Canon 1

Villamor Jr v. Santos

A.C. No. 9868 April 22, 2015

[formerly CBD Case No. 05-1617]

ATTY. ALFREDO L. VILLAMOR, JR., Complainant,

vs. ATTYS. E. HANS A. SANTOS and AGNES H. MARANAN, Respondents.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

For the Court's consideration is the disbarment complaint1 filed by Atty. Alfredo L. Villamor, Jr.
(complainant) against Attys. E. Hans A. Santos and Agnes H. Maranan (respondents) for committing
an unethical act in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Factual Background

In his complaint, the complainant related that the respondents initiated Civil Case No. 70251 for a
sum of money before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City (RTC Pasig) and used a deceptive ploy
to prevent the payment of the proper docket fees. Knowing that the complaint was actually one for
damages, the respondents allegedly disguised the complaint as an action for specific performance
and injunction (where the amount involved is incapable of pecuniary estimation) and deliberately
omitted to specify the damages prayed for amounting to ₱68,000,000.00 in the prayer of the
complaint in order to avoid paying the proper docket fees. According to the complainant, this
intentional omission to specify the amount of damages was specifically declared by the Court in
Manchester Development Corporation, et al. v. Court of Appeals2 as grossly unethical, and thus
constitutes a valid ground for disbarment.3

The respondents denied that they deceived the court in Civil Case No. 70251 by making it appear
that the case was an action for specific performance and injunction. They claimed that at the time
the complaint in Civil Case No. 70251 was filed on January 13, 2005, twelve (12) out of fifteen (15)
checks were not yet due and demandable, clearly indicating that the complaint was really an action
for specific performance and injunction, rather than an action for sum of money or damages.4

The respondents also claimed that the Manchester doctrine the complainant invoked was modified
less than two (2) years after it was announced.5

The Investigating Commissioner’s Findings

In his Report and Recommendation dated October 29, 2008, IBP Commissioner Wilfredo E.J.E.
Reyes found that the respondents did not commit any violation of the code of professional ethics.
According to Commissioner Reyes, there is no showing that the Clerk of Court had been deceived
when she assessed the filing fees due on the complaint in Civil Case No. 70251. A reading of the
prayer in Civil Case No. 70251 shows that there were clear and unequivocal references to
paragraph 2.27 of the complaint, which detailed the amounts of the post-dated checks. There was
also a specific reference in the prayer to the amount of ₱9.5 Million representing the value of the
checks that had become due.
Moreover, there is no showing that the Clerk of Court had made any mistake in the assessment of
the docket fees since the court never issued an order for reassessment or payment of higher docket
fees.

Commissioner Reyes recommended that the disbarment case be dismissed for lack of merit. The
IBP Board of Governors’ Findings

In a resolution6 dated December 11, 2008, the Board of Governors of the IBP resolved to adopt and
approve the Report and Recommendation of the IBP Commissioner after finding it to be fully
supported by the evidence on record, and by the applicable laws and rules.

The complainant moved to reconsider the resolution but the IBP Board of Governors denied his
motion in a resolution7 dated January 3, 2013.

On April 5, 2013, the complainant filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the IBP’s
findings. The complainant reiterated that:

(1) The respondents’ omission to state, in the prayer of the complaint, the amount claimed in the
action is an "unethical practice";

(2) The case filed by the respondents in Civil Case No. 70251 is one for the collection of a sum of
money; and

(3) The respondents violated the Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically, Canon 1, Rule
1.01; and Canon 10, Rules 10.01, 10.02, and 10.03.

The Issue

The issue in this case is whether the respondents’ omission of the specification of the amount of
damages in the prayer of the complaint is unethical, and thereby violative of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

The Court’s Ruling

After a careful study of the record, we agree with the findings and recommendations of the IBP
Commissioner and the IBP Board of Governors.

The complainant argued that the Investigating Commissioner’s Report and Recommendation is
contrary to the Court’s pronouncement in Manchester Development Corporation, et al. v. Court of
Appeals.8 The material portions of the Manchester doctrine provide:

"The Court cannot close this case without making the observation that it frowns at the practice of
counsel who filed the original complaint in this case of omitting any specification of the amount of
damages in the prayer although the amount of over Seventy-Eight Million Pesos (₱78,000,000.00) is
alleged in the body of the complaint. This is clearly intended for no other purpose than to evade the
payment of the correct filing fees if not to mislead the docket clerk in the assessment of the filing
fee."

"The Court serves warning that it will take drastic action upon a repetition of this unethical practice."
In that case, the Court observed that the lawyer’s act of omitting any specification of the amount of
damages in the prayer of the complaint, although the amount was alleged in its body, "was clearly
intended for no other purpose than to evade the payment of the correct filing fees if not to mislead
the docket clerk in the assessment of the filing fee."9It noted the lawyer’s fraudulent act of avoiding
payment of the required docket fees, and declared the said act as unethical. Following this
pronouncement, the Court required lawyers filing an original complaint to specify the amount of
damages prayed for not only in the body of the pleading, but also in the prayer. After a careful study
of the import of the Manchester doctrine and the arguments of the parties, we find as the
Investigating Commissioner did that the respondents did not commit any violation of the Code of
Professional Conduct.

We stress that the main issue in disbarment cases is whether or not a lawyer has committed serious
professional misconduct sufficient to cause disbarment. The test is whether the lawyer’s conduct
shows him or her to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor; or whether
it renders him or her unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.10 The burden of proof rests upon
the complainant; and the Court will exercise its disciplinary power only if the complainant establishes
the complaint with clearly preponderant evidence.[[11

In the present case, the respondents’ administrative liability would depend on the resolution of the
following sub-issues: (1) whether the respondents employed a deceptive ploy to avoid payment of
the docket fees; (2) whether the respondents’ failure to specify the amount of damages in the prayer
of the complaint constitutes an unethical practice; and ultimately; (3) whether the respondents
violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Liability.

We agree with the respondents that they did not deceive the court in Civil Case No. 70251 in its
assessment of the correct docket fees. Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Liability
provide:

"CANON 1 – A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE
LANDAND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND FOR LEGAL PROCESSES

xxx

Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."

On the other hand, Canon 10, Rules 10.01, 10.02 and 10.03 provide:

"CANON 10 – A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT. Rule
10.01 – A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court, nor shall he
misled by any artifice.

Rule 10.02 – A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of a paper, the
language or the argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or authority, or knowingly
cite as law a provision already rendered inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert as a fact that
which has not been proved.

Rule 10.03 – A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them to defeat the
ends of justice."

Contrary to the complainant’s allegation that the respondents had defrauded the court, the element
of "deceitful conduct" or "deceit" was not present in this case.
First, the prayer in the complaint clearly showed that there was a clear and express reference to
paragraph 2.27 of the complaint, which listed and described in detail the date of the checks, the
check numbers, and their corresponding amounts.

Second, there was also an express mention in the prayer of the amount of ₱9.5 Million representing
the value of the checks that had already become due. Thus, we find unmeritorious the
1âw phi1

complainant’s claim that the respondents intentionally and deceptively omitted to specify the amount
of damages in the prayer.

Third, despite the complainant’s move for the dismissal of Case No. 70251 on the ground that the
proper docket fees were not paid, the RTC Pasig Clerk of Court neither reassessed the filing fees,
nor required the plaintiff in that case to pay additional filing fees.

Fourth, even as of this date, the Court in Civil Case No. 70251 has not issued an order requiring the
reassessment, recomputation, and/or payment of additional docket fees, signifying that the RTC
Pasig Clerk of Court did not make any mistake in the assessment of the docket fees.

Fifth, an examination of the allegations of the complaint and the prayer in Civil Case No. 70251
shows that the case is really an action for specific performance and injunction. The complaint sought
to judicially require the complainant to deliver the actual and physical checks enumerated in
paragraph 2.27 of the complaint; to compel him to account for the checks that he may have had
already encashed; and to restrain him from negotiating, transacting, and encashing the checks in his
possession. Clearly, the complaint was an action for specific performance, rather than for a sum of
money.

Even assuming that the respondents' mere reference to paragraph 2.27 of the complaint does not
fully comply with the Manchester doctrine, this Court still finds that it is not a sufficient ground for
disbarment. As discussed above, there is no clear showing that the respondents defrauded or misled
the RTC Pasig Clerk of Court. Neither was there any proof that the respondents have maliciously
disguised their complaint as an action for specific performance and injunction so as to evade the
payment of the proper docket fees. Clearly, the complainant's allegation is merely anchored on
speculation and conjecture, and hence insufficient to justify the imposition of the administrative
penalty of disbarment.

We are likewise not convinced that the respondents violated Canon 10 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. The record of the case do not show that the respondents had committed misconduct,
dishonesty, falsehood, or had misused the rules of procedure. In the absence of such proof, the
presumption of innocence of the lawyer remains and the complaint against him must be
dismissed.12 Viewed in these lights, the disbarment complaint against the respondents Attys. E. Hans
A. Santos and Agnes H. Maranan should be dismissed for lack of merit.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the present petition for review for lack of merit.
Accordingly, we AFFIRM the IBP Governors' (1) Notice of Resolution No. XVIII-2008-602 dated
December 11, 2008; and (2) Notice of Resolution No. XX-2013-09 dated January 3, 2013.

Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

Ecreala v. Pangalangan AC No 10676

A.C. No. 10676, September 08, 2015

ATTY. ROY B. ECRAELA, Complainant, v. ATTY. IAN RAYMOND A. PANGALANGAN, Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

The Case

Before the Court is a Petition for Disbarment1 filed by Atty. Roy B. Ecraela with the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) on April 12, 2007 against Atty. Ian Raymond A.
Pangalangan for his illicit relations, chronic womanizing, abuse of authority as an educator, and "other
unscrupulous activities" which cause "undue embarrassment to the legal profession." Complainant claims
that respondent's actions involve deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct and grossly immoral conduct in
violation of the Lawyer's Oath.

The Facts

Complainant and respondent were best friends and both graduated from the University of the Philippines
(UP) College of Law in 1990, where they were part of a peer group or barkada with several of their
classmates. After passing the bar examinations and being admitted as members of the Bar in 1991, they
were both registered with the IBP Quezon City.

Respondent was formerly married to Sheila P. Jardiolin (Jardiolin) with whom he has three (3) children.
Complainant avers that while married to Jardiolin, respondent had a series of adulterous and illicit relations
with married and unmarried women between the years 1990 to 2007. These alleged illicit relations
involved:ChanRob lesvi rtua lLawl ibra ry

a. AAA,2 who is the spouse of a colleague in the UP College of Law, from 1990 to 1992, which
complainant had personal knowledge of such illicit relations;

b. BBB, sometime during the period from 1992 to 1994 or from 1994 to 1996, despite being
already married to Jardiolin;

c. CCC, despite being married to Jardiolin and while also being romantically involved with
DDD;

d. DDD, sometime during the period from 2000 to 2002, despite still being married to Jardiolin
and while still being romantically involved with CCC;

e. EEE, who is related to complainant, sometime during the period from May 2004 until the
filing of the Petition, while still being romantically involved with CCC.3

Complainant claims that respondent, with malice and without remorse, deceived CCC and DDD by
representing himself to be a bachelor, thereby convincing the two women to start a love affair with him,
when in truth, he was then still married to Jardiolin.4 c ralawred nad

Aside from these illicit affairs, complainant avers that sometime during the period of 1998 to 2000,
respondent, as a lawyer of the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC), represented the
interest of Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) in cancellation proceedings filed by MIAA against
Kendrick Development Corporation (KDC). However, despite being a public officer and a government
counsel, respondent conspired with Atty. Abraham Espejo, legal counsel of KDC, and assisted KDC in its
case, thereby sabotaging MIAA's case, and, in effect, that of the Philippine Government.3 cralawred nad

Complainant further claims that respondent even attempted to bribe then Solicitor Rolando Martin of the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) in exchange for the latter's cooperation in the dismissal of the
cancellation proceedings in favor of KDC. In return for his "earnest efforts" in assisting KDC in its case,
respondent was allegedly rewarded with a Toyota Corolla XL with plate number ULS-835 by Atty. Espejo.
The vehicle was seen several times by respondent's classmates and officemates being driven and parked by
respondent in his own home and in the OGCC premises itself.6 cralaw rednad

In connection with his involvement in the MIAA case, complainant claims that respondent was summoned in
a Senate inquiry concerning rampant faking of land titles in the Philippines, which included an investigation
of the alleged spurious land titles of KDC. In Senate Committee Final Report No. 367, the Senate Blue
Ribbon and Justice & Human Rights Committees recommended that respondent be investigated and
prosecuted by the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) for graft and corruption, as well as disbarment
or disciplinary sanction by this Court for grave misconduct or violation of the Revised Penal Code.7 cralawred nad

It was further alleged that, during the pendency of the Senate Inquiry, respondent even attempted to
conceal the evidence by requesting complainant's parents, spouses Marcelo F. Ecraela and Visitacion B.
Ecraela, to have the Toyota Corolla XL parked in their residence in Cainta, Rizal, for an indefinite period of
time. Respondent's request, however, was refused by the spouses when they learned that the vehicle was
the subject of the Senate Inquiry.8 cra lawredna d

It appears from the documents presented by complainant that the Ombudsman issued a Resolution finding
probable cause against respondent, and an Information was thereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan for
violation of Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019.9 cralaw rednad

Complainant also claims that respondent abused his authority as an educator in Manuel L. Quezon
University, San Sebastian College, College of St. Benilde, and Maryknoll College, where respondent induced
his male students to engage in "nocturnal preoccupations" and entertained the romantic gestures of his
female students in exchange for passing grades.10 cralaw rednad

The Petition was docketed as CBD Case No. 07-1973.

In an Order11 dated April 16, 2007, the Director for Bar Discipline, Honorable Rogelio A. Vinluan, required
respondent to file his verified answer.

In his undated Answer,12 respondent opted not to present any counter-statement of facts in support of his
defense. Instead, respondent simply argued that the petition suffers from procedural and substantive
infirmities, claiming that petitioner failed to substantiate the allegations or charges against him. Respondent
pointed out that Annex "J" of the Petition entitled "Arguments in Support of the Disbarment" lacked formal
requirements, and thus, should be treated as a mere scrap of paper. Respondent also asserts that the e-
mail messages attached to the petition were inadmissible for having been obtained in violation of the Rules
on Electronic Evidence.13 He claims that the identities of the owners of the e-mail messages, as well as the
allegations of illicit relations and abuse of authority, were not properly established. Respondent further
argues that the statements of complainant's witnesses were merely self-serving and deserved scant
consideration.

Complainant filed a Comment (to the Respondent's Answer),14 stating that the allegations in the complaint
were deemed admitted by reason of respondent's failure to make specific or even general denials of such in
his Answer.

In his Reply (to the Comment filed by Complainant),15 respondent simply denied all of complainant's
accusations in the petition, allegedly for "lack of knowledge and information sufficient to form a belief as to
the truth or falsity thereof."16
cralaw rednad

On August 3, 2007, 1BP-CBD Investigating Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid, Jr. (Commissioner Villadolid)
set the case for mandatory conference on August 28, 2007,17 which respondent failed to attend. It appears
that respondent filed a Motion to Cancel Hearing,18 praying for the resetting of the mandatory conference
allegedly due to a previously scheduled hearing on the same date. Respondent's motion was opposed by
complainant and eventually denied by Commissioner Villadolid in his Order19 dated August 28, 2007. In the
same order, complainant's Manifestation20 praying that subpoenas be issued to several persons who shall be
complainant's hostile witnesses was granted by Commissioner Villadolid. Accordingly, the case was
scheduled for the presentation of complainant's witnesses on September 11, 2007 and the respective
subpoenas21 were issued.

A day before the scheduled hearing, the IBP-CBD received respondent's Motion for
Reconsideration,22 praying that the Order dated August 28, 2007 be set aside and that the hearing be reset
to sometime during the third week of October. In said motion, respondent informed the IBP-CBD that he has
viral conjunctivitis or more commonly known as "sore eyes" and has been ordered by the doctor to rest for
at least one to two weeks while his eyes are being treated. Attached to his motion were photocopies of two
medical certificates, stating that a certain R. Pangalangan was suffering from sore eyes.

During the scheduled hearing on September 11, 2007, complainant opposed petitioner's motion, arguing
that based on his personal verification with the court personnel of Branch 77 of Metropolitan Trial Court
(MTC) of Parafiaque City, there was no case calendared for hearing on the date of the previous setting.
Complainant also argued that this is another ploy of respondent to delay the proceedings because he knew
that complainant worked overseas and was only in the country for a limited period of time. Finding merit in
complainant's opposition, respondent's motion was denied and complainant was allowed to present his
witnesses.23cra lawredna d

Complainant presented his witnesses, as follows: Assistant Solicitor General Karl Miranda (ASG Miranda),
Ms. Laarni Morallos (Ms. Morallos), Atty. Glenda T. Litong (Atty. Litong), Atty. Emelyn W. Corpus (Atty.
Corpus), Mr. Marcelo Ecraela, and Mrs. Visitacion Ecraela.

ASG Miranda testified on his participation in the KDC case as reflected in the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee
Report, as well as on his recollection that the Senate Report had recommended the disbarment of
respondent.

Ms. Morallos, Atty. Litong, and Atty. Corpus were presented to establish that the email messages submitted
by complainant indeed originated from respondent based on their familiarity with respondent, particularly,
the email messages which contained references to his daughter, his relationship with complainant, and
respondent's high blood pressure.

Atty. Litong further testified that respondent personally introduced DDD to her as his girlfriend and that
sometime in 2002 or 2003, she saw respondent with another girl in Glorietta despite still being married to
his wife. Atty. Litong also recalled encountering respondent at a party sometime in 2007 where he was with
CCC, whom she perceived to be respondent's girlfriend at that time. She also confirmed that respondent
had, in more than one occasion, brought with him his students during their drinking sessions and had even
one student driving for him.

For her testimony, Atty. Corpus corroborated Atty. Litong's statements about respondent's preoccupations
with his students. Atty. Corpus also testified that DDD called her at her office sometime in 2000 or 2001 to
inform her that the latter had broken up with respondent upon learning that he was actually married. Atty.
Corpus surmised based on her telephone conversation with DDD that respondent did not tell the latter his
actual marital status. Aside from this, Atty. Corpus also recalled that during complainant's farewell party in
February 2007, respondent introduced CCC as his girlfriend of six years, or since the year 2000 or 2001.

To expedite the hearing, the spouses Ecraela were made to affirm the execution of their affidavits since their
testimonies were based on the affidavits that complainant included in his petition.

