CONSTI LAW APRIL 7, 2018 1
FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION
G.R. No. L-27833 April 18, 1969
IN THE MATTER OF PETITION FOR
DECLARATORY RELIEF RE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF REPUBLIC ACT
4880. ARSENIO GONZALES and FELICISIMO
R. CABIGAO, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
F. R. Cabigao in his own behalf as petitioner.
B. F. Advincula for petitioner Arsenio
Gonzales.
Ramon Barrios for respondent Commission on
Elections. Sen. Lorenzo Tañada as amicus
curiae.
FERNANDO, J.:
A statute designed to maintain the purity and
integrity of the electoral process by Congress
calling a halt to the undesirable practice of
prolonged political campaign bringing in their wake
serious evils not the least of which is the ever
increasing cost of seeking public office, is
challenged on constitutional grounds. More
precisely, the basic liberties of free speech and
free press, freedom of assembly and freedom of
association are invoked to nullify the act. Thus the
question confronting this Court is one of
transcendental significance.
It is faced with the reconciliation of two values
esteemed highly and cherished dearly in a
constitutional democracy. One is the freedom of
belief and of expression availed of by an individual
whether by himself alone or in association with
others of similar persuasion, a goal that occupies
a place and to none in the legal hierarchy. The
other is the safeguarding of the equally vital right
of suffrage by a prohibition of the early nomination
of candidates and the limitation of the period of
election campaign or partisan political activity, with
the hope that the time-consuming efforts, entailing
huge expenditures of funds and involving the risk
of bitter rivalries that may end in violence, to
paraphrase the explanatory note of the challenged
legislation, could be devoted to more fruitful
endeavors.
The task is not easy, but it is unavoidable. That is
of the very essence of judicial duty. To paraphrase
a landmark opinion, 1 when we act in these
matters we do so not on the assumption that to us
is granted the requisite knowledge to set matters
right, but by virtue of the responsibility we cannot
escape under the Constitution, one that history
authenticates, to pass upon every assertion of an
alleged infringement of liberty, when our
competence is appropriately invoked.
This then is the crucial question: Is there an
infringement of liberty? Petitioners so alleged in his
action, which they entitled Declaratory Relief with
Preliminary Injunction, filed on July 22, 1967, a
proceeding that should have been started in the of
Court of First Instance but treated by this Court as
one of prohibition in view of the seriousness and
the urgency of the constitutional issue raised.
Petitioners challenged the validity of two new
sections now included in the Revised Election
Code, under Republic Act No. 4880, which was
approved and took effect on June 17, 1967,
prohibiting the too early nomination of candidates
2 and limiting the period of election campaign or
partisan political activity. 3
The terms "candidate" and "election campaign" or
"partisan political activity" are likewise defined. The
former according to Act No. 4880 "refers to any
person aspiring for or seeking an elective public
office regarded of whether or not said person has
already filed his certificate of candidacy or has
been nominated by any political party as its
candidate." "Election campaign" or "partisan
political activity" refers to acts designed to have a
candidate elected or not or promote the candidacy
of a person or persons to a public office." Then the
acts were specified. There is a proviso that simple
expression of opinion and thoughts concerning the
election shall not be considered as part of an
election campaign. There is the further proviso that
nothing stated in the Act "shall be understood to
prevent any person from expressing his views on
current political problems or issues, or from
mentioning the names of the candidates for public
office whom he supports." 4
Petitioner Cabigao was, at the time of the filing 6f
the petition, an incumbent councilor in the 4th
District of Manila and the Nacionalista Party official
candidate for Vice-Mayor of Manila to which he
was subsequently elected on November 11, 1967;
petitioner Gonzales, on the other hand, is a private
individual, a registered voter in the City of Manila
and a political leader of his co-petitioner. It is their
claim that "the enforcement of said Republic Act
No. 4880 in question [would] prejudice [their] basic
rights..., such as their freedom of speech, their
freedom of assembly and their right to form
associations or societies for purpose not contrary
to law, guaranteed under the Philippine
Constitution," and that therefore said act is
unconstitutional.

After invoking anew the fundamental rights to free
speech, free press, freedom of association and
freedom of assembly with a citation of two
American Supreme Court decisions, 5 they
asserted that "there is nothing in the spirit or
intention of the law that would legally justify its
passage and [enforcement] whether for reasons of
public policy, public order or morality, and that
therefore the enactment of Republic Act [No.] 4880
under, the guise of regulation is but a clear and
simple abridgment of the constitutional rights of
freedom of speech, freedom of assembly and the
right to form associations and societies for
purposes not contrary to law, ..." There was the
further allegation that the nomination of a
candidate and the fixing of period of election
campaign are matters of political expediency and
convenience which only political parties can
regulate or curtail by and among themselves
through self-restraint or mutual understanding or
agreement and that the regulation and limitation of
these political matters invoking the police power, in
the absence of clear and present danger to the
state, would render the constitutional rights of
petitioners meaningless and without effect.
To the plea of petitioners that after hearing,
Republic Act No. 4880 be declared
unconstitutional, null and void, respondent
Commission on Elections, in its answer filed on
August 1, 1967, after denying the allegations as to
the validity of the act "for being mere conclusions
of law, erroneous at that," and setting forth special
affirmative defenses, procedural and substantive
character, would have this Court dismiss the
petition.
Thereafter the case was set for hearing on August
3, 1967. On the same date a resolution was
passed by us to the following effect: "At the hearing
of case L-27833 (Arsenio Gonzales, et al. vs.
Commission on Elections), Atty. F. Reyes Cabigao
appeared for the petitioners and Atty. Ramon
Barrios appeared for the respondent and they were
given a period of four days from today within which
to submit, simultaneously,, their respective
memorandum in lieu of oral argument."
On August 9, 1967, another resolution, self-
explanatory in character, came from this Court.
Thus: "In ease G.R. No. L-27833 (Arsenio
Gonzales, et al. vs. Commission on Elections), the
Court, with eight (8) Justice present, having
deliberated on the issue of the constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 4880; and a divergence of views
having developed among the Justices as to the
constitutionality of section 50-B, pars. (c), (d) and
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(e) of the Revised Election Code: considering the
Constitutional provision that "no treaty or law may
be declared unconstitutional without the
concurrence of two-thirds of all the members of the
(Supreme) Court' (sec. 10, Art, VII), the Court
[resolved] to defer final voting on the issue until
after the return of the Justices now on official
leave."
The case was then reset for oral argument. At such
hearing, one of the co-petitioners, now Vice-Mayor
Felicisimo Cabigao of the City of Manila acting as
counsel, assailed the validity of the challenged
legislation relying primarily on American Supreme
Court opinion that warn against curtailment in
whatever guise or form of the cherished freedoms
of expression, of assemble and of association, all
embraced in the First Amendment of the United
States Constitution. Respondent Commission on
Elections was duly represented by Atty. Ramon
Barrios.
Senator Lorenzo M. Tañada was asked to appear
as amicus curiae. That he did, arguing most
impressively with a persuasive exposition of the
existence of undeniable conditions that
imperatively called for regulation of the electoral
process and with full recognition that Act No. 4880
could indeed be looked upon as a limitation on the
preferred rights of speech and press, of assembly
and of association. He did justify its enactment
however under the clear and present danger
doctrine, there being the substantive evil of
elections, whether for national or local officials,
being debased and degraded by unrestricted
campaigning, excess of partisanship and undue
concentration in politics with the loss not only of
efficiency in government but of lives as well.
The matter was then discussed in conference, but
no final action was taken. The divergence of views
with reference to the paragraphs above mentioned
having continued, on Oct. 10, 1968, this Court, by
resolution, invited certain entities to submit
memoranda as amici curiae on the question of the
validity of R.A. Act No. 4880. The Philippine Bar
Association, the Civil Liberties Union, the U.P. Law
Center and the U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle were
included, among them. They did file their
respective memoranda with this Court and aided it
in the consideration of the constitutional issues
involved.
1. In the course of the deliberations, a serious
procedural objection was raised by five members
of the Court. 6 It is their view that respondent
Commission on Elections not being sought to be
restrained from performing any specific act, this

suit cannot be characterized as other than a mere
request for an advisory opinion. Such a view, from
the remedial law standpoint, has much to
recommend it. Nonetheless, a majority would
affirm, the original stand that under the
circumstances it could still rightfully be treated as
a petition for prohibition.
The language of Justice Laurel fits the case "All
await the decision of this Court on the
constitutional question. Considering, therefore, the
importance which the instant case has assumed
and to prevent multiplicity of suits, strong reasons
of public policy demand that [its] constitutionality ...
be now resolved." 7 It may likewise be added that
the exceptional character of the situation that
confronts us, the paramount public interest, and
the undeniable necessity for a ruling, the national
elections being, barely six months away, reinforce
our stand.
It would appear undeniable, therefore, that before
us is an appropriate invocation of our jurisdiction to
prevent the enforcement of an alleged
unconstitutional statute. We are left with no choice
then; we must act on the matter.
There is another procedural obstacle raised by
respondent to be hurdled. It is not insuperable. It is
true that ordinarily, a party who impugns the
validity of a statute or ordinance must have a
substantial interest in the case such that he has
sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of
its enforcement. 8 Respondent cannot see such
interest as being possessed by petitioners. It may
indicate the clarity of vision being dimmed,
considering that one of the petitioners was a
candidate for an elective position. Even if such
were the case, however, the objection is not
necessarily fatal. In this jurisdiction, the rule has
been sufficiently relaxed to allow a taxpayer to
bring an action to restrain the expenditure of public
funds through the enforcement of an invalid or
unconstitutional legislative measure. 9
2. In the answer of the respondent as well as its
memorandum, stress was laid on Republic Act No.
4880 as an exercise of the police power of the
state, designed to insure a free, orderly and honest
election by regulating "conduct which Congress
has determined harmful if unstrained and carried
for a long period before elections it necessarily
entails huge expenditures of funds on the part of
the candidates, precipitates violence and even
deaths, results in the corruption of the electorate,
and inflicts direful consequences upon public
interest as the vital affairs of the country are
sacrificed to purely partisan pursuits." Evidently for
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respondent that would suffice to meet the
constitutional questions raised as to the alleged
infringement of free speech, free press, freedom of
assembly and 'freedom' of association. Would it
were as simple as that?
An eloquent excerpt from a leading American
decision 10 admonishes though against such a
cavalier approach. "The case confronts us again
with the duty our system places on this Court to
say where the individual's, freedom ends the
State's power begins. Choice on that border, now
as always delicate, is perhaps more so where the
usual. presumption supporting legislation is
balanced by the preferred place given in our
scheme to the great, the indispensable democratic
freedoms secured by the First Amendment.... That
priority gives these liberties a sanctity and a
sanction not permitting dubious intrusions. And it is
the character of the right, not of the limitation,
which determines what standard governs the
choice..."
Even a leading American State court decision on a
regulatory measure dealing with elections, cited in
the answer of respondent, militates against a stand
minimizing the importance and significance of the
alleged violation of individual rights: "As so
construed by us, it has not been made to appear
that section 8189, Comp. Gen. Laws, section
5925, Rev. Gen. St., is on its face violative of any
provision of either the state or Federal Constitution
on the subject of free speech or liberty of the press,
nor that its operation is in any wise subversive of
any one's constitutional liberty." 11 Another
leading State decision is much more emphatic:
"Broad as the power of the legislature is with
respect to regulation of elections, that power is not
wholly without limitation. Under the guise of
regulating elections, the legislature may not
deprive a citizen of the right of trial by jury. A
person charged with its violation may not be
compelled to give evidence against himself. If it
destroys the right of free speech, it is to that extent
void." 12
The question then of the alleged violation of
Constitutional rights must be squarely
met.lawphi1.nêt
3. Now as to the merits. A brief resume of the basic
rights on which petitioners premise their stand that
the act is unconstitutional may prove illuminating.
The primacy, the high estate accorded freedom of
expression is of course a fundamental postulate of
our constitutional system. No law shall be passed
abridging the freedom of speech or of the press ....
13 What does it embrace? At the very least, free

speech and free press may be identified with the
liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter
of public interest without censorship or
punishment. 14 There is to be then no previous
restraint on the communication of views or
subsequent liability whether in libel suits, 15
prosecution for sedition, 16 or action for damages,
17 or contempt proceedings 18 unless there be a
clear and present danger of substantive evil that
Congress has a right to prevent.
The vital need in a constitutional democracy for
freedom of expression is undeniable whether as a
means of assuring individual self-fulfillment, of
attaining the truth, of assuring participation by the
people in social including political decision-
making, and of maintaining the balance between
stability and change. 19 The trend as reflected in
Philippine and American decisions is to recognize
the broadcast scope and assure the widest latitude
to this constitutional guaranty. It represents a
profound commitment to the principle that debate
of public issue should be uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open. 20 It is not going too far, according to
another American decision, to view the function of
free speech as inviting dispute. "It may indeed best
serve its high purpose when it induces a condition
of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as
they are, or even stirs people to anger." 21
Freedom of speech and of the press thus means
something more than the right to approve existing
political beliefs or economic arrangements, to lend
support to official measures, to take refuge in the
existing climate of opinion on any matter of public
consequence. So atrophied, the right becomes
meaningless. The right belongs as well, if not
more, for those who question, who do not conform,
who differ. To paraphrase Justice Holmes, it is
freedom for the thought that we hate, no less than
for the thought that agrees with us. 22
So with Emerson one may conclude that "the
theory of freedom of expression involves more
than a technique for arriving at better social
judgments through democratic procedures. It
comprehends a vision of society, a faith and a
whole way of life. The theory grew out of an age
that was awakened and invigorated by the idea of
new society in which man's mind was free, his fate
determined by his own powers of reason, and his
prospects of creating a rational and enlightened
civilization virtually unlimited. It is put forward as a
prescription for attaining a creative, progressive,
exciting and intellectually robust community. It
contemplates a mode of life that, through
encouraging toleration, skepticism, reason and
initiative, will allow man to realize his full
potentialities. It spurns the alternative of a society
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that is tyrannical, conformist, irrational and
stagnant." 23
From the language of the specified constitutional
provision, it would appear that the right is not
susceptible of any limitation. No law may be
passed abridging the freedom of speech and of the
press. The realities of life in a complex society
preclude however a literal interpretation. Freedom
of expression is not an absolute. It would be too
much to insist that at all times and under all
circumstances it should remain unfettered and
unrestrained. There are other societal values that
press for recognition. How is it to be limited then?
This Court spoke, in Cabansag v. Fernandez; 24
of two tests that may supply an acceptable criterion
for permissible restriction. Thus: "These are the
'clear and present danger' rule and the 'dangerous
tendency' rule. The first, as interpreted in a number
of cases, means that the evil consequence of the
comment or utterance must be extremely serious
and the degree of imminence extremely high'
before the utterance can be punished. The danger
to be guarded against is the 'substantive evil'
sought to be prevented." It has the advantage of
establishing according to the above decision "a
definite rule in constitutional law. It provides the
criterion as to what words may be public
established."
The Cabansag case likewise referred to the other
test, the "dangerous tendency" rule and explained
it thus: "If the words uttered create a dangerous
tendency which the state has a right to prevent,
then such words are punishable. It is not
necessary that some definite or immediate acts of
force, violence, or unlawfulness be advocated. It is
sufficient that such acts be advocated in general
terms. Nor is it necessary that the language used
be reasonably calculated to incite persons to acts
of force, violence, or unlawfulness. It is sufficient if
the natural tendency and probable effect of the
utterance be to bring about the substantive evil
which the legislative body seeks to prevent.
We posed the issue thus: "Has the letter of
Cabansag created a sufficient danger to a fair
administration of justice? Did its remittance to the
PCAC create a danger sufficiently imminent to
come under the two rules mentioned above?" The
choice of this Court was manifest and indisputable.
It adopted the clear and present danger test. As a
matter of fact, in an earlier decision, Primicias v.
Fugoso, 25 there was likewise an implicit
acceptance of the clear and present danger
doctrine.

Why repression is permissible only when the
danger of substantive evil is present is explained
by Justice Branders thus: ... the evil apprehended
is so imminent that it may befall before there is
opportunity for full discussion. If there be time to
expose through discussion the falsehood and
fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of
education, the remedy to be applied is more
speech, not enforced silence." 26 For him the
apprehended evil must be "relatively serious." For
"[prohibition] of free speech and assembly is a
measure so stringent that it would be inappropriate
as the means for averting a relatively trivial harm
to society." Justice Black would go further. He
would require that the substantive evil be
"extremely serious." 27 Only thus may there be a
realization of the ideal envisioned by Cardozo:
"There shall be no compromise of the freedom to
think one's thoughts and speak them, except at
those extreme borders where thought merges into
action." 28 It received its original formulation from
Holmes. Thus: "The question in every case is
whether the words used in such circumstances
and of such a nature as to create a clear and
present danger that they will bring about the
substantive evils that Congress has a right to
prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree."
29
This test then as a limitation on freedom of
expression is justified by the danger or evil a
substantive character that the state has a right to
prevent. Unlike the dangerous tendency doctrine,
the danger must not only be clear but also present.
The term clear seems to point to a causal
connection with the danger of the substantially evil
arising from the utterance questioned. Present
refers to the time element. It used to be identified
with imminent and immediate danger. The danger
must not only be probable but very likely inevitable.
4. How about freedom of assembly? The Bill of
Rights as thus noted prohibits abridgment by law
of freedom of speech or of the press. It likewise
extends the same protection to the right of the
people peaceably to assemble. As was pointed out
by Justice Malcolm in the case of United States v.
Bustos, 30 this right is a necessary consequence
of our republican institution and complements the
right of free speech. Assembly means a right on
the part of citizens to meet peaceably for
consultation in respect to public affairs. From the
same Bustos opinion: "Public policy, the welfare of
society and orderly administration of government
have demanded protection for public opinion." To
paraphrase the opinion of Justice Rutledge
speaking for the majority in Thomas v. Collins,31 it
was not by accident or coincidence that the rights
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to freedom of speech and of the press were
coupled in a single guaranty with the rights of the
people peaceably to assemble and to petition the
government for redress of grievances. All these
rights while not identical are inseparable. They are
cognate rights and the assurance afforded by the
clause of this section of the Bill of Rights wherein
they are contained, applies to all. As emphatically
put in the leading case of United States v.
Cruikshank, 32 "the very idea of a government,
republican in form, implies a right on the part of its
citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in
respect to public affairs and to petition for redress
of grievances." As in the case of freedom of
expression, this right is not to be limited, much less
denied, except on a showing of a clear and present
danger of a substantive evil that Congress has a
right to prevent.
5. Our Constitution likewise recognizes the
freedom to form association for purposes not
contrary to law. 33 With or without a constitutional
provision of this character, it may be assumed that
the freedom to organize or to be a member of any
group or society exists. With this explicit provision,
whatever doubts there may be on the matter are
dispelled. Unlike the cases of other guarantee
which are mostly American in origin, this particular
freedom has an indigenous cast. It can trace its
origin to the Malolos Constitution.
In the United States, in the absence of an explicit
provision of such character, it is the view of Justice
Douglas that it is primarily the first amendment of
her Constitution, which safeguards freedom of
speech and of the press, of assembly and of
petition "that provides [associations] with the
protection they need if they are to remain viable
and continue to contribute to our Free Society." 34
He adopted the view of De Tocqueville on the
importance and the significance of the freedom to
associate. Thus: "The most natural privilege of
man, next to the right of acting for himself, is that
of combining his exertions with those of his fellow
creatures and of acting in common with them. The
right of association therefore appears to me almost
inalienable in its nature as the right of personal
liberty. No legislator can attack it without impairing
the foundation of society." 35
There can be no dispute as to the soundness of
the above observation of De Tocqueville. Since
man lives in social it would be a barren existence
if he could not freely associate with others of
kindred persuasion or of congenial frame of mind.
As a matter of fact, the more common form of
associations may be likely to be fraternal, cultural,
social or religious. Thereby, for almost everybody,

save for those exceptional few who glory in
aloofness and isolation life is enriched and
becomes more meaningful.
In a sense, however, the stress on this freedom of
association should be on its political significance.
If such a right were non-existent then the likelihood
of a one-party government is more than a
possibility. Authoritarianism may become
unavoidable. Political opposition will simply cease
to exist; minority groups may be outlawed,
constitutional democracy as intended by the
Constitution may well become a thing of the past.
Political parties which, as is originally the case,
assume the role alternately of being in the majority
or in the minority as the will of the electorate
dictates, will lose their constitutional protection. It
is undeniable therefore, that the utmost scope
should be afforded this freedom of association.
It is indispensable not only for its enhancing the
respect that should be accorded a human
personality but equally so for its assurance that the
wishes of any group to oppose whatever for the
moment is the party in power and with the help of
the electorate to set up its own program of
government would not be nullified or frustrated. To
quote from Douglas anew: "Justice Frankfurter
thought that political and academic affiliations
have a preferred position under the due process
version of the First Amendment. But the
associational rights protected by the First
Amendment are in my view much broader and
cover the entire spectrum in political ideology as
well as in art, in journalism, in teaching, and in
religion. In my view, government can neither
legislate with respect to nor probe the intimacies of
political, spiritual, or intellectual relationships in the
myriad of lawful societies and groups, whether
popular or unpopular, that exist in this country." 36
Nonetheless, the Constitution limits this particular
freedom in the sense that there could be an
abridgment of the right to form associations or
societies when their purposes are "contrary to
law". How should the limitation "for purposes not
contrary to law" be interpreted? It is submitted that
it is another way of expressing the clear and
present danger rule for unless an association or
society could be shown to create an imminent
danger to public safety, there is no justification for
abridging the right to form association societies.37
As was so aptly stated: "There is no other course
consistent with the Free Society envisioned by the
First Amendment. For the views a citizen
entertains, the beliefs he harbors, the utterances
he makes, the ideology he embraces, and the
CONSTI LAW APRIL 7, 2018 6
people he associates with are no concern to
government — until and unless he moves into
action. That article of faith marks indeed the main
difference between the Free Society which we
espouse and the dictatorships both on the Left and
on the Right." 38 With the above principles in mind,
we now consider the validity of the prohibition in
Republic Act No. 4880 of the too early nomination
of candidates and the limitation found therein on
the period of election campaign or partisan political
activity alleged by petitioners to offend against the
rights of free speech, free press, freedom of
assembly and freedom of association. In effect
what are asked to do is to declare the act void on
its face evidence having been introduced as to its
actual operation. There is respectable authority for
the court having the power to so act. Such
fundamental liberties are accorded so high a place
in our constitutional scheme that any alleged
infringement manifest in the wording of statute
cannot be allowed to pass unnoticed. 39
In considering whether it is violative of any of the
above rights, we cannot ignore of course the
legislative declaration that its enactment was in
response to a serious substantive evil affecting the
electoral process, not merely in danger of
happening, but actually in existence, and likely to
continue unless curbed or remedied. To assert
otherwise would be to close one's eyes to the
realities of the situation. Nor can we ignore the
express legislative purpose apparent in the proviso
"that simple expressions of opinion and thoughts
concerning the election shall not be considered as
part of an election campaign," and in the other
proviso "that nothing herein stated shall be
understood to prevent any person from expressing
his views on current political problems or issues, or
from mentioning the names of the candidates for
public office whom he supports." Such limitations
qualify the entire provision restricting the period of
an election campaign or partisan political activity.
The prohibition of too early nomination of
candidates presents a question that is not too
formidable in character. According to the act: "It
shall be unlawful for any political party political
committee, or political group to nominate
candidates for any elective public officio voted for
at large earlier than one hundred and fifty days
immediately preceding an election, and for any
other elective public, office earlier than ninety days
immediately preceding an election." 40
The right of association is affected. Political parties
have less freedom as to the time during which they
may nominate candidates; the curtailment is not
such, however, as to render meaningless such a

basic right. Their scope of legitimate activities,
save this one, is not unduly narrowed. Neither is
there infringement of their freedom to assemble.
They can do so, but not for such a purpose. We
sustain in validity. We do so unanimously.
The limitation on the period of "election campaign"
or "partisan political activity" calls for a more
intensive scrutiny. According to Republic Act No.
4880: "It is unlawful for any person whether or not
a voter or candidate, or for any group or
association of persons whether or not a political
party or political committee, to engage in an
election campaign or partisan political activity
except during the period of one hundred twenty
days immediately preceding an election involving
a public office voted for at large and ninety days
immediately preceding an election for any other
elective public office. The term 'candidate' refers to
any person aspiring for or seeking an elective
public office, regardless of whether or not said
person has already filed his certificate of candidacy
or has been nominated by any political party as its
candidate. The term 'election campaign' or
'partisan political activity' refers to acts designed to
have a candidate elected or not or promote the
candidacy of a person or persons to a public office
..."
If that is all there is to that provision, it suffers from
the fatal constitutional infirmity of vagueness and
may be stricken down. What other conclusion can
there be extending as it does to so wide and all-
encompassing a front that what is valid, being a
legitimate exercise of press freedom as well as
freedom of assembly, becomes prohibited? That
cannot be done; such an undesirable eventuality,
this Court cannot allow to pass.
It is a well-settled principle that stricter standard of
permissible statutory vagueness may be applied to
a statute having inhibiting effect on speech; a man
may the less be required to act at his peril here,
because the free dissemination of ideas may be
the loser.41 Where the statutory provision then
operates to inhibit the exercise of individual
freedom affirmatively protected by the
Constitution, the imputation of vagueness
sufficient to invalidate the statute is inescapable.
42 The language of Justice Douglas, both
appropriate and vigorous, comes to mind: "Words
which are vague and fluid ... may be as much of a
trap for the innocent as the ancient laws of
Caligula." 43 Nor is the reason difficult to discern:
."These freedoms are delicate and vulnerable, as
well as supremely precious in our society. The
threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost
CONSTI LAW APRIL 7, 2018 7
as potently as the actual application of sanctions."
44
7. The constitutional objections are thus
formidable. It cannot be denied that the limitations
thus imposed on the constitutional rights of free
speech and press, of assembly, and of association
cut deeply, into their substance. This on the one
hand.
On the other, it cannot be denied either that evils
substantial in character taint the purity of the
electoral process. There can be under the
circumstances then no outright condemnation of
the statute. It could not be said to be unwarranted,
much less arbitrary. There is need for refraining
from the outright assumption that the constitutional
infirmity is apparent from a mere reading thereof.
For under circumstances that manifest abuses of
the gravest character, remedies much more drastic
than what ordinarily would suffice would indeed be
called for. The justification alleged by the
proponents of the measures weighs heavily with
the members of the Court, though in varying
degrees, in the appraisal of the aforesaid
restrictions to which such precious freedoms are
subjected. They are not unaware of the clear and
present danger that calls for measures that may
bear heavily on the exercise of the cherished rights
of expression, of assembly, and of association.
This is not to say, that once such a situation is
found to exist there is no limit to the allowable
limitations on such constitutional rights. The clear
and present danger doctrine rightly viewed
requires that not only should there be an occasion
for the imposition of such restrictions but also that
they be limited in scope.
There are still constitutional questions of a serious
character then to be faced. The practices which the
act identifies with "election campaign" or "partisan
political activity" must be such that they are free
from the taint of being violative of free speech, free
press, freedom of assembly, and freedom of
association. What removes the sting from
constitutional objection of vagueness is the
enumeration of the acts deemed included in the
terms "election campaign" or "partisan political
activity."
They are: "(a) Forming organizations,
associations, clubs, committees or other groups of
persons for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or
undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or
against a party or candidate; (b) holding political
conventions, caucuses, conferences, meetings,

rallies, parades, or other similar assemblies, for the
purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any
campaign or propaganda for or against a
candidate or party;(c) making speeches,
announcements or commentaries or holding
interviews for or against the election or any party
or candidate for public office; (d) publishing or
distributing campaign literature or materials; (e)
directly or indirectly soliciting votes and/or
undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or
against any party; (f) giving, soliciting, or receiving
contributions for election campaign purposes,
either directly or indirectly." 45 As thus limited the
objection that may be raised as to vagueness has
been minimized, if not totally set at rest. 46
8. This Court, with the aforementioned five
Justices unable to agree, is of the view that no
unconstitutional infringement exists insofar as the
formation of organization, associations, clubs,
committees, or other groups of persons for the
purpose of soliciting votes or undertaking any
campaign or propaganda or both for or against a
candidate or party is restricted 47 and that the
prohibition against giving, soliciting, or receiving
contribution for election purposes, either directly or
indirectly, is equally free from constitutional
infirmity. 48
The restriction on freedom of assembly as
confined to holding political conventions,
caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades
or other similar assemblies for the purpose of
soliciting votes or undertaking any campaign or
propaganda or both for or against a candidate or
party, 49 leaving untouched all other legitimate
exercise of such poses a more difficult question.
Nevertheless, after a thorough consideration, and
with the same Justices entertaining the opposite
conviction, we reject the contention that it should
be annulled. Candor compels the admission that
the writer of this opinion suffers from the gravest
doubts. For him, such statutory prescription could
very well be within the outermost limits of validity,
beyond which lies the abyss of unconstitutionality.
The other acts, likewise deemed included in
"election campaign" or "partisan political activity"
tax to the utmost the judicial predisposition to view
with sympathy legislative efforts to regulate
election practices deemed inimical, because of
their collision with the preferred right of freedom of
expression. From the outset, such provisions did
occasion divergence of views among the members
of the Court. Originally only a minority was for their
being adjudged as invalid. It is not so. any more.
50 This is merely to emphasize that the scope of
the curtailment to which freedom of expression
CONSTI LAW APRIL 7, 2018 8
may be subjected is not foreclosed by the
recognition of the existence of a clear and present
danger of a substantive evil, the debasement of the
electoral process.
The majority of the Court is thus of the belief that
the solicitation or undertaking of any campaign or
propaganda whether directly or indirectly, by an
individual, 51 the making of speeches,
announcements or commentaries or holding
interview for or against the election for any party or
candidate for public office, 52 or the publication or
distribution of campaign literature or materials, 53
suffer from the corrosion of invalidity. It lacks
however one more affirmative vote to call for a
declaration of unconstitutionality.
This is not to deny that Congress was indeed
called upon to seek remedial measures for the far-
from-satisfactory condition arising from the too-
early nomination of candidates and the necessarily
prolonged, political campaigns. The direful
consequences and the harmful effects on the
public interest with the vital affairs of the country
sacrificed many a time to purely partisan pursuits
were known to all. Moreover, it is no exaggeration
to state that violence and even death did frequently
occur because of the heat engendered by such
political activities. Then, too, the opportunity for
dishonesty and corruption, with the right to
suffrage being bartered, was further magnified.
Under the police power then, with its concern for
the general welfare and with the commendable aim
of safe-guarding the right of suffrage, the
legislative body must have felt impelled to impose
the foregoing restrictions. It is understandable for
Congress to believe that without the limitations
thus set forth in the challenged legislation, the
laudable purpose of Republic Act No. 4880 would
be frustrated and nullified. Whatever persuasive
force such approach may command failed to elicit
the assent of a majority of the Court. This is not to
say that the conclusion reached by the minority
that the above poisons of the statute now assailed
has passed the constitutional test is devoid of
merit.
It only indicates that for the majority, the prohibition
of any speeches, announcements or
commentaries, or the holding of interviews for or
against the election of any party or candidate for
public office and the prohibition of the publication
or distribution of campaign literature or materials,
against the solicitation of votes whether directly or
indirectly, or the undertaking of any campaign
literature or propaganda for or against any
candidate or party is repugnant to a constitutional

command. To that extent, the challenged statute
prohibits what under the Constitution cannot by
any law be abridged.
More specifically, in terms of the permissible scope
of legislation that otherwise could be justified under
the clear and present danger doctrine, it is the
consideration opinion of the majority, though
lacking the necessary vote for an adjudication of
invalidity, that the challenged statute could have
been more narrowly drawn and the practices
prohibited more precisely delineated to satisfy the
constitutional requirements as to a valid limitation
under the clear and present danger doctrine.
In a 1968 opinion, the American Supreme Court
made clear that the absence of such reasonable
and definite standards in a legislation of its
character is fatal. 54 Where, as in the case of the
above paragraphs, the majority of the Court could
discern "an over breadth that makes possible
oppressive or capricious application" 55 of the
statutory provisions, the line dividing the valid from
the constitutionally infirm has been crossed. Such
provisions offend the constitutional principle that "a
governmental purpose constitutionally subject to
control or prevent activities state regulation may
not be achieved by means which sweep
unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area
of protected freedoms. 56
It is undeniable, therefore, that even though the
governmental purposes be legitimate and
substantial, they cannot be pursued by means that
broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when
the end can be more narrowly achieved. 57 For
precision of regulation is the touchstone in an area
so closely related to our most precious freedoms.
58
Under the circumstances then, a majority of the
Court feels compelled to view the statutory
provisions in question as unconstitutional on their
face inasmuch as they appear to range too widely
and indiscriminately across the fundamental
liberties associated with freedom of the mind. 59
Such a conclusion does not find favor with the
other members of the Court. For this minority
group, no judgment of nullity insofar as the
challenged sections are concerned is called for. It
cannot accept the conclusion that the limitations
thus imposed on freedom of expression vitiated by
their latitudinarian scope, for Congress was not at
all insensible to the problem that an all-
encompassing coverage of the practices sought to
be restrained would seriously pose.
CONSTI LAW APRIL 7, 2018 9
Such an approach finds support in the exposition
made by the author of the measure, Senator
Lorenzo M. Tañada, appearing before us as
amicus curiae. He did clearly explain that such
provisions were deemed by the legislative body to
be part and parcel of the necessary and
appropriate response not merely to a clear and
present danger but to the actual existence of a
grave and substantive evil of excessive
partisanship, dishonesty and corruption as well as
violence that of late has invariably marred election
campaigns and partisan political activities in this
country. He did invite our attention likewise to the
well-settled doctrine that in the choice of remedies
for an admitted malady requiring governmental
action, on the legislature primarily rests the
responsibility. Nor should the cure prescribed by it,
unless clearly repugnant to fundamental rights, be
ignored or disregarded.
More than that, he would stress the two provisos
already mentioned, precisely placed in the state as
a manifestation of the undeniable legislative
determination not to transgress the preferred
freedom of speech, of press, of assembly and of
association. It is thus provided: "That simple
expressions or opinion and thoughts concerning
the election shall not be considered as part of an
election campaign [and that nothing in the Act]
shall be understood to prevent any person from
expressing his views on current political problems
or issues, or from mentioning the names of the
candidates for public office whom he supports. 60
If properly implemented then, as it ought to, the
barrier to free, expression becomes minimal and
far from unwarranted.
For the minority of the Court, all of the above
arguments possess sufficient persuasive force to
blunt whatever cutting edge may be ascribed to the
fears entertained that Congress failed to abide by
what the Constitution commands as far as freedom
of the mind and of association are concerned. It is
its opinion that it would be premature to say the
least, for a judgment of nullity of any provision
found in Republic Act No. 4880. The need for
adjudication arises only if in the implementation of
the Act, there is in fact an unconstitutional
application of its provisions. Nor are we called
upon, under this approach, to anticipate each and
every problem that may arise. It is time enough to
consider it when there is in fact an actual, concrete
case that requires an exercise of judicial power.
9. To recapitulate, we give due recognition to the
legislative concern to cleanse, and, if possible,
render spotless, the electoral process. There is full
acceptance by the Court of the power of Congress,

under narrowly drawn legislation to impose the
necessary restrictions to what otherwise would be
liberties traditionally accorded the widest scope
and the utmost deference, freedom of speech and
of the press, of assembly, and of association. We
cannot, however, be recreant to the trust reposed
on us; we are called upon to safeguard individual
rights. In the language of Justice Laurel: "This
Court is perhaps the last bulwark of constitutional
government. It shall not obstruct the popular will as
manifested through proper organs... But, in the
same way that it cannot renounce the life breathed
into it by the Constitution, so may it not forego its
obligation, in proper cases, to apply the
necessary,..." 61
We recognize the wide discretion accorded
Congress to protect vital interests. Considering the
responsibility incumbent on the judiciary, it is not
always possible, even with the utmost sympathy
shown for the legislative choice of means to cure
an admitted evil, that the legislative judgment
arrived at, with its possible curtailment of the
preferred freedoms, be accepted uncritically.
There may be times, and this is one of them, with
the majority, with all due reject to a coordinate
branch, unable to extend their approval to the
aforesaid specific provisions of one of the sections
of the challenged statute. The necessary two-third
vote, however, not being obtained, there is no
occasion for the power to annul statutes to come
into play.
Such being the case, it is the judgment of this
Court that Republic Act No. 4880 cannot be
declared unconstitutional.
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed and the
writ of prayed for denied. Without costs.
CONSTI LAW APRIL 7, 2018 10
A.C. 1928 December 19, 1980
In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues
Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILLION
(IBP Administrative Case No. MDD-1),
petitioner,
FERNANDO, C.J.:
The full and plenary discretion in the exercise of its
competence to reinstate a disbarred member of
the bar admits of no doubt. All the relevant factors
bearing on the specific case, public interest, the
integrity of the profession and the welfare of the
recreant who had purged himself of his guilt are
given their due weight. Respondent Marcial A.
Edillon was disbarred on August 3, 1978, 1 the
vote being unanimous with the late.
Chief Justice Castro ponente. From June 5, 1979,
he had repeatedly pleaded that he be reinstated.
The minute resolution dated October 23, 1980,
granted such prayer. It was there made clear that
it "is without prejudice to issuing an extended
opinion." 2
Before doing so, a recital of the background facts
that led to the disbarment of respondent may not
be amiss. As set forth in the resolution penned by
the late Chief Justice Castro: "On November 29.
1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for
short) Board of Governors, unanimously adopted
Resolution No. 75-65 in Administrative case No.
MDD-1 (In the Matter of the Membership Dues
Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon)
recommending to the Court the removal of the
name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys
for 'stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues'
to the IBP since the latter's constitution
notwithstanding due notice. On January 21, 1976,
the IBP, through its then President Liliano B. Neri,
submitted the said resolution to the Court for
consideration and approval,. Pursuant to
paragraph 2, Section 24, Article III of the By-Laws
of the IBP, which. reads: ... Should the delinquency
further continue until the following June 29, the
Board shall promptly inquire into the cause or
causes of the continued delinquency and take
whatever action it shall deem appropriate,
including a recommendation to the Supreme Court
for the removal of the delinquent member's name
from the Roll of Attorneys. Notice of the action
taken should be submit by registered mail to the
member and to the Secretary of the Chapter
concerned.' On January 27, 1976, the Court
required the respondent to comment on the
resolution and letter adverted to above he
submitted his comment on February 23, 1976,

reiterating his refusal to pay the membership fees
due from him. On March 2, 1976, the Court
required the IBP President and the IBP Board of
Governors to reply to Edillon's comment: On
March 24, 1976, they submitted a joint reply.
Thereafter, the case was set for hearing on June
3, 1976. After the hearing, the parties were
required to submit memoranda in amplification of
their oral arguments. The matter was thenceforth
submitted for resolution." 3
Reference was then made to the authority of the
IBP Board of Governors to recommend to the
Supreme Court the removal of a delinquent
member's name from the Roll of Attorneys as
found in Rules of Court: 'Effect of non-payment of
dues. — Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of
this Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for
six months shall warrant suspension of
membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in
such payment for one year shall be a ground for
the removal of the name of the delinquent member
from the Roll of Attorneys. 4
The submission of respondent Edillion as
summarized in the aforesaid resolution "is that the
above provisions constitute an invasion of his
constitutional rights in the sense that he is being
compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his
status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a
member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding
dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled
financial support of the said organization to which
he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is
being deprived of the rights to liberty and property
guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the
respondent concludes, the above provisions of the
Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of
no legal force and effect. 5 It was pointed out in the
resolution that such issues was raised on a
previous case before the Court, entitled
'Administrative Case No. 526, In the Matter of the
Petition for the Integration of the Bar of the
Philippines, Roman Ozaeta, et al., Petitioners.'
The Court exhaustively considered all these
matters in that case in its Resolution ordaining the
integration of the Bar of the Philippines,
promulgated on January 9, 1973. 6 The
unanimous conclusion reached by the Court was
that the integration of the Philippine Bar raises no
constitutional question and is therefore legally
unobjectionable, "and, within the context of
contemporary conditions in the Philippine, has
become an imperative means to raise the
standards of the legal profession, improve the
administration of justice, and enable the Bar to
discharge its public responsibility fully and
effectively." 7
CONSTI LAW APRIL 7, 2018 11
As mentioned at the outset, the vote was
unanimous. From the time the decision was
rendered, there were various pleadings filed by
respondent for reinstatement starting with a motion
for reconsideration dated August 19, 1978.
Characterized as it was by persistence in his
adamantine refusal to admit the full competence of
the Court on the matter, it was not unexpected that
it would be denied. So it turned out. 8 It was the
consensus that he continued to be oblivious to
certain balic juridical concepts, the appreciation of
which does not even require great depth of
intellect. Since respondent could not be said to be
that deficient in legal knowledge and since his
pleadings in other cases coming before this
Tribunal were quite literate, even if rather
generously sprinkled with invective for which he
had been duly taken to task, there was the
impression that his recalcitrance arose from and
sheer obstinacy. Necessary, the extreme penalty
of disbarment visited on him was more than
justified.
Since then, however, there were other
communications to this Court where a different
attitude on his part was discernible. 9 The tone of
defiance was gone and circumstances of a
mitigating character invoked — the state of his
health and his advanced age. He likewise spoke of
the welfare of former clients who still rely on him
for counsel, their confidence apparently
undiminished. For he had in his career been a
valiant, if at times unreasonable, defender of the
causes entrusted to him.
This Court, in the light of the above, felt that
reinstatement could be ordered and so it did in the
resolution of October 23, 1980. It made certain that
there was full acceptance on his part of the
competence of this Tribunal in the exercise of its
plenary power to regulate the legal profession and
can integrate the bar and that the dues were duly
paid. Moreover, the fact that more than two years
had elapsed during which he war. barred from
exercising his profession was likewise taken into
account. It may likewise be said that as in the case
of the inherent power to punish for contempt and
paraphrasing the dictum of Justice Malcolm in
Villavicencio v. Lukban, 10 the power to discipline,
especially if amounting to disbarment, should be
exercised on the preservative and not on the
vindictive principle. 11
One last word. It has been pertinently observed
that there is no irretrievable finality as far as
admission to the bar is concerned. So it is likewise
as to loss of membership. What must ever be

borne in mind is that membership in the bar, to
follow Cardozo, is a privilege burdened with
conditions. Failure to abide by any of them entails
the loss of such privilege if the gravity thereof
warrant such drastic move. Thereafter a sufficient
time having elapsed and after actuations
evidencing that there was due contrition on the part
of the transgressor, he may once again be
considered for the restoration of such a privilege.
Hence, our resolution of October 23, 1980.
The Court restores to membership to the bar
Marcial A. Edillon.
G.R. No. 85279 July 28, 1989
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION (SSSEA), DIONISION T.
BAYLON, RAMON MODESTO, JUANITO
MADURA, REUBEN ZAMORA, VIRGILIO DE
ALDAY, SERGIO ARANETA, PLACIDO
AGUSTIN, VIRGILIO MAGPAYO, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, SOCIAL SECURITY
SYSTEM (SSS), HON. CEZAR C. PERALEJO,
RTC, BRANCH 98, QUEZON CITY,
respondents.
Vicente T. Ocampo & Associates for
petitioners.
CORTES, J:
Primarily, the issue raised in this petition is whether
or not the Regional Trial Court can enjoin the
Social Security System Employees Association
(SSSEA) from striking and order the striking
employees to return to work. Collaterally, it is
whether or not employees of the Social Security
System (SSS) have the right to strike.
The antecedents are as follows:
On June 11, 1987, the SSS filed with the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint for
damages with a prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction against petitioners, alleging that on June
9, 1987, the officers and members of SSSEA
staged an illegal strike and baricaded the
entrances to the SSS Building, preventing non-
striking employees from reporting for work and
SSS members from transacting business with the
SSS; that the strike was reported to the Public
Sector Labor - Management Council, which
ordered the strikers to return to work; that the
strikers refused to return to work; and that the SSS
CONSTI LAW APRIL 7, 2018 12
suffered damages as a result of the strike. The
complaint prayed that a writ of preliminary
injunction be issued to enjoin the strike and that the
strikers be ordered to return to work; that the
defendants (petitioners herein) be ordered to pay
damages; and that the strike be declared illegal.
It appears that the SSSEA went on strike after the
SSS failed to act on the union's demands, which
included: implementation of the provisions of the
old SSS-SSSEA collective bargaining agreement
(CBA) on check-off of union dues; payment of
accrued overtime pay, night differential pay and
holiday pay; conversion of temporary or
contractual employees with six (6) months or more
of service into regular and permanent employees
and their entitlement to the same salaries,
allowances and benefits given to other regular
employees of the SSS; and payment of the
children's allowance of P30.00, and after the SSS
deducted certain amounts from the salaries of the
employees and allegedly committed acts of
discrimination and unfair labor practices [Rollo, pp.
21-241].
The court a quo, on June 11, 1987, issued a
temporary restraining order pending resolution of
the application for a writ of preliminary injunction
[Rollo, p. 71.] In the meantime, petitioners filed a
motion to dismiss alleging the trial court's lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter [Rollo, pp. 72-
82.] To this motion, the SSS filed an opposition,
reiterating its prayer for the issuance of a writ of
injunction [Rollo, pp. 209-222]. On July 22,1987, in
a four-page order, the court a quo denied the
motion to dismiss and converted the restraining
order into an injunction upon posting of a bond,
after finding that the strike was illegal [Rollo, pp.
83- 86]. As petitioners' motion for the
reconsideration of the aforesaid order was also
denied on August 14, 1988 [Rollo, p. 94],
petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction before this
Court. Their petition was docketed as G.R. No.
79577. In a resolution dated October 21, 1987, the
Court, through the Third Division, resolved to refer
the case to the Court of Appeals. Petitioners filed
a motion for reconsideration thereof, but during its
pendency the Court of Appeals on March 9,1988
promulgated its decision on the referred case
[Rollo, pp. 130-137]. Petitioners moved to recall
the Court of Appeals' decision. In the meantime,
the Court on June 29,1988 denied the motion for
reconsideration in G.R. No. 97577 for being moot
and academic. Petitioners' motion to recall the
decision of the Court of Appeals was also denied
in view of this Court's denial of the motion for
reconsideration [Rollo, pp. 141- 143]. Hence, the

