF Message must be brief and
 A ACCURATE Details given must be clear
 S SECURITY
 Never transmit classified information
 unless it is dis-
 S SPEED Do not rush the message but make sure that you are
accurate.
Common words and phrases
Word or phrase Meaning
Call sign The call sign of the station as registered and reflected on the radio licence.
Abbreviated call Unofficial domestic call signs arranged by individuals.
Over My message is complete and I am expecting a reply.
Out My message is complete – do not reply.
Roger I have received your message.
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I understand your message.

Everything is going according to plan.
Sitrep Situation report
Mayday Emergency call (repeat at least
twice).
Say again I am repeating my previous message or portion of the message.
Relay to Pass my message on to (call sign).
Let us differentiate between radio calls and single calls.
Radio calls and single calls
Radio calls
Before commencing a transmission, the user must ensure that the net is clear. The
operator uses his or her own call sing to identify himself or herself, and after that the
call sign of the station or stations he or she is calling.
Once the link is established, an abbreviated call sign (ACS) may be used.
Single calls
The single call is a single transmission between two stations.
Example
Sender's call sign ZRA 3131

Receiver's call sign ZRA 3154
The phonetic alphabet is used to spell out the call sign, which in this case is ZULU
ROMEO ALPHA. The message transmission would be:
ZRA 3131 for ZRA 3154 Over

ZRA 3154 Roger Out
Only the sender can end a message, saying 'Roger Out'. All other persons
responding to the originator must go back to him or her and say 'Roger Over'.
When ending a message the operator will use either 'Over' or 'Out', depending upon
whether a reply is required or not. Contrary to popular belief, the phrase 'Over and
out' is never used.
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Do's and don'ts of radio procedure
Keep to the following do's and don'ts of radio procedure:
Do’s Don’ts
Do keep the radio room secure. Do not use abusive language over the
air. Apart from prejudicing voice
procedure, this can result in licenses
being revoked.
Do treat radios as technical equipment Do not play music in the background.
and handle them with care to prevent
damage.
Do use radios for the transmission of
official messages only. The transmission
of music or other entertainment is
prohibited.
Security of communications
Based on the principle that 'the enemy listens’; every effort must be made to safe-
guard the information transmitted over the air. Examples of information that must be
safe-guarded are:
information received from delicate sources, such as the Special Branch of
the police;
classified inreps and sitreps;
future intentions regarding operations; and
any movements of the VIP.
When the contents of a message must be safe-guarded, code words will be used in
the message. The CPO initiating the message must use his or her discretion as to
when the use of code words is necessary.
Vigilance
Developing all round observation skills again comes with practice. You will need to
be aware of your surroundings as well as the position of the principal. Would be
attackers will be watching for that momentary lapse which gives them the opportunity
to make their move. Keeping the communication links open with team members
needs to become an instinctive action. At any time the principal may decide to stop
that is when the team adopts an outward looking stance covering all angles from
potential attack.
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Chapter 3: manage threats and or attacks on the principal

whilst on foot.
Outcomes:
On completion of this module the learner must be able to manage threats and or
attacks on the principal whilst on foot.
• Possible threats are drawn from the risk analysis and prioritized within the
pedestrian escort formation. .
• Responses to the potential threats are determined in line with current legal
prescripts and protocol requirements.
• Immediate action drills are applied during a simulated hostile attack.
• Escort formation is maintained during a medical emergency.
• . Possible threats within the pedestrian formation environment are identified
and measured response is implemented.
Introduction
We will discuss possible threats from the risk analysis and prioritise risks within the
pedestrian escort formation. Responses to the potential threats are determined in line
with current legal prescripts and protocol requirements. Immediate action drills are
applied during a simulated hostile attack. The following will be included:
Impact weapons (such as, but is not limited to hands, feet and batons).
Chemical weapons (such as, but is not limited to maces and pepper
sprays).
Edged weapons (such as, but is not limited to knives, blades and bottles).
Ballistic weapons (such as, but is not limited to projectile weapons,
firearms).
Electrical weapons (such as, but is not limited to Tazers).
Sighting of threats (sounds off).
Interception and neutralizing of threats.
Body cover of principal.
Evacuation to cover or transport.
Escort formation is maintained during a medical emergency. Medical emergency

