The Trump Administration’s Military Policy in Afghanistan

Alex Koehler

3/19/18
Red Group
The Trump administration’s adherence to militaristic policy to resurrect the effort in

Afghanistan is misguided in the belief that the Taliban can be defeated through renewed
American military offensives. The resilience of the Taliban as an active, territory-possessing

force clearly indicates the insufficient effect of years of U.S. military presence, therefore

continued expenditure towards the military intervention is unlikely to yield substantial long-term

results. In order to properly step down America’s entangling involvement in the region, priority

must be directed towards endorsing Afghanistan’s developing defense capacity, as it has in the

Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF). It is clear, however, that the Defense Department’s

spending overseas has not been appropriately prioritized. The Overseas Contingency Operations

(OCO) fund needs to receive attention from the Department of Defense (DOD) and regulation

must be set that would shape American priorities towards active reconstruction over continued

military occupation. The current administration’s insistence on contributing more to the OCO

fund and increasing military spending generally illuminates the necessity of greater

responsibility on behalf of the DOD in the allocation of funding to their unregulated wartime

budget. The Trump administration’s reversal of de-escalation in Afghanistan must end because it

is costly to the U.S., destabilizing to the region, and diverts essential resources from

reconstruction.

Whereas former president Barack Obama pursued a plan to de-escalate and focused on

long-term strategic solutions, President Trump has proposed an opposing strategy. Trump

derided Afghanistan reconstruction efforts in a speech in August 2017: “I share the American

people’s frustration…over a foreign policy that has spent too much time, energy, money — and

most importantly, lives — trying to rebuild countries in our own image instead of pursuing our

security interests above all other considerations” (“Remarks by President Trump”). Trump

dismissed dedicating resources to counterinsurgency, addressing the conditions that allow for the

existence of extremist groups, focusing instead on counterterrorism, combating the terrorist

1
groups themselves through eradication: “America and our partners are committed to stripping

terrorists of their territory, cutting off their funding and exposing the false allure of their evil

ideology…we will defeat them, and we will defeat them handily” (“Remarks by President

Trump”). Three months into his regime, Congress made due on his promises: “Our budget takes

significant steps to undo the hollowing out of the military that occurred during the previous

administration; it increases base defense discretionary spending to $621.5 billion in fiscal year

2018, combined with $75 billion [of additional OCO spending]” (Black). One of the first moves

to implement Trump’s new strategy was to allow the Air Force free reign over targets of

opportunity, resulting in a peak number of airstrikes between August and December 2017

(Bearak). At a glance, this statistic seems to indicate progress: more damage is being inflicted, if

limited in scope. The negligible effect of prolonged bombing campaigns, however, has been

evident since its first application during World War II. Alone, conventional bombing is not

strategically decisive. Similarly, the pursuit of a conventional strategy of military domination,

inflicting casualties and securing tactical victories, cannot succeed against an elusive enemy.

This fundamental concept was realised during Obama’s administration, and guided

reconstruction policy: “High body counts alone cannot end an insurgency…The only way out of

Afghanistan, [Ret. General Jack] Keane indicated, was an intensive counterinsurgency geared

toward protecting Afghans… The Taliban insurgency is an alternative to the existing Afghan

government, a competitor for legitimacy and loyalty. This meant that the U.S. must help

establish an Afghan government that the people endorse, a government capable of maintaining

the peace” (Woodward, qtd. Keane, 83). Therefore, responsibility for maintaining military

initiative should be transferred upon reinforced Afghan National Defense and Security Forces

(ANDSF), not brought to bear upon U.S. soldiers on indefinite deployment in a protracted

2
stalemate. If conditions conducive to the existence of the Taliban persist, Afghanistan will

continue to be a hotbed of insurgency and regional terror and continue to pose a threat to national

security. Current counterterrorism strategy should be reevaluated and recognized as being

inordinately costly and insufficient to counter the Taliban effectively, and a counterinsurgency

strategy hinging on Afghans themselves must be adopted.

