Baltazar v.

Laxa
11 April 2012 G.R. No. 174489 Del Castillo, J.

Petitioners Antonio B. Baltazar, Sebastian M. Baltazar, Antonio L.

Mangalindan, Nenita A. Pacheco, Virgilio Regala, Jr., and
Rafael Titco

Respondent Lorenzo Laxa

Doctrine It is an established rule that a testament may not be disallowed
just because the attesting witnesses declare against its due
execution; neither does it have to be necessarily allowed just
because all the attesting witnesses declare in favor of its
legalization; what is decisive is that the court is convinced by
evidence before it, not necessarily from the attesting witnesses,
although they must testify, that the will was or was not duly
executed in the manner required by law.

Facts

Paciencia was a 78 year old spinster when she made her last will and testament.
Childless and without any brothers or sisters, Paciencia bequeathed all her properties to
respondent Lorenzo R. Laxa, his wife Corazon and their children. More than four years after
the death of Paciencia, Lorenzo filed a petition with the RTC of Guagua, Pampanga for the
probate of the will of Paciencia and for the issuance of Letters of Administration in his favor.
Petitioner Baltazar filed an opposition contending that the properties subject of Paciencia’s will
belong to Nicomeda Mangalindan, his predecessor-in-interest hence, Paciencia had no right to
bequeath them to Lorenzo. Petitioners also opposed the issuance of Letters of Administration
in Lorenzo’s favor arguing that Lorenzo was disqualified to be appointed as such, he being a
citizen and resident of the USA. Petitioners dispute the authenticity of Paciencia’s will on the
ground that Section 11 of Rule 76 of the Rules of Court was not complied with.

RTC gave considerable weight to the testimony of Rosie and concluded that at the time
Paciencia signed the will, she no longer possessed sufficient reason or strength of mind to
have testamentary capacity. On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC Decision as the oppositors in
the probate proceedings were not able to overcome the presumption that every person is of
sound mind. Further, no concrete circumstances or events were given to prove the allegation
that Paciencia was tricked or forced into signing the will.

Issue
 Should the probate court allow Paciencia’s will despite respondents failure to comply
with Section 11, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court?

Ruling

Yes. Section 11, Rule 76 states, “If the will is contested, all the subscribing witnesses,
and the notary in the case of wills executed under the Civil Code of the Philippines, if present
in the Philippines and not insane, must be produced and examined, and the death, absence, or
insanity of any of them must be satisfactorily shown to the court.”

Here, the inability of Faustino and Judge Limpin to appear and testify before the court
was satisfactorily explained during the probate proceedings. As testified to by his son, Faustino
had a heart attack, was already bedridden and could no longer talk and express himself due to
brain damage. To prove this, said witness presented the corresponding medical certificate. For
her part, Dra. Limpin testified that her father, Judge Limpin, suffered a stroke in 1991 and had
to undergo brain surgery. At that time, Judge Limpin could no longer talk and could not even
remember his daughters name so that Dra. Limpin stated that given such condition, her father
could no longer testify. It is well to note that at that point, despite ample opportunity,
petitioners neither interposed any objections to the testimonies of said witnesses nor
challenged the same on cross examination. For all intents and purposes, Lorenzo was able to
satisfactorily account for the incapacity and failure of the said subscribing witness and of the
notary public to testify in court. Because of this, the probate of Paciencia’s will may be allowed
on the basis of Dra. Limpins testimony proving her sanity and the due execution of the will, as
well as on the proof of her handwriting.
 Maninang v. Court of Appeals
6 July 2011 G.R. No. 167284 Del Castillo, J.

Petitioners The Estate Of Soledad Maninang and The Law Firm Of

Quisumbing Torres

Respondent The Honorable Court of Appeals, Spouses Salvacion Serrano

Ladanga and Agustin Ladanga, and Bernardo Aseneta,
Doctrine It is an established rule that a testament may not be disallowed
just because the attesting witnesses declare against its due
execution; neither does it have to be necessarily allowed just
because all the attesting witnesses declare in favor of its
legalization; what is decisive is that the court is convinced by
evidence before it, not necessarily from the attesting witnesses,
although they must testify, that the will was or was not duly
executed in the manner required by law.
Facts

Clemencia Aseneta, through her adopted son and judicially-appointed guardian,

respondent Bernardo Aseneta filed a reconveyance case against respondent-spouses
Salvacion and Agustin Ladanga. The complaint sought to annul the Deeds of Sale
allegedly executed by Clemencia in favor of the spouses Ladanga on grounds of lack of
intent to convey and lack of consideration. Clemencia died during the pendency of the
reconveyance case and was substituted as plaintiff by her known putative heir,
Bernardo.

Meanwhile, Clemencia’s death also brought about estate settlement proceedings

between Soledad Maninang represented by petitioner Law Firm of Quisumbing Torres
(QT), and Bernardo. Maninang claimed that Clemencia bequeathed to her the entire
estate in her last will and testament. Bernardo countered that the will is void on the
ground of preterition. While the Probate Case was still pending, a development
allegedly took place in the Reconveyance Case. According to Bernardo, the parties to
the Reconveyance Case – Bernardo and spouses Ladanga – allegedly entered into a
Compromise Agreement with respect to the Cubao property. The Probate Case was
eventually decided based on a compromise agreement and provided for their
distribution among the parties while the Reconveyance Case proceeded and, after 20
years in the trial court, was finally decided in favor of Clemencia’s estate.

Petitioners insist that, as pro indiviso co-owners of the Cubao property, they
have a right to join Bernardo as party-plaintiff in the reconveyance case.
Issue

Can petitioners adjudicate their claims to the Cubao property through appeal in
the reconveyance case by virtue of the decision in the probate case?

Ruling

No. There is no need for petitioners to join the appeal in the Reconveyance Case
because: first, such appeal covered the Diliman property and not the Cubao property;
and second, as to the Cubao property, it has already been settled with finality that such
property must be reconveyed by the spouses Ladanga to Clemencia’s estate.The said
motion is moot because the Cubao property had already been adjudicated in favor of
Clemencia’s estate with finality by the trial court in the Reconveyance Case. The trial
court’s decision ordered the spouses Ladanga to reconvey the Cubao property to
Clemencia’s estate, and this was not appealed. What was appealed to the CA was the
order to reconvey the Diliman property and that the appeal in the Reconveyance Case
only involved the Diliman property was finally determined.

As to petitioners’ ultimate objective of getting their alleged share in the Cubao

property, this cannot be litigated in the appeal of the Reconveyance Case but must be
the subject of a separate suit or proceeding. Petitioners’ cause of action is independent
of the cause of action in the Reconveyance Case and cannot possibly be litigated
without causing undue delay and prejudice to the respondents, who have already
endured more than two decades only to resolve the issues in the Reconveyance Case.
Moreover, petitioners’ cause of action presents contentious issues which may still need
to be threshed out in a proper trial and may require impleading other interested parties.
To allow petitioners to litigate these matters for the first time in the appellate stage of
the Reconveyance Case will not serve the ends of justice – not to respondents and not
even to petitioners.