refers to simulated emergencies. Possible threats within the pedestrian formation
environment are identified and measured response is implemented
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SO3 AC1
Possible Threats Are Drawn From The Risk Analysis And Prioritised Within The
Pedestrian Escort Formation & Measured
Risk analysis is a technique to identify and assess factors that may jeopardise the
success of achieving a goal. This technique also helps to define preventive measures
to reduce the probability of these factors from occurring and identify
countermeasures to successfully deal with these constraints when they develop to
prevent possible negative effects. Possible threats are identified and drawn from the
risk analysis. Let us identify possible precautions and procedures to support this
technique.
Identifying Risks
Risk identification is the first step in a complete risk analysis, given that the objectives
of the decision maker have been well defined. There are a number of techniques
used to help formalise the identification of risks. This part of a formal risk analysis will
often prove to be the most informative and constructive element of the whole
process, improving company culture by encouraging greater team effort and reducing
blame and should be executed with care. The organisations participating in a formal
risk analysis should take pains to create an open and blameless environment in
which expressions of concern and doubt can be openly given.
We can distinguish between two types of events.
A risk is an event that may possibly occur, and if it did occur would have a negative
impact on the goals of the organisation. Thus a risk is composed of three elements:
The scenario.
Its probability of occurrence.
The size of its impact if it did occur (either a fixed value or a distribution).
An opportunity is an event that may possibly occur, and if it did occur would have a
positive impact on the goals of the organization. Thus an opportunity is composed of
the same three elements as a risk.
A risk and an opportunity can be considered the opposite sides of the same coin. It is
usually easiest to consider a potential event to be a risk if it would have a negative
impact and its probability is less than 50%, and if the risk had a probability in excess
of 50%, to include it in a base plan and then consider the opportunity of it not
occurring.
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Categories of Risk
Deciding the potential level of perceived risk is affected by many factors, but once
that evidence has been gathered then you can start to put your risk category
together.
Category C
• In
Category B considerable
danger
• In some danger • High likelihood
• Must not of an attempt
disregard
Category A possible
attempt
• Possible danger
• Maybe an
attempt.
The Threat
In the world of executive protection the term “threat” is perceived to be ‘intended or

targeted attacks’. However, do not forget the unintentional situations that were
discussed earlier when looking at threats. We discussed in the previous modules the
different terrorist groups and their tactics, but remember that the Principal can be
under threat from:
Cranks;
Crowds;
Hate groups;
Extremists;
Displaced persons;
Sanctuary seekers;
Refugees;
Violent employees;
Ex employees;
Criminals;
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Cults;
Serial killers; and
Family.
Although these groups in many cases are not well organised and not terrorist by
nature, they are nevertheless a threat. They are all a potential threat to the executive
and having up to date intelligence is important. Unfortunately our adversary has an
advantage and this is that:-
they know their intended target;

 the target almost never knows the adversary; and
 the protectors are not aware of a situation until it
actually materialises.
This state of affairs makes the gathering and assessment of intelligence most
important if it is going to be effective. Remember your adversary will work in isolation
and unless you carry out counter surveillance, the first time that you have any
indication of a problem is when it occurs.
Threat assessment
The assessment of all potential risks and their evaluation against designed security
methods that can be employed to eradicate or reduce them. Threats are anything
that can be of danger or embarrassment to your principal and the risk is defined as
how likely is the possibility of it happening.
Threat assessment is not just about looking at possible kidnaps and assassination
attempts but any other forms of threat or risks which can include:-
Fire;
Accidents;
Illness;
Stalking;
Harassment; and
The unforeseen!
Having gathered your intelligence, you now need to make the perceived threat
assessment. It is important that the decision making process include the following
elements:-
Logical;
Unclouded;
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Accurate;
Relevant; and
Objective.
It is necessary to identify the possible or perceived threats and then take a decision
how likely it is that the threat will occur and what counter measures can you
implement to reduce the risk of it occurring. You should spend many hours practising
drills, conflict management exercising and proactive counter measures. There may
be times when you will have to react to given situations. Rarely does a planned
operation run according to plan and that it is why protection specialists have an
obligation to prepare viable alternatives and consider escape routes.
Key elements of threat assessment
The close protection team can determine what threats a target may face by
measuring the target's profile against the 'three Vs':
vulnerability
visibility
value
Vulnerability of target
Vulnerability is a primary factor to consider when weighing up a threat against a

