CASE DIGEST : US vs TURIBIO
G.R. No. L-5060 January 26, 1910 THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-
appellee, vs. LUIS TORIBIO, defendant-appellant.
Facts:
Respondent Toribio is an owner of carabao, residing in the town of
Carmen in the province of Bohol. The trial court of Bohol found that
the respondent slaughtered or caused to be slaughtered a carabao
without a permit from the municipal treasurer of the municipality
wherein it was slaughtered, in violation of Sections 30 and 33 of Act
No. 1147, an Act regulating the registration, branding, and slaughter
of Large Cattle. The act prohibits the slaughter of large cattle fit for
agricultural work or other draft purposes for human consumption.
The respondent counters by stating that what the Act is (1)
prohibiting is the slaughter of large cattle in the municipal slaughter
house without a permit given by the municipal treasurer.
Furthermore, he contends that the municipality of Carmen has no
slaughter house and that he slaughtered his carabao in his dwelling,
(2) the act constitutes a taking of property for public use in the
exercise of the right of eminent domain without providing for the
compensation of owners, and it is an undue and unauthorized
exercise of police power of the state for it deprives them of the
enjoyment of their private property.
Issue: Whether or not Act. No. 1147, regulating the registration,
branding and slaughter of large cattle, is an undue and unauthorized
exercise of police power.
Held: It is a valid exercise of police power of the state.
Ruling: The Supreme court Said sections 30 and 33 of the Act
prohibit and penalize the slaughtering or causing to be slaughtered
for human consumption of large cattle at any place without the
permit provided for in section 30
Where the language of a statute is fairly susceptible of two or more
constructions, that construction should be adopted which will most
tend to give effect to the manifest intent of the lawmaker and
promote the object for which the statute was enacted, and a
construction should be rejected which would tend to render
abortive other provisions of the statute and to defeat the object
which the legislator sought to attain by its enactment
The Supreme Court also said that if they will follow the contention
of Toribio it will defeat the purpose of the law.
The police power rests upon necessity and the right of self-
protection and if ever the invasion of private property by police
regulation can be justified, The Supreme Court think that the
reasonable restriction placed upon the use of carabaos by the
provision of the law under discussion must be held to be authorized
as a reasonable and proper exercise of that power.
The Supreme Court cited events that happen in the Philippines like
an epidemic that wiped 70-100% of the population of carabaos.. The
Supreme Court also said that these animals are vested with public
interest for they are fundamental use for the production of crops.
These reasons satisfy the requesites of a valid exercise of police
power
1
The Supreme court finally said that article 1147 is not an exercise of violation of the said ordinance for failing to render
the inherent power of eminent domain. The said law does not service on patrol duty required under the same
constitute the taking of caraboes for public purpose; it just serve as
a mere regulation for the consumption of these private properties  defendant argued that the municipal ordinance
for the protection of general welfare and public interest. alleged to be violated is unconstitutional because
it is repugnant to the Organic Act of the
Philippines, which guarantees the liberty of the
citizens
G.R. No. L-10255 August 6, 1915
ISSUE: whether or not the ordinance upon which said
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellant, vs.
complaint was based is constitutional.
SILVESTRE POMPEYA, defendant-appellee
HELD: Yes
FACTS:
 The right or power conferred upon the
municipalities by Act No. 1309 falls within the
 A Municipal Ordinance was enacted by the
police power of the state and the state was fully
Province of Iloilo pursuant to the provisions of Act
authorized and justified in conferring the same
No. 1309, the specific purpose of which is to
upon the municipalities of the Philippine Islands
require each able-bodied male resident of the
and that, therefore, the provisions of said Act are
municipality, between the ages of 18 and 55, as
constitutional and not in violation nor in derogation
well as each householder when so required by the
of the rights of the persons affected thereby
president, to assist in the maintenance of peace
and good order in the community, by
 Police power has been defined as the
apprehending ladrones, etc., as well as by giving
power of the government, inherent in
information of the existence of such persons in the
every sovereign, and cannot be limited.
locality. The amendment contains a punishment
The power vested in the legislature to
for those who may be called upon for such service,
make such laws as they shall judge to
and who refuse to render the same.
be for the good of the state and its
subjects. The power to govern men and
things, extending to the protection of
 A complaint was filed by the prosecuting attorney
the lives, limbs, health, comfort, and
of the Province of Iloilo against Pompeya with
quiet of all persons, and the protection