The Executive-in-Chief must not pursue an unabated policy of counterterrorism because

of the greater financial burden of sustaining U.S. troops in the field with the impractical

objective of “defeating” the Taliban. Sustaining troops in the field is extremely costly, and

magnified by the uncertainty of overseas military operations’ required expenditure, results in an

under-regulated and overboard discretionary defense budget. The OCO fund is the embodiment

of this principle of overcommitment, the accumulation of unrestricted resources to cover the

potential costs of deployment. “Since the OCO fund has very little oversight and is not subject to

the sequestration cuts that slashed every other part of the budget in 2013, many experts consider

it a ‘slush fund’ for the Pentagon” (“Pentagon Slush Fund”). The unregulated nature of the OCO

fund encourages corpulent spending on behalf of the U.S. Armed Forces and compounds base

budget costs drastically:1 “the total military and civil cost of Overseas Contingency Operations

(OCO) in the Afghan War rose to $686 billion in FY2001/2002 to FY2015… OCO spending has

since risen by a total of some $83 billion in FY2016 and FY2017. This brings the direct cost of

the Afghan war to a total of some $770 billion through FY2017” (Cordesman). In addition to

hyperinflating the cost of overseas commitments, OCO provided a means for the past

administration and the Pentagon to circumvent limiting budget caps, infringing upon budgetary

transparency: “Because OCO funding is intended for war-related activities that cannot be

1 See “Charts,” pg 10

3
forecasted well in advance, it is not restricted by the Budget Control Act (BCA) budget caps.

However, in recent years both Congress and the Obama administration have moved items from

the base budget to the OCO budget as a way of circumventing the BCA budget caps…”

(Harrison). Regardless of its blatant exploitation of the fund, the DOD remains noncompliant

with regulatory demands posed by the Government Accountability Office, the widely-regarded

Congressional watchdog: “Recommendation for Executive Action…to reevaluate and revise the

criteria for determining what can be included in DOD’s OCO budget requests…[and] to develop

a complete and reliable estimate of DOD's enduring OCO costs… The Department of Defense

(DOD) and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) have not taken action on our

recommendation” (Pendleton). Besides bloated overseas contingency spending, even U.S.-

backed aid missions have proven excessively costly, due to failure to properly prioritize

appropriations and manage assistance money. According to the Special Inspector General for

Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), appointed by USAID in 2008, pressure to artificially

produce reconstruction results caused a hasty deluge of payments and wasted reconstruction

funds. Under-capacity, mismanagement, and primitive reconstruction demands resulted in

shoddy but incentive-meeting efforts: “Many former U.S. officials and experts who spent time in

Afghanistan point to systemic problems with the way assistance was delivered… a USAID office

in Kabul did not have the capacity to manage many small projects because each one took as

much time as one large project. The result was [sustancial subcontracting]. The former official

claimed that the overhead for each of these levels absorbed 20 percent of the budget…” (Sopko,

19). Contributing to the failure of the aid system was the insufficient evaluation of the essential

problem and the absence of means to oversee the influx of reconstruction money. “[USAID’s

Afghanistan Strategic Plan 2005–2010] failed to address two fundamental aspects of the

4
corruption problem…As a result, the document did not consider how better oversight of U.S.

assistance might reduce corruption and the extent to which technical anticorruption efforts could

succeed if the Afghan government itself did not cooperate in such efforts.” (Sopko, 24). Indeed,

the Afghan government conveniently ignored the problem and avoided by all means commitment

to anti-corruption efforts: “In his 2004 inauguration address, Karzai vowed to “root out

corruption [and] stop the abuse of public funds.” …Nevertheless, genuine Afghan leadership on

the issue was elusive; GIROA failed to take concrete steps to combat corruption” (Sopko, 25-

26). The problem of budgetary mismanagement is remarkably reminiscent of that facing Senator

Harry Truman of Missouri in 1941, after Roosevelt hastily propelled $10.5 billion through

Congress. Senator Truman took the initiative in a critical moment to investigate national defense

spending, establishing the “Special Committee to Investigate the National Defense Program.”

For the following three years he would chairman the committee’s efforts to bolster the efficiency

of national defense projects, gaining crucial publicity and support from the American people

(“Special Committee”). The need for a Truman Committee-esque investigation on spending for

operations concerning National Defense, involving publicized scrutiny of overseas campaigns

such as OCO and foreign aid deposits, is readily apparent.