target. For instance, a target with a high degree of public exposure may be more
accessible than a target with a lower degree of public exposure.
CPOs can determine vulnerability by calculating the degree of effort attackers require
to gain access to a position from where they can launch an attack on the target
without
their being compromised by the protection blanket around the target.
Visibility of target
Other factors that may affect visibility include:
the position or post that the target holds;

the opinions expressed or action taken by the target, or the institution that
the target represents; and
the involvement of the target or institution in controversial or high-profile
actions, for example, an Italian judge in
a mafia trail.
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Value of the target
The value of the target is the strategic value that an attack on the target holds for the
source of the threat.
The target has direct (individual) value and indirect (representative) value to the
potential attacker.
The critical value of the target may be indicated by the effect that an attack on the
target may have on the institution or community that he or she represents. For
example, there was widespread civil disruption after the assassination of Chris Hani
in 1993, quite apart from the loss to the country of an exceptional future politician.
Questions to ask include how long it will take an institution to recover from the effects
of an attack on the target, and whether the value of the target can be replaced. In the
case of Chris Hani, the ANC as an institution recovered fairly quickly from his loss,
but his potential contribution to the country was irreplaceable.
Could the value of Harry Oppenheimer of Anglo-American or Bill Gates of Microsoft

be replaced? Would the computer industry be threatened if Bill Gates were
assassinated?
Attackers may gain value if the attack benefits their cause.
After the assassination of Lord Mountbatten by the IRA in 1979, many Irish people
and sponsors condemned the IRA. The IRA did not appear to benefit from this
assassination.
The target's direct value may be replaced after the initial loss. However, there may be
huge secondary losses, for example:
• the direct and indirect cost of the subsequent investigation or commission of

enquiry;
• the upset in the balance of political or economic power;
• the forfeiture of foreign investment; and
• the fluctuation in capital markets (the gold price, shares and so on).
Again, the value of the target as perceived by protection and intelligence agencies on
the one hand, and the source of the threat on the other, may differ.
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Intelligence
Historically the intelligence community has not actively gathered, collated or co-
ordinated information for the specific purpose of compiling the principal's threat
analysis. Such intelligence has mostly been the product of incidental information, or
been discovered during the course of other investigations.
CPOs should establish a database of all information relating to analysis and threat
sources, and a counterintelligence programme should be established. Members of
the intelligence community should liaise and interact to provide information, and their
liaison should be co-ordinated from a central point.
Protection services should use covert surveillance to determine whether any client is
under surveillance by a third party. In this way, they can observe the work
performance of protection personnel, and identify any weaknesses in the principal's
protection network.
(source: SA Bodyguard Academy)
Brainstorming
Brainstorming is a general technique that can be used for identifying risks, pooling
the available information on each risk, and identifying possible risk management
options. It involves gathering together a group of project stakeholders under the
direction of a neutral and reasonably strong-willed chairperson.
It is prudent to have instructed brainstorm session participants well before the

meeting about what one is hoping to achieve, together perhaps with some
explanation of the meaning of a 'risk' and an 'opportunity'. They may also have been
given prompt lists to think about, or any other means for helping them focus on the
task.
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Ten golden rules for risk analysis
There are rules for a risk analysis. Ensure that you adhere to these rules: -
1. Do your homework with literature, experts and users.