2
 of all property within the state. The
authority to establish such rules and
regulations for the conduct of all
persons as may be conducive to the
public interest.
 Blackstone, in his valuable
commentaries on the common laws,
defines police power as "the defenses,
regulations, and domestic order of the
country, whereby the inhabitants of a
state, like members of a well-governed
family, are bound to conform their
general behaviour to the rules of
propriety, good neighborhood, and good
manners, and to be decent,
industrious, and inoffensive in their
respective stations."
 The police power of the state may be said to
embrace the whole system of internal
regulation, by which the state seeks not only
to preserve public order and to prevent
offenses against the state, but also to
establish, for the intercourse of citizen with
citizen, those rules of good manners and
good neighborhood, which are calculated to
prevent a conflict of rights, and to insure to
each the uninterrupted enjoyment of his
own, so far as is reasonably consistent, with
a like enjoyment of the rights of others. The
police power of the state includes not only
the public health and safety, but also the
public welfare, protection against
impositions, and generally the public's best
best interest. It so extensive and all
pervading, that the courts refuse to lay down
a general rule defining it, but decide each
specific case on its merits
 It will also be noted that the law authorizing the
president of the municipality to call upon persons,
imposes certain conditions as prerequisites: (1) The
person called upon to render such services must be
an able-bodied male resident of the municipality; (2)
he must be between the ages of 18 and 55 [50], and
(3) certain conditions must exist requiring the
services of such persons
 It will not contended that a nonresident of
the municipality would be liable for his
refusal to obey the call of the president;
neither can it be logically contended that one
under the age of 18 or over the age of 55 [50]
would incur the penalty of the law by his
refusal to obey the command of the
president. Moreover, the persons liable for
the service mentioned in the law cannot be
called upon at the mere whim or caprice of
the president. There must be some just and
reasonable ground, at least sufficient in the
mind of a reasonable man, before the
3
 president can call upon the the persons for
the service mentioned in the law. The law
does not apply to all persons. The law does
not apply to every condition. The law applies
to special persons and special conditions
 A complaint based upon such a law, in order
to be free from objection under a demurrer,
must show that the person charged belongs
to the class of persons to which the law is
applicable
 Even admitting all of the facts in the complaint in
the present case, the court would be unable to
impose the punishment provided for by law,
because it does not show (a) that the defendant was
a male citizen of the municipality; (b) that he was
an able-bodied citizen; (c) that he was not under 18
years of age nor over 55 [50]; nor (d) that conditions
existed which justified the president of the
municipality in calling upon him for the services
mentioned in the law
Ichong vs Hernandez
FACTS:
The Legislature passed R.A. 1180 (An Act to Regulate
the Retail Business). Its purpose was to prevent persons
who are not citizens of the Phil. from having a
stranglehold upon the people’s economic life.
 a prohibition against aliens and against
associations, partnerships, or corporations the
capital of which are not wholly owned by
Filipinos, from engaging directly or indirectly in
the retail trade
 aliens actually engaged in the retail business on
May 15, 1954 are allowed to continue their
business, unless their licenses are forfeited in
accordance with law, until their death or
voluntary retirement. In case of juridical persons,
ten years after the approval of the Act or until the
expiration of term.
Citizens and juridical entities of the United States were
exempted from this Act.
 provision for the forfeiture of licenses to engage in
the retail business for violation of the laws on
nationalization, economic control weights and
measures and labor and other laws relating to
trade, commerce and industry.
 provision against the establishment or opening by
aliens actually engaged in the retail business of
additional stores or branches of retail business
4
Lao Ichong, in his own behalf and behalf of other alien
residents, corporations and partnerships affected by the
Act, filed an action to declare it unconstitutional for the
ff: reasons:
1. it denies to alien residents the equal protection of
the laws and deprives them of their liberty and
property without due process
2. the subject of the Act is not expressed in the title
3. the Act violates international and treaty
obligations
4. the provisions of the Act against the transmission
by aliens of their retail business thru hereditary
succession
ISSUE: WON the Act deprives the aliens of the equal
protection of the laws.
HELD: The law is a valid exercise of police power and it
does not deny the aliens the equal protection of the
laws. There are real and actual, positive and
fundamental differences between an alien and a citizen,
which fully justify the legislative classification adopted.
RATIO:
The equal protection clause does not demand absolute
equality among residents. It merely requires that all
persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances
and conditions both as to privileges conferred and
liabilities enforced.
The classification is actual, real and reasonable, and all
persons of one class are treated alike.
The difference in status between citizens and aliens
constitutes a basis for reasonable classification in the
exercise of police power.
Official statistics point out to the ever-increasing
dominance and control by alien of the retail trade. It is
this domination and control that is the legislature’s
target in the enactment of the Act.
The mere fact of alienage is the root cause of the
distinction between the alien and the national as a
trader. The alien is naturally lacking in that spirit of
loyalty and enthusiasm for the Phil. where he
temporarily stays and makes his living. The alien owes
no allegiance or loyalty to the State, and the State
cannot rely on him/her in times of crisis or emergency.
While the citizen holds his life, his person and his
property subject to the needs of the country, the alien
may become the potential enemy of the State.
The alien retailer has shown such utter disregard for his
customers and the people on whom he makes his profit.
Through the illegitimate use of pernicious designs and
practices, the alien now enjoys a monopolistic control on
the nation’s economy endangering the national security
in times of crisis and emergency.
5
Lutz vs. Araneta [December 22, 1955, (98
Phil 148)]
Facts: Commonwealth Act No. 567, otherwise known as
SugarAdjustment Act was promulgated in 1940 “to
stabilize the sugar industry so as to prepare it for the
eventuality of the loss of its preferential position in the
United States market and the imposition of export
taxes.” Plaintiff, Walter Lutz, in his capacity as Judicial
Administrator of the Intestate Estate of Antonio Jayme
Ledesma, seeks to recover from the Collector of Internal
Revenue the sum of P14,666.40 paid by the estate as
taxes, under Sec.3 of the Act, alleging that such tax is
unconstitutional and void, being levied for the aid and
support of the sugar industry exclusively, which in
plaintiff’s opinion is not a public purpose for which a tax
may be constitutionally levied. The action has been
dismissed by the Court of First Instance.
Issue: Whether or not the tax imposed is constitutional.
Held: Yes. The act is primarily an exercise of the police
power. It is shown in the Act that the tax is levied with a
regulatory purpose, to provide means for the
rehabilitation and stabilization of the threatened sugar
industry.
It is inherent in the power to tax that a state
be free to select thesubjects of taxation, and it has been
repeatedly held that “inequalities which result from a
singling out of one particular class for taxation or
exemption infringe no constitutional limitation.”
The funds raised under the Act should be exclusively
spent in aid of the sugar industry, since it is that very
enterprise that is being protected. It may be that other
industries are also in need of similar protection; but the
legislature is not required by the Constitution
toadhere to a policy of “all or none.”
Agustin v Edu (1979) 88 SCRA 195
Facts:
Leovillo Agustin, the owner of a Beetle, challenged the
constitutionality of Letter of Instruction 229 and its
implementing order No. 1 issued by LTO Commissioner
Romeo Edu. His car already had warning lights and did
not want to use this.
The letter was promulgation for the requirement of an
early warning device installed on a vehicle to
reduce accidentsbetween moving vehicles and parked
cars.
The LTO was the issuer of the device at the rate of not
more than 15% of the acquisition cost.
The triangular reflector plates were set when the car
parked on any street or highway for 30 minutes. It was
mandatory.
Petitioner: 1. LOI violated the provisions and delegation
of police power, equal protection, and due process/
2. It was oppressive because the make manufacturers
and car dealers millionaires at the expense f car owners
at 56-72 pesos per set.
Hence the petition.
6
The OSG denied the allegations in par X and XI of the
petition with regard to the unconstitutionality and
undue delegation of police power to such acts.
The Philippines was also a member of the 1968 Vienna
convention of UN on road signs as a regulation. To the
petitioner, this was still an unlawful delegation of police
power.
Issue:
Is the LOI constitutional? If it is, is it a valid delegation
of police power?
Held: Yes on both. Petition dismissed.
Ratio:
Police power, according to the case of Edu v Ericta,
which cited J. Taney, is nothing more or less than the
power of government inherent in every sovereignty.
The case also says that police power is state authority to
enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty
or property to promote the general welfare.
Primicias v Fulgoso- It is the power to describe
regulations to promote the health, morals, peace,
education, good order, and general welfare of the people.
J. Carazo- government limitations to protect
constitutional rights did not also intend to enable a
citizen to obstruct unreasonable the enactment of
measures calculated to insure communal peace.
There was no factual foundation on petitioner to refute
validity.
Ermita Malate Hotel-The presumption of
constitutionality must prevail in the absence of factual
record in over throwing the statute.
Brandeis- constitutionality must prevail in
the absence of some factual foundation in overthrowing
the statute.
Even if the car had blinking lights, he must still buy
reflectors. His claims that the statute was oppressive
was fantastic because the reflectors were not expensive.
SC- blinking lights may lead to confusion whether the
nature and purpose of the driver is concerned.
Unlike the triangular reflectors, whose nature is evident
because it’s installed when parked for 30 minutes and
placed from 400 meters from the car allowing drivers to
see clearly.
There was no constitutional basis for petitioner because
the law doesn’t violate any constitutional provision.
LOI 229 doesn’t force motor vehicle owners to purchase
the reflector from the LTO. It only prescribes rge
requirement from any source.
The objective is public safety.
The Vienna convention on road rights and PD 207 both
recommended enforcement for installation of ewd’s.
Bother possess relevance in applying rules with the
decvlaration of principles in the Constitution.
On the unlawful delegation of legislative power, the
petitioners have no settled legal doctrines.
7