instant petition to review the decision of the Court
of Appeals [Rollo, pp. 12-37].
Upon motion of the SSS on February 6,1989, the
Court issued a temporary restraining order
enjoining the petitioners from staging another
strike or from pursuing the notice of strike they filed
with the Department of Labor and Employment on
January 25, 1989 and to maintain the status quo
[Rollo, pp. 151-152].
The Court, taking the comment as answer, and
noting the reply and supplemental reply filed by
petitioners, considered the issues joined and the
case submitted for decision.
The position of the petitioners is that the Regional
Trial Court had no jurisdiction to hear the case
initiated by the SSS and to issue the restraining
order and the writ of preliminary injunction, as
jurisdiction lay with the Department of Labor and
Employment or the National Labor Relations
Commission, since the case involves a labor
dispute.
On the other hand, the SSS advances the contrary
view, on the ground that the employees of the SSS
are covered by civil service laws and rules and
regulations, not the Labor Code, therefore they do
not have the right to strike. Since neither the DOLE
nor the NLRC has jurisdiction over the dispute, the
Regional Trial Court may enjoin the employees
from striking.
In dismissing the petition for certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction filed by
petitioners, the Court of Appeals held that since the
employees of the SSS, are government
employees, they are not allowed to strike, and may
be enjoined by the Regional Trial Court, which had
jurisdiction over the SSS' complaint for damages,
from continuing with their strike.
Thus, the sequential questions to be resolved by
the Court in deciding whether or not the Court of
Appeals erred in finding that the Regional Trial
Court did not act without or in excess of jurisdiction
when it took cognizance of the case and enjoined
the strike are as follows:
1. Do the employees of the SSS have the
right to strike?
2. Does the Regional Trial Court have
jurisdiction to hear the case initiated by the SSS
and to enjoin the strikers from continuing with the
strike and to order them to return to work?
CONSTI LAW APRIL 7, 2018 13
These shall be discussed and resolved seriatim
I
The 1987 Constitution, in the Article on Social
Justice and Human Rights, provides that the State
"shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-
organization, collective bargaining and
negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities,
including the right to strike in accordance with law"
[Art. XIII, Sec. 31].
By itself, this provision would seem to recognize
the right of all workers and employees, including
those in the public sector, to strike. But the
Constitution itself fails to expressly confirm this
impression, for in the Sub-Article on the Civil
Service Commission, it provides, after defining the
scope of the civil service as "all branches,
subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of
the Government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charters," that
"[t]he right to self-organization shall not be denied
to government employees" [Art. IX(B), Sec. 2(l)
and (50)]. Parenthetically, the Bill of Rights also
provides that "[tlhe right of the people, including
those employed in the public and private sectors,
to form unions, associations, or societies for
purposes not contrary to law shall not abridged"
[Art. III, Sec. 8]. Thus, while there is no question
that the Constitution recognizes the right of
government employees to organize, it is silent as
to whether such recognition also includes the right
to strike.
Resort to the intent of the framers of the organic
law becomes helpful in understanding the meaning
of these provisions. A reading of the proceedings
of the Constitutional Commission that drafted the
1987 Constitution would show that in recognizing
the right of government employees to organize, the
commissioners intended to limit the right to the
formation of unions or associations only, without
including the right to strike.
Thus, Commissioner Eulogio R. Lerum, one of the
sponsors of the provision that "[tlhe right to self-
organization shall not be denied to government
employees" [Art. IX(B), Sec. 2(5)], in answer to the
apprehensions expressed by Commissioner
Ambrosio B. Padilla, Vice-President of the
Commission, explained:
MR. LERUM. I think what I will try to say will not
take that long. When we proposed this amendment
providing for self-organization of government
employees, it does not mean that because they
have the right to organize, they also have the right

to strike. That is a different matter. We are only
talking about organizing, uniting as a union. With
regard to the right to strike, everyone will
remember that in the Bill of Rights, there is a
provision that the right to form associations or
societies whose purpose is not contrary to law
shall not be abridged. Now then, if the purpose of
the state is to prohibit the strikes coming from
employees exercising government functions, that
could be done because the moment that is
prohibited, then the union which will go on strike
will be an illegal union. And that provision is carried
in Republic Act 875. In Republic Act 875, workers,
including those from the government-owned and
controlled, are allowed to organize but they are
prohibited from striking. So, the fear of our
honorable Vice- President is unfounded. It does
not mean that because we approve this resolution,
it carries with it the right to strike. That is a different
matter. As a matter of fact, that subject is now
being discussed in the Committee on Social
Justice because we are trying to find a solution to
this problem. We know that this problem exist; that
the moment we allow anybody in the government
to strike, then what will happen if the members of
the Armed Forces will go on strike? What will
happen to those people trying to protect us? So
that is a matter of discussion in the Committee on
Social Justice. But, I repeat, the right to form an
organization does not carry with it the right to
strike. [Record of the Constitutional Commission,
vol. 1, p. 569].
It will be recalled that the Industrial Peace Act (R.A.
No. 875), which was repealed by the Labor Code
(P.D. 442) in 1974, expressly banned strikes by
employees in the Government, including
instrumentalities exercising governmental
functions, but excluding entities entrusted with
proprietary functions:
.Sec. 11. Prohibition Against Strikes in the
Government. — The terms and conditions of
employment in the Government, including any
political subdivision or instrumentality thereof, are
governed by law and it is declared to be the policy
of this Act that employees therein shall not strike
for the purpose of securing changes or
modification in their terms and conditions of
employment. Such employees may belong to any
labor organization which does not impose the
obligation to strike or to join in strike: Provided,
however, That this section shall apply only to
employees employed in governmental functions
and not those employed in proprietary functions of
the Government including but not limited to
governmental corporations.
CONSTI LAW APRIL 7, 2018 14
No similar provision is found in the Labor Code,
although at one time it recognized the right of
employees of government corporations
established under the Corporation Code to
organize and bargain collectively and those in the
civil service to "form organizations for purposes not
contrary to law" [Art. 244, before its amendment by
B.P. Blg. 70 in 1980], in the same breath it
provided that "[t]he terms and conditions of
employment of all government employees,
including employees of government owned and
controlled corporations, shall be governed by the
Civil Service Law, rules and regulations" [now Art.
276]. Understandably, the Labor Code is silent as
to whether or not government employees may
strike, for such are excluded from its coverage
[Ibid]. But then the Civil Service Decree [P.D. No.
807], is equally silent on the matter.
On June 1, 1987, to implement the constitutional
guarantee of the right of government employees to
organize, the President issued E.O. No. 180 which
provides guidelines for the exercise of the right to
organize of government employees. In Section 14
thereof, it is provided that "[t]he Civil Service law
and rules governing concerted activities and
strikes in the government service shall be
observed, subject to any legislation that may be
enacted by Congress." The President was
apparently referring to Memorandum Circular No.
6, s. 1987 of the Civil Service Commission under
date April 21, 1987 which, "prior to the enactment
by Congress of applicable laws concerning strike
by government employees ... enjoins under pain of
administrative sanctions, all government officers
and employees from staging strikes,
demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outs and other
forms of mass action which will result in temporary
stoppage or disruption of public service." The air
was thus cleared of the confusion. At present, in
the absence of any legislation allowing
government employees to strike, recognizing their
right to do so, or regulating the exercise of the
right, they are prohibited from striking, by express
provision of Memorandum Circular No. 6 and as
implied in E.O. No. 180. [At this juncture, it must be
stated that the validity of Memorandum Circular
No. 6 is not at issue].
But are employees of the SSS covered by the
prohibition against strikes?
The Court is of the considered view that they are.
Considering that under the 1987 Constitution "[t]he
civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions,
instrumentalities, and agencies of the
Government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charters" [Art.

IX(B), Sec. .2(l) see also Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180
where the employees in the civil service are
denominated as "government employees"] and
that the SSS is one such government-controlled
corporation with an original charter, having been
created under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are
part of the civil service [NASECO v. NLRC, G.R.
Nos. 69870 & 70295, November 24,1988] and are
covered by the Civil Service Commission's
memorandum prohibiting strikes. This being the
case, the strike staged by the employees of the
SSS was illegal.
The statement of the Court in Alliance of
Government Workers v. Minister of Labor and
Employment [G.R. No. 60403, August 3, 1:983,
124 SCRA 11 is relevant as it furnishes the
rationale for distinguishing between workers in the
private sector and government employees with
regard to the right to strike:
The general rule in the past and up to the present
is that 'the terms and conditions of employment in
the Government, including any political subdivision
or instrumentality thereof are governed by law"
(Section 11, the Industrial Peace Act, R.A. No.
875, as amended and Article 277, the Labor Code,
P.D. No. 442, as amended). Since the terms and
conditions of government employment are fixed by
law, government workers cannot use the same
weapons employed by workers in the private
sector to secure concessions from their employers.
The principle behind labor unionism in private
industry is that industrial peace cannot be secured
through compulsion by law. Relations between
private employers and their employees rest on an
essentially voluntary basis. Subject to the
minimum requirements of wage laws and other
labor and welfare legislation, the terms and
conditions of employment in the unionized private
sector are settled through the process of collective
bargaining. In government employment, however,
it is the legislature and, where properly given
delegated power, the administrative heads of
government which fix the terms and conditions of
employment. And this is effected through statutes
or administrative circulars, rules, and regulations,
not through collective bargaining agreements. [At
p. 13; Emphasis supplied].
Apropos is the observation of the Acting
Commissioner of Civil Service, in his position
paper submitted to the 1971 Constitutional
Convention, and quoted with approval by the Court
in Alliance, to wit:
It is the stand, therefore, of this Commission that
by reason of the nature of the public employer and
CONSTI LAW APRIL 7, 2018 15
the peculiar character of the public service, it must
necessarily regard the right to strike given to
unions in private industry as not applying to public
employees and civil service employees. It has
been stated that the Government, in contrast to the
private employer, protects the interest of all people
in the public service, and that accordingly, such
conflicting interests as are present in private labor
relations could not exist in the relations between
government and those whom they employ. [At pp.
16-17; also quoted in National Housing
Corporation v. Juco, G.R. No. 64313, January
17,1985,134 SCRA 172,178-179].
E.O. No. 180, which provides guidelines for the
exercise of the right to organize of government
employees, while clinging to the same philosophy,
has, however, relaxed the rule to allow negotiation
where the terms and conditions of employment
involved are not among those fixed by law. Thus:
.SECTION 13. Terms and conditions of
employment or improvements thereof, except
those that are fixed by law, may be the subject of
negotiations between duly recognized employees'
organizations and appropriate government
authorities.
The same executive order has also provided for
the general mechanism for the settlement of labor
disputes in the public sector to wit:
.SECTION 16. The Civil Service and labor laws
and procedures, whenever applicable, shall be
followed in the resolution of complaints,
grievances and cases involving government
employees. In case any dispute remains
unresolved after exhausting all the available
remedies under existing laws and procedures, the
parties may jointly refer the dispute to the [Public
Sector Labor- Management] Council for
appropriate action.
Government employees may, therefore, through
their unions or associations, either petition the
Congress for the betterment of the terms and
conditions of employment which are within the
ambit of legislation or negotiate with the
appropriate government agencies for the
improvement of those which are not fixed by law.
If there be any unresolved grievances, the dispute
may be referred to the Public Sector Labor -
Management Council for appropriate action. But
employees in the civil service may not resort to
strikes, walk-outs and other temporary work
stoppages, like workers in the private sector, to
pressure the Govemment to accede to their
demands. As now provided under Sec. 4, Rule III
 CONSTI LAW APRIL 7, 2018 16

of the Rules and Regulations to Govern the III

Exercise of the Right of Government- Employees
to Self- Organization, which took effect after the
instant dispute arose, "[t]he terms and conditions
of employment in the government, including any
political subdivision or instrumentality thereof and
government- owned and controlled corporations
with original charters are governed by law and
employees therein shall not strike for the purpose
of securing changes thereof."
II
The strike staged by the employees of the SSS
belonging to petitioner union being prohibited by
law, an injunction may be issued to restrain it.
It is futile for the petitioners to assert that the
subject labor dispute falls within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the NLRC and, hence, the Regional
Trial Court had no jurisdiction to issue a writ of
injunction enjoining the continuance of the strike.
The Labor Code itself provides that terms and
conditions of employment of government
employees shall be governed by the Civil Service
Law, rules and regulations [Art. 276]. More
importantly, E.O. No. 180 vests the Public Sector
Labor - Management Council with jurisdiction over
unresolved labor disputes involving government
employees [Sec. 16]. Clearly, the NLRC has no
jurisdiction over the dispute.
This being the case, the Regional Trial Court was
not precluded, in the exercise of its general
jurisdiction under B.P. Blg. 129, as amended, from
assuming jurisdiction over the SSS's complaint for
damages and issuing the injunctive writ prayed for
therein. Unlike the NLRC, the Public Sector Labor
- Management Council has not been granted by
law authority to issue writs of injunction in labor
disputes within its jurisdiction. Thus, since it is the
Council, and not the NLRC, that has jurisdiction
over the instant labor dispute, resort to the general
courts of law for the issuance of a writ of injunction
to enjoin the strike is appropriate.
In their "Petition/Application for Preliminary and
Mandatory Injunction," and reiterated in their reply
and supplemental reply, petitioners allege that the
SSS unlawfully withheld bonuses and benefits due
the individual petitioners and they pray that the
Court issue a writ of preliminary prohibitive and
mandatory injunction to restrain the SSS and its
agents from withholding payment thereof and to
compel the SSS to pay them. In their supplemental
reply, petitioners annexed an order of the Civil
Service Commission, dated May 5, 1989, which
ruled that the officers of the SSSEA who are not
preventively suspended and who are reporting for
work pending the resolution of the administrative
cases against them are entitled to their salaries,
year-end bonuses and other fringe benefits and
affirmed the previous order of the Merit Systems
Promotion Board.
The matter being extraneous to the issues
elevated to this Court, it is Our view that petitioners'
remedy is not to petition this Court to issue an
injunction, but to cause the execution of the
aforesaid order, if it has already become final.
WHEREFORE, no reversible error having been
committed by the Court of Appeals, the instant
petition for review is hereby DENIED and the
decision of the appellate court dated March 9,
1988 in CA-G.R. SP No. 13192 is AFFIRMED.
Petitioners' "Petition/Application for Preliminary
and Mandatory Injunction" dated December
13,1988 is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

Neither could the court a quo be accused of

imprudence or overzealousness, for in fact it had
proceeded with caution. Thus, after issuing a writ
of injunction enjoining the continuance of the strike
to prevent any further disruption of public service,
the respondent judge, in the same order,
admonished the parties to refer the unresolved
controversies emanating from their employer-
employee relationship to the Public Sector Labor -
Management Council for appropriate action [Rollo,
p. 86].

NON-IMPAIRMENT OF CONTRACTS
G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993
JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and JOSE
ALFONSO, all surnamed OPOSA, et.al.,
petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO
S. FACTORAN, JR., in his capacity as the
Secretary of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources, and THE HONORABLE
ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, Presiding Judge of
the RTC, Makati, Branch 66, respondents.
Oposa Law Office for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the
right of Filipinos to a balanced and healthful
ecology which the petitioners dramatically
associate with the twin concepts of "inter-
generational responsibility" and "inter-generational
justice." Specifically, it touches on the issue of
whether the said petitioners have a cause of action
to "prevent the misappropriation or impairment" of
Philippine rainforests and "arrest the unabated
hemorrhage of the country's vital life support
systems and continued rape of Mother Earth."
The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case No.
90-77 which was filed before Branch 66 (Makati,
Metro Manila) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
National Capital Judicial Region. The principal
plaintiffs therein, now the principal petitioners, are
all minors duly represented and joined by their
respective parents. Impleaded as an additional
plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc.
(PENI), a domestic, non-stock and non-profit
corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia,
engaging in concerted action geared for the
protection of our environment and natural
resources. The original defendant was the
Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then
Secretary of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR). His substitution in this
petition by the new Secretary, the Honorable Angel
C. Alcala, was subsequently ordered upon proper
motion by the petitioners.1 The complaint2 was
instituted as a taxpayers' class suit3 and alleges
that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of
the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full
benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource
treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests."
The same was filed for themselves and others who
are equally concerned about the preservation of
said resource but are "so numerous that it is
CONSTI LAW APRIL 7, 2018 17
impracticable to bring them all before the Court."
The minors further asseverate that they "represent
their generation as well as generations yet
unborn."4 Consequently, it is prayed for that
judgment be rendered:
. . . ordering defendant, his agents, representatives
and other persons acting in his behalf to —
(1) Cancel all existing timber license
agreements in the country;
(2) Cease and desist from receiving,
accepting, processing, renewing or approving new
timber license agreements.
and granting the plaintiffs ". . . such other reliefs
just and equitable under the premises."5
The complaint starts off with the general
averments that the Philippine archipelago of 7,100
islands has a land area of thirty million
(30,000,000) hectares and is endowed with rich,
lush and verdant rainforests in which varied, rare
and unique species of flora and fauna may be
found; these rainforests contain a genetic,
biological and chemical pool which is
irreplaceable; they are also the habitat of
indigenous Philippine cultures which have existed,
endured and flourished since time immemorial;
scientific evidence reveals that in order to maintain
a balanced and healthful ecology, the country's
land area should be utilized on the basis of a ratio
of fifty-four per cent (54%) for forest cover and
forty-six per cent (46%) for agricultural, residential,
industrial, commercial and other uses; the
distortion and disturbance of this balance as a
consequence of deforestation have resulted in a
host of environmental tragedies, such as (a) water
shortages resulting from drying up of the water
table, otherwise known as the "aquifer," as well as
of rivers, brooks and streams, (b) salinization of the
water table as a result of the intrusion therein of
salt water, incontrovertible examples of which may
be found in the island of Cebu and the Municipality
of Bacoor, Cavite, (c) massive erosion and the
consequential loss of soil fertility and agricultural
productivity, with the volume of soil eroded
estimated at one billion (1,000,000,000) cubic
meters per annum — approximately the size of the
entire island of Catanduanes, (d) the endangering
and extinction of the country's unique, rare and
varied flora and fauna, (e) the disturbance and
dislocation of cultural communities, including the
disappearance of the Filipino's indigenous
cultures, (f) the siltation of rivers and seabeds and
consequential destruction of corals and other
aquatic life leading to a critical reduction in marine

resource productivity, (g) recurrent spells of
drought as is presently experienced by the entire
country, (h) increasing velocity of typhoon winds
which result from the absence of windbreakers, (i)
the floodings of lowlands and agricultural plains
arising from the absence of the absorbent
mechanism of forests, (j) the siltation and
shortening of the lifespan of multi-billion peso
dams constructed and operated for the purpose of
supplying water for domestic uses, irrigation and
the generation of electric power, and (k) the
reduction of the earth's capacity to process carbon
dioxide gases which has led to perplexing and
catastrophic climatic changes such as the
phenomenon of global warming, otherwise known
as the "greenhouse effect."
Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and
detrimental consequences of continued and
deforestation are so capable of unquestionable
demonstration that the same may be submitted as
a matter of judicial notice. This notwithstanding,
they expressed their intention to present expert
witnesses as well as documentary, photographic
and film evidence in the course of the trial.
As their cause of action, they specifically allege
that:
CAUSE OF ACTION
7. Plaintiffs replead by reference the
foregoing allegations.
8. Twenty-five (25) years ago, the Philippines
had some sixteen (16) million hectares of
rainforests constituting roughly 53% of the
country's land mass.
9. Satellite images taken in 1987 reveal that
there remained no more than 1.2 million hectares
of said rainforests or four per cent (4.0%) of the
country's land area.
10. More recent surveys reveal that a mere
850,000 hectares of virgin old-growth rainforests
are left, barely 2.8% of the entire land mass of the
Philippine archipelago and about 3.0 million
hectares of immature and uneconomical
secondary growth forests.
11. Public records reveal that the defendant's,
predecessors have granted timber license
agreements ('TLA's') to various corporations to cut
the aggregate area of 3.89 million hectares for
commercial logging purposes.
CONSTI LAW APRIL 7, 2018 18
A copy of the TLA holders and the corresponding
areas covered is hereto attached as Annex "A".
12. At the present rate of deforestation, i.e.
about 200,000 hectares per annum or 25 hectares
per hour — nighttime, Saturdays, Sundays and
holidays included — the Philippines will be bereft
of forest resources after the end of this ensuing
decade, if not earlier.
13. The adverse effects, disastrous
consequences, serious injury and irreparable
damage of this continued trend of deforestation to
the plaintiff minor's generation and to generations
yet unborn are evident and incontrovertible. As a
matter of fact, the environmental damages
enumerated in paragraph 6 hereof are already
being felt, experienced and suffered by the
generation of plaintiff adults.
14. The continued allowance by defendant of
TLA holders to cut and deforest the remaining
forest stands will work great damage and
irreparable injury to plaintiffs — especially plaintiff
minors and their successors — who may never
see, use, benefit from and enjoy this rare and
unique natural resource treasure.
This act of defendant constitutes a
misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural
resource property he holds in trust for the benefit
of plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.
15. Plaintiffs have a clear and constitutional
right to a balanced and healthful ecology and are
entitled to protection by the State in its capacity as
the parens patriae.
16. Plaintiff have exhausted all administrative
remedies with the defendant's office. On March 2,
1990, plaintiffs served upon defendant a final
demand to cancel all logging permits in the
country.
A copy of the plaintiffs' letter dated March 1, 1990
is hereto attached as Annex "B".
17. Defendant, however, fails and refuses to
cancel the existing TLA's to the continuing serious
damage and extreme prejudice of plaintiffs.
18. The continued failure and refusal by
defendant to cancel the TLA's is an act violative of
the rights of plaintiffs, especially plaintiff minors
who may be left with a country that is desertified
(sic), bare, barren and devoid of the wonderful
flora, fauna and indigenous cultures which the
Philippines had been abundantly blessed with.

19. Defendant's refusal to cancel the
aforementioned TLA's is manifestly contrary to the
public policy enunciated in the Philippine
Environmental Policy which, in pertinent part,
states that it is the policy of the State —
(a) to create, develop, maintain and improve
conditions under which man and nature can thrive
in productive and enjoyable harmony with each
other;
(b) to fulfill the social, economic and other
requirements of present and future generations of
Filipinos and;
(c) to ensure the attainment of an
environmental quality that is conductive to a life of
dignity and well-being. (P.D. 1151, 6 June 1977)
20. Furthermore, defendant's continued
refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is
contradictory to the Constitutional policy of the
State to —
a. effect "a more equitable distribution of
opportunities, income and wealth" and "make full
and efficient use of natural resources (sic)."
(Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution);
b. "protect the nation's marine wealth."
(Section 2, ibid);
c. "conserve and promote the nation's cultural
heritage and resources (sic)" (Section 14, Article
XIV, id.);
d. "protect and advance the right of the
people to a balanced and healthful ecology in
accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature."
(Section 16, Article II, id.)
21. Finally, defendant's act is contrary to the
highest law of humankind — the natural law — and
violative of plaintiffs' right to self-preservation and
perpetuation.
22. There is no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in law other than the instant
action to arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the
country's vital life support systems and continued
rape of Mother Earth. 6
On 22 June 1990, the original defendant,
Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss
the complaint based on two (2) grounds, namely:
(1) the plaintiffs have no cause of action against
him and (2) the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a
CONSTI LAW APRIL 7, 2018 19
political question which properly pertains to the
legislative or executive branches of Government.
In their 12 July 1990 Opposition to the Motion, the
petitioners maintain that (1) the complaint shows a
clear and unmistakable cause of action, (2) the
motion is dilatory and (3) the action presents a
justiciable question as it involves the defendant's
abuse of discretion.
On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an
order granting the aforementioned motion to
dismiss.7 In the said order, not only was the
defendant's claim — that the complaint states no
cause of action against him and that it raises a
political question — sustained, the respondent
Judge further ruled that the granting of the relief
prayed for would result in the impairment of
contracts which is prohibited by the fundamental
law of the land.
Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
Court and ask this Court to rescind and set aside
the dismissal order on the ground that the
respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in
dismissing the action. Again, the parents of the
plaintiffs-minors not only represent their children,
but have also joined the latter in this case.8
On 14 May 1992, We resolved to give due course
to the petition and required the parties to submit
their respective Memoranda after the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Comment in behalf
of the respondents and the petitioners filed a reply
thereto.
Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and
unmistakably states a cause of action as it
contains sufficient allegations concerning their
right to a sound environment based on Articles 19,
20 and 21 of the Civil Code (Human Relations),
Section 4 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192
creating the DENR, Section 3 of Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental
Policy), Section 16, Article II of the 1987
Constitution recognizing the right of the people to
a balanced and healthful ecology, the concept of
generational genocide in Criminal Law and the
concept of man's inalienable right to self-
preservation and self-perpetuation embodied in
natural law. Petitioners likewise rely on the
respondent's correlative obligation per Section 4 of
E.O. No. 192, to safeguard the people's right to a
healthful environment.
It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent
Secretary's alleged grave abuse of discretion in
granting Timber License Agreements (TLAs) to

cover more areas for logging than what is available
involves a judicial question.
Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of
the Constitution's non-impairment clause,
petitioners maintain that the same does not apply
in this case because TLAs are not contracts. They
likewise submit that even if TLAs may be
considered protected by the said clause, it is well
settled that they may still be revoked by the State
when the public interest so requires.
On the other hand, the respondents aver that the
petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a
specific legal right violated by the respondent
Secretary for which any relief is provided by law.
They see nothing in the complaint but vague and
nebulous allegations concerning an
"environmental right" which supposedly entitles
the petitioners to the "protection by the state in its
capacity as parens patriae." Such allegations,
according to them, do not reveal a valid cause of
action. They then reiterate the theory that the
question of whether logging should be permitted in
the country is a political question which should be
properly addressed to the executive or legislative
branches of Government. They therefore assert
that the petitioners' resources is not to file an action
to court, but to lobby before Congress for the
passage of a bill that would ban logging totally.
As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs,
respondents submit that the same cannot be done
by the State without due process of law. Once
issued, a TLA remains effective for a certain period
of time — usually for twenty-five (25) years. During
its effectivity, the same can neither be revised nor
cancelled unless the holder has been found, after
due notice and hearing, to have violated the terms
of the agreement or other forestry laws and
regulations. Petitioners' proposition to have all the
TLAs indiscriminately cancelled without the
requisite hearing would be violative of the
requirements of due process.
Before going any further, We must first focus on
some procedural matters. Petitioners instituted
Civil Case No. 90-777 as a class suit. The original
defendant and the present respondents did not
take issue with this matter. Nevertheless, We
hereby rule that the said civil case is indeed a class
suit. The subject matter of the complaint is of
common and general interest not just to several,
but to all citizens of the Philippines. Consequently,
since the parties are so numerous, it, becomes
impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all
of them before the court. We likewise declare that
the plaintiffs therein are numerous and
CONSTI LAW APRIL 7, 2018 20
representative enough to ensure the full protection
of all concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites
for the filing of a valid class suit under Section 12,
Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court are present
both in the said civil case and in the instant petition,
the latter being but an incident to the former.
This case, however, has a special and novel
element. Petitioners minors assert that they
represent their generation as well as generations
yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they
can, for themselves, for others of their generation
and for the succeeding generations, file a class
suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the
succeeding generations can only be based on the
concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar
as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is
concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter
expounded, considers
the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means
the created world in its entirety.9 Such rhythm and
harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the
judicious disposition, utilization, management,
renewal and conservation of the country's forest,
mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore
areas and other natural resources to the end that
their exploration, development and utilization be
equitably accessible to the present as well as
future generations. 10 Needless to say, every
generation has a responsibility to the next to
preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full
enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology.
Put a little differently, the minors' assertion of their
right to a sound environment constitutes, at the
same time, the performance of their obligation to
ensure the protection of that right for the
generations to come.
The locus standi of the petitioners having thus
been addressed, We shall now proceed to the
merits of the petition.
After a careful perusal of the complaint in question
and a meticulous consideration and evaluation of
the issues raised and arguments adduced by the
parties, We do not hesitate to find for the
petitioners and rule against the respondent
Judge's challenged order for having been issued
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. The pertinent portions of the said order
reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
After a careful and circumspect evaluation of the
Complaint, the Court cannot help but agree with
the defendant. For although we believe that
plaintiffs have but the noblest of all intentions, it

(sic) fell short of alleging, with sufficient
definiteness, a specific legal right they are seeking
to enforce and protect, or a specific legal wrong
they are seeking to prevent and redress (Sec. 1,
Rule 2, RRC). Furthermore, the Court notes that
the Complaint is replete with vague assumptions
and vague conclusions based on unverified data.
In fine, plaintiffs fail to state a cause of action in its
Complaint against the herein defendant.
Furthermore, the Court firmly believes that the
matter before it, being impressed with political
color and involving a matter of public policy, may
not be taken cognizance of by this Court without
doing violence to the sacred principle of
"Separation of Powers" of the three (3) co-equal
branches of the Government.
The Court is likewise of the impression that it
cannot, no matter how we stretch our jurisdiction,
grant the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to
cancel all existing timber license agreements in the
country and to cease and desist from receiving,
accepting, processing, renewing or approving new
timber license agreements. For to do otherwise
would amount to "impairment of contracts"
abhored (sic) by the fundamental law. 11
We do not agree with the trial court's conclusions
that the plaintiffs failed to allege with sufficient
definiteness a specific legal right involved or a
specific legal wrong committed, and that the
complaint is replete with vague assumptions and
conclusions based on unverified data. A reading of
the complaint itself belies these conclusions.
The complaint focuses on one specific
fundamental legal right — the right to a balanced
and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our
nation's constitutional history, is solemnly
incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16,
Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly
provides:
Sec. 16. The State shall protect and
advance the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and
harmony of nature.
This right unites with the right to health which is
provided for in the preceding section of the same
article:
Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote
the right to health of the people and instill health
consciousness among them.
CONSTI LAW APRIL 7, 2018 21
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology
is to be found under the Declaration of Principles
and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights,
it does not follow that it is less important than any
of the civil and political rights enumerated in the
latter. Such a right belongs to a different category
of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than
self-preservation and self-perpetuation — aptly
and fittingly stressed by the petitioners — the
advancement of which may even be said to
predate all governments and constitutions. As a
matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be
written in the Constitution for they are assumed to
exist from the inception of humankind. If they are
now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental
charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its
framers that unless the rights to a balanced and
healthful ecology and to health are mandated as
state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby
highlighting their continuing importance and
imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to
preserve the first and protect and advance the
second, the day would not be too far when all else
would be lost not only for the present generation,
but also for those to come — generations which
stand to inherit nothing but parched earth
incapable of sustaining life.
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology
carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from
impairing the environment. During the debates on
this right in one of the plenary sessions of the 1986
Constitutional Commission, the following
exchange transpired between Commissioner
Wilfrido Villacorta and Commissioner Adolfo
Azcuna who sponsored the section in question:
MR. VILLACORTA:
Does this section mandate the State to provide
sanctions against all forms of pollution — air, water
and noise pollution?
MR. AZCUNA:
Yes, Madam President. The right to healthful (sic)
environment necessarily carries with it the
correlative duty of not impairing the same and,
therefore, sanctions may be provided for
impairment of environmental balance. 12
The said right implies, among many other things,
the judicious management and conservation of the
country's forests.
Without such forests, the ecological or
environmental balance would be irreversiby
disrupted.

Conformably with the enunciated right to a
balanced and healthful ecology and the right to
health, as well as the other related provisions of
the Constitution concerning the conservation,
development and utilization of the country's natural
resources, 13 then President Corazon C. Aquino
promulgated on 10 June 1987 E.O. No. 192, 14
Section 4 of which expressly mandates that the
Department of Environment and Natural
Resources "shall be the primary government
agency responsible for the conservation,
management, development and proper use of the
country's environment and natural resources,
specifically forest and grazing lands, mineral,
resources, including those in reservation and
watershed areas, and lands of the public domain,
as well as the licensing and regulation of all natural
resources as may be provided for by law in order
to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits derived
therefrom for the welfare of the present and future
generations of Filipinos." Section 3 thereof makes
the following statement of policy:
Sec. 3. Declaration of Policy. — It is hereby
declared the policy of the State to ensure the
sustainable use, development, management,
renewal, and conservation of the country's forest,
mineral, land, off-shore areas and other natural
resources, including the protection and
enhancement of the quality of the environment,
and equitable access of the different segments of
the population to the development and the use of
the country's natural resources, not only for the
present generation but for future generations as
well. It is also the policy of the state to recognize
and apply a true value system including social and
environmental cost implications relative to their
utilization, development and conservation of our
natural resources.
This policy declaration is substantially re-stated it
Title XIV, Book IV of the Administrative Code of
1987,15 specifically in Section 1 thereof which
reads:
Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. — (1) The State shall
ensure, for the benefit of the Filipino people, the
full exploration and development as well as the
judicious disposition, utilization, management,
renewal and conservation of the country's forest,
mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore
areas and other natural resources, consistent with
the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological
balance and protecting and enhancing the quality
of the environment and the objective of making the
exploration, development and utilization of such
natural resources equitably accessible to the
CONSTI LAW APRIL 7, 2018 22
different segments of the present as well as future
generations.
(2) The State shall likewise recognize and
apply a true value system that takes into account
social and environmental cost implications relative
to the utilization, development and conservation of
our natural resources.
The above provision stresses "the necessity of
maintaining a sound ecological balance and
protecting and enhancing the quality of the
environment." Section 2 of the same Title, on the
other hand, specifically speaks of the mandate of
the DENR; however, it makes particular reference
to the fact of the agency's being subject to law and
higher authority. Said section provides:
Sec. 2. Mandate. — (1) The Department of
Environment and Natural Resources shall be
primarily responsible for the implementation of the
foregoing policy.
(2) It shall, subject to law and higher authority,
be in charge of carrying out the State's
constitutional mandate to control and supervise
the exploration, development, utilization, and
conservation of the country's natural resources.
Both E.O. NO. 192 and the Administrative Code of
1987 have set the objectives which will serve as
the bases for policy formulation, and have defined
the powers and functions of the DENR.
It may, however, be recalled that even before the
ratification of the 1987 Constitution, specific
statutes already paid special attention to the
"environmental right" of the present and future
generations. On 6 June 1977, P.D. No. 1151
(Philippine Environmental Policy) and P.D. No.
1152 (Philippine Environment Code) were issued.
The former "declared a continuing policy of the
State (a) to create, develop, maintain and improve
conditions under which man and nature can thrive
in productive and enjoyable harmony with each
other, (b) to fulfill the social, economic and other
requirements of present and future generations of
Filipinos, and (c) to insure the attainment of an
environmental quality that is conducive to a life of
dignity and well-being." 16 As its goal, it speaks of
the "responsibilities of each generation as trustee
and guardian of the environment for succeeding
generations." 17 The latter statute, on the other
hand, gave flesh to the said policy.
Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they
represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is
as clear as the DENR's duty — under its mandate

and by virtue of its powers and functions under
E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987
— to protect and advance the said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who
has the corelative duty or obligation to respect or
protect the same gives rise to a cause of action.
Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLAs,
which they claim was done with grave abuse of
discretion, violated their right to a balanced and
healthful ecology; hence, the full protection thereof
requires that no further TLAs should be renewed
or granted.
A cause of action is defined as:
. . . an act or omission of one party in violation of
the legal right or rights of the other; and its
essential elements are legal right of the plaintiff,
correlative obligation of the defendant, and act or
omission of the defendant in violation of said legal
right. 18
It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to
dismiss based on the ground that the complaint
fails to state a cause of action, 19 the question
submitted to the court for resolution involves the
sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint
itself. No other matter should be considered;
furthermore, the truth of falsity of the said
allegations is beside the point for the truth thereof
is deemed hypothetically admitted. The only issue
to be resolved in such a case is: admitting such
alleged facts to be true, may the court render a
valid judgment in accordance with the prayer in the
complaint? 20 In Militante vs. Edrosolano, 21 this
Court laid down the rule that the judiciary should
"exercise the utmost care and circumspection in
passing upon a motion to dismiss on the ground of
the absence thereof [cause of action] lest, by its
failure to manifest a correct appreciation of the
facts alleged and deemed hypothetically admitted,
what the law grants or recognizes is effectively
nullified. If that happens, there is a blot on the legal
order. The law itself stands in disrepute."
After careful examination of the petitioners'
complaint, We find the statements under the
introductory affirmative allegations, as well as the
specific averments under the sub-heading CAUSE
OF ACTION, to be adequate enough to show,
prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights. On
the basis thereof, they may thus be granted, wholly
or partly, the reliefs prayed for. It bears stressing,
however, that insofar as the cancellation of the
TLAs is concerned, there is the need to implead,
as party defendants, the grantees thereof for they
are indispensable parties.
CONSTI LAW APRIL 7, 2018 23
The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-777
be said to raise a political question. Policy
formulation or determination by the executive or
legislative branches of Government is not squarely
put in issue. What is principally involved is the
enforcement of a right vis-a-vis policies already
formulated and expressed in legislation. It must,
nonetheless, be emphasized that the political
question doctrine is no longer, the insurmountable
obstacle to the exercise of judicial power or the
impenetrable shield that protects executive and
legislative actions from judicial inquiry or review.
The second paragraph of section 1, Article VIII of
the Constitution states that:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government.
Commenting on this provision in his book,
Philippine Political Law, 22 Mr. Justice Isagani A.
Cruz, a distinguished member of this Court, says:
The first part of the authority represents the
traditional concept of judicial power, involving the
settlement of conflicting rights as conferred as law.
The second part of the authority represents a
broadening of judicial power to enable the courts
of justice to review what was before forbidden
territory, to wit, the discretion of the political
departments of the government.
As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary,
and particularly the Supreme Court, the power to
rule upon even the wisdom of the decisions of the
executive and the legislature and to declare their
acts invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction
because tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
The catch, of course, is the meaning of "grave
abuse of discretion," which is a very elastic phrase
that can expand or contract according to the
disposition of the judiciary.
In Daza vs. Singson, 23 Mr. Justice Cruz, now
speaking for this Court, noted:
In the case now before us, the jurisdictional
objection becomes even less tenable and decisive.
The reason is that, even if we were to assume that
the issue presented before us was political in
nature, we would still not be precluded from
revolving it under the expanded jurisdiction
conferred upon us that now covers, in proper

cases, even the political question. Article VII,
Section 1, of the Constitution clearly provides: . . .
The last ground invoked by the trial court in
dismissing the complaint is the non-impairment of
contracts clause found in the Constitution. The
court a quo declared that:
The Court is likewise of the impression that it
cannot, no matter how we stretch our jurisdiction,
grant the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to
cancel all existing timber license agreements in the
country and to cease and desist from receiving,
accepting, processing, renewing or approving new
timber license agreements. For to do otherwise
would amount to "impairment of contracts"
abhored (sic) by the fundamental law. 24
We are not persuaded at all; on the contrary, We
are amazed, if not shocked, by such a sweeping
pronouncement. In the first place, the respondent
Secretary did not, for obvious reasons, even
invoke in his motion to dismiss the non-impairment
clause. If he had done so, he would have acted
with utmost infidelity to the Government by
providing undue and unwarranted benefits and
advantages to the timber license holders because
he would have forever bound the Government to
strictly respect the said licenses according to their
terms and conditions regardless of changes in
policy and the demands of public interest and
welfare. He was aware that as correctly pointed out
by the petitioners, into every timber license must
be read Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code
(P.D. No. 705) which provides:
. . . Provided, That when the national interest so
requires, the President may amend, modify,
replace or rescind any contract, concession,
permit, licenses or any other form of privilege
granted herein . . .
Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked
or rescinded by executive action. It is not a
contract, property or a property right protested by
the due process clause of the Constitution. In Tan
vs. Director of Forestry, 25 this Court held:
. . . A timber license is an instrument by which the
State regulates the utilization and disposition of
forest resources to the end that public welfare is
promoted. A timber license is not a contract within
the purview of the due process clause; it is only a
license or privilege, which can be validly withdrawn
whenever dictated by public interest or public
welfare as in this case.
CONSTI LAW APRIL 7, 2018 24
A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what
otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract
between the authority, federal, state, or municipal,
granting it and the person to whom it is granted;
neither is it property or a property right, nor does it
create a vested right; nor is it taxation (37 C.J.
168). Thus, this Court held that the granting of
license does not create irrevocable rights, neither
is it property or property rights (People vs. Ong Tin,
54 O.G. 7576).
We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe
Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. vs. Deputy Executive
Secretary: 26
. . . Timber licenses, permits and license
agreements are the principal instruments by which
the State regulates the utilization and disposition
of forest resources to the end that public welfare is
promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that they
merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to
qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a
permanent or irrevocable right to the particular
concession area and the forest products therein.
They may be validly amended, modified, replaced
or rescinded by the Chief Executive when national
interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed
contracts within the purview of the due process of
law clause [See Sections 3(ee) and 20 of Pres.
Decree No. 705, as amended. Also, Tan v. Director
of Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548, October 27, 1983,
125 SCRA 302].
Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-
impairment clause, which reads:
Sec. 10. No law impairing, the obligation of
contracts shall be passed. 27 cannot be invoked.
In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that
the same are contracts, the instant case does not
involve a law or even an executive issuance
declaring the cancellation or modification of
existing timber licenses. Hence, the non-
impairment clause cannot as yet be invoked.
Nevertheless, granting further that a law has
actually been passed mandating cancellations or
modifications, the same cannot still be stigmatized
as a violation of the non-impairment clause. This is
because by its very nature and purpose, such as
law could have only been passed in the exercise
of the police power of the state for the purpose of
advancing the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology, promoting their health and
enhancing the general welfare. In Abe vs. Foster
Wheeler
Corp. 28 this Court stated:
 CONSTI LAW APRIL 7, 2018 25

The freedom of contract, under our system of

government, is not meant to be absolute. The
same is understood to be subject to reasonable
legislative regulation aimed at the promotion of
public health, moral, safety and welfare. In other
words, the constitutional guaranty of non-
impairment of obligations of contract is limited by
the exercise of the police power of the State, in the
interest of public health, safety, moral and general
welfare.

The reason for this is emphatically set forth in

Nebia vs. New York, 29 quoted in Philippine
American Life Insurance Co. vs. Auditor
General,30 to wit:

Under our form of government the use of property

and the making of contracts are normally matters
of private and not of public concern. The general
rule is that both shall be free of governmental
interference. But neither property rights nor
contract rights are absolute; for government
cannot exist if the citizen may at will use his
property to the detriment of his fellows, or exercise
his freedom of contract to work them harm. Equally
fundamental with the private right is that of the
public to regulate it in the common interest.

In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to

the police power of the state. 31

Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did,

how the non-impairment clause could apply with
respect to the prayer to enjoin the respondent
Secretary from receiving, accepting, processing,
renewing or approving new timber licenses for,
save in cases of renewal, no contract would have
as of yet existed in the other instances. Moreover,
with respect to renewal, the holder is not entitled to
it as a matter of right.

WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the

instant Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the
challenged Order of respondent Judge of 18 July
1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is hereby
set aside. The petitioners may therefore amend
their complaint to implead as defendants the
holders or grantees of the questioned timber
license agreements.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 126102. December 4, 2000]
ORTIGAS & CO. LTD., petitioner, vs. THE
COURT OF APPEALS and ISMAEL G. MATHAY
III, respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition seeks to reverse the decision of the
Court of Appeals, dated March 25, 1996, in CA-
G.R. SP No. 39193, which nullified the writ of
preliminary injunction issued by the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig City, Branch 261, in Civil Case No.
64931. It also assails the resolution of the
appellate court, dated August 13, 1996, denying
petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The facts of this case, as culled from the records,
are as follows:
On August 25, 1976, petitioner Ortigas & Company
sold to Emilia Hermoso, a parcel of land known as
Lot 1, Block 21, Psd-66759, with an area of 1,508
square meters, located in Greenhills Subdivision
IV, San Juan, Metro Manila, and covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 0737. The contract
of sale provided that the lot:
1. (1) be used exclusivelyfor residential purposes
only, and not more than one single-family
residential building will be constructed thereon,
xxx
6. The BUYER shall not erectany sign or billboard
on the rooffor advertising purposes
xxx
11. No single-family residential building shall be
erecteduntil the building plans, specificationhave
been approved by the SELLER
xxx
14....restrictions shall run with the land and shall
be construed as real covenants until December 31,
2025 when they shall cease and terminate[1]
These and the other conditions were duly
annotated on the certificate of title issued to Emilia.
In 1981, the Metropolitan Manila Commission (now
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority)
enacted MMC Ordinance No. 81-01, also known
as the Comprehensive Zoning Area for the
CONSTI LAW APRIL 7, 2018 26
National Capital Region. The ordinance
reclassified as a commercial area a portion of
Ortigas Avenue from Madison to Roosevelt Streets
of Greenhills Subdivision where the lot is located.
On June 8, 1984, private respondent Ismael
Mathay III leased the lot from Emilia Hermoso and
J.P. Hermoso Realty Corp.. The lease contract did
not specify the purposes of the lease. Thereupon,
private respondent constructed a single story
commercial building for Greenhills Autohaus, Inc.,
a car sales company.
On January 18, 1995, petitioner filed a complaint
against Emilia Hermoso with the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig, Branch 261. Docketed as Civil
Case No. 64931, the complaint sought the
demolition of the said commercial structure for
having violated the terms and conditions of the
Deed of Sale. Complainant prayed for the issuance
of a temporary restraining order and a writ of
preliminary injunction to prohibit petitioner from
constructing the commercial building and/or
engaging in commercial activity on the lot. The
complaint was later amended to implead Ismael G.
Mathay III and J.P. Hermoso Realty Corp., which
has a ten percent (10%) interest in the lot.
In his answer, Mathay III denied any knowledge of
the restrictions on the use of the lot and filed a
cross-claim against the Hermosos.
On June 16, 1995, the trial court issued the writ of
preliminary injunction. On June 29, 1995, Mathay
III moved to set aside the injunctive order, but the
trial court denied the motion.
Mathay III then filed with the Court of Appeals a
special civil action for certiorari, docketed as CA-
G.R. SP No. 39193, ascribing to the trial court
grave abuse of discretion in issuing the writ of
preliminary injunction. He claimed that MMC
Ordinance No. 81-01 classified the area where the
lot was located as commercial area and said
ordinance must be read into the August 25, 1976
Deed of Sale as a concrete exercise of police
power.
Ortigas and Company averred that inasmuch as
the restrictions on the use of the lot were duly
annotated on the title it issued to Emilia Hermoso,
said restrictions must prevail over the ordinance,
specially since these restrictions were agreed
upon before the passage of MMC Ordinance No.
81-01.
On March 25, 1996, the appellate court disposed
of the case as follows:

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the petition
is hereby GRANTED. The assailed orders are
hereby nullified and set aside.
SO ORDERED.[2]
In finding for Mathay III, the Court of Appeals held
that the MMC Ordinance No. 81-01 effectively
nullified the restrictions allowing only residential
use of the property in question.
Ortigas seasonably moved for reconsideration, but
the appellate court denied it on August 13, 1996.
Hence, the instant petition.
In its Memorandum, petitioner now submits that
the principal issue in this case is whether
respondent Court of Appeals correctly set aside
the Order dated June 16, 1995 of the trial court
which issued the writ of preliminary injunction on
the sole ground that MMC Ordinance No. 81-01
nullified the building restriction imposing exclusive
residential use on the property in question.[3] It
also asserts that Mathay III lacks legal capacity to
question the validity of conditions of the deed of
sale; and he is barred by estoppel or waiver to
raise the same question like his principals, the
owners.[4] Lastly, it avers that the appellate court
unaccountably failed to address several questions
of fact.
Principally, we must resolve the issue of whether
the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the trial
court committed grave abuse of discretion when it
refused to apply MMC Ordinance No.81-01 to Civil
Case No. 64931.
But first, we must address petitioners allegation
that the Court of Appeals unaccountably failed to
address questions of fact. For basic is the rule that
factual issues may not be raised before this Court
in a petition for review and this Court is not duty-
bound to consider said questions.[5] CA-G.R. SP
No. 39193 was a special civil action for certiorari,
and the appellate court only had to determine if the
trial court committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to want or excess of jurisdiction in
issuing the writ of preliminary injunction. Thus,
unless vital to our determination of the issue at
hand, we shall refrain from further consideration of
factual questions.
Petitioner contends that the appellate court erred
in limiting its decision to the cited zoning
ordinance. It avers that a contractual right is not
automatically discarded once a claim is made that
CONSTI LAW APRIL 7, 2018 27
it conflicts with police power. Petitioner submits
that the restrictive clauses in the questioned
contract is not in conflict with the zoning ordinance.
For one, according to petitioner, the MMC
Ordinance No. 81-01 did not prohibit the
construction of residential buildings. Petitioner
argues that even with the zoning ordinance, the
seller and buyer of the re-classified lot can
voluntarily agree to an exclusive residential use
thereof. Hence, petitioner concludes that the Court
of Appeals erred in holding that the condition
imposing exclusive residential use was effectively
nullified by the zoning ordinance.
In its turn, private respondent argues that the
appellate court correctly ruled that the trial court
had acted with grave abuse of discretion in
refusing to subject the contract to the MMC
Ordinance No. 81-01. He avers that the appellate
court properly held the police power superior to the
non-impairment of contract clause in the
Constitution. He concludes that the appellate court
did not err in dissolving the writ of preliminary
injunction issued by the trial court in excess of its
jurisdiction.
We note that in issuing the disputed writ of
preliminary injunction, the trial court observed that
the contract of sale was entered into in August
1976, while the zoning ordinance was enacted only
in March 1981. The trial court reasoned that since
private respondent had failed to show that MMC
Ordinance No. 81-01 had retroactive effect, said
ordinance should be given prospective application
only,[6] citing Co vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,
162 SCRA 390 (1988).
In general, we agree that laws are to be construed
as having only prospective operation. Lex
prospicit, non respicit. Equally settled, only laws
existing at the time of the execution of a contract
are applicable thereto and not later statutes,
unless the latter are specifically intended to have
retroactive effect.[7] A later law which enlarges,
abridges, or in any manner changes the intent of
the parties to the contract necessarily impairs the
contract itself[8] and cannot be given retroactive
effect without violating the constitutional
prohibition against impairment of contracts.[9]
But, the foregoing principles do admit of certain
exceptions. One involves police power. A law
enacted in the exercise of police power to regulate
or govern certain activities or transactions could be
given retroactive effect and may reasonably impair
vested rights or contracts. Police power legislation
is applicable not only to future contracts, but
equally to those already in existence.[10]

Nonimpairment of contracts or vested rights
clauses will have to yield to the superior and
legitimate exercise by the State of police power to
promote the health, morals, peace, education,
good order, safety, and general welfare of the
people.[11] Moreover, statutes in exercise of valid
police power must be read into every contract.[12]
Noteworthy, in Sangalang vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court,[13] we already upheld MMC
Ordinance No. 81-01 as a legitimate police power
measure.
The trial courts reliance on the Co vs. IAC,[14] is
misplaced. In Co, the disputed area was
agricultural and Ordinance No. 81-01 did not
specifically provide that it shall have retroactive
effect so as to discontinue all rights previously
acquired over lands located within the zone which
are neither residential nor light industrial in
nature,[15] and stated with respect to agricultural
areas covered that the zoning ordinance should be
given prospective operation only.[16] The area in
this case involves not agricultural but urban
residential land. Ordinance No. 81-01 retroactively
affected the operation of the zoning ordinance in
Greenhills by reclassifying certain locations therein
as commercial.
Following our ruling in Ortigas & Co., Ltd. vs. Feati
Bank & Trust Co., 94 SCRA 533 (1979), the
contractual stipulations annotated on the Torrens
Title, on which Ortigas relies, must yield to the
ordinance. When that stretch of Ortigas Avenue
from Roosevelt Street to Madison Street was
reclassified as a commercial zone by the
Metropolitan Manila Commission in March 1981,
the restrictions in the contract of sale between
Ortigas and Hermoso, limiting all construction on
the disputed lot to single-family residential
buildings, were deemed extinguished by the
retroactive operation of the zoning ordinance and
could no longer be enforced. While our legal
system upholds the sanctity of contract so that a
contract is deemed law between the contracting
parties,[17] nonetheless, stipulations in a contract
cannot contravene law, morals, good customs,
public order, or public policy.[18] Otherwise such
stipulations would be deemed null and void.
Respondent court correctly found that the trial
court committed in this case a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to want of or excess of
jurisdiction in refusing to treat Ordinance No. 81-
01 as applicable to Civil Case No. 64931. In
resolving matters in litigation, judges are not only
duty-bound to ascertain the facts and the
applicable laws,[19] they are also bound by their
oath of office to apply the applicable law.[20]
CONSTI LAW APRIL 7, 2018 28
As a secondary issue, petitioner contends that
respondent Mathay III, as a mere lessee of the lot
in question, is a total stranger to the deed of sale
and is thus barred from questioning the conditions
of said deed. Petitioner points out that the owners
of the lot voluntarily agreed to the restrictions on
the use of the lot and do not question the validity
of these restrictions. Petitioner argues that Mathay
III as a lessee is merely an agent of the owners,
and could not override and rise above the status of
his principals. Petitioner submits that he could not
have a higher interest than those of the owners,
the Hermosos, and thus had no locus standi to file
CA-G.R. SP No. 39193 to dissolve the injunctive
writ issued by the RTC of Pasig City.
For his part, private respondent argues that as the
lessee who built the commercial structure, it is he
and he alone who stands to be either benefited or
injured by the results of the judgment in Civil Case
No. 64931. He avers he is the party with real
interest in the subject matter of the action, as it
would be his business, not the Hermosos, which
would suffer had not the respondent court
dissolved the writ of preliminary injunction.
A real party in interest is defined as the party who
stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment
or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Interest
within the meaning of the rule means material
interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by
the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in
the question involved, or a mere incidental
interest.[21] By real interest is meant a present
substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere
expectancy or a future, contingent, subordinate, or
consequential interest.[22]
Tested by the foregoing definition, private
respondent in this case is clearly a real party in
interest. It is not disputed that he is in possession
of the lot pursuant to a valid lease. He is a
possessor in the concept of a holder of the thing
under Article 525 of the Civil Code.[23] He was
impleaded as a defendant in the amended
complaint in Civil Case No. 64931. Further, what
petitioner seeks to enjoin is the building by
respondent of a commercial structure on the lot.
Clearly, it is private respondents acts which are in
issue, and his interest in said issue cannot be a
mere incidental interest. In its amended complaint,
petitioner prayed for, among others, judgment
ordering the demolition of all improvements
illegally built on the lot in question.[24] These show
that it is petitioner Mathay III, doing business as
Greenhills Autohaus, Inc., and not only the
Hermosos, who will be adversely affected by the
courts decree.
 CONSTI LAW APRIL 7, 2018 29

Petitioner also cites the rule that a stranger to a

contract has no rights or obligations under it,[25]
and thus has no standing to challenge its
validity.[26] But in seeking to enforce the
stipulations in the deed of sale, petitioner
impleaded private respondent as a defendant.
Thus petitioner must recognize that where a
plaintiff has impleaded a party as a defendant, he
cannot subsequently question the latters standing
in court.[27]

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The

challenged decision of the Court of Appeals dated
March 25, 1996, as well as the assailed resolution
of August 13, 1996, in CA-G.R. SP No. 39193 is
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

ACCESS TO COURTS
G.R. No. L-21707 March 18, 1967
FELIPE ACAR, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
HON. INOCENCIO ROSAL, in his capacity as
Executive Judge, Court of First Instance of
Negros Oriental, 12th Judicial District,
respondent.
F. S. Villarin for petitioners.
Jose B. Navarro for respondent.
BENGZON J.P., J.:
All over the world, Constitutions share one
purpose: to protect and enhance the people's
interest, as a nation collectively and as persons
individually. The Philippine Constitution is no
exception. Interpretation of its provisions,
therefore, should be done with a view to realizing
this fundamental objective. Among the provisions
in our Constitution is one both, timely and far-
reaching, as it affects the people at large and
relates to social justice problems of the day. It is
Subsec. 21, Sec. I of Art. III: "Free access to the
courts shall not be denied to any person by reason
of poverty." It is the one involved in this case.
A suit was filed in the Court of First Instance of
Negros Oriental on February 21, 1963 by ten
persons for their own behalf and that of 9,000 other
farm laborers working off and on in sugar cane
plantations at the Bais milling district, Negros
Oriental, against Compañia General de Tabacos
de Filipinas, Central Azucarera de Bais, Compañia
Celulosa de Filipinas, Ramon Barata, Aurelio
Montinola, Sr., and Miguel Franco. Plaintiffs
sought to recover their alleged participations or
shares amounting to the aggregate sum of
P14,031,836.74, in the sugar, molasses, bagasse
and other derivatives based on the provisions of
Republic Act 809 (The Sugar Act of 1952),
particularly Sections 1 and 9 thereof:
SECTION 1. In the absence of written milling
agreements between the majority of planters and
the millers of sugarcane in any milling district in the
Philippines, the unrefined sugar produced in that
district from the milling by any sugar central of the
sugar-cane of any sugar-cane planter or plantation
owner, as well as all by-products and derivatives
thereof, shall be divided between them as follows:
Sixty per centum for the planter, and forty per
centum for the central in any milling district the
maximum actual production of which is not more
CONSTI LAW APRIL 7, 2018 30
than four hundred thousand piculs: Provided, That
the provisions of this section shall not apply to
sugar centrals with an actual production of less
than one hundred fifty thousand piculs;
Sixty-two and one-half per centum for the planter,
and thirty-seven and one-half per centum for the
central in any milling district the maximum actual
production of which exceeds four hundred
thousand piculs but does not exceed six hundred
thousand piculs;
Sixty-five per centum for the planter, and thirty-five
per centum for the central in any milling district the
maximum actual production of which exceeds six
hundred thousand piculs but does not exceed nine
hundred thousand piculs;
Sixty-seven and one-half per centum for the
planter, and thirty-two and one-half per centum for
the central in any milling district the maximum
actual production of which exceeds nine hundred
thousand piculs but does not exceed one million
two hundred thousand piculs;
Seventy per centum for the planter, and thirty per
centum for the central in any milling district the
maximum actual production of which exceeds one
million two hundred thousand piculs.1äwphï1.ñët
By actual production is meant the total production
of the mill for the crop year immediately preceding.
xxx xxx xxx
SEC. 9. In addition to the benefits granted by the
Minimum Wage Law, the proceeds of any increase
in the participation granted the planters under this
Act and above their present share shall be divided
between the planter and his laborers in the
plantation in the following proportion:
Sixty per centum of the increased participation for
the laborers and forty per centum for the planters.
The distribution of the share corresponding to the
laborers shall be made under the supervision of
the Department of Labor.
The benefits granted to laborers in sugar
plantations under this Act and in the Minimum
Wage Law shall not in any way be diminished by
such labor contracts known as "by the piece," "by
the volume," "by the area," or by any other system
of "pakyaw," the Secretary of Labor being hereby
authorized to issue the necessary orders for the
enforcement of this provision."

Furthermore, plaintiffs asked thereunder as well as
by separate motion, that the aforementioned court
authorize them to sue as pauper litigants, under
Sec. 22, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 22. Pauper litigant. — Any court may
authorize a litigant to prosecute his action or
defense as a pauper upon a proper showing that
he has no means to that effect by affidavits,
certificate of the corresponding provincial, city or
municipal treasurer, or otherwise. Such authority
once given shall include an exemption from
payment of legal fees and from filing appeal bond,
printed record and printed brief. The legal fees
shall be a lien to any judgment rendered in the
case favorably to the pauper, unless the court
otherwise provides.
invoking Sec. 1, subsec. (21) of Art. III of the
Constitution of the Philippines. They alleged that
they had no means, to pay the docket fee of
P14,500.00, being laborers dependent solely on
their daily wages for livehood and possessed of no
properties. And in support of the foregoing, the ten
named plaintiffs submitted certificates of the
municipal treasurers of their places of residence
stating that they have no real property declared in
their names in said municipalities.
Acting on the petition to litigate in forma pauperis,
the Court of First Instance issued an order on May
27, 1963, denying the same upon the ground that
the plaintiffs have regular employment and
sources of income and, thus, can not be classified
as poor or paupers.
Plaintiffs sought reconsideration of said order but
reconsideration was denied in an order dated June
11, 1963. Assailing said two CFI orders and
asserting their alleged right not to be denied free
access to the courts by reason of poverty, plaintiffs
in said case filed herein, on August 1, 1963, the
present special civil action or certiorari and
mandamus. Petition to litigate as pauper in the
instant case before Us was also filed. And on
August 16, 1963, We allowed petitioners herein to
litigate in this Court as paupers and required
respondent to answer. Respondent's answer was
filed on November 2, 1963. After hearing on
February 10, 1964 this case was submitted for
decision.
The sole issue herein is whether petitioners were
deprived, by the orders in question, of free access
to the courts by reason of poverty. In denying
petitioners' motion to litigate as paupers,
respondent Judge adopted the definition at
"pauper" in Black's Law Dictionary (at p. 1284) as
CONSTI LAW APRIL 7, 2018 31
"a person so poor that he must be supported at
public expense". And, as afore-stated, he ruled
that petitioners are not that poor.
Such interpretation, to our mind, does not fit with
the purpose of the rules on suits in forma pauperis
and the provision of the Constitution, in the Bill of
Rights, that: "Free access to the courts shall not be
denied to any person by reason of poverty." As
applied to statutes or provisions on the right to sue
in forma pauperis, the term has a broader
meaning. It has thus been recognized that: "An
applicant for leave to sue in forma pauperis need
not be a pauper; the fact that he is able-bodied and
may earn the necessary money is no answer to his
statement that he has not sufficient means to
prosecute the action or to secure the costs" (14
Am. Jur. 31). It suffices that plaintiff is indigent
(Ibid.), the not a public charge. And the difference
between "paupers" and "indigent" persons is that
the latter are "persons who have no property or
source of income sufficient for their support aside
from their own labor, though self-supporting when
able to work and in employment" (Black's Law
Dictionary, p. 913, "Indigent", citing People vs.
Schoharie County, 121 NY 345, 24 NE 830). It is
therefore in this sense of being indigent that
"pauper" is taken when referring to suits in forma
pauperis. Black's Law Dictionary in fact defines
pauper, thus: "A person so poor that he must be
supported at public expense; also a suitor who, on
account of poverty, is allowed to sue or defend
without being chargeable with costs" (p. 1284,
emphasis supplied).
It is further argued that the docket fee of P14,500
would very well be shouldered by petitioners since
there are around 9,000 of them. It must be
remembered, however that the action in question
was filed by way of a class suit. And the Rules of
Court allowing such procedure state under Sec.
12, Rule 3:
SEC. 12. Class suit. — When the subject matter of
the controversy is one of common or general
interest to many persons, and the parties are so
numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all
before the court, one or more may sue or defend
for the benefit of all. But in such case the court shall
make sure that the parties actually before it are
sufficiently numerous and representative so that all
interest concerned are fully protected. Any party in
interest shall have a right to intervene in protection
of his individual interest.
So that in the suit before respondent Judge the ten
named petitioners herein are the ones suing, albeit
for the benefit of all the others. It follows that the
 CONSTI LAW APRIL 7, 2018 32

payment of docket fee would be directly charged

upon them, not upon the unnamed "9,000 other
laborers." And even if the 9,000 other laborers
should later bear the payment of said docket fee of
P14,500, the same would be spread among them
at about P1.60 each. Said cost of pressing their
respective average demand of P1.60 each is, to
Our mind, a substantial imposition on a seasonal
farm laborer earning barely subsistent wages. And
as pointed out, this is only the initial fee;
subsequent fees and charges would have to be
paid. The philosophy underlying the constitutional
mandate of free access to the courts
notwithstanding poverty, therefore, calls for
exemption of herein petitioners from payment of
the aforesaid legal fees in their assertion and claim
of substantial rights under the Sugar Act of 1952.

Returning to the purpose of all Constitutions, as

mentioned earlier, We find this course the most
sensible, logical and practical construction
demanded by the free access clause of the
Constitution. For a contrary interpretation could not
make said provision the living reality that it is
designed to be.

As regards the fact that the supporting

certifications of indigence refer only to the ten
named plaintiffs, suffice it to reiterate that this
involves a class suit, where it is not practicable to
bring all the other 9,000 laborers before the court.
This Court finds the supporting evidence of
indigence adequate, showing in petitioners' favor,
as plaintiffs in the suit before respondent Judge,
the right not to be denied free access to the courts
by reason of poverty. Since they were excluded
from the use and enjoyment of said right,
mandamus lies to enforce it. Appeal was
unavailing, since they were not even accorded the
status of litigants, for non-payment of docket fee;
and perfecting an appeal would have presented
the same question of exemption from legal fees,
appeal bond and similar requisites.

Wherefore, petitioners are declared entitled to

litigate as paupers in their class suit before
respondent Judge and the latter is hereby ordered
to grant their petition to litigate in forma pauperis.
No costs. So ordered.

CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION
G.R. No. 122485 February 1, 1999
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appellee,
vs.
LARRY MAHINAY Y AMPARADO, accused-
appellant.
PER CURIAM:
A violation of the dignity, purity and privacy of a
child who is still innocent and unexposed to the
ways of worldly pleasures is a harrowing
experience that destroys not only her future but of
the youth population as well, who in the teachings
of our national hero, are considered the hope of the
fatherland. Once again, the Court is confronted by
another tragic desecration of human dignity,
committed no less upon a child, who at the salad
age of a few days past 12 years, has yet to knock
on the portals of womanhood, and met her
untimely death as a result of the "intrinsically evil
act" of non-consensual sex called rape. Burdened
with the supreme penalty of death, rape is an
ignominious crime for which necessity is neither an
excuse nor does there exist any other rational
justification other than lust. But those who lust
ought not to last.
The Court quotes with approval from the People's
Brief, the facts narrating the horrible experience
and the tragic demise of a young and innocent
child in the bloody hands of appellant, as such
facts are ably supported by evidence on record: 1*
Appellant Larry Mahinay started working as
houseboy with Maria Isip on November 20, 1953.
His task was to take care of Isip's house which was
under construction adjacent to her old residence
situated inside a compound at No. 4165 Dian
Street, Gen. T. de Leon, Valenzuela, Metro Manila.
But he stayed and slept in an apartment also
owned by Isip, located 10 meters away from the
unfinished house (TSN, September 6, 1995, pp. 5-
10).
The victim, Ma. Victoria Chan, 12 years old, was
Isip's neighbor in Dian Street. She used to pass by
Isip's house on her way to school and play inside
the compound yard, catching maya birds together
with other children. While they were playing,
appellant was always around washing his clothes.
Inside the compound yard was a septic tank (TSN,
August 22, 1995, pp. 29-31; September 6, 1995,
pp.17; 20-22).
CONSTI LAW APRIL 7, 2018 33
On June 25, 1995, at 8 o'clock a.m., appellant
joined Gregorio Rivera in a drinking spree. Around
10 o'clock in the morning, appellant, who was
already drunk, left Gregorio Rivera and asked
permission from Isip to go out with his friends
(TSN, September 6, 1995; pp. 9-11).
Meantime, Isip's sister-in-law, Norgina Rivera, who
also owned a store fronting the compound, saw
Ma.Victoria on that same day three to four times
catching birds inside Isip's unfinished house
around 4 o'clock in the afternoon. The unfinished
house was about 8 meters away from Rivera's
store (TSN, September 18, 1995, pp. 9-11).
On the other hand, Sgt. Roberto Suni, also a
resident of Dian Street, went to his in-law's house
between 6 to 7 o'clock p.m. to call his office
regarding changes on the trip of President Fidel V.
Ramos. The house of his in-laws was near the
house of Isip. On his way to his in-law's house, Sgt.
Suni met appellant along Dian Street. That same
evening, between 8 to 9 o'clock p.m., he saw Ma.
Victoria standing in front of the gate of the
unfinished house (TSN, September 27, 1995, pp.
3-7; 14-17).
Later, at 9 o'clock in the evening, appellant showed
up at Norgina Rivera's store to buy lugaw. Norgina
Rivera informed appellant that there was none left
of it. She notice that appellant appeared to be
uneasy and in deep thought. His hair was
disarrayed; he was drunk and was walking in a
dazed manner. She asked why he looked so
worried but he did not answer. Then he left and
walked back to the compound (TSN, September
18, 1995, pp. 4-8; 12-14).
Meanwhile, Elvira Chan noticed that her daughter,
Ma. Victoria, was missing. She last saw her
daughter wearing a pair of white shorts, brown belt,
a yellow hair ribbon, printed blue blouse, dirty white
panty, white lady sando and blue rubber slippers
(TSN, August 23, 1995, pp. 22, 33).
Isip testified that appellant failed to show up for
supper that night. On the following day, June 26,
1995, at 2 o'clock in the morning, appellant
boarded a passenger jeepney driven by Fernando
Trinidad at the talipapa. Appellant alighted at the
top of the bridge of the North Expressway and had
thereafter disappeared (TSN, September 20,
1995, pp. 4-9; September 27, l995; pp. 14-17).
That same morning, around 7:30, a certain Boy
found the dead body of Ma. Victoria inside the
septic tank. Boy immediately reported what he saw

to the victim's parents, Eduardo and Elvira Chan
(TSN, September 6, 1995, p. 13).
With the help of the Valenzuela Police, the lifeless
body of Ma. Victoria was retrieved from the septic
tank. She was wearing a printed blouse without
underwear. Her face bore bruises. Results of the
autopsy revealed the following findings:
Cyanosis, lips and nailbeds,
Contusions, suprapubic area, 6.0 x 3.0 cm., thigh
right,
Anterior aspect, middle third, 4.5 x 3.0 cm.
Contused-abrasions on the forehead, 5.0 x 5.0 cm.
angle of the left eye, lateral aspect, 2.5 x 1.5 cm.
left jaw, 13.5 x 7.0 cm. neck, antero-lateral aspect,
right, 2.0 x 1.0 cm. and left, 7.0 x 6.0 cm., left iliac
area, 9.0 x 5.5 cm. intraclavicular area, left,
posterior aspect, 4.0 x 2.0 cm. scapular area, right
4.0 x 4.0 cm. subscapular area, left, 1.5 x 1.5 cm.
lumbar area, left 7.0 x 8.0 cm. arm, left, posterior
aspect, middle third, 11.00 x 4.0 cm elbows, right,
4.0 x 3.0 cm. and left 6.0 x 5.0 cm, forearms, left,
posterior aspect, lower rd, 5.2 x 4.0 cm. hand, left,
dorsal aspect, 0.8 x 0.9 cm. thighs; right antero-
lateral aspect, upper 33rd , 12.0 x 10.0 cm. right
anterior aspect, lower 3rd 5.0 x 2.0 cm. and left
antero-lower 3rd, 5.5 x 2.5 cm. knee, right, lateral
aspect, 1.5 X 1.0 cm. lateral mallcolum, left, 3.0 x
3.5 cm. foot, left, dorsal aspect 2.2 x 1.0 cm.
Hematoma, forehead, and scalp, left, 3.5 x 3.0 cm.
Hemorrhage, interstitial, underneath nailmarks,
neck, subepicardial, subpleural petechial
hemorrhages.
Hemorrhage, subdural, left fronto-parietal area.
Tracheo-bronchial tree, congested.
Other visceral organs, congested.
Stomach, contain 1/4 rice and other food particles.
CAUSE OF DEATH - Asphyxia by Manual
Strangulation; Traumatic Head Injury,
Contributory.
REMARKS: Hymen: tall, thick with complete
lacerations at 4:00 and 8:00 o'clock position
corresponding to the face of a watch edges
congested with blood clots. (TSN, August 18,
1995; p. 4; Record, p. 126).
CONSTI LAW APRIL 7, 2018 34
Back in the compound, SPO1 Arsenio Nacis and
SPO1 Arnold Alabastro were informed by Isip that
her houseboy, appellant Larry Mahinay, was
missing. According to her, it was unlikely for
appellant to just disappear from the apartment
since whenever he would go out, he would
normally return on the same day or early morning
of the following day (TSN, September 6, 1995, pp.
6-11-27).
SPO1 Nacis and SPO1 Alabastro were also
informed that a townmate of appellant was working
in a pancit factory at Barangay Reparo, Caloocan
City. They proceeded to said place. The owner of
the factory confirmed to them that appellant used
to work at the factory but she did not know his
present whereabouts. Appellant's townmate, on
the other hand, informed them that appellant could
possibly be found on 8th Street, Grace Park,
Caloocan City (TSN, August 14, 1995, pp. 8-9).
The policemen returned to the scene of the crime.
At the second floor of the house under
construction, they retrieved from one of the rooms
a pair of dirty white short pants, a brown belt and a
yellow hair ribbon which was identified by Elvira
Chan to belong to her daughter, Ma. Victoria. They
also found inside another room a pair of blue
slippers which Isip identified as that of appellant.
Also found in the yard, three armslength away from
the septic tank were an underwear, a leather
wallet, a pair of dirty long pants and a pliers
positively identified by Isip as appellant's
belongings. These items were brought to the police
station (TSN, August 14, 1995, pp. 10-13; August
18, 1995, pp. 3-8; August 23, 1995, pp. 21-25).
A police report was subsequently prepared
including a referral slip addressed to the office of
the Valenzuela Prosecutor. The next day, SPO1
Virgilio Villano retrieved the victim's underwear
from the septic tank (TSN, August 23, 1995, pp. 3-
8; 14-17).
After a series of follow-up operations, appellant
was finally arrested in Barangay Obario Matala,
Ibaan, Batangas. He was brought to the
Valenzuela Police Station. On July 7, 1995, with
the assistance of Atty. Restituto Viernes, appellant
executed an extra-judicial confession wherein he
narrated in detail how he raped and killed the
victim. Also, when appellant came face to face with
the victim's mother and aunt, he confided to them
that he was not alone in raping and killing the
victim. He pointed to Zaldy and Boyet as his co-
conspirators (TSN, August 14,1995, pp. 13-21).

Thus, on July 10, 1995, appellant was charged
with rape with homicide in an Information which
reads:2
That on or about the 26th day of June 1995 in
Valenzuela, Metro Manila and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the above-
named accused, by means of force and
intimidation employed upon the person of MARIA
VICTORIA CHAN y CABALLERO, age 12 years
old, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously lie with and have sexual intercourse
with said MARIA VICTORIA CHAN Y
CABALLERO against her will and without her
consent; that on the occasion of said sexual
assault, the above-named accused, choke and
strangle said MARIA VICTORIA CHAN Y
CABALLERO as a result of which, said victim died.
Contrary to law.3
to which he pleaded not guilty. After trial, the lower
court rendered a decision convicting appellant of
the crime charged, sentenced him to suffer the
penalty of death and to pay a total of P73,000.00
to the victim's heirs. The dispositive portion of the
trial court's decision states:
WHEREFORE, finding accused Larry Mahinay y
Amparado guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime charged, he is hereby sentenced to death by
electricution (sic). He is likewise condemned to
indemnify the heirs of the victim, Ma. Victoria Chan
the amount of P50,000.00 and to pay the further
sum of P23,000.00 for the funeral, burial and wake
of the victim.
Let the complete records of the case be
immediately forwarded to the Honorable Supreme
Court for the automatic review in accordance to
Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code as amended
by Section 22 of Republic Act No. 7659.
SO ORDERED. 4
Upon automatic review by the Court en banc
pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code.
(RPC), as amended,5 appellant insists that the
circumstantial evidence presented by the
prosecution against him is insufficient to prove his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In his testimony
summarized by the trial court, appellant offered his
version of what transpired as follows:
(T)hat on June 25, 1995, around 9:30 a.m. on Dian
Street, Gen. T. de Leon, Valenzuela, Metro Manila,
he joined Gregorio Rivera and a certain Totoy in a
drinking spree. Gregorio Rivera is the brother of
CONSTI LAW APRIL 7, 2018 35
Maria Isip, appellant's employer. After consuming
three cases of red horse beer, he was summoned
by Isip to clean the jeepney. He finished cleaning
the jeepney at 12 o'clock noon. Then he had lunch
and took a bath. Later, he asked permission from
Isip to go out with his friends to see a movie. He
also asked for a cash advance of P300.00 (TSN,
October 16, 1995, pp. 4-5-5).
At 2 o'clock in the afternoon, appellant, instead of
going out with his friend, opted to rejoin Gregorio
Rivera and Totoy for another drinking session.
They consumed one case of red horse beer.
Around 6 o'clock p.m., Zaldy, a co-worker, fetched
him at Gregorio Rivera's house. They went to
Zaldy's house and bought a bottle of gin. They
finished drinking gin around 8 o'clock p.m. After
consuming the bottle of gin, they went out and
bought another bottle of gin from a nearby store. It
was already 9 o'clock in the evening. While they
were at the store, appellant and Zaldy met Boyet.
After giving the bottle of gin to Zaldy and Boyet,
appellant left (TSN, October 16, 1995, pp. 6-7).
On his way home, appellant passed by Norgina
Rivera's store to buy lugaw. Norgina Rivera
informed him that there was none left of it. He left
the store and proceeded to Isip's apartment. But
because it was already closed, he decided to sleep
at the second floor of Isip's unfinished house.
Around 10 o'clock p.m., Zaldy and Boyet arrived
carrying a cadaver. The two placed the body inside
the room where appellant was sleeping. As
appellant stood up, Zaldy pointed to him a knife.
Zaldy and Boyet directed him to rape the dead
body of the child or they would kill him. He,
however, refused to follow. Then, he was asked by
Zaldy and Boyet to assist them in bringing the dead
body downstairs. He obliged and helped dump the
body into the septic tank. Thereupon, Zaldy and
Boyet warned him that should they ever see him
again, they would kill him. At 4 o'clock the following
morning, he left the compound and proceeded first
to Navotas and later to Batangas (TSN, October
16, 1995, pp. 4-13).
Subsequently, appellant was apprehended by the
police officers in Ibaan, Batangas. The police
officers allegedly brought him to a big house
somewhere in Manila. There, appellant heard the
police officer's plan to salvage him if he would not
admit that he was the one who raped and killed the
victim. Scared, he executed an extra-judicial
confession. He claimed that he was assisted by
Atty. Restituto Viernes only when he was forced to
sign the extra-judicial confession (TSN, October
16, 1995, pp. 9-11).6

This being a death penalty case, the Court
exercises the greatest circumspection in the
review thereof since "there can be no stake higher
and no penalty more severe . . . than the
termination of a human life." 7 For life, once taken
is like virginity, which once defiled can never be
restored. In order therefore, that appellant's guilty
mind be satisfied, the Court states the reasons
why, as the records are not shy, for him to verify.
The proven circumstances of this case when
juxtaposed with appellant's proffered excuse are
sufficient to sustain his conviction beyond
reasonable doubt, notwithstanding the absence of
any direct evidence relative to the commission of
the crime for which he was prosecuted. Absence
of direct proof does not necessarily absolve him
from any liability because under the Rules on
evidence8 and pursuant to settled jurisprudence, 9
conviction may be had on circumstantial evidence
provided that the following requisites concur:
1. there is more than one circumstance;
2. the facts from which the inferences are
derived are proven; and
3. the combination of all the circumstances is
such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.
Simply put, for circumstantial evidence to be
sufficient to support a conviction, all circumstances
must be consistent with each other, consistent with
the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the
same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he
is innocent and with every other rational
hypothesis except that of guilt.10 Facts and
circumstances consistent with guilt and
inconsistent with innocence, constitute evidence
which, in weight and probative force, may surpass
even direct evidence in its effect upon the court.11
In the case at bench, the trial court gave credence
to several circumstantial evidence, which upon
thorough review of the Court is more than enough
to prove appellant's guilt beyond the shadow of
reasonable doubt. These circumstantial evidence
are as follows:
FIRST — Prosecution witness Norgina Rivera,
sister-in-law of Maria Isip, owner of the unfinished
big house where the crime happened and the
septic tank where the body of Maria Victoria Chan
was found in the morning of June 26, 1995 is
located, categorically testified that at about 9:00 in
the evening on June 25, 1995, accused Larry
Mahinay was in her store located in front portion of
CONSTI LAW APRIL 7, 2018 36
the compound of her sister-in-law Maria Isip where
the unfinished big house is situated buying rice
noodle (lugaw). That she noticed the accused's
hair was disarranged, drunk and walking in
sigsagging manner. That the accused appeared
uneasy and seems to be thinking deeply. That the
accused did not reply to her queries why he looked
worried but went inside the compound.
SECOND — Prosecution witness Sgt. Roberto C.
Suni, categorically testified that on June 25, 1995
between 6:00 and 7:00 in the evening, on his way
to his in-laws house, he met accused Larry
Mahinay walking on the road leading to his in-law's
residence which is about 50 to 75 meters away to
the unfinished big house of Maria Isip. That he also
saw victim Maria Victoria Chan standing at the
gate of the unfinished big house of Maria Isip
between 8:00 and 9:00 in the same evening.
THIRD — Prosecution witness Maria Isip, owner of
the unfinished big house where victim's body was
found inside the septic tank, testified that accused
Larry Mahinay is her houseboy since November
20, 1993. That in the morning of June 25, 1995, a
Sunday, Larry Mahinay asked permission from her
to leave. That after finishing some work she asked
him to do accused Larry Mahinay left. That it is
customary on the part of Larry Mahinay to return in
the afternoon of the same day or sometimes in the
next morning. That accused Larry Mahinay did not
return until he was arrested in Batangas on July 7,
1995.
FOURTH — Prosecution witness Fernando
Trinidad, a passenger jeepney driver plying the
route Karuhatan-Ugong and vice versa which
include Dian St., Gen. T. de Leon, Valenzuela,
Metro Manila, pinpointed the accused Larry
Mahinay as one of the passengers who boarded
his passenger jeepney on June 26, 1995 at 2:00
early morning and alighted on top of the overpass
of the North Expressway.
FIFTH — Personal belongings of the victim was
found in the unfinished big house of Maria Isip
where accused Larry Mahinay slept on the night of
the incident. This is a clear indication that the
victim was raped and killed in the said premises.
There is no showing that the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses (sic) fabricated or there was
any reason for them to testify falsely against the
accused. The absence of any evidence as to the
existence of improper motive sustain the
conclusion that no such improper motive exists
and that the testimonies of the witnesses,
therefore, should be given full faith and credit.

(People vs. Retubado, 58585 January 20, 1988
162 SCRA 276,. 284; People vs. Ali L-18512
October 30, 1969, 29 SCRA 756).
SIXTH — Accused Larry Mahinay during the
custodial investigation and after having been
informed of his constitutional rights with the
assistance of Atty. Restituto Viernes of the Public
Attorney's Office voluntarily gave his statement
admitting the commission of the crime. Said
confession of accused Larry Mahinay given with
the assistance of Atty. Restituto Viernes is
believed to have been freely and voluntarily given.
That accused did not complain to the proper
authorities of any maltreatment on his person
(People vs. delos Santos L-3398 May 29,
1984;150 SCRA 311). He did not even informed
the Inquest Prosecutor when he sworn to the truth
of his statement on July 8, 1995 that he was
forced, coersed or was promised of reward or
leniency. That his confession abound with details
know only to him. The Court noted that a lawyer
from the Public Attorneys Office Atty. Restituto
Viernes and as testified by said Atty. Viernes he
informed and explained to the accused his
constitutional rights and was present all throughout
the giving of the testimony. That he signed the
statement given by the accused. Lawyer from the
Public Attorneys Office is expected to be watchful
and vigilant to notice any irregularity in the manner
of the investigation and the physical conditions of
the accused. The post mortem findings shows that
the cause of death Asphyxia by manual
strangulation; Traumatic Head injury Contributory
substantiate. Consistent with the testimony of the
accused that he pushed the victim and the latter's
head hit the table and the victim lost
consciousness.
Pagpasok niya sa kuwarto, hinawakan ko siya sa
kamay tapos tinulak ko siya, tapos tumama iyong
ulo niya sa mesa. Ayon na, nakatulog siya tapos
ni-rape ko na siya.
There is no clear proof of maltreatment and/or
tortured in giving the statement. There were no
medical certificate submitted by the accused to
sustain his claim that he was mauled by the police
officers.
There being no evidence presented to show that
said confession were obtained as a result of
violence, torture, maltreatment, intimidation, threat
or promise of reward or leniency nor that the
investigating officer could have been motivated to
concoct facts narrated in said affidavit; the
confession of the accused is held to be true,
correct and freely or voluntarily given. (People v.
CONSTI LAW APRIL 7, 2018 37
Tuazon 6 SCRA 249; People v. Tiongson 6 SCRA
431, People v. Baluran 52 SCRA 71, People v.
Pingol 35 SCRA 73.)
SEVENTH — Accused Larry Mahinay testified in
open Court that he was notable to enter the
apartment where he is sleeping because it was
already closed and he proceeded to the second
floor of the unfinished house and slept. He said
while sleeping Zaldy and Boyet arrived carrying the
cadaver of the victim and dumped it inside his
room. That at the point of a knife, the two ordered
him to have sex with the dead body but he refused.
That the two asked him to assist them in dumping
the dead body of the victim in the septic tank
downstairs. (Tsn pp. 8-9 October 16, 1995). This is
unbelievable and unnatural. Accused Larry
Mahinay is staying in the apartment and not in the
unfinished house. That he slept in the said
unfinished house only that night of June 25, 1995
because the apartment where he was staying was
already closed. The Court is at a loss how would
Zaldy and Boyet knew he (Larry Mahinay) was in
the second floor of the unfinished house.
Furthermore, if the child is already dead when
brought by Zaldy and Boyet in the room at the
second floor of the unfinished house where
accused Larry Mahinay was sleeping, why will
Boyet and Zaldy still brought the cadaver upstairs
only to be disposed/dump later in the septic tank
located in the ground floor. Boyet and Zaldy can
easily disposed and dumped the body in the septic
tank by themselves.
It is likewise strange that the dead body of the child
was taken to the room where accused Larry
Mahinay was sleeping only to force the latter to
have sex with the dead body of the child.
We have no test to the truth of human testimony
except it's conformity to aver knowledge
observation and experience. Whatever is
repugnant to these belongs to the miraculous.
(People vs. Santos L-385 Nov. 16, 1979)
EIGHT — If the accused did not commit the crime
and was only forced to disposed/dumpted the body
of the victim in the septic tank, he could have
apprise Col. Maganto, a high ranking police officer
or the lady reporter who interviewed him. His
failure and omission to reveal the same is
unnatural. An innocent person will at once naturally
and emphatically repel an accusation of crime as
a matter of preservation and self-defense and as a
precaution against prejudicing himself. A person's
silence therefore, particularly when it is persistent

will justify an inference that he is not innocent.
(People vs. Pilones, L-32754-5 July 21, 1978).
NINTH — The circumstance of flight of the
accused strongly indicate his consciousness of
guilt. He left the crime scene on the early morning
after the incident and did not return until he was
arrested in Batangas on July 7, 1995. 12
Guided by the three principles in the review of rape
cases, to wit:13
1). An accusation for rape can be made with
facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for
the person accused, though innocent, to disprove;
2). In view of the intrinsic nature of the crime
of rape, where only two persons are usually
involved, the testimony of the complainant is
scrutinized with extreme caution; and
3). The evidence of the prosecution stands or
falls on its own merits and cannot be allowed to
draw strength from the weakness of the defense.
the foregoing circumstantial evidence clearly
establishes the felony of rape with homicide
defined and penalized under Section 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11,
R.A. 7659, which provides:
When and how rape is committed - Rape is
committed by having carnal knowledge of a
woman under any of the following circumstances.
1.) By using force or intimidation;
2.) When the woman is deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious: and
3.) When the woman is under twelve years of
age or is demented.
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion
perpetua.
Whenever the crime of rape is committed with use
of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the
penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the
victim has become insane, the penalty shall be
death.
When the rape is attempted or frustrated and a
homicide is committed by reason or on the
occasion thereof, the penalty shall be reclusion
perpetua to death.
CONSTI LAW APRIL 7, 2018 38
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a
homicide is committed the penalty shall be death.
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the
crime of rape is committed with any of the following
attendant circumstances:
1.) When the victim is under eighteen (18)
years of age and the offender is a parent,
ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil
degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent
of the victim.
2.) When the victim is under the custody of the
police or military authorities.
3.) When the rape is committed in full view of
the husband, parent, any of the children or other
relatives within the third degree of consanguinity.
4.) When the victim is a religious or a child
below seven (7) years old.
5.) When the offender knows that he is
afflicted with Acquired Immune Deficiency
Syndrome (AIDS) disease.
6.) When committed by any member of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines or Philippine
National Police or any law enforcement agency
7.) When by reason or on the occasion of the
rape, the victim has suffered permanent physical
mutilation. 14
At the time of the commission of this heinous act,
rape was still considered a crime against
chastity,15 although under the Anti-Rape Law of
1997 (R.A. No. 8353), rape has since been re-
classified as a crime against persons under
Articles 266-A and 266-B, and thus, may be
prosecuted even without a complaint filed by the
offended party.
The gravamen of the offense of rape, prior to R.A.
8353, is sexual congress with a woman by force
and without consent. 16 (Under the new law, rape
may be committed even by a woman and the victim
may even be a
man.) 17 If the woman is under 12 years of age,
proof of force and consent becomes immaterial18
not only because force is not an element of
statutory rape, 19 but the absence of a free
consent is presumed when the woman is below
such age. Conviction will therefore lie, provided
sexual intercourse is proven. But if the woman is
 CONSTI LAW APRIL 7, 2018 39

12 years of age or over at the time she was 16. T: Ano ang suot nung batang babae
violated, as in this case, not only the first element na sinasabi mo?
of sexual intercourse must be proven but also the
other element that the perpetrator's evil acts with S: Itong short na ito, (pointing to a dirty white
the offended party was done through force, short placed atop this investigator's table. Subject
violence, intimidation or threat needs to be evidence were part of evidences recovered at the
established. Both elements are present in this crime scene).
case.
17. T: Bakit mo naman ni rape yung
Based on the evidence on record, sexual batang babae?
intercourse with the victim was adequately proven.
This is shown from the testimony of the medical S: Eh nasobrahan ako ng lasing. Hindi ko na
doctor who conducted post mortem examination alam ang ginagawa ko.
on the child's body:
18. T: Ano ba ang inyong ininom bakit ka
Q: And after that what other parts or the victim nasobrahan ng lasing?
did you examine?
S: Red Horse po at saka GIN.
A: Then I examined the genitalia of the victim.
19. T: Saan lugar ng malaking bahay ni
Q: And what did you find out after you ATE MARIA mo ni rape yung batang babae?.
examined the genitalia of the victim?
S: Sa kuwarto ko po sa itaas.
A: The hymen was tall-thick with complete
laceration at 4:00 o'clock and 8:00 o'clock position 20. T: Kailan ito at anong oras nangyari?
and that the edges were congested.
S: Mga bandang alas 8:00 ng gabi, araw ng
Q: Now, what might have caused the Linggo, hindi ko na matandaan kung anong petsa,
laceration? basta araw ng Linggo.