Once complainant's presentation of witnesses was concluded, the mandatory conference/hearing was
terminated and the parties were directed to submit their respective verified position papers with supporting
documentary evidence within thirty (30) days from receipt of the transcript of stenographic notes. After
which, the case was considered submitted for report and recommendation.

On September 18, 2007, the IBP-CBD received complainant's Manifestation (with Comments),24pertaining to
respondent's Motion to Cancel Hearing and praying for the IBP-CBD to formally request for records from
Branch 77 of MTC, Paranaque City to verify respondent's claim that he had a hearing in said court during the
first scheduled mandatory conference. On the same date, the IBP-CBD also received complainant's
Compliance (with Comments),25 submitting the certified photo copies of the Senate Committee Final Report
cralaw red

No. 367, the Resolution dated January 22, 2001 of the Ombudsman, and the Information dated June 30,
2003 filed with the Sandiganbayan.
On January 8, 2008, the IBP-CBD received complainant's Position Paper.26 Complainant thereafter filed two
Manifestations,27 asserting that respondent is already barred from submitting his verified position paper and
that any decision or judgment would have to be based solely on complainant's Verified Position Paper.28 cralaw rednad

Findings of the IBP Investigating Commissioner

After the case was submitted for report and recommendation, Commissioner Villadolid rendered a
Report,29 finding that there is more than sufficient evidence establishing respondent's gross misconduct
affecting his standing and moral character as an officer of the court and member of the bar.

On the issue of respondent's alleged violations of the Revised Penal Code30 and/or RA 301931 as reflected in
the Senate Report, the Ombudsman's Resolution, and the Information, Commissioner Villadolid found that
despite respondent's denials, complainant was able to present certified true copies of the relevant
documents which support his allegations in the petition.

As for the alleged illicit affairs of respondent, Commissioner Villadolid discredited complainant's assertion
that respondent is guilty of gross immoral conduct for his alleged adulterous relations with EEE. Based on
the Report, complainant was not able to discharge the burden of proving the authenticity of the email
messages pertaining to this adulterous affair; thus, they were deemed inadmissible. However, Commissioner
Villadolid found merit in complainant's claim that respondent committed grossly immoral conduct by having
illicit relations with DDD, CCC, and BBB, all while still married to Jardiolin, to wit:
ChanRoble svi rtual Lawli bra ry

4.21 In engaging in such illicit relationships, Respondent disregarded the sanctity of marriage and the
marital vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws, which as a lawyer he swore under oath
to protect. The 1987 Constitution, specifically Article XV. Section 2 thereof clearly provides that marriage, an
inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the state.

xxxx

4.23 Moreover. Respondent violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which provides that "a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral
or deceitful conduct" nor shall a lawyer "engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law. nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession".32

Accordingly, the IBP-CBD reached and gave the following conclusion and recommendation: ChanRoblesvi rtua lLawl ibra ry

V. Conclusion/Recommendations

5.1 In view of the foregoing, and considering that there is more than sufficient evidence establishing
Respondent's gross misconduct affecting his standing and moral character as an officer of the court and
member of the bar. this Commissioner respectfully recommends that Respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for a period of two (2) years with a STERN WARNING that Respondent should reform his
conduct in a manner consistent with the norms prescribed by the Canons of Professional Responsibility."33

Findings of the IBP Board of Governors

On March 20, 2013, the Board of Governors of the IBP issued a Resolution34 adopting and approving, with
modification, the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner Villadolid. As modified, the Board of
Governors disbarred respondent, thus: ChanRoblesvirt ual Lawlib rary

RESOLUTION NO. XX-2013-280

CBD Case No. 07-1973
Atty. Roy B. Ecraela vs.
Atty. Ian Raymundo A. Pangalangan
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED, with
modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled
case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A", and finding the recommendation fully supported by
the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules and considering Respondent's violations of Article
XV of the 1987 Constitution, Section 2, Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, and the Lawyer's Oath, Atty. Ian Raymundo A. Pangalangan is
hereby DISBARRED and his name Ordered Stricken Off from the Roll of Attorneys.

On July 9, 2013, the IBP received respondent's Motion for Reconsideration35 dated July 3, 2013, to which
complainant was required to submit his comment.36 cralawred nad

For his part, complainant filed a Motion for Reconsideration (of the IBP-CBD Report dated June 28,
2012)37 dated August 17, 2013. Similarly, respondent was required to comment on complainant's motion in
an Order38 dated August 27, 2013. On the same date, complainant filed his Comment and/or Opposition (to
the Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration).39 c ralaw rednad

Subsequently, respondent filed a Comment on/Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration with
Leave40 dated September 12, 2013, as well as a Reply to the Comment and/or Opposition41 dated
September 20, 2013.

On May 3, 2014, the Board of Governors of the IBP passed a resolution denying respondent's motion for
reconsideration.42 Thereafter, the Director for Bar Discipline forwarded the records of this case to this Court
on November 11, 2014.43 cralaw rednad

The Issue

The issue in this case is whether the respondent committed gross immoral conduct, which would warrant his
disbarment.

The Court's Ruling

After a thorough examination of the records, the Court agrees with the Board of Governors' resolution
finding that Atty. Pangalangan's grossly immoral conduct was fully supported by the evidences offered.

The Code of Professional Responsibility provides: ChanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry

CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

xxxx

CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.

Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor
shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.

The practice of law is a privilege given to those who possess and continue to possess the legal qualifications
for the profession.44 Good moral character is not only required for admission to the Bar, but must also be
retained in order to maintain one's good standing in this exclusive and honored fraternity.45

We are not unmindful of the serious consequences of disbarment or suspension proceedings against a
member of the Bar. Thus, the Court has consistently held that clearly preponderant evidence is necessary to
justify the imposition of administrative penalties on a member of the Bar. This, We explained in Aba v. De
Guzman, Jr.: ChanRoblesvirt ual Lawlib rary

Preponderance of evidence means that the evidence adduced by one side is, as a whole, superior to or has
greater weight than that of the other. It means evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of
belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto. Under Section 1 of Rule 133. in determining whether
or not there is preponderance of evidence, the court may consider the following: (a) all the facts and
circumstances of the case; (b) the witnesses' manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and
opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they testify,
the probability or improbability of their testimony; (c) the witnesses' interest or want of interest, and also
their personal credibility so far as the same may ultimately appear in the trial; and (d) the number of
witnesses, although it docs not mean that preponderance is necessarily with the greater number.

When the evidence of the parties are evenly balanced or there is doubt on which side the evidence
preponderates, the decision should be against the party with the burden of proof according to the equipoise
doctrine.

To summarize, the Court has consistently held that in suspension or disbarment proceedings against
lawyers, the lawyer enjoys the presumption of innocence, and the burden of proof rests upon the
complainant to prove the allegations in his complaint. The evidence required in suspension or disbarment
proceedings is preponderance of evidence. In case the evidence of the parties are equally balanced, the
equipoise doctrine mandates a decision in favor of the respondent.46

The IBP-CBD Report sufficiently showed by preponderant evidence the grounds by which respondent has
been found committing gross immorality in the conduct of his personal affairs.

This Court has, in numerous occasions, revoked the licenses of lawyers who were proven to have not only
failed to retain good moral character in their professional and personal lives, but have also made a mockery
of the institution of marriage by maintaining illicit affairs.

In Guevarra v. Eala, respondent Atty. Eala was disbarred because he showed disrespect for an institution
held sacred by the law, by having an extramarital affair with the wife of the complainant. In doing so, he
betrayed his unfitness to be a lawyer.47 cralawre dnad

A year later, Atty. Arnobit met the same fate as Atty. Eala when the Court revoked his privilege to practice
law after his philandering ways was proven by preponderant evidence in Arnobit v. Arnobit.48 We ruled: ChanRob lesvi rtua lLawl ibra ry

As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be seen to
be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the
community. A member of the bar and an officer of the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous
relationships or keeping a mistress but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by
creating the impression that he is flouting those moral standards.

xxxx

The fact that respondent's philandering ways are far removed from the exercise of his profession would not
save the day for him. For a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct which, albeit
unrelated to the actual practice of his profession, would show him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of
the privileges with which his license and the law invest him. To borrow from Orbe v. Adaza, "[t]he grounds
expressed in Section 27, Rule 138. of the Rules of Court are not limitative and are broad enough to. cover
any misconduct x x x of a lawyer in his professional or private capacity." To reiterate, possession of good
moral character is not only a condition precedent to the practice of law, but a continuing qualification for all
members of the bar.49

Similarly, in the more recent case of Dr. Elmar O. Perez v. Atty. Tristan Catindig,50 the Court disbarred
respondent Atty. Catindig for blatantly and purposefully disregarding our laws on marriage by resorting to
various legal strategies to render a facade of validity to his invalid second marriage, despite the existence of
his first marriage. We said:ChanRoble s virtua lLawl ibra ry

The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such includes conduct
that outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the community, conduct for instance, which makes
'a mockery of the inviolable social institution of marriage.'" In various cases, the Court has held that
disbarment is warranted when a lawyer abandons his lawful wife and maintains an illicit
relationship with another woman who has borne him a child. 51 (emphasis ours.)

In the present case, complainant alleged that respondent carried on several adulterous and illicit relations
with both married and unmarried women between the years 1990 to 2007, including complainant's own
wife. Through documentary evidences in the form of email messages, as well as the corroborating
testimonies of the witnesses presented, complainant was able to establish respondent's illicit relations with
DDD and CCC by preponderant evidence.
Respondent's main defense against the alleged illicit relations was that the same were not sufficiently
established. In his answer, respondent simply argued that complainant's petition contains self-serving
averments not supported by evidence. Respondent did not specifically deny complainant's allegations and,
instead, questioned the admissibility of the supporting documents. Due to respondent's own failure to attend
the hearings and even submit his own position paper, the existence of respondent's illicit relations with DDD
and CCC remain uncontroverted.

The IBP-CBD Report was correct when it found that respondent violated Article XV, Section 2 of the 1987
Constitution, to wit:
ChanRoblesvirtual Lawlib rary

4.21 In engaging in such illicit relationships, Respondent disregarded the sanctity of marriage and the
marital vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws, which as a lawyer he swore under oath
to protect. The 1987 Constitution, specifically Article XV, Section 2 thereof clearly provides that marriage,
an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the
State.52 (emphasis in the original.)

Aside from respondent's illicit relations, We agree with Commissioner Villadolid's findings that respondent
violated Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as well as Rule 10.01 and Rule 10.03 thereof.

The Code of Professional Responsibility provides: ChanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry

CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.

Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he
mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.

xxx

Rule 10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them to defeat the ends of
justice.

In the Petition, complainant alleged that respondent was the subject of a Senate Inquiry and had a pending
case for graft and corruption against him with the Sandiganbayan, to wit: ChanRoblesvirtual Lawlib rary

13. Respondent has been recommended by the Senate Blue Ribbon and Justice & Human Rights Committees
to be investigated and prosecuted by the Ombudsman, the same as contained in their "Committee Final
Report No. 367" herein attached as Annex D;

14. Respondent has also been recommended by the above- mentioned committees to suffer the penalty of
disbarment, among others, as evidenced by the herein attached Annex D-1, and it is believed that a case for
graft and corruption against him is still pending with the Sandiganbayan.''53

Instead of refuting these claims, respondent merely pointed out in his Answer that complainant failed to
adduce additional evidence that a case had been filed against him, and that complainant's statements were
merely self-serving averments not substantiated by any evidence. In his Reply, respondent even specifically
denied complainant's averments for "lack of knowledge and information sufficient to form a belief as to the
truth or falsity thereof."

We agree with Commissioner Villadolid's findings in the IBP-CBD Report, viz: ChanRoblesvi rtua lLawl ibra ry

4.8 It (sic) is thus indisputable that Respondent's pretensions in his Answer were made in attempt to
mislead this Commission. Respondent could have easily admitted or denied said allegations or explained the
same, as he (sic) clearly had knowledge thereof, however, he (sic) chose to take advantage of Complainant"
s position of being not present in the country and not being able to acquire the necessary documents, skirt
the issue, and mislead the Commission. In doing so, he has violated Canon 10 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which provides that "a lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court" as
well as Rule 10.01 and Rule 10.03 thereof which states that "a lawyer should do no falsehood nor
consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the court to be misled by any
artifice" and that "a lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them to defeat
the ends of justice."

4.9 Courts [as well as this Commission] are entitled to expect only complete candor and honesty from the
lawyers appearing and pleading before them. Respondent, through his actuations, has been lacking in the
candor required of him not only as a member of the Bar but also as an officer of the Court. In view of the
foregoing, the Commission finds that Respondent has violated Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, for which he should be disciplined.54 (emphasis in the original.)

In denying complainant's allegations, respondent had no other intention but to mislead the IBP, which
intention was more so established because complainant was able to submit supporting documents in the
form of certified true copies of the Senate Report, the Ombudsman's Resolution, and Information.

We also agree with Commissioner Villadolid's finding that respondent violated the lawyer's oath which he
took before admission to the Bar, which states: ChanRoblesvirtual Lawlib ra ry

I,__________ , do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; [will
support its Constitution and obey laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein;
1 will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any court; I will not wittingly nor willingly promote or sue
any groundless, false or unlawful suit, or give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or
malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all
good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary obligations
without any menial reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God.

In all, Atty. Pangalangan displayed deplorable arrogance by making a mockery out of the institution of
marriage, and taking advantage of his legal skills by attacking the Petition through technicalities and
refusing to participate in the proceedings. His actions showed that he lacked the degree of morality required
of him as a member of the bar, thus warranting the penalty of disbarment.

WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing, the Court resolves to ADOPT the resolution of the IBP
Board of Governors approving and adopting, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner. Accordingly, respondent Atty. Ian Raymond A. Pangalangan is
found GUILTY of gross immorality and of violating Section 2 of Article XV of the 1987 Constitution, Canon 1
and Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03, and Rule 10.01 of Canon 10 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and the Lawyer's Oath and is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law.

Let a copy of this Decision be entered into the personal records of Atty. Ian Raymond A. Pangalangan with
the Office of the Bar Confidant and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Likewise,
let copies of this Decision be furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and circulated
by the Court Administrator to all the courts in the country for their information and guidance.

This Decision takes effect immediately.

SO ORDERED.

Perez v. Catindig AC 5816

A.C. No. 5816, March 10, 2015

DR. ELMAR O. PEREZ, Complainant, v. ATTY. TRISTAN A. CATINDIG AND ATTY. KAREN E.
BAYDO, Respondents.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:
Before the Court is an administrative complaint1 for disbarment filed by Dr. Elmar O. Perez (Dr. Perez) with
the Office of the Bar Confidant on August 27, 2002 against Atty. Tristan A. Catindig (Atty. Catindig) and
Atty. Karen E. Baydo (Atty. Baydo) (respondents) for gross immorality and violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

The Facts

In her complaint, Dr. Perez alleged that she and Atty. Catindig had been friends since the mid-1960’s when
they were both students at the University of the Philippines, but they lost touch after their graduation.
Sometime in 1983, the paths of Atty. Catindig and Dr. Perez again crossed. It was at that time that Atty.
Catindig started to court Dr. Perez.2 chan roble svirtual lawlib rary

Atty. Catindig admitted to Dr. Perez that he was already wed to Lily Corazon Gomez (Gomez), having
married the latter on May 18, 1968 at the Central Methodist Church in Ermita, Manila, which was followed by
a Catholic wedding at the Shrine of Our Lady of Lourdes in Quezon City.3 Atty. Catindig however claimed
that he only married Gomez because he got her pregnant; that he was afraid that Gomez would make a
scandal out of her pregnancy should he refuse to marry her, which could have jeopardized his scholarship in
the Harvard Law School.4 chanroblesvi rt uallawl ibra ry

Atty. Catindig told Dr. Perez that he was in the process of obtaining a divorce in a foreign country to dissolve
his marriage to Gomez, and that he would eventually marry her once the divorce had been decreed.
Consequently, sometime in 1984, Atty. Catindig and Gomez obtained a divorce decree from the Dominican
Republic. Dr. Perez claimed that Atty. Catindig assured her that the said divorce decree was lawful and valid
and that there was no longer any impediment to their marriage.5 chan roble svirtuallaw lib rary

Thus, on July 14, 1984, Atty. Catindig married Dr. Perez in the State of Virginia in the United States of
America (USA). Their union was blessed with a child whom they named Tristan Jegar Josef Frederic.6 chan roble svirtuallaw lib rary

Years later, Dr. Perez came to know that her marriage to Atty. Catindig is a nullity since the divorce decree
that was obtained from the Dominican Republic by the latter and Gomez is not recognized by Philippine
laws. When she confronted Atty. Catindig about it, the latter allegedly assured Dr. Perez that he would
legalize their union once he obtains a declaration of nullity of his marriage to Gomez under the laws of the
Philippines. He also promised to legally adopt their son.7 c hanrob lesvi rtua llawlib ra ry

Sometime in 1997, Dr. Perez reminded Atty. Catindig of his promise to legalize their union by filing a
petition to nullify his marriage to Gomez. Atty. Catindig told her that he would still have to get the consent
of Gomez to the said petition.8 chanrob lesvi rtua llawli bra ry

Sometime in 2001, Dr. Perez alleged that she received an anonymous letter9 in the mail informing her of
Atty. Catindig’s scandalous affair with Atty. Baydo, and that sometime later, she came upon a love
letter10 written and signed by Atty. Catindig for Atty. Baydo dated April 25, 2001. In the said letter, Atty.
Catindig professed his love to Atty. Baydo, promising to marry her once his “impediment is removed.”
Apparently, five months into their relationship, Atty. Baydo requested Atty. Catindig to put a halt to their
affair until such time that he is able to obtain the annulment of his marriage. On August 13, 2001, Atty.
Catindig filed a petition to declare the nullity of his marriage to Gomez.11 chan roble svirtual lawlib rary

On October 31, 2001, Atty. Catindig abandoned Dr. Perez and their son; he moved to an upscale
condominium in Salcedo Village, Makati City where Atty. Baydo was frequently seen.12 chan roble svirtuallaw lib rary

In a Resolution13 dated October 9, 2002, the Court directed the respondents to file their respective
comments, which they separately did on November 25, 2002.14 chan roblesv irtuallaw lib rary

Atty. Catindig, in his Comment,15 admitted that he married Gomez on May 18, 1968. He claimed, however,
that immediately after the wedding, Gomez showed signs that she was incapable of complying with her
marital obligations, as she had serious intimacy problems; and that while their union was blessed with four
children, their relationship simply deteriorated.