G.R. No. L-3491 June 24, 1983
CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY and CITY
COUNCIL OF QUEZON CITY,petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUDGE VICENTE G. ERICTA as Judge of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City, Branch
XVIII; HIMLAYANG PILIPINO, INC., respondents.
Facts:
Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 provides that at
least 6% of the total area of the memorial park cemetery
shall be set aside for the charity burial of deceased
persons who are paupers and have been residents of
Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their death. As
such, the Quezon City engineer required the respondent,
Himlayang Pilipino Inc, to stop any further selling
and/or transaction of memorial park lots in Quezon City
where the owners thereof have failed to donate the
required 6% space intended for paupers burial.
The then Court of First Instance and its judge, Hon.
Ericta, declared Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64
null and void.
Petitioners argued that the taking of the respondent’s
property is a valid and reasonable exercise of police
power and that the land is taken for a public use as it is
intended for the burial ground of paupers. They further
argued that the Quezon City Council is authorized
under its charter, in the exercise of local police power, ”
to make such further ordinances and resolutions not
repugnant to law as may be necessary to carry into
effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred by
this Act and such as it shall deem necessary and proper
to provide for the health and safety, promote the
prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order,
comfort and convenience of the city and the inhabitants
thereof, and for the protection of property therein.”
On the otherhand, respondent Himlayang Pilipino, Inc.
contended that the taking or confiscation of property
was obvious because the questioned ordinance
permanently restricts the use of the property such that
it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose and
deprives the owner of all beneficial use of his property.
Issue:
Is Section 9 of the ordinance in question a valid exercise
of the police power?
Held:
No. The Sec. 9 of the ordinance is not a valid exercise of
the police power.
Occupying the forefront in the bill of rights is the
provision which states that ‘no person shall be deprived
of life, liberty or property without due process of law’
(Art. Ill, Section 1 subparagraph 1, Constitution). On the
other hand, there are three inherent powers of
government by which the state interferes with the
property rights, namely-. (1) police power, (2) eminent
domain, (3) taxation. These are said to exist
independently of the Constitution as necessary
attributes of sovereignty.
An examination of the Charter of Quezon City (Rep. Act
No. 537), does not reveal any provision that would
8
justify the ordinance in question except the provision
granting police power to the City. Section 9 cannot be
justified under the power granted to Quezon City to tax,
fix the license fee, and regulate such other business,
trades, and occupation as may be established or
practised in the City. The power to regulate does not
include the power to prohibit or confiscate. The
ordinance in question not only confiscates but also
prohibits the operation of a memorial park cemetery.
Police power is defined by Freund as ‘the power of
promoting the public welfare by restraining and
regulating the use of liberty and property’. It is usually
exerted in order to merely regulate the use and
enjoyment of property of the owner. If he is deprived of
his property outright, it is not taken for public use but
rather to destroy in order to promote the general welfare.
In police power, the owner does not recover from the
government for injury sustained in consequence thereof.
Under the provisions of municipal charters which are
known as the general welfare clauses, a city, by virtue of
its police power, may adopt ordinances to the peace,
safety, health, morals and the best and highest interests
of the municipality. It is a well-settled principle, growing
out of the nature of well-ordered and society, that every
holder of property, however absolute and may be his
title, holds it under the implied liability that his use of it
shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others
having an equal right to the enjoyment of their property,
nor injurious to the rights of the community. A property
in the state is held subject to its general regulations,
which are necessary to the common good and general
welfare. Rights of property, like all other social and
conventional rights, are subject to such reasonable
limitations in their enjoyment as shall prevent them
from being injurious, and to such reasonable restraints
and regulations, established by law, as the legislature,
under the governing and controlling power vested in
them by the constitution, may think necessary and
expedient. The state, under the police power, is
possessed with plenary power to deal with all matters
relating to the general health, morals, and safety of the
people, so long as it does not contravene any positive
inhibition of the organic law and providing that such
power is not exercised in such a manner as to justify the
interference of the courts to prevent positive wrong and
oppression.
However, in the case at hand, there is no reasonable
relation between the setting aside of at least six (6)
percent of the total area of an private cemeteries for
charity burial grounds of deceased paupers and the
promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or the
general welfare of the people. The ordinance is actually a
taking without compensation of a certain area from a
private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of
the municipal corporation. Instead of building or
maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city
passes the burden to private cemeteries.
The expropriation without compensation of a portion of
private cemeteries is not covered by Section 12(t) of
Republic Act 537, the Revised Charter of Quezon City
which empowers the city council to prohibit the burial of
the dead within the center of population of the city and
to provide for their burial in a proper place subject to
the provisions of general law regulating burial grounds
9
and cemeteries. When the Local Government Code,
Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 provides in Section 177 (q)
that a Sangguniang panlungsod may “provide for the
burial of the dead in such place and in such manner as
prescribed by law or ordinance” it simply authorizes the
city to provide its own city owned land or to buy or
expropriate private properties to construct public
cemeteries. This has been the law and practise in the
past. It continues to the present. Expropriation,
however, requires payment of just compensation. The
questioned ordinance is different from laws and
regulations requiring owners of subdivisions to set aside
certain areas for streets, parks, playgrounds, and other
public facilities from the land they sell to buyers of
subdivision lots. The necessities of public safety, health,
and convenience are very clear from said requirements
which are intended to insure the development of
communities with salubrious and wholesome
environments. The beneficiaries of the regulation, in
turn, are made to pay by the subdivision developer when
individual lots are sold to home-owners.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby
DISMISSED. The decision of the respondent court is
affirmed.
Lozano Vs Martinez
Facts:
Petitioners were charged with violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang
22 (Bouncing Check Law). They moved seasonably to quash the
informations on the ground that the acts charged did not constitute
an offense, the statute being unconstitutional. The motions were
denied by the respondent trial courts, except in one case, wherein
the trial court declared the law unconstitutional and dismissed the
case. The parties adversely affected thus appealed.
Issue:
1. Whether or not BP 22 is violative of the constitutional provision
on non-imprisonment due to debt
2. Whether it impairs freedom of contract
3. Whether it contravenes the equal protection clause
Held:
1. The enactment of BP 22 is a valid exercise of the police power
and is not repugnant to the constitutional inhibition against
imprisonment for debt. The gravamen of the offense punished by
BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or
a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It
is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes.
The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his
debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal
sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in
circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest,
the practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not
as an offense against property, but an offense against public order.
Unlike a promissory note, a check is not a mere undertaking to pay
an amount of money. It is an order addressed to a bank and
partakes of a representation that the drawer has funds on deposit
against which the check is drawn, sufficient to ensure payment
upon its presentation to the bank. There is therefore an element of
certainty or assurance that the instrument will be paid upon
presentation. For this reason, checks have become
widely accepted as a medium of payment in trade and commerce.
Although not legal tender, checks have come to be perceived as
convenient substitutes for currency in commercial and financial
transactions. The basis or foundation of such perception is
10
confidence. If such confidence is shaken, the usefulness of checks
as currency substitutes would be greatly diminished or may
become nil. Any practice therefore tending to destroy that
confidence should be deterred for the proliferation of worthless
checks can only create havoc in trade circles and
the banking community.
The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the
private interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction
and touches the interests of the community at large. The mischief
it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an
injury to the public. The harmful practice of putting valueless
commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousand fold, can
very wen pollute the channels of trade and
commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the
welfare of society and the public interest.
2. The freedom of contract which is constitutionally protected is
freedom to enter into “lawful” contracts. Contracts which
contravene public policy are not lawful. Besides, we must bear in
mind that checks can not be categorized as mere contracts. It is a
commercial instrument which, in this modem day and age, has
become a convenient substitute for money; it forms part of
the banking system and therefore not entirely freefrom the
regulatory power of the state.
3. There is no substance in the claim that the statute in question
denies equal protection of the laws or is discriminatory, since it
penalizes the drawer of the check, but not the payee. It is
contended that the payee is just as responsible for the crime as the
drawer of the check, since without the indispensable participation
of the payee by his acceptance of the check there would be no
crime. This argument is tantamount to saying that, to give equal
protection, the law should punish both the swindler and the
swindled. The petitioners’ posture ignores the well-
accepted meaning of the clause “equal protection of the laws.” The
clause does not preclude classification of individuals, who may be
accorded different treatment under the law as long as the
classification is not unreasonable or arbitrary. (Lozano vs
Martinez, G.R. No. L-63419, December 18, 1986)
CASE DIGEST : Restituto Ynot Vs IAC
G.R. No. 74457 March 20, 1987 RESTITUTO YNOT,
petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT,
THE STATION COMMANDER, INTEGRATED NATIONAL
POLICE, BAROTAC NUEVO, ILOILO and THE
REGIONAL DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF ANIMAL
INDUSTRY, REGION IV, ILOILO CITY, respondents.
On January 13, 1984, the petitioner transported six
carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo when
the same was confiscated by the police station
commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo for the violation of
E.O. 626-A. A case was filed by the petitioner
questioning the constitutionality of executive order and
the recovery of the carabaos. After considering the
merits of the case, the confiscation was sustained and
the court declined to rule on the constitutionality issue.
The petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate
Appellate Court but it also upheld the ruling of RTC.
Issue:
Is E.O. 626-A unconstitutional?
Ruling:
The Respondent contends that it is a valid exercise of
police power to justify EO 626-A amending EO 626 in
asic rule prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos except
under certain conditions. The supreme court said that
11
The reasonable connection between the means employed are a 9-hectare and 5 hectare Riceland worked by four
and the purpose sought to be achieved by the tenants. Tenants were declared full owners by EO 228
questioned measure is missing the Supreme Court do as qualified farmers under PD 27. The petitioners now
not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial contend that PresidentAquino usurped the legislature’s
transport of carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate power.
slaughter, considering that they can be killed anywhere,
with no less difficulty in one province than in another. b. A petition by landowners and sugarplanters in
Obviously, retaining the carabaos in one province will Victoria’s Mill Negros Occidental
not prevent their slaughter there, any more than moving against Proclamation 131 and EO
them to another province will make it easier to kill them 229. Proclamation 131 is the creation of Agrarian
there Reform Fund with initial fund of P50Billion.
The Supreme Court found E.O. 626-A unconstitutional.
c. A petition by owners of land which was placed by the
The executive act defined the prohibition, convicted the
DAR under the coverage of Operation Land Transfer.
petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, which
was carried out forthright. Due process was not properly
d. A petition invoking the right of retention under PD 27
observed. In the instant case, the carabaos were
to owners of rice and corn lands not exceeding seven
arbitrarily confiscated by the police station commander,
hectares.
were returned to the petitioner only after he had filed a
complaint for recovery and given a supersedeas bond of
P12,000.00. The measure struck at once and pounced
Issue: Whether or Not the aforementioned EO’s, PD, and
upon the petitioner without giving him a chance to be
RA wereconstitutional.
heard, thus denying due process.