2. Let the problem drive the analysis.
3. Make the analysis as simple as possible, but no
simpler.
4. Identify all significant assumptions.
5. Be explicit about decision criteria and policy
strategies.
6. Be explicit about uncertainties.
7. Perform systematic sensitivity and uncertainty
analysis.
8. Iteratively refine the problem statement and the
analysis.
9. Document clearly and completely.
10. Expose to peer review.
The possible responses to risks
The response to correctly identified and evaluated risks generally falls into one of
these categories:
Increase! (the project plan may be overly cautious).
Do nothing (because it would cost too much or there is nothing that can be
done).
Collect more data (to better understand the risk).
Add a contingency (extra amount to budget, deadline, etc. to allow for

possibility of risk).
Reduce (e.g. build in redundancy, take a less risky approach).
Share (e.g. with partner, contractor providing they can reasonably handle
the impact).
Transfer (e.g. insure, back-to-back contract).
Eliminate (e.g. do it another way).
Cancel project.
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This list can be helpful in thinking of possible responses to identified risks. It should
be borne in mind that these risks responses might in their turn carry secondary risks.
Fallback plans should be developed to deal with risks that are identified and not
eliminated. If done well in advance, they can help the CPO’s to react efficiently,
calmly and in unison in a situation where blame and havoc might normally occur.
SO3 AC2
Responses To The Potential Threats Are Determined In Line With Current Legal
Prescripts And Protocol Requirements
There are several laws in place in South Africa. The CPO’s must adhere to these
legal prescripts and protocols. When the CPO(s) are facing a “deadly threat” they
should still act within the law, otherwise it may become unlawful. A CPO must know
all the relevant laws (see laws in unit standard). We discussed potential threats on
numerous occasions. Let us see what happens when you “react” to the threat in line
with legal prescripts and protocol requirements.
Requirements for a valid act of private defence
The requirements for a valid act of private defence (self-defence) are as

follows:
There must be an unlawful attack, or such an attack must be imminent. (The
attack must be either in process or immediately imminent.)
The CPO must act to protect his/her and the principals life, bodily integrity or
property, or that of someone else if that person wants your help.
The action must be necessary for the protection of these rights and interests.
Your defence must be aimed at the attacker.
The act of defence must not be more harmful than is necessary to defend
yourself from the attack. The degree of force or violence you use must,
therefore, be reasonable.
Putative self-defence
When you believe that you are in danger, you may harm your alleged attacker,
believing that you are acting in self-defence. Viewed objectively, later, it may become
clear that there was no danger. In this case, there will have been no grounds for self-
defence. Your actions will therefore have been unlawful.
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However, you will not be guilty of a crime, because you honestly thought that you
were acting lawfully. Being aware of the unlawfulness of your actions is an essential
requirement for intention, one of the basic elements of a crime.
You can then plead putative self-defence in a court of law.
Necessity
You will act out of necessity if you protect yourself, or a recognised legal interest,
against imminent danger by committing an offence. For example, if you break the
speed limit while rushing to the aid of a wounded principal or colleague, you may
raise the defence of necessity in a court of law.
You may rely on necessity as grounds for defence if your act:
• infringes on the interests of an innocent third party, or

• contravenes a rule of law,
• and is directed at the protection of:
• your own or another's interests, or
• the interests of the innocent third party himself or herself,
• against an emergency that has commenced or is imminent (and that is not
an attack by a person whose own interests may be infringed in the process).
Difference between private defence and necessity
Private defence differs from necessity in the following ways:
In private defence, the defensive action is directed against the attacker.
In the case of necessity it is directed against the interests of an innocent third party,
or amounts to a contravention of a legal rule without causing damage to any specific
person.
In private defence, you will have acted against an unlawful attack by a human being.
In the case of necessity, you will have acted against a danger or threat of danger,
which may have been of any origin.
If the interests of an innocent third party are infringed during the performance of
an act in necessity, the court will weight the interests protected against the interests
damaged far more cautiously than where private defence is at stake.
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In the case of necessity, we are dealing with an infringement of the interests of an

innocent third party or the contravention of a legal rule, and not with the warding off
of an unlawful attack, so the defensive action must not only be reasonable, but must
be the only reasonable way out.
In the case of private defence the attacker may be have been killed should
circumstances have been thought to warrant it. In the case of necessity the position
is not altogether clear. In the past, our courts have found that if someone is under
serious duress and his or her life is endangered, he or she may kill an innocent third
party to escape death himself or herself (S vs. Goliath 1972 (3) SA 1 (A)).
A plea of Justification due to self defence rests on two (2) basic, but critical principles
that must be proven in a court of law:
There must be an attack, and
There must be a defensive action to ward off the attack
No Private Defence Description

1 The Attack / • There must have been some kind of an attack
Threatening • There must be an unlawful attack by a human
Attack being
• The attack must be directed at a legal interest
• The attack must have commenced or be
imminent
2 The Defence • It must be directed against the attacker
• There must be a need to protect the interest in
danger
• The defensive action must be reasonable
Table 3: Private Defence
The essentials of a plea of necessity
The essentials of a plea of necessity are as follows:
The accused must have found himself or herself in an actual emergency.