U.S. military intervention and occupation in Afghanistan experienced many destabilizing

setbacks, as mistakes compounded over a decade and a half. Early U.S. occupation facilitated

abundant corruption. What was seen as a priority, pushing against al-Qaeda and the Taliban,

necessitated tolerance and political backing for extrajudicial crimelords who controlled the

regions’ militias and soon withheld local authority from the national government. The

consequences of this misjudgment have been lasting: “Indirectly, the United States helped to lay

a foundation for continued impunity of malign actors, weak rule of law, and the growth of

5
corruption. Although U.S. agencies recognized the dangers of aligning with warlords, they did

not fully appreciate the risks this posed to the mission in Afghanistan” (Sopko, 19). Corruption is

as prevalent under current President Ghani as it was under Karzai. Bribery and corruption were

such ingrained aspects of daily life that the United Nations and the Government of Afghanistan

admitted in 2012, “The large-scale population survey on the extent of bribery and four sector-

specific integrity surveys…reveal that the delivery of public services remains severely affected

by bribery in Afghanistan and that bribery has a major impact on the country’s economy”

(“Corruption in Afghanistan,” 5). Local enforcement forces remain under-equipped,

undermanned, plagued by corruption and local rivalries, and generally rendered impotent to the

Taliban threat. In one instance, local officials confirmed in interviews for The Washington Post,

“…the police force is filled with ‘ghost’ positions — fake names of low-ranking men whose

salaries and other payments are pocketed by higher officers. ‘Believe me, 60 percent of the

police are ghost officers,’ said Abdul Saboor Khedmat, a member of parliament from Farah”

(Hassan). Fear of Taliban attacks grip Afghans today and diminish pro-government sentiment.

As Abdullah Safi, a 60-year-old resident of Kabul, attested in an interview for the Washington

Post, “‘we have two governments — one on the other side of the river, and one on this side’”

(“Abandoned by Struggling Government”). By another Afghan’s assertion, “‘This government

is destroying itself and the country’” (“Abandoned by Struggling Government”). The constant

threat from the Taliban in the lives of Afghan civilians is detrimental to the perceived legitimacy

of the national government and attests to the need for stronger, more capable law enforcement.

At the same time, U.S. military presence is destabilizing to the country as the Afghan National

Police (ANP) and Army (ANA) continues to rely heavily upon American soldiers themselves.

The ANDSF’s failure to ensure the security of cites and civilian lives show their inadequacies

6
and the lesser threat they pose to the Taliban due to their dependence on foreign military

assistance. Increasing American troop strength will have the adverse effect of promoting ANDSF

reliance on U.S. forces to combat the Taliban directly, while it is clearly an Afghan mission.

Furthermore, increasing U.S. military presence is at odds with both growing anti-war sentiment

among Afghans and government-headed reconciliatory moves. Most recently, President Ghani

has offered to participate in “unconditional” peace talks, reflecting increasing desire to resolve

the conflict whatever means necessary (“Violence in Afghan capital”). Committing more U.S.

manpower and military resources to a primary strategy of counterterrorism will not address the

fundamental problems that the government of Afghanistan faces, preventing it from ever

carrying out its own counterterrorism operations effectively.

Increasing American troops in Afghanistan will not result in greater stability nor satisfy

the need for a long-term solution to the insurgency problem. The presence of U.S. forces

reinforces the Taliban’s resilience, as foreign-led counterterrorism has long remained ineffective

while the insurgent’s gains mounted increasingly. SIGAR has indicated the main obstacle to

conciliation with the Taliban were U.S. troops: “On December 23, 2016, the Taliban again

publicly rejected peace talks, reiterating their long-held stance that talk of peace and

reconciliation is ‘meaningless’ as long as foreign forces remain in Afghanistan”

(“Reconstruction Update,” 65). As reported by SIGAR’s assessment dated January 30th, 2018,

“Historically, the number of districts controlled or influenced by the government has been falling

since SIGAR began reporting on it, while the number controlled or influenced by the insurgents

has been rising,” demonstrating the futility of continued U.S.-lead counterterrorism strategy

(“Quarterly Report,” 1). Instead, the legacy of US military assistance lay in the capacity of the

ANDSF, upon whom the responsibility of combating the Taliban truly resides. SIGAR described

7
former president Obama’s similar conviction that lasting success is intrinsic to ANDSF success:

“President Barack Obama…[authorized] up to $4.26 billion for the Afghanistan Security Forces

Fund (ASFF). The ASFF is the United States’ principal fund to build, train, equip, and sustain

the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF). Obama pledged to recommend to

his successor that the United States continue to seek funding for the ANDSF at or near current

levels through 2020” (“Reconstruction Update,” 65). President Trump cannot disregard the need

for continued American sponsorship of the ASFF and its mission. Should efforts to bolster

Afghan national security forces prove negligible or lacking, nothing will prevent the Taliban or

other insurgencies from challenging the government’s legitimacy in the future without America.