Eventually, their irreconcilable differences led to their de facto separation in 1984. They then consulted Atty.
Wilhelmina Joven (Atty. Joven), a mutual friend, on how the agreement to separate and live apart could be
implemented. Atty. Joven suggested that the couple adopt a property regime of complete separation of
property. She likewise advised the couple to obtain a divorce decree from the Dominican Republic for
whatever value it may have and comfort it may provide them.16 chanro blesvi rt uallawli bra ry
Thus, on April 27, 1984, Atty. Catindig and Gomez each executed a Special Power of Attorney addressed to
a Judge of the First Civil Court of San Cristobal, Dominican Republic, appointing an attorney-in-fact to
institute a divorce action under its laws. Atty. Catindig likewise admitted that a divorce by mutual consent
was ratified by the Dominican Republic court on June 12, 1984. Further, Atty. Catindig and Gomez filed a
Joint Petition for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch
133, which was granted on June 23, 1984.17 chanrob lesvi rtua llawlib ra ry

Atty. Catindig claimed that Dr. Perez knew of the foregoing, including the fact that the divorce decreed by
the Dominican Republic court does not have any effect in the Philippines. Notwithstanding that she knew
that the marriage of Atty. Catindig and Gomez still subsisted, Dr. Perez demanded that Atty. Catindig marry
her. Thus, Atty. Catindig married Dr. Perez in July 1984 in the USA.18 chanroble svirtual lawlib rary

Atty. Catindig claimed that Dr. Perez knew that their marriage was not valid since his previous marriage to
Gomez was still subsisting, and that he only married Dr. Perez because he loved her and that he was afraid
of losing her if he did not. He merely desired to lend a modicum of legitimacy to their relationship.19 cha nrob lesvi rtua llawli bra ry

Atty. Catindig claimed that his relationship with Dr. Perez turned sour. Eventually, he left their home in
October 2001 to prevent any acrimony from developing.20 chan roble svirtuallaw lib rary

He denied that Atty. Baydo was the reason that he left Dr. Perez, claiming that his relationship with Dr.
Perez started to fall apart as early as 1997. He asserted that Atty. Baydo joined his law firm only in
September 1999; and that while he was attracted to her, Atty. Baydo did not reciprocate and in fact rejected
him. He likewise pointed out that Atty. Baydo resigned from his firm in January 2001.21 chan roblesv irt uallawl ibra ry

For her part, Atty. Baydo denied that she had an affair with Atty. Catindig. She claimed that Atty. Catindig
began courting her while she was employed in his firm. She however rejected Atty. Catindig’s romantic
overtures; she told him that she could not reciprocate his feelings since he was married and that he was too
old for her. She said that despite being turned down, Atty. Catindig still pursued her, which was the reason
why she resigned from his law firm.22 chanro blesvi rt uallawl ibra ry

On January 29, 2003, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation within 90 days from notice.23 chan roblesv irt uallawl ibra ry

On June 2, 2003, the IBP’s Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) issued an Order24 setting the mandatory
conference of the administrative case on July 4, 2003, which was later reset to August 29, 2003. During the
conference, the parties manifested that they were already submitting the case for resolution based on the
pleadings already submitted. Thereupon, the IBP-CBD directed the parties to submit their respective position
papers within 10 days from notice. Respondents Atty. Catindig and Atty. Baydo filed their position papers on
October 17, 200325 and October 20, 2003,26 respectively. Dr. Perez filed her position paper27 on October 24,
2003.

Findings of the IBP Investigating Commissioner

On May 6, 2011, after due proceedings, the Investigating Commissioner of the IBP-CBD issued a Report and
Recommendation,28 which recommended the disbarment of Atty. Catindig for gross immorality, violation of
Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The Investigating
Commissioner pointed out that Atty. Catindig’s act of marrying Dr. Perez despite knowing fully well that his
previous marriage to Gomez still subsisted was a grossly immoral and illegal conduct, which warrants the
ultimate penalty of disbarment. The Investigating Commissioner further opined that: chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry

In this case, the undisputed facts gathered from the evidence and the admissions of Atty. Catindig
established a pattern of grossly immoral conduct that warrants fustigation and his disbarment. His conduct
was not only corrupt or unprincipled; it was reprehensible to the highest degree.

There is no dichotomy of morality. A lawyer and a professor of law, both in his official and personal conduct,
must display exemplary behavior. Respondent’s bigamous marriage and his proclivity for extramarital
adventurism have definitely caused damage to the legal and teaching professions. How can he hold his head
up high and expect his students, his peers and the community to look up to him as a model worthy of
emulation when he failed to follow the tenets of morality? In contracting a second marriage notwithstanding
knowing fully well that he has a prior valid subsisting marriage, Atty. Catindig has made a mockery of an
otherwise inviolable institution, a serious outrage to the generally accepted moral standards of the
community.29
On the other hand, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that the charge against Atty. Baydo be
dismissed for dearth of evidence; Dr. Perez failed to present clear and preponderant evidence in support of
the alleged affair between the respondents.

Findings of the IBP Board of Governors

On December 10, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors issued a Resolution,30 which adopted and approved the
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.

Atty. Catindig sought a reconsideration31 of the December 10, 2011 Resolution of the IBP Board of
Governors, claiming that the Investigating Commissioner erred in relying solely on Dr. Perez’s
uncorroborated allegations. He pointed out that, under Section 1 of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, a
complaint for disbarment must be supported by affidavits of persons having knowledge of the facts therein
alleged and/or by such documents as may substantiate said facts. He said that despite the absence of any
corroborating testimony, the Investigating Commissioner gave credence to Dr. Perez’ testimony.

He also claimed that he had absolutely no intention of committing any felony; that he never concealed the
status of his marriage from anyone. In fact, Atty. Catindig asserted that he had always been transparent
with both Gomez and Dr. Perez.

The IBP Board of Governors, in its Resolution32 dated December 29, 2012, denied Atty. Catindig’s motion for
reconsideration.

The Issue

The issue in this case is whether the respondents committed gross immorality, which would warrant their
disbarment.

Ruling of the Court

After a thorough perusal of the respective allegations of the parties and the circumstances of this case, the
Court agrees with the findings and recommendations of the Investigating Commissioner and the IBP Board
of Governors.

The Code of Professional Responsibility provides: chanRob lesvi rtua lLawl ibra ry

Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Canon 7 – A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support the
activities of the Integrated Bar.

Rule 7.03 – A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor
should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.cral awred

In Arnobit v. Atty. Arnobit,33 the Court held:

chanRoblesv irt ual Lawlib rary

[T]he requirement of good moral character is of much greater import, as far as the general public is
concerned, than the possession of legal learning. Good moral character is not only a condition precedent for
admission to the legal profession, but it must also remain intact in order to maintain one’s good standing in
that exclusive and honored fraternity. Good moral character is more than just the absence of bad character.
Such character expresses itself in the will to do the unpleasant thing if it is right and the resolve not to do
the pleasant thing if it is wrong. This must be so because “vast interests are committed to his care; he is the
recipient of unbounded trust and confidence; he deals with his client’s property, reputation, his life, his
all.”34(Citation omitted)
In this regard, Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that a lawyer may be removed or
suspended from the practice of law, inter alia, for grossly immoral conduct. Thus: chanRoblesvirt ual Lawlib rary

Sec. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. — A member of the bar
may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before the admission to practice, or for a wilfull disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for
corruptly or willful appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of
soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice. (Emphasis ours)
“A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct showing any fault or deficiency in his moral
character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.”35 Immoral conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or
shameless, and that show a moral indifference to the opinion of the upright and respectable members of the
community. Immoral conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled
as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed under such scandalous or revolting
circumstances as to shock the community’s sense of decency. The Court makes these distinctions, as the
supreme penalty of disbarment arising from conduct requires grossly immoral, not simply immoral,
conduct.36chanrob lesvi rtual lawlib rary

Contracting a marriage during the subsistence of a previous one amounts to a grossly immoral
conduct.

The facts gathered from the evidence adduced by the parties and, ironically, from Atty. Catindig’s own
admission, indeed establish a pattern of conduct that is grossly immoral; it is not only corrupt and
unprincipled, but reprehensible to a high degree.

Atty. Catindig was validly married to Gomez twice – a wedding in the Central Methodist Church in 1968,
which was then followed by a Catholic wedding. In 1983, Atty. Catindig started pursuing Dr. Perez when
their paths crossed again. Curiously, 15 years into his first marriage and four children after, Atty. Catindig
claimed that his first marriage was then already falling apart due to Gomez’ serious intimacy problems.

A year after pursuing Dr. Perez, Atty. Catindig had a de facto separation from Gomez, dissolved their
conjugal partnership of gains, obtained a divorce decree from a court in the Dominican Republic, and
married Dr. Perez in the USA all in the same year. Atty. Catindig was so enchanted with Dr. Perez at that
time that he moved heaven and earth just so he could marry her right away – a marriage that has at least a
semblance of legality.

From his own admission, Atty. Catindig knew that the divorce decree he obtained from the court in the
Dominican Republic was not recognized in our jurisdiction as he and Gomez were both Filipino citizens at
that time. He knew that he was still validly married to Gomez; that he cannot marry anew unless his
previous marriage be properly declared a nullity. Otherwise, his subsequent marriage would be void. This
notwithstanding, he still married Dr. Perez. The foregoing circumstances seriously taint Atty. Catindig’s
sense of social propriety and moral values. It is a blatant and purposeful disregard of our laws on marriage.

It has also not escaped the attention of the Court that Atty. Catindig married Dr. Perez in the USA.
Considering that Atty. Catindig knew that his previous marriage remained valid, the logical conclusion is that
he wanted to marry Dr. Perez in the USA for the added security of avoiding any charge of bigamy by
entering into the subsequent marriage outside Philippine jurisdiction.

Moreover, assuming arguendo that Atty. Catindig’s claim is true, it matters not that Dr. Perez knew that
their marriage is a nullity. The fact still remains that he resorted to various legal strategies in order to
render a façade of validity to his otherwise invalid marriage to Dr. Perez. Such act is, at the very least, so
unprincipled that it is reprehensible to the highest degree.

Further, after 17 years of cohabiting with Dr. Perez, and despite the various legal actions he resorted to in
order to give their union a semblance of validity, Atty. Catindig left her and their son. It was only at that
time that he finally decided to properly seek the nullity of his first marriage to Gomez. Apparently, he was
then already entranced with the much younger Atty. Baydo, an associate lawyer employed by his firm.

While the fact that Atty. Catindig decided to separate from Dr. Perez to pursue Atty. Baydo, in itself, cannot
be considered a grossly immoral conduct, such fact forms part of the pattern showing his propensity towards
immoral conduct. Lest it be misunderstood, the Court’s finding of gross immoral conduct is hinged not on
Atty. Catindig’s desertion of Dr. Perez, but on his contracting of a subsequent marriage during the
subsistence of his previous marriage to Gomez.

“The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such includes conduct
that outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the community, conduct for instance, which makes
‘a mockery of the inviolable social institution of marriage.’”37 In various cases, the Court has held that
disbarment is warranted when a lawyer abandons his lawful wife and maintains an illicit relationship with
another woman who has borne him a child.38 chan roble svirtuallaw lib rary
Atty. Catindig’s subsequent marriage during the subsistence of his previous one definitely manifests a
deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and
affirmed by our laws. By his own admission, Atty. Catindig made a mockery out of the institution of
marriage, taking advantage of his legal skills in the process. He exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of
morality required of him as a member of the bar, which thus warrant the penalty of disbarment.

The Court is not unmindful of the rule that the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and
only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an
officer of the Court and as a member of the bar. Where a lesser penalty, such as temporary suspension,
could accomplish the end desired, disbarment should never be decreed. Nevertheless, in this case, the
seriousness of the offense compels the Court to wield its power to disbar, as it appears to be the most
appropriate penalty.

Atty. Catindig’s claim that Dr. Perez’s allegations against him are not credible since they are uncorroborated
and not supported by affidavits contrary to Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, deserves scant
consideration. Verily, Atty. Catindig himself admitted in his pleadings that he indeed married Dr. Perez in
1984 while his previous marriage with Gomez still subsisted. Indubitably, such admission provides ample
basis for the Court to render disciplinary sanction against him.

There is insufficient evidence to prove the affair between the respondents.

The Court likewise agrees with the Investigating Commissioner that there is a dearth of evidence to prove
the claimed amorous relationship between the respondents. As it is, the evidence that was presented by Dr.
Perez to prove her claim was mere allegation, an anonymous letter informing her that the respondents were
indeed having an affair and the purported love letter to Atty. Baydo that was signed by Atty. Catindig.

The Court has consistently held that in suspension or disbarment proceedings against lawyers, the lawyer
enjoys the presumption of innocence, and the burden of proof rests upon the complainant to prove the
allegations in his complaint. The evidence required in suspension or disbarment proceedings is
preponderance of evidence.39 chan roblesv irt uallawl ibrary

The presentation of the anonymous letter that was received by Dr. Perez only proves that the latter indeed
received a letter informing her of the alleged relations between the respondents; it does not prove the
veracity of the allegations therein. Similarly, the supposed love letter, if at all, only proves that Atty.
Catindig wrote Atty. Baydo a letter professing his love for her. It does not prove that Atty. Baydo is indeed
in a relationship with Atty. Catindig.

WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the Court resolves to ADOPT the
recommendations of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Atty. Tristan
A. Catindig is found GUILTY of gross immorality and of violating the Lawyer’s Oath and Rule 1.01, Canon 7
and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is hereby DISBARREDfrom the practice of law.

Let a copy of this Decision be entered into the records of Atty. Tristan A. Catindig in the Office of the Bar
Confidant and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Likewise, copies of this
Decision shall be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and circulated by the Court Administrator
to all appellate and trial courts.

The charge of gross immorality against Atty. Karen E. Baydo is hereby DISMISSED for lack of evidence.

This Decision takes effect immediately.

SO ORDERED.

CANAON 2
Ulep v. Legal Clinic 223 SCRA 378

Bar Matter No. 553 June 17, 1993

MAURICIO C. ULEP, petitioner,
vs.
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC., respondent.

R E SO L U T I O N

REGALADO, J.:

Petitioner prays this Court "to order the respondent to cease and desist from issuing advertisements
similar to or of the same tenor as that of annexes "A" and "B" (of said petition) and to perpetually
prohibit persons or entities from making advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the law
profession other than those allowed by law."

The advertisements complained of by herein petitioner are as follows:

Annex A

SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.

THE Please call: 521-0767 LEGAL 5217232, 5222041 CLINIC, INC. 8:30 am— 6:00 pm 7-Flr.
Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Mla.

Annex B

GUAM DIVORCE.

DON PARKINSON

an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal Clinic beginning
Monday to Friday during office hours.

Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non-quota Res. &
Special Retiree's Visa. Declaration of Absence. Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption.
Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.

THE 7F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave., LEGAL Ermita, Manila nr. US Embassy CLINIC, INC.1 Tel. 521-
7232; 521-7251; 522-2041; 521-0767

It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above reproduced are champterous,
unethical, demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the confidence of the community in
the integrity of the members of the bar and that, as a member of the legal profession, he is ashamed
and offended by the said advertisements, hence the reliefs sought in his petition as hereinbefore
quoted.

In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said advertisement at its
instance, but claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of "legal support
services" through paralegals with the use of modern computers and electronic machines.
Respondent further argues that assuming that the services advertised are legal services, the act of
advertising these services should be allowed supposedly
in the light of the case of John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State Bar of Arizona,2 reportedly
decided by the United States Supreme Court on June 7, 1977.

Considering the critical implications on the legal profession of the issues raised herein, we required
the (1) Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), (2) Philippine Bar Association (PBA), (3) Philippine
Lawyers' Association (PLA), (4) U.P. Womens Lawyers' Circle (WILOCI), (5) Women Lawyers
Association of the Philippines (WLAP), and (6) Federacion International de Abogadas (FIDA) to
submit their respective position papers on the controversy and, thereafter, their memoranda. 3 The
said bar associations readily responded and extended their valuable services and cooperation of
which this Court takes note with appreciation and gratitude.

The main issues posed for resolution before the Court are whether or not the services offered by
respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., as advertised by it constitutes practice of law and, in either case,
whether the same can properly be the subject of the advertisements herein complained of.

Before proceeding with an in-depth analysis of the merits of this case, we deem it proper and
enlightening to present hereunder excerpts from the respective position papers adopted by the
aforementioned bar associations and the memoranda submitted by them on the issues involved in
this bar matter.

1. Integrated Bar of the Philippines:

xxx xxx xxx

Notwithstanding the subtle manner by which respondent endeavored to distinguish the two
terms, i.e., "legal support services" vis-a-vis "legal services", common sense would readily dictate
that the same are essentially without substantial distinction. For who could deny that document
search, evidence gathering, assistance to layman in need of basic institutional services from
government or non-government agencies like birth, marriage, property, or business registration,
obtaining documents like clearance, passports, local or foreign visas, constitutes practice of law?

xxx xxx xxx

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) does not wish to make issue with respondent's foreign
citations. Suffice it to state that the IBP has made its position manifest, to wit, that it strongly
opposes the view espoused by respondent (to the effect that today it is alright to advertise one's
legal services).

The IBP accordingly declares in no uncertain terms its opposition to respondent's act of establishing
a "legal clinic" and of concomitantly advertising the same through newspaper publications.

The IBP would therefore invoke the administrative supervision of this Honorable Court to perpetually
restrain respondent from undertaking highly unethical activities in the field of law practice as
aforedescribed.4

xxx xxx xxx

A. The use of the name "The Legal Clinic, Inc." gives the impression that respondent corporation is
being operated by lawyers and that it renders legal services.
While the respondent repeatedly denies that it offers legal services to the public, the advertisements
in question give the impression that respondent is offering legal services. The Petition in fact simply
assumes this to be so, as earlier mentioned, apparently because this (is) the effect that the
advertisements have on the reading public.

The impression created by the advertisements in question can be traced, first of all, to the very name
being used by respondent — "The Legal Clinic, Inc." Such a name, it is respectfully submitted
connotes the rendering of legal services for legal problems, just like a medical clinic connotes
medical services for medical problems. More importantly, the term "Legal Clinic" connotes lawyers,
as the term medical clinic connotes doctors.

Furthermore, the respondent's name, as published in the advertisements subject of the present
case, appears with (the) scale(s) of justice, which all the more reinforces the impression that it is
being operated by members of the bar and that it offers legal services. In addition, the
advertisements in question appear with a picture and name of a person being represented as a
lawyer from Guam, and this practically removes whatever doubt may still remain as to the nature of
the service or services being offered.