Alternatively, he or she must have found himself or herself in an emergency, viewed
objectively.
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The evil must have begun or be imminent.
Not only will a menace to life and limb sustain a plea of necessity, but a menace to
any other lawful interest will also do so.
A person can also act in necessity to protect another person's interests.
To escape the emergency someone may violate any interest of a third party or
contravene any legal rule.
Where a person is legally compelled to undergo the evil, the defence of necessity
cannot be raised. The defence will be sustained only if the person could not escape
in any other manner.
A person acting in necessity may cause more harm that is necessary to escape the
evil.
As a general rule, the interests sacrificed should not be of a greater value than those
saved.
Law
The law is divided into different sections. They are:
Criminal law,
the law of criminal procedure and
the law of evidence are examples of such sections of
the law.
It is of utmost importance for a CPO to have a certain
knowledge of the above-mentioned sections of the law. Without such knowledge,
they will not be able to perform their duties in a proper manner and may transgress
the law in the process of attempting to safeguard the interests of their service
provider (employer). Their conduct may even constitute a criminal offence in which
case they themselves will be guilty of the offence and may be sentenced by a court.
It may also result in other people instituting civil claims for damages against them or
their employers, which could result in the court ordering them or their employers to
pay out money in damages to the parties that suffered damages as a result of the
Close protection officers conduct.
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Criminal Law
Criminal law consists of all legal rules which stipulate what human conduct is
punishable by the State, and the form the punishment should take.
Conduct which is punishable by the State is known as crime. Criminal law thus deals
with crimes and punishment.
The requirements for a crime

If one considers all the crimes in our law carefully, one will find that the basic
requirements for all of them are similar. The requirements we are referring to, are
the following:
No Requirement Description
1 Legality Conduct constitutes an offence (a crime) only if the law states
that it is an offence and is punishable by the State. An act
therefore constitutes an offence only if it is punishable by the
State. The requirement for a crime is known as the
"requirement of legality" or the "principle of legality".
2 An Act It is a requirement of every crime that a human being has
performed an act. This does not necessarily mean that one
can be guilty of a crime only if one has actually done
something. One can also be guilty of a crime if something,
which the law requires one to do, was not done (e.g. non-
submission of an income-tax return). This "failure to act" is
called "an omission". For the purposes of our criminal law, an
omission is also regarded as an act.
3 Unlawfulness It is a requirement of every crime that the conduct (act) must
be unlawful. Conduct will be unlawful if it contravenes a
statutory provision or a common law rule or if it conflicts with
the general public's idea of what is right or wrong
4 Fault It is a requirement of the vast majority of crimes that the
unlawful conduct must have been accompanied by a
blameworthy state of mind. This "blameworthy state of mind"
is called "Fault" or "Mens Rea" and is a state of mind for which
a person may be blamed.
Table 4: Requirements of a Crime
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Legality
Conduct constitutes an offence (a crime) only if the law states that it is an offence
and is punishable by the State. An act therefore constitutes an offence only if it is
punishable by the State. This requirement for a crime is known as the "requirement
of legality" or the "principle of legality".
SO3 AC3
Immediate Action Drills Are Applied During A Simulated Hostile Attack
Each team member will be given designated areas of responsibility which will overlap
with the other members of the team. It is paramount that during any practice drills
that these responses are practised until they become second nature. Team flexibility
and tactics are an important issue. Practising differing situations with different threat
levels is necessary.
Actions And Reactions
Practice drills can only prepare you to act instinctively to given situations but no
matter how well the route and drills have been planned, there are going to be times
when instinct takes over. Reaction to an opportunist attack will dictate the need to
divert. Whatever the decision, there are three principles which need to be observed.
Fast, Decisive Action
The basic principle of CPO is essentially non-confrontational defensive action. The

