LORENZO vs. POSADAS JR.

G.R. No. L-43082

June 18, 1937

FACTS: Thomas Hanley died, leaving a will and a considerable amount of real and personal properties.
Proceedings for the probate of his will and the settlement and distribution of his estate were begun in
the CFI of Zamboanga. The will was admitted to probate.

The CFI considered it proper for the best interests of the estate to appoint a trustee to administer the
real properties which, under the will, were to pass to nephew Matthew ten years after the two
executors named in the will was appointed trustee. Moore acted as trustee until he resigned and the
plaintiff Lorenzo herein was appointed in his stead.

During the incumbency of the plaintiff as trustee, the defendant Collector of Internal Revenue (Posadas)
assessed against the estate an inheritance tax, together with the penalties for deliquency in payment.
Lorenzo paid said amount under protest, notifying Posadas at the same time that unless the amount was
promptly refunded suit would be brought for its recovery. Posadas overruled Lorenzo’s protest and
refused to refund the said amount. Plaintiff went to court. The CFI dismissed Lorenzo’s complaint and
Posadas’ counterclaim. Both parties appealed to this court.

ISSUE:

(e) Has there been delinquency in the payment of the inheritance tax?

HELD: The judgment of the lower court is accordingly modified, with costs against the plaintiff in both
instances

YES

The defendant maintains that it was the duty of the executor to pay the inheritance tax before the
delivery of the decedent’s property to the trustee. Stated otherwise, the defendant contends that
delivery to the trustee was delivery to the cestui que trust, the beneficiary in this case, within the
meaning of the first paragraph of subsection (b) of section 1544 of the Revised Administrative Code. This
contention is well taken and is sustained. A trustee is but an instrument or agent for the cestui que
trust
The appointment of Moore as trustee was made by the trial court in conformity with the wishes of the
testator as expressed in his will. It is true that the word “trust” is not mentioned or used in the will but
the intention to create one is clear. No particular or technical words are required to create a
testamentary trust. The words “trust” and “trustee”, though apt for the purpose, are not necessary. In
fact, the use of these two words is not conclusive on the question that a trust is created. ”

People v. Sandiganbayan and Rolando Plaza,

G.R. No. 169004, Sept. 15, 2010

Facts:

The accused, Rolando Plaza was a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, Cebu, with a
salary grade 25. He was charged in the Sandiganbayan for violating Section 89 of P.D. No. 1445 or The
Auditing Code of the Philippines. Allegedly, he failed to liquidate the cash advances he received by
reason of his office on December 19, 1995 in the amount of P30,000. On April 7, 2005, Plaza filed a
motion to dismiss with the Sandiganbayan which was found to be with merit.

The Sandiganbayan dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction over the case. So, the petitioner filed this
case to the Supreme Court contending that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over criminal cases
involving public officials and employees enumerated under Section 4 (a) (1) of P.D. 1606, whether or not
occupying a position classified under salary grade 27 and above, who are charged not only for violation
of R.A. 3019, R.A. 1379 or any of the felonies included in Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the
Revised Penal Code, but also for crimes committed in relation to their office.

Issue: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a member of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod whose salary grade is below 27 and charged with violation of The Auditing Code of the
Philippines.

Held: Yes, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod whose
salary grade is below 27 and charged with violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines.
Those that are classified as Grade 26 and below may still fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
provided that they hold the positions enumerated by the same law. Particularly and exclusively
enumerated are provincial governors, vice-govenors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and
provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial department heads ( Sec. 4 (1) (a) of P.D.
1606); city mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors,
engineers, and other city department heads (Sec. 4 (1) (b) of P.D. 1606); officials of the diplomatic
service occupying the position as consul and higher; Philippine army and air force colonels, naval
captains, and all officers of higher rank; PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank; City
and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the
Ombudsman and special prosecutor; and presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-
owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations.

MAGNO VS CA

Facts:

Oriel Magno, lacking fund in acquiring complete set of equipment to make his car repair shop
operational, approached Corazon Teng, Vice President of Mancor Industries.

VP Teng referred Magno to LS Finance and Management Corporation, advising its Vice President, Joey
Gomez, that Mancor was willing to supply the pieces of equipment needed if LS Finance could
accommodate Magno and and provide him credit facilities.

The arrangement went on requiring Magno to pay 30% of the total amount of the equipment as
warranty deposit but Magno couldn't afford to pay so he requested VP Gomez to look for third party
who could lend him that amount.

Without Magno's knowledge, Corazon was the one who provided that amount.