It thus becomes irrelevant whether respondent is merely offering "legal support services" as claimed
by it, or whether it offers legal services as any lawyer actively engaged in law practice does. And it
becomes unnecessary to make a distinction between "legal services" and "legal support services,"
as the respondent would have it. The advertisements in question leave no room for doubt in the
minds of the reading public that legal services are being offered by lawyers, whether true or not.

B. The advertisements in question are meant to induce the performance of acts contrary to law,
morals, public order and public policy.

It may be conceded that, as the respondent claims, the advertisements in question are only meant to
inform the general public of the services being offered by it. Said advertisements, however,
emphasize to Guam divorce, and any law student ought to know that under the Family Code, there
is only one instance when a foreign divorce is recognized, and that is:

Article 26. . . .

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine Law.

It must not be forgotten, too, that the Family Code (defines) a marriage as follows:

Article 1. Marriage is special contract of permanent union between a man and woman entered into
accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family
and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law
and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relation during
the marriage within the limits provided by this Code.

By simply reading the questioned advertisements, it is obvious that the message being conveyed is
that Filipinos can avoid the legal consequences of a marriage celebrated in accordance with our law,
by simply going to Guam for a divorce. This is not only misleading, but encourages, or serves to
induce, violation of Philippine law. At the very least, this can be considered "the dark side" of legal
practice, where certain defects in Philippine laws are exploited for the sake of profit. At worst, this is
outright malpractice.
Rule 1.02. — A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at
lessening confidence in the legal system.

In addition, it may also be relevant to point out that advertisements such as that shown in Annex "A"
of the Petition, which contains a cartoon of a motor vehicle with the words "Just Married" on its
bumper and seems to address those planning a "secret marriage," if not suggesting a "secret
marriage," makes light of the "special contract of permanent union," the inviolable social institution,"
which is how the Family Code describes marriage, obviously to emphasize its sanctity and
inviolability. Worse, this particular advertisement appears to encourage marriages celebrated in
secrecy, which is suggestive of immoral publication of applications for a marriage license.

If the article "Rx for Legal Problems" is to be reviewed, it can readily be concluded that the above
impressions one may gather from the advertisements in question are accurate. The Sharon Cuneta-
Gabby Concepcion example alone confirms what the advertisements suggest. Here it can be seen
that criminal acts are being encouraged or committed
(a bigamous marriage in Hong Kong or Las Vegas) with impunity simply because the jurisdiction of
Philippine courts does not extend to the place where the crime is committed.

Even if it be assumed, arguendo, (that) the "legal support services" respondent offers do not
constitute legal services as commonly understood, the advertisements in question give the
impression that respondent corporation is being operated by lawyers and that it offers legal services,
as earlier discussed. Thus, the only logical consequence is that, in the eyes of an ordinary
newspaper reader, members of the bar themselves are encouraging or inducing the performance of
acts which are contrary to law, morals, good customs and the public good, thereby destroying and
demeaning the integrity of the Bar.

xxx xxx xxx

It is respectfully submitted that respondent should be enjoined from causing the publication of the
advertisements in question, or any other advertisements similar thereto. It is also submitted that
respondent should be prohibited from further performing or offering some of the services it presently
offers, or, at the very least, from offering such services to the public in general.

The IBP is aware of the fact that providing computerized legal research, electronic data gathering,
storage and retrieval, standardized legal forms, investigators for gathering of evidence, and like
services will greatly benefit the legal profession and should not be stifled but instead encouraged.
However, when the conduct of such business by non-members of the Bar encroaches upon the
practice of law, there can be no choice but to prohibit such business.

Admittedly, many of the services involved in the case at bar can be better performed by specialists in
other fields, such as computer experts, who by reason of their having devoted time and effort
exclusively to such field cannot fulfill the exacting requirements for admission to the Bar. To prohibit
them from "encroaching" upon the legal profession will deny the profession of the great benefits and
advantages of modern technology. Indeed, a lawyer using a computer will be doing better than a
lawyer using a typewriter, even if both are (equal) in skill.

Both the Bench and the Bar, however, should be careful not to allow or tolerate the illegal practice of
law in any form, not only for the protection of members of the Bar but also, and more importantly, for
the protection of the public. Technological development in the profession may be encouraged
without tolerating, but instead ensuring prevention of illegal practice.
There might be nothing objectionable if respondent is allowed to perform all of its services, but only if
such services are made available exclusively to members of the Bench and Bar. Respondent would
then be offering technical assistance, not legal services. Alternatively, the more difficult task of
carefully distinguishing between which service may be offered to the public in general and which
should be made available exclusively to members of the Bar may be undertaken. This, however,
may require further proceedings because of the factual considerations involved.

It must be emphasized, however, that some of respondent's services ought to be prohibited outright,
such as acts which tend to suggest or induce celebration abroad of marriages which are bigamous
or otherwise illegal and void under Philippine law. While respondent may not be prohibited from
simply disseminating information regarding such matters, it must be required to include, in the
information given, a disclaimer that it is not authorized to practice law, that certain course of action
may be illegal under Philippine law, that it is not authorized or capable of rendering a legal opinion,
that a lawyer should be consulted before deciding on which course of action to take, and that it
cannot recommend any particular lawyer without subjecting itself to possible sanctions for illegal
practice of law.

If respondent is allowed to advertise, advertising should be directed exclusively at members of the

Bar, with a clear and unmistakable disclaimer that it is not authorized to practice law or perform legal
services.

The benefits of being assisted by paralegals cannot be ignored. But nobody should be allowed to
represent himself as a "paralegal" for profit, without such term being clearly defined by rule or
regulation, and without any adequate and effective means of regulating his activities. Also, law
practice in a corporate form may prove to be advantageous to the legal profession, but before
allowance of such practice may be considered, the corporation's Article of Incorporation and By-laws
must conform to each and every provision of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Rules
of Court.5

2. Philippine Bar Association:

xxx xxx xxx.

Respondent asserts that it "is not engaged in the practice of law but engaged in giving legal support
services to lawyers and laymen, through experienced paralegals, with the use of modern computers
and electronic machines" (pars. 2 and 3, Comment). This is absurd. Unquestionably, respondent's
acts of holding out itself to the public under the trade name "The Legal Clinic, Inc.," and soliciting
employment for its enumerated services fall within the realm of a practice which thus yields itself to
the regulatory powers of the Supreme Court. For respondent to say that it is merely engaged in
paralegal work is to stretch credulity. Respondent's own commercial advertisement which
announces a certain Atty. Don Parkinson to be handling the fields of law belies its pretense. From all
indications, respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc." is offering and rendering legal services through its
reserve of lawyers. It has been held that the practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in
court, but includes drawing of deeds, incorporation, rendering opinions, and advising clients as to
their legal right and then take them to an attorney and ask the latter to look after their case in
court See Martin, Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1984 ed., p. 39).

It is apt to recall that only natural persons can engage in the practice of law, and such limitation
cannot be evaded by a corporation employing competent lawyers to practice for it. Obviously, this is
the scheme or device by which respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc." holds out itself to the public and
solicits employment of its legal services. It is an odious vehicle for deception, especially so when the
public cannot ventilate any grievance for malpractice against the business conduit. Precisely, the
limitation of practice of law to persons who have been duly admitted as members of the Bar (Sec. 1,
Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court) is to subject the members to the discipline of the Supreme Court.
Although respondent uses its business name, the persons and the lawyers who act for it are subject
to court discipline. The practice of law is not a profession open to all who wish to engage in it nor can
it be assigned to another (See 5 Am. Jur. 270). It is a personal right limited to persons who have
qualified themselves under the law. It follows that not only respondent but also all the persons who
are acting for respondent are the persons engaged in unethical law practice.6

3. Philippine Lawyers' Association:

The Philippine Lawyers' Association's position, in answer to the issues stated herein, are wit:

1. The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law;

2. Such practice is unauthorized;

3. The advertisements complained of are not only unethical, but also misleading and patently
immoral; and

4. The Honorable Supreme Court has the power to supress and punish the Legal Clinic and its
corporate officers for its unauthorized practice of law and for its unethical, misleading and immoral
advertising.

xxx xxx xxx

Respondent posits that is it not engaged in the practice of law. It claims that it merely renders "legal
support services" to answers, litigants and the general public as enunciated in the Primary Purpose
Clause of its Article(s) of Incorporation. (See pages 2 to 5 of Respondent's Comment). But its
advertised services, as enumerated above, clearly and convincingly show that it is indeed engaged
in law practice, albeit outside of court.

As advertised, it offers the general public its advisory services on Persons and Family Relations
Law, particularly regarding foreign divorces, annulment of marriages, secret marriages, absence and
adoption; Immigration Laws, particularly on visa related problems, immigration problems; the
Investments Law of the Philippines and such other related laws.

Its advertised services unmistakably require the application of the aforesaid law, the legal principles
and procedures related thereto, the legal advices based thereon and which activities call for legal
training, knowledge and experience.

Applying the test laid down by the Court in the aforecited Agrava Case, the activities of respondent
fall squarely and are embraced in what lawyers and laymen equally term as "the practice of law."7

4. U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle:

In resolving, the issues before this Honorable Court, paramount consideration should be given to the
protection of the general public from the danger of being exploited by unqualified persons or entities
who may be engaged in the practice of law.
At present, becoming a lawyer requires one to take a rigorous four-year course of study on top of a
four-year bachelor of arts or sciences course and then to take and pass the bar examinations. Only
then, is a lawyer qualified to practice law.

While the use of a paralegal is sanctioned in many jurisdiction as an aid to the administration of
justice, there are in those jurisdictions, courses of study and/or standards which would qualify these
paralegals to deal with the general public as such. While it may now be the opportune time to
establish these courses of study and/or standards, the fact remains that at present, these do not
exist in the Philippines. In the meantime, this Honorable Court may decide to make measures to
protect the general public from being exploited by those who may be dealing with the general public
in the guise of being "paralegals" without being qualified to do so.

In the same manner, the general public should also be protected from the dangers which may be
brought about by advertising of legal services. While it appears that lawyers are prohibited under the
present Code of Professional Responsibility from advertising, it appears in the instant case that legal
services are being advertised not by lawyers but by an entity staffed by "paralegals." Clearly,
measures should be taken to protect the general public from falling prey to those who advertise legal
services without being qualified to offer such services. 8

A perusal of the questioned advertisements of Respondent, however, seems to give the impression
that information regarding validity of marriages, divorce, annulment of marriage, immigration, visa
extensions, declaration of absence, adoption and foreign investment, which are in essence, legal
matters , will be given to them if they avail of its services. The Respondent's name — The Legal
Clinic, Inc. — does not help matters. It gives the impression again that Respondent will or can cure
the legal problems brought to them. Assuming that Respondent is, as claimed, staffed purely by
paralegals, it also gives the misleading impression that there are lawyers involved in The Legal
Clinic, Inc., as there are doctors in any medical clinic, when only "paralegals" are involved in The
Legal Clinic, Inc.

Respondent's allegations are further belied by the very admissions of its President and majority
stockholder, Atty. Nogales, who gave an insight on the structure and main purpose of Respondent
corporation in the aforementioned "Starweek" article."9

5. Women Lawyer's Association of the Philippines:

Annexes "A" and "B" of the petition are clearly advertisements to solicit cases for the purpose of gain
which, as provided for under the above cited law, (are) illegal and against the Code of Professional
Responsibility of lawyers in this country.

Annex "A" of the petition is not only illegal in that it is an advertisement to solicit cases, but it is illegal
in that in bold letters it announces that the Legal Clinic, Inc., could work out/cause the celebration of
a secret marriage which is not only illegal but immoral in this country. While it is advertised that one
has to go to said agency and pay P560 for a valid marriage it is certainly fooling the public for valid
marriages in the Philippines are solemnized only by officers authorized to do so under the law. And
to employ an agency for said purpose of contracting marriage is not necessary.

No amount of reasoning that in the USA, Canada and other countries the trend is towards allowing
lawyers to advertise their special skills to enable people to obtain from qualified practitioners legal
services for their particular needs can justify the use of advertisements such as are the subject
matter of the petition, for one (cannot) justify an illegal act even by whatever merit the illegal act may
serve. The law has yet to be amended so that such act could become justifiable.
We submit further that these advertisements that seem to project that secret marriages and divorce
are possible in this country for a fee, when in fact it is not so, are highly reprehensible.

It would encourage people to consult this clinic about how they could go about having a secret
marriage here, when it cannot nor should ever be attempted, and seek advice on divorce, where in
this country there is none, except under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws in the Philippines. It is
also against good morals and is deceitful because it falsely represents to the public to be able to do
that which by our laws cannot be done (and) by our Code of Morals should not be done.

In the case (of) In re Taguda, 53 Phil. 37, the Supreme Court held that solicitation for clients by an
attorney by circulars of advertisements, is unprofessional, and offenses of this character justify
permanent elimination from the Bar. 10

6. Federacion Internacional de Abogados:

xxx xxx xxx

1.7 That entities admittedly not engaged in the practice of law, such as management consultancy
firms or travel agencies, whether run by lawyers or not, perform the services rendered by
Respondent does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that Respondent is not unlawfully practicing
law. In the same vein, however, the fact that the business of respondent (assuming it can be
engaged in independently of the practice of law) involves knowledge of the law does not necessarily
make respondent guilty of unlawful practice of law.

. . . . Of necessity, no one . . . . acting as a consultant can render effective service unless he is

familiar with such statutes and regulations. He must be careful not to suggest a course of conduct
which the law forbids. It seems . . . .clear that (the consultant's) knowledge of the law, and his use of
that knowledge as a factor in determining what measures he shall recommend, do not constitute the
practice of law . . . . It is not only presumed that all men know the law, but it is a fact that most men
have considerable acquaintance with broad features of the law . . . . Our knowledge of the law —
accurate or inaccurate — moulds our conduct not only when we are acting for ourselves, but when
we are serving others. Bankers, liquor dealers and laymen generally possess rather precise
knowledge of the laws touching their particular business or profession. A good example is the
architect, who must be familiar with zoning, building and fire prevention codes, factory and tenement
house statutes, and who draws plans and specification in harmony with the law. This is not
practicing law.

But suppose the architect, asked by his client to omit a fire tower, replies that it is required by the
statute. Or the industrial relations expert cites, in support of some measure that he recommends, a
decision of the National Labor Relations Board. Are they practicing law? In my opinion, they are not,
provided no separate fee is charged for the legal advice or information, and the legal question is
subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal problem.

It is largely a matter of degree and of custom.

If it were usual for one intending to erect a building on his land to engage a lawyer to advise him and
the architect in respect to the building code and the like, then an architect who performed this
function would probably be considered to be trespassing on territory reserved for licensed attorneys.
Likewise, if the industrial relations field had been pre-empted by lawyers, or custom placed a lawyer
always at the elbow of the lay personnel man. But this is not the case. The most important body of
the industrial relations experts are the officers and business agents of the labor unions and few of
them are lawyers. Among the larger corporate employers, it has been the practice for some years to
delegate special responsibility in employee matters to a management group chosen for their
practical knowledge and skill in such matter, and without regard to legal thinking or lack of it. More
recently, consultants like the defendants have the same service that the larger employers get from
their own specialized staff.

The handling of industrial relations is growing into a recognized profession for which appropriate
courses are offered by our leading universities. The court should be very cautious about declaring
[that] a widespread, well-established method of conducting business is unlawful, or that the
considerable class of men who customarily perform a certain function have no right to do so, or that
the technical education given by our schools cannot be used by the graduates in their business.

In determining whether a man is practicing law, we should consider his work for any particular client
or customer, as a whole. I can imagine defendant being engaged primarily to advise as to the law
defining his client's obligations to his employees, to guide his client's obligations to his employees, to
guide his client along the path charted by law. This, of course, would be the practice of the law. But
such is not the fact in the case before me. Defendant's primarily efforts are along economic and
psychological lines. The law only provides the frame within which he must work, just as the zoning
code limits the kind of building the limits the kind of building the architect may plan. The incidental
legal advice or information defendant may give, does not transform his activities into the practice of
law. Let me add that if, even as a minor feature of his work, he performed services which are
customarily reserved to members of the bar, he would be practicing law. For instance, if as part of a
welfare program, he drew employees' wills.

Another branch of defendant's work is the representations of the employer in the adjustment of
grievances and in collective bargaining, with or without a mediator. This is not per se the practice of
law. Anyone may use an agent for negotiations and may select an agent particularly skilled in the
subject under discussion, and the person appointed is free to accept the employment whether or not
he is a member of the bar. Here, however, there may be an exception where the business turns on a
question of law. Most real estate sales are negotiated by brokers who are not lawyers. But if the
value of the land depends on a disputed right-of-way and the principal role of the negotiator is to
assess the probable outcome of the dispute and persuade the opposite party to the same opinion,
then it may be that only a lawyer can accept the assignment. Or if a controversy between an
employer and his men grows from differing interpretations of a contract, or of a statute, it is quite
likely that defendant should not handle it. But I need not reach a definite conclusion here, since the
situation is not presented by the proofs.

Defendant also appears to represent the employer before administrative agencies of the federal
government, especially before trial examiners of the National Labor Relations Board. An agency of
the federal government, acting by virtue of an authority granted by the Congress, may regulate the
representation of parties before such agency. The State of New Jersey is without power to interfere
with such determination or to forbid representation before the agency by one whom the agency
admits. The rules of the National Labor Relations Board give to a party the right to appear in person,
or by counsel, or by other representative. Rules and Regulations, September 11th, 1946, S. 203.31.
'Counsel' here means a licensed attorney, and ther representative' one not a lawyer. In this phase of
his work, defendant may lawfully do whatever the Labor Board allows, even arguing questions purely
legal. (Auerbacher v. Wood, 53 A. 2d 800, cited in Statsky, Introduction to Paralegalism [1974], at
pp. 154-156.).

1.8 From the foregoing, it can be said that a person engaged in a lawful calling (which may involve
knowledge of the law) is not engaged in the practice of law provided that:

(a) The legal question is subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal problem;.
(b) The services performed are not customarily reserved to members of the bar; .

(c) No separate fee is charged for the legal advice or information.

All these must be considered in relation to the work for any particular client as a whole.

1.9. If the person involved is both lawyer and non-lawyer, the Code of Professional Responsibility
succintly states the rule of conduct:

Rule 15.08 — A lawyer who is engaged in another profession or occupation concurrently with the
practice of law shall make clear to his client whether he is acting as a lawyer or in another capacity.