A: Under normal circumstances this might 21. T: Saan lugar ito nangyari?
have (sic) caused by a penetration of an organ.
S: Sa Dian, Gen. T. de Leon, Valenzuela,
Q: So, the laceration was caused by the M.M.
penetration of a male organ?
22. T: Alam mo ba ang pangalan ng batang
A: Adult male organ, sir. babae na ni rape mo?

Q: You are very sure of that, Mr. Witness? S: Hindi ko po alam.

A: I am very sure of that.20 23. T: Ngayon, nais kong ipaalam sa iyo

na ang pangalan ng batang babae na iyong ni rape
Besides, as may be gleaned from his extrajudicial at pinatay ay si MA. VICTORIA CHAN?
confession, appellant himself admitted that he had Matatandaan mo ha ito?
sexual congress with the unconscious child.
S: Oho.
15. T: Ano ang nangyari ng mga sandali o
oras na iyon? 24. T: Nung ma-rape mo, nakaraos ka
ba?
S: Natutulog po ako sa itaas ng bahay ni ATE
MARIA, yung malaking bahay na ginagawa, tapos S: Naka-isa po.
dumating yung batang babae. Pag-pasok niya sa
kuwarto hinawakan ko siya sa kamay tapos tinulak 25. T: Nais kong liwanagin sa iyo kung
ko siya. Tapos tumama yung ulo niya sa mesa. ano ang ibig sabihin ng "NAKARAOS", maaari
Ayon na, nakakatulog na siya tapos ni rape ko na bang ipaliwanag mo ito?
siya.
S: Nilabasan po ako ng tamod.
 CONSTI LAW APRIL 7, 2018 40

26 T: Nung nakaraos ka, nasaan parte na In proving sexual intercourse, it is not full or deep
katawan ng batang babae yung iyong ari? penetration of the victim's vagina; rather the
slightest penetration of the male organ into the
S: Nakapasok po doon sa ari nung babae. female sex organ is enough to consummate the
sexual intercourse. 22 The mere touching by the
27. T: Natapos mong ma-rape si MA. male's organ or instrument of sex of the labia of the
VICTORIA CHAN, ano pa ang sumunod mong pudendum of the woman's private parts is
ginawa? sufficient to consummate rape.

S: Natulak ko siya sa terrace. From the wounds, contusions and abrasions

suffered by the victim, force was indeed employed
28. T: Ano ang nangyari kay MA. upon her to satisfy carnal lust. Moreover, from
VICTORIA matapos mong itulak sa terrace? appellant's own account, he pushed the victim
causing the latter to hit her head on the table and
S: Inilagay ko po sa poso-negra. fell unconscious. It was at that instance that he
ravished her and satisfied his salacious and
29. T: Saan makikita yung poso negra na prurient desires. Considering that the victim, at the
sinasabi mo? time of her penile invasion, was unconscious, it
could safely be concluded that she had not given
S: Doon din sa malaking bahay ni ATE free and voluntary consent to her defilement,
MARIA. whether before or during the sexual act.

30. T: Bakit mo namang naisipang ilagay Another thing that militates against appellant is his
si MA. VICTORIA sa poso-negra? extra judicial confession, which he, however,
claims was executed in violation of his
S: Doon ko lang po inilagay. constitutional right to counsel. But his contention is
belied by the records as well as the testimony of
31. T: Bakit nga doon mo inilagay siya? the lawyer who assisted, warned and explained to
him his constitutionally guaranteed pre-
S: Natatakot po ako. interrogatory and custodial rights. As testified to by
the assisting lawyer:
32. T: Kanino ka natatakot?
Q — Will you please inform the Court what was
S: Natatakot po ako sa ginawa kong masama, that call about?
natatakot ako sa mga pulis.
A — We went to the station, police investigation
33. T: Buhay pa ba si MA. VICTORIA together with Atty. Froilan Zapanta and we were
nung ilagay mo siya sa poso-negra? told by Police Officer Alabastro that one Larry
Mahinay would like to confess of the crime of, I
S: Hindi ko po alam dahil nung pagbagsak think, rape with homicide.
niya inilagay ko na siya sa poso-negra.
Q — And upon reaching the investigation room
34. T: Nung gawin mo ba itong krimen na of Valenzuela PNP who were the other person
ito, mayroon ka kasama? present?

S: Nag-iisa lang po ako. A — Police Officer Alabastro, sir, Police Officer

Nacis and other investigator inside the
35. T: Noong mga oras o sandaling investigation room and the parents of the child who
gahasain mo si MA. VICTORIA CHAN, buhay pa was allegedly raped.
ba siya o patay na?
Q — And when you reached the investigation
S: Buhay pa po. room do you notice whether the accused already
there?
36. T: Papaano mo siya pinatay?
A— The accused was already there.
S: Tinulak ko nga po siya sa terrace.21
Q— Was he alone?

A— He was alone, sir.
Q — So, when you were already infront of SPO1
Arnold Alabastro and the other PNP Officers, what
did they tell you, if any?
A — They told us together with Atty. Zapanta
that this Larry Mahinay would like to confess of the
crime charged, sir.
Q— By the way, who was that Atty. Zapanta?
A — Our immediate Superior of the Public
Attorney's Office.
Q — Was he also present at the start of the
question and answer period to the accused?
A — No more, sir, he already went to our office.
I was left alone.
Q— But he saw the accused, Larry Mahinay?
A— Yes, sir.
Q — Now, when Atty. Zapanta left at what time
did the question and answer period start?
A — If I am not mistaken at around 4:05 of July
7, 1995 in the afternoon, sir.
Q — And when this question and answer period
started, what was the first thing that you did as
assisting lawyer to the accused?
A — First, I tried to explain to him his right, sir,
under the constitution.
Q— What are those right?
A — That he has the right to remain silent. That
he has the right of a counsel of his own choice and
that if he has no counsel a lawyer will be appointed
to him and that he has the right to refuse to answer
any question that would incriminate him.
Q — Now, after enumerating these
constitutional rights of accused Larry Mahinay, do
you recall whether this constitutional right
enumerated by you were reduced in writing?
A — Yes, sir, and it was also explained to him
one by one by Police Officer Alabastro.
Q — I show to you this constitutional right which
you said were reduced into writing, will you be able
to recognize the same?
CONSTI LAW APRIL 7, 2018 41
A— Yes, sir.
Q — Will you please go over this and tell the
Court whether that is the same document you
mentioned?
A — Yes, sir, these were the said rights reduced
into writing.
ATTY. PRINCIPE:
May we request, Your Honor, that this document
be marked as our Exhibit A. proper.
Q — Do you recall after reducing into writing this
constitutional right of the accused whether you
asked him to sign to acknowledge or to conform?
A — I was the one who asked him, sir. It was
Police Officer Alabastro.
Q— But you were present?
A— I was then present when he signed.
Q — There is a signature in this constitutional
right after the enumeration, before and after there
are two (2) signatures, will you please recognize
the two (2) signatures?
A — These were the same signatures signed in
my presence, sir.
Q— The signature of whom?
A— The signature of Larry Mahinay, sir.
ATTY. PRINCIPE:
May we request, Your Honor, that the two (2)
signatures identified by my compañero be
encircled and marked as Exhibit A-1 and A-2.
Q — After you said that you apprised the
accused of his constitutional right explaining to him
in Filipino, in local dialect, what was the respond of
the accused?
A — Larry Mahinay said that we will proceed
with his statement.
Q— What was the reply?
A— He said "Opo".
Q — Did you ask him of his educational
attainment?

A— It was the Police Officer who asked him.
Q— In your presence?
A— In my presence, sir.
Q — And when he said or when he replied "Opo"
so the question started?
A— Yes, sir.
Q — I noticed in this Exhibit A that there is also
a waiver of rights, were you present also when he
signed this waiver?
A— Yes, sir, I was also present.
Q — Did you explain to him the meaning of this
waiver?
A— I had also explained to him, sir.
Q— In Filipino?
A— In Tagalog, sir.
Q — And there is also a signature after the
waiver in Filipino over the typewritten name Larry
Mahinay, "Nagsasalaysay", whose signature is
that?
A— This is also signed in my presence.
Q— Why are you sure that this is his signature?
A— He signed in my presence, sir.
Q — And below immediately are the two (2)
signatures. The first one is when Larry Mahinay
subscribed and sworn to, there is a signature here,
do you recognize this signature?
A— This is my signature, sir.
Q — And immediately after your first signature is
a Certification that you have personally examined
the accused Larry Mahinay and testified that he
voluntary executed the Extra Judicial Confession,
do you recognize the signature?
A — This is also my signature, sir.23 (emphasis
supplied).
Appellant's defense that two other persons brought
to him the dead body of the victim and forced him
to rape the cadaver is too unbelievable. In the
words of Vice-Chancellor Van Fleet of New Jersey,
24
CONSTI LAW APRIL 7, 2018 42
Evidence to be believed must not only proceed
from the mouth of a credible witness, but must be
credible in itself - such as the common experience
and observation of mankind can approve as
probable under the circumstances. We have no
test or the truth of human testimony, except its
conformity to our knowledge, observation and
experience. Whatever is repugnant to these
belongs to the miraculous, and is outside of judicial
cognizance.
Ultimately, all the foregoing boils down to the issue
of credibility of witnesses. Settled is the rule that
the findings of facts and assessment of credibility
of witnesses is a matter best left to the trial court
because of its unique position of having observed
that elusive and incommunicable evidence of the
witnesses' deportment on the stand while
testifying, which opportunity is denied to the
appellate courts.25 In this case, the trial court's
findings, conclusions and evaluation of the
testimony of witnesses is received on appeal with
the highest respect, 26 the same being supported
by substantial evidence on record. There was no
showing that the court a quo had overlooked or
disregarded relevant facts and circumstances
which when considered would have affected the
outcome of this case27 or justify a departure from
the assessments and findings of the court below.
The absence of any improper or ill-motive on the
part of the principal witnesses for the prosecution
all the more strengthens the conclusion that no
such motive exists. 28 Neither was any wrong
motive attributed to the police officers who testified
against appellant.
Coming now to the penalty, the sentence imposed
by the trial court is correct. Under Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by R.A.
7659 "when by reason or on occasion of the rape,
a homicide is committed, the penalty shall be
death." This special complex crime is treated by
law in the same degree as qualified rape - that is,
when any of the 7 (now 10) "attendant
circumstances" enumerated in the law is alleged
and proven, in which instances, the penalty is
death. In cases where any of those circumstances
is proven though not alleged, the penalty cannot
be death except if the circumstance proven can be
properly appreciated as an aggravating
circumstance under Articles 14 and 15 of the RPC
which will affect the imposition of the proper
penalty in accordance with Article 53 of the RPC
However, if any of those circumstances proven but
not alleged cannot be considered as an
aggravating circumstance under Articles 14 and
15, the same cannot affect the imposition of the

penalty because Article 63 of the RPC in
mentioning aggravating circumstances refers to
those defined in Articles 14 and 15. Under R.A. No.
8353, if any of the 10 circumstances is alleged in
the information/complaint, it may be treated as a
qualifying circumstance. But if it is not so alleged,
it may be considered as an aggravating
circumstance, in which case the only penalty is
death - subject to the usual proof of such
circumstance in either case.
Death being a single indivisible penalty and the
only penalty prescribed by law for the crime of
"rape with homicide", the court has no option but
to apply the same "regardless of any mitigating or
aggravating circumstance that may have attended
the commission of the crime"29 in accordance with
Article 63 of the RPC, as amended. 30 This case
of rape with homicide carries with it penalty of
death which is mandatorily imposed by law within
the import of Article 47 of the RPC, as amended,
which provides:
The death penalty shall be imposed in all cases in
which it must be imposed under existing laws,
except when the guilty person is below eighteen
(18) years of age at the time of the commission of
the crime or is more than seventy years of age or
when upon appeal or automatic review of the case
by the Supreme Court, the required majority vote
is not obtained for the imposition of the death
penalty, in which cases the penalty shall be
reclusion perpetua.
(emphasis supplied).
In an apparent but futile attempt to escape the
imposition of the death penalty, appellant tried to
alter his date of birth to show that he was only 17
years and a few months old at the time he
committed the rape and thus, covered by the
proscription on the imposition of death if the guilty
person is below eighteen (18) years at the time of
the commission of the crime.31 Again, the record
rebuffs appellant on this point considering that he
was proven to be already more than 20 years of
age when he did the heinous act.
Pursuant to current case law, a victim of simple
rape is entitled to a civil indemnity of fifty thousand
pesos (P50,000.00) but if the crime of rape is
committed or effectively qualified by any of the
circumstances under which the death penalty is
authorized by present amended law, the civil
indemnity for the victim shall be not less than
seventy-five thousand pesos (P75,000.00).32 In
addition to such indemnity, she can also recover
moral damages pursuant to Article 2219 of the Civil
CONSTI LAW APRIL 7, 2018 43
Code 33 in such amount as the court deems just,
without the necessity for pleading or proof of the
basis thereof. 34 Civil indemnity is different from
the award of moral and exemplary damages. 35
The requirement of proof of mental and physical
suffering provided in Article 2217 of the Civil Code
is dispensed with because it is "recognized that the
victim's injury is inherently concomitant with and
necessarily resulting from the odious crime of rape
to warrant per se the award of moral damages". 36
Thus, it was held that a conviction for rape carries
with it the award of moral damages to the victim
without need for pleading or proof of the basis
thereof. 37
Exemplary damages can also be awarded if the
commission of the crime was attended by one or
more aggravating circumstances pursuant to
Article 2230 of the Civil Code38 after proof that the
offended party is entitled to moral, temperate and
compensatory damages. 39 Under the
circumstances of this case, appellant is liable to
the victim's heirs for the amount of P75,000.00 as
civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages.
Lastly, considering the heavy penalty of death and
in order to ensure that the evidence against an
accused were obtained through lawful means, the
Court, as guardian of the rights of the people lays
down the procedure, guidelines and duties which
the arresting, detaining, inviting, or investigating
officer or his companions must do and observe at
the time of making an arrest and again at and
during the time of the custodial interrogation 40 in
accordance with the Constitution, jurisprudence
and Republic Act No. 7438: 41 It is high-time to
educate our law-enforcement agencies who
neglect either by ignorance or indifference the so-
called Miranda rights which had become
insufficient and which the Court must update in the
light of new legal developments:
1. The person arrested, detained, invited or
under custodial investigation must be informed in
a language known to and understood by him of the
reason for the arrest and he must be shown the
warrant of arrest, if any; Every other warnings,
information or communication must be in a
language known to and understood by said
person;
2. He must be warned that he has a right to
remain silent and that anystatement he makes may
be used as evidence against him;
3. He must be informed that he has the right
to be assisted at all times and have the presence
 CONSTI LAW APRIL 7, 2018 44

of an independent and competent lawyer, obtained in violation of any of the foregoing,

preferably of his own choice;
4. He must be informed that if he has no
lawyer or cannot afford the services of a lawyer,
one will be provided for him; and that a lawyer may
also be engaged by any person in his behalf, or
may be appointed by the court upon petition of the
person arrested or one acting in his behalf;
5. That whether or not the person arrested
has a lawyer, he must be informed that no
custodial investigation in any form shall be
conducted except in the presence of his counsel or
after a valid waiver has been made;
6. The person arrested must be informed that,
at any time, he has the right to communicate or
confer by the most expedient means - telephone,
radio, letter or messenger - with his lawyer (either
retained or appointed), any member of his
immediate family, or any medical doctor, priest or
minister chosen by him or by any one from his
immediate family or by his counsel, or be visited
by/confer with duly accredited national or
international non-government organization. It shall
be the responsibility of the officer to ensure that
this is accomplished;
whether inculpatory or exculpatory, in whole or in
part, shall be inadmissible in evidence.
Four members of the Court — although
maintaining their adherence to the separate
opinions expressed in People v. Echegaray 42 that
R.A. No. 7659, insofar as it prescribes the death
penalty, is unconstitutional — nevertheless submit
to the ruling of the Court, by a majority vote, that
the law is constitutional and that the death penalty
should accordingly be imposed.
WHEREFORE, the conviction of appellant is
hereby AFFIRMED except for the award of civil
indemnity for the heinous rape which is
INCREASED to P75,000.00, PLUS P50,000.00
moral damages.
In accordance with Section 25 of Republic Act No.
7659, amending Article 83 of the Revised Penal
Code, upon finality of this decision, let the records
of this case be forthwith forwarded to the Office of
the President for possible exercise of the
pardoning power.
SO ORDERED.

7. He must be informed that he has the right

to waive any of said rights provided it is made
voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently and ensure
that he understood the same;

8. In addition, if the person arrested waives

his right to a lawyer, he must be informed that it
must be done in writing AND in the presence of
counsel, otherwise, he must be warned that the
waiver is void even if he insist on his waiver and
chooses to speak;

9. That the person arrested must be informed

that he may indicate in any manner at any time or
stage of the process that he does not wish to be
questioned with warning that once he makes such
indication, the police may not interrogate him if the
same had not yet commenced, or the interrogation
must ceased if it has already begun;

10. The person arrested must be informed that

his initial waiver of his right to remain silent, the
right to counsel or any of his rights does not bar
him from invoking it at any time during the process,
regardless of whether he may have answered
some questions or volunteered some statements;

11. He must also be informed that any

statement or evidence, as the case may be,

G.R. No. 131036 June 20, 2001
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appellee,
vs.
DONATO DEL ROSARIO, defendant-appellant.
BUENA, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional
Trial Court at Olongapo City, Branch 72 in Criminal
Case No. 838-92, entitled "People of the
Philippines versus Donato del Rosario," convicting
the accused of the crime of robbery with homicide
and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua.
On November 20, 1992, an information was filed
against Donato del Rosario charging him of
robbery with homicide committed as follows:
"That on or about the twenty-sixth (26th) of
September, 1992, in the City of Olongapo,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with
intent of gain and without the knowledge and
consent of the owner, and by means of violence
and intimidation, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry
away one (1) pc. of 22K grams of gold bracelet
worth P3,500.00, one (1) pc. of diamond ring with
letter ‘E’ worth P3,200.00, one (1) pc. of wedding
ring worth P800.00, two (2) pairs of gold earring
worth P1,600.00 and cash money in the amount of
P1,600.00, all in the total amount of Ten Thousand
Seven Hundred Pesos (P10,700.00), Philippine
Currency, belonging to Emelita Paragua, and on
the occasion of said robbery and for the purpose
of enabling him to take, steal and carry away the
above-mentioned items, the herein accused, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and
taking advantage of superior strength and with
intent to kill treacherously attack, assault, hit her
with a hard object on the head and then strangle
and tie the neck of Raquel Lopez (niece of Emelita
Paragua) with a Cat-V wire to prevent her from
breathing and making an outcry, thereby inflicting
upon said Raquel Lopez asphyxia injuries which
directly caused her death shortly thereafter."1
Upon arraignment on February 3, 1993, accused
Donato del Rosario, assisted by counsel, pleaded
not guilty to the crime charged. The Regional Trial
Court thereafter proceeded with the trial.
Culled from the records are the following:
On September 26, 1992, at about 8:10 in the
morning, Emelita Paragua and a companion, a
CONSTI LAW APRIL 7, 2018 45
Delia Aquino, left their house at 1657 Balic-Balic,
Sta. Rita, Olongapo City to go to the former’s stall
in the public market. Raquel Lopez, the 11-year old
niece of Paragua, was left behind as she had no
classes that day, a Saturday.
Notified of the news that their house was on fire,
they went home.
Paragua saw that the sala set, their merchandise
(stuffed toys that they sell at the public market),
and the cassette were burned. When she entered
the kitchen, she saw her niece lying on her
stomach with a raincoat covering her head and her
neck and arms tied with CATV wire. Parts of her
hand and her thigh were burned. Raquel Lopez
was already dead when her aunt discovered her.
The total value of the burned properties was
around Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00).
Emelita Paragua likewise discovered that six
pieces of her jewelries were missing.
SPO1 Ramon Fernandez received a report
regarding the fire in Balic-Balic wherein a minor
who was identified as Raquel Lopez was found
dead. Together with his chief investigator,
Leonardo Esteban and other personnel, he went to
the scene of the incident to conduct an
investigation.
He found the single-storey house in complete
disarray. The sala was set on fire and he found the
items therein burned. Likewise the two bedrooms.
He located the body of Raquel Lopez in the
kitchen. Her head was covered with a pink raincoat
and around her neck was a CATV wire. She was
lying face down, her hands behind her back.
Inquiries made revealed that a certain Ramon
Ilagan was seen in the vicinity of the house before
the incident. Ramon Ilagan was interrogated but
denied the accusation against him. Since no
evidence could be produced linking him to the
crime, he was released.
Three days after the incident, the police received
information from the live-in partner of Ilagan, that a
certain Donato del Rosario was seen standing at
the back of the house of Paragua before the crime
was committed and had disappeared since then.
Del Rosario’s mother and common-law wife were
questioned about the whereabouts of the accused.
SPO1 Fernandez told the mother of del Rosario
that her son was suspected of committing the
crimes in Balic-Balic.

On October 2, 1992, the Olongapo City police
received a call from the Subic police that Donato
del Rosario surrendered to police officer Fernando
Morales, the brother-in-law of his common-law
wife, Ruby Tan. Thereafter, SPO1 Fernandez,
together with Inspector Leonardo Esteban and
PO3 Laurea, proceeded to Subic to fetch Donato
del Rosario.
Del Rosario, even without being asked, told them
that he really surrendered to Morales because he
was being bothered by his conscience and that he
was very willing to accompany them to recover the
stolen items. He also volunteered the information
as to where he sold the jewelries that he took from
the house of Emelita Paragua.
Thereafter the policemen from Olongapo and
Donato del Rosario proceeded to the places
mentioned by the latter – Barrio Barretto,
Olongapo City, where the "Lovely Kahael
Pawnshop" was located, and Barangay
Magsaysay, Iba, Zambales. Del Rosario was not
even handcuffed at the time.
At the Lovely Kahael pawnshop del Rosario
pointed out the jewelry that he had pawned. He
also signed the pawnshop ticket in order that a
wedding band and a diamond ring with the letter
"E" could be redeemed. At the pawnshop he was
identified by Florencio Gamboa, the OIC/appraiser
therein.
Afterwards they proceeded to Magsaysay, Iba,
Zambales to the shop of Rogelio Adriano. They
were not able to immediately recover a bracelet
and a 7-day ring that were sold to Adriano, a watch
repairer and a buyer/seller of second hand jewelry,
as he had given them to his son for safekeeping.
However, Adriano assured the police that he is
going to voluntarily surrender the jewelry because
he learned of the girl who was found dead and of
the robbery. His son, Rogelio Adriano, Jr., returned
the jewelry to the police some days later. Both
Adrianos identified del Rosario as the person who
sold them the jewelry. After the jewelry was
recovered, the police called Emelita Paragua who
positively identified the jewels as hers.
Del Rosario was then brought to the Olongapo
police station. A lawyer, Atty. Norberto dela Cruz,
was called in to assist del Rosario. During the
custodial investigation, Atty. dela Cruz was
present the whole time. He informed del Rosario
what was stated in the waiver/confession. It was
only when del Rosario said that he fully understood
its contents that Atty. dela Cruz signed it as
counsel. SPO1 Fernandez brought the accused
CONSTI LAW APRIL 7, 2018 46
and Atty. dela Cruz to Assistant City Prosecutor
Martinez for subscription.
As to be expected, Donato del Rosario’s account
of the day in question, September 26, 1992, was
different.
He alleged that on the morning of September 26,
1992, at around 7:00 A.M., he went to Subic,
Zambales to buy containers for his vinegar and
Clorox business. He was with a certain Rancen
Anonat, the son of his would-be employer. They
returned to Balic-balic at around 9:00 A.M. and
spent the night at the house of Anonat. The
following day, he went to the house of his common-
law wife. On the 28th of September, he went to
Navotas and returned to Subic the next day. On
the 30th he stayed with the brother-in-law of his
common-law wife, Fernando Morales, a police
officer in Subic.
It was Morales who informed del Rosario that he
was a suspect in the arson case. He was
persuaded by Morales to place himself in the
custody of the police pending the investigation of
the case, as there was a threat to kill him by a
certain Zapanta, a member of a salvage team in
Olongapo. He spent the night in the detention cell
in Subic.
On October 1, four policemen from Olongapo
arrived. He was led out of the detention cell to talk
with the policemen. In the investigation room, he
was told that he would be taken to Olongapo for
further investigation. Morales told him to trust the
police as they are in the same corps. He was not
handcuffed when he was taken out to the vehicle
which would take him to Olongapo.
When they arrived in the police station (Station A),
he found his aunt and some people in a room.
When he sat down he was boxed by an unknown
man.
Thereafter, he was brought to Station B. He was
forced to sign a document, but not before being
mauled with a rattan stick and a chair. While he
was being mauled he was forced to admit that he
committed the arson.
From the "mayores" in the jail, he found out that
the document he had signed was a waiver.
Del Rosario did not recall going to the prosecutor’s
office to file or submit his counter-affidavit. Neither
did he go to the fiscal’s office for preliminary
investigation.

Based on the findings of Dr. Richard Patilano,
medico-legal officer, the cause of death of Raquel
Lopez was asphyxia by strangulation and multiple
physical injuries. The victim was already dead
when the burning took place because the body did
not show any carbonization or black color.
On November 8, 1996, an order was issued
stating, among other things, that since the
prosecution and the defense agreed that if witness
Raymund Tan (the father of the accused’s
common-law wife) will be presented to testify that
his son-in-law (Fernando Morales) accompanied
del Rosario in surrendering to the police
department of Subic, Zambales, the testimony of
the said witness was dispensed with.2
On April 2, 1997, a decision was rendered by the
trial court convicting the accused and imposing the
following penalty:
"WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused
Donato del Rosario guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide and
hereby sentences him to the maximum of
Reclusion Perpetua or from THIRTY-THREE (33)
YEARS and FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1)
DAY to FORTY YEARS, and to indemnify the heirs
of Raquel Lopez y Paragua the amount of ONE
HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00)
and to pay the costs.
"SO ORDERED."3
Hence, this appeal where accused-appellant
assigns the following errors allegedly committed by
the trial court:
"I
"IT IS ERRONEOUS AND ILLOGICAL FOR THE
TRIAL COURT TO CONVICT APPELLANT
WHEN THE ELEMENTAL REQUISITES OF THE
SPECIAL COMPLEX CRIME OF ROBBERY
WITH HOMICIDE ARE NOT PRESENT.
"II
"THE COURT A QUO IS LIKEWISE IN ERROR IN
HANDING DOWN A CONVICTION ON A
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE ABSENT ITS
REQUISITE ELEMENTS.
"III
"THE LOWER COURT’S QUESTIONED
DECISION OVERLOOKED MATERIAL FACTS
OF IMPORTANCE AND SUBSTANCE WHICH IF
CONSTI LAW APRIL 7, 2018 47
CONSIDERED WOULD TILT THE SCALE OF
‘LADY JUSTICE’ TO ACQUIT THE APPELLANT."
The appeal is unmeritorious.
Accused-appellant Donato del Rosario contends
that it is essential to prove the intent to rob and that
the intent to rob must come first before the killing
transpired. He is of the impression that not all the
essential requisites of the crime of robbery with
homicide were proven.
We hold otherwise.
In the offense of robbery with homicide, a crime
primarily classified as one against property and not
against persons, the prosecution has to firmly
establish the following elements: (a) the taking of
personal property with the use of violence or
intimidation against a person; (b) the property thus
taken belongs to another; (c) the taking is
characterized by intent to gain or animus lucrandi;
and (d) on the occasion of the robbery or by reason
thereof, the crime of homicide, which is therein
used in a generic sense, was committed.4
Animus lucrandi, or intent to gain, is an internal act
which can be established through the overt acts of
the offender.5 Although proof as to motive for the
crime is essential when the evidence of the theft is
circumstantial, the intent to gain or animus lucrandi
is the usual motive to be presumed from all furtive
taking of useful property appertaining to another,
unless special circumstances reveal a different
intent on the part of the perpetrator. "xxx (T)he
intent to gain may be presumed from the proven
unlawful taking."6
Intent to gain (animus lucrandi) is presumed to be
alleged in an information where it is charged that
there was unlawful taking (apoderamiento) and
appropriation by the offender of the things subject
of the robbery.7
In this case, it was apparent that the reason why
accused-appellant stole the jewelry of Emelita
Paragua was because he intended to gain by
them. He had already admitted that he needed
money to marry his common-law wife.8
We take note of the places where the jewelry were
recovered – a pawnshop in Olongapo City, and a
stall of a second hand jewelry buyer in Iba.
Florencio Gamboa, the OIC/appraiser of the
Lovely Kahael Pawnshop, remembered giving the
accused-appellant nine hundred pesos (P900.00)
for the two pieces of jewelry the latter had pawned,

while Rogelio Adriano admitted paying the
accused the amount of One Thousand Five
Hundred Pesos (P1,500.00) for two jewelries.
If gaining through unlawful means was farthest
from the mind of the accused, why then did he
pawn and sell the jewelry he had taken from
Emelita Paragua for a total amount of two
thousand four hundred pesos (P2,400.00)?
The accused vehemently denies having robbed
the house of Emelita Paragua. But the testimonies
of Gamboa and the Adrianos that it was the
accused who pawned and sold, respectively, the
jewelry to them shows that the accused had in his
possession the stolen jewelry. His failure to refute
this must be taken against him.
It is a rule established by an abundance of
jurisprudence that when stolen property is found in
the possession of one, not the owner, without a
satisfactory explanation of his possession, he will
be presumed to be the thief. This rule is in
accordance with the disputable presumption "that
a person found in possession of a thing taken in
the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and
doer of the whole act."9
We conclude that accused-appellant went to the
house of Emelita Paragua because he intended to
rob her. Lamentably, Paragua’s niece, Raquel
Lopez, was in the way and she had to be dealt with
in the direct manner possible. And the means
resorted to by the accused-appellant was to
strangle her until her very last breath. Raquel
Lopez was killed on the occasion of the robbery
because she was the only one in the house at that
time and the only witness to the crime that
accused-appellant committed.
Her autopsy report revealed that she was already
dead before the fire started, thus eliminating any
inference that arson was committed to finish her
off. The arson was but a ruse to cover up the theft.
It is immaterial whether the killing transpired before
or after the robbery. In the crime of robbery with
homicide, the homicide may precede robbery or
may occur after robbery. What is essential is that
there is a nexus, an intimate connection between
robbery and the killing whether the latter be prior
or subsequent to the former, or whether both
crimes be committed at the same time.10
Accused-appellant claims that his arrest was
violative of his constitutional rights and that all the
evidence obtained thereat were fruits of the
poisonous tree and therefore inadmissible in any
CONSTI LAW APRIL 7, 2018 48
proceeding of whatever nature and for any
purpose. He alleged that he was mauled to force
him to sign a confession.
Contrary to accused-appellant’s allegation that he
was arrested, we find that he was not, and that he
voluntarily surrendered to police officer Fernando
Morales of the Subic police.
In fact, his surrender was to be the gist of the
testimony of Raymund Tan, the father of his
common-law wife, had he testified: that his son-in-
law, Fernando Morales, accompanied del Rosario
in surrendering to the police department of Subic,
Zambales.11 (Emphasis supplied) We do not see
why Raymund Tan would not say that Morales
accompanied del Rosario in surrendering to the
police if it was not the truth.
We, therefore, find that accused-appellant
surrendered to the police authorities, confessed to
the crime, volunteered the information as to where
he pawned and sold the jewelry, and went with the
Olongapo police willingly to the Lovely Kahael
Pawnshop and to the stall of the Adrianos and to
the police station in Olongapo. He admitted that he
was not even handcuffed.
After his surrender and the recovery of the jewelry,
accused-appellant executed a waiver and
confession in the vernacular, in the presence of his
aunt and some persons whom he cannot
identify.12 He was assisted by Atty. dela Cruz. The
waiver reads:
"W A I V E R
"SA SINUMANG KINAUUKULAN:
"AKO, DONATO DEL ROSARIO Y LACORTE,
NASA HUSTONG GULANG AT NAKATIRA SA
NR. 1663 Balic-balic, Sta. Rita, Olongapo City ay
nagsasaad ng mga sumusunod:
"1. Na ako ay kusang sumuko sa Pulisya noong
ika-02 ng Oktubre 1992 dahil sa nakokonsensiya
ako sa nagawa kong pagpatay kay Raquel Lopez
at pagnanakaw at pagsunog ko sa bahay nila;
"2. Na sa dahilang ito ay pinawawalang bisa ko
ang aking mga karapatan na nakapaloob sa Art.
125 ng RPC at ako ay pumapayag na
pansamantalang magpakulong at pumailalim sa
pangangalaga ng mga pulis at para na rin
makaharap ko ang nagrereklamo sa akin.

"3. Na nilagdaan ko ang pawawalang bisa ko sa
aking mga karapatan bilang patotoo sa nilalaman
nito.
(Sgd.) Donato del Rosario
Nagsasaad
Assisted by:
(Sgd.) ATTY. NORBERTO DELA CRUZ"13 (Italics
supplied)
A confession to be admissible must be: (1) express
and categorical; (2) given voluntarily, and
intelligently where the accused realizes the legal
significance of his act; (3) with assistance of
competent and independent counsel; (4) in writing,
and in the language known to and understood by
the confessant; and (5) signed, or if the confessant
does not know how to read and write,
thumbmarked by him.14
As officers of the court, lawyers have a
responsibility to assist in the proper administration
of justice.15 As an officer of the court, he has in his
favor the presumption of regularity in the
performance of his sworn duties and
responsibilities.16 Absent any showing that Atty.
dela Cruz was remiss in his duty, the confession of
the accused-appellant is valid and binding upon
him and is thus admissible in evidence.
Assuming for the sake of argument that the
extrajudicial admission is not binding upon him, let
it be stressed that he was positively identified by
Florencio Gamboa, the appraiser of Lovely Kahael
Pawnshop, and by Rogelio Adriano and his son, as
the person who pawned and sold the jewelry.
Both SPO1 Ramon Fernandez and Lt. Leonardo
Esteban told the court that the accused voluntarily
led them to the place where he pawned and sold
the jewelry so that the jewelry could be recovered.
If he was not the culprit, how did he come to know
where to lead the policemen in order to retrieve the
jewelry of Emelita Paragua?
Where there is nothing to indicate that a witness
was actuated by improper motives, his positive and
categorical declarations on the witness stand
under solemn oath deserve full faith and
credence.17
We find it incredible that he was mauled to force
him to sign his confession, let alone mauled.
Accused-appellant admitted knowing Fernando
Morales of the Subic police station. His relationship
CONSTI LAW APRIL 7, 2018 49
with the said police officer would make other police
officers be wary of him. They could not have dared
maul him as del Rosario would have sent word to
Morales as to the fate he had suffered in the hands
of the Olongapo police.
The Olongapo police would have had a hands-off
policy with regard to the accused-appellant, as
they would not have wanted any of their friends or
relatives to be mauled by the Subic police if they
ever get arrested there. Quid pro quo.
In addition, bare assertions of maltreatment by the
police authorities in extracting confessions from
the accused are not sufficient in view of the
standing rule enunciated in cases of People vs.
Mada-I Santalani;18 People vs. Balane;19 and
People vs. Villanueva,20 "that where the
defendants did not present evidence of
compulsion, or duress nor violence on their
person; where they failed to complain to the officer
who administered their oaths; where they did not
institute any criminal or administrative action
against their alleged intimidators for maltreatment;
where there appeared to be no marks of violence
on their bodies; and where they did not have
themselves examined by a reputable physician to
buttress their claim, all these were considered by
this Court as factors indicating voluntariness."21
The court a quo did not hand down a conviction
based on circumstantial evidence.
The accused-appellant voluntarily surrendered to
the police and admitted his guilt by way of the
waiver/confession he had signed. Circumstantial
evidence had no place in this case.
Accused-appellant relied on alibi as a defense to
belie the accusation against him. However,
nobody was presented to corroborate his
statements as to his whereabouts on the day when
the robbery, homicide, and arson took place, not
even Rancen Anonat who was his companion on
that day and who was with him when the crimes
occurred. Already a weak defense, alibi becomes
even weaker by reason of the failure of the defense
to present any corroboration.22
In the absence of showing that the factual findings
of the trial judge were reached arbitrarily or without
sufficient basis, these findings are to be received
with respect by, and indeed are binding on, the
Supreme Court.23
In every case, courts must specify the award for
each item of damages and make a finding thereon
in the body of the decision.24 Prevailing
 CONSTI LAW APRIL 7, 2018 50

jurisprudence awards only P50,000.00 to the heirs

of the victim without need of any evidence other
than the fact of the commission of the crime. The
trial court therefore erred in awarding P100,000.00
as indemnity.

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING,

the conviction of appellant is AFFIRMED, with the
modification that the P100,000.00 awarded as
indemnity is reduced to P50,000.00 pursuant to the
prevailing jurisprudence.

SO ORDERED.

RIGHT TO BAIL
G.R. No. 79269 June 5, 1991
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. PROCORO J. DONATO, in his official
capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court, Branch XII, Manila; RODOLFO C.
SALAS, alias Commander Bilog, respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Jose Suarez, Romeo Capulong, Efren Mercado
and Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood,
Integrity, Nationalism, Inc. (MABINI) for
Rodolfo Salas.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
The People of the Philippines, through the Chief
State Prosecutor of the Department of Justice, the
City Fiscal of Manila and the Judge Advocate
General, filed the instant petition for certiorari and
prohibition, with a prayer for restraining
order/preliminary injunction, to set aside the order
of respondent Judge dated July 7, 1987 granting
bail to the accused Rodolfo Salas alias
"Commander Bilog" in Criminal Case No. 86-
48926 for Rebellion,1 and the subsequent Order
dated July 30, 1987 granting the motion for
reconsideration of 16 July 1987 by increasing the
bail bond from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00 but
denying petitioner's supplemental motion for
reconsideration of July 17, 1987 which asked the
court to allow petitioner to present evidence in
support of its prayer for a reconsideration of the
order of 7 July 1987.
The pivotal issues presented before Us are
whether the right to bail may, under certain
circumstances, be denied to a person who is
charged with an otherwise bailable offense, and
whether such right may be waived.
The following are the antecedents of this petition:
In the original Information2 filed on 2 October 1986
in Criminal Case No. 86-48926 of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, later amended in an
Amended Information3 which was filed on 24
October 1986, private respondent Rodolfo Salas,
alias "Commander Bilog", and his co-accused
were charged for the crime of rebellion under
Article 134, in relation to Article 135, of the Revised
Penal Code allegedly committed as follows:
CONSTI LAW APRIL 7, 2018 51
That in or about 1968 and for some time before
said year and continuously thereafter until the
present time, in the City of Manila and elsewhere
in the Philippines, the Communist Party of the
Philippines, its military arm, the New People's
Army, its mass infiltration network, the National
Democratic Front with its other subordinate
organizations and fronts, have, under the direction
and control of said organizations' leaders, among
whom are the aforenamed accused, and with the
aid, participation or support of members and
followers whose whereabouts and identities are
still unknown, risen publicly and taken arms
throughout the country against the Government of
the Republic of the Philippines for the purpose of
overthrowing the present Government, the seat of
which is in the City of Manila, or of removing from
the allegiance to that government and its laws, the
country's territory or part of it;
That from 1970 to the present, the above-named
accused in their capacities as leaders of the
aforenamed organizations, in conspiracy with, and
in support of the cause of, the organizations
aforementioned, engaged themselves in war
against the forces of the government, destroying
property or committing serious violence, and other
acts in the pursuit of their unlawful purpose, such
as . . .
(then follows the enumeration of specific acts
committed before and after February 1986).
At the time the Information was filed the private
respondent and his co-accused were in military
custody following their arrest on 29 September
1986 at the Philippine General Hospital, Taft Ave.,
Manila; he had earlier escaped from military
detention and a cash reward of P250,000.00 was
offered for his
capture.4
A day after the filing of the original information, or
on 3 October 1986, a petition for habeas corpus for
private respondent and his co-accused was filed
with this Court5 which, as shall hereafter be
discussed in detail, was dismissed in Our
resolution of 16 October 1986 on the basis of the
agreement of the parties under which herein
private respondent "will remain in legal custody
and will face trial before the court having custody
over his person" and the warrants for the arrest of
his co-accused are deemed recalled and they shall
be immediately released but shall submit
themselves to the court having jurisdiction over
their person.