In requisitioning funding for the ASFF for Fiscal Year 2018, the DOD claimed: “The ASFF is a

manifestation of the United States commitment to Afghanistan… At the peak of the “surge,” the

United States and other coalition nations had 140,000 troops in Afghanistan conducting a wide-

ranging counterinsurgency mission…Today, the Afghan forces have full responsibility for

conducting that mission at a fraction of the cost with limited enabler and other support from our

advisors” (“Justification for FY2018,” 2). The billions of dollars being spent on the U.S. military

occupation of Afghanistan could be better applied in reinforcing the hold of the government of

Afghanistan over its potential successor, the Taliban.

The military objective of the Afghan War has evolved from striking out against the

country on a basis of harboring al-Qaeda to eliminating the Taliban’s grip over the country.

Strategic goals of the intervention have been muddled and unclear, with different focuses on

counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and reconstruction in Afghanistan. The situation facing the

government of Afghanistan has largely remained stagnant, despite the different approaches. Both

historically and recently, the Taliban has remained a consistently present force, territory has been

8
ceded to Taliban control, and ANDSF remain far from independent. Afghans themselves are

reportedly questioning the legitimacy of their government, aware of its rampant corruption and

the limitations of their security forces. Bolstering U.S. military engagement, while adopting the

responsibility and cost of combating the entrenched Taliban, does not address long-term issues of

stability in Afghanistan, rendering efforts to contain the Taliban inevitably futile. An effective

enforcement force, capable of protecting Afghan government infrastructure and securing the

populace from Taliban influence, would legitimize the national government and enable U.S. de-

escalation in the country. Foreign assistance would be necessary to establish such a force, and

lessons from past failures can guide monetary supervision and unite militia under government

authority. A stable beginning for reconstruction would prove to be the most cost-effective means

of providing a lasting answer for Afghanistan in the future.

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 Charts:

1. (Cordesman, 32)

10
 Works Cited

Bearak, Max. “A new U.S. air blitz in Afghanistan isn’t stopping for winter. But will it

stop the Taliban?” The Washington Post, 16 Jan. 2018. The Washington Post,

<www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/a-new-us-air-blitz-in-afghanistan-isnt-

stopping-for-winter-but-will-it-stop-the-taliban/2018/01/16/c9bb874c-f4cd-11e7-9af7-

a50bc3300042_story.html?utm_term=.643f8949fa8e.> Accessed 18 Mar. 2018.

Secondary source, about the increased level of US air activity over Afghanistan. Used to

emphasize the uncertainty of decisive counterterrorist strategy.

Black, Diane. Building A Better America A Plan for Fiscal Responsibility. House Budget

Committee, <budget.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Building-a-Better-America-

PDF-2.pdf.> Accessed 18 Mar. 2018. Primary source, the FY2018 budget as

recommended by the House Budget Committee. Used to reference the amount of money

going to national defense, OCO fund.

Congress. Quarterly Report to the United States Congress. By John F. Sopko, Special

Inspector General For Afghanistan Reconstruction, 30 Jan. 2018,

<www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2018-01-30qr.pdf.> Accessed 19 Mar. 2018.

Primary source of experience and research conducted by Special Inspector General for

Afghanistan Reconstruction and staff. Used to emphasize the historical track record of

counterterrorism, in terms of territory gained/lost.

Congress. Reconstruction Update. By John F. Sopko, Special Inspector General For

Afghanistan Reconstruction, 30 Jan. 2017. Quarterly Report to the United States

Congress, <www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2017-01-30qr-section3.pdf.> Accessed

18 Mar. 2018. Primary source of experience and research conducted by Special Inspector

11
General For Afghanistan Reconstruction and staff. Used to emphasize the importance of

ASFF as the pen-ultimate legacy of US involvement.