attacker always has the element of surprise and in the early stage the team will have
to take defensive action tactics. Whatever that action, it must be fast and decisive.
For the time being, remember that if a threat arises, you must take immediate action.
The primary objective is to protect the principal.
Priorities
We just discussed the fact that the priority is to give protection to the principal.
Although that role has been designated to one team member, the responsibility still
lies with every member of the protection detail.
Well Practised Drills
No matter how well drilled the team becomes there will always be a situation that
occurs that you have not trained for. The saving grace is that you have practised
drills and your practice will take over instinctively adapting where necessary.
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If you liken the team to that of many top sports teams: they practice different drills.
On the day opportunities present themselves and without thinking team members
react. That automatic thought process is what the protective detail is striving to
achieve. Remember he who hesitates is lost, it is better to make a wrong decision
than no decision at all. You cannot afford the luxury of stopping and thinking. React
and react fast.
SO3 AC4
Types Of Hostile Attacks
These come in many forms ranging from simple nuisances to attempted

assassinations. As we discussed earlier whatever the situation, they have to be dealt
with quickly and decisively. Not taking an immediate action will lead to a simple
situation getting out of hand. You are not there to make friends but defend the
principal. The types of attacks can be generally categorised into four groups.
Group 1 Nuisance and verbal attack
Group 2 Unarmed physical and Thrown Missile Attack
Group 3 Knife and Handgun Attack
Group 4 • Explosive and grenade attack

• Sniper attack
• Vehicle attack
The Nuisance Attack
The over attentive photographer, the well-intentioned well wisher or just an over
enthusiastic onlooker. Take care when dealing with these types. Remember our
basic concept of non - confrontation. You can still be firm without being aggressive.
One important point to remember, they could also be a diversion for a more serious
attack.
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The Verbal Attack
In many instances if not dealt with affectively, this situation, although not at first
appears to be less than threatening but again can easily soon get out of control if
ignored. A change of formation is required to take a closer order and endeavour to
navigate from the source of danger, if at all possible.
The Unarmed Physical Attack
In this instance you have to deal with situation without breaking the formation as that
leaves a gap in the security ring where a more serious attack could and sometimes
happen. Never forget the act of diversion. If the team member does break formation
this is when team flexibility comes into action and that created space must be
covered. The next decision is how much force you can use to prevent the attack.
Remember as protection specialist you are not above the law. The point to
remember is that if you have any reason to believe the principal to be in immediate
threat remove them swiftly and decisively from the point of danger.
The Thrown Missile Attack
In this instance we’re only discussing potentially non life threatening missiles. That is
not to say a brick or rock will not kill you, far from it. In most instances many of these
types of attack are more of an embarrassment nature and not life threatening.
Objects like eggs, mouldy food and water bombs are just ways of people showing
their disrespect. Action in such a situation is to close ranks and move the principal
from the danger zone quickly and with the minimum of fuss.
The Knife And Handgun Attack
To attack the principal with these types of weapons means that the attacker has got
in close and our first level of security protection has been breached. This is not a
statement of failure,nevertheless a true observation. The team member nearest to
the attack point has to engage the target, which can then turn attack into defence.
The remainder of the team gives body cover and protection to the principal and
removes him/her from the danger zone.
Remember that even expert pistol shots need to get into 10-15 metres to ensure a
kill. There are unfortunately many areas of the world where you are not allowed to
carry weapons. If the situation dictates that the likelihood of such attacks are liable to
happen then good local police liaison is essential.
101
The Explosive And Grenade Attack
In the event of this type of attack occurring there is a need for simultaneous actions.
If you believe the missile is a grenade or explosive device shout a warning and give
body cover to the principal. The best defence is to get the principal to the ground as
explosives especially grenades has a blast pattern that travels mainly upwards.
Getting the principal down to ground level is important. After the initial attack get the
principal away from the scene as quickly as possible.
The Sniper Attack
The main problem here is that an expert sniper can be a great distance from their
intended target and we only become aware on hearing the shot. After the first shot,
get the principal away from the point of attack moving swiftly and haphazardly.
Remember a moving target is far more difficult to hit than a static one. Do not forget
good body cover at all times.
The Vehicle Attack
This form of attack will be covered in specialist training course but warrants a
mention in this module. Evading a vehicle attack requires special training that cannot
be given in the classroom or from reading a book. If attacked the basic need is the
same, get the principal away from the scene.
You should now appreciate the importance of practice and preparation, without this
your team will be less than effective when it comes to walking drills. Remember that
these drills and formations are not written in tablets of stone.
Disarming of weapons
We will introduce the different types of weapons. This is a practical demonstration.