On November 7, 1986 , private respondent filed
with the court below a Motion to Quash the
Information alleging that: (a) the facts alleged do
not constitute an offense; (b) the Court has no
jurisdiction over the offense charged; (c) the Court
has no jurisdiction over the persons of the
defendants; and (d) the criminal action or liability
has been extinguished,6 to which petitioner filed
an Opposition7 citing, among other grounds, the
fact that in the Joint Manifestation and Motion
dated October 14, 1986, in G.R. No. 76009, private
respondent categorically conceded that:
xxx xxx xxx
Par. 2 (B) — Petitioner Rodolfo Salas will remain
in legal custody and face trial before the court
having custody over his person.
In his Order of March 6, 1987,8 respondent Judge
denied the motion to quash.
Instead of asking for a reconsideration of said
Order, private respondent filed on 9 May 1987 a
petition for bail,9 which herein petitioner opposed
in an Opposition filed on 27 May 198710 on the
ground that since rebellion became a capital
offense under the provisions of P.D. Nos. 1996,
942 and 1834, which amended Article 135 of the
Revised Penal Code, by imposing the penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death on those who promote,
maintain, or head a rebellion the accused is no
longer entitled to bail as evidence of his guilt is
strong.
On 5 June 1987 the President issued Executive
Order No. 187 repealing, among others, P.D. Nos.
1996, 942 and 1834 and restoring to full force and
effect Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code as it
existed before the amendatory decrees. Thus, the
original penalty for rebellion, prision mayor and a
fine not to exceed P20,000.00, was restored.
Executive Order No. 187 was published in the
Official Gazette in its June 15, 1987 issue (Vol. 83,
No. 24) which was officially released for circulation
on June 26, 1987.
In his Order of 7 July 198711 respondent Judge,
taking into consideration Executive Order No. 187,
granted private respondent's petition for bail, fixed
the bail bond at P30,000.00 and imposed upon
private respondent the additional condition that he
shall report to the court once every two (2) months
within the first ten (10) days of every period
thereof. In granting the petition respondent Judge
stated:
CONSTI LAW APRIL 7, 2018 52
. . . There is no more debate that with the effectivity
of Executive Order No. 187, the offense of
rebellion, for which accused Rodolfo Salas is
herein charged, is now punishable with the penalty
of prision mayor and a fine not exceeding
P20,000.00, which makes it now bailable pursuant
to Section 13, Article III, 1986 Constitution and
Section 3, Rule 114, 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure. Unlike the old rule, bail is now a matter
of right in non-capital offenses before final
judgment. This is very evident upon a reading of
Section 3, Rule 114, aforementioned, in relation to
Section 21, same rule. In view, therefore, of the
present circumstances in this case, said accused-
applicant is now entitled to bail as a matter of right
inasmuch as the crime of rebellion ceased to be a
capital offense.
As to the contention of herein petitioner that it
would be dangerous to grant bail to private
respondent considering his stature in the CPP-
NPA hierarchy, whose ultimate and overriding goal
is to wipe out all vestiges of our democracy and to
replace it with their ideology, and that his release
would allow his return to his organization to direct
its armed struggle to topple the government before
whose courts he invokes his constitutional right to
bail, respondent Judge replied:
True, there now appears a clash between the
accused's constitutional right to bail in a non-
capital offense, which right is guaranteed in the Bill
of Rights and, to quote again the prosecution, "the
existence of the government that bestows the right,
the paramount interest of the state." Suffice to
state that the Bill of Rights, one of which is the right
to bail, is a "declaration of the rights of the
individual, civil, political and social and economic,
guaranteed by the Constitution against impairment
or intrusion by any form of governmental action.
Emphasis is placed on the dignity of man and the
worth of individual. There is recognition of certain
inherent and inalienable rights of the individual,
which the government is prohibited from violating"
(Quisumbing-Fernando, Philippine Constitutional
Law, 1984 Edition, p. 77). To this Court, in case of
such conflict as now pictured by the prosecution,
the same should be resolved in favor of the
individual who, in the eyes of the law, is alone in
the assertion of his rights under the Bill of Rights
as against the State. Anyway, the government is
that powerful and strong, having the resources,
manpower and the wherewithals to fight those
"who oppose, threathen (sic) and destroy a just
and orderly society and its existing civil and
political institutions." The prosecution's fear may or
may not be founded that the accused may later on
jump bail and rejoin his comrades in the field to

sow further disorders and anarchy against the duly
constituted authorities. But, then, such a fear can
not be a reason to deny him bail. For the law is very
explicit that when it comes to bailable offenses an
accused is entitled as a matter of light to bail. Dura
est lex sed lex.
In a motion to reconsider12 the above order filed
on 16 July 1987, petitioner asked the court to
increase the bail from P30,000.00 to P100,000.00
alleging therein that per Department of Justice
Circular No. 10 dated 3 July 1987, the bail for the,
provisional release of an accused should be in an
amount computed at P10,000.00 per year of
imprisonment based on the medium penalty
imposable for the offense and explaining that it is
recommending P100,000.00 because the private
respondent "had in the past escaped from the
custody of the military authorities and the offense
for which he is charged is not an ordinary crime,
like murder, homicide or robbery, where after the
commission, the perpetrator has achieved his end"
and that "the rebellious acts are not consummated
until the well-organized plan to overthrow the
government through armed struggle and replace it
with an alien system based on a foreign ideology
is attained."
On 17 July 1987, petitioner filed a supplemental
motion for reconsideration13 indirectly asking the
court to deny bail to the private respondent and to
allow it to present evidence in support thereof
considering the "inevitable probability that the
accused will not comply with this main condition of
his bail –– to appear in court for trial," a conclusion
it claims to be buttressed "by the following facts
which are widely known by the People of the
Philippines and which this Honorable Court may
have judicial notice of:
1. The accused has evaded the authorities for
thirteen years and was an escapee from detention
when arrested;
2. He was not arrested at his residence as he
had no known address;
3. He was using the false name "Manuel
Mercado Castro" at the time of his arrest and
presented a Driver's License to substantiate his
false identity;
4. The address he gave "Panamitan, Kawit,
Cavite," turned out to be also a false address;
5. He and his companions were on board a
private vehicle with a declared owner whose
identity and address were also found to be false;
CONSTI LAW APRIL 7, 2018 53
6. Pursuant to Ministry Order No. 1-A dated
11 January 1982 , a reward of P250,000.00 was
offered and paid for his arrest,
which "clearly indicate that the accused does not
entertain the slightest intention to appear in court
for trial, if released." Petitioner further argues that
the accused, who is the Chairman of the
Communist Party of the Philippines and head of its
military arm, the NPA, together with his followers,
are now engaged in an open warfare and rebellion
against this government and threatens the
existence of this very Court from which he now
seeks provisional release," and that while he is
entitled to bail as a matter of right in view of
Executive Order No. 187 which restored the
original penalty for rebellion under Article 135 of
the Revised Penal Code, yet, when the interest of
the State conflicts with that of an individual, that of
the former prevails for "the right of the State of self-
preservation is paramount to any of the rights of an
individual enshrined in the Bill of Rights of the
Constitution." Petitioner further invokes
precedents in the United States of America holding
"that there is no absolute constitutional barrier to
detention of potentially dangerous resident aliens
pending deportation proceedings,14 and that an
arrestee may be incarcerated until trial as he
presents a risk of flight;15 and sustaining a
detention prior to trial of arrestee charged with
serious felonies who are found after an adversary
hearing to pose threat to the safety of individuals
and to the community which no condition of
release can dispel.16
On 30 July 1987 respondent Judge handed down
the Order17 adverted to in the introductory portion
of this decision the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing
considerations, the Court finds the "supplemental"
motion for reconsideration to be without merit and
hereby denies it but finds the first motion for
reconsideration to be meritorious only insofar as
the amount of bail is concerned and hereby
reconsiders its Order of July 7, 1987 only to
increase the amount of bail from P30,000.00 to
P50,000.00, subject to the approval of this Court,
and with the additional condition that accused
Rodolfo Salas shall report to the court once every
two (2) months within the first ten (10) days of
every period thereof (Almendras vs. Villaluz, et al.,
L-31665, August 6, 1975, 66 SCRA 58).
In denying the supplemental motion for
reconsideration the respondent Judge took into

account the "sudden turn-about" on the part of the
petitioner in that a day earlier it filed a motion for
reconsideration wherein it conceded the right of
the private respondent to bail but merely asked to
increase the amount of bail; observed that it is only
a reiteration of arguments in its opposition to the
petition for bail of 25 May 1987; asserted that the
American precedents are not applicable since the
cases involved deportation of aliens and,
moreover, the U.S. Federal Constitution does not
contain a proviso on the right of an accused to bail
in bailable offenses, but only an injunction against
excessive bail; and quoted the concurring opinion
of the late Justice Pedro Tuason in the cases of
Nava, et al. vs. Gatmaitan, L-4853, Hernandez vs.
Montesa, L-4964 and Angeles vs. Abaya, L-5108,
October 11, 1951, 90 Phil, 172.
Unable to agree with said Order, petitioner
commenced this petition submitting therein the
following issues:
THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE
PROCORO J. DONATO ACTED WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND IN EXCESS OF
HIS JURISDICTION, AND IN TOTAL
DISREGARD OF THE PREVAILING REALITIES,
WHEN HE DENIED PETITIONER'S
SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION WITH PRAYER TO BE
GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY TO ADDUCE
EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF ITS OPPOSITION
TO THE GRANT OF BAIL TO THE
RESPONDENT RODOLFO SALAS.
THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE
PROCORO J. DONATO ACTED WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND IN EXCESS OF
HIS JURISDICTION WHEN HE GRANTED BAIL
TO THE RESPONDENT RODOLFO SALAS.
in support of which petitioner argues that private
respondent is estopped from invoking his right to
bail, having expressly waived it in G.R. No. 76009
when he agreed to "remain in legal custody and
face trial before the court having custody of his
person" in consideration of the recall of the warrant
of arrest for his co-petitioners Josefina Cruz and
Jose Concepcion; and the right to bail, even in
non-capital offenses, is not absolute when there is
prima facie evidence that the accused is a serious
threat to the very existence of the State, in which
case the prosecution must be allowed to present
evidence for the denial of bail. Consequently,
respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of
discretion when he did not allow petitioner to
present all the evidence it may desire to support its
prayer for the denial of bail and when he declared
CONSTI LAW APRIL 7, 2018 54
that the State has forfeited its right to do so since
during all the time that the petition for bail was
pending, it never manifested, much less hinted, its
intention to adduce such evidence. And that even
if release on bail may be allowed, respondent
judge, in fixing the amount of bail at P50,000.00
(originally P30,000.00 only), failed to take into
account the lengthy record of private respondents'
criminal background, the gravity of the pending
charge, and the likelihood of flight.18
In Our resolution of 11 August 198719 We required
the respondents to comment on the petition and
issued a Temporary Restraining Order ordering
respondent Judge to cease and desist from
implementing his order of 30 July 1987 granting
bail to private respondent in the amount of
P50,000.00.
In his Comment filed on 27 August 1987,20 private
respondent asks for the outright dismissal of the
petition and immediate lifting of the temporary
restraining order on the following grounds:
I
RESPONDENT SALAS NEVER WAIVED HIS
RIGHT TO BAIL; NEITHER IS HE ESTOPPED
FROM ASSERTING SAID RIGHT. ON THE
CONTRARY IT IS PETITIONER WHO IS
ESTOPPED FROM RAISING THE SAID ISSUE
FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL.
II
RESPONDENT SALAS ENJOYS NOT ONLY THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE PRESUMED
INNOCENT BUT ALSO THE RIGHT TO BAIL.
III
RESPONDENT SALAS IS NOT CHARGED WITH
A CAPITAL OFFENSE (RECLUSION
PERPETUA), HENCE HE HAS THE RIGHT TO
BAIL AS MANDATED BY THE CONSTITUTION.
IV
THE ORDER OF JULY 30, 1987 DENYING
PETITIONER OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT
EVIDENCE IS CORRECT. PETITIONER'S
ALLEGED RIGHT TO PRESENT EVIDENCE IS
NON-EXISTENT AND/OR HAD BEEN WAIVED.
V
THE ISSUANCE OF A TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER IN THIS CASE

VIOLATES NOT ONLY RESPONDENT SALAS'
RIGHT TO BAIL BUT ALSO HIS OTHER
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.
We required the petitioner to reply to the comment
of private respondent.21 The reply was filed on 18
September 1987.22
In Our resolution of 15 October 198723 We gave
due course to the petition and required the parties
to file simultaneously their memoranda within
twenty days from notice.
In their respective manifestations and motions
dated 5 November24 and 23 November 198725
petitioner and private respondents asked to be
excused from filing their Memoranda and that the
petition and reply be considered as the
Memorandum for petitioner and the Comment as
the Memorandum for private respondent, which
We granted in Our resolution of 19 November
198726 and 1 December 1987,27 respectively.
In Our resolution of 14 September 1989 We
required the Solicitor General to express his stand
on the issues raised in this petitions,28 which he
complied with by filing his Manifestation on 30 May
199029 wherein he manifests that he supports the
petition and submits that the Order of respondent
Judge of July 7, July 17 and July 30, 1987 should
be annulled and set aside asserting that private
respondent had waived the light to bail in view of
the agreement in G.R. No. 76009; that granting bail
to him is accepting wide-eyed his undertaking
which he is sure to break; in determining bail, the
primary consideration is to insure the attendance
of the accused at the trial of the case against him
which would be frustrated by the "almost certainty
that respondent Salas will lump bail of whatever
amount"; and application of the guidelines
provided for in Section 10 of Rule 114, 1985 Rules
on Criminal Procedure on the amount of bail
dictates denial of bail to private respondent. The
Solicitor General likewise maintains that the right
of the petitioner to hearing on the application of
private respondent for bail cannot be denied by
respondent Judge.
And now on the issues presented in this case.
I.
Unquestionably, at the time the original and the
amended Informations for rebellion and the
application for bail were filed before the court
below the penalty imposable for the offense for
which the private respondent was charged was
reclusion perpetua to death. During the pendency
CONSTI LAW APRIL 7, 2018 55
of the application for bail Executive Order No. 187
was issued by the President, by virtue of which the
penalty for rebellion as originally provided for in
Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code was
restored. The restored law was the governing law
at the time the respondent court resolved the
petition for bail.
We agree with the respondent court that bail
cannot be denied to the private respondent for he
is charged with the crime of rebellion as defined in
Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code to which is
attached the penalty of prision mayor and a fine not
exceeding P20,000.00.30 It is, therefore, a
bailable offense under Section 13 of Article III of
the 1987 Constitution which provides thus:
Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged
with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua
when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before
conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be
released on recognizance as may be prescribed by
law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even
when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
Section 3, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, as
amended, also provides:
Bail, a matter of right: exception. — All persons in
custody shall, before final conviction, be entitled to
bail as a matter of right, except those charged with
a capital offense or an offense which, under the
law at the time of its commission and at the time of
the application for bail, is punishable by reclusion
perpetua, when evidence of guilt is strong.
Therefore, before conviction bail is either a matter
of right or of discretion. It is a matter of right when
the offense charged is punishable by any penalty
lower than reclusion perpetua.31 To that extent the
right is absolute.32
And so, in a similar case for rebellion, People vs.
Hernandez, et al., 99 Phil. 515, despite the fact that
the accused was already convicted, although
erroneously, by the trial court for the complex
crime of rebellion with multiple murders, arsons
and robberies, and sentenced to life imprisonment,
We granted bail in the amount of P30,000.00
during the pendency of his appeal from such
conviction. To the vigorous stand of the People
that We must deny bail to the accused because the
security of the State so requires, and because the
judgment of conviction appealed from indicates
that the evidence of guilt of Hernandez is strong,
We held:

. . . Furthermore, individual freedom is too basic,
too transcendental and vital in a republican state,
like ours, to be derived upon mere general
principles and abstract consideration of public
safety. Indeed, the preservation of liberty is such a
major preoccupation of our political system that,
not satisfied with guaranteeing its enjoyment in the
very first paragraph of section (1) of the Bill of
Rights, the framers of our Constitution devoted
paragraphs (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (11), (12), (13),
(14), (15), (16), (17), (18), and (21) of said section
(1) to the protection of several aspects of freedom.
The 1987 Constitution strengthens further the right
to bail by explicitly providing that it shall not be
impaired even when the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus is suspended. This overturns the
Court's ruling in Garcia-Padilla vs. Enrile, et al.,
supra., to wit:
The suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus must, indeed, carry with it the
suspension of the right to bail, if the government's
campaign to suppress the rebellion is to be
enhanced and rendered effective. If the right to bail
may be demanded during the continuance of the
rebellion, and those arrested, captured and
detained in the course thereof will be released,
they would, without the least doubt, rejoin their
comrades in the field thereby jeopardizing the
success of government efforts to bring to an end
the invasion, rebellion or insurrection.
Upon the other hand, if the offense charged is
punishable by reclusion perpetua bail becomes a
matter of discretion. It shall be denied if the
evidence of guilt is strong. The court's discretion is
limited to determining whether or not evidence of
guilt is strong.33 But once it is determined that the
evidence of guilt is not strong, bail also becomes a
matter of right. In Teehankee vs. Director of
Prisons, supra., We held:
The provision on bail in our Constitution is
patterned after similar provisions contained in the
Constitution of the United States and that of many
states of the Union. And it is said that:
The Constitution of the United States and the
constitution of the many states provide that all
persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties,
except for capital offenses, where the proof is
evident or the presumption of guilt is great, and,
under such provisions, bail is a matter of right
which no court or judge can properly refuse, in all
cases not embraced in the exceptions. Under such
provisions bail is a matter of right even in cases of
CONSTI LAW APRIL 7, 2018 56
capital offenses, unless the proof of guilt is evident
or the presumption thereof is great!34
Accordingly, the prosecution does not have the
right to present evidence for the denial of bail in the
instances where bail is a matter of right. However,
in the cases where the grant of bail is discretionary,
due process requires that the prosecution must be
given an opportunity to present, within a
reasonable time, all the evidence that it may desire
to introduce before the court should resolve the
motion for bail.35
We agree, however, with petitioner that it was error
for the respondent court to fix the bond at
P30,000.00, then later at P50,000.00 without
hearing the prosecution. The guidelines for the
fixing of the amount of bail provided for in Section
10 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court are not
matters left entirely to the discretion of the court.
As We stated in People vs. Dacudao, et al., 170
SCRA, 489, 495:
Certain guidelines in the fixing of a bailbond call for
the presentation of evidence and reasonable
opportunity for the prosecution to refute it. Among
them are the nature and circumstances of the
crime, character and reputation of the accused, the
weight of the evidence against him, the probability
of the accused appearing at the trial, whether or
not the accused is a fugitive from justice, and
whether or not the accused is under bond in other
case. . . .
In the instant case petitioner has sufficiently made
out allegations which necessitate a grant of an
opportunity to be heard for the purpose of
determining the amount of bail, but not for the
denial thereof because aforesaid Section 10 of
Rule 114 does not authorize any court to deny bail.
II.
It must, however, be stressed that under the
present state of the law, rebellion is no longer
punishable by prision mayor and fine not
exceeding P20,000.00. Republic Act No. 6968
approved on 24 October 1990 and which took
effect after publication in at least two newspapers
of general circulation, amended, among others,
Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code by
increasing the penalty for rebellion such that, as
amended, it now reads:
Article 135. Penalty for rebellion, insurrection or
coup d'etat. ––– Any person who promotes,
maintains, or heads a rebellion or insurrection shall
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

Any person merely participating or executing the
commands of others in a rebellion or insurrection
shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
xxx xxx xxx
This amendatory law cannot apply to the private
respondent for acts allegedly committed prior to its
effectivity. It is not favorable to him. "Penal laws
shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor
the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual
criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article
62 of this Code, although at the time of the
publication of such laws a final sentence has been
pronounced and the convict is serving the same.36
III.
We agree with Petitioner that private respondent
has, however, waived his right to bail in G.R. No.
76009.
On 3 October 1986, or the day following the filing
of the original information in Criminal Case No. 86-
48926 with the trial court, a petition for habeas
corpus for herein private respondent, and his co-
accused Josefina Cruz and Jose Concepcion, was
filed with this Court by Lucia Cruz, Aida
Concepcion Paniza and Beatriz Salas against
Juan Ponce Enrile, Gen. Fidel Ramos, Brig. Gen.
Renato de Villa, Brig. Gen. Ramon Montaño, and
Col. Saldajeno praying, among others, that the
petition be given due course and a writ of habeas
corpus be issued requiring respondents to produce
the bodies of herein private respondent and his co-
accused before the Court and explain by what
authority they arrested and detained them. The
following proceedings took place thereafter in said
case:
1. In a resolution of 7 October 1986 We
issued a writ of habeas corpus, required
respondents to make a return of the writ on or
before the close of office hours on 13 October and
set the petition for hearing on 14 October 1986 at
10:00 o'clock in the morning.
2. On 13 October 1986 respondents, through
the Office of the Solicitor General, filed a Return
To The Writ of Habeas Corpus alleging therein that
private respondent and Josefina Cruz alias "Mrs.
Mercado", and Jose Milo Concepcion alias
"Eugene Zamora" were apprehended by the
military on September 29, 1986 in the evening at
the Philippine General Hospital Compound at Taft
Ave., Mangga being leaders or members of the
Communist Party of the Philippines, New People's
CONSTI LAW APRIL 7, 2018 57
Army and National Democratic Front,
organizations dedicated to the overthrow of the
Government through violent means, and having
actually committed acts of rebellion under Article
134 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. After
their arrest they were forthwith charged with
rebellion before Branch XII of the Regional Trial
Court, National Capital Region in Criminal Case
No. 86-48926 and on 3 October warrants for their
arrest were issued and respondents continue to
detain them because of the warrants of arrest and
the pendency of the criminal cases against them.
Respondents further allege that, contrary to the
allegation in the petition, herein private respondent
was not a member of the NDF panel involved in
peace negotiations with the Government; neither is
he and his companions Cruz and Concepcion
covered by any, safe conduct pass issued by
competent authorities.
3. At the hearing on 14 October 1986 the
parties informed the Court of certain agreements
reached between them. We issued a resolution
reading as follows:
When this case was called for hearing this
morning, Attorneys Romeo Capulong, Arno V.
Sanidad, Efren H. Mercado, Edgardo Pamin-tuan,
Casiano Sabile, Ramon Cura, and William Chua
appeared for the petitioners with Atty. Capulong
arguing for the petitioners. Solicitor General
Sedfrey Ordonez, Assistant Solicitor General
Romeo C. de la Cruz and Trial Attorney Josue E.
Villanueva appeared for the respondents, with
Solicitor General Ordoñez arguing for the
respondents.
Petitioners' counsel, Atty. Romeo Capulong,
manifested in open Court that in conformity with
the agreement reached with the government, the
petition for habeas corpus will be withdrawn with
detainee Rodolfo Salas to remain under custody,
whereas his co-detainees Josefina Cruz and Jose
Milo Concepcion will be released immediately.
Solicitor General Sedfrey Ordoñez, also in open
Court, confirmed the foregoing statement made by
petitioners' counsel regarding the withdrawal of the
petition for habeas corpus, declaring that no
objection will be interposed to the immediate
release of detainees Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo
Concepcion, and that no bond will be required of
them, but they will continue to face trial with their
co-accused, Rodolfo Salas; further, that they will
not be rearrested on the basis of the warrants
issued by the trial court provided that they manifest
in open Court their willingness to subject

themselves to the jurisdiction of the Court and to
appear in court when their presence is required.
In addition, he stated that he is willing to confer
with petitioners' counsel today relative to the
compromise agreement that they have previously
undertaken to submit.
Upon manifestation of petitioners' counsel, Atty.
Romeo Capulong, that on his oath as member of
the Bar, the detainees Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo
Concepcion have agreed to subject themselves to
the jurisdiction of the trial court, the Court ordered
their immediate release.
Thereafter, the Court approved the foregoing
manifestations and statements and required both
parties to SUBMIT to the Court their compromise
agreement by 4:00 o'clock this afternoon.
Teehankee, C.J., is on official leave.
4. At 3:49 o'clock in the afternoon of 14
October 1986 the parties submitted a Joint
Manifestation and Motion duly signed by Atty.
Romeo Capulong, counsel for petitioners, and
Solicitor General Sedfrey Ordoñez, Assistant
Solicitor General Romeo C. de la Cruz and Trial
Attorney Josue S. Villanueva, counsel for
respondents, which reads as follows:
COME NOW petitioners and the respondents,
assisted by their respective counsel, and to this
Honorable Tribunal respectfully manifest:
1. That in the discussion between Romeo
Capulong, petitioners' counsel, and Solicitor
General Sedfrey A. Ordoñez on October 13, 1986
exploratory talks were conducted to find out how
the majesty of the law may be preserved and
human considerations may be called into play.
2. That in the conference both counsel agreed
to the following terms of agreement:
a. The petition for habeas corpus will be
withdrawn by petitioners and Josefina Cruz and
Jose Milo Concepcion will be immediately released
but shall appear at the trial of the criminal case for
rebellion (People v. Rodolfo Salas, et al., Criminal
Case No. 4886 [should be 86-48926], Regional
Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region) filed
against them under their personal recognizance.
b. Petitioner Rodolfo Salas will remain in legal
custody and face trial before the court having
custody over his person.
CONSTI LAW APRIL 7, 2018 58
c. The warrant of arrest for the persons of
Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion is hereby
deemed recalled in view of formal manifestation
before the Supreme Court that they will submit
themselves to the court having jurisdiction over
their person.
3. That on October 14, the Solicitor General
was able to obtain the conformity of the
Government to the foregoing terms which were
likewise accepted by petitioner (sic) and their
counsel of record.
4. That the two counsel submitted their oral
manifestation during the hearing on October 14
and the present manifestation in compliance with
the resolution announced in court this morning.
WHEREFORE, it is prayed that the petition for
habeas corpus be dismissed.
5. On 16 October 1986 We issued the
following resolution:
G.R. No. 76009 [In the Matter of the Petition for
Habeas Corpus of Rodolfo Salas, Josefina Cruz
and Jose Milo Concepcion, et al. v. Hon. Juan
Ponce Enrile, Gen. Fidel V. Ramos, Brig. Gen.
Renato de Villa, Brig. Gen. Ramon Montaño and
Col. Virgilio Saldajeno] considering the Joint
Manifestation and Motion dated October 14, 1986
filed by Attorneys Romeo Capulong, Arno V.
Sanidad, Efren H. Mercado and Ricardo
Fernandez, Jr. as counsel for petitioners and
Solicitor General Sedfrey A. Ordonez and
Assistant Solicitor General Romeo C. de la Cruz
and Trial Attorney Josue S. Villanueva as counsel
for respondents which states that they have
entered into an agreement whereby: [a] the petition
for habeas corpus will be withdrawn by petitioners,
and Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion will
be immediately released but shall appear at the
trial of the criminal case for rebellion [People vs.
Rodolfo Salas, et al., Criminal Case No. 4886,
Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial
Region, Branch XII, Manila], filed against them, on
their personal recognizance; [b] petitioner Rodolfo
Salas will remain in legal custody and face trial
before the court having custody over his person;
and [c] the warrant of arrest for the person of
Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion is hereby
deemed recalled in view of the formal
manifestation before this Court that they will submit
themselves to the court having jurisdiction over
their person and in view of the said agreement, the
petition for habeas corpus be dismissed, the Court
Resolved to DISMISS the petition for habeas
corpus but subject to the condition that petitioners'

lead counsel, Atty. Capulong, upon his oath as
member of the Bar, shall abide by his commitment
to ensure the appearance of Josefina Cruz and
Jose Milo Concepcion at the trial of the criminal
case for rebellion filed against them. Teehankee,
C.J., is on official leave.
It is the stand of the petitioner that private
respondent, "in agreeing to remain in legal custody
even during the pendency of the trial of his criminal
case, [he] has expressly waived his right to bail."37
Upon the other hand, private respondent asserts
that this claim is totally devoid of factual and legal
basis, for in their petition for habeas corpus they
precisely questioned the legality of the arrest and
the continued detention of Rodolfo Salas, Josefina
Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion, which was not
resolved by this Court or by the compromise
agreement of the parties but left open for further
determination in another proceeding. Moreover,
the matter of the right to bail was neither raised by
either party nor resolved by this Court, and the
legal steps promptly taken by private respondent
after the agreement was reached, like the filing of
the motion to quash on 7 November 1986 and the
petition for bail on 14 May 1987, were clear and
positive assertions of his statutory and
constitutional rights to be granted not only
provisional but final and permanent liberty. Finally,
private respondent maintains that the term "legal
custody" as used in the Joint Manifestation and
Motion simply means that private respondent
agreed to continue to be in the custody of the law
or in custodia legis and nothing else; it is not to be
interpreted as waiver.
Interestingly, private respondent admits that:
"Custody" has been held to mean nothing less than
actual imprisonment. It is also defined as the
detainer of a person by virtue of a lawful authority,
or the "care and possession of a thing or person."
(Bouviers Law Dictionary, Third Ed, Vol. I, pp. 741-
742 citing Smith v. Com. 59 Pa. 320 and Rolland
v. Com. 82 Pa. 306)
He further admits that, in the light of Section 1 of
Rule 114 of the Rules of Court and settled
jurisprudence, the "constitutional right to bail is
subject to the limitation that the person applying for
admission to bail should be in the custody of the
law or otherwise deprived of his liberty."38
When the parties in G.R. No. 76009 stipulated that:
b. Petitioner Rodolfo Salas will remain in legal
custody and face trial before the court having
custody over his person.
CONSTI LAW APRIL 7, 2018 59
they simply meant that Rodolfo Salas, herein
respondent, will remain in actual physical custody
of the court, or in actual confinement or detention,
as distinguished from the stipulation concerning
his co-petitioners, who were to be released in view
of the recall of the warrants of arrest against them;
they agreed, however, "to submit themselves to
the court having jurisdiction over their persons."
Note should be made of the deliberate care of the
parties in making a fine distinction between legal
custody and court having custody over the person
in respect to Rodolfo Salas and court having
jurisdiction over the persons of his co-accused.
Such a fine distinction was precisely intended to
emphasize the agreement that Rodolfo Salas will
not be released, but should remain in custody. Had
the parties intended otherwise, or had this been
unclear to private respondent and his counsel, they
should have insisted on the use of a clearer
language. It must be remembered that at the time
the parties orally manifested before this Court on
14 October 1986 the terms and conditions of their
agreement and prepared and signed the Joint
Manifestation and Motion, a warrant of arrest had
already been issued by the trial court against
private respondent and his co-accused. The
stipulation that only the warrants of arrest for
Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion shall be
recalled and that only they shall be released,
further confirmed the agreement that herein
petitioner shall remain in custody of the law, or
detention or confinement.
In defining bail as:
. . . the security given for the release of a person in
custody of the law, . . .
Section 1 of Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of
Court admits no other meaning or interpretation for
the term "in custody of the law" than that as above
indicated. The purpose of bail is to relieve an
accused from imprisonment until his conviction
and yet secure his appearance at the trial.39 It
presupposes that the person applying for it should
be in the custody of the law or otherwise deprived
of liberty.40
Consequently, having agreed in G.R. No. 76009 to
remain in legal custody, private respondent had
unequivocably waived his right to bail.
But, is such waiver valid?
Article 6 of the Civil Code expressly provides:

Art. 6. Rights may be waived, unless the waiver is
contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals,
or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person
with a right recognized by law.
Waiver is defined as "a voluntary and intentional
relinquishment or abandonment of a known
existing legal right, advantage, benefit, claim or
privilege, which except for such waiver the party
would have enjoyed; the voluntary abandonment
or surrender, by a capable person, of a right known
by him to exist, with the intent that such right shall
be surrendered and such person forever deprived
of its benefit; or such conduct as warrants an
inference of the relinquishment of such right; or the
intentional doing of an act inconsistent with
claiming it."41
As to what rights and privileges may be waived, the
authority is settled:
. . . the doctrine of waiver extends to rights and
privileges of any character, and, since the word
"waiver" covers every conceivable right, it is the
general rule that a person may waive any matter
which affects his property, and any alienable right
or privilege of which he is the owner or which
belongs to him or to which he is legally entitled,
whether secured by contract, conferred with
statute, or guaranteed by constitution, provided
such rights and privileges rest in the individual, are
intended for his sole benefit, do not infringe on the
rights of others, and further provided the waiver of
the right or privilege is not forbidden by law, and
does not contravene public policy; and the
principle is recognized that everyone has a right to
waive, and agree to waive, the advantage of a law
or rule made solely for the benefit and protection
of the individual in his private capacity, if it can be
dispensed with and relinquished without infringing
on any public right, and without detriment to the
community at large. . . .
Although the general rule is that any right or
privilege conferred by statute or guaranteed by
constitution may be waived, a waiver in derogation
of a statutory right is not favored, and a waiver will
be inoperative and void if it infringes on the rights
of others, or would be against public policy or
morals and the public interest may be waived.
While it has been stated generally that all personal
rights conferred by statute and guaranteed by
constitution may be waived, it has also been said
that constitutional provisions intended to protect
property may be waived, and even some of the
constitutional rights created to secure personal
liberty are subjects of waiver.42
CONSTI LAW APRIL 7, 2018 60
In Commonwealth vs. Petrillo,43 it was held:
Rights guaranteed to one accused of a crime fall
naturally into two classes: (a) those in which the
state, as well as the accused, is interested; and (b)
those which are personal to the accused, which
are in the nature of personal privileges. Those of
the first class cannot be waived; those of the
second may be.
It is "competent for a person to waive a right
guaranteed by the Constitution, and to consent to
action which would be invalid if taken against his
will."44
This Court has recognized waivers of constitutional
rights such as, for example, the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures;45 the right
to counsel and to remain silent;46 and the right to
be heard.47
Even the 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes a
waiver of rights guaranteed by its Bill of
Rights.1âwphi1 Section 12(l) of Article III thereof
on the right to remain silent and to have a
competent and independent counsel, preferably of
his own choice states:
. . . These rights cannot be waived except in writing
and in the presence of counsel.
This provision merely particularizes the form and
manner of the waiver; it, nevertheless, clearly
suggests that the other rights may be waived in
some other form or manner provided such waiver
will not offend Article 6 of the Civil Code.
We hereby rule that the right to bail is another of
the constitutional rights which can be waived. It is
a right which is personal to the accused and whose
waiver would not be contrary to law, public order,
public policy, morals, or good customs, or
prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized
by law.
The respondent Judge then clearly acted with
grave abuse of discretion in granting bail to the
private respondent.
WHEREFORE, the Orders of respondent Judge of
July 7, 1987 and July 30, 1987 in Criminal Case
No. 86-48926 entitled People of the Philippines vs.
Rodolfo C. Salas alias Commander Bilog/Henry,
Josefina Cruz alias Mrs. Mercado, and Jose Milo
Concepcion alias Eugene Zamora, for Rebellion,
are hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 115407 August 28, 1995
MIGUEL P. PADERANGA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
The adverse decision in this case promulgated by
respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
32233 on November 24, 1993, as well as its
resolution of April 26, 1994 denying the motion for
reconsideration thereof, are challenged by
petitioner Miguel P. Paderanga in this appeal by
certiorari through a petition which raises issues
centering mainly on said petitioner's right to be
admitted to bail.
On January 28, 1990, petitioner was belatedly
charged in an amended information as a co-
conspirator in the crime of multiple murder in
Criminal Case No. 86-39 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 18 of Cagayan de Oro City for the
killing of members of the Bucag family sometime in
1984 in Gingoog City of which petitioner was the
mayor at the time. The original information, filed on
October 6, 1986 with the Regional Trial Court of
Gingoog City,1 had initially indicted for multiple
murder eight accused suspect, namely, Felipe
Galarion, Manuel Sabit, Cesar Sabit, Julito Ampo,
Eddie Torion, John Doe, Peter Doe And Richard
Doe as the alleged conspirators in the
indiscriminate slaying of the spouses Romeo and
Juliet Bucag and their son, Romeo, Jr. However,
only one of the accused, Felipe Galarion, was
apprehended, tried and eventually convicted.
Galarion later escaped from prison. The others
have remained at large up to the present. 2
In a bizarre twist of events, one Felizardo ("Ely")
Roxas was implicated in the crime. In an amended
information dated October 6, 1988, he was
charged as a co-accused therein. As herein
petitioner was his former employer and thus knew
him well, Roxas engaged the former's services as
counsel in said case. Ironically, in the course of the
preliminary investigation therein, said accused, in
a signed affidavit dated March 30, 1989 but which
he later retracted on June 20, 1990, implicated
petitioner as the supposed mastermind behind the
massacre of the Bucag family.3
Then, upon the inhibition of the City Prosecutor of
Cagayan de Oro City from the case per his
resolution of July 7, 1989, the Department of
Justice, at the instance of said prosecutor,
CONSTI LAW APRIL 7, 2018 61
designated a replacement, State Prosecutor
Henrick F. Gingoyon, for purposes of both the
preliminary investigation and prosecution of
Criminal Case No. 86-39. Pursuant to a resolution
of the new prosecutor dated September 6, 1989,
petitioner was finally charged as a co-conspirator
in said criminal case in a second amended
information dated October 6, 1992. Petitioner
assailed his inclusion therein as a co-accused all
the way to this Court in G.R. No. 96080 entitled
"Atty. Miguel P. Paderanga vs. Hon. Franklin M.
Drilon, Hon. Silvestre H. Bello III, Atty. Henrick F.
Gingoyon, Helen B. Canoy and Rebecca B. Tan."
In an en banc decision promulgated on April 19,
1991, the Court sustained the filing of the second
amended information against him.4
Under this backdrop, the trial of the base was all
set to start with the issuance of an arrest warrant
for petitioner's apprehension but, before it could be
served on him, petitioner through counsel, filed on
October 28, 1992 a motion for admission to bail
with the trial court which set the same for hearing
on November 5, 1992. Petitioner duly furnished
copies of the motion to State Prosecutor Henrick
F. Gingoyon, the Regional State Prosecutor's
Office, and the private prosecutor, Atty. Benjamin
Guimong. On November 5, 1992, the trial court
proceeded to hear the application for bail. Four of
petitioner's counsel appeared in court but only
Assistant Prosecutor Erlindo Abejo of the Regional
State Prosecution's Office appeared for the
prosecution.5
As petitioner was then confined at the Cagayan
Capitol College General Hospital due to "acute
costochondritis," his counsel manifested that they
were submitting custody over the person of their
client to the local chapter president of the
integrated Bar of the Philippines and that, for
purposes of said hearing of his bail application, he
considered being in the custody of the law.
Prosecutor Abejo, on the other hand, informed the
trial court that in accordance with the directive of
the chief of their office, Regional State prosecutor
Jesus Zozobrado, the prosecution was neither
supporting nor opposing the application for bail
and that they were submitting the same to the
sound discretion of the trail judge.6
Upon further inquiries from the trial court,
Prosecutor Abejo announced that he was waiving
any further presentation of evidence. On that note
and in a resolution dated November 5, 1992, the
trial court admitted petitioner to bail in the amount
of P200,000.00. The following day, November 6,
1992, petitioner, apparently still weak but well
enough to travel by then, managed to personally

appear before the clerk of court of the trial court
and posted bail in the amount thus fixed. He was
thereafter arraigned and in the trial that ensued, he
also personally appeared and attended all the
scheduled court hearings of the case.7
The subsequent motion for reconsideration of said
resolution filed twenty (20) days later on November
26, 1992 by Prosecutor Gingoyon who allegedly
received his copy of the petition for admission to
bail on the day after the hearing, was denied by the
trial court in its omnibus order dated March 29,
1993. On October 1, 1993, or more than six (6)
months later, Prosecutor Gingoyon elevated the
matter to respondent Court of Appeals through a
special civil action for certiorari. Thus were the
resolution and the order of the trial court granting
bail to petitioner annulled on November 24, 1993,
in the decision now under review, on the ground
that they were tainted with grave abuse of
discretion.8
Respondent court observed in its decision that at
the time of petitioner's application for bail, he was
not yet "in the custody of the law," apparently
because he filed his motion for admission to bail
before he was actually arrested or had voluntarily
surrendered. It further noted that apart from the
circumstance that petitioner was charged with a
crime punishable by reclusion perpetua, the
evidence of guilt was strong as borne out by the
fact that no bail was recommended by the
prosecution, for which reasons it held that the grant
of bail was doubly improvident. Lastly, the
prosecution, according to respondent court, was
not afforded an opportunity to oppose petitioner's
application for bail contrary to the requirements of
due process. Hence, this appeal.
Petitioner argues that, in accordance with the
ruling of this Court in Santiago vs. Vasquez etc., et
al.,9 his filing of the aforesaid application for bail
with the trial court effectively conferred on the latter
jurisdiction over his person. In short, for all intents
and purposes, he was in the custody of the law. In
petitioner's words, the "invocation by the accused
of the court's jurisdiction by filing a pleading in
court is sufficient to vest the court with jurisdiction
over the person of the accused and bring him
within the custody of the law."
Petitioner goes on to contend that the evidence on
record negates the existence of such strong
evidence as would bar his provisional release on
bail. Furthermore, the prosecution, by reason of
the waiver by Prosecutor Abejo of any further
presentation of evidence to oppose the application
for bail and whose representation in court in behalf
CONSTI LAW APRIL 7, 2018 62
of the prosecution bound the latter, cannot legally
assert any claim to a denial of procedural due
process. Finally, petitioner points out that the
special civil action for certiorari was filed in
respondent court after an unjustifiable length of
time.
On the undisputed facts , the legal principles
applicable and the equities involved in this case,
the Court finds for petitioner.
1. Section 1 of Rule 114, as amended,
defines bail as the security given for the release of
a person in custody of the law, furnished by him or
a bondsman, conditioned upon his appearing
before any court as required under the conditions
specified in said Rule. Its main purpose, then, is to
relieve an accused from the rigors of imprisonment
until his conviction and yet secure his appearance
at the trial.10 As bail is intended to obtain or secure
one's provisional liberty, the same cannot be
posted before custody over him has been acquired
by the judicial authorities, either by his lawful arrest
or voluntary surrender.11 As this Court has put it
in a case "it would be incongruous to grant bail to
one who is free."12
The rationale behind the rule is that it discourages
and prevents resort to the former pernicious
practice whereby an accused could just send
another in his stead to post his bail, without
recognizing the jurisdiction of the court by his
personal appearance therein and compliance with
the requirements therefor.13 Thus, in Feliciano vs.
Pasicolan, etc., et al.,14 where the petitioner who
had been charged with kidnapping with murder
went into hiding without surrendering himself, and
shortly thereafter filed a motion asking the court to
fix the amount of the bail bond for his release
pending trial, the Supreme Court categorically
pronounced that said petitioner was not eligible for
admission to bail.
As a paramount requisite then, only those persons
who have either been arrested, detained, or other
wise deprived of their freedom will ever have
occasion to seek the protective mantle extended
by the right to bail. The person seeking his
provisional release under the auspices of bail need
not even wait for a formal complaint or information
to be filed against him as it is available to "all
persons"15 where the offense is bailable. The rule
is, of course, subject to the condition or limitation
that the applicant is in the custody of the law.16
On the other hand, a person is considered to be in
the custody of the law (a) when he is arrested
either by virtue of a warrant of arrest issued

pursuant to Section 6, Rule 112, or by warrantless
arrest under Section 5, Rule 113 in relation to
Section 7, Rule 112 of the revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure, or (b) when he has voluntarily
submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court by
surrendering to the proper authorities.17 in this
light, the ruling, vis-a-vis the facts in Santiago vs.
Vasquez, etc., et al.,18 should be explained.
In said case, the petitioner who was charged
before the Sandiganbayan for violation of the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, filed through
counsel what purported to be an "Urgent Ex-parte
Motion for Acceptance of Cash Bail Bond." Said
petitioner was at the time confined in a hospital
recuperating from serious physical injuries which
she sustained in a major vehicular mishap.
Consequently, she expressly sought leave "that
she be considered as having placed herself under
the jurisdiction of (the Sandiganbayan) for
purposes of the required trial and other
proceedings." On the basis of said ex-parte motion
and the peculiar circumstances obtaining in that
incident, the Sandiganbayan authorized petitioner
to post a cash bail bond for her provisional liberty
without need of her personal appearance in view
of her physical incapacity and as a matter of
humane consideration.
When the Sandiganbayan later issued a hold
departure order against her, she question the
jurisdiction of that court over her person in a
recourse before this Court, on the ground that "she
neither been arrested nor has she voluntarily
surrendered, aside from the fact that she has not
validly posted bail since she never personally
appeared before said court" In rejecting her
arguments, the Court held that she was clearly
estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan for by her own representations in
the urgent ex parte motion for bail she had earlier
recognized such jurisdiction. Furthermore, by
actually posting a cash bail was accepted by the
court, she had effectively submitted to its
jurisdiction over her person. Nonetheless, on the
matter of bail, the Court took pains to reiterate that
the same cannot be posted before custody of the
accused has been acquired by the judicial
authorities either by his arrest or voluntary
surrender.
In the case of herein petitioner, it may be conceded
that he had indeed filed his motion for admission
to bail before he was actually and physically placed
under arrest. He may, however, at that point and in
the factual ambience therefore, be considered as
being constructively and legally under custody.
Thus in the likewise peculiar circumstance which
CONSTI LAW APRIL 7, 2018 63
attended the filing of his bail application with the
trail court, for purposes of the hearing thereof he
should be deemed to have voluntarily submitted
his person to the custody of the law and,
necessarily, to the jurisdiction of the trial court
which thereafter granted bail as prayed for. In fact,
an arrest is made either by actual restraint of the
arrestee or merely by his submission to the
custody of the person making the arrest.19 The
latter mode may be exemplified by the so-called
"house arrest" or, in case of military offenders, by
being "confined to quarters" or restricted to the
military camp area.
It should be stressed herein that petitioner, through
his counsel, emphatically made it known to the
prosecution and to the trail court during the hearing
for bail that he could not personally appear as he
was then confined at the nearby Cagayan Capitol
College General Hospital for acute
costochondritis, and could not then obtain medical
clearance to leave the hospital. The prosecution
and the trial court, notwithstanding their explicit
knowledge of the specific whereabouts of
petitioner, never lifted a finger to have the arrest
warrant duly served upon him. Certainly, it would
have taken but the slightest effort to place
petitioner in the physical custody of the authorities,
since he was then incapacitated and under
medication in a hospital bed just over a kilometer
away, by simply ordering his confinement or
placing him under guard.
The undeniable fact is that petitioner was by then
in the constructive custody of the law. Apparently,
both the trial court and the prosecutors agreed on
that point since they never attempted to have him
physically restrained. Through his lawyers, he
expressly submitted to physical and legal control
over his person, firstly, by filing the application for
bail with the trail court; secondly, by furnishing true
information of his actual whereabouts; and, more
importantly, by unequivocally recognizing the
jurisdiction of the said court. Moreover, when it
came to his knowledge that a warrant for his arrest
had been issued, petitioner never made any
attempt or evinced any intent to evade the clutches
of the law or concealed his whereabouts from the
authorities since the day he was charged in court,
up to the submission application for bail, and until
the day of the hearing thereof.
At the hearing, his counsel offered proof of his
actual confinement at the hospital on account of an
acute ailment, which facts were not at all contested
as they were easily verifiable. And, as a
manifestation of his good faith and of his actual
recognition of the authority of trial court,