Held: The promulgation of PD 27 by President Marcos

ASSO. OF SMALL LANDOWNERS VS. SEC. OF DAR was valid in exercise of Police power and eminent
[175 SCRA 343; G.R. NO. L-78742; 14 JUL 1989] domain.

The power of President Aquino to promulgate Proc. 131

Facts: Several petitions are the root of the case: and EO 228 and 229 was authorized under Sec. 6 of the
Transitory Provisions of the 1987Constitution. Therefore
a. A petition alleging the constitutionality of PD No. 27, it is a valid exercise of Police Power and Eminent
EO 228 and 229 and RA 6657. Subjects of the petition Domain.

12

RA 6657 is likewise valid. The carrying out of the
regulation under CARPbecomes necessary to deprive
owners of whatever lands they may own in excess of the
maximum area allowed, there is definitely a taking
under the power of eminent domain for which payment
of just compensation is imperative. The taking
contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the
land. What is required is the surrender of the title and
the physical possession of said excess and
all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favour of
the farmer.
A statute may be sustained under the police power only
if there isconcurrence of the lawful subject and the
method.
Subject and purpose of the Agrarian Reform Law is
valid, however what is to be determined is the method
employed to achieve it.
DECS VS SAN DIEGO
DECS v San Diego 180 SCRA
533 (December 21, 1989)
Facts: The respondent failed to pass the National
Medical Admission Test (NMAT) 3 times and he was
denied admission to take the test for another time by the
petitioner under its rule that a student is allowed only to
take the NMAT 3 times and after 3 consecutive failures a
student shall not be allowed to take NMAT the 4th time.
Respondent invoke his constitutional rights on academic
freedom and quality education in his petition for
mandamus before the court. Respondent judge rendered
decision citing the admission rule of the petitioner as an
arbitrary exercise of police power, depriving respondent
of his right to pursue medical education thus this
petition for review before the higher court.
Issue: Whether or not the admission rule implemented
by petitioner an arbitrary exercise of police power.
Held: The court held that police power is validly
exercised if (a) the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require
the interference of the State, and (b) the means
employed are reasonably necessary to the attainment of
the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals. The proper exercise of the
police power requires the concurrence of a lawful
subject and a lawful method. The subject of the
challenged regulation is certainly within the ambit of the
police power. It is the right and indeed the responsibility
of the State to insure that the medical profession is not
infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may
unwarily entrust their lives and health. The method
employed by the challenged regulation is not irrelevant
to the purpose of the law nor is it arbitrary or
oppressive. The three-flunk rule is intended to insulate
the medical schools and ultimately the medical
profession from the intrusion of those not qualified to be
doctors. The State needs to implement decisive steps to
13
regulate system of education by directing students to
the course where he is best suited through initial tests
and evaluation. The decision of the respondent judge
was reversed.
Carlos Superdrug Corp. v. DSWD,
526 SCRA 130 (2007)
Facts: Petitioners are domestic corporations and
proprietors operating drugstores in the Philippines.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Section 4(a) of
RA 9257, otherwise known as the “Expanded Senior
Citizens Act of 2003.” Section 4(a) of RA 9257 grants
twenty percent (20%) discount as privileges for the
Senior Citizens. Petitioner contends that said law is
unconstitutional because it constitutes deprivation of
private property.
Issue: Whether or not RA 9257 is unconstitutional
Held: Petition is dismissed. The law is a legitimate
exercise of police power which, similar to the power of
eminent domain, has general welfare for its object.
Accordingly, it has been described as “the most
essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers,
extending as it does to all the great public needs.” It is
the power vested in the legislature by the constitution to
make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome
and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either
with penalties or without, not repugnant to the
constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and
welfare of the commonwealth, and of thesubjects of the
same.”
For this reason, when the conditions so demand as
determined by the legislature, property rights must bow
to the primacy of police power because property rights,
though sheltered by due process, must yield to general
welfare.
G.R. No. 122846 January 20, 2009
WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION, TITANIUM
CORPORATION and STA. MESA TOURIST &
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioners,
vs.
CITY OF MANILA, represented by DE CASTRO,
MAYOR ALFREDO S. LIM, Respondent.
Facts:
On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim signed
into law Manila City Ordinance No. 7774 entitled “An
Ordinance Prohibiting Short-Time Admission, Short-
Time Admission Rates, and Wash-Up Rate Schemes in
Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, Pension Houses,
and Similar Establishments in the City of Manila” (the
Ordinance).” The ordinance sanctions any person or
corporation who will allow the admission and charging
of room rates for less than 12 hours or the renting of
rooms more than twice a day.
14
The petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC), Titanium
Corporation (TC), and Sta. Mesa Tourist and
Development Corporation (STDC), who own and operate
several hotels and motels in Metro Manila, filed a motion
to intervene and to admit attached complaint-in-
intervention on the ground that the ordinance will affect
their business interests as operators. The respondents,
in turn, alleged that the ordinance is a legitimate
exercise of police power.
RTC declared Ordinance No. 7774 null and void as it
“strikes at the personal liberty of the individual
guaranteed and jealously guarded by the Constitution.”
Reference was made to the provisions of the
Constitution encouraging private enterprises and the
incentive to needed investment, as well as the right to
operate economic enterprises. Finally, from the
observation that the illicit relationships the Ordinance
sought to dissuade could nonetheless be consummated
by simply paying for a 12-hour stay,
When elevated to CA, the respondents asserted that the
ordinance is a valid exercise of police power pursuant to
Section 458 (4)(iv) of the Local Government Code which
confers on cities the power to regulate the
establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes,
restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension
houses, lodging houses and other similar
establishments, including tourist guides and transports.
Also, they contended that under Art III Sec 18 of Revised
Manila Charter, they have the power to enact all
ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the
sanitation and safety, the furtherance of the prosperity
and the promotion of the morality, peace, good order,
comfort, convenience and general welfare of the city and
its inhabitants and to fix penalties for the violation of
ordinances.
Petitioners argued that the ordinance is
unconstitutional and void since it violates the right to