1.10. In the present case. the Legal Clinic appears to render wedding services (See Annex "A"
Petition). Services on routine, straightforward marriages, like securing a marriage license, and
making arrangements with a priest or a judge, may not constitute practice of law. However, if the
problem is as complicated as that described in "Rx for Legal Problems" on the Sharon Cuneta-
Gabby Concepcion-Richard Gomez case, then what may be involved is actually the practice of law.
If a non-lawyer, such as the Legal Clinic, renders such services then it is engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law.

1.11. The Legal Clinic also appears to give information on divorce, absence, annulment of marriage
and visas (See Annexes "A" and "B" Petition). Purely giving informational materials may not
constitute of law. The business is similar to that of a bookstore where the customer buys materials
on the subject and determines on the subject and determines by himself what courses of action to
take.

It is not entirely improbable, however, that aside from purely giving information, the Legal Clinic's
paralegals may apply the law to the particular problem of the client, and give legal advice. Such
would constitute unauthorized practice of law.

It cannot be claimed that the publication of a legal text which publication of a legal text which
purports to say what the law is amount to legal practice. And the mere fact that the principles or rules
stated in the text may be accepted by a particular reader as a solution to his problem does not affect
this. . . . . Apparently it is urged that the conjoining of these two, that is, the text and the forms, with
advice as to how the forms should be filled out, constitutes the unlawful practice of law. But that is
the situation with many approved and accepted texts. Dacey's book is sold to the public at
large. There is no personal contact or relationship with a particular individual. Nor does there exist
that relation of confidence and trust so necessary to the status of attorney and client. THIS IS THE
ESSENTIAL OF LEGAL PRACTICE — THE REPRESENTATION AND ADVISING OF A
PARTICULAR PERSON IN A PARTICULAR SITUATION. At most the book assumes to offer
general advice on common problems, and does not purport to give personal advice on a specific
problem peculiar to a designated or readily identified person. Similarly the defendant's publication
does not purport to give personal advice on a specific problem peculiar to a designated or readily
identified person in a particular situation — in their publication and sale of the kits, such publication
and sale did not constitutes the unlawful practice of law . . . . There being no legal impediment under
the statute to the sale of the kit, there was no proper basis for the injunction against defendant
maintaining an office for the purpose of selling to persons seeking a divorce, separation, annulment
or separation agreement any printed material or writings relating to matrimonial law or the prohibition
in the memorandum of modification of the judgment against defendant having an interest in any
publishing house publishing his manuscript on divorce and against his having any personal contact
with any prospective purchaser. The record does fully support, however, the finding that for the
change of $75 or $100 for the kit, the defendant gave legal advice in the course of personal contacts
concerning particular problems which might arise in the preparation and presentation of the
purchaser's asserted matrimonial cause of action or pursuit of other legal remedies and assistance
in the preparation of necessary documents (The injunction therefore sought to) enjoin conduct
constituting the practice of law, particularly with reference to the giving of advice and counsel by the
defendant relating to specific problems of particular individuals in connection with a divorce,
separation, annulment of separation agreement sought and should be affirmed. (State v. Winder,
348, NYS 2D 270 [1973], cited in Statsky, supra at p. 101.).

1.12. Respondent, of course, states that its services are "strictly non-diagnostic, non-advisory. "It is
not controverted, however, that if the services "involve giving legal advice or counselling," such
would constitute practice of law (Comment, par. 6.2). It is in this light that FIDA submits that a factual
inquiry may be necessary for the judicious disposition of this case.

xxx xxx xxx

2.10. Annex "A" may be ethically objectionable in that it can give the impression (or perpetuate the
wrong notion) that there is a secret marriage. With all the solemnities, formalities and other
requisites of marriages (See Articles 2, et seq., Family Code), no Philippine marriage can be secret.

2.11. Annex "B" may likewise be ethically objectionable. The second paragraph thereof (which is not
necessarily related to the first paragraph) fails to state the limitation that only "paralegal services?" or
"legal support services", and not legal services, are available." 11

A prefatory discussion on the meaning of the phrase "practice of law" becomes exigent for the
proper determination of the issues raised by the petition at bar. On this score, we note that the
clause "practice of law" has long been the subject of judicial construction and interpretation. The
courts have laid down general principles and doctrines explaining the meaning and scope of the
term, some of which we now take into account.

Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedures, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform
those acts which are characteristic of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give advice or
render any kind of service that involves legal knowledge or skill. 12

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. It includes legal advice and
counsel, and the preparation of legal instruments and contract by which legal rights are secured,
although such matter may or may not be pending in a court. 13

In the practice of his profession, a licensed attorney at law generally engages in three principal types
of professional activity: legal advice and instructions to clients to inform them of their rights and
obligations, preparation for clients of documents requiring knowledge of legal principles not
possessed by ordinary layman, and appearance for clients before public tribunals which possess
power and authority to determine rights of life, liberty, and property according to law, in order to
assist in proper interpretation and enforcement of law. 14

When a person participates in the a trial and advertises himself as a lawyer, he is in the practice of
law. 15 One who confers with clients, advises them as to their legal rights and then takes the business
to an attorney and asks the latter to look after the case in court, is also practicing law. 16 Giving
advice for compensation regarding the legal status and rights of another and the conduct with
respect thereto constitutes a practice of law. 17 One who renders an opinion as to the proper
interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it, is, to that extent, practicing law. 18
In the recent case of Cayetano vs. Monsod, 19 after citing the doctrines in several cases, we laid
down the test to determine whether certain acts constitute "practice of law," thus:

Black defines "practice of law" as:

The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and
technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or
advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and
other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal
instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients
and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the law.

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases on court.(Land Title Abstract and Trust Co.
v. Dworken , 129 Ohio St. 23, 193N. E. 650). A person is also considered to be in the practice of law
when he:

. . . . for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms, associations or
corporations as to their right under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an advocate
in proceedings, pending or prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body,
committee, or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies and there, in such
representative capacity, performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or defending the rights
of their clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engages in
the business of advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so engaged performs any
act or acts either in court or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law.
(State ex. rel. Mckittrick v. C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S. W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852).

This Court, in the case of Philippines Lawyers Association v. Agrava (105 Phil. 173, 176-177),stated:

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the
management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in
addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters
connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services
contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of
a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters or estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as
do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the determination
by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263).

Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of any
court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the
giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects and the preparation and execution of legal
instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and other affairs. Although
these transactions may have no direct connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to
become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide
experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations.
These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the
administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth
in the order, can be drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer which involves appearance in
court and that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance
to the welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions be performed by persons
possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times under the
heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules o
Court, Vol. 3 [1973 ed.], pp. 665-666, citing In Re Opinion of the Justices [Mass], 194 N. E. 313,
quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 197 A. 139, 144).

The practice of law, therefore, covers a wide range of activities in and out of court. Applying the
aforementioned criteria to the case at bar, we agree with the perceptive findings and observations of
the aforestated bar associations that the activities of respondent, as advertised, constitute "practice
of law."

The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support services can neither be seriously
considered nor sustained. Said proposition is belied by respondent's own description of the services
it has been offering, to wit:

Legal support services basically consists of giving ready information by trained paralegals to laymen
and lawyers, which are strictly non-diagnostic, non-advisory, through the extensive use of computers
and modern information technology in the gathering, processing, storage, transmission and
reproduction of information and communication, such as computerized legal research; encoding and
reproduction of documents and pleadings prepared by laymen or lawyers; document search;
evidence gathering; locating parties or witnesses to a case; fact finding investigations; and
assistance to laymen in need of basic institutional services from government or non-government
agencies, like birth, marriage, property, or business registrations; educational or employment
records or certifications, obtaining documentation like clearances, passports, local or foreign visas;
giving information about laws of other countries that they may find useful, like foreign divorce,
marriage or adoption laws that they can avail of preparatory to emigration to the foreign country, and
other matters that do not involve representation of clients in court; designing and installing computer
systems, programs, or software for the efficient management of law offices, corporate legal
departments, courts and other entities engaged in dispensing or administering legal services. 20

While some of the services being offered by respondent corporation merely involve mechanical and
technical knowhow, such as the installation of computer systems and programs for the efficient
management of law offices, or the computerization of research aids and materials, these will not
suffice to justify an exception to the general rule.

What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal information to laymen and
lawyers. Its contention that such function is non-advisory and non-diagnostic is more apparent than
real. In providing information, for example, about foreign laws on marriage, divorce and adoption, it
strains the credulity of this Court that all the respondent corporation will simply do is look for the law,
furnish a copy thereof to the client, and stop there as if it were merely a bookstore. With its attorneys
and so called paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain to the client the intricacies of the law and
advise him or her on the proper course of action to be taken as may be provided for by said law.
That is what its advertisements represent and for the which services it will consequently charge and
be paid. That activity falls squarely within the jurisprudential definition of "practice of law." Such a
conclusion will not be altered by the fact that respondent corporation does not represent clients in
court since law practice, as the weight of authority holds, is not limited merely giving legal advice,
contract drafting and so forth.

The aforesaid conclusion is further strengthened by an article published in the January 13, 1991
issue of the Starweek/The Sunday Magazine of the Philippines Star, entitled "Rx for Legal
Problems," where an insight into the structure, main purpose and operations of respondent
corporation was given by its own "proprietor," Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales:
This is the kind of business that is transacted everyday at The Legal Clinic, with offices on the
seventh floor of the Victoria Building along U. N. Avenue in Manila. No matter what the client's
problem, and even if it is as complicated as the Cuneta-Concepcion domestic situation, Atty.
Nogales and his staff of lawyers, who, like doctors are "specialists" in various fields can take care of
it. The Legal Clinic, Inc. has specialists in taxation and criminal law, medico-legal problems, labor,
litigation, and family law. These specialist are backed up by a battery of paralegals, counsellors and
attorneys.

Atty. Nogales set up The Legal Clinic in 1984. Inspired by the trend in the medical field toward
specialization, it caters to clients who cannot afford the services of the big law firms.

The Legal Clinic has regular and walk-in clients. "when they come, we start by analyzing the
problem. That's what doctors do also. They ask you how you contracted what's bothering you, they
take your temperature, they observe you for the symptoms and so on. That's how we operate, too.
And once the problem has been categorized, then it's referred to one of our specialists.

There are cases which do not, in medical terms, require surgery or follow-up treatment. These The
Legal Clinic disposes of in a matter of minutes. "Things like preparing a simple deed of sale or an
affidavit of loss can be taken care of by our staff or, if this were a hospital the residents or the
interns. We can take care of these matters on a while you wait basis. Again, kung baga sa hospital,
out-patient, hindi kailangang ma-confine. It's just like a common cold or diarrhea," explains Atty.
Nogales.

Those cases which requires more extensive "treatment" are dealt with accordingly. "If you had a rich
relative who died and named you her sole heir, and you stand to inherit millions of pesos of property,
we would refer you to a specialist in taxation. There would be real estate taxes and arrears which
would need to be put in order, and your relative is even taxed by the state for the right to transfer her
property, and only a specialist in taxation would be properly trained to deal with the problem. Now, if
there were other heirs contesting your rich relatives will, then you would need a litigator, who knows
how to arrange the problem for presentation in court, and gather evidence to support the case. 21

That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry out its services is not controlling. What is
important is that it is engaged in the practice of law by virtue of the nature of the services it renders
which thereby brings it within the ambit of the statutory prohibitions against the advertisements which
it has caused to be published and are now assailed in this proceeding.

Further, as correctly and appropriately pointed out by the U.P. WILOCI, said reported facts
sufficiently establish that the main purpose of respondent is to serve as a one-stop-shop of sorts for
various legal problems wherein a client may avail of legal services from simple documentation to
complex litigation and corporate undertakings. Most of these services are undoubtedly beyond the
domain of paralegals, but rather, are exclusive functions of lawyers engaged in the practice of law. 22

It should be noted that in our jurisdiction the services being offered by private respondent which
constitute practice of law cannot be performed by paralegals. Only a person duly admitted as a
member of the bar, or hereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of
Court, and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law. 23

Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified in
education and character. The permissive right conferred on the lawyers is an individual and limited
privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards of moral and professional
conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the court, the client and the bar from the incompetence
or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the disciplinary control of the
court. 24

The same rule is observed in the american jurisdiction wherefrom respondent would wish to draw
support for his thesis. The doctrines there also stress that the practice of law is limited to those who
meet the requirements for, and have been admitted to, the bar, and various statutes or rules
specifically so provide. 25 The practice of law is not a lawful business except for members of the bar
who have complied with all the conditions required by statute and the rules of court. Only those
persons are allowed to practice law who, by reason of attainments previously acquired through
education and study, have been recognized by the courts as possessing profound knowledge of
legal science entitling them to advise, counsel with, protect, or defend the rights claims, or liabilities
of their clients, with respect to the construction, interpretation, operation and effect of law. 26 The
justification for excluding from the practice of law those not admitted to the bar is found, not in the
protection of the bar from competition, but in the protection of the public from being advised and
represented in legal matters by incompetent and unreliable persons over whom the judicial
department can exercise little control.27

We have to necessarily and definitely reject respondent's position that the concept in the United
States of paralegals as an occupation separate from the law profession be adopted in this
jurisdiction. Whatever may be its merits, respondent cannot but be aware that this should first be a
matter for judicial rules or legislative action, and not of unilateral adoption as it has done.

Paralegals in the United States are trained professionals. As admitted by respondent, there are
schools and universities there which offer studies and degrees in paralegal education, while there
are none in the Philippines. 28As the concept of the "paralegals" or "legal assistant" evolved in the
United States, standards and guidelines also evolved to protect the general public. One of the major
standards or guidelines was developed by the American Bar Association which set up Guidelines for
the Approval of Legal Assistant Education Programs (1973). Legislation has even been proposed to
certify legal assistants. There are also associations of paralegals in the United States with their own
code of professional ethics, such as the National Association of Legal Assistants, Inc. and the
American Paralegal Association. 29

In the Philippines, we still have a restricted concept and limited acceptance of what may be
considered as paralegal service. As pointed out by FIDA, some persons not duly licensed to practice
law are or have been allowed limited representation in behalf of another or to render legal services,
but such allowable services are limited in scope and extent by the law, rules or regulations granting
permission therefor. 30

Accordingly, we have adopted the American judicial policy that, in the absence of constitutional or
statutory authority, a person who has not been admitted as an attorney cannot practice law for the
proper administration of justice cannot be hindered by the unwarranted intrusion of an unauthorized
and unskilled person into the practice of law. 31That policy should continue to be one of encouraging
persons who are unsure of their legal rights and remedies to seek legal assistance only from
persons licensed to practice law in the state. 32

Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true, honest,
fair, dignified and objective information or statement of facts. 33 He is not supposed to use or permit
the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement
or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services. 34 Nor shall he pay or give something of value
to representatives of the mass media in anticipation of, or in return for, publicity to attract legal
business. 35 Prior to the adoption of the code of Professional Responsibility, the Canons of
Professional Ethics had also warned that lawyers should not resort to indirect advertisements for
professional employment, such as furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments, or procuring his
photograph to be published in connection with causes in which the lawyer has been or is engaged or
concerning the manner of their conduct, the magnitude of the interest involved, the importance of the
lawyer's position, and all other like self-laudation. 36

The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement of his talents. A lawyer
cannot, without violating the ethics of his profession. advertise his talents or skill as in a manner
similar to a merchant advertising his goods. 37 The prescription against advertising of legal services
or solicitation of legal business rests on the fundamental postulate that the that the practice of law is
a profession. Thus, in the case of The Director of Religious Affairs. vs. Estanislao R. Bayot 38 an
advertisement, similar to those of respondent which are involved in the present proceeding, 39 was
held to constitute improper advertising or solicitation.

The pertinent part of the decision therein reads:

It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by the respondent of the
ethics of his profession, it being a brazen solicitation of business from the public. Section 25 of Rule
127 expressly provides among other things that "the practice of soliciting cases at law for the
purpose of gain, either personally or thru paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." It is highly
unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his wares. Law is a
profession and not a trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his profession who stoops to and
adopts the practices of mercantilism by advertising his services or offering them to the public. As a
member of the bar, he defiles the temple of justice with mercenary activities as the money-changers
of old defiled the temple of Jehovah. "The most worthy and effective advertisement possible, even
for a young lawyer, . . . . is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity
and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced but must be the outcome of character and conduct."
(Canon 27, Code of Ethics.).

We repeat, the canon of the profession tell us that the best advertising possible for a lawyer is a
well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the
outcome of character and conduct. Good and efficient service to a client as well as to the community
has a way of publicizing itself and catching public attention. That publicity is a normal by-product of
effective service which is right and proper. A good and reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus
to generate it and to magnify his success. He easily sees the difference between a normal by-
product of able service and the unwholesome result of propaganda. 40

Of course, not all types of advertising or solicitation are prohibited. The canons of the profession
enumerate exceptions to the rule against advertising or solicitation and define the extent to which
they may be undertaken. The exceptions are of two broad categories, namely, those which are
expressly allowed and those which are necessarily implied from the restrictions. 41

The first of such exceptions is the publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the
standards of conduct imposed by the canons, of brief biographical and informative data. "Such data
must not be misleading and may include only a statement of the lawyer's name and the names of his
professional associates; addresses, telephone numbers, cable addresses; branches of law
practiced; date and place of birth and admission to the bar; schools attended with dates of
graduation, degrees and other educational distinction; public or quasi-public offices; posts of honor;
legal authorships; legal teaching positions; membership and offices in bar associations and
committees thereof, in legal and scientific societies and legal fraternities; the fact of listings in other
reputable law lists; the names and addresses of references; and, with their written consent, the
names of clients regularly represented." 42
The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it cannot be a mere
supplemental feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical which is published principally
for other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not properly publish his brief biographical and
informative data in a daily paper, magazine, trade journal or society program. Nor may a lawyer
permit his name to be published in a law list the conduct, management or contents of which are
calculated or likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar, or to lower the dignity or standing of the
profession. 43

The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may contain only a
statement of his name, the name of the law firm which he is connected with, address, telephone
number and special branch of law practiced. The publication of a simple announcement of the
opening of a law firm or of changes in the partnership, associates, firm name or office address, being
for the convenience of the profession, is not objectionable. He may likewise have his name listed in
a telephone directory but not under a designation of special branch of law. 44

Verily, taking into consideration the nature and contents of the advertisements for which respondent
is being taken to task, which even includes a quotation of the fees charged by said respondent
corporation for services rendered, we find and so hold that the same definitely do not and
conclusively cannot fall under any of the above-mentioned exceptions.