petitioner's counsel readily informed the court that
they were surrendering custody of petitioner to the
president of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
Misamis Oriental Chapter.20 In other words, the
motion for admission to bail was filed not for the
purpose or in the manner of the former practice
which the law proscribes for the being derogatory
of the authority and jurisdiction of the courts, as
what had happened in Feliciano. There was here
no intent or strategy employed to obtain bail in
absentia and thereby be able to avoid arrest
should the application therefore be denied.
2. Section 13, Article III of the Constitution
lays down the rule that before conviction, all
indictees shall be allowed bail, except only those
charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when the evidence of guilt is strong. In
pursuance thereof, Section 4 of Rule 114, as
amended, now provides that all persons in custody
shall, before conviction by a regional trial court of
an offense not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, be admitted to bail
as a matter of right. The right to bail, which may be
waived considering its personal nature21 and
which, to repeat, arises from the time one is placed
in the custody of the law, springs from the
presumption of innocence accorded every
accused upon whom should not be inflicted
incarceration at the outset since after trial he would
be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be
established beyond reasonable doubt.22
Thus, the general rule is that prior to conviction by
the regional trial court of a criminal offense, an
accused is entitled to be released on bail as a
matter of right, the present exceptions thereto
being the instances where the accused is charged
with a capital offense or an offense punishable by
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment23 and the
evidence of guilt is strong. Under said general rule,
upon proper application for admission to bail, the
court having custody of the accused should, as a
matter of course, grant the same after a hearing
conducted to specifically determine the conditions
of the bail in accordance with Section 6 (now,
Section 2) of Rule 114. On the other hand, as the
grant of bail becomes a matter of judicial discretion
on the part of the court under the exceptions to the
rule, a hearing, mandatory in nature and which
should be summary or otherwise in the discretion
of the court,24 is required with the participation of
both the defense and a duly notified representative
of the prosecution, this time to ascertain whether
or not the evidence of guilt is strong for the
provisional liberty of the applicant.25 Of course,
the burden of proof is on the prosecution to show
that the evidence meets the required quantum.26
CONSTI LAW APRIL 7, 2018 64
Where such a hearing is set upon proper motion or
petition, the prosecution must be give an
opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all
the evidence that it may want to introduce before
the court may resolve the application, since it is
equally entitled as the accused to due process.27
If the prosecution is denied this opportunity, there
would be a denial of procedural due process, as a
consequence of which the court's order in respect
of the motion or petition is void.28 At the hearing,
the petitioner can rightfully cross-examine the
witnesses presented by the prosecution and
introduce his own evidence in rebuttal.29 When,
eventually, the court issues an order either
granting or refusing bail, the same should contain
a summary of the evidence for the prosecution,
followed by its conclusion as to whether or not the
evidence of guilt is strong.30 The court, though,
cannot rely on mere affidavits or recitals of their
contents, if timely objected to, for these represent
only hearsay evidence, and thus are insufficient to
establish the quantum of evidence that the law
requires.31
In this appeal, the prosecution assails what it
considers to be a violation of procedural due
process when the court below allowed Assistant
Prosecutor Erlindo Abejo of the Regional State
Prosecutor's Office to appear in behalf of the
prosecution, instead of State Prosecutor Henrick
P. Gingoyon who is claimed to be the sole
government prosecutor expressly authorized to
handle the case and who received his copy of the
motion only on the day after the hearing had been
conducted. Accordingly, the prosecution now
insists that Prosecutor Abejo had no authority at all
to waive the presentation of any further evidence
in opposition to the application for bail and to
submit the matter to the sound discretion of the trial
court. In addition, they argue that the prosecution
was not afforded "reasonable time" to oppose that
application for bail.
We disagree. Firstly, it is undisputed that the Office
of the Regional State Prosecutor acted as the
collaborating counsel, with State Prosecutor
Henrick Gingoyon, in Criminal Case No. 86-39 on
the basis of an authority from then Chief State
Prosecutor Fernando de Leon which was sent
through radio message on July 10, 1992 and duly
received by the Office of the Regional State
Prosecutor on the same date. This authorization,
which was to be continuing until and unless it was
expressly withdrawn, was later confirmed and then
withdrawn only on July 12, 1993 by then Secretary
of Justice Franklin M. Drilon. This was done after
one Rebecca Bucag-tan questioned the authority

of Regional State Prosecutor Jesus Zozobrado
and State Prosecutor II Erlindo Abejo to enter their
appearance as collaborating government
prosecutors in said criminal case.32 It was in fact
by virtue of this arrangement that the same
Prosecutor Zozobrado and Prosecutor
Perseverando Arana entered their appearance as
collaborating prosecutor in the previous hearing in
said case.33 Hence, on the strength of said
authority and of its receipt of the notice of the
hearing for bail, the Regional State Prosecutor's
Office, through Prosecutor Abejo, could validly
represent the prosecution in the hearing held on
November 5, 1992.
Secondly, although it is now claimed that
Prosecutor Abejo was allegedly not familiar with
the case, he nonetheless was explicitly instructed
about the position of the Regional State
Prosecutor's Office on the matter. Prosecutor
Zozobrado, whose office received its copy of the
motion on the very day when it was sent, that is,
October 28, 1992, duly instructed Prosecutor
Abejo to manifest to the court that the prosecution
was neither supporting nor opposing the
application for bail and that they were submitting
the matter to its sound discretion. Obviously, what
this meant was that the prosecution, at that
particular posture of the case, was waiving the
presentation of any countervailing evidence. When
the court a quo sought to ascertain whether or not
that was the real import of the submission by
Prosecutor Abejo, the latter readily answered in
the affirmative.
The following exchanges bear this out:
PROSECUTOR ERLINDO ABEJO:
I was informed to appear in this case just now Your
Honor.
COURT:
Where is your Chief of Office? Your office received
a copy of the motion as early as October 28. There
is an element of urgency here.
PROSECUTOR ABEJO:
I am not aware of that, Your Honor, I was only
informed just now. The one assigned here is State
Prosecutor Perseverando Arena, Jr. who
unfortunately is in the hospital attending to his sick
son. I do not know about this but before I came I
received an instruction from our Chief to relay to
this court the stand of the office regarding the
motion to admit bail. That office is neither
CONSTI LAW APRIL 7, 2018 65
supporting nor opposing it and we are submitting
to the sound discretion of the Honorable Court.
COURT:
Place that manifestation on record. For the record,
Fiscal Abejo, would you like to formally enter your
appearance in this matter?
PROSECUTOR ABEJO:
Yes, Your Honor. For the government, the
Regional State Prosecutor's Office represented by
State Prosecutor Erlindo Abejo.
COURT:
By that manifestation do you want the Court to
understand that in effect, at least, the prosecution
is dispensing with the presentation of evidence to
show that the guilt of the accused is strong, the
denial . . .
PROSECUTOR ABEJO:
I am amenable to that manifestation, Your Honor.
COURT:
Final inquiry. Is the Prosecution willing to submit
the incident covered by this particular motion for
resolution by this court?
PROSECUTOR ABEJO:
Yes, Your Honor.
COURT:
Without presenting any further evidence?
PROSECUTOR ABEJO:
Yes, Your Honor.34
It is further evident from the foregoing that the
prosecution, on the instructions of Regional State
prosecutor Zozobrado, had no intention at all to
oppose the motion for bail and this should be so
notwithstanding the statement that they were
"neither supporting nor opposing" the motion.
What is of significance is the manifestation that the
prosecution was "submitting (the motion) to the
sound discretion of the Honorable Court." By that,
it could not be any clearer. The prosecution was
dispensing with the introduction of evidence en
contra and this it did at the proper forum and stage
of the proceedings, that is, during the mandatory

hearing for bail and after the trial court had fully
satisfied itself that such was the position of the
prosecution.
3. In Herras Teehankee vs. Director of
Prisons,35 it was stressed that where the trial court
has reasons to believe that the prosecutor's
attitude of not opposing the application for bail is
not justified, as when he is evidently committing a
gross error or a dereliction of duty, the court, in the
interest of Justice, must inquire from the
prosecutor concerned as the nature of his
evidence to determine whether or not it is strong.
And, in the very recent administrative matter Re:
First Indorsement Dated July 21, 1992 of Hon.
Fernando de Leon, Chief State Prosecutor,
Department of Justice; Alicia A. Baylon, City
Prosecutor of Dagupan City vs. Judge Deodoro
Sison, 36 the Court, citing Tucay vs. Domagas,
etc., 37 held that where the prosecutor interposes
no objection to the motion of the accused, the trial
court should nevertheless set the application for
hearing and from there diligently ascertain from the
prosecution whether the latter is really not
contesting the bail application.
No irregularity, in the context of procedural due
process, could therefore be attributed to the trial
court here as regards its order granting bail to
petitioner. A review of the transcript of the
stenographic notes pertinent to its resolution of
November 5, 1992 and the omnibus order of March
29, 1993 abundantly reveals scrupulous
adherence to procedural rules. As summarized in
its aforementioned order, the lower court
exhausted all means to convince itself of the
propriety of the waiver of evidence on the part of
the prosecution. Moreover, the omnibus order
contained the requisite summary of the evidence
of both the prosecution and the defense, and only
after sifting through them did the court conclude
that petitioner could be provisionally released on
bail. Parenthetically, there is no showing that,
since then and up to the present, petitioner has
ever committed any violation of the conditions of
his bail.
As to the contention that the prosecutor was not
given the opportunity to present its evidence within
a reasonable period of time, we hold otherwise.
The records indicate that the Regional State
Prosecutor's Office duly received its copy of the
application for bail on the very same day that the it
was filed with the trial court on October 28, 1992.
Counted from said date up to the day of the
hearing on November 5, 1992, the prosecution had
more than one (1) week to muster such evidence
as it would have wanted to adduce in that hearing
CONSTI LAW APRIL 7, 2018 66
in opposition to the motion. Certainly, under the
circumstances, that period was more than
reasonable. The fact that Prosecutor Gingoyon
received his copy of the application only on
November 6, 1992 is beside the point for, as
already established, the Office of the Regional
State Prosecutor was authorized to appear for the
People.
4. What finally militates against the cause of
the prosecutor is the indubitably unreasonable
period of time that elapsed before it questioned
before the respondent court the resolution and the
omnibus order of the trial court through a special
civil action for certiorari. The Solicitor General
submits that the delay of more than six (6) months,
or one hundred eighty-four (184) days to be exact,
was reasonable due to the attendant difficulties
which characterized the prosecution of the criminal
case against petitioner. But then, the certiorari
proceeding was initiated before the respondent
court long after trial on the merits of the case had
ensued in the court below with the active
participation of prosecution lawyers, including
Prosecutor Gingoyon. At any rate, the definitive
rule now in that the special civil action for certiorari
should not be instituted beyond a period of the
three months,38 the same to be reckoned by
taking into account the duration of time that had
expired from the commission of the acts
complained to annul the same.39
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment of respondent
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 32233,
promulgated on November 24, 1993, annulling the
resolution dated November 5, 1992 and the
omnibus order dated March 29, 1993 of the
Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City, as
well as said respondent court's resolution of April
26, 1994 denying the motion for reconsideration of
said judgment, are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The aforesaid resolution and omnibus
order of the Regional Trail Court granting bail to
petitioner Miguel P. Paderanga are hereby
REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.

RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED
[G.R. No. 127126. September 17, 1998]
People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
Rodrigo Calma y Sacdalan, accused-appellant.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This Court repeats: men who rape children, worse,
their own daughters, are filthier than the slime
where they belong. Whatever punishment is
imposed on them can never expiate their
loathsome offense, for which forgiveness itself
from a mortal court, at least, would be a sin.[1]
There is no fathoming the deluge of rape cases,
often involving children, that has swamped the
Court. But this particular case is by far, the most
bizarre. Not just one but three young girls have
been left precipitately stigmatized by the bestial
violence perpetrated on them by their own father.
The very person who should have protected them
with his life, destroyed theirs. What strikes this
Court as extremely perverse is that he spared no
one, not even his daughter of the tenderest age of
5.
Accused-appellant Rodrigo Calma was charged
with two (2) counts of Rape under Art. 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Sec. 11 of
Republic Act No. 7659, and one (1) count of Acts
of Lasciviousness under Art. 336 of the Revised
Penal Code in relation to Sec. 5(b) of Art. III of
Republic Act No. 7610[2], before the Regional Trial
Court, 3rd Judicial Region, Malolos Bulacan,
Branch 14[3] in the following three (3) separate
Informations:
In Crim. Case No. 752-M-96, for Rape:
The undersigned upon the prior sworn complaint
of the offended party, fourteen (14) year old minor
Annalyn Calma, accuses RODRIGO CALMA Y
SACDALAN of Rape, defined and penalized under
Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended
by Sec. 11 of Republic Act [No.] 7659, committed
as follows:
That in between the period May 1995 to March 8,
1996, in Marilao, Bulacan and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, being the biological father of the
offended party Annalyn Calma, with lewd designs
and by means of threat and violence by arming
CONSTI LAW APRIL 7, 2018 67
himself with bladed weapon, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously lie and had
sexual intercourse with private complainant
Annalyn Calma against her will and consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
In Crim. Case No. 752-M-96, also for Rape:
The undersigned upon the prior sworn complaint
of the offended party, ten (10) year old minor
Roselyn Calma, assisted by her mother Myrna
Calma y Ignacio, accuses RODRIGO CALMA Y
SACDALAN of Rape, defined and penalized under
Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended
by Sec. 11 of Republic Act [No.] 7659, committed
as follows:
That in between the period May 1995 to March 8,
1996, in Marilao, Bulacan and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, being the biological father of the
offended party Roselyn Calma, with lewd designs,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously lie and had sexual intercourse with
private complainant Roselyn Calma against her
will and consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[5]
In Crim. Case no. 754-M-96, for Acts of
Lasciviousness:
The undersigned upon the prior sworn complaint
of Myrna Calma y Ignacio in behalf of her Four (4)
year old daughter Irene Calma, the offended party,
accuses RODRIGO CALMA Y SACDALAN of
ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS defined and
penalized under Art. 336 of the Revised Penal
Code, in relation to Section 5 (b), Art. III of
Republic Act [No.] 7610, committed as follows:
That in between the period May 1995 to March 8,
1996, in Marilao, Bulacan and with the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, by taking advantage of his natural
daughter, Four (4) year old Irene Calma, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously with
lewd designs, touched the private parts of the
above-stated offended party.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[6]
Accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the
charges.
On May 31, 1996, the three cases were jointly tried
upon motion of the prosecution.

The evidence of the prosecution established that
between May 1995 and March 8, 1996, accused-
appellant forced himself on his two daughters,
namely, Annalyn and Roselyn, born on July 11,
1981[7] and December 28, 1985[8], respectively.
During the same period, accused-appellant
inserted his finger into the sex organ of his
youngest daughter, Irene, born on June 29,
1991[9]
At ages 15, 11 and 5 years, Annalyn, Roselyn, and
Irene, respectively, testified thus:
Annalyn on the witness stand:
A. One day by the middle of May, 1995, my father
arrived home drank [sic] and he forced me to
undress myself while carrying an icepick.
xxx
Q. But can you tell us the time?
A. It was already night time, madam.
xxx
Q. And where did this incident happened [sic]?
A. In our bedroom, madam.
xxx
Q. When you said that your father removed your
panty and your short[s] and your father was only
wearing his short[s] at that time, what did your
father do to you if any?
A. He asked me to lie down on the bed, madam.
Q. And when you laid down on the bed, what
happened next?
A. He approached me pointing the icepick towards
me, sir.
xxx
Q. And then when he approached you, what
happened next?
A. He started to kiss me on the different parts of
my body, madam.
Q. Specifically what part of your body did he kiss
first?
CONSTI LAW APRIL 7, 2018 68
A. My vagina, madam.
"x x x
Q. Did you not resist or cry or ask him the reason
why he was doing that to you?
A. I asked him, madam.
Q. And what was his answer?
A. None, madam.
xxx
Q. And after your father kissed your whole body,
your breast and including your vagina that was all
he did to you?
A. On that particular day, yes madam on that day
only.
xxx
Q. After that first incident, you did not tell anyone
or anybody your mother and brother and your
sister what your father did to you?
A. I did not, sir.
Q. Why?
A. Because at the very start, he had already
threatened us and he told us that he would kill our
mother in our presence, madam.
Q. And after that first incident in the middle of May,
1995, this act was never repeated again?
A. It was repeated again, madam.
Q. How many times?
A. For many more times, madam.
xxx
A. After a week time [sic] or something like that in
as much as he seem[s] not to be satisfied he
inserted his sex organ [in]to mine, madam.
Q. Can you recall the first time your father inserted
his penis inside your private parts?
A. No more, madam.
Q. You can not recall the exact date?

A. I can no longer recall, madam.
xxx
Q. Now, when you were left alone with your father,
do you recall what happened if any?
A. Yes, madam.
xxx
A. First he look [sic] our main door and then he
ordered me to get inside our bedroom, madam.
Q. After he instructed you to get inside your
bedroom, what happened next?
A. He ordered me or instructed me to undress
myself, madam.
Q. Did you actually remove your clothes?
A. Yes, madam because I was frightened then.
Q. How about your father, what happened to his
clothes then?
A. He likewise removed his short pants, madam.
Q. So, both of you were totally naked?
A. Yes, madam.
Q. After you were both totally naked, did [sic] you
kindly tell us what happened next?
A. He instructed me to lie down on [the] bed,
madam.
Q. After you laid down on [the] bed, what
happened next?
A. He placed himself on top of me, madam.
Q. And when he laid on top of you, do you recall
what
happened next?
A. Yes, madam.
Q. What was that?
A. He was making a push and pull motion, madam.
xxx
CONSTI LAW APRIL 7, 2018 69
Q. When you say that he was likewise making this
push up motion, did you notice anything else?
A. He inserted his penis on [sic] my vagina,
madam.
Q. How do you know it was his penis that was
inserted on [sic] your vagina?
A. Because I saw it, madam.
Q. When he inserted his penis inside your vagina,
what did you feel?
A. I cried because it was painful, madam.
Q. Did you resist or fought [sic] back to [sic] what
your father was doing to you?
xxx
SP BALAWAG:
Q. What did you do if any?
A. I cried and cried and when I was struggling to
free myself, he pointed again the icepick on [sic]
me, madam.
Q. And can you tell us for how long did this push
up movements [which] your father was doing while
his penis was inserted in your vagina lasted [sic]?
A. For less than five (5) minutes, madam.
Q. After that what happened?
A. He stood up and seated himself on top of the
bed, madam.
Q. What did you see when your father suddenly
stood [sic] up and sit on top of the bed?
xxx
A. He took hold and played with his sex organ or
penis, madam.
Q. After playing [with] his sex organ, what
happened next?
A. Something came out of his penis, madam.
Q. Would you kindly describe to us what you saw
coming out from his penis?
A. A sticky substance, madam.

Q. Why do you know that this sticky substance
came out from the penis of your father?
A. Because he was showing that to me, madam.
He even told me that that substance was the one
introducing [sic] baby, madam.
xxx
Q. And after this first sexual abuse committed by
your father on you, you never relayed this incident
to anyone?
A. Yes, madam I did not.
Q. Why was this?
A. As I have stated a while ago, he was threatening
us. He was threatening me and he further stated
that that will include my mother and even my other
sister and brother, madam.
Q. You stated earlier that this sexual abuse was
repeatedly done by your father?
A. Yes, madam.
xxx
A. When my mother was not yet around whenever
he likes it.
xxx
Q. During the time that you have or you were
repeatedly raped or your father have [sic] sexual
intercourse with you, will you kindly tell us the
positions your father did?
A. Sometimes I am lying on my back. Sometimes I
am on my side that is all.
xxx
SP BALAWAG:
Q. In all those instances that you were repeatedly
abused by your father notwithstanding the return
of your mother, you never told anyone what was
[sic] your father was doing to you?
A. I did not, madam.
Q. Why?
A. Because I am afraid of his threat and I love very
much my family.
CONSTI LAW APRIL 7, 2018 70
xxx
Q. Now, madam witness, do you recall the last time
when your father sexually abused you?
A. Yes, madam.
Q. When was that?
A. March 3, Sunday in the morning 1996, madam.
Q. In other words, madam witness since the middle
of May, 1995, up to March 3, 1996, this sexual
abuse committed by your father lasted up to one
(1) year?
A. Yes, madam.[10]
Roselyn on the witness stand:
Q. Can you tell us, Madam Witness, what grade
were you in and how old were you at the time you
were first sexually molested by your father?
A. I was then in Grade 2 and I was only 8 years old
then, madam.
xxx
Q. In other words, Madam Witness, the first time
you were sexually abused by your father, you were
left alone with him?
A. Yes, madam.
Q. And you also mentioned earlier that you were
first sexually abused by your father in your living
room, can you tell us who brought you there in the
living room?
A. It was he, madam.
xxx
Q. Now, when your father or the accused led you
in the living room of your house alone and you
were alone with him, can you recall what
happened, if any?
A. First, he instructed me to remove my shorts but
I didnt want and what he did is that he pointed an
ice pick to [sic] me, madam.
xxx
Q. When you refused at first to remove your shorts
and then the accused pointed an ice pick at you,
can you recall what happened next?

A. It was he who removed my shorts, madam.
Q. In what particular part of your body was the ice
pick pointed?
A. On my neck, madam. x x x
Q. After your father removed your shorts, what
happened next, if any?
A. He brought out his sex organ from his short, he
lifted up one of my feet and make [sic] me lie down
on my back and he placed himself on top of me,
madam.
Q. What part of your leg was raised at that time?
A. My right leg, madam.
Q. In other words, while you were lying down, the
accused lifted your right leg and then he went on
top of you?
A. Yes, madam.
xxx
PROS. BALAUAG:
Q. What happened next after your father laid on
top of you?
A. He was actually making a push and full [sic]
motions [sic] (kinakabayo).
xxx
PROS. BALAUAG:
Q. Now, after your father went on top of you, what
did he do next, if any and made [sic] that
kinakabayo?
A. He pulled out his sex organ and then played with
it, madam.
Q. Where did he pulled [sic] out his sex organ?
A. From my sex organ, madam.
Q. In other words, madam Witness, your father
inserted his sex organ or penis in your vagina?
A. Yes, madam.
Q. Can you tell what you felt at that time while the
penis of your father was inserted in your vagina?
CONSTI LAW APRIL 7, 2018 71
A. It was painful, madam.
Q. Did you not tell him about it?
A. I told him about that, madam.
Q. What was his responds [sic]?
A. None, madam.
xxx
Q. After your father pulled out his sex organ or his
penis, can you recall what happened next or what
did he do with it, if any?
A. After my father had pulled out his sex organ
from my sex organ he played with it and something
whity [sic] substance came out, madam.
Q. Did you actually see that whity [sic] substance
coming out from your fathers penis?
A. Yes, madam, because he was then in front of
me.
xxx
Q. Now, did you not tell anyone of what had
happened to you?
A. I did not, madam.
Q. Why not, madam witness?
A. I am afraid, madam, because he told me that if
I do so, he would kill my mother.
xxx
Q. Now, the second time you were sexually
abused by your father, can you tell us where did it
happen?
A. In the same hut, madam.
Q. In what particular portion of the house?
A. Also, in the living room, madam.
xxx
Q. Now, you mentioned earlier that the second
time you were sexually abused by your father, it
happened in the living room, can you tell us what
your father did to you at that time?

A. The same as in the first occasion, he instructed
me to remove my clothes, madam.
Q. In other words, madam witness, what you are
trying to say to us right now was that the second
time you were sexually abused by your father, it
was like the first incident when you were sexually
abused?
A. Yes, madam.
xxx
A. The same as in the first occasion when I was
abused by my father. He first brought out his sex
organ from his shorts and then allowed me to lie
down on my back, then raised my right leg and
then he inserted his sex organ to [six] my sex
organ, madam.
xxx
Q. When was that, the last time you were sexually
abused by your father?
A. March 8, 1996, madam, because after that date
it was then the birthday of my father.
Q. In other words, the birthday of the accused is
March 9.
A. Yes, madam.
xxx
A. I was about to place my bag inside that bedroom
and I have to change clothes while my father
followed me inside.
Q. Madam Witness, where did you came [sic] from
on that particular date?
A. I came from school, madam.
Q. When your father followed you inside the
bedroom, can you recall what happened next, if
any?
A. Yes, madam.
Q. What happened?
A. He instructed me to lie down on my back and
instructed me further to remove my shorts,
madam.
Q. Did you obey his orders?
CONSTI LAW APRIL 7, 2018 72
A. No madam, I did not.
Q. What happened next when you refused to
removed [sic] your shorts?
A. He pointed an ice pick to [sic] me, madam.
Q. The same ice pick he pointed at you on the first
occasion you were sexually abused by your
father?
A. No madam, it is different.
Q. How can you tell that it was a different ice pick
that he used?
A. I said that it was different ice pick because the
first ice pick he used on me before, I kept it away,
so what he did, he made another ice pick which is
quite longer.
Q. Did you actually see your father making that
particular ice pick?
A. Yes, madam.
xxx
Q. Now, after your father placed some oil in [sic]
his penis, what did he do next, if he did anything?
A. He lifted again one of my legs and then placed
himself on top of me, madam.
Q. In other words, madam witness, the third time
you were sexually abused by your father, he lifted
again your right legs [sic] but this time he put some
oil in [sic] it before he inserted it in your vagina?
A. Yes, madam.
Q. And after inserting his penis inside your vagina,
what happened next, if any?
A. He removed his sex organ or pulled out his sex
organ and then played with it and sticky substance
came out of it.[11]
Irene on the witness stand:
PROS. AGARAN:
Q. Irene, kilala mo ba si Mama?
A. Opo.
xxx
 CONSTI LAW APRIL 7, 2018 73

Q. Si Papa kilala mo rin?

A. Masakit po.
A. Opo.
Q. Maliban sa pagpasok ng daliri ng Papa sa
xxx penching mo, ano pa ang ginawa sa iyo?

Q. Irene, mahal mo ba si Mama? A. No answer.

A. Opo. PROS. AGARAN: She refused to answer, your

Honor, but she kept on crying.
Q. Eh, si Papa, mahal mo rin ba?
COURT:
A. Hindi na po.
Q. Bakit ka umiiyak? Hindi naman kami nagagalit
Q. Bakit hindi mo na mahal si Papa? sa iyo.

A. Kasi po ang kamay niya ay pinapasok sa PROS. AGARAN:

penching ko.
Q. Meron ka bang pinagkuwentuhan ng ginawa ng
Q. Pakituro mo nga kung ano yong sinasabi mong Papa mo ang pagpasok sa penching mo?
penching?
A. Wala po.
AT THIS JUNCTURE, THE WITNESS IS CRYING.
AND WITNESS [IS] TOUCHING HER SEX Q. Kahit kanino?
ORGAN.
A. Wala po.
Q. Ano yong kamay na ipinapasok doon sa
penching mo, sabihin mo nga anak kung ano yon? Q. Kay Mama, hindi mo kinuwento kay Mama?
Nasaan yong daliring sinasabi mo, ituro mo kung
anong daliri ang ipinapasok ng iyong Papa sa A. Hindi po.
penching mo?
Q. Bakit hindi mo kinuwento kay Mama?
WITNESS TOUCHING HER RIGHT AND MIDDLE
FINGER. A. Eh, wala siya.

Q. Nasaan kayo pagka pinapasok ni Papa yong Q. Nasaan si Mama noon nuong ipasok niya ang
daliri niya sa penching mo? daliri niya sa penching mo?

A. Nasa kama po. A. Kina Lola po.

Q. Anong suot mo pag nasa kama kayo tapos Q. Hindi na ba bumalik si Mama sa bahay?
pinapasok ni Papa yong daliri niya sa penching
mo? Nasaan ka? A. Bumalik po.

A. Nasa amin po. Q. Eh, bakit hindi mo ikinuwento?

Q. Saan yon amin na sinasabi mo, Irene saan A. Gabi na po.

anak?
Q. Ibig mong sabihin pag gabi na si Mama
PROS. AGARAN: The witness is now crying, your natutulog ka na?
Honor.
A. Opo.
ATTY. JOSON: Scratching only, your Honor.
Q. Wala kang talagang pinagkwentuhan?
PROS. AGARAN:
A. Wala po.
Q. Pag ipinapasok ang daliri ni Papa sa penching
mo, ano ang nararamdaman mo? Q. Hindi mo ikinuwento maski na kina Ate?

A. Kay Roselyn po.
Q. Ano ang sinabi mo kay Ate Roselyn?
PROS. AGARAN: The witness refused to answer,
your Honor. That will be all for the witness, your
Honor.
COURT:
Q. Ituro mo nga kung sino ang nagpapasok ng
daliri sa penching mo?
A. WITNESS POINTING TO A PERSON IN THE
COURTROOM WHO STOOD UP AND GAVE HIS
NAME AS RODRIGO CALMA.
PROS. AGARAN:
Q. Sino siya?
A. Papa ko.
COURT: Cross?
ATTY. JOSON: Yes, your Honor. With the kind
permission of this Honorable Court.
COURT: Proceed.
ATTY. JOSON:
Q. Irene, is it not a fact that your mother and your
father frequently quarrel with each other?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And in fact, because of that frequent trouble
your mother was angry [sic] to your father?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And because your mother was angry she told
you to testify against your father?
PROS. AGARAN: Your Honor, at her age she is
incompetent to testify on those matters.
COURT: Let the witness answer.
A. No, sir.
Q. Considering that your mother did not instructed
[sic] you to file action against your father, my
question to you Irene is, who is the person who told
you that something wrong was done to you by your
father?
CONSTI LAW APRIL 7, 2018 74
A. None, sir.
COURT:
Q. Di ba natutulog ka nuong ilagay ang kamay niya
sa penching mo?
A. No, your Honor.
Q. Anong naramdaman mo nong ilagay iyon?
A. Painful, your Honor.
Q. Ano pa?
No answer.
ATTY. JOSON: No further question, your
Honor.[12]
Accused-appellant denied his daughters
accusations. He charged that Myrna Ignacio, his
common law wife and mother of his children,
coached his daughters to lie. He claimed that he
had seriously hurt her in the past, twice by
electrocution on suspicion of infidelity. He also
accused her of using the criminal cases to force
him to waive his ownership rights over their house
and lot in her favor.
Seeking to help accused-appellant, his mother,
Catalina Calma, his neighbor, Gloria Ceraus, his
mothers laundrywoman, Eugenia Lontoc, his
sister-in-law, Lolita Calma, family friend, Rosalie
Ofrecio, and a confidante of Annalyn, Larry
Laurora, attested to the close family ties of the
Calmas. They testified that accused-appellants
daughters, especially Annalyn, showed much
affection towards their father. Catalina Calma,
Lolita Calma and Larry Laurora even insinuated
that Annalyn was in love with her father and was
seducing him.
On September 25, 1996, the trial court convicted
the accused on all three (3) charges. It ruled:
The defenses position that the charges were
fabricated and that the private complainants were
coached is untenable. A teenage unmarried lass
would not ordinarily file a rape complaint against
anybody much less her own father if it were not
true (People v. Matrimonio, 215 SCRA 613). A
daughter, especially one of tender age would not
accuse her own father of this heinous crime had
she really not have been aggrieved (People v.
Dusohan, 227 SCRA 87; People v. Magpayo, 226
SCRA 13). In their childhood innocence and

naivete they could not have concocted the story of
how they were wantonly ravished and sexually
assaulted (see People v. Magallanes, 218 SCRA
109; People v. Joya, 227 SCRA 9).
Neither is there no [sic] merit in the accuseds
argument that the abuses if true could not have
been endured by the private complainants for
almost a year without telling anyone. It is not
uncommon for young girls to conceal for sometime
the assaults on their virtue because of the rapists
threats on their lives. Delay or vaccilation in
making a criminal accusation does not necessarily
impair the credibility of the witness if such delay is
satisfactorily explained (People v. Errojo, 229
SCRA 49 x x x). The fact that there was no outcry
from the offended party is immaterial in the rape of
a child below twelve years old (People v. Ylarde,
224 SCRA 405). Also, the precise date when
complainant was sexually abused is not an
essential element of the offense (People v.
Ocampo, 206 SCRA 223).
The defense also argues that there was no
external evidence of the use of force. In the case
of People v. Coloma it has held that previous
passivity of a daughter in allowing her father to
have carnal knowledge of her for eight (8) years is
not a valid defense against unconsented
intercourse. The kind of force or violence, threat or
intimidation as between father and daughter need
not be of such nature and degree as would be
required in other cases, for the father in this
particular instance exercises strong moral and
physical influence and control over his daughter
(People v. Coloma, 222 SCRA 255). In a rape case
committed by a father against his own daughter the
fathers moral ascendancy and influence over the
latter substitutes for violence and intimidation
(People v. Matrimonio, 215 SCRA 613).
It was held in People v. Ignacio, 233 SCRA 1, that
courts may take judicial notice of the interesting
fact that among poor couples with big families
living in small quarters, copulation does not seem
to be a problem despite the presence of other
persons around them. Rape can be committed
even if the victim is sleeping on the same bed with
others (People v. Villorente, 210 SCRA 647). Thus
it was not impossible for the accused to commit the
abuses on his daughters simply because they
were sleeping on the same bed.
It was also argues [sic] that the extent of the
injuries sustained by the two younger
complainants are not enough to support the
charges. Suffice it to say that healed lacerations in
the hymen do not negate rape; neither does the
CONSTI LAW APRIL 7, 2018 75
absence of spermatozoa in the vaginal canal
(People v. Liquiran, 228 SCRA 62; People v.
Magallanes, 218 SCRA 109). Even if there were
no lacerations of the hymen this fact alone does
not necessarily mean that there was no rape. The
merest introduction of the male organ into the labia
of the pudendum is sufficient. The mere
penetration of the penis by the entry thereof into
the labia majora of the female organ even without
rupture of the hymen suffices to warrant a
conviction for rape (People v. Sanchez, 250 SCRA
14). Annalyn and Roselyn testified that there was
penetration and that it was very painful. The pain
could be nothing but the result of penile
penetration, sufficient to constitute rape (People v.
Sanchez, supra).
The mother of the accused, as well as his sister-in-
law imply (sic) that an amorous relationship could
exist between the accused and Annalyn, and such
is one of the theories of the defense. However,
where the accused adopted the theory that the
victim consented to his sexual desires, the sexual
act itself is deemed admitted except as to consent
[but] x x x as contrary evidence showed the victim
sustained physical injuries consistent with her
claim that she was sexually abused without her
consent (People v. Saluna, 226 SCRA 447). The
charge that the complainant in a rape case has
loose morals must be supported by strong
evidence (People v. Coloma, 222 SCRA 255).
Such a claim could only lead this court to believe
that the defense would try to exculpate the
accused by blaming the victim, which this court is
not inclined to do.
The accused imputes false motive in the filing of
these case[s] on the part of Myrna. It is unnatural
for a parent to use her offspring as an engine of
malice, especially if it will subject a daughter to
embarassment and even stigma (People v. Ching,
240 SCRA 267; People v. Ignacio, 233 SCRA 1).
No mother would stoop so low as to subject her
daughter to physical hardship and shame
concommittant to a rape prosecution just to
assuage her own hurt feelings (People v. Rejano,
237 SCRA 627).
A violation of a womans chastity becomes doubly
repulsive where the outrage is perpetrated on ones
own flesh and blood, for the culprit is reduced to a
level lower than a beast (People v. Dusohan, 227
SCRA 87). Because of the acts of the accused the
private complainants have been denied their right
to grow up and discover the wonders of
womanhood in the natural way, and an award of
moral indemnification in the amount of P50,000.00
is proper (People v. Escoto, 229 SCRA 430;

People v. Mejorada, 224 SCRA 857), as well as an
award of exemplary damages as correction for the
public good (People v. Matrimonio, 215 SCRA
613), in the amount of P25,000.00.[13]
Accordingly, accused-appellant was meted out the
following penalties:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is
hereby rendered:
In Criminal Case No. 752-M-96
Finding the accused Rodrigo Calma y Sacdalan
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
rape and sentencing him to the penalty of death to
be carried out in accordance with law; and to
indemnify Annalyn Calma in the amount of
P50,000.00, to pay her the amount of P50,000.00
as moral damages, the amount of P25,000.00 as
exemplary damages;
In Criminal Case No. 753-M-96
Finding accused Rodrigo Calma y Sacdalan
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
rape and sentencing him to the penalty of death to
be carried out in accordance with law; and to
indemnify Roselyn Calma in the amount of
P50,000.00, to pay her the amount of P50,000.00
as moral damages and the amount of P25,000.00
as exemplary damages; and
In Criminal Case No. 754-M-96
Finding the accused Rodrigo Calma y Sacdalan
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the [crime of]
acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the
Revised Penal Code and R.A. [No.] 7610, and
sentencing him to the penalty of reclusion temporal
in its medium period, to indemnify Irene Calma in
the amount of P50,000.00, to pay P50,000.00 as
moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages.
SO ORDERED.[14]
On automatic appeal because of its twin sentences
imposing the death penalty, the foregoing decision
of the trial court is now before us.
In his Brief dated October 21, 1997, accused-
appellant interposed a single error, thus:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING
THE ACCUSED OF THE CRIMES CHARGED
DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO
CONSTI LAW APRIL 7, 2018 76
PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.[15]
We find on record overwhelming evidence of the
guilt of accused-appellant. The testimony of the
three victims, his own daughters, withstood the test
of cross-examination. They spontaneously, clearly
and credibly spoke of the details of their
defilement. The defense did not dispute the time,
the place, the manner and the frequency of the
sexual abuses. Neither did the defense show that
their hymenal lacerations, as found by Dr. Jesusa
Nieves Vergara, the medico-legal officer who
examined them, were the results of other causes.
Dr. Vergara testified, thus:
xxx
Q. At around 11:30 in the morning of that day, do
you recall having physically examine [sic] the
person[s] of Roselyn Calma, Irene Calma and
Annalyn Calma?
A. Yes, sir.
xxx
SP BALAUAG:
Q. You stated that you conducted a physical
examination on the person of Annalyn Calma on
May 3, 1996, is [sic] the findings of your
examination was [sic] also reduced in writing?
A. Yes, madam.
Q. I am showing to you medico legal report No. M-
647-96, what relation has this medico legal report
to the one you stated you executed?
A. This is the original medico legal report No. M-
647-96 which I prepared.
xxx
Q. We are marking the same as our Exhibit K, and
that the signature of Dr. Vergara be bracketed and
be marked as Exhibit K-1. x x x You stated in your
genital findings that on separating the same
disclosed an elastic, fleshy-type hymen with
shallow healed lacerations at 3 and 5 oclock and
deep healed lacerations at 8 and 9 oclock
positions. [I]n laymans language, can you tell us
wat this [sic] genital findings means [sic]?
A. The numbers here, 3, 5, 8 and 9 oclock will just
indicate the positions of the lacerations. So, since
the hymen is circular in appearance, it is being

correlated to the face of the watch when we say
the laceration is 3:00 oclock, it means that the
laceration or it occupies the number in the clock.
The same goes with the 5, 8 and 9 oclock. By
shallow laceration, it means that it does not exceed
more than 50% or more than half of the width of
the hymen and by deep laceration, it exceed [sic]
more than 50% or more than 1/2 of the width of the
hymen and by healed laceration, it means that the
edges of the laceration has already healed
showing reaction like swelling, redness or
contusion on the area.
xxx
SP Balauag:
Q. You concluded in your conclusion that the
subject is in non-virgin state physically. Can you
kindly explain how you were able to conclude that
the subject is in a non-virgin state?
A. The findings in the hymen is [sic] a healing
laceration.
xxx
Q. Dr., can you tell us what might have cause [sic]
this laceration in the hymen you found on [sic]
Annalyn Calma?
A. Forcible entry of a hard blunt object.
xxx
COURT:
xxx
Q. What was the cause of your conclusion or
findings that the victim is no longer a virgin?
A. Forcible entry of a hard blunt object can be
caused by an insertion of a male sex organ.
SP BALAUAG:
Q. On May 6, 1996, did you examine the person of
Rosallyn [sic] Calma?
A. Yes, madam.
Q. After conducting your physical examination was
[sic] your findings reduced into writing?
A. Yes, madam.
xxx
CONSTI LAW APRIL 7, 2018 77
Q. [Let] the signature over the typewritten name
Jesusa Vergara be bracketed and be marked as
our Exhibit L-1 x x x. You stated in your findings
that on the genital [area]:
`There is absence of pubic hair. Labia majora are
full, convex and gaping with th [sic] pinkish labia
minora presenting in between. On separating the
same disclosed an elastic, fleshy-type hymen with
shallow healed lacerations at 3 and 9 oclock
positions. External vaginal origice [sic] admits tip
of the examiners smallest finger. Now in laymans
language, Doctor, can you tell us what this [sic]
gental findings means [sic]?
A. That I found two (2) lacerations on the hymen,
positions 3 and 9 oclock positions. [B]oth
lacerations were shallow healed lacerations.
Q. Now, Doctor, there appears a conclusion
[where] you said [in the] medico legal report that
the subject is in a non-virgin state physically, can
you tell us the basis of your conclusion?
A. The basis for saying this is my findings on the
hymen revealing the healed lacerations.
Q. This laceration you found on the hymen [of] the
private complainant Rosallyn [sic] Calma, can yoy
[sic] inform this Honorable Court what or [sic] might
have cause [sic] the said lacerations?
A. Forcible entry of a hard blunt object which can
be a form of an erected sexual organ.
Q. On May 3, 1996, do you remember having
physically examine [sic] the person of Irene
Calma?
A. Yes, madam.
Q. Was [sic] your findings after you physically
examine [sic] the person of Irene Calma reduced
into writing?
A. Yes, madam.
xxx
Q. I forgot, we are marking the findings of the
doctor as Exhibit L-3, your Honor for purposes of
identification we are marking the medico legal
report 649-M-96 as our Exhibit M and the signature
over the typewritten name Dr. Jesusa Vergara be
bracketed and be marked as our Exhibit M-1. x x x
Doctor, in this [sic] findings regarding the four year
old private complainant Irene Calma you stated in

your findings that there are lacerations found in the
hymen of the four (4) year old child, can you tell us
in laymans language what this means?
A. In this particular case, there were two (2)
lacerations noted on the hymen of the victim.
[B]oth were healing lacerations one shallow
healing laceration 3 oclock and another, deep
laceration position 3 oclock.
Q. Can you tell us the basis of your conclusion that
the victim Irene Calma is also [in] a non-virgin
state?
A. My basis for saying this [is] the findings on the
hymen revealing lacerations.
Q. In this particular case where the victim or the
private complainant is four years old, will you tell
us what might have caused the laceration you
found in the hymen of Irene Calma?
A. Forcible entry of a hard blunt object.[16]
At most, during cross-examination, the defense
got Dr. Vergara to concede that hymenal
lacerations can also be caused by a fall on a sharp
object. The defense, however, failed to establish
that the three victims had, on specific occasions,
met an accident of that nature. Thus goes the
cross-examination of Dr. Vergara:
ATTY. JOSON:
Q. Madam witness, x x x you stated that that [sic]
x x x the healed laceration might be caused by a
blunt instrument or an erected adult penis. Now,
madam witness, aside from adult male penis, what
other factor that might caused [sic] lacerations in
the hymen which falls under the category of a hard
blund [sic] object?
A. Insertion of the finger provided that diameter of
the finger is greater than the diameter of the
opening of the vagina, [sir].
Q. Can it be the finger of the subject person
herself?
I withdraw that.
xxx
Q. In fact, aside from the erected male penis,
finger, what are the other factors or things that
might cause laceration in the hymen?
A. A fall against a hard sharp object, sir.
CONSTI LAW APRIL 7, 2018 78
Q. Doctor, is it possible considering the young age
of the subject person by strenuous exercise and
activities may the same caused [sic] laceration of
the hymen?
A. No, sir there has to be a direct trauma on the
hymen, sir.
Q. How about riding on a bicycle?
A. No, sir.
Q. Doctor, you also stated healing laceration, from
the time of the examination what is the probable
time or what is the period of time wherein you can
still consider a laceration a healing laceration?
A. Less than seven (7) days per examination, sir.
Q. To be considered a healed laceration, the
examination must be conducted within seven
days?
A. More than seven (7) days.
Q. Healing laceration?
A. For healed laceration, it should be more than
seven (7) days, for heal[ing] lacerations less than
seven (7) days.
xxx
COURT:
Q. Doctor, can you determine Dr. when was the
actual date wherein the victim lost their virginity?
A. For the exact date, I can not determine but I can
only approximate, but my findings are compatible
per their allegations that the incident happened a
year [before my examination].[17]
Accused-appellant next submits that the evidence
of the prosecution should not be given credence by
this Court because of their inherent improbabilities.
He pleads this Court to consider his daughters to
have lied under oath because:
1. Annalyn and Roselyn both testified that he
always withdrew his penis and ejaculated outside
them, but such self-control and willpower is
impossible for a man who lusted even for his own
daughters.[18]
2. His daughters did not behave like rape victims.
They continued to be close and affectionate