You must be able to demonstrate the types of weapons during a simulated
environment. Your instructor will brief you on this.
Impact weapons (such as, but is not limited to hands, feet and batons).
Chemical weapons (such as, but is not limited to maces and pepper sprays).
Edged weapons (such as, but is not limited to knives, blades and bottles).
Ballistic weapons (such as, but is not limited to projectile weapons, firearms).
Electrical weapons (such as, but is not limited to Tazers).
102
Impact weapons
Impact weapons may include batons, hands and feet.
Description of How does it look like

impact weapon
Batons
Hands and feet
103
Chemical weapons
Chemical weapons may include maces and pepper sprays.

impact weapon
Pepper spray
Edged weapons
Edged weapons may include: knives, blades and bottles

impact weapon
Knives
Blades
104
Bottles
Ballistic weapons
Ballistic weapons may include: projectile weapons and firearms.

impact weapon
Projectile weapons
Firearms
105
Electrical weapons
Electrical weapons may include the Tazer.

impact weapon
Tazer Stun gun tazer
Simulation must include a combination of the following:
Sighting of threats (sounds off).

Interception and neutralizing of threats.
Body cover of principal.
Evacuation to cover or transport.
106
SO3 AC5
Escort Formation Is Maintained During A Medical Emergency
Practical demonstration
This is a practical demonstration. You must be able to demonstrate how to maintain

a selected escort formation during a medical emergency. Your instructor will brief
you on this. Medical emergency refers to simulated emergencies.
As a close protection operative your function and responsibility is to protect your

principal, To define the word protection, relating to the close protection industry
means the following:
• To protect your principals life

• To protect your principals image
• To protect your principals privacy
• To protect your principal against unlawful acts ( from acting unlawful as cpo)
Your instructor will take you through the simulated exercise when a medical
emergency occurs without being distracted. There should always be a “First Aider” in
the formation that can take care of medical emergencies or to contact the medical
emergency services, depending on the incident or injury.
The medical component obviously will be categorised under the heading saving
principals life.
As a cpo the chances are good that you will most likely on a contract apply your
medical skills before you would draw a fire arm to protect your principal. The
application of skills then would be predominantly be medical orientated.
Eg. The chance that your principal might have a cold, bad stomach, any form of
injury, cuts, choking, heart attack, is a 100% but drawing a fire arm might be once in
a life time, maybe never.
107
List of Figures and Tables.
Figure 1: The attack on Ronald Reagan ................................................................... 19

Figure 2: Pedestrian Escort on the move. ................................................................ 22
Figure 3:Example two man foot formation. ............................................................... 26
Figure 4: The Four Key Areas of Operation .............................................................. 27
Figure 5: Foot Patrol Reaction Options .................................................................... 31
Figure 6: Levels of Risk ............................................................................................ 32
Figure 7: Example of Suspicious Persons ................................................................ 39
Figure 8: Example Suspicious persons Form ........................................................... 39
Figure 9: Police inspecting the van used to ambush Charles De Gualle .................. 42
Figure 10: An example of a suspect vehicle. ............................................................ 42
Figure 11: Possible hiding places for explosives ...................................................... 43
Figure 12: Levels of Risk .......................................................................................... 50
Figure 13: Example Open V formation ..................................................................... 61
Figure 14: Example Inverted V ................................................................................. 62
Figure 15: Example Open Box Formation ................................................................ 63
Figure 16: Example of variations on 4 man formations. ............................................ 64
Figure 17: The 7 Man All Around Method ................................................................. 66
Figure 18: Example Two man Protective Formation ................................................. 67
Figure 19: Example of the variation of a Two man formation.................................... 67
Figure 21: Example Three Man Formation ............................................................... 68
Figure 20: Example of the flexibility of the Two man Formation. .............................. 68
Figure 22: Example of Entering through doors. ........................................................ 69
Figure 23: Example of a Line Formation ................................................................... 70
Figure 24: Example variation of Line Method ........................................................... 71
Figure 25: Movement Between Buildings and Down Corridors................................. 72
Figure 26: Movement Up Escalators ........................................................................ 73
Figure 27: Movement Up and Down Stairs ............................................................... 74
Figure 28: Position Inside a Lift and Exiting the Lift. ................................................. 75
Table 1: Equipment used by the CPO on Foot Formations ...................................... 26