privacy and freedom of movement; it is an invalid
exercise of police power; and it is unreasonable and
oppressive interference in their business.
CA, in turn, reversed the decision of RTC and affirmed
the constitutionality of the ordinance. First, it held that
the ordinance did not violate the right to privacy or the
freedom of movement, as it only penalizes the owners or
operators of establishments that admit individuals for
short time stays. Second, the virtually limitless reach of
police power is only constrained by having a lawful
object obtained through a lawful method. The lawful
objective of the ordinance is satisfied since it aims to
curb immoral activities. There is a lawful method since
the establishments are still allowed to operate. Third,
the adverse effect on the establishments is justified by
the well-being of its constituents in general.
Hence, the petitioners appeared before the SC.
Issue:
Whether Ordinance No. 7774 is a valid exercise of police
power of the State.
Held:
No. Ordinance No. 7774 cannot be considered as a valid
exercise of police power, and as such, it is
unconstitutional.
15
The facts of this case will recall to mind not only the
recent City of Manila v Laguio Jr ruling, but the 1967
decision in Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operations
Association, Inc., v. Hon. City Mayor of Manila. The
common thread that runs through those decisions and
the case at bar goes beyond the singularity of the
localities covered under the respective ordinances. All
three ordinances were enacted with a view of regulating
public morals including particular illicit activity in
transient lodging establishments. This could be
described as the middle case, wherein there is no
wholesale ban on motels and hotels but the services
offered by these establishments have been severely
restricted. At its core, this is another case about the
extent to which the State can intrude into and regulate
the lives of its citizens
The test of a valid ordinance is well established. A long
line of decisions including City of Manila has held that
for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within
the corporate powers of the local government unit to
enact and pass according to the procedure prescribed by
law, it must also conform to the following substantive
requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution
or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3)
must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not
prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and
consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be
unreasonable.
The ordinance in this case prohibits two specific and
distinct business practices, namely wash rate
admissions and renting out a room more than twice a
day. The ban is evidently sought to be rooted in the
police power as conferred on local government units by
the Local Government Code through such implements
as the general welfare clause.
Police power is based upon the concept of necessity of
the State and its corresponding right to protect itself
and its people. Police power has been used as
justification for numerous and varied actions by the
State.
The apparent goal of the ordinance is to minimize if not
eliminate the use of the covered establishments for illicit
sex, prostitution, drug use and alike. These goals, by
themselves, are unimpeachable and certainly fall within
the ambit of the police power of the State. Yet the
desirability of these ends do not sanctify any and all
means for their achievement. Those means must align
with the Constitution.
SC contended that if they were to take the myopic view
that an ordinance should be analyzed strictly as to its
effect only on the petitioners at bar, then it would seem
that the only restraint imposed by the law that they
were capacitated to act upon is the injury to property
sustained by the petitioners. Yet, they also recognized
the capacity of the petitioners to invoke as well the
constitutional rights of their patrons – those persons
who would be deprived of availing short time access or
wash-up rates to the lodging establishments in question.
The rights at stake herein fell within the same
fundamental rights to liberty. Liberty as guaranteed by
the Constitution was defined by Justice Malcolm to
include “the right to exist and the right to be free from
arbitrary restraint or servitude. The term cannot be
16
dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint of the
person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right
of man to enjoy the facilities with which he has been
endowed by his Creator, subject only to such restraint
as are necessary for the common welfare,
Indeed, the right to privacy as a constitutional right
must be recognized and the invasion of it should be
justified by a compelling state interest. Jurisprudence
accorded recognition to the right to privacy
independently of its identification with liberty; in itself it
is fully deserving of constitutional protection.
Governmental powers should stop short of certain
intrusions into the personal life of the citizen.
An ordinance which prevents the lawful uses of a wash
rate depriving patrons of a product and the petitioners
of lucrative business ties in with another constitutional
requisite for the legitimacy of the ordinance as a police
power measure. It must appear that the interests of the
public generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, require an interference with private
rights and the means must be reasonably necessary for
the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly
oppressive of private rights. It must also be evident that
no other alternative for the accomplishment of the
purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. More
importantly, a reasonable relation must exist between
the purposes of the measure and the means employed
for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of
protecting the public interest, personal rights and those
pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be
arbitrarily invaded.
Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police
measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion
into private rights.
The behavior which the ordinance seeks to curtail is in
fact already prohibited and could in fact be diminished
simply by applying existing laws. Less intrusive
measures such as curbing the proliferation of
prostitutes and drug dealers through active police work
would be more effective in easing the situation. So would
the strict enforcement of existing laws and regulations
penalizing prostitution and drug use. These measures
would have minimal intrusion on the businesses of the
petitioners and other legitimate merchants. Further, it is
apparent that the ordinance can easily be circumvented
by merely paying the whole day rate without any
hindrance to those engaged in illicit activities. Moreover,
drug dealers and prostitutes can in fact collect “wash
rates” from their clientele by charging their customers a
portion of the rent for motel rooms and even
apartments.
SC reiterated that individual rights may be adversely
affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by
the legitimate demands of public interest or public
welfare. The State is a leviathan that must be restrained
from needlessly intruding into the lives of its citizens.
However well¬-intentioned the ordinance may be, it is in
effect an arbitrary and whimsical intrusion into the
rights of the establishments as well as their patrons.
The ordinance needlessly restrains the operation of the