The ruling in the case of Bates, et al. vs. State Bar of Arizona, 45 which is repeatedly invoked and
constitutes the justification relied upon by respondent, is obviously not applicable to the case at bar.
Foremost is the fact that the disciplinary rule involved in said case explicitly allows a lawyer, as an
exception to the prohibition against advertisements by lawyers, to publish a statement of legal fees
for an initial consultation or the availability upon request of a written schedule of fees or an estimate
of the fee to be charged for the specific services. No such exception is provided for, expressly or
impliedly, whether in our former Canons of Professional Ethics or the present Code of Professional
Responsibility. Besides, even the disciplinary rule in the Bates case contains a proviso that the
exceptions stated therein are "not applicable in any state unless and until it is implemented by such
authority in that state." 46 This goes to show that an exception to the general rule, such as that being
invoked by herein respondent, can be made only if and when the canons expressly provide for such
an exception. Otherwise, the prohibition stands, as in the case at bar.

It bears mention that in a survey conducted by the American Bar Association after the decision in
Bates, on the attitude of the public about lawyers after viewing television commercials, it was found
that public opinion dropped significantly 47 with respect to these characteristics of lawyers:

Trustworthy from 71% to 14%

Professional from 71% to 14%
Honest from 65% to 14%
Dignified from 45% to 14%

Secondly, it is our firm belief that with the present situation of our legal and judicial systems, to allow
the publication of advertisements of the kind used by respondent would only serve to aggravate what
is already a deteriorating public opinion of the legal profession whose integrity has consistently been
under attack lately by media and the community in general. At this point in time, it is of utmost
importance in the face of such negative, even if unfair, criticisms at times, to adopt and maintain that
level of professional conduct which is beyond reproach, and to exert all efforts to regain the high
esteem formerly accorded to the legal profession.

In sum, it is undoubtedly a misbehavior on the part of the lawyer, subject to disciplinary action, to
advertise his services except in allowable instances 48 or to aid a layman in the unauthorized practice
of law. 49 Considering that Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales, who is the prime incorporator, major stockholder
and proprietor of The Legal Clinic, Inc. is a member of the Philippine Bar, he is hereby reprimanded,
with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts which are involved in this proceeding will
be dealt with more severely.

While we deem it necessary that the question as to the legality or illegality of the purpose/s for which
the Legal Clinic, Inc. was created should be passed upon and determined, we are constrained to
refrain from lapsing into an obiter on that aspect since it is clearly not within the adjudicative
parameters of the present proceeding which is merely administrative in nature. It is, of course,
imperative that this matter be promptly determined, albeit in a different proceeding and forum, since,
under the present state of our law and jurisprudence, a corporation cannot be organized for or
engage in the practice of law in this country. This interdiction, just like the rule against unethical
advertising, cannot be subverted by employing some so-called paralegals supposedly rendering the
alleged support services.

The remedy for the apparent breach of this prohibition by respondent is the concern and province of
the Solicitor General who can institute the corresponding quo warranto action, 50 after due
ascertainment of the factual background and basis for the grant of respondent's corporate charter, in
light of the putative misuse thereof. That spin-off from the instant bar matter is referred to the
Solicitor General for such action as may be necessary under the circumstances.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and ENJOIN herein respondent, The Legal
Clinic, Inc., from issuing or causing the publication or dissemination of any advertisement in any form
which is of the same or similar tenor and purpose as Annexes "A" and "B" of this petition, and from
conducting, directly or indirectly, any activity, operation or transaction proscribed by law or the Code
of Professional Ethics as indicated herein. Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Office of the Solicitor General for
appropriate action in accordance herewith.

Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo,
Melo and Quiason, JJ., concur

Linsangan v. Atty Tolentino AC No 6672

FIRST DIVISION
PEDRO L. LINSANGAN, A.C. No. 6672
Complainant,
Present:
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
CARPIO,
- v e r s u s - CORONA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO and
BERSAMIN, JJ.
ATTY. NICOMEDES TOLENTINO,
Respondent. Promulgated:
September 4, 2009
x-----------------------------------------x
 RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
This is a complaint for disbarment[1] filed by Pedro Linsangan of the
Linsangan Linsangan & Linsangan Law Office against Atty.
Nicomedes Tolentino for solicitation of clients and encroachment of
professional services.
Complainant alleged that respondent, with the help of paralegal Fe
Marie Labiano, convinced his clients[2] to transfer legal
representation. Respondent promised them financial
assistance and expeditious collection on their claims. To induce
[3] [4]

them to hire his services, he persistently called them and sent them
text messages.
To support his allegations, complainant presented the sworn
affidavit[5] of James Gregorio attesting that Labiano tried to prevail
upon him to sever his lawyer-client relations with complainant and
utilize respondents services instead, in exchange for a loan
of P50,000. Complainant also attached respondents calling card:[6]
Front
NICOMEDES TOLENTINO
LAW OFFFICE
CONSULTANCY & MARITIME SERVICES
W/ FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE
Fe Marie L. Labiano
Paralegal
1st MIJI Mansion, 2nd Flr. Rm. M-01 Tel: 362-7820
6th Ave., cor M.H. Del Pilar Fax: (632) 362-7821
Grace Park, Caloocan City Cel.: (0926) 2701719
Back
SERVICES OFFERED:
CONSULTATION AND ASSISTANCE
TO OVERSEAS SEAMEN
REPATRIATED DUE TO ACCIDENT,
INJURY, ILLNESS, SICKNESS, DEATH
AND INSURANCE BENEFIT CLAIMS
ABROAD.
(emphasis supplied)
Hence, this complaint.
Respondent, in his defense, denied knowing Labiano and authorizing
the printing and circulation of the said calling card.[7]
The complaint was referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline
(CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report and recommendation.[8]
Based on testimonial and documentary evidence, the CBD, in its
report and recommendation,[9] found that respondent had
encroached on the professional practice of complainant, violating
Rule 8.02[10] and other canons[11] of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR). Moreover, he contravened the rule against
soliciting cases for gain, personally or through paid agents or brokers
as stated in Section 27, Rule 138[12] of the Rules of Court. Hence, the
CBD recommended that respondent be reprimanded with a stern
warning that any repetition would merit a heavier penalty.
We adopt the findings of the IBP on the unethical conduct of
respondent but we modify the recommended penalty.
The complaint before us is rooted on the alleged intrusion by
respondent into complainants professional practice in violation of
Rule 8.02 of the CPR. And the means employed by respondent in
furtherance of the said misconduct themselves constituted distinct
violations of ethical rules.
Canons of the CPR are rules of conduct all lawyers must adhere to,
including the manner by which a lawyers services are to be made
known. Thus, Canon 3 of the CPR provides:
CANON 3 - A LAWYER IN MAKING KNOWN HIS LEGAL SERVICES
SHALL USE ONLY TRUE, HONEST, FAIR, DIGNIFIED AND OBJECTIVE
INFORMATION OR STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Time and time again, lawyers are reminded that the practice of law
is a profession and not a business; lawyers should not advertise their
talents as merchants advertise their wares.[13] To allow a lawyer to
advertise his talent or skill is to commercialize the practice of law,
degrade the profession in the publics estimation and impair its ability
to efficiently render that high character of service to which every
member of the bar is called.[14]
Rule 2.03 of the CPR provides:
RULE 2.03. A LAWYER SHALL NOT DO OR PERMIT TO BE DONE ANY
ACT DESIGNED PRIMARILY TO SOLICIT LEGAL BUSINESS.
Hence, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for the purpose of
gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers.[15] Such
actuation constitutes malpractice, a ground for disbarment.[16]
Rule 2.03 should be read in connection with Rule 1.03 of the
CPR which provides:
RULE 1.03. A LAWYER SHALL NOT, FOR ANY CORRUPT MOTIVE OR
INTEREST, ENCOURAGE ANY SUIT OR PROCEEDING OR DELAY ANY
MANS CAUSE.
This rule proscribes ambulance chasing (the solicitation of almost
any kind of legal business by an attorney, personally or through an
agent in order to gain employment)[17] as a measure to protect the
community from barratry and champerty.[18]
Complainant presented substantial evidence[19] (consisting of the
sworn statements of the very same persons coaxed by Labiano and
referred to respondents office) to prove that respondent indeed
solicited legal business as well as profited from referrals suits.
Although respondent initially denied knowing Labiano in his
answer, he later admitted it during the mandatory hearing.
Through Labianos actions, respondents law practice was
benefited. Hapless seamen were enticed to transfer representation on
the strength of Labianos word that respondent could produce a more
favorable result.
Based on the foregoing, respondent clearly solicited employment
violating Rule 2.03, and Rule 1.03 and Canon 3 of the CPR and
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
With regard to respondents violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR, settled
is the rule that a lawyer should not steal another lawyers client nor
induce the latter to retain him by a promise of better service, good
result or reduced fees for his services.[20] Again the Court notes that
respondent never denied having these seafarers in his client list nor
receiving benefits from Labianos referrals. Furthermore, he never
denied Labianos connection to his office.[21] Respondent committed
an unethical, predatory overstep into anothers legal practice. He
cannot escape liability under Rule 8.02 of the CPR.
Moreover, by engaging in a money-lending venture with his clients as
borrowers, respondent violated Rule 16.04:
Rule 16.04 A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the clients
interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent
advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client except, when in the
interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter
he is handling for the client.
The rule is that a lawyer shall not lend money to his client. The
only exception is, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance
necessary expenses (such as filing fees, stenographers fees for
transcript of stenographic notes, cash bond or premium for surety
bond, etc.) for a matter that he is handling for the client.
The rule is intended to safeguard the lawyers independence of
mind so that the free exercise of his judgment may not be adversely
affected.[22] It seeks to ensure his undivided attention to the case he
is handling as well as his entire devotion and fidelity to the clients
cause. If the lawyer lends money to the client in connection with the
clients case, the lawyer in effect acquires an interest in the subject
matter of the case or an additional stake in its outcome.[23] Either of
these circumstances may lead the lawyer to consider his own
recovery rather than that of his client, or to accept a settlement which
may take care of his interest in the verdict to the prejudice of the
client in violation of his duty of undivided fidelity to the clients
cause.[24]
As previously mentioned, any act of solicitation constitutes
malpractice[25] which calls for the exercise of the Courts disciplinary
powers. Violation of anti-solicitation statutes warrants serious
sanctions for initiating contact with a prospective client for the
purpose of obtaining employment.[26] Thus, in this jurisdiction, we
adhere to the rule to protect the public from the Machiavellian
machinations of unscrupulous lawyers and to uphold the nobility of
the legal profession.
Considering the myriad infractions of respondent (including
violation of the prohibition on lending money to clients), the sanction
recommended by the IBP, a mere reprimand, is a wimpy slap on the
wrist. The proposed penalty is grossly incommensurate to its
findings.
A final word regarding the calling card presented in evidence by
petitioner. A lawyers best advertisement is a well-merited reputation
for professional capacity and fidelity to trust based on his character
and conduct.[27] For this reason, lawyers are only allowed to
announce their services by publication in reputable law lists or use
of simple professional cards.
Professional calling cards may only contain the following details:
(a) lawyers name;
(b) name of the law firm with which he is connected;
(c) address;
(d) telephone number and
(e) special branch of law practiced.[28]
Labianos calling card contained the phrase with financial
assistance. The phrase was clearly used to entice clients (who
already had representation) to change counsels with a promise of
loans to finance their legal actions. Money was dangled to lure clients
away from their original lawyers, thereby taking advantage of their
financial distress and emotional vulnerability. This crass
commercialism degraded the integrity of the bar and deserved no
place in the legal profession. However, in the absence of substantial
evidence to prove his culpability, the Court is not prepared to rule
that respondent was personally and directly responsible for the
printing and distribution of Labianos calling cards.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for violating
Rules 1.03, 2.03, 8.02 and 16.04 and Canon 3 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period
of one year effective immediately from receipt of this resolution. He
is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts
in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Resolution be made part of his records in the Office
of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines, and be
furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of
the Court Administrator to be circulated to all courts.
SO ORDERED.

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO T. CARPIO TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

[1]
Complaint dated February 1, 2005. Rollo, pp. 1-7.
[2]
Overseas seafarers Cenen Magno, Henry Dy, James R. Gregorio and Noel Geronimo. Id., pp. 2-3, 9-14.
[3]
Id., p. 9.
[4]
Involved benefits and disability collection cases. Id., pp. 2-3.
[5]
Complaint, Annex D. Id., pp. 12-14.
[6]
Complaint, Annex A. Id., p. 8.
[7]
Answer dated April 26, 2005. Id., pp. 20-23.
[8]
Resolution dated August 15, 2005. Id., p. 24.
[9]
Report and recommendation penned by Commissioner Lolita Quisumbing dated March 2, 2006. Id., pp. 106-111.
[10]
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Rule 8.02 provides:
A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the professional employment of another lawyer;
however, it is the right of any lawyer, without fear or favor, to give proper advice and assistance to those
seeking relief against unfaithful or neglectful counsel.
[11]
Rule 1.01; Canon 2; Rule 2.03; Canon 3; Rule 3.01; Canon 7; Rule 7.03; Canon 8; Rule 8.01; Canon 9; and Rule
9.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Rollo, p. 110.
[12]
RULES OF COURT, Rule 138, Section 27 provides:
Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. A member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other
gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or
for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as
an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the
purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice. (emphasis supplied)
[13]
In Re: Tagorda, 53 Phil. 37 (1933).
[14]
Agpalo, LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS, 7TH Edition (2002), p. 109.
[15]
Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court. See supra note 12.
[16]
Supra note 13.
[17]
Agpalo. Supra note 14, p. 72.
[18]
McCloskey v. Tobin, 252 US 107, 64 L Ed 481, 40 S Ct 306 (1920).
[19]
Or evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion even if other equally
reasonable minds might opine otherwise (Portuguez v. GSIS Family Savings Bank, G.R. No. 169570, 2 March
2007, 517 SCRA 309; Bautista v. Sula, A.M. No. P-04-1920, 17 August 2007, 530 SCRA 406; ePacific
Global Contact Center, Inc. v. Cabansay, G.R. No. 167345, 23 November 2007, 538 SCRA 498). Moreover,
in In re: Improper Solicitation of Court Employees Rolando H. Hernandez, Executive Assistant 1, Office of
the Court Administrator, A.M. No. 2008-12-SC, 24 April 2009, the Court adopted the OCAs evaluation
which relied on the sworn statements to support its conclusion that illegal acts were committed by
respondents in this case.
[20]
Supra note 14, p. 101.
[21]
Rollo, pp. 96-97.
[22]
Agpalo, supra note 14, p. 240 citing comments of the IBP Committee that drafted the CPR, p. 90.
[23]
Id.
[24]
Id.
[25]
Supra notes 10 and 12.
[26]
State Bar v. Kilpatrick, 874 SW2d 656 (1994, Tex). In this case, the lawyer was disbarred.
[27]
Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc., B.M. No. 553, 17 June 1993, 223 SCRA 378.
[28]
Id., p. 408.

Khan v Simbillo AC No 5299

FIRST DIVISION

[A.C. No. 5299. August 19, 2003]

ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., Assistant Court Administrator and Chief,
Public Information Office, complainant, vs. ATTY. RIZALINO T.
SIMBILLO, respondent.

[G.R. No. 157053. August 19, 2003]

ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO, petitioner, vs. IBP COMMISSION ON

BAR DISCIPLINE and ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., in his capacity
as Assistant Court Administrator and Chief, Public Information
Office, respondents.

RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This administrative complaint arose from a paid advertisement that appeared in the
July 5, 2000 issue of the newspaper, Philippine Daily Inquirer, which reads: ANNULMENT
OF MARRIAGE Specialist 532-4333/521-2667.[1]
Ms. Ma. Theresa B. Espeleta, a staff member of the Public Information Office of the
Supreme Court, called up the published telephone number and pretended to be an
interested party. She spoke to Mrs. Simbillo, who claimed that her husband, Atty. Rizalino
Simbillo, was an expert in handling annulment cases and can guarantee a court decree
within four to six months, provided the case will not involve separation of property or
custody of children. Mrs. Simbillo also said that her husband charges a fee of P48,000.00,
half of which is payable at the time of filing of the case and the other half after a decision
thereon has been rendered.
Further research by the Office of the Court Administrator and the Public Information
Office revealed that similar advertisements were published in the August 2 and 6, 2000
issues of the Manila Bulletin and August 5, 2000 issue of The Philippine Star.[2]
On September 1, 2000, Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., in his capacity as Assistant Court
Administrator and Chief of the Public Information Office, filed an administrative complaint
against Atty. Rizalino T. Simbillo for improper advertising and solicitation of his legal
services, in violation of Rule 2.03 and Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court.[3]
In his answer, respondent admitted the acts imputed to him, but argued that
advertising and solicitation per se are not prohibited acts; that the time has come to
change our views about the prohibition on advertising and solicitation; that the interest of
the public is not served by the absolute prohibition on lawyer advertising; that the Court
can lift the ban on lawyer advertising; and that the rationale behind the decades-old
prohibition should be abandoned. Thus, he prayed that he be exonerated from all the
charges against him and that the Court promulgate a ruling that advertisement of legal
services offered by a lawyer is not contrary to law, public policy and public order as long
as it is dignified.[4]
The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report
and recommendation.[5] On June 29, 2002, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline passed
Resolution No. XV-2002-306,[6] finding respondent guilty of violation of Rules 2.03 and
3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of
Court, and suspended him from the practice of law for one (1) year with the warning that
a repetition of similar acts would be dealt with more severely. The IBP Resolution was
noted by this Court on November 11, 2002.[7]
In the meantime, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration,[8] which was
denied by the IBP in Resolution No. XV-2002-606 dated October 19, 2002[9]
Hence, the instant petition for certiorari, which was docketed as G.R. No. 157053
entitled, Atty. Rizalino T. Simbillo, Petitioner versus IBP Commission on Bar Discipline,
Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., Asst. Court Administrator and Chief, Public Information Office,
Respondents. This petition was consolidated with A.C. No. 5299 per the Courts
Resolution dated March 4, 2003.
In a Resolution dated March 26, 2003, the parties were required to manifest whether
or not they were willing to submit the case for resolution on the basis of the
pleadings.[10] Complainant filed his Manifestation on April 25, 2003, stating that he is not
submitting any additional pleading or evidence and is submitting the case for its early
resolution on the basis of pleadings and records thereof. [11] Respondent, on the other
hand, filed a Supplemental Memorandum on June 20, 2003.
We agree with the IBPs Resolutions Nos. XV-2002-306 and XV-2002-606.
Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility read:

Rule 2.03. A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to
solicit legal business.