towards him, hugging and kissing him in public.
They always slept together in one room. They
continuously attended their classes and even got
high grades.[19]
3. His daughters should have died or suffered
some serious physical injury if it were true that his
penis forcefully penetrated their vaginas.[20]
All these, accused-appellant submits, cast
reasonable doubt on his guilt.
The law presumes that an accused is innocent and
this presumption stands until it is overturned by
competent and credible proof. It is incumbent upon
the prosecution to establish the guilt of the
defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. The
reasonable doubt should necessarily pertain to the
facts constitutive of the crime charged.[21]
Discrepancies that touch on significant facts are
crucial on the guilt or innocence of an accused.[22]
Conversely, inconsistencies and discrepancies in
details which are irrelevant to the elements of the
crime are not grounds for acquittal.[23] The rule of
falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus has never been
regarded as positive, mandatory, or inflexible.[24]
Surmises and conjectures have no place in a
judicial inquiry and are especially anathema in a
criminal prosecution.[25] In a criminal prosecution
a reasonable doubt can be created by many things
but to be sufficient to prevent a conviction, it must
arise from the evidence adduced or from the lack
of evidence, and can arise from no other legitimate
source.[26] While no test definitively determines
which is and which is not considered reasonable
doubt under the law, it must necessarily involve
genuine and irreconcilable contradictions based,
not on suppositional thinking, but on the hard facts
constituting the elements of the crime. It is not
mere possible doubt, because everything relating
to human affairs is open to some possible or
imaginary doubt.[27] It should not be vague,
speculative or whimsical, but intelligent,
reasonable and impartial and based on a careful
examination and conscious consideration of all the
evidence in the case.[28] A reasonable doubt is not
such a doubt as any man may start by questioning
for the sake of a doubt; nor a doubt suggested or
surmised without foundation in facts or testimony,
for it is possible always to question any conclusion
derived from testimony, but such questioning is not
what is reasonable doubt. Rather, it is that state of
the case which, after the entire comparison and
consideration of all the evidence leaves the mind
of the judge in that condition that he cannot say
that he feels an abiding conviction to a moral
certainty of the truth of the charge.[29] Absolute
CONSTI LAW APRIL 7, 2018 79
certainty is not demanded by the law to convict of
any criminal charge but moral certainty is required,
and this certainty must attend every proposition of
proof requisite to constitute the offense.[30]
Absolute, mathematical, or metaphysical certainty
is not essential, and besides, in judicial
investigation, it is wholly unattainable. Moral
certainty is all that can be required.
In the instant case, accused-appellant exhorts this
court to consider the lack of internal ejaculation
and the absence of any injury on the part of the
victims, which were testified to by the prosecution
witnesses themselves, and their continuous show
of affection towards their father, as testified to by
the defense witnesses, as indicia of reasonable
doubt warranting his acquittal. They lied, argues
accused-appellant, because their testimony is
improbable, if not impossible, and their
affectionate behavior towards him, their alleged
rapist, was a contradiction in terms.
We agree with the Solicitor General that these
contentions are conjectural. On the charge that the
narrations of the victims were fabricated for the
purpose of evading the questions as to why no
spermatozoa was found in them during the
physical examinations and why they did not get
pregnant, the Solicitor General correctly noted that
Annalyn and Roselyn were last sexually abused by
appellant in March 1996 while the physical
examinations were conducted on May 3, 1996 or
almost two (2) months thereafter. Hence, even
assuming that he ejaculated while they had
intercourse, the spermatozoa would have been
washed off by May 3, 1996, not to mention that the
lifetime of spermatozoa definitely does not run to
two (2) months. In any event, the presence or
absence of spermatozoa in the vagina is not even
determinative of the commission of rape because
a sperm test is not a sine qua non for the
successful prosecution of a rape case.[31] The
important element in rape is penetration of the
pudenda and not emission of seminal fluid.[32]
The Court is also not impressed by accused-
appellant's claim that he could not have raped
Annalyn and Roselyn because they continued to
be close to him, i.e., they still hugged and kissed
him in public and continued to sleep with him in
one room. They were also allegedly able to
continue attending their classes and obtain good
grades at the time they were supposedly molested
by him.
It was Catalina Calma, mother of accused-
appellant, , who testified about Annalyns and
Roselyns supposed show of affection towards him

and their supposed normal life during that trying
period. But Catalinas testimony is hard to believe.
Annalyn herself testified that at that time, she was
cutting classes and in school, her classmates saw
her crying at the library.[33] Roselyn, on her part,
testified that she was greatly bothered by what
appellant had done to her and after the case was
filed, she felt at peace and was able to continue
with her studies.[34]
There is also nothing commendable in accused-
appellant's contention that the forceful insertion of
a normal-size adult male penis into the vagina of
girls of victims' ages would have required
hospitalization and medical attention. Again, we
sustain the Solicitor General's argument that full
penetration of the vagina is not necessary to
constitute the consummated crime of rape. It is
settled that the mere entry of the penis into the
labia majora of the female organ, even without
rupture of the hymen, suffices to warrant a
conviction of rape.[35]
The arguments of accused-appellant are premised
on the misconception that reasonable doubt is
anything and everything that removes a statement
from the matrix of certitude. Were we to agree with
him and treat every unlikely or uncommon trait
characterizing a person, each strange or unusual
event in the occurrence of a crime, or just any
unexplained, irregular or dysfunctional behavior on
the part of the accused or his victims, as basis for
reasonable doubt, no criminal prosecution would
prevail. It bears repeating that even
inconsistencies and discrepancies in the
prosecution evidence, unless treating of the
elements of the crime, would not necessarily bring
about a judgment of acquittal. In this case, there is
not even any inconsistency or discrepancy to
speak of. Accused-appellant denied criminal
liability by simply insisting that his daughters, with
coaching from their mother, lied on the witness
stand. But during cross examination, they never
flinched in their testimony. They spoke in simple,
direct words customary of children of their ages,
and they maintained their testimony amidst
warnings[36] by the court and the defense counsel
that their father may be meted out the death
penalty if found guilty of the crimes that they were
charging him with. Significantly, their testimony
was corroborated by the medical findings of
vaginal lacerations on all three victims and their
non-virgin state.[37] Neither may any of the
defense evidence be attributed with having
materially negated the positive testimony of
accused-appellants daughters regarding their
defilement in the hands of their father. The defense
witnesses may have testified that they remained
CONSTI LAW APRIL 7, 2018 80
affectionate towards their father and continued to
earn high grades in school, but they denied these
statements and countered that they had cut
classes and were sometimes seen crying in the
library by some of their classmates.[38] All things
considered, we find the evidence against the
accused-appellant established his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is HEREBY DENIED,
and the judgment of conviction rendered by the
Regional Trial Court, 3rd Judicial Region, Malolos
Bulacan, Branch 14, finding Rodrigo Calma y
Sacdalan guilty beyond reasonable doubt for two
(2) counts of Rape under Art. 335 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Sec. 11 of Republic
Act No. 7659, and one (1) count of Acts of
Lasciviousness under Art. 336 of the Revised
Penal Code in relation to Sec. 5(B) of Art. III of
Republic Act No. 7610, is AFFIRMED with the
slight modification that the civil indemnity in each
of the three offenses is increased to P75,000.00 in
accordance with the latest jurisprudence[39]on the
matter. Accused-appellant RODRIGO CALMA Y
SACDALAN is hereby sentenced:
In Criminal Case No. 752-M-96
To the penalty of death to be carried out in
accordance with law; and to indemnify Annalyn
Calma in the amount of P75,000.00, and to pay her
the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages and
P25,000.00 as exemplary damages;
In Criminal Case No. 753-M-96
To the penalty of death to be carried out in
accordance with law; and to indemnify Roselyn
Calma in the amount of P75,000.00, and to pay her
the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages and
P25,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
In Criminal Case No. 754-M-96
To the penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium
period; and to indemnify Irene Calma in the
amount of P50,000.00, and to pay P50,000.00 as
moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages.
Four (4) Members of the Court, although
maintaining their adherence to the separate
opinions expressed in People v. Echegaray[40]
that R.A. No. 7659 insofar as it prescribes the
penalty of DEATH is unconstitutional,
nevertheless, submit to the ruling of the Court, by
a majority vote, that the law is constitutional and
 CONSTI LAW APRIL 7, 2018 81

that the death penalty should accordingly be

imposed.

In accordance with Section 25 of Republic Act No.

7659, amending Article 83 of the Revised Penal
Code, upon finality of this decision, let the records
of this case be forthwith forwarded to the Office of
the President for possible exercise of the
pardoning power. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

[G. R. No. 128823-24. December 27, 2002]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, accused-
appellee, vs. PEDRO FLORES, JR., y FLORES
ALIAS PESIONG, accused-appellant.
DECISION
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:
An assault on sexual innocence can open a
floodgate of emotions. This Court, however,
cannot allow emotions to drown an accuseds right
to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him.
For automatic review before this Court is the Joint
Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 46,
Urdaneta, Pangasinan finding accused-appellant
Pedro Flores Jr. y Flores alias Pesiong guilty of two
counts of rape of his then 11 year old daughter and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death in
each.
The complaints against accused-appellant filed on
February 3, 1997 read as follows:
Criminal Case No. U-9184:
CRIMINAL COMPLAINT[1]
The undersigned, FILIPINA FLORES Y LAZO, 11
years old, grade three pupil and a resident of Sitio
Buenlag, Brgy Nancamaliran West, Urdaneta,
Pangasinan, under oath, hereby accuses PEDRO
FLORES, JR., Y FLORES for the crime of RAPE,
committed as follows:
That on the 9th day of December 1996, in the
morning at Sitio Buenlag, Brgy. Nancamaliran
West, Municipality of Urdaneta, Province of
Pangasinan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, by means of force and intimidation, did
then and there, willfully, unlawfully, criminally and
feloniously sexually abuse the herein complaining
witness FILIPINA FLORES Y LAZO, 11 years old,
all against her will.
x x x (Emphasis supplied).
Criminal Case No. U-9185:
CRIMINAL COMPLAINT[2]
The undersigned, FILIPINA FLORES Y LAZO, 11
years old, grade three pupil and a resident of Sitio
Buenlag, Brgy. Nancamaliran West, Urdaneta,
CONSTI LAW APRIL 7, 2018 82
Pangasinan, under oath, hereby accuses PEDRO
FLORES, JR., Y FLORES, ALIAS PESYONG,
committed as follows:
That on the 28th day of December 1996, in the
evening at Sitio Buenlag, Brgy Nancamaliran
West, Municipality of Urdaneta, Province of
Pangasinan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, with deliberate intent and by means of
force and intimidation, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully, criminally and feloniously sexually
abuse the herein complaining witness FILIPINA
FLORES, an 11 years old and daughter of the
herein accused with the use of sharp pointed
bladed weapon and all against her will.
x x x (Emphasis supplied).
Arraigned on February 10, 1997, accused-
appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges.[3]
Culled from the records of the case are the
following facts established by the prosecution:
On December 5, 1996, private complainant Filipina
L. Flores (Filipina), 11 years old at the time, and
her younger sister Catherine were left to the care
of their father, herein accused-appellant, at their
family residence in Sitio Buenlag, Barangay
Nancamaliran West, Urdaneta, Pangasinan, their
mother Marcelina L. Flores having departed for
Singapore to work as an overseas contract worker.
After partaking of supper on the night of December
9, 1996,[4] accused-appellant asked Filipina to
accompany him to the comfort room situated
outside their house,[5] claiming that he was afraid
of ghosts.[6] Albeit Filipina did not believe[7] him,
she acquiesced because her mother had told her
to always obey her father.[8]
When accused-appellant came out of the comfort
room, he ordered Filipina to remove her short
pants, threatening her with death if she
disobeyed,[9] and made her lie down.[10] He then
removed his short pants and brief and, against her
will, he inserted his finger and later his penis into
Filipinas vagina[11] where she later felt hot
fluid.[12]
Accused-appellant thereafter wiped Filipinas
vagina and his hand, threatened to kill her if she
reported what he did, directed her to put on her
shorts, and they both went home. The following
morning, Filipina reported the incident to her Inang
Lorie whose full name is Norielyn Antonio, the aunt
of her mother, who told her that if her father would

sexually assault her again, he would have him
detained.
Nineteen nights later or on December 28, 1996, as
Filipina lay asleep in their house, she was
awakened when accused-appellant touched her
right foot.[13] Armed with a knife[14], accused-
appellant told her not to talk[15] and ordered her to
remove her short pants and panty. She complied.
Accused-appellant thereupon removed his short
pants and brief and went on top of her chest during
which she tried to push him away but failed.
Accused-appellant then inserted his finger into
Filipinas vagina for some time,[16] wiped his
hands, and then inserted his penis for a long time
as he was sucking her breast. Filipina felt accused-
appellants semen drop into her private organ
where she noticed the presence of blood and a bit
of whitish substance.
Accused-appellant later wiped her vagina with a
towel. The following morning, private complainant
again reported the matter to her grandaunt
Norielyn,[17] and to her playmate Carla
Salvador.[18]
On January 31, 1997, Filipina, accompanied by
Norielyn, a relative, and a tricycle driver-neighbor,
reported the matter to the Philippine National
Police of Urdaneta where she gave a statement.
On the same day, she, still accompanied by
Norielyn, submitted herself to a medical
examination at the Don Amadeo J. Perez, Jr.
Memorial General Hospital the results of which are
contained in a medical certificate[19] showing the
following:
(-) Negative menarche
- Multiple deep healed lacerations all over the labia
majora.
- Admits examining finger with ease.
- (+) sticky whitish discharge.
Dr. Jeanna B. Nebril, the examining physician,
found the presence of deep-healed lacerations all
over the labia majora[20] which deep-healed
lacerations connote, according to the doctor, the
application of force, possibly two weeks before the
examination.
Denying the accusations, accused-appellant
claimed as follows:
CONSTI LAW APRIL 7, 2018 83
Filipina, whom he whipped in the afternoon of
December 9, 1996 for not attending school on the
6th, 7th and 8th of December that year and for
having received money from her classmate,[21]
was not in their house on the night of December 9,
1996 because she was in the house of Norielyn.
Neither was she in their house on the night of
December 28, 1996 as she was at the house of his
mother Margarita Flores[22] in Cafloresan.
Accused-appellants testimony was corroborated
by his mother Margarita, and his teenaged children
Benito and Baby Jean Flores who were staying in
his mothers house. It was also corroborated by
another teenaged child, Jocelyn Flores, who was
staying in the house of accused-appellants
mother-in-law, Lourdes Lazo, also in Barangay
Nancamaliran West.[23] Jocelyn added that
Filipina had intimated to her that she fabricated the
rape charges because their maternal grandmother
Lourdes wanted their father, accused-appellant,
jailed as he begrudged him for having eloped with
their mother,[24] and that Lourdes threatened her
with abandonment or detention in jail in case she
defied, and promised to give her jewelry, shoes
and dress if she agreed to carry out her desire.
After trial, the court a quo found accused-appellant
guilty of Statutory Rape and sentenced her to
death in both cases in its April 7, 1997 Joint
Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, JUDGMENT is rendered
CONVICTING PEDRO FLORES, JR. Y FLORES
ALIAS PESIONG beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Statutory Rape, an offense defined and
penalized under paragraph 3, Article 335, of the
Revised Penal Code in relation to Section 1,
Republic Act 7659 aggravated by relationship, the
Court sentences, PEDRO FLORES, JR. Y
FLORES ALIAS PESIONG as follows:
CRIMINAL CASE NO. U-9184 to suffer the penalty
of DEATH; ordering Pedro Flores, Jr. y Flores alias
Pesiong to pay Filipina the sum of P50,000.00 as
moral damages, P20,000.00 as exemplary
damages, plus all the necessary penalties and
costs.
CRIMINAL CASE NO. U-9185 to suffer the penalty
of DEATH; ordering Pedro Flores, Jr. y Flores alias
Pesiong to pay Filipina the sum of P50,000.00 as
moral damages, P20,000.00 as exemplary
damages, plus all the necessary penalties and
costs.
Pedro Flores, Jr. y Flores alias Pesiong shall be
committed immediately to the National Bilibid

Prisons. The Branch Clerk of Court is hereby
ordered to transmit the entire records of this case
to the Honorable Supreme Court of the Philippines
for automatic review of this Decision.
In view of the penalty of death imposed by the
court a quo, the case is now before this Court on
automatic review. Accused-appellant assigns as
errors the following:
I. THAT THE FILING OF THE CASE [AT BAR]
WAS MOTIVATED BY SOME FACTORS OTHER
THAN THE TRUTH AS TO ITS COMMISSION,
AND SO THE ACCUSED SHOULD BE
ACQUITTED.
II. THAT THE COURT [A QUO] ERRED IN NOT
APPRECIATING THE DEFENSE OF THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT THAT THE
COMPLAINANT WAS NOT AT THE SCENE OF
THE CRIME WHEN THE ALLEGED INCIDENTS
TOOK PLACE, A DEFENSE SUFFICIENT TO
OVERCOME AND DESTROY THE TESTIMONY
OF THE COMPLAINANT THAT WOULD HAVE
WARRANTED THE ACQUITTAL OF THE
ACCUSED-APELLANT.
It is settled that in a criminal case, an appeal
throws the whole case open for review, and it
becomes the duty of the appellate court to correct
such errors as may be found in the judgment
appealed from, whether they are made the subject
of assignment of errors or not.[25]
It is at once apparent, from a reading of the above-
quoted complaints, that accused-appellant was
denied the constitutional right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him.
This right has the following objectives: [26]
1. To furnish the accused with such a description
of the charge against him as will enable him to
make the defense;
2. To avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for
protection against further prosecution for the same
cause;
3. To inform the court of the facts alleged, so that
it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to
support a conviction if one should be had.
The right cannot be waived for reasons of public
policy.[27] Hence, it is imperative that the
complaint or information filed against the accused
be complete to meet its objectives. As such, an
indictment must fully state the elements of the
specific offense alleged to have been
CONSTI LAW APRIL 7, 2018 84
committed.[28] For an accused cannot be
convicted of an offense, even if duly proven, unless
it is alleged or necessarily included in the
complaint or information.[29]
The court a quo found accused-appellant guilty of
Statutory Rape under Article 335[30] of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by R. A. No.
7659 (which restored the death penalty for heinous
crimes effective December 31, 1993) which
provides:
Article 335. When and how rape is committed.---
Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of
a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age
or is demented.
The gravamen of the crime of rape is carnal
knowledge or sexual intercourse between a man
and a woman under the circumstances
enumerated in the penal code.[31] Thus, to sustain
a conviction, the complaint or information must
allege that the accused had carnal knowledge of or
sexual intercourse with the private complainant. In
the criminal complaints at bar, however, no such
allegation was made.
The allegation that accused-appellant did sexually
abuse Filipina does not suffice. In the recent case
of People v. Lito Egan alias Akiao[32], this Court
ruled that although the prosecution has proved that
[the therein private complainant] Lenie was
sexually abused, the evidence proffered is
inadequate to establish carnal knowledge.[33]
Hence, sexual abuse cannot be equated with
carnal knowledge or sexual intercourse.[34] The
allegation in the instant criminal complaints that
accused-appellant sexually abuse[d] the private
complainant cannot thus be read to mean that
accused-appellant had carnal knowledge or sexual
intercourse with the private complainant.
This Court is not unaware of the rule in case there
is a variance between allegation and proof as
etched in Section 4 of Rule 120 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure which reads:
SEC. 4. Judgment in case of variance between
allegation and proof.When there is variance
between the offense charged in the complaint or

information and that proved, and the offense as
charged is included in or necessarily includes the
offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of
the offense proved which is included in the offense
charged, or of the offense charged which is
included in the offense proved.[35]
The case at bar, however, is not one of variance
between allegation and proof. The recital of facts
in the criminal complaints simply does not properly
charge rape, sexual abuse not being an essential
element or ingredient thereof.
Neither can accused-appellant be convicted of
acts of lasciviousness or of any offense for that
matter under our penal laws. It is settled that what
characterizes the charge is the actual recital of
facts [36] in the complaint or information. For every
crime is made up of certain acts and intent which
must be set forth in the complaint or information
with reasonable particularity of time, place, names
(plaintiff and defendant), and circumstances. In
other words, the complaint must contain a specific
allegation of every fact and circumstance
necessary to constitute the crime charged[37], the
accused being presumed to have no independent
knowledge of the facts that constitute the
offense.[38]
And even under the provisions of Republic Act No.
7610 (The Special Protection of Children Against
Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination
Act),[39] accused-appellant cannot be held liable.
Section 5 of said Act provides:
SEC. 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual
Abuse. -- Children, whether male or female, who
for money, profit, or any other consideration or due
to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate
or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children
exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium
period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed
upon the following:
(a) Those who engage in or promote, facilitate or
induce child prostitution which include, but are not
limited to, the following:
(1) Acting as a procurer of a child prostitute;
(2) Inducing a person to be a client of a child
prostitute by means of written or oral
advertisements or other similar means;
CONSTI LAW APRIL 7, 2018 85
(3) Taking advantage of influence or relationship to
procure a child as a prostitute;
(4) Threatening or using violence towards a child
to engage him as a prostitute; or
(5) Giving monetary consideration, goods or other
pecuniary benefit to a child with the intent to
engage such child in prostitution.
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse
or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in
prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse:
Provided, That when the victim is under twelve (12)
years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted
under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and Article
336 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Act No. 3815, for rape or lascivious conduct when
the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall
be reclusion temporal in its medium period; and
(c) Those who derive profit or advantage
therefrom, whether as manager or owner of the
establishment where the prostitution takes place or
of the sauna, disco, bar, resort, place of
entertainment or establishment serving as a cover
or which engages in prostitution in addition to the
activity for which the license has been issued to
said establishment. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied).
Section 2 (g) of the Rules and Regulations on the
Reporting and Investigation of Child Abuse
Cases[40], issued pursuant to Section 32 of
Republic Act No. 7610, defines sexual abuse by
inclusion as follows:
Sexual abuse includes 1) the employment, use,
persuasion, enticement, or coercion of a child to
engage in, or assist another person to engage in
sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct or 2) the
molestation, 3) prostitution, or 4) incest with
children. (Underscoring supplied)
From this broad, non-exclusive definition, this
Court finds that the phrase sexually abuse in the
criminal complaints at bar does not comply with the
requirement that the complaint must contain a
specific averment of every fact necessary to
constitute the crime. Notably, the phrase sexual
abuse is not used under R.A. No. 7610 as an
elemental fact but as an altogether separate
offense. Above-quoted Section 5 thereof
enumerates the punishable acts that must be
alleged in the complaint or information to hold an
accused liable, none of which is reflected in the
complaints at bar charging accused-appellant.

The case of People v. Cruz [41] is instructive.
There the information in Criminal Case No. 15368-
R read:
That on or about the 2nd day of August, 1997, in
the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously commit sexual abuse on
his daughter either by raping her or committing
acts of lasciviousness on her, which has debased,
degraded and demeaned the intrinsic worth and
dignity of his daughter, JEANNIE ANN DELA
CRUZ as a human being.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (Emphasis supplied)
Finding the above-quoted information void, this
Court held:
The Court also finds that accused-appellant
cannot be convicted of rape or acts of
lasciviousness under the information in Criminal
Case No. 15368-R, which charges accused-
appellant of a violation of R.A. No. 7610 (The
Special Protection of Children Against Child
Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act), either
by raping her or committing acts of lasciviousness.
It is readily apparent that the facts charged in said
information do not constitute an offense. The
information does not cite which among the
numerous sections or subsections of R.A. No.
7610 has been violated by accused-appellant.
Moreover, it does not state the acts and omissions
constituting the offense, or any special or
aggravating circumstances attending the same, as
required under the rules of criminal procedure.
Section 8, Rule 110 thereof provides:
Designation of the offense.The complaint or
information shall state the designation of the
offense given by the statue, aver the acts or
omissions constituting the offense, and specify its
qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there
is no designation of the offense, reference shall be
made to the section or subsection of the statute
punishing it.
The allegation in the information that accused-
appellant willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
commit sexual abuse on his daughter [Jeannie
Ann] either by raping her or committing acts of
lasciviousness on her is not a sufficient averment
of the acts constituting the offense as required
under Section 8, for these are conclusions of law,
not facts. The information in Criminal Case No.
15368-R is therefore void for being violative of the
CONSTI LAW APRIL 7, 2018 86
accused-appellants constitutionally-guaranteed
right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him. (Emphasis & underscoring
supplied)
As held by this Court in the above-case of Cruz,
the allegation in the information that the therein
accused-appellant sexually abused the therein
private complainant by either raping or committing
acts of lasciviousness on her is not a sufficient
averment of the acts constituting the offense as
required under Section 8 [of Rule 110], for these
are conclusions of law, not facts. Nothing less can
be said of the criminal complaints in the cases at
bar. They are void for being violative of the
accused-appellants constitutional right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him.
This Court thus takes this occasion to remind
public prosecutors of their crucial role in crafting
criminal complaints and information. For all efforts
may be rendered futile and justice may be denied
by a failure to state the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense as
exemplified by the present case.
The foregoing disquisition leaves it unnecessary to
dwell on accused-appellants assigned errors or of
other errors including failure to allege relationship
in the first complaint, and lack of proof of minority
in both cases.
WHEREFORE, the informations in Criminal Case
Nos. U-9184 and U-9185 are hereby declared null
and void for being violative of the constitutional
right of accused-appellant Pedro Flores, Jr. y
Flores alias Pesiong, for Rape to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against
him. Hence, the cases against him are hereby
DISMISSED.
The Director of Prisons is hereby directed to
forthwith cause the release of accused-appellant
unless the latter is being lawfully held for another
cause and to inform the Court accordingly within
10 days from notice.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 134583 July 14, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
FREDDIE MURILLO, appellant.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before this Court on automatic review is the
decision1 rendered by the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 259, Parañaque, dated June 1, 1998,
finding appellant Freddie Murillo guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death.
The Information charges appellant Freddie Murillo
as follows:
That on or about the 6th day of June, 1997, in the
Municipality of Parañaque, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with
intent to kill and with treachery and evident
premeditation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab
one Paz Abiera with a bladed weapon on her
chest, thereby inflicting upon her serious and
mortal wounds which directly caused her death.
With the aggravating circumstances of cruelty and
abuse of superior strength.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
Upon arraignment, appellant, with the assistance
of Atty. Dante O. Garin of the Public Attorney's
Office, pleaded guilty to the charge.3 Trial then
ensued.
The prosecution presented Sancho Ferreras,
brother of the victim; barangay tanod Ramon
Saraos; SPO2 Angel Nieves of the Parañaque
Police; and NBI Medico-legal Officer Ludivino
Lagat. They established the following facts:
On June 12, 1997, SPO2 Nieves received a report
that Paz Abiera was missing.4 The following day,
Ramon Saraos, a barangay tanod of Cul de Sac
Rotonda, Sun Valley, Parañaque received a
request from Sarah Murillo, mother of herein
appellant and Arlan Murillo, to investigate a foul
smell emanating from the house of Paz Abiera.
Said house was being shared by Paz and her two
nephews, appellant and Arlan. When Ramon
asked appellant what happened to his aunt, the
latter answered that Paz had been missing since
CONSTI LAW APRIL 7, 2018 87
June 7, 1997 and that he earlier reported the
incident to the police. Ramon then asked
permission from appellant to look inside the house
and there he noticed blood stains at the foot of the
house. Ramon also noticed that the foul odor was
coming from inside. He asked assistance from the
Parañaque Police and SPO2 Nieves responded.
When SPO2 Nieves arrived, they removed the
toilet bowl and opened the septic tank where they
recovered parts of human arms and legs.5 SPO2
Nieves questioned Freddie and Arlan, who both
denied any involvement in the killing of Paz. SPO2
Nieves later ordered that the two brothers be
brought to Block 6. After about 30 minutes, SPO2
Nieves received a call from the radio saying that
Freddie Murillo already admitted to having killed
his aunt Paz Aberia using a knife. Freddie then
showed them where he threw Paz's severed head.
They were able to locate a red and white striped
plastic bag which contained the victim's head at a
canal near the service road of the South Super
Highway. They also found a blood stained bed
sheet, reading glasses and a stone with blood
stains in the house of the victim.6
They recovered a total of eighty pieces of body
parts that were all in an advanced state of
decomposition. An examination conducted on the
body parts showed that there were stab wounds
that penetrated the lungs, the intestines and the
liver. The examination also showed that it is
possible that the instrument used in killing and
decapitating the victim was a knife.7
As a hostile witness of the prosecution, appellant
testified as follows: On June 6, 1997, at around
2:30 in the afternoon, his aunt, Paz Abiera scolded
and slapped him for wasting electricity after she
caught him watching television at the second floor
of their house. His vision darkened ("nagdilim na
po ang pangingin ko") due to the repeated times
that Paz scolded and uttered hurtful words to him.
When he saw a knife, he took it and stabbed her
on the chest. He dragged her body from the
second floor to the comfort room downstairs where
he chopped her body into several pieces using the
same knife. After doing so, he removed the toilet
bowl and dumped the body parts into the septic
tank. He brought the severed head to the highway
along the service road near Astra. Later, he asked
help from his brother Arlan in cementing a new
toilet bowl over the septic tank. His brother Arlan
did not know that he killed their aunt. It took him a
while to confess his guilt because he was afraid
that the police might hurt him. While his mother,
Sarah Murillo, often visited him and Arlan at their
aunt's house, he did not tell his mother about what
he did because he was afraid.8

After the testimony of appellant, the prosecution
rested its case. On June 1, 1998, the trial court
rendered its decision with the following findings:
Assessing the evidence on record, particularly
considering the admission made in open Court by
the herein accused despite having been duly
informed by his counsel of the consequences of his
testimony, this Court finds without an iota of doubt
that he alone committed the abominable act of
killing his aunt and later on hideously
dismembering her body in his attempt to hide the
corpus of his crime. Truly unspeakable is the
manner by which accused Murillo disposed of the
body of the victim first by cutting her body parts
and hiding them in a septic tank and then throwing
away the victim's head in a canal or drainage along
the service road near the South Superhighway.
...
The information charges the herein accused for
committing the crime of Murder with the qualifying
circumstances of treachery (alevosia) and evident
premeditation and with cruelty and abuse of
superior strength as aggravating circumstances.
On the aggravating circumstances of abuse of
superior strength, the mere fact that the assailant
is a male person whereas the victim is a woman
does not ipso fact mean that such circumstance
can be appreciated by the Court unless perhaps if
it was shown that the attacker was a Hulk Hogan
and the victim is a frail reed thin woman. Cruelty
likewise cannot be inferred in the case at bar from
the fact that the body of the deceased was
dismembered in the absence of proof that this was
done while the victim was still alive. The object
sought to be attained by Murillo in this case may
well have been to make the recovery of the body
of the victim absolutely impossible.
In regard to the qualifying circumstances of
treachery or alevosia and evident premeditation,
the fact that no commotion, no unusual sounds or
noises were even heard or noticed in the vicinity at
the time of the stabbing of the victim would indicate
that the accused planned the killing and made sure
that in its execution, there would be no risk to
himself arising from any defense which said victim
might make. Considering the rule however, that, if
two or more possible qualifying circumstances
were alleged and proven or in the case obtaining
at the bar, only one would qualify the offense to
Murder and the other would be generic.9
The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
CONSTI LAW APRIL 7, 2018 88
WHEREFORE, premises considered, finding
accused FREDDIE MURILLO, GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder as defined
and penalized under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal
Code with the qualifying and/or generic
aggravating circumstances of treachery or
alevosia and or evident premeditation, this Court
hereby sentences him to the penalty of DEATH
and to suffer the accessory penalties provided by
law specifically Art. 40 of the Revised Penal Code.
For the civil liabilities, he is further condemned to
indemnify the heirs of the herein victim Paz Abiera
the amount of P50,000.00 in line with existing
jurisprudence; P27,000.00 for funeral expenses;
P50,000.00 for moral damages and P50,000.00 for
exemplary damages.
The Clerk of Court is also directed to prepare the
Mittimus for the immediate transfer of accused
Freddie Murillo from the Parañaque City Jail to the
Bureau of Correction in Muntinlupa City and finally
to forward all the records of this case to the
Supreme Court for automatic review in accordance
with Sec. 9, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court and Art.
47 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A.
7659.
SO ORDERED.10
Hence this automatic review pursuant to Article 47
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
In his brief, appellant claims that the court a quo
gravely erred:
I
…IN CONVICTING (HIM) OF THE CRIME OF
MURDER AND SENTENCING HIM TO DEATH
ON THE BASIS OF HIS IMPROVIDENT PLEA OF
GUITY; and
II
…IN CONSIDERING THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF
TREACHERY AND EVIDENT PREMEDITATION
IN QUALIFYING THE KILLING TO MURDER
NOTWITHSTANDING THAT THE
PROSECUTION FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE
SAME.11
Appellant argues: His plea of guilt was improvident
since there was no indication that he fully
understood that the qualifying circumstances
charged in the information would result to the
penalty of death. He only admitted the killing but
not the circumstances of treachery and evident

premeditation. There could be no evident
premeditation since he stabbed Paz only after
losing his senses. There could also be no
treachery since it cannot be determined with
certainty whether or not the wounds inflicted on the
victim were made before or after her death. The
aggravating circumstance of "outraging or scoffing
at his person or corpse" cannot be appreciated in
this case since it was not alleged in the
Information.12
The Solicitor General points out that there was
treachery since the appellant himself admitted that
when his aunt scolded him, he took a knife and
suddenly stabbed her in the chest;13 and that the
trial court did not err in finding the presence of
evident premeditation.14
In his Reply, appellant adds that the observations
made by the court a quo are based merely on
inferences that are unsubstantiated by concrete
evidence.15
After reviewing the entire records of the case, we
find that there was an improvident plea of guilt that
warrants the remand of the case to the trial court.
Rule 116 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure
provides:
SEC. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception
of evidence.--- When the accused pleads guilty to
a capital offense, the court shall conduct a
searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full
comprehension of the consequences of his plea
and shall require the prosecution to prove his guilt
and the precise degree of culpability. The accused
may also present evidence in his behalf.
The reason for this rule is that courts must
necessarily proceed with more care where the
possible punishment is in its severest form – death
– for the reason that the execution of such
sentence is irrevocable. Experience has shown
that innocent persons have at times pleaded guilty
in the hope of a lenient treatment, or upon bad
advice or because of promises of the authorities or
parties of a lighter penalty should he admit guilt or
express remorse. An accused might be admitting
his guilt before the court and thus forfeit his life and
liberty without having fully understood the
meaning, significance and consequences of his
plea. The judge therefore has the duty to ensure
that the accused does not suffer by reason of
mistaken impressions.16 Requiring the trial court
to take further evidence would also aid this Court
on appellate review in evaluating the propriety or
impropriety of the plea.17
CONSTI LAW APRIL 7, 2018 89
Under the said rule, three things are required from
the trial court when a plea of guilty to a capital
offense is entered: (1) the court must conduct a
searching inquiry into the voluntariness of the plea
and the accused's full comprehension of the
consequences thereof; (2) the court must require
the prosecution to present evidence to prove the
guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his
culpability; and (3) the court must ask the accused
if he desires to present evidence on his behalf and
allow him to do so if he desires.18
The searching inquiry referred to here means more
than just informing cursorily the accused that he
faces jail term.19 The inquiry must expound on the
events that actually took place during the
arraignment, the words spoken and the warnings
given, with special attention to the age of the
accused, his educational attainment and socio-
economic status as well as the manner of his arrest
and detention, the provision of counsel in his
behalf during the custodial and preliminary
investigations, and the opportunity of his defense
counsel to confer with him. The trial court must
also explain to the accused the essential elements
of the crime he is charged with as well as its
respective penalties and civil liabilities.20 The
exact length of imprisonment under the law and the
certainty that he will serve time at the national
penitentiary or a penal colony must be fully
explained to the accused. The court must also
explain to the accused that once convicted, he
could be meted the death penalty and that it is a
single and indivisible penalty that will be imposed
regardless of any mitigating circumstance that may
have attended the commission of the felony.21
The court must also direct a series of questions to
the defense counsel to determine whether he has
conferred with the accused and has completely
explained to the latter the meaning of a plea of
guilt. This formula is mandatory and absent any
showing that it has been followed, a searching
inquiry cannot be said to have been undertaken.22
In People vs. Pastor,23 the Court explained that
while there is no definite and concrete rule as to
how a trial judge must conduct a "searching
inquiry", the following guidelines should
nevertheless be observed:
1. Ascertain from the accused himself (a) how he
was brought into the custody of the law; (b)
whether he had the assistance of a competent
counsel during the custodial and preliminary
investigations; and (c) under what conditions he
was detained and interrogated during the
investigations. This is intended to rule out the

possibility that the accused has been coerced or
placed under a state of duress either by actual
threats of physical harm coming from malevolent
quarters or simply because of the judge's
intimidating robes.
2. Ask the defense counsel a series of questions
as to whether he had conferred with, and
completely explained to, the accused the meaning
and consequences of a plea of guilty.
3. Elicit information about the personality profile of
the accused, such as his age, socio-economic
status, and educational background, which may
serve as a trustworthy index of his capacity to give
a free and informed plea of guilty.
4. Inform the accused the exact length of
imprisonment or nature of the penalty under the
law and the certainty that he will serve such
sentence. For not infrequently, an accused pleads
guilty in the hope of a lenient treatment or upon
bad advice or because of promises of the
authorities or parties of a lighter penalty should he
admit guilt or express remorse. It is the duty of the
judge to ensure that the accused does not labor
under these mistaken impressions because a plea
of guilty carries with it not only the admission of
authorship of the crime proper but also of the
aggravating circumstances attending it, that
increase punishment.
5. Inquire if the accused knows the crime with
which he is charged and fully explain to him the
elements of the crime which is the basis of his
indictment. Failure of the court to do so would
constitute a violation of his fundamental right to be
informed of the precise nature of the accusation
against him and a denial of his right to due
process.
6. All questions posed to the accused should be in
a language known and understood by the latter.
7. The trial judge must satisfy himself that the
accused in pleading guilty, is truly guilty. The
accused must be required to narrate the tragedy or
reenact the crime or furnish its missing details.24
In the case at bar, records do not show that a
searching inquiry was ever conducted by the judge
when appellant entered his plea of guilty. The
Order dated July 14, 1997 simply reads as follows:
Accused, when arraigned, with the assistance of
Atty. Dante O Garin of the Public Attorney's Office,
pleaded GUILTY to the crime charged in the
information.
CONSTI LAW APRIL 7, 2018 90
Let this case be set for hearing on July 28, 1997 at
8:30 o'clock in the morning.
Let subpoena be issued to all prosecution
witnesses for the next scheduled hearing.
SO ORDERED.25
While we have held that the absence of the
transcript of stenographic notes of the proceedings
during the arraignment does not make the
procedure flawed, the minutes of the proceedings,
however, must indubitably show that the judge has
substantially complied with the requirements of
Rule 116, Sec. 3.26 No less than a man's life is at
stake in this case. Whatever appellant might have
said to show that he was waiving his defense
voluntarily and with full knowledge of the
consequences of his plea should have been made
of record.27 Here, there is no proof at all that the
judge ever conducted any searching inquiry.
The trial court mentioned in its decision the
importance of Section 3, Rule 116, of the Rules of
Court in cases of pleas of guilt, however, it failed
to show compliance therewith. Pertinent portions
of the decision read:
Under Sec. 3, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, when
the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the
court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the
voluntariness and full comprehension of the
consequences of his plea and require the
prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise
degree of culpability. The accused may also
present evidence in his behalf.
In People vs. Salvador, 224 SCRA 819, to be liable
for murder, an accused must be proven to have
committed the killing of another person under the
attendant circumstances specified in Article 248 of
the Revised Penal Code.
In People vs. Jocson, 163 SCRA 525, Accused's
plea of guilty which was freely and voluntarily
made added to the evidence adduced by the
prosecution sufficiently established his culpability.
With the plea of guilty, appellant had admitted the
commission of the unlawful act. Hence, the
presumption is that the act was done with an
unlawful intent unless accused rebuts this
presumption. People vs. Verona, 163 SCRA 614.
Assessing the evidence on record, particularly
considering the admission made in open Court by
the herein accused despite having been duly

informed by his counsel of the consequences of his
testimony, this Court finds without an iota of doubt
that he alone committed the abominable act of
killing his aunt and later on hideously
dismembering her body in his attempt to hide the
corpus of his crime. Truly unspeakable is the
manner by which accused Murillo disposed of the
body of the victim first by cutting her body parts
and hiding them in a septic tank and then throwing
away the victim's head in a canal or drainage along
the service road near the South Superhighway.28
The transcript of how the defense counsel, Atty.
Dante O. Garin of the Public Attorney's Office,
supposedly informed the accused of his rights also
merely read as follows:
ATTY. GARIN:
Your Honor please the accused already pleaded
guilty to the offense charged and the only reason
we have to the motion of presenting evidence is
that the guilt of the accused must be proven by the
prosecution notwithstanding the plea of guilty
entered into during his arraignment. This
representation your Honor finds it necessary to
inform the accused of his constitutional rights. And
with the Court's permission, before he will testify
as hostile witness, I would like to inform the
accused for the record.
Q. Mr. Freddie Murillo, ikaw ang akusado dito sa
kasong ito. Ang proseso natin ay kung sino man
ang nagbibintang ay siyang dapat magpatunay ng
kasalanang ibinibintang. Sa sitwasyong ito, ikaw
ay pinagbibintangan ng kasong murder. At ang
ebidensiyang gagamitin ay dapat manggagaling
sa kung sino man ang nagbibintang sa iyo na ikaw
ay nakapatay ng tao. Ngayon ikaw ay uupo ngayon
sa silyang iyan para magsalita tungkol doon sa
pangyayari. Meron kang karapatan na hindi
pumayag na magsalita ng ano'ng bagay na
maaaring ikapahamak mo. Maaari mong hindi
sagutin iyong tanong, maaring hindi ka umupo
riyan, nasa sa iyo ang desisyon. Naiintindihan mo
ba?
A. Opo.
Q. Ngayong naipaliwanag ko na sa iyo ikaw ba ay
handang magsalita tungkol sa kasong ito?
A. Opo.
That's all for the witness, your Honor.29
Clearly, the proceedings taken by the trial court
was short of being satisfactory. Appellant was
CONSTI LAW APRIL 7, 2018 91
never asked about the circumstances of his arrest
and detention, not even when SPO2 Nieves
himself in his testimony mentioned that he ordered
that the two brothers be brought to "Block 6" for
questioning without the presence of counsel.
Where or what kind of place "Block 6" is, was not
even explained by the witness neither did the court
nor the defense counsel ask the witness to clarify
said point. The Court also did not ask appellant
about the circumstances of his arraignment as well
as his age and educational attainment. He was
also neither apprised of the consequences of his
plea nor was it explained to him that the penalty
imposable for the crime attended by its qualifying
circumstances as alleged in the Information is
death regardless of the presence of mitigating
circumstances.
The failure of the defense counsel to faithfully
protect the rights of appellant also cannot go
unnoticed. Records show that defense counsel
Atty. Dante O. Garin, never cross-examined three
of the four witnesses of the prosecution, namely
Sancho Fereras,30 Ramon Saraos,31 and Dr.
Ludivino Lagat.32 The only prosecution witness he
cross-examined was SPO2 Nieves to whom he
asked four questions pertaining only as to how the
police came to the conclusion that the body parts
belong to Paz Abiera.33 Apart from these, no other
questions were ever offered.
There is also no record anywhere that the defense
counsel presented evidence for the accused nor
that the trial court even inform him of his right to do
so if he so desires.
For these reasons, it cannot be said that the
appellant's rights were observed in the
proceedings a quo.
It is well established that the due process
requirement is part of a person's basic rights and
is not a mere formality that may be dispensed with
or performed perfunctorily. An accused needs the
aid of counsel lest he be the victim of overzealous
prosecutors, of the law's complexity or of his own
ignorance and bewilderment. Indeed, the right to
counsel springs from the fundamental principle of
due process.34 The right to counsel, however,
means more than just the presence of a lawyer in
the courtroom or the mere propounding of
standard questions and objections. The right to
counsel means that the accused is sufficiently
accorded legal assistance extended by a counsel
who commits himself to the cause for the defense
and acts accordingly. This right necessitates an
active involvement by the lawyer in the
proceedings, particularly at the trial of the case, his
 CONSTI LAW APRIL 7, 2018 92

bearing constantly in mind of the basic rights of the

accused, his being well-versed on the case and his SO ORDERED.
knowing the fundamental procedures, essential
laws and existing jurisprudence. Indeed, the right
of an accused to counsel finds meaning only in the
performance by the lawyer of his sworn duty of
fidelity to his client and an efficient and truly
decisive legal assistance which is not just a simple
perfunctory representation.35

Atty. Garin, had the duty to defend his client and

protect his rights, no matter how guilty or evil he
perceives appellant to be. The performance of this
duty was all the more imperative since the life of
appellant hangs in the balance. As a defense
counsel, he should have performed his duty with
all the zeal and vigor at his command to protect
and safeguard appellant's fundamental rights.36

While our jurisdiction does not subscribe to a per

se rule that once a plea of guilty is found
improvidently he is at once entitled to a remand,
the circumstances of this case warrant that a
remand to the trial court be made. To warrant a
remand of the criminal case, the Court has held
that it must be shown that as a result of such
irregularity there was inadequate representation of
facts by either the prosecution or the defense
during the trial.37 Where the improvident plea of
guilty was followed by an abbreviated proceeding
with practically no role at all played by the defense,
we have ruled that this procedure was just too
meager to accept as being the standard
constitutional due process at work enough to forfeit
a human life.38 What justifies the remand of the
criminal case to the trial court is the unfairness or
complete miscarriage of justice in the handling of
the proceedings a quo as occasioned by the
improvident plea of guilt.39 In this case, apart from
the testimony of appellant, the prosecution does
not have any other evidence to hold him liable for
the crime charged.

In view of the foregoing, we find that it is imperative

to remand the case for the proper arraignment and
trial of the accused, considering not only the
accused's improvident plea of guilt but also his
lawyer's neglect in representing his cause.