businesses of the petitioners as well as restricting the
rights of their patrons without sufficient justification.
The ordinance rashly equates wash rates and renting
17
out a room more than twice a day with immorality
without accommodating innocuous intentions.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of
the Court of Appeals is REVERSED, and the Decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 9, is
REINSTATED. Ordinance No. 7774 is hereby declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. No pronouncement as to costs.
Manila Memorial Park vs. DSWD
GR. 175356
Facts:
On April 23, 1992, RA 7432 was passed into law, granting senior
citizens the following privileges: SECTION 4. Privileges for the
Senior Citizens. – The senior citizens shall be entitled to the
following:
a) the grant of twenty percent (20%) discount from all
establishments relative to utilization of transportation services,
hotels and similar lodging establishment[s], restaurants and
recreation centers and purchase of medicine anywhere in the
country: Provided, That private establishments may claim the cost
as tax credit;
b) a minimum of twenty percent (20%) discount on admission
fees charged by theaters, cinema houses and concert halls,
circuses, carnivals and other similar places of culture, leisure, and
amusement;
xxx
On August 23, 1993, Revenue Regulations (RR) No. 0294 was
issued to implement RA 7432. Sections 2(i) and 4 of RR No. 0294
provide:
Sec. 2. DEFINITIONS. – For purposes of these regulations: i. Tax
Credit – refers to the amount representing the 20% discount
granted to a qualified senior citizen by all establishments relative
to their utilization of transportation services, hotels and similar
lodging establishments, restaurants, drugstores, recreation
centers, theaters, cinema houses, concert halls, circuses, carnivals
and other similar places of culture, leisure and amusement, which
discount shall be deducted by the said establishments from their
gross income for income tax purposes and from their gross sales
for valueadded tax or other percentage tax purposes.
On February 26, 2004, RA 92578 amended certain provisions of
RA 7432, to wit:
SECTION 4. Privileges for the Senior Citizens. –
The senior citizens shall be entitled to the following:
(a) the grant
of twenty percent (20%) discount from all establishments relative
to the utilization of services in hotels and similar lodging
establishments, restaurants and recreation centers, and purchase
of medicines in all establishments for the exclusive use or
enjoyment of senior citizens, including funeral and burial services
for the death of senior citizens;
xxxx
The establishment may claim the discounts granted under (a), (f),
(g) and (h) as tax deduction based on the net cost of the goods sold
or services rendered: Provided, That the cost of the discount shall
be allowed as deduction from gross income for the same taxable
year that the discount is granted. Provided, further, That the total
amount of the claimed tax deduction net of value added tax if
applicable, shall be included in their gross sales receipts for tax
purposes and shall be subject to proper documentation and to the
provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended.
18
To implement the tax provisions of RA 9257, the Secretary of
Finance issued RR No. 42006, the pertinent provision of which
provides:
SEC. 8. AVAILMENT BY ESTABLISHMENTS OF SALES DISCOUNTS
AS DEDUCTION FROM GROSS INCOME. – Establishments
enumerated in subparagraph (6) hereunder granting sales
discounts to senior citizens on the sale of goods and/or services
specified thereunder are entitled to deduct the said discount from
gross income subject to the following conditions:
Xxx
To implement the tax provisions of RA 9257, the Secretary of
Finance issued RR No. 42006, the pertinent provision of which
provides:
SEC. 8. AVAILMENT BY ESTABLISHMENTS OF SALES DISCOUNTS
AS DEDUCTION FROM GROSS INCOME. – Establishments
enumerated in subparagraph (6) hereunder granting sales
discounts to senior citizens on the sale of goods and/or services
specified thereunder are entitled to deduct the said discount from
gross income subject to the following conditions:
Xxx
Feeling aggrieved by the tax deduction scheme, petitioners filed
the present recourse, praying that Section 4 of RA 7432, as
amended by RA 9257, and the implementing rules and regulations
issued by the DSWD and the DOF be declared unconstitutional
insofar as these allow business establishments to claim the 20%
discount given to senior citizens as a tax deduction; that the DSWD
and the DOF be prohibited from enforcing the same; and that the
tax credit treatment of the 20% discount under the former Section
4 (a) of RA 7432 be reinstated.
Issue:
WHETHER SECTION 4 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9257 AND ITS
IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS, INSOFAR AS THEY
PROVIDE THAT THE TWENTY PERCENT (20%) DISCOUNT TO
SENIOR CITIZENS MAY BE CLAIMED AS A TAX DEDUCTION BY
THE PRIVATE ESTABLISHMENTS, ARE INVALID AND
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
Ruling:
No. Based on the afore-stated DOF Opinion, the tax deduction
scheme does not fully reimburse petitioners for the discount
privilege accorded to senior citizens. This is because the discount
is treated as a deduction, a tax-deductible expense that is
subtracted from the gross income and results in a lower taxable
income. Being a tax deduction, the discount does not reduce taxes
owed on a peso for peso basis but merely offers a fractional
reduction in taxes owed. Theoretically, the treatment of the
discount as a deduction reduces the net income of the private
establishments concerned. The discounts given would have
entered the coffers and formed part of the gross sales of the
private establishments, were it not for R.A. No. 9257. The
permanent reduction in their total revenues is a forced subsidy
corresponding to the taking of private property for public use or
benefit. This constitutes compensable taking for which petitioners
would ordinarily become entitled to a just compensation. Just
compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the
property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The measure
is not the takers gain but the owners loss. The word just is used to
intensify the meaning of the word compensation, and to convey
the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be
taken shall be real, substantial, full and ample.
A tax deduction does not offer full reimbursement of the senior
citizen discount. As such, it would not meet the definition of just
compensation. Having said that, this raises the question of
19
whether the State, in promoting the health and welfare of a special
group of citizens, can impose upon private establishments the
burden of partly subsidizing a government program. The Court
believes so.
The Senior Citizens Act was enacted primarily to maximize the
contribution of senior citizens to nation-building, and to grant
benefits and privileges to them for their improvement and well-
being as the State considers them an integral part of our society.
When we ruled that petitioners in Carlos Superdrug case failed to
prove that the 20% discount is arbitrary, oppressive or
confiscatory. We noted that no evidence, such as a financial report,
to establish the impact of the 20% discount on the overall
profitability of petitioners was presented in order to show that
they would be operating at a loss due to the subject regulation or
that the continued implementation of the law would be
unconscionably detrimental to the business operations of
petitioners.