Table 2: The Phonetic Alphabet ............................................................................... 81
Table 3: Private Defence .......................................................................................... 96
Table 4: Requirements of a Crime ............................................................................ 98
108

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LG US 244327: Provide pedestrian escort to designated persons within a close protection environment.

UNIT STANDARD 244327

In terms of the Copyright Act 1978:

Options to consider in foot formations ............................................................... 30

Route Selection Phases .................................................................................... 52

Difference between multiple calls and all stations calls ..................................... 82

Actions And Reactions ...................................................................................... 99

SOUTH AFRICAN QUALIFICATIONS AUTHORITY

Provide pedestrian escort to designated persons within a close protection environment

PURPOSE OF THE UNIT STANDARD

A person credited with this unit will be able to:

• Plan a pedestrian escort.

LEARNING ASSUMED TO BE IN PLACE AND RECOGNITION OF PRIOR LEARNING

• Mathematical Literacy at NQF Level 4.

UNIT STANDARD RANGE

Specific Outcomes and Assessment Criteria:

ASSESSMENT CRITERION RANGE

Simulation must include the disarming of the following classes of weapons:

• Sighting of threats (sounds off).

Escort formation is maintained during a medical emergency.

UNIT STANDARD ACCREDITATION AND MODERATION OPTIONS

• Moderation of assessment will be conducted by the relevant ETQA at its discretion.

UNIT STANDARD ESSENTIAL EMBEDDED KNOWLEDGE

Pedestrian escort section includes:

• Form-up foot formations according to a pedestrian escort plan.

Protective foot formations may include:

• One on one right formation.

• Seven man/CPO formation.

Managing threats includes:

• Assigning generic roles and responsibilities during an attack on principal:

Principles and procedures relating to:

• Emergency/non-emergency incidents and procedures.

Current sections of the following Acts as amended:

• Constitution, Chapter Two, Bill of Rights.

Common Law principles pertaining to:

Standards and procedures relating to:

• Minimum Information Security Standards (M.I.S.S).

UNIT STANDARD DEVELOPMENTAL OUTCOME

UNIT STANDARD LINKAGES

Critical Cross-field Outcomes (CCFO):

UNIT STANDARD CCFO IDENTIFYING

UNIT STANDARD CCFO WORKING

UNIT STANDARD CCFO ORGANISING

UNIT STANDARD CCFO COLLECTING

UNIT STANDARD CCFO COMMUNICATING

QUALIFICATIONS UTILISING THIS UNIT STANDARD:

LEARNER PROGRAM GUIDE

Purpose of this learning program

1. Plan a pedestrian escort.

Unit standards are the “building blocks” of qualifications. All

Unit standards comprises of outcomes. An outcome is a statement that describes

The assessment criteria describe the evidence that is

The range statements indicate detailed requirements of the

The learner guide

Indicates activities that needs to be done by the learner.

Indicates where there is a definition of a concept that needs to be

Indicates an example that is used.

Indicates an important concept that the learner needs to master before

Indicates an interesting fact that will enhance the learning experience

Indicates were in the learning material an assessment criteria is

Preparation of summative assessment

This proof or evidence can be in the format of certified copies (certificates) of

Roles and responsibilities

The role of the assessor