Constable, Pamela. “Afghans, fearing more insurgent violence, feel abandoned by

struggling government.” The Washington Post, 11 Feb. 2018. The Washington Post,

<www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/afghans-fearing-more-insurgent-violence-

feel-abandoned-by-struggling-government/2018/02/09/29196310-0b50-11e8-998c-

96deb18cca19_story.html?utm_term=.3282ad2d9165.> Accessed 18 Mar. 2018. Primary

source, from The Washington Post’s bureau chief in Afghanistan and Pakistan, reported

from IN KABUL, interviewing firsthand local politicians, officials, and locals (if not a

primary source then I don’t know what is). Describes the scene in the aftermath of

another terrorist attack, interviews about government instability and the perceived

inadequacy of political response. Used as an accurate account of anti-war sentiment

among Afghans from a direct interview with a local of Kabul.

---. "Violence in Afghan capital continues as Taliban remain silent on peace talks offer."

The Washington Post, 3 Mar. 2018. The Washington Post,

<www.washingtonpost.com/world/nato-convoy-escapes-kabul-blast-as-taliban-remain-

silent-on-offer-to-hold-peace-talks/2018/03/02/5aba9c72-1ded-11e8-ae5a-

16e60e4605f3_story.html?utm_term=.d283ef32143e.> Accessed 19 Mar. 2018.

Secondary source, about President Ghani's plea for peace with the Taliban. Used to

illustrate desperation of Afghan gov. to resolve conflict with Taliban, due to the

inadequacy of ANDSF forces to protect the people.

Cordesman, Anthony H., compiler. OCO Spending and the Uncertain Cost of America’s

Wars. Center for Strategic & International Studies, 9 May 2016, <csis-

12
prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/160510_OCO_US_Wars2.pdf.>

Accessed 18 Mar. 2018. Secondary source analyzing the overall cost of years of buildup

of funding for Overseas Contingency Operations. Used to quantitatively specify, with an

accurate approximation, the billions of dollars’ worth dedicated to the OCO fund.

Corruption in Afghanistan: Recent patterns and trends. Vienna, United nations Office on

Drugs and Crime / Islamic Republic of Afghanistan High Office of Oversight and Anti-

Corruption, Dec. 2012,

<www.unodc.org/documents/frontpage/Corruption_in_Afghanistan_FINAL.pdf.>

Accessed 18 Mar. 2018. Secondary source, used for insight into ingrained nature of

corruption throughout Afghanistan.

Harrison, Todd. “The Enduring Dilemma of Overseas Contingency Operations Funding.”

Defense 360, Center for Strategic & International Studies, 11 Jan. 2017,

<defense360.csis.org/enduring-dilemma-oco-funding/.> Accessed 18 Mar. 2018.

Secondary source, suggesting the Trump administration could find the possibility of

hiding funding for base budget activity in the Overseas Contingency Operations fund

attractive. Used to demonstrate the limited oversight of the fund and how it could be

abused.

Hassan, Sharif. “Outgunned in urban centers, Taliban wages fierce fight in remote

western Afghanistan.” The Washington Post, 26 Feb. 2018. The Washington Post,

<www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/outgunned-in-urban-centers-taliban-

wage-fierce-fight-in-remote-western-afghanistan/2018/02/25/05abcd2a-1710-11e8-930c-

45838ad0d77a_story.html?utm_term=.0d4dfd0394d9.> Accessed 18 Mar. 2018. Primary

source from Belandi, Afghanistan, about inadequacies of ANA and ANP forces as well as

13
Taliban gains in Farah. Used to determine relative strength of Taliban and effectiveness

of ANDSF.

Justification for FY 2018 Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) Afghanistan Security

Forces Fund (ASFF). Office of the Secretary of Defense, May 2017. Department Of

Defense Budget Fiscal Year (FY) 2018,

<comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2018/FY18_ASFF_J-

Book.pdf.> Accessed 19 Mar. 2018. Secondary source, DOD justification for funding to

the ASFF. Used to establish the significance of ASFF as a fund in support of ANDSF

development.