Rule 3.01. A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent,
misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim
regarding his qualifications or legal services.

Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court states:

SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds

therefor. A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct
in such office, grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as attorney
for a party without authority to do so.
 It has been repeatedly stressed that the practice of law is not a business.[12] It is a
profession in which duty to public service, not money, is the primary
consideration. Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-making venture, and law
advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields profits.[13] The gaining of a livelihood
should be a secondary consideration.[14] The duty to public service and to the
administration of justice should be the primary consideration of lawyers, who must
subordinate their personal interests or what they owe to themselves.[15] The following
elements distinguish the legal profession from a business:

1. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a by-product, and in

which one may attain the highest eminence without making much
money;

2. A relation as an officer of the court to the administration of justice

involving thorough sincerity, integrity and reliability;

3. A relation to clients in the highest degree of fiduciary;

4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness, and

unwillingness to resort to current business methods of advertising and
encroachment on their practice, or dealing directly with their clients. [16]

There is no question that respondent committed the acts complained of. He himself
admits that he caused the publication of the advertisements. While he professes
repentance and begs for the Courts indulgence, his contrition rings hollow considering the
fact that he advertised his legal services again after he pleaded for compassion
and after claiming that he had no intention to violate the rules. Eight months after filing
his answer, he again advertised his legal services in the August 14, 2001 issue of the Buy
& Sell Free Ads Newspaper.[17] Ten months later, he caused the same advertisement to
be published in the October 5, 2001 issue of Buy & Sell.[18] Such acts of respondent are a
deliberate and contemptuous affront on the Courts authority.
What adds to the gravity of respondents acts is that in advertising himself as a self-
styled Annulment of Marriage Specialist, he wittingly or unwittingly erodes and
undermines not only the stability but also the sanctity of an institution still considered
sacrosanct despite the contemporary climate of permissiveness in our society. Indeed, in
assuring prospective clients that an annulment may be obtained in four to six months from
the time of the filing of the case,[19] he in fact encourages people, who might have
otherwise been disinclined and would have refrained from dissolving their marriage
bonds, to do so.
Nonetheless, the solicitation of legal business is not altogether proscribed. However,
for solicitation to be proper, it must be compatible with the dignity of the legal profession. If
it is made in a modest and decorous manner, it would bring no injury to the lawyer and to
the bar.[20] Thus, the use of simple signs stating the name or names of the lawyers, the
office and residence address and fields of practice, as well as advertisement in legal
periodicals bearing the same brief data, are permissible. Even the use of calling cards is
now acceptable.[21] Publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the
standards of conduct imposed by the canon, of brief biographical and informative data is
likewise allowable. As explicitly stated in Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc.:[22]

Such data must not be misleading and may include only a statement of the lawyers
name and the names of his professional associates; addresses, telephone numbers,
cable addresses; branches of law practiced; date and place of birth and admission to
the bar; schools attended with dates of graduation, degrees and other educational
distinctions; public or quasi-public offices; posts of honor; legal authorships; legal
teaching positions; membership and offices in bar associations and committees
thereof, in legal and scientific societies and legal fraternities; the fact of listings in
other reputable law lists; the names and addresses of references; and, with their
written consent, the names of clients regularly represented.

The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it
cannot be a mere supplemental feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal or
periodical which is published principally for other purposes. For that reason, a
lawyer may not properly publish his brief biographical and informative data in a
daily paper, magazine, trade journal or society program. Nor may a lawyer permit
his name to be published in a law list the conduct, management, or contents of which
are calculated or likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar, or to lower dignity
or standing of the profession.

The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may
contain only a statement of his name, the name of the law firm which he is connected
with, address, telephone number and special branch of law practiced. The publication
of a simple announcement of the opening of a law firm or of changes in the
partnership, associates, firm name or office address, being for the convenience of the
profession, is not objectionable. He may likewise have his name listed in a telephone
directory but not under a designation of special branch of law. (emphasis and italics
supplied)

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO is found

GUILTY of violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for ONE (1) YEAR effective upon receipt of this Resolution. He is likewise STERNLY
WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Resolution be entered in his record as attorney and be furnished
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the country for their information and
guidance.
SO ORDERED.
 Vitug, (Acting Chairman),Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman ), abroad, on official business.

[1]
Rollo, p. 13.
[2]
Id., pp. 14-15.
[3]
Id., p. 9.
[4]
Id., pp. 21-57.
[5]
Id., p. 60.
[6]
Id., p. 62.
[7]
Id., p. 72.
[8]
Id., p. 75.
[9]
Id., p. 73.
[10]
Id., p. 109.
[11]
Id., p. 110.
[12]
Cantiller v. Potenciano, A.C. No. 3195, 18 December 1989, 180 SCRA 246, 253.
[13]
Canlas v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-77691, 8 August 1988, 164 SCRA 160, 174.
[14]
Agpalo R., LEGAL ETHICS, p. 12 [1997].
[15]
Burbe v. Magulta, A.C. No. 5713, 10 June 2002.
[16]
Agpalo, supra, at pp. 13-14, citing In re Sycip, 30 July 1979, 92 SCRA 1, 10; Pineda E.L. LEGAL AND
JUDICIAL ETHICS, p. 58 [1999].
[17]
Rollo, Vol. II, p. 41.
[18]
Id., p. 110.
[19]
Rollo, Vol. I, p. 3.
[20]
Pineda, Legal and Judicial Ethics, supra, at p. 61.
[21]
Id., p. 65.
[22]
Bar Matter No. 553, 17 June 1993, 223 SCRA 378, 407.

CANON 3
Director of Religious Affairs v Bayot 74 Phil 579

A.C. No. L-1117 March 20, 1944

THE DIRECTOR OF RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS, complainant,
vs.
ESTANISLAO R. BAYOT, respondent.

Office of the Solicitor General De la Costa and Solicitor Feria for complainant.
Francisco Claravall for respondent.

OZAETA, J.:

The respondent, who is an attorney-at-law, is charged with malpractice for having published an
advertisement in the Sunday Tribune of June 13, 1943, which reads as follows:

Marriage

license promptly secured thru our assistance & the annoyance of delay or publicity avoided if
desired, and marriage arranged to wishes of parties. Consultation on any matter free for the poor.
Everything confidential.

Legal assistance service

12 Escolta, Manila, Room, 105
Tel. 2-41-60.

Appearing in his own behalf, respondent at first denied having published the said advertisement; but
subsequently, thru his attorney, he admitted having caused its publication and prayed for "the
indulgence and mercy" of the Court, promising "not to repeat such professional misconduct in the
future and to abide himself to the strict ethical rules of the law profession." In further mitigation he
alleged that the said advertisement was published only once in the Tribune and that he never had
any case at law by reason thereof.

Upon that plea the case was submitted to the Court for decision.

It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by the respondent of the
ethics of his profession, it being a brazen solicitation of business from the public. Section 25 of Rule
127 expressly provides among other things that "the practice of soliciting cases at law for the
purpose of gain, either personally or thru paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." It is highly
unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his wares. Law is a
profession and not a trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his profession who stoops to and
adopts the practices of mercantilism by advertising his services or offering them to the public. As a
member of the bar, he defiles the temple of justice with mercenary activities as the money-changers
of old defiled the temple of Jehovah. "The most worth and effective advertisement possible, even for
a young lawyer, . . . is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and
fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced but must be the outcome of character and conduct." (Canon
27, Code of Ethics.)

In In re Tagorda, 53 Phil., the respondent attorney was suspended from the practice of law for the
period of one month for advertising his services and soliciting work from the public by writing circular
letters. That case, however, was more serious than this because there the solicitations were
repeatedly made and were more elaborate and insistent.

Considering his plea for leniency and his promise not to repeat the misconduct, the Court is of the
opinion and so decided that the respondent should be, as he hereby is, reprimanded.
Yulo, C.J., Moran, Horrilleno, Paras and Bocobo, JJ., concur.

Linsangan

CANON 4 and 5
Bar Matter No. 850 Oct 2, 2001
EN BANC

[B.M. 850. October 2, 2001]

MANDATORY CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION

RESOLUTION
ADOPTING THE REVISED RULES ON THE CONTINUING LEGAL
EDUCATION FOR MEMBERS OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE
PHILIPPINES
Considering the Rules on the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) for members
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), recommended by the IBP, endorsed by the
Philippine Judicial Academy, and reviewed and passed upon by the Supreme Court Committee on
Legal Education, the Court hereby resolves to approve, as it hereby approves, the following
Revised Rules for proper implementation:

Rule 1. PURPOSE

SECTION 1. Purpose of the MCLE. Continuing legal education is required of members of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) to ensure that throughout their career, they keep abreast
with law and jurisprudence, maintain the ethics of the profession and enhance the standards of the
practice of law.

Rule 2. MANDATORY CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION

SECTION 1. Commencement of the MCLE. Within two (2) months from the approval of these
Rules by the Supreme Court En Banc, the MCLE Committee shall be constituted and shall
commence the implementation of the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) program
in accordance with these Rules.
 SEC. 2. Requirements of completion of MCLE. Members of the IBP not exempt under Rule 7
shall complete every three (3) years at least thirty-six (36) hours of continuing legal education
activities approved by the MCLE Committee. Of the 36 hours:
(a) At least six (6) hours shall be devoted to legal ethics equivalent to six (6) credit units.
(b) At least four (4) hours shall be devoted to trial and pretrial skills equivalent to four (4) credit
units.
(c) At least five (5) hours shall be devoted to alternative dispute resolution equivalent to five (5)
credit units.
(d) At least nine (9) hours shall be devoted to updates on substantive and procedural laws, and
jurisprudence equivalent to nine (9) credit units.
(e) At least four (4) hours shall be devoted to legal writing and oral advocacy equivalent to four
(4) credit units.
(f) At least two (2) hours shall be devoted to international law and international
conventions equivalent to two (2) credit units.
(g) The remaining six (6) hours shall be devoted to such subjects as may be prescribed by the
MCLE Committee equivalent to six (6) credit units.

Rule 3. COMPLIANCE PERIOD

SECTION 1. Initial compliance period. -- The initial compliance period shall begin not later
than three (3) months from the adoption of these Rules. Except for the initial compliance period
for members admitted or readmitted after the establishment of the program, all compliance periods
shall be for thirty-six (36) months and shall begin the day after the end of the previous compliance
period.
SEC. 2. Compliance Groups. -- Members of the IBP not exempt from the MCLE requirement
shall be divided into three (3) compliance groups, namely:
(a) Compliance group 1. -- Members in the National Capital Region (NCR) or Metro Manila are
assigned to Compliance Group 1.
(b) Compliance group 2. -- Members in Luzon outside NCR are assigned to Compliance Group
2.
(c) Compliance group 3. -- Members in Visayas and Mindanao are assigned to Compliance Group
3.
Nevertheless, members may participate in any legal education activity wherever it may
be available to earn credit unit toward compliance with the MCLE requirement.
SEC. 3. Compliance period of members admitted or readmitted after establishment of the
program. Members admitted or readmitted to the Bar after the establishment of the program shall
be assigned to the appropriate Compliance Group based on their Chapter membership on the date
of admission or readmission.
 The initial compliance period after admission or readmission shall begin on the first day of
the month of admission or readmission and shall end on the same day as that of all other members
in the same Compliance Group.
(a) Where four (4) months or less remain of the initial compliance period after admission or
readmission, the member is not required to comply with the program requirement for the initial
compliance.
(b) Where more than four (4) months remain of the initial compliance period after admission or
readmission, the member shall be required to complete a number of hours of approved
continuing legal education activities equal to the number of months remaining in the
compliance period in which the member is admitted or readmitted. Such member shall be
required to complete a number of hours of education in legal ethics in proportion to the number
of months remaining in the compliance period. Fractions of hours shall be rounded up to the
next whole number.

Rule 4. COMPUTATION OF CREDIT UNITS(CU)

SECTION 1. Guidelines. - CREDIT UNITS ARE EQUIVALENT TO CREDIT

HOURS. CREDIT UNITS measure compliance with the MCLE requirement under the
Rules, based on the category of the lawyers participation in the MCLE activity. The following
are the guidelines for computing credit units and the supporting documents required
therefor:

PROGRAMS/ACTIVITY CREDIT UNITS SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

1. SEMINARS, CONVENTIONS, CONFERENCES, SYMPOSIA, IN-HOUSE

EDUCATION PROGRAMS, WORKSHOPS, DIALOGUES, ROUND TABLE
DISCUSSIONS BY APPROVED PROVIDERS UNDER RULE 7 AND OTHER
RELATED RULES

1.1 PARTICIPANT/ 1 CU PER HOUR OF CERTIFICATE OF

ATTENDEE ATTENDANCE ATTENDANCE WITH
NUMBER OF HOURS
1.2 LECTURER FULL CU FOR THE PHOTOCOPY OF
RESOURCE SUBJECT PER PLAQUE OR
SPEAKER COMPLIANCE PERIOD SPONSORS
CERTIFICATION

1.3 PANELIST/REACTOR 1/2 OF CU FOR THE CERTIFICATION

COMMENTATOR/ SUBJECT PER FROM
MODERATOR/ COMPLIANCE PERIOD SPONSORING
COORDINATOR/ ORGANIZATION
FACILITATOR
2. AUTHORSHIP, EDITING AND REVIEW

2.1 LAW BOOK OF NOT FULL CU FOR THE PUBLISHED BOOK

LESS THAN 100 PAGES SUBJECT PER
COMPLIANCE PERIOD
2.2 BOOK EDITOR 1/2 OF THE CU OF PUBLISHED BOOK
AUTHORSHIP CATEGORY WITH PROOF AS
EDITOR

2.3 RESEARCH PAPER 1/2 OF CU FOR THE DULY

INNOVATIVE PROGRAM/ SUBJECT PER CERTIFIED/
CREATIVE PROJECT COMPLIANCE PERIOD PUBLISHED
TECHNICAL
REPORT/PAPER

2.4 LEGAL ARTICLE OF AT 1/2 OF CU FOR THE PUBLISHED ARTICLE

LEAST TEN (10) PAGES SUBJECT PER
COMPLIANCE PERIOD

2.5 LEGAL NEWSLETTER/ 1 CU PER ISSUE PUBLISHED

LAW JOURNAL EDITOR NEWSLETTER/JOURNAL

2.6 PROFESSORIAL CHAIR/ FULL CU FOR THE CERTIFICATION OF

BAR REVIEW LECTURE SUBJECT PER LAW DEAN OR
LAW TEACHING/ COMPLIANCE PERIOD BAR REVIEW
DIRECTOR

Rule 5. CATEGORIES OF CREDIT UNITS

SECTION 1. Classes of Credit units. -- Credit units are either participatory or non-
participatory.
SEC. 2. Claim for participatory credit units. -- Participatory credit units may be claimed for:
(a) Attending approved education activities like seminars, conferences, conventions, symposia,
in-house education programs, workshops, dialogues or round table discussion.
(b) Speaking or lecturing, or acting as assigned panelist, reactor, commentator, resource speaker,
moderator, coordinator or facilitator in approved education activities.
(c) Teaching in a law school or lecturing in a bar review class.
SEC. 3. Claim for non-participatory credit units. Non-participatory credit units may be
claimed per compliance period for:
 (a) Preparing, as an author or co-author, written materials published or accepted for publication,
e.g., in the form of an article, chapter, book, or book review which contribute to the legal
education of the author member, which were not prepared in the ordinary course of the
members practice or employment.
(b) Editing a law book, law journal or legal newsletter.

Rule 6. COMPUTATION OF CREDIT HOURS (CH)

SECTION 1. Computation of credit hours. -- Credit hours are computed based on actual time
spent in an education activity in hours to the nearest one-quarter hour reported in decimals.

Rule 7. EXEMPTIONS

SECTION 1. Parties exempted from the MCLE. -- The following members of the Bar are
exempt from the MCLE requirement:
(a) The President and the Vice President of the Philippines, and the Secretaries and
Undersecretaries of Executive Departments;
(b) Senators and Members of the House of Representatives;
(c) The Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, incumbent and retired
members of the judiciary, incumbent members of the Judicial and Bar Council and incumbent
court lawyers covered by the Philippine Judicial Academy program of continuing judicial
education;
(d) The Chief State Counsel, Chief State Prosecutor and Assistant Secretaries of the Department
of Justice;
(e) The Solicitor General and the Assistant Solicitors General;
(f) The Government Corporate Counsel, Deputy and Assistant Government Corporate Counsel;
(g) The Chairmen and Members of the Constitutional Commissions;
(h) The Ombudsman, the Overall Deputy Ombudsman, the Deputy Ombudsman and the Special
Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman;
(i) Heads of government agencies exercising quasi-judicial functions;
(j) Incumbent deans, bar reviewers and professors of law who have teaching experience for at
least ten (10) years in accredited law schools;
(k) The Chancellor, Vice-Chancellor and members of the Corps of Professors and Professorial
Lecturers of the Philippine Judicial Academy; and
(l) Governors and Mayors.
SEC. 2. Other parties exempted from the MCLE. The following Members of the Bar are
likewise exempt:
 (a) Those who are not in law practice, private or public.
(b) Those who have retired from law practice with the approval of the IBP Board of Governors.
SEC. 3. Good cause for exemption from or modification of requirement A member may file a
verified request setting forth good cause for exemption (such as physical disability, illness, post
graduate study abroad, proven expertise in law, etc.) from compliance with or modification of any
of the requirements, including an extension of time for compliance, in accordance with a procedure
to be established by the MCLE Committee.
SEC. 4. Change of status. The compliance period shall begin on the first day of the month in
which a member ceases to be exempt under Sections 1, 2, or 3 of this Rule and shall end on the
same day as that of all other members in the same Compliance Group.
SEC. 5. Proof of exemption. Applications for exemption from or modification of the MCLE
requirement shall be under oath and supported by documents.

Rule 8. STANDARDS FOR APPROVAL OF

EDUCATION ACTIVITIES

SECTION 1. Approval of MCLE program. Subject to the implementing regulations that

may be adopted by the MCLE Committee, continuing legal education program may be granted
approval in either of two (2) ways: (1) the provider of the activity is an accredited provider and
certifies that the activity meets the criteria of Section 2 of this Rule; and (2) the provider is
specifically mandated by law to provide continuing legal education.
SEC. 2. Standards for all education activities. All continuing legal education activities must
meet the following standards:
(a) The activity shall have significant current intellectual or practical content.
(b) The activity shall constitute an organized program of learning related to legal subjects and the
legal profession, including cross profession activities (e.g., accounting-tax or medical-legal)
that enhance legal skills or the ability to practice law, as well as subjects in legal writing and
oral advocacy.
(c) The activity shall be conducted by a provider with adequate professional experience.
(d) Where the activity is more than one (1) hour in length, substantive written materials must be
distributed to all participants. Such materials must be distributed at or before the time the
activity is offered.
(e) In-house education activities must be scheduled at a time and location so as to be free from
interruption like telephone calls and other distractions.