As payment to the equipment, Magno issued six checks, two of them were cleared and the rest had no
sufficient fund.

Because of the unsuccessful venture, Magno failed to pay LS Finance which then pulled out the
equipment.

Magno was charged of violation of BP Blg. 2 (The Bouncing Checks Law) and found guilty.
Issue:

Whether or not Magno should be punished for the issuance of the checks in question.

Held:

No

To charge Magno for the refund of a warranty deposit which he did not withdraw as it was not his own
account, it having remained with LS Finance, is to even make him pay an unjust debt since he did not
receive the amount in question. All the while, said amount was in the safekeeping of the financing
company which is managed by the officials and employees of LS Finance.

Mendoza vs People G.R. No. 183891 October 19, 2011

Facts:

Romarico Mendoza (petitioner) is a company boss/employer convicted for violating a special law known
as the Social Security Condonation Law of 2009 for non-remittance of the Social Security Service (SSS)
contributions to his employees. The offense is criminal in nature. Nevertheless, Mendoza admitted his
fault, as he said, he acted in good faith. But still, the Court has to render judgment and apply the proper
penalty how harsh it may be dura lex sed lex).

The Court sentenced Mendoza to an indeterminate prison term. Considering the circumstances, the
court the Court transmitted the case to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, and
RECOMMENDS the grant of executive clemency to the petitioner.

Issue:

Without violating the separation of powers, can the Supreme Court recommend to the President, the
grant of executive clemency to a convict?
Ruling:

The Court the discretion to recommend to the President actions it deems appropriate but are beyond its
power when it considers the penalty imposed as excessive. It is clearly stated in the Revised Penal Code
which provides; “Whenever a court has knowledge of any act which it may deem proper to repress and
which is not punishable by law, it shall render the proper decision, and shall report to the Chief
Executive, through the Department of Justice, the reasons which induce the court to believe that said
act should be made the subject of legislation. In the same way, the court shall submit to the Chief
Executive, through the Department of Justice, such statement as may be deemed proper, without
suspending the execution of the sentence, when a strict enforcement of the provisions of this Code
would result in the imposition of a clearly excessive penalty, taking into consideration the degree of
malice and the injury caused by the offense.”

PANLILIO V RTC

On October 15, 2004, Jose Marcel Panlilio, Erlinda Panlilio, Nicole Morris and Marlo Cristobal
(petitioners), as corporate officers of Silahis International Hotel, Inc. (SIHI), filed with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 24, a petition for Suspension of Payments and Rehabilitation in SEC Corp.
Case No. 04-111180.

On October 18, 2004, the RTC of Manila, Branch 24, issued an Order staying all claims against SIHI upon
finding the petition sufficient in form and substance.

At the time, however, of the filing of the petition for rehabilitation, there were a number of criminal
charges pending against petitioners in Branch 51 of the RTC of Manila. These criminal charges were
initiated by respondent Social Security System (SSS) and involved charges of violations of Section 28
(h)[8] of Republic Act 8282, or the Social Security Act of 1997 (SSS law), in relation to Article 315 (1)
(b)[9] of the Revised Penal Code, or Estafa. Consequently, petitioners filed with the RTC of Manila, Branch
51, a Manifestation and Motion to Suspend Proceedings.[10] Petitioners argued that the stay order issued
by Branch 24 should also apply to the criminal charges pending in Branch 51. Petitioners, thus, prayed
that Branch 51 suspend its proceedings until the petition for rehabilitation was finally resolved.
The CA discussed that violation of the provisions of the SSS law was a criminal liability and was, thus,
personal to the offender. As such, the CA held that the criminal proceedings against the petitioners
should not be considered a claim against the corporation and, consequently, not covered by the stay
order issued by Branch 24.

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT THE STAY ORDER ISSUED BY BRANCH 24, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, IN SEC
CORP. CASE NO. 04-111180 COVERS ALSO VIOLATION OF SSS LAW FOR NON-REMITTANCE OF
PREMIUMS AND VIOLATION OF [ARTICLE] [3] 515 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE

HELD:

The petition is not meritorious.

To begin with, corporate rehabilitation connotes the restoration of the debtor to a position of successful
operation and solvency, if it is shown that its continued operation is economically feasible and its
creditors can recover more, by way of the present value of payments projected in the rehabilitation
plan, if the corporation continues as a going concern than if it is immediately liquidated.[17] It
contemplates a continuance of corporate life and activities in an effort to restore and reinstate the
corporation to its former position of successful operation and solvency, the purpose being to enable the
company to gain a new lease on life and allow its creditors to be paid their claims out of its earnings.[18]