“Overseas Contingency Operations: The Pentagon Slush Fund.” National Priorities

Project, Institute for Policy Studies, <www.nationalpriorities.org/campaigns/overseas-

contingency-operations/.> Accessed 18 Mar. 2018. Secondary source, analyzing the

Overseas Contingency Operations fund from the critical standpoint of ‘what role is it

accomplishing and is it worthwhile.’ Used to demonstrate the limited oversight of the

fund and how it could be abused.

Pendleton, John, compiler. Overseas Contingency Operations: OMB and DOD Should

Revise the Criteria for Determining Eligible Costs and Identify the Costs Likely to

Endure Long Term. Issue brief no. GAO-17-68, Government Accountability Office, 18

Jan. 2017. U.S. Government Accountability Office, <www.gao.gov/products/GAO-17-

68.> Accessed 18 Mar. 2018. Primary source, compiled proceedings of the GAO and

their recommendations for the DOD in regards to monitoring long-term investments in

the OCO, to which the DOD has not responded. Used to demonstrate the unwillingness of

14
the DOD to reveal the criteria for OCO or the enduring costs within the multi-billion

dollar fund.

Sopko, John F. Corruption in Conflict: Lessons from the U.S. Experience in Afghanistan.

Special Inspector General For Afghanistan Reconstruction, Sept. 2016,

<www.sigar.mil/pdf/LessonsLearned/SIGAR-16-58-LL.pdf.> Accessed 18 Mar. 2018.

Primary source of experience and research conducted by Special Inspector General for

Afghanistan Reconstruction and staff. Used to emphasize extent of corruption within

government of Afghanistan.

“Special Committee to Investigate the National Defense Program.” United States Senate,

<www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/investigations/Truman.htm.> Accessed

18 Mar. 2018. Secondary source describing the origin, rise and success of the Turman

Committee. Used to exemplify a possible step for the DOD: to host an open investigation

of US spending on National Defense.

“Remarks by President Trump on the Strategy in Afghanistan and South Asia.” The

White House, 21 Aug. 2017, <www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-

president-trump-strategy-afghanistan-south-asia/.> Accessed 18 Mar. 2018. Primary

source from the White House, of Trump’s remarks on US role in Afghanistan. Used to

determine Trump’s military priorities and plan for pursuing agenda of counterterrorism.

Woodward, Bob. Obama's Wars. Simon & Schuster, 2010. Secondary source, a

thorough history of Obama's handling of Afghanistan, Iraq wars, drawn from

intensive scrutiny, interviews, and personal experience of the author. Used

to understand Obama-era strategy towards Afghan war.

15
 Annotated Bibliography

Bearak, Max. “A new U.S. air blitz in Afghanistan isn’t stopping for winter. But will it

stop the Taliban?” The Washington Post, 16 Jan. 2018. The Washington Post,

<www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/a-new-us-air-blitz-in-afghanistan-isnt-

stopping-for-winter-but-will-it-stop-the-taliban/2018/01/16/c9bb874c-f4cd-11e7-9af7-

a50bc3300042_story.html?utm_term=.643f8949fa8e.> Accessed 18 Mar. 2018.

Secondary source, about the increased level of US air activity over Afghanistan. Used to

emphasize the uncertainty of decisive counterterrorist strategy.

Black, Diane. Building A Better America A Plan for Fiscal Responsibility. House Budget

Committee, <budget.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Building-a-Better-America-

PDF-2.pdf.> Accessed 18 Mar. 2018. Primary source, the FY2018 budget as

recommended by the House Budget Committee. Used to reference the amount of money

going to national defense, OCO fund.

Cohen, Richard. “The United States should get out of Afghanistan. Now.” The

Washington Post, 26 Feb. 2018. The Washington Post,

<www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-united-states-should-get-out-of-afghanistan-

now/2018/02/26/2194e644-1b29-11e8-9de1-

147dd2df3829_story.html?utm_term=.0084ffc90305.> Accessed 18 Mar. 2018.

Secondary source, opinion piece, indicating the futility of US involvement in Afghanistan

and demanding an end. Referenced to emphasize the dependency on US military to

uphold legitimacy of Afghan gov, to insist need of reinforcing ANDSF independent

capacity.

16
Congress. Quarterly Report to the United States Congress. By John F. Sopko, Special

Inspector General For Afghanistan Reconstruction, 30 Jan. 2018,

<www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2018-01-30qr.pdf.> Accessed 19 Mar. 2018.