The priority given to senior citizens finds its basis in the In the case at bar, petitioners proceeded with a hypothetical
Constitution as set forth in the law itself. computation of the alleged loss that they will suffer similar to
what the petitioners in Carlos Superdrug Corporationdid.
As a form of reimbursement, the law provides that business
establishments extending the twenty percent discount to senior We, thus, found that the 20% discount as well as the tax deduction
citizens may claim the discount as a tax deduction. The law is a scheme is a valid exercise of the police power of the State. Thus, it
legitimate exercise of police power which, similar to the power of is constitutional.
eminent domain, has general welfare for its object.

While the Constitution protects property rights, petitioners must

accept the realities of business and the State, in the exercise of
police power, can intervene in the operations of a business which
may result in an impairment of property rights in the process.

Undeniably, the success of the senior citizens program rests

largely on the support imparted by petitioners and the other
private establishments concerned. This being the case, the means
employed in invoking the active participation of the private
sector, in order to achieve the purpose or objective of the law, is
reasonably and directly related. Without sufficient proof that
Section 4 (a) of R.A. No. 9257 is arbitrary, and that the continued
implementation of the same would be unconscionably
detrimental to petitioners, the Court will refrain from quashing a
legislative act. Carlos Superdrug Corp v. DSWD, 553 Phil. 120
(2007).

20

G.R. No. 211356, September 29, 2014
CRISOSTOMO B. AQUINO v.
MUNICIPALITY OF MALAY, AKLAN
G.R. No. 211356, September 29, 2014
CRISOSTOMO B. AQUINO, Petitioner,
v.
MUNICIPALITY OF MALAY, AKLAN, Respondent.
VELASCO JR., J.:
NATURE:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari challenging the
Decision1 and the Resolution of the Court of Appeals. The assailed
rulings denied Crisostomo Aquino’s Petition for Certiorari for not
being the proper remedy to question the issuance and
implementation of Executive Order No. 10, Series of 2011 (EO 10),
ordering the demolition of his hotel establishment.
FACTS:
Boracay Island West Cove Management Philippines, Inc. applied for
a building permit covering the construction of a three-storey hotel
over a parcel of land in Malay, Aklan, which is covered by a Forest
Land Use Agreement for Tourism Purposes (FLAgT) issued by the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). The
Municipal Zoning Administrator denied petitioner’s application on the
ground that the proposed construction site was within the “no build
zone” demarcated in Municipal Ordinance 2000-131.
Petitioner appealed the denial action to the Office of the Mayor but
despite follow up, no action was ever taken by the respondent
mayor.
A Cease and Desist Order was issued by the municipal government,
enjoining the expansion of the resort, and on June 7, 2011, the
Office of the Mayor of Malay, Aklan issued the assailed EO 10,
ordering the closure and demolition of Boracay West Cove’s hotel.
EO 10 was partially implemented on June 10, 2011. Thereafter, two
more instances followed wherein respondents demolished the
improvements introduced by Boracay West Cove.
Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for injunctive relief
with the CA Alleging that the order was issued and executed with
grave abuse of discretion
Contentions of West Cove:
1) The hotel cannot summarily be abated because it is not a
nuisance per se, given the hundred million peso-worth of capital
infused in the venture.
2) Municipality of Malay, Aklan should have first secured a court
order before proceeding with the demolition.
Contention of the Mayor: The demolition needed no court order
because the municipal mayor has the express power under the Local
Government Code (LGC) to order the removal of illegally constructed
buildings
The CA dismissed the petition solely on procedural ground, i.e., the
special writ of certiorari can only be directed against a tribunal,
board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions and
since the issuance of EO 10 was done in the exercise of executive
functions, and not of judicial or quasi-judicial functions, certiorari will
not lie.
ISSUE:
Whether the judicial proceedings should first be conducted before
the LGU can order the closure and demolition of the property in
question.
HELD:
The Court ruled that the property involved cannot be classified as
a nuisance per sewhich can therefore be summarily abated. Here, it
is merely the hotel’s particular incident, its location and not its
inherent qualities that rendered it a nuisance. Otherwise stated, had
it not been constructed in the no build zone, Boracay West Cove
could have secured the necessary permits without issue. As such,
even if the hotel is not a nuisance per se, it is still a nuisance per
accidens
21
Generally, LGUs have no power to declare a particular thing as a
nuisance unless such a thing is a nuisance per se. Despite the hotel’s
classification as a nuisance per accidens, however, the LGU may
nevertheless properly order the hotel’s demolition. This is because,
in the exercise ofpolice power and the general welfare clause,
property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and
burdens in order to fulfill the objectives of the government. Moreover,
the Local Government Code authorizes city and municipal
governments, acting through their local chief executives, to issue
demolition orders. The office of the mayor has quasi-judicial powers
to order the closing and demolition of establishments.

FALLO:

Petition is denied

22