WHEREFORE, the decision dated June 1, 1998 of

the Regional Trial Court, Branch 259, Parañaque,
finding appellant Freddie Murillo guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Murder in Criminal Case No.
97-502 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Let the
records be REMANDED to the court of origin for
further proceedings as indicated in the text of
herein decision, to be conducted with deliberate
speed in accordance with this decision.

[G.R. No. 139180. July 31, 2001]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appellee, vs. ROLANDO RIVERA, accused-
appellant.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a review pursuant to Rule 122, 10 of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure of the decision,[1]
dated June 22, 1999, of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 49, Guagua, Pampanga, finding accused-
appellant Rolando Rivera guilty of rape and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death and
to pay the offended party, Erlanie Rivera, the sum
of P75,000.00 as compensatory damages and
P50,000.00 as moral damages.
The information against accused-appellant
charged
That sometime in the month of March 1997, in
barangay Santiago, municipality of Lubao,
province of Pampanga, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused ROLANDO RIVERA, by means of
violence, threat and intimidation, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and
maliciously succeeded in having carnal knowledge
[of] his 13 year old daughter, Erlanie D. Rivera,
against the latters will and without her consent.
Contrary to law.[2]
When the information was read to him in the local
dialect (Pampango) during his arraignment on
September 30, 1997, accused-appellant, duly
assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded not guilty to
the crime charged,[3] whereupon trial was held.
The prosecution presented as its witnesses
complainant Erlanie Rivera, her aunt, Marietta
Pagtalunan, and Dr. Demetria Barin, who
conducted the physical examination of
complainant.
Complainant Erlanie Rivera testified that sometime
in March 1997, her younger sister, Zaira,[4] was
taken by their parents to the Escolastica Romero
Memorial Hospital in Lubao, Pampanga.
Complainants mother stayed with her sister in the
hospital, but her father, herein accused-appellant,
went back home to Santiago, Lubao, Pampanga.
At around 11 oclock in the evening of the same
day, complainant was awakened as accused-
appellant started kissing her and fondling her
CONSTI LAW APRIL 7, 2018 93
breasts. Complainant tried to resist by kicking and
pushing accused-appellant, but her efforts were to
no avail. Accused-appellant removed her shorts
and panty, touched her private parts, and then had
sexual intercourse with her. After he was through
with her, accused-appellant told complainant not to
tell anyone what had happened or he would kill
complainants mother and sister. Hence, when her
mother came home the following day, Erlanie did
not tell her what had happened because she was
afraid of accused-appellant.
On April 9, 1997, however, Erlanie, in the presence
of her mother, told her aunt, Marietta Pagtalunan,
and her grandmother, Maxima Payumo, that she
had been raped by accused-appellant. For this
reason, she was referred to Dr. Barin for physical
examination. She also executed a sworn
statement before the police of Lubao,
Pampanga.[5]
Erlanie testified that she became pregnant as a
result of the rape committed against her by
accused-appellant, but the pregnancy was
aborted.[6] On cross-examination, she said she
was 13 years old at the time of her testimony, the
second child in the family. She said that her
parents were not on good terms with each other
and that she knew that her father had a mistress.
Atty. Mangalindan, then defense counsel,
questioned Erlanie about other supposed acts of
molestation committed by accused-appellant
against her previous to the rape subject of the
present case, but, upon objection of the
prosecution, the trial court disallowed the question
on the ground that it concerned matters not
covered by her direct examination.[7]
Erlanie testified that her mother, grandmother,
aunt, and a certain Nora Baluyut were present
when she made her sworn statement before the
police. She said that her father raped her only
once, sometime in March 1997. She could not
remember the exact date when she was raped by
accused-appellant, but she did remember that the
same took place in March as her sister, Zaira, was
hospitalized at the time. When the rape occurred,
her younger brother and sister were in their house
asleep. She did not tell her mother after the latter
had returned home that she had been raped by
accused-appellant because she was afraid of her
father who had threatened her. After the rape,
accused-appellant would only come home on
Sundays.[8]
Questioned further on cross-examination, Erlanie
said that she gave her sworn statement before the
police and that her answers to questions asked

during her direct examination were freely given
without coaching by anyone. She could
understand Tagalog, the language used in her
sworn statement. She told the court that she
struggled against accused-appellant, kicking and
pushing him, but she was overpowered by her
father. At that time, Erlanies younger sister,
Corazon, was lying beside her, but Erlanie did not
shout even when her father succeeded in
penetrating her. Erlanie could not remember how
long the sexual act took place, but she felt
something like urine come out of her fathers penis
after he was finished with her. Erlanie testified that
she was 12 years old when she was raped by her
father.[9]
On re-direct examination, when asked about the
discrepancy between her testimony that her
mother returned home only the day after the rape
and her statement in her affidavit that accused-
appellant slept beside her mother after the rape,
Erlanie replied that she made a mistake as the
incident narrated in her affidavit referred to a
different occasion when no rape was committed
against her by accused-appellant.[10]
The next witness for the prosecution was Marietta
Pagtalunan, complainants aunt and the sister of
complainants mother, Evangeline. Marietta
corroborated Erlanies testimony that the latter told
her sometime in April 1997 that she had been
raped by accused-appellant. Marietta said she
took complainant to Dr. Barin, who examined
complainant.[11]
Dr. Demetria Barin was Chief Physician of the
Escolastica Romero District Hospital. Her findings
are as follows:
P.E. FINDINGS:
- No signs of external Physical Injuries
I.E. FINDINGS:
HYMEN - healed laceration at 3:00 oclock
VAGINA - Admits one finger with ease two fingers
with difficulty
UTERUS - not enlarged
LMP - March 3, 1997
Pregnancy Test (+)[12]
Dr. Barin testified that on April 10, 1997, she
examined complainant Erlanie Rivera and found
CONSTI LAW APRIL 7, 2018 94
that the victim had an injury in the hymen at the 3
oclock position which could possibly have been
caused by the insertion of a hard object, such as a
male organ. Dr. Barin testified that complainant
Erlanie went back to see her on May 2, 1997
because she suffered from vaginal bleeding
indicative of a threatened abortion. She said that
she found that complainant was then pregnant.
Upon examination of the patient at that time, Dr.
Barin found that abortion had not yet taken place
and prescribed medicines for the complainant.
Erlanie was subjected to another pregnancy test
on May 13, 1997, but the result was negative. Dr.
Barin stated that the vaginal bleeding suffered by
complainant could have caused the abortion of the
fetus.[13]
Thereafter, the defense presented its evidence.
Accused-appellant, his sister, Concepcion Sayo,
and Natividad Pinlac, Records Officer of the
Escolastica Romero District Hospital, were
presented as witnesses.
Accused-appellant denied that he raped Erlanie
Rivera. He alleged that the rape charge was filed
against him because his wife, Evangeline, had a
paramour and resented him because he hurt her.
He explained that he saw his wife talking with
another man in their house and beat her up on
April 1, 1997 because he heard that she had a
lover. He also said that his wife was angry with him
because he had a mistress who stayed in their
house for three weeks. He further stated that his
wifes relatives were likewise angry with him
because he caused the lot owned by his father-in-
law in Santiago, Lubao, Pampanga to be
registered in his name. He said that he was
compelled to sign a waiver of his rights over the
land owned by his parents-in-law.[14] The defense
presented a letter to accused-appellant written by
his wife, who was asking him to sign a document
so that she could attend to it before he got out of
prison.[15]
The defense also offered as evidence a document,
designated as Waiver of Rights,[16] signed by
accused-appellant, in which he acknowledged that
he was a tenant of a parcel of land and that he
waived and voluntarily surrendered his right over
the said landholding to the SMPCI, recommending
that a certain Ponciano Miguel be given the land to
work on the same. The document was identified by
accused-appellant in open court. He said that
Ponciano Miguel was a first cousin of his wife and
that he signed the document because his wifes
relatives promised him that he would get out of
prison after signing the document.[17]

Another witness for the defense was Concepcion
Sayo, accused-appellants sister, who testified that
in March 1997, accused-appellant lived with her
family in Malawak, Bustos, Bulacan, to help her
husband operate a fishpond. She said that
accused-appellant stayed in their house during the
entire month of March, except in March 19, 1997
when he stayed with their sister, Perla, in Tibagan,
Bustos, Bulacan.[18]
The last defense witness was Natividad Pinlac,
Records Officer of the Escolastica Romero District
Hospital, who identified[19] a certification, dated
April 29, 1999, in which it was stated that Zaira
Rivera was confined at that hospital from March 1
to March 2, 1997.[20]
On June 22, 1999, the trial court rendered a
decision, the dispositive portion of which stated:
WHEREFORE, the court finding the accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape as
charged. For having violated Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act
7659, with the attendant circumstances that the
victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the
offender is the father of the victim and absent any
circumstance that could mitigate the commission
thereof, accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the
supreme penalty of death by lethal injection.
In line with established jurisprudence, said
accused is also ordered to indemnify the offended
party Erlanie Rivera in the sum of P75,000.00 as
compensatory damages and P50,000.00 as moral
damages.
SO ORDERED.[21]
Hence, this appeal. Accused-appellant contends
that:
1. The lower court failed to observe the
constitutional right of the Accused-Appellant to due
process and right to counsel;
2. The lower court failed to consider the evidence
of the Accused-Appellant.[22]
I. Accused-appellant invokes his right to due
process of law. He claims that he was denied the
same because: (a) the trial judge disallowed his
lawyer from cross-examining Erlanie Rivera
concerning the latters sworn statements on the
ground of irrelevance and immateriality; (b) the trial
court denied the motion made by accused-
appellants counsel de oficio to postpone the cross-
examination of Dr. Barin, the examining physician,
CONSTI LAW APRIL 7, 2018 95
because of which the said counsel consequently
waived the cross-examination of Dr. Barin; (c) the
judge propounded numerous questions to
accused-appellant during his cross-examination
by the prosecutor; and (d) the trial courts decision
was promulgated just one day after accused-
appellant submitted his memorandum.
Procedural due process simply means that a
person must be heard before he is condemned.
The due process requirement is a part of a persons
basic rights, not a mere formality that may be
dispensed with or performed perfunctorily.[23]
Considering both the evidence and the law
applicable to this case, we hold that accused-
appellant has been accorded his right to due
process.
A. One basis for accused-appellants contention
that he was denied due process is the refusal of
the trial judge to allow Atty. Mangalindans
questions concerning the other alleged acts of
molestation committed by accused-appellant
against complainant. Accused-appellant argues
that no legal ground exists for the trial courts ruling.
The transcript of stenographic notes concerning
this incident shows the following:
ATTY. MANGALINDAN:
Q You mentioned in your testimony that you were
molested by your father since 1996.
COURT:
Are you referring to a chain of events because
police station you are referring is something there
are two places this girl testified that she was raped,
you referred to us Acts of Lasciviousness and she
did not testified about that, that is another case
with another Court, we are only trying here a rape
case that is only they you never mention. Only on
the matters that she testified (sic).
ATTY. MANGALINDAN:
But this is also related to the rape case your Honor
because I will confront it with another form of a
question.
ATTY. MANGALINDAN:
Q Prior to this incident, were you molested by your
father?
PROSECUTOR SANTOS:

Immaterial, your Honor, whatever acts w[ere] done
by the accused is not a subject of the case at bar.
COURT:
Let us confine [questioning] to the complaint at bar
which is a rape case.
ATTY. MANGALINDAN:
This is related to the incident because we are here
your Honor to prove, we are trying to discredit her
testimony. We will just direct our question touching
on the direct examination.
COURT:
Only on the matters that she only testified that is
only thing you can cross-examine. Only matters
testified which is only a rape case let us not dwell
the Court knows there are other cases Acts of
Lasciviousness pending in the lower Court at the
proper Court otherwise if I will allow you to ask
questions on other matters specially I know you
are pinpointing the Acts of Lasciviousness you are
prolonging this case here (sic).
ATTY. MANGALINDAN:
I am trying to discredit the witness as one where
the credibility as witness here your Honor is very
important. I stated before our main cross-
examination is the accused is not a plan in such
case, although I do sympathize (sic). We would like
to propound question that will discredit her as
witness and a complainant not with her testimony
alone. Our center of cross-examination is to
discredit her as complaining witness that is why
our question may not be limited to be accepted
under the rule of cross-examination your Honor the
cross-examination your Honor the cross-examiner
is not limited on the direct-testimony of the witness
but he can propound questions which may petition
or destroy the credibility of the witness that is our
view point (sic).
PROSECUTOR SANTOS:
We cannot dispute the right of accused to discredit
or to adopt our credibility of our witness, but it
should be done in the proper way, not to ask
immaterial questions which are not related.
ATTY. MANGALINDAN:
The rule for cross-examination insofar as to
destroy the credibility of the witness is not only
limited to what the Honorable Fiscal we came
CONSTI LAW APRIL 7, 2018 96
approach of so many cross-examinations goes
allow your Honor under the rules of Court insofar
as this case is related to the present case we are
trying, this is very related because even the
witness I have transcript in my hand, testified not
only the rape case your Honor she had testified by
direct-examination the preparatory acts before the
testimony of rape that she was been molested
early, finger of the father, this were testified
through by the witness, it is here direct-testimony
it is not limited (sic).
PROSECUTOR SANTOS:
Prior to this incident were you molested by your
father, obviously your Honor the question is not
relevant.
ATTY. MANGALINDAN:
Your Honor please Im very disagreeable (sic), I
have not with me the transcript but I have read that
you [can] ask questions concerning the rape case.
COURT:
A question referring to events prior to the complaint
at bar.[24]
The trial court later issued an order, dated
December 9, 1997, the pertinent parts of which
provided:
After private complainant testified on direct-
examination, counsel for accused attempted to
cross-examine her on matters relevant to the
complaint for Acts of Lasciviousness which was
objected to by Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Arturo
G. Santos on the ground that private complainant
did not testify on that matter but limited her
testimony on the rape case only. Counsel for the
accused argued that although that is correct
nonetheless because [of] the sworn statement
executed by private complainant identified by said
witness in her direct examination and marked as
Exhibit C for the prosecution, he is at liberty to
cross-examine the witness on all matters stated in
her sworn statement including that portion
touching on the acts of lasciviousness subject
matter of another case before another court.
The Court sustained the objection. Section 6, Rule
132, Revised Rules on Evidence provides that the
witness may be cross-examined by the adverse
party as to any matters stated in the direct
examination, or connected therewith, with
sufficient fullness and freedom to test his accuracy
and truthfulness and freedom from interest or bias

or the reverse, and to elicit all important facts
bearing upon the issue.
The witness testified only on the rape case. She
did not testify anything about acts of
lasciviousness committed upon her person. She
may not therefore be questioned on this matter
because it is not connected with her direct
testimony or has any bearing upon the issue. To
allow adverse party to cross-examine the witness
on the acts of lasciviousness which is pending trial
in another court and which the witness did not
testify is improper.
Questions concerning acts of lasciviousness will
not in any way test the accuracy and truthfulness
and freedom from interest or bias or the reverse.
On the contrary such questions, if allowed, will
unduly burden the court with immaterial
testimonies.[25]
In another order, dated January 13, 1998, the trial
court gave accused-appellants counsel 20 days
within which to elevate its ruling to the appellate
court.[26] The records reveal, however, that no
such petition was filed by Atty. Mangalindan as
regards this particular matter.
The question, therefore, is whether the trial court
correctly disallowed accused-appellants counsel
from questioning complainant as regards the other
supposed acts of lasciviousness contained in her
sworn statement. On this point, Rule 132, 6 of the
Revised Rules on Evidence provides:
Upon the termination of the direct examination, the
witness may be cross-examined by the adverse
party as to any matters stated in the direct
examination, or connected therewith, with
sufficient fullness and freedom to test his accuracy
and truthfulness and freedom from interest, bias or
the reverse and to elicit all important facts bearing
upon the issue.
The right of a party to cross-examine a witness is
embodied in Art. III, 14(2) of the Constitution which
provides that the accused shall have the right to
meet the witnesses face to face and in Rule 115,
1(f) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
which states that, in all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall have the right to confront and cross-
examine the witnesses against him.[27] The cross-
examination of a witness is essential to test his or
her credibility, expose falsehoods or half-truths,
uncover the truth which rehearsed direct
examination testimonies may successfully
suppress, and demonstrate inconsistencies in
substantial matters which create reasonable doubt
CONSTI LAW APRIL 7, 2018 97
as to the guilt of the accused and thus give
substance to the constitutional right of the accused
to confront the witnesses against him.[28]
The right of the accused to cross-examine a
witness is, however, not without limits but is
subject to the rules on the admissibility and
relevance of evidence. Thus, in People v. Zheng
Bai Hui,[29] this Court upheld the ruling of the trial
judge disallowing the questions propounded by the
accuseds counsel on the ability of the arresting
officer to distinguish between tawas and shabu
without a laboratory examination, the academic
degree of his training instructor, and the officers
authorship of books on drug identity and analysis
for being irrelevant, improper, and impertinent.
In this case, accused-appellants counsel argued
that his questions to Erlanie on the other acts of
lasciviousness supposedly committed by accused-
appellant against her were for the purpose of
testing her credibility. There was, however, no
showing on his part how these questions had any
bearing on complainants credibility or on the truth
of her claims. One is led to suspect that the
purpose of these questions was to confuse
complainant into committing mistakes in her
answers during cross-examination that accused-
appellants counsel could later use to possibly put
complainants credibility, not to mention her
character, in question.
Accused-appellant insists that his counsel should
have been allowed to ask questions in relation to
the sworn statement executed by complainant. He
cites Rule 132, 17 of the Revised Rules of
Evidence which provides that:
When part of an act, declaration, conversation,
writing or record is given in evidence by one party,
the whole of the same subject matter may be
inquired into by the other.
Neither can this rule be invoked to justify the
questioning of complainant which the trial court did
not allow. As the above provision states, this rule
applies to parts of an act, declaration,
conversation, writing or record which is given in
evidence.
Indeed, the records show that after Erlanie had
finished with her direct examination on November
25, 1997, the trial judge granted the motion made
by Atty. Anselmo Mangalindan, accused-
appellants private counsel, to postpone Erlanie
Riveras cross-examination to allow him time to
secure copies of the transcript of stenographic
notes of Erlanies testimony and thus enable him to

fully question complainant.[30] Erlanie was first
cross-examined on December 2, 1997, but several
postponements, namely, on January 13, 1998,[31]
February 10, 1998,[32] March 12, 1998,[33] March
31, 1998,[34] April 7, 1998,[35] May 12, 1998,[36]
May 26, 1998,[37] May 28, 1998,[38] and June 11,
1998,[39] on Erlanies cross-examination took
place because of the failure of Atty. Mangalindan
to appear on the said trial dates. Erlanies cross-
examination was continued on July 14, 1998 and
July 23, 1998. Her cross-examination by accused-
appellants counsel was thorough and covered
various subjects, such as the nature of the
relationship between her parents, who were
present during the execution of her sworn
statement, whether the same had been executed
by her voluntarily, the date when she was raped by
accused-appellant the reason for her delay in
reporting the rape committed by accused-
appellant, her understanding of Tagalog, who were
with her in the house at the time of the rape, the
details surrounding the rape committed against
her, and her age. It is evident that accused-
appellant and his counsel were given ample
opportunity to conduct the cross-examination of
Erlanie Rivera in order to test her truthfulness.
B. The record shows that because accused-
appellants private counsel was not present when
Dr. Barin testified, Atty. Eddie Bansil was
appointed by the trial court as accused-appellants
counsel de oficio for that particular hearing. Atty.
Bansil moved for the postponement of the witness
cross-examination, but the trial court denied his
request because, on the one hand, accused-
appellant was a detention prisoner and Dr. Barin
was a very busy person, while, on the other hand,
Atty. Bansil had heard the testimony of the said
witness. Atty. Bansil then decided not to cross-
examine Dr. Barin.[40]
Accused-appellant now contends that the trial
judge denied the motion of Atty. Bansil for
postponement because he was biased against
him. Accused-appellant claims that the counsel de
oficio was not familiar with the facts of his case and
was thus in no position to cross-examine Dr. Barin.
While the Constitution recognizes the accuseds
right to competent and independent counsel of his
own choice, his option to secure the services of a
private counsel is not absolute. For considering the
States and the offended partys right to speedy and
adequate justice, the court may restrict the
accuseds option to retain a private counsel if the
accused insists on an attorney he cannot afford, or
if the chosen counsel is not a member of the bar,
CONSTI LAW APRIL 7, 2018 98
or if the attorney declines to represent the accused
for a valid reason.[41]
The trial court appointed Atty. Bansil a counsel de
oficio to represent accused-appellant on October
6, 1998 because his regular counsel, Atty.
Anselmo Mangalindan, was absent without any
explanation. Atty. Mangalindan had previously
been granted several postponements. As this
Court ruled in another case:
. . . Courts are not required to wait indefinitely the
pleasure and convenience of the accused as they
are also mandated to promote the speedy and
orderly administration of justice. Nor should they
countenance such an obvious trifling with the rules.
Indeed, public policy requires that the trial continue
as scheduled, considering that appellant was
adequately represented by counsels who were not
shown to be negligent, incompetent or otherwise
unable to represent him.[42]
Atty. Bansil was present and heard the testimony
of Dr. Barin, the prosecution witness, on that day.
Dr. Barins testimony on direct examination was
simple, containing primarily a discussion of her
findings on the hymenal laceration sustained by
complainant. Her testimony did not require
considerable study and extraordinary preparation
on the part of defense counsel for the purpose of
cross-examination. It seems Atty. Bansil no longer
found it necessary to cross-examine Dr. Barin.
Moreover, beyond stating that Dr. Barin was a vital
witness, accused-appellant has not indicated what
questions his counsel wanted to ask from Dr.
Barin. It may well be that these questions do not
exist at all and that the importance given by
accused-appellant to counsel de oficios failure to
cross-examine the witness is exaggerated.
Indeed, a medical examination of the victim,
together with the medical certificate, is merely
corroborative and is not an indispensable element
of rape.[43] The primordial issue in this case
remains to be whether the complainants
testimony, not Dr. Barins, established beyond
reasonable doubt the crime of rape.
C. Accused-appellant likewise points to the trial
judges questions propounded to him during his
cross-examination as an indication of the latters
partiality for the prosecution.
We find no merit in this contention. Where the trial
court is judge both of the law and of the facts, it is
oftentimes necessary in the due and faithful
administration of justice for the presiding judge to
re-examine a witness so that his judgment, when

rendered, may rest upon a full and clear
understanding of the facts.[44] Our reading of the
transcript of stenographic notes in this case shows
that the trial judge merely wanted to clarify certain
points relating to the defense of accused-appellant
and not to establish his guilt. It is a judges
prerogative to ask questions to ferret out the
truth.[45] It cannot be taken against him if the
questions he propounds reveals certain truths
which, in turn, tend to destroy the theory of one
party.[46] As this Court held:
In any case, a severe examination by a trial judge
of some of the witness for the defense in an effort
to develop the truth and to get at the real facts
affords no justification for a charge that he has
assisted the prosecution with an evident desire to
secure a conviction, or that he had intimidated the
witnesses for the defense. The trial judge must be
accorded a reasonable leeway in putting such
questions to witnesses as may be essential to elicit
relevant facts to make the record speak the truth.
Trial judges in this jurisdiction are judges of both
the law and the facts, and they would be negligent
in the performance of their duties if they permitted
a miscarriage of justice as a result of a failure to
propound a proper question to a witness which
might develop some material bearing upon the
outcome. In the exercise of sound discretion, he
may put such question to the witness as will enable
him to formulate a sound opinion as to the ability
or the willingness of the witness to tell the truth. A
judge may examine or cross-examine a witness.
He may propound clarificatory questions to test the
credibility of the witness and to extract the truth. He
may seek to draw out relevant and material
testimony though that testimony may tend to
support or rebut the position taken by one or the
other party. . .[47]
D. We also find no merit in accused-appellants
argument that he was denied due process
considering the speed with which the trial court
rendered judgment against him, which judgment
was promulgated one day after he filed his
memorandum.
The decision rendered by the trial court gives a
clear account of the facts and the law on which it
is based. It discusses in full the courts findings on
the credibility of both the prosecution and defense
witnesses and its evaluation of the evidence of
both parties. What we said in the analogous case
of People v. Mercado[48] applies to this case:
. . . A review of the trial courts decision shows that
its findings were based on the records of this case
and the transcripts of stenographic notes during
CONSTI LAW APRIL 7, 2018 99
the trial. The speed with which the trial court
disposed of the case cannot thus be attributed to
the injudicious performance of its function. Indeed,
a judge is not supposed to study a case only after
all the pertinent pleadings have been filed. It is a
mark of diligence and devotion to duty that a judge
studies a case long before the deadline set for the
promulgation of his decision has arrived. The one-
day period between the filing of accused-
appellants memorandum and the promulgation of
the decision was sufficient time to consider their
arguments and to incorporate these in the
decision. As long as the trial judge does not
sacrifice the orderly administration of justice in
favor of a speedy but reckless disposition of a
case, he cannot be taken to task for rendering his
decision with due dispatch. . .
II. Coming now to the merits of this case, we find
that the evidence proves beyond reasonable doubt
the guilt of accused-appellant. In reviewing rape
cases, we have been guided by the following
principles: (a) An accusation for rape is easy to
make, difficult to prove, and even more difficult to
disprove; (b) In view of the intrinsic nature of the
crime, the testimony of the complainant must be
scrutinized with extreme caution; and (c) The
evidence for the prosecution must stand on its own
merits and cannot draw strength from the
weakness of the evidence for the defense.[49]
A. Well-settled is the rule that the lone testimony of
a rape victim, by itself, is sufficient to warrant a
judgment of conviction if found to be credible. It
has likewise been established that when a woman
declares that she has been raped she says in
effect all that is necessary to mean that she has
been raped, and where her testimony passes the
test of credibility the accused can be convicted on
the basis thereof. This is because from the nature
of the offense, the sole evidence that can usually
be offered to establish the guilt of the accused is
the complainants testimony.[50]
Considering complainants tender age, her shy
demeanor, and manner of testifying in court, the
trial court found Erlanies testimony to be
straightforward, natural, and convincing and
accorded the same full faith and credit.[51]
Complainant told the court how she was awakened
because accused-appellant kissed her and
fondled her breasts. She narrated that she tried to
resist accused-appellants advances by pushing
and kicking him, but the latter succeeded in
ravishing her. She told of how her father
threatened to kill her mother and her siblings if she
reported the incident. Despite the lengthy cross-

examination of accused-appellants counsel, she
remained firm and steadfast in her story of how she
was raped by her father. Her narration not only
rings true and sincere but is consistent and
unshaken on its material points. Complainants
testimony is fully corroborated by the medical
findings of Dr. Barin who examined complainant
shortly after she had been raped. She found
complainant to have suffered a hymenal laceration
at the 3 oclock position which could have been
caused by the penetration of a hard object, such
as a male organ.
Complainants failure to remember the date of the
commission of the rape cannot be taken against
her. The exact date when complainant was
sexually abused is not an essential element of the
crime of rape.[52] Nor does the fact that
complainant was sleeping beside her sister when
the rape occurred detract from her credibility. The
possibility of rape is not negated by the fact that
the presence of even the whole family of the
accused inside the same room produced the
possibility of discovery. For rape to be committed,
it is not necessary for the place to be ideal, for
rapists respect neither time nor place for carrying
out their evil designs.[53]
In sum, accused-appellant failed to show any
reason why this Court should disbelieve
complainants testimony. Indeed, the gravity of
filing a case for incestuous rape is of such a nature
that a daughters accusation must be taken
seriously. It is against human experience for a girl
to fabricate a story which would drag herself and
her family to a lifetime of dishonor, unless it is the
truth. More so when her charge could mean the
execution of her own father, as in this case.[54]
Accused-appellants counsel on cross-examination
made much of the discrepancy between
complainants sworn statement where she stated
that accused-appellant slept beside her mother
after the rape[55] and her testimony that her
mother returned home from the hospital only the
day after the rape took place.[56] It must be
pointed out, however, that discrepancies between
a witness affidavit and his testimony in open court
does not necessarily impair his credibility.
Affidavits, which are taken ex parte, are often
incomplete or inaccurate for lack of or absence of
searching inquiries by the investigating officer.[57]
Moreover, whether accused-appellant slept alone
or with complainants mother after committing the
rape of complainant is of no moment as it is a minor
point that does not reflect on the commission of the
crime itself. The rule is that discrepancies and
CONSTI LAW APRIL 7, 2018 100
inconsistencies on minor matters neither impair the
essential integrity of the prosecution evidence as a
whole nor reflect on the witness honesty. Such
inconsistencies may in fact strengthen rather than
weaken the credibility of the witness as they erase
any suspicion of rehearsed testimony.[58]
Accused-appellant contends that complainant
could not have been raped on March 1 or 2, 1997,
the dates when her sister Zaira was hospitalized,
because she had her last menstrual period on
March 3, 1998 and thus she could not have gotten
pregnant as a result of the rape. He argues that a
woman who had her monthly period cannot be
impregnated as a result of sexual intercourse five
days before or five days after her last
menstruation.[59]
Accused-appellant does not, however, cite any
legal or medical authority for his thesis, except
what he claims to be common knowledge. On the
other hand, we have previously held that it is hard
to ascertain the exact date of fertilization inasmuch
as more than two weeks is considered to be the life
span of the spermatozoa in the vaginal canal.[60]
Hence, even granting that complainant could not
have been impregnated by accused-appellant
during the period alleged by him, it remains
possible for complainant to have gotten pregnant
afterwards. More importantly, it must be
emphasized that pregnancy is not an element of
the crime of rape and is, therefore, totally
immaterial to the question of accused-appellants
guilt.[61] In other words, accused-appellant being
the cause of complainants pregnancy is a non-
issue in the prosecution of the crime of rape. What
should not be lost sight of is the fact that
complainants testimony constitutes proof beyond
reasonable doubt that accused-appellant had
carnal knowledge of her without her consent, and
such fully established the crime of rape.
B. Accused-appellant imputes ill motive on the part
of complainants mother and her relatives for
bringing charges against him. He claims that
complainants mother resented the fact that he
used to beat her up out of jealousy and that he had
several paramours in the past. He further asserts
that his wifes relatives were angry with him
because of the land which he caused to be
registered in his name to the prejudice of the latter.
This allegation is without merit. Accused-appellant
makes it appear that complainants mother was
responsible for the filing of this case against him.
This is not so. For that matter, his wife did not
testify against him. It was his daughter,
complainant, alone who denounced him in court.

Accused-appellants claim that the motivation for
the filing of this case was the animosity of his wifes
relatives towards him caused by his land-grabbing
of their land is likewise without any basis. It may be
that his wifes relatives took advantage of his
incarceration and made him sign his waiver of
rights over the land.[62] But this does not
necessarily mean they conspired to persecute him.
It is noteworthy that accused-appellant never
claimed that the document which he signed (Exh.
3) existed before the filing of the criminal complaint
against him or that his wifes relatives fabricated the
charge against him because of his failure to sign
the same.
Indeed, what accused-appellants defense cannot
explain is the hymenal laceration sustained by
complainant or the steadfastness she has
exhibited in pursuing the charge against her own
father. It is doubtful that complainant would let
herself be embroiled in a petty family dispute in
exchange for her honor and dignity. We cannot
believe that a young girl, like complainant, would
invent a sordid tale of sexual abuse by accused-
appellant unless it was the truth.[63] Where there
is no evidence to show a doubtful reason or
improper motive why a prosecution witness should
testify against the accused or falsely implicate him
in a crime, her testimony is trustworthy.[64]
Accused-appellant also raises the defense of
denial and alibi. But the bare denial of accused-
appellant cannot overcome the positive
declarations of complainant. Denial, when
unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence,
constitutes negative self-serving evidence which
deserves no greater evidentiary value than the
testimony of a credible witness who testified on
affirmative matters.[65]
Accused-appellants sister, Concepcion Sayo,
testified that accused-appellant lived with her
family in Bulacan at the time of the rape. No other
witness not related to accused-appellant, however,
was called to corroborate her claim. We have
already held that the defense of alibi cannot
prosper if it is established mainly by the accused
and his relatives, and not by credible persons. It is
not improbable that these witnesses would freely
perjure themselves for the sake of their loved
ones.[66] Accused-appellants defense thus fails to
convince this Court.
C. The foregoing discussion notwithstanding, we
think that the imposition of the death penalty by the
trial court is erroneous. It is settled that to justify
the imposition of the death penalty, both the
CONSTI LAW APRIL 7, 2018 101
relationship of the victim and her age must be
alleged and proved.[67] Thus, in People v.
Javier,[68] where the victim was alleged to be 16
years old at the time of the commission of the
rapes, it was held:
. . . Although the victims age was not contested by
the defense, proof of age of the victim is
particularly necessary in this case considering that
the victims age which was then 16 years old is just
two years less than the majority age of 18. In this
age of modernism, there is hardly any difference
between a 16-year old girl and an 18-year old one
insofar as physical features and attributes are
concerned. A physically developed 16-year old
lass may be mistaken for an 18-year old young
woman, in the same manner that a frail and young-
looking 18-year old lady may pass as a 16-year old
minor. Thus, it is in this context that independent
proof of the actual age of a rape victim becomes
vital and essential so as to remove an iota of doubt
that the victim is indeed under 18 years of age as
to fall under the qualifying circumstances
enumerated in Republic Act No. 7659. In a criminal
prosecution especially of cases involving the
extreme penalty of death, nothing but proof beyond
reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to
constitute the crime with which an accused is
charged must be established by the prosecution in
order for said penalty to be upheld.
A duly certified certificate of live birth showing
complainants age, or some other official document
on record, such as a school record, has been
recognized as competent evidence.[69]
In this case, although complainants minority has
been alleged in the information, no independent
evidence was presented by the prosecution to
prove the same. Complainant did not even state
her age at the time of the rape during direct
examination; it was only during her cross-
examination when she stated that she was 12
years old at the time she was raped by her
father.[70]
Nor was her birth certificate or baptismal certificate
or any school record presented by the prosecution
to prove the age of Erlanie at the time of the rape.
Not even her mother, whose testimony could have
been sufficient to prove the age of
complainant,[71] testified in this case. What was
relied upon by the trial court was that fact that the
age of the victim was undisputed by the
defense.[72] It also took judicial notice of the
victims minority on account of her appearance.[73]
 CONSTI LAW APRIL 7, 2018 102

We do not agree with this conclusion. The trial their daughters, such award may be imposed to
court can only take judicial notice of the victims serve as a deterrent to other parents similarly
minority when the latter is, for example, 10 years disposed to commit the same crime.[79]
old or below. Otherwise, the prosecution has the
burden of proving the victims age at the time of the WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial
rape and the absence of denial on the part of Court, Branch 49, Guagua, Pampanga, finding
accused-appellant does not excuse the accused-appellant guilty of the crime of rape is
prosecution from discharging its burden.[74] In a AFFIRMED with the modification that accused-
similar case, People v. Tundag,[75] in which the appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of
trial court took judicial notice of the minority of the reclusion perpetua and to pay complainant Erlanie
victim who was alleged to be 13 years old, we Rivera the amount of P50,000.00 as civil
ruled: indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and
P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
In this case, judicial notice of the age of the victim
is improper, despite the defense counsels SO ORDERED.
admission, thereof acceding to the prosecutions
motion. As required by Section 3 of Rule 129, as
to any other matters such as age, a hearing is
required before courts can take judicial notice of
such fact. Generally, the age of the victim may be
proven by the birth or baptismal certificate of the
victim, or in the absence thereof, upon showing
that said documents were lost or destroyed, by
other documentary or oral evidence sufficient for
the purpose.

The prosecution having failed to present evidence

as to complainants age, accused-appellant can be
convicted only of simple rape, for which the penalty
is reclusion perpetua.

Consequently, the award of civil indemnity in the

amount of P75,000.00 made by the trial court
cannot be sustained. Such amount can only be
awarded if the crime of rape was effectively
qualified by any of the circumstances under which
the death penalty is authorized by the applicable
amendatory laws.[76] Accordingly, the civil
indemnity awarded to complainant must be
reduced to P50,000.00 in consonance with current
rulings.[77]

The award of moral damages in the amount of

P50,000.00 to complainant is correct. Moral
damages is awarded in rape cases without need of
showing that the victim suffered from mental,
physical, and psychological trauma as these are
too obvious to require recital by the victim during
trial.[78]

In addition to the damages given by the trial court,

exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00
should likewise be awarded in favor of
complainant. Accused-appellant being the father
of complainant, such relationship can be
appreciated as a generic aggravating
circumstance warranting the award of exemplary
damages. In rapes committed by fathers against

A.M. No. 01-4-03-SC September 13, 2001
RE: REQUEST FOR LIVE RADIO-TV
COVERAGE OF THE TRIAL IN THE
SANDIGANBAYAN OF THE PLUNDER CASES
AGAINST FORMER PRESIDENT JOSEPH E.
ESTRADA
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE HERNANDO PEREZ,
KAPISANAN NG MGA BRODKASTER NG
PILIPINAS, CESAR SARINO, RENATO
CAYETANO, and ATTY. RICARDO ROMULO,
petitioners,
vs.
JOSEPH E. ESTRADA and INTEGRATED BAR
OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositors.
RESOLUTION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision
denying petitioners' request for permission to
televise and broadcast live the trial of former
President Estrada before the Sandiganbayan. The
motion was filed by the Secretary of Justice, as
one of the petitioners, who argues that there is
really no conflict between the right of the people to
public information and the freedom of the press, on
the one hand, and, on the other, the right of the
accused to a fair trial; that if there is a clash
between these rights, it must be resolved in favor
of the right of the people and the press because
the people, as the repository of sovereignty, are
entitled to information; and that live media
coverage is a safeguard against attempts by any
party to use the courts as instruments for the
pursuit of selfish interests.
On the other hand, former President Joseph E.
Estrada reiterates his objection to the live TV and
radio coverage of his trial on the ground that its
allowance will violate the sub judice rule and that,
based on his experience with the impeachment
trial, live media coverage will only pave the way for
so-called "expert commentary" which can trigger
massive demonstrations aimed at pressuring the
Sandiganbayan to render a decision one way or
the other. Mr. Estrada contends that the right of the
people to information may be served through other
means less distracting, degrading, and prejudicial
than live TV and radio coverage.1âwphi1.nêt
The Court has considered the arguments of the
parties on this important issue and, after due
deliberation, finds no reason to alter or in any way
modify its decision prohibiting live or real time
broadcast by radio or television of the trial of the
CONSTI LAW APRIL 7, 2018 103
former president. By a vote of nine (9) to six (6) of
its members,1 the Court denies the motion for
reconsideration of the Secretary of Justice.
In lieu of live TV and radio coverage of the trial, the
Court, by the vote of eight (8) Justices,2 has
resolved to order the audio-visual recording of the
trial.
What follows is the opinion of the
majority.lawphil.net
Considering the significance of the trial before the
Sandiganbayan of former President Estrada and
the importance of preserving the records thereof,
the Court believes that there should be an audio-
visual recording of the proceedings. The
recordings will not be for live or real time broadcast
but for documentary purposes. Only later will they
be available for public showing, after the
Sandiganbayan shall have promulgated its
decision in every case to which the recording
pertains. The master film shall be deposited in the
National Museum and the Records Management
and Archives Office for historical preservation and
exhibition pursuant to law.4
For the purpose of recording the proceedings,
cameras will be inconspicuously installed in the
courtroom and the movement of TV crews will be
regulated, consistent with the dignity and
solemnity of the proceedings. The trial shall be
recorded in its entirety, except such portions
thereof as the Sandiganbayan may decide should
not be held public pursuant to Rule 119, §21 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. No
comment shall be included in the documentary
except annotations which may be necessary to
explain certain scenes which are depicted. The
audio-visual recordings shall be made under the
supervision and control of the Sandiganbayan or
its Division as the case may be.
There are several reasons for such televised
recording.1awphil.net First, the hearings are of
historic significance. They are an affirmation of our
commitment to the rule that "the King is under no
man, but he is under God and the law." (Quod Rex
non debet esse sub homine, sed sub Deo et Lege.)
Second, the Estrada cases involve matters of vital
concern to our people who have a fundamental
right to know how their government is conducted.
This right can be enhanced by audio visual
presentation. Third, audio-visual presentation is
essential for the education and civic training of the
people.

Above all, there is the need to keep audio-visual
records of the hearings for documentary purposes.
The recordings will be useful in preserving the
essence of the proceedings in a way that the cold
print cannot quite do because it cannot capture the
sights and sounds of events. They will be primarily
for the use of appellate courts in the event a review
of the proceedings, rulings, or decisions of the
Sandiganbayan is sought or becomes necessary.
The accuracy of the transcripts of stenographic
notes taken during the trial can be checked by
reference to the tapes.
On the other hand, by delaying the release of the
tapes for broadcast, concerns that those taking
part in the proceedings will be playing to the
cameras and will thus be distracted from the
proper performance of their roles -- whether as
counsel, witnesses, court personnel, or judges --
will be allayed. The possibility that parallel trials
before the bar of justice and the bar of public
opinion may jeopardize, or even prevent, the just
determination of the cases can be minimized. The
possibility that judgment will be rendered by the
popular tribunal before the court of justice can
render its own will be avoided.
At the same time, concerns about the regularity
and fairness of the trial -- which, it may be
assumed, is the concern of those opposed to, as
much as of those in favor of, televised trials - will
be addressed since the tapes will not be released
for public showing until after the decision of the
cases by the Sandiganbayan. By delaying the
release of the tapes, much of the problem posed
by real time TV and radio broadcast will be
avoided.
Thus, many important purposes for preserving the
record of the trial can be served by audio-visual
recordings without impairing the right of the
accused to a fair trial.
Nor is the right of privacy of the accused a bar to
the production of such documentary. In Ayer
Productions Pty. Ltd. V. Capulong,5 this Court set
aside a lower court's injunction restraining the
filming of "Four Day Revolution," a documentary
film depicting, among other things, the role of then
Minister of National Defense Juan Ponce Enrile in
the 1986 EDSA people power. This Court held: "A
limited intrusion into a person's privacy has long
been regarded as permissible where that person is
a public figure and the information sought to be
elicited from him or to be published about him
constitute matters of a public character."6
CONSTI LAW APRIL 7, 2018 104
No one can prevent the making of a movie based
on the trial. But, at least, if a documentary record
is made of the proceedings, any movie that may
later be produced can be checked for its accuracy
against such documentary and any attempt to
distort the truth can thus be averted.
Indeed, a somewhat similar proposal for
documentary recording of celebrated cases or
causes célèbres was made was made way back in
1971 by Paul Freund of the Harvard Law School.
As he explained:
In fairness let me refer to an American experience
many of my lay friends found similarly moving. An
educational television network filmed a trial in
Denver of a Black Panther leader on charges of
resisting arrest, and broadcast the document in
full, in four installments, several months after the
case was concluded -- concluded incidentally, with
a verdict of acquittal.
No one could witness the trial without a feeling of
profound respect for the painstaking way in which
the truth was searched for, for the ways whereby
law copes with uncertainties and ambiguities
through presumptions and burden of proof, and the
sense of gravity with which judge and jury carried
out their responsibilities.
I agree in general with the exclusion of television
from the courtroom, for the familiar good reasons.
And yet the use of television at a trial for
documentary purposes, not for the broadcast of
live news, and with the safeguards of
completeness and consent, is an educational
experiment that I would be prepared to welcome.
Properly safeguarded and with suitable
commentary, the depiction of an actual trial is an
agency of enlightenment that could have few
equals in its impact on the public understanding.
Understanding of our legal process, so rarely
provided by our educational system, is now a
desperate need.7
Professor Freund's observation is as valid today as
when it was made thirty years ago. It is perceptive
for its recognition of the serious risks posed to the
fair administration of justice by live TV and radio
broadcasts, especially when emotions are running
high on the issues stirred by a case, while at the
same time acknowledging the necessity of keeping
audio-visual recordings of the proceedings of
celebrated cases, for public information and
exhibition, after passions have subsided.
 CONSTI LAW APRIL 7, 2018 105

WHEREFORE, an audio-visual recording of the

trial of former President Estrada before the
Sandiganbayan is hereby ordered to be made, for
the account of the Sandiganbayan, under the
following conditions: (a) the trial shall be recorded
in its entirety, excepting such portions thereof as
the Sandiganbayan may determine should not be
held public under Rule 119, §21 of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure; (b) cameras shall be installed
inconspicuously inside the courtroom and the
movement of TV crews shall be regulated
consistent with the dignity and solemnity of the
proceedings; (c) the audio-visual recordings shall
be made for documentary purposes only and shall
be made without comment except such
annotations of scenes depicted therein as may be
necessary to explain them; (d) the live broadcast
of the recordings before the Sandiganbayan shall
have rendered its decision in all the cases against
the former President shall be prohibited under pain
of contempt of court and other sanctions in case of
violations of the prohibition; (e) to ensure that the
conditions are observed, the audio-visual
recording of the proceedings shall be made under
the supervision and control of the Sandiganbayan
or its Division concerned and shall be made
pursuant to rules promulgated by it; and (f)
simultaneously with the release of the audio-visual
recordings for public broadcast, the original thereof
shall be deposited in the National Museum and the
Records Management and Archives Office for
preservation and exhibition in accordance with
law.

SO ORDERED.