Primary source of experience and research conducted by Special Inspector

General for Afghanistan Reconstruction and staff. Used to emphasize the

historical track record of counterterrorism, in terms of territory

gained/lost.

Congress. Reconstruction Update. By John F. Sopko, Special Inspector General For

Afghanistan Reconstruction, 30 Jan. 2017. Quarterly Report to the United States

Congress, <www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2017-01-30qr-section3.pdf.> Accessed

18 Mar. 2018. Primary source of experience and research conducted by Special Inspector

General For Afghanistan Reconstruction and staff. Used to emphasize the importance of

ASFF as the pen-ultimate legacy of US involvement.

Constable, Pamela. “Afghans, fearing more insurgent violence, feel abandoned by

struggling government.” The Washington Post, 11 Feb. 2018. The Washington Post,

<www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/afghans-fearing-more-insurgent-violence-

feel-abandoned-by-struggling-government/2018/02/09/29196310-0b50-11e8-998c-

96deb18cca19_story.html?utm_term=.3282ad2d9165.> Accessed 18 Mar. 2018. Primary

source, from The Washington Post’s bureau chief in Afghanistan and Pakistan, reported

from IN KABUL, interviewing firsthand local politicians, officials, and locals (if it’s not

a primary source then I don’t know what is). Describes the scene in the aftermath of

another terrorist attack, interviews about government instability and the perceived

17
inadequacy of political response.Used as an accurate account of anti-war sentiment

among Afghans from a direct interview with a local of Kabul.

---. “Taliban appeals to American people to ‘rationally’ rethink war effort.” The

Washington Post, 14 Feb. 2018. The Washington Post,

<www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/taliban-appeals-to-american-people-

torationally-rethink-war-effort/2018/02/14/eaf881fe-1187-11e8-9065-

e55346f6de81_story.html?utm_term=.f7f2b9eb64a4.> Accessed 18 Mar. 2018.

Secondary source, about Taliban appeal to American people to pull out of Afghanistan.

Illustrates desperation of Taliban for US military extraction, emphasizes minimal threat

of ANDSF relative to US military.

---. "Violence in Afghan capital continues as Taliban remain silent on peace

talks offer." The Washington Post, 3 Mar. 2018. The Washington Post,

<www.washingtonpost.com/world/nato-convoy-escapes-kabul-blast-as-taliban-remain-

silent-on-offer-to-hold-peace-talks/2018/03/02/5aba9c72-1ded-11e8-ae5a-

16e60e4605f3_story.html?utm_term=.d283ef32143e.> Accessed 19 Mar. 2018.

Secondary source, about President Ghani's plea for peace with the Taliban. Illustrates

desperation of Afghan gov. to resolve conflict with Taliban, due to the inadequacy of

ANDSF forces to protect the people.

Cordesman, Anthony H., compiler. OCO Spending and the Uncertain Cost of America’s

Wars. Center for Strategic & International Studies, 9 May 2016, <csis-

prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/160510_OCO_US_Wars2.pdf.>

Accessed 18 Mar. 2018. Secondary source analyzing the overall cost of years of buildup

18
of funding for Overseas Contingency Operations. Used to quantitatively specify, with an

accurate approximation, the billions of dollars’ worth dedicated to the OCO fund.

Corruption in Afghanistan: Recent patterns and trends. Vienna, United Nations Office on

Drugs and Crime / Islamic Republic of Afghanistan High Office of Oversight and Anti-

Corruption, Dec. 2012,

<www.unodc.org/documents/frontpage/Corruption_in_Afghanistan_FINAL.pdf.>

Accessed 18 Mar. 2018. Secondary source, reviewed for insight into ingrained nature of

corruption throughout Afghanistan.

Harrison, Todd. “The Enduring Dilemma of Overseas Contingency Operations Funding.”

Defense 360, Center for Strategic & International Studies, 11 Jan. 2017,

<defense360.csis.org/enduring-dilemma-oco-funding/.> Accessed 18 Mar. 2018.

Secondary source, suggesting the Trump administration could find the possibility of

hiding funding for base budget activity in the Overseas Contingency Operations fund

attractive. Used to demonstrate the limited oversight of the fund and how it could be

abused.

Hassan, Sharif. “Outgunned in urban centers, Taliban wages fierce fight in remote

western Afghanistan.” The Washington Post, 26 Feb. 2018. The Washington Post,

<www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/outgunned-in-urban-centers-taliban-

wage-fierce-fight-in-remote-western-afghanistan/2018/02/25/05abcd2a-1710-11e8-930c-

45838ad0d77a_story.html?utm_term=.0d4dfd0394d9.> Accessed 18 Mar. 2018. Primary

source from Belandi, Afghanistan, about inadequacies of ANA and ANP forces as well as

Taliban gains in Farah. Referenced to determine relative strength of Taliban and

effectiveness of ANDSF.

19
Justification for FY 2018 Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) Afghanistan Security

Forces Fund (ASFF). Office of the Secretary of Defense, May 2017. Department Of

Defense Budget Fiscal Year (FY) 2018,

<comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2018/FY18_ASFF_J-

Book.pdf.> Accessed 19 Mar. 2018. Secondary source, DOD justification for funding to

the ASFF. Used to establish the significance of ASFF as a fund in support of ANDSF

development.

“Overseas Contingency Operations: The Pentagon Slush Fund.” National Priorities

Project, Institute for Policy Studies, <www.nationalpriorities.org/campaigns/overseas-

contingency-operations/.> Accessed 18 Mar. 2018. Secondary source, analyzing the

Overseas Contingency Operations fund from the critical standpoint of ‘what role is it

accomplishing and is it worthwhile.’ Used to demonstrate the limited oversight of the

fund and how it could be abused.

Pendleton, John, compiler. Overseas Contingency Operations: OMB and DOD Should

Revise the Criteria for Determining Eligible Costs and Identify the Costs Likely to

Endure Long Term. Issue brief no. GAO-17-68, Government Accountability Office, 18

Jan. 2017. U.S. Government Accountability Office, <www.gao.gov/products/GAO-17-

68.> Accessed 18 Mar. 2018. Primary source, compiled proceedings of the GAO and

their recommendations for the DOD in regards to monitoring long-term investments in

the OCO, to which the DOD has not responded. Used to demonstrate the unwillingness of

the DOD to reveal the criteria for OCO or the enduring costs within the multi-billion

dollar fund.

20
Ryan, Missy, and Karen DeYoung. “Obama alters Afghanistan exit plan once more, will

leave 8,400 troops.” The Washington Post, 6 July 2016. The Washington Post,

<www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/obama-alters-afghanistan-exit-plan-

once-more/2016/07/06/466c54f2-4380-11e6-88d0-

6adee48be8bc_story.html?utm_term=.36ce8ad9079f.> Accessed 18 Mar. 2018.

Secondary source, about Obama’s de-escalation of US presence in Afghanistan.

Referenced to establish Obama-era foreign policy in regards to Afghanistan.

Sopko, John F. Corruption in Conflict: Lessons from the U.S. Experience in Afghanistan.

Special Inspector General For Afghanistan Reconstruction, Sept. 2016,

<www.sigar.mil/pdf/LessonsLearned/SIGAR-16-58-LL.pdf.> Accessed 18 Mar. 2018.

Primary source of experience and research conducted by Special Inspector General for

Afghanistan Reconstruction and staff. Used to emphasize extent of corruption within

government of Afghanistan.

“Special Committee to Investigate the National Defense Program.” United States Senate,

<www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/investigations/Truman.htm.> Accessed

18 Mar. 2018. Secondary source describing the origin, rise and success of the Turman

Committee. Used to exemplify a possible step for the DOD: to host an open investigation

of US spending on National Defense.

“Remarks by President Trump on the Strategy in Afghanistan and South Asia.” The

White House, 21 Aug. 2017, <www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-

president-trump-strategy-afghanistan-south-asia/.> Accessed 18 Mar. 2018. Primary

source from the White House, of Trump’s remarks on US role in Afghanistan. Used to

determine Trump’s military priorities and plan for pursuing agenda of counterterrorism.

21
Woodward, Bob. Obama's Wars. Simon & Schuster, 2010. Secondary source, a

thorough history of Obama's handling of Afghanistan, Iraq wars, drawn from

intensive scrutiny, interviews, and personal experience of the author. Used

to understand Obama-era strategy towards Afghan war.

22