Rule 9. ACCREDITATION OF PROVIDERS

SECTION 1. Accreditation of providers. -- Accreditation of providers shall be done by the

MCLE Committee.
 SEC. 2. Requirements for accreditation of providers. Any person or group may
be accredited as a provider for a term of two (2) years, which may be renewed, upon written
application. All providers of continuing legal education activities, including in-house providers,
are eligible to be accredited providers. Application for accreditation shall:
(a) Be submitted on a form provided by the MCLE Committee;
(b) Contain all information requested in the form;
(c) Be accompanied by the appropriate approval fee.
SEC. 3. Requirements of all providers. -- All approved accredited providers shall agree to the
following:
(a) An official record verifying the attendance at the activity shall be maintained by the provider
for at least four (4) years after the completion date. The provider shall include the member on
the official record of attendance only if the members signature was obtained at the time of
attendance at the activity. The official record of attendance shall contain the members name
and number in the Roll of Attorneys and shall identify the time, date, location, subject matter,
and length of the education activity. A copy of such record shall be furnished the MCLE
COMMITTEE.
(b) The provider shall certify that:

(1) This activity has been approved BY THE MCLE COMMITTEE in the amount of
________ hours of which ______ hours will apply in (legal ethics, etc.), as
appropriate to the content of the activity;

(2) The activity conforms to the standards for approved education activities prescribed
by these Rules and such regulations as may be prescribed by the MCLE
COMMITTEE.

(c) The provider shall issue a record or certificate to all participants identifying
the time, date, location, subject matter and length of the activity.

(d) The provider shall allow in-person observation of all approved continuing
legal education activity by THE MCLE COMMITTEE, members of the IBP
Board of Governors, or designees of the Committee and IBP staff Board for
purposes of monitoring compliance with these Rules.

(e) The provider shall indicate in promotional materials, the nature of the activity,
the time devoted to each topic and identity of the instructors. The provider shall
make available to each participant a copy of THE MCLE COMMITTEE-
approved Education Activity Evaluation Form.

(f) The provider shall maintain the completed Education Activity Evaluation
Forms for a period of not less than one (1) year after the activity, copy
furnished the MCLE COMMITTEE.
 (g) Any person or group who conducts an unauthorized activity under this
program or issues a spurious certificate in violation of these Rules shall be
subject to appropriate sanctions.

SEC. 4. Renewal of provider accreditation. The accreditation of a provider may be renewed

every two (2) years. It may be denied if the provider fails to comply with any of the requirements
of these Rules or fails to provide satisfactory education activities for the preceding period.
SEC. 5. Revocation of provider accreditation. -- the accreditation of any provider referred to
in Rule 9 may be revoked by a majority vote of the MCLE Committee, after notice and hearing
and for good cause.

Rule 10. FEE FOR APPROVAL OF ACTIVITY AND ACCREDITATION OF PROVIDER

SECTION 1. Payment of fees. Application for approval of an education activity or

accreditation as a provider requires payment of the appropriate fee as provided in the Schedule of
MCLE Fees.

Rule 11. GENERAL COMPLIANCE PROCEDURES

SECTION 1. Compliance card. -- Each member shall secure from the MCLE Committee a
Compliance Card before the end of his compliance period. He shall complete the card by attesting
under oath that he has complied with the education requirement or that he is exempt, specifying
the nature of the exemption. Such Compliance Card must be returned to the Committee not later
than the day after the end of the members compliance period.
SEC. 2. Member record keeping requirement. -- Each member shall maintain sufficient record
of compliance or exemption, copy furnished the MCLE Committee. The record required to be
provided to the members by the provider pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 9 should be a sufficient
record of attendance at a participatory activity. A record of non-participatory activity shall also be
maintained by the member, as referred to in Section 3 of Rule 5.

Rule 12. NON-COMPLIANCE PROCEDURES

SECTION 1. What constitutes non-compliance. The following shall constitute non-

compliance:
(a) Failure to complete the education requirement within the compliance period;
(b) Failure to provide attestation of compliance or exemption;
(c) Failure to provide satisfactory evidence of compliance (including evidence of exempt status)
within the prescribed period;
 (d) Failure to satisfy the education requirement and furnish evidence of such compliance within
sixty (60) days from receipt of non-compliance notice;
(e) Failure to pay non-compliance fee within the prescribed period;
(f) Any other act or omission analogous to any of the foregoing or intended to circumvent or
evade compliance with the MCLE requirements.
SEC. 2. Non-compliance notice and 60-day period to attain compliance. -Members failing to
comply will receive a Non-Compliance Notice stating the specific deficiency and will be given
sixty (60) days from the date of notification to file a response clarifying the deficiency or otherwise
showing compliance with the requirements. Such notice shall contain the following language near
the beginning of the notice in capital letters:

IF YOU FAIL TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE PROOF OF COMPLIANCE WITH

THE MCLE REQUIREMENT BY (INSERT DATE 60 DAYS FROM DATE OF
NOTICE), YOU SHALL BE LISTED AS A DELINQUENT MEMBER AND
SHALL NOT BE PERMITTED TO PRACTICE LAW UNTIL SUCH TIME AS
ADEQUATE PROOF OF COMPLIANCE IS RECEIVED BY THE MCLE
COMMITTEE.

Members given sixty (60) days to respond to a Non-Compliance Notice may use
this period to attain the adequate number of credit units for compliance.
Credit units earned during this period may only be counted toward compliance
with the prior compliance period requirement unless units in excess of the
requirement are earned, in which case the excess may be counted toward meeting
the current compliance period requirement.

Rule 13. CONSEQUENCES OF NON-COMPLIANCE

SECTION 1. Non-compliance fee. -- A member who, for whatever reason, is in non-

compliance at the end of the compliance period shall pay a non-compliance fee.
SEC. 2. Listing as delinquent member. -- A member who fails to comply with the
requirements after the sixty (60) day period for compliance has expired, shall be listed as a
delinquent member of the IBP upon the recommendation of the MCLE Committee. The
investigation of a member for non-compliance shall be conducted by the IBPs Commission on Bar
Discipline as a fact-finding arm of the MCLE Committee.
SEC. 3. Accrual of membership fee. -- Membership fees shall continue to accrue at the active
rate against a member during the period he/she is listed as a delinquent member.

Rule 14. REINSTATEMENT

 SECTION 1. Process. -- The involuntary listing as a delinquent member shall be terminated
when the member provides proof of compliance with the MCLE requirement, including payment
of non-compliance fee. A member may attain the necessary credit units to meet the requirement
for the period of non-compliance during the period the member is on inactive status. These
credit units may not be counted toward meeting the current compliance period requirement.
Credit units earned during the period of non-compliance in excess of the number needed to satisfy
the prior compliance period requirement may be counted toward meeting the current compliance
period requirement.
SEC. 2. Termination of delinquent listing is an administrative process. The termination of
listing as a delinquent member is administrative in nature AND it shall be made by the MCLE
Committee.

Rule. 15. COMMITTEE ON MANDATORY CONTINUING

LEGAL EDUCATION

SECTION 1. Composition. The MCLE Committee shall be composed of five (5) members,
namely, a retired Justice of the Supreme Court as Chair, and four (4) members respectively
nominated by the IBP, the Philippine Judicial Academy, a law center designated by the Supreme
Court and associations of law schools and/or law professors.
The members of the Committee shall be of proven probity and integrity. They shall be
appointed by the Supreme Court for a term of three (3) years and shall receive such compensation
as may be determined by the Court.
SEC. 2. Duty of committee. The MCLE Committee shall administer and adopt such
implementing rules as may be necessary subject to the approval of the Supreme Court. It shall, in
consultation with the IBP Board of Governors, prescribe a schedule of MCLE fees with the
approval of the Supreme Court.
SEC. 3. Staff of the MCLE Committee. Subject to approval by the Supreme Court, the
MCLE Committee shall employ such staff as may be necessary to perform the record-keeping,
auditing, reporting, approval and other necessary functions.
SEC. 4. Submission of annual budget. The MCLE Committee shall submit to the Supreme
Court for approval, an annual budget [for a subsidy] to establish, operate and maintain the MCLE
Program.
This resolution shall take effect on the fifteenth of September 2000, following its publication
in two (2) newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines.
Adopted this 22nd day of August, 2000, as amended on 02 October 2001.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Pardo,
Buena, Ynares-Santiago, De Leon, Jr., and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
Kapunan, J., on official leave.
EN BANC
 [B.M. 850. October 2, 2001]

MANDATORY CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION

RESOLUTION
ADOPTING THE REVISED RULES ON THE CONTINUING LEGAL
EDUCATION FOR MEMBERS OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE
PHILIPPINES
Considering the Rules on the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) for members
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), recommended by the IBP, endorsed by the
Philippine Judicial Academy, and reviewed and passed upon by the Supreme Court Committee on
Legal Education, the Court hereby resolves to approve, as it hereby approves, the following
Revised Rules for proper implementation:

Rule 1. PURPOSE

SECTION 1. Purpose of the MCLE. Continuing legal education is required of members of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) to ensure that throughout their career, they keep abreast
with law and jurisprudence, maintain the ethics of the profession and enhance the standards of the
practice of law.

Rule 2. MANDATORY CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION

SECTION 1. Commencement of the MCLE. Within two (2) months from the approval of these
Rules by the Supreme Court En Banc, the MCLE Committee shall be constituted and shall
commence the implementation of the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) program
in accordance with these Rules.
SEC. 2. Requirements of completion of MCLE. Members of the IBP not exempt under Rule 7
shall complete every three (3) years at least thirty-six (36) hours of continuing legal education
activities approved by the MCLE Committee. Of the 36 hours:
(a) At least six (6) hours shall be devoted to legal ethics equivalent to six (6) credit units.
(b) At least four (4) hours shall be devoted to trial and pretrial skills equivalent to four (4) credit
units.
(c) At least five (5) hours shall be devoted to alternative dispute resolution equivalent to five (5)
credit units.
(d) At least nine (9) hours shall be devoted to updates on substantive and procedural laws, and
jurisprudence equivalent to nine (9) credit units.
 (e) At least four (4) hours shall be devoted to legal writing and oral advocacy equivalent to four
(4) credit units.
(f) At least two (2) hours shall be devoted to international law and international
conventions equivalent to two (2) credit units.
(g) The remaining six (6) hours shall be devoted to such subjects as may be prescribed by the
MCLE Committee equivalent to six (6) credit units.

Rule 3. COMPLIANCE PERIOD

SECTION 1. Initial compliance period. -- The initial compliance period shall begin not later
than three (3) months from the adoption of these Rules. Except for the initial compliance period
for members admitted or readmitted after the establishment of the program, all compliance periods
shall be for thirty-six (36) months and shall begin the day after the end of the previous compliance
period.
SEC. 2. Compliance Groups. -- Members of the IBP not exempt from the MCLE requirement
shall be divided into three (3) compliance groups, namely:
(a) Compliance group 1. -- Members in the National Capital Region (NCR) or Metro Manila are
assigned to Compliance Group 1.
(b) Compliance group 2. -- Members in Luzon outside NCR are assigned to Compliance Group
2.
(c) Compliance group 3. -- Members in Visayas and Mindanao are assigned to Compliance Group
3.
Nevertheless, members may participate in any legal education activity wherever it may
be available to earn credit unit toward compliance with the MCLE requirement.
SEC. 3. Compliance period of members admitted or readmitted after establishment of the
program. Members admitted or readmitted to the Bar after the establishment of the program shall
be assigned to the appropriate Compliance Group based on their Chapter membership on the date
of admission or readmission.
The initial compliance period after admission or readmission shall begin on the first day of
the month of admission or readmission and shall end on the same day as that of all other members
in the same Compliance Group.
(a) Where four (4) months or less remain of the initial compliance period after admission or
readmission, the member is not required to comply with the program requirement for the initial
compliance.
(b) Where more than four (4) months remain of the initial compliance period after admission or
readmission, the member shall be required to complete a number of hours of approved
continuing legal education activities equal to the number of months remaining in the
compliance period in which the member is admitted or readmitted. Such member shall be
required to complete a number of hours of education in legal ethics in proportion to the number
of months remaining in the compliance period. Fractions of hours shall be rounded up to the
next whole number.
 Rule 4. COMPUTATION OF CREDIT UNITS(CU)

SECTION 1. Guidelines. - CREDIT UNITS ARE EQUIVALENT TO CREDIT

HOURS. CREDIT UNITS measure compliance with the MCLE requirement under the
Rules, based on the category of the lawyers participation in the MCLE activity. The following
are the guidelines for computing credit units and the supporting documents required
therefor:

PROGRAMS/ACTIVITY CREDIT UNITS SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

1. SEMINARS, CONVENTIONS, CONFERENCES, SYMPOSIA, IN-HOUSE

EDUCATION PROGRAMS, WORKSHOPS, DIALOGUES, ROUND TABLE
DISCUSSIONS BY APPROVED PROVIDERS UNDER RULE 7 AND OTHER
RELATED RULES

1.1 PARTICIPANT/ 1 CU PER HOUR OF CERTIFICATE OF

ATTENDEE ATTENDANCE ATTENDANCE WITH
NUMBER OF HOURS
1.2 LECTURER FULL CU FOR THE PHOTOCOPY OF
RESOURCE SUBJECT PER PLAQUE OR
SPEAKER COMPLIANCE PERIOD SPONSORS
CERTIFICATION

1.3 PANELIST/REACTOR 1/2 OF CU FOR THE CERTIFICATION

COMMENTATOR/ SUBJECT PER FROM
MODERATOR/ COMPLIANCE PERIOD SPONSORING
COORDINATOR/ ORGANIZATION
FACILITATOR

2. AUTHORSHIP, EDITING AND REVIEW

2.1 LAW BOOK OF NOT FULL CU FOR THE PUBLISHED BOOK

LESS THAN 100 PAGES SUBJECT PER
COMPLIANCE PERIOD
2.2 BOOK EDITOR 1/2 OF THE CU OF PUBLISHED BOOK
AUTHORSHIP CATEGORY WITH PROOF AS
EDITOR

2.3 RESEARCH PAPER 1/2 OF CU FOR THE DULY

INNOVATIVE PROGRAM/ SUBJECT PER CERTIFIED/
CREATIVE PROJECT COMPLIANCE PERIOD PUBLISHED
 TECHNICAL
REPORT/PAPER

2.4 LEGAL ARTICLE OF AT 1/2 OF CU FOR THE PUBLISHED ARTICLE

LEAST TEN (10) PAGES SUBJECT PER
COMPLIANCE PERIOD

2.5 LEGAL NEWSLETTER/ 1 CU PER ISSUE PUBLISHED

LAW JOURNAL EDITOR NEWSLETTER/JOURNAL

2.6 PROFESSORIAL CHAIR/ FULL CU FOR THE CERTIFICATION OF

BAR REVIEW LECTURE SUBJECT PER LAW DEAN OR
LAW TEACHING/ COMPLIANCE PERIOD BAR REVIEW
DIRECTOR

Rule 5. CATEGORIES OF CREDIT UNITS

SECTION 1. Classes of Credit units. -- Credit units are either participatory or non-
participatory.
SEC. 2. Claim for participatory credit units. -- Participatory credit units may be claimed for:
(a) Attending approved education activities like seminars, conferences, conventions, symposia,
in-house education programs, workshops, dialogues or round table discussion.
(b) Speaking or lecturing, or acting as assigned panelist, reactor, commentator, resource speaker,
moderator, coordinator or facilitator in approved education activities.
(c) Teaching in a law school or lecturing in a bar review class.
SEC. 3. Claim for non-participatory credit units. Non-participatory credit units may be
claimed per compliance period for:
(a) Preparing, as an author or co-author, written materials published or accepted for publication,
e.g., in the form of an article, chapter, book, or book review which contribute to the legal
education of the author member, which were not prepared in the ordinary course of the
members practice or employment.
(b) Editing a law book, law journal or legal newsletter.

Rule 6. COMPUTATION OF CREDIT HOURS (CH)

SECTION 1. Computation of credit hours. -- Credit hours are computed based on actual time
spent in an education activity in hours to the nearest one-quarter hour reported in decimals.
 Rule 7. EXEMPTIONS

SECTION 1. Parties exempted from the MCLE. -- The following members of the Bar are
exempt from the MCLE requirement:
(a) The President and the Vice President of the Philippines, and the Secretaries and
Undersecretaries of Executive Departments;
(b) Senators and Members of the House of Representatives;
(c) The Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, incumbent and retired
members of the judiciary, incumbent members of the Judicial and Bar Council and incumbent
court lawyers covered by the Philippine Judicial Academy program of continuing judicial
education;
(d) The Chief State Counsel, Chief State Prosecutor and Assistant Secretaries of the Department
of Justice;
(e) The Solicitor General and the Assistant Solicitors General;
(f) The Government Corporate Counsel, Deputy and Assistant Government Corporate Counsel;
(g) The Chairmen and Members of the Constitutional Commissions;
(h) The Ombudsman, the Overall Deputy Ombudsman, the Deputy Ombudsman and the Special
Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman;
(i) Heads of government agencies exercising quasi-judicial functions;
(j) Incumbent deans, bar reviewers and professors of law who have teaching experience for at
least ten (10) years in accredited law schools;
(k) The Chancellor, Vice-Chancellor and members of the Corps of Professors and Professorial
Lecturers of the Philippine Judicial Academy; and
(l) Governors and Mayors.
SEC. 2. Other parties exempted from the MCLE. The following Members of the Bar are
likewise exempt:
(a) Those who are not in law practice, private or public.
(b) Those who have retired from law practice with the approval of the IBP Board of Governors.
SEC. 3. Good cause for exemption from or modification of requirement A member may file a
verified request setting forth good cause for exemption (such as physical disability, illness, post
graduate study abroad, proven expertise in law, etc.) from compliance with or modification of any
of the requirements, including an extension of time for compliance, in accordance with a procedure
to be established by the MCLE Committee.
SEC. 4. Change of status. The compliance period shall begin on the first day of the month in
which a member ceases to be exempt under Sections 1, 2, or 3 of this Rule and shall end on the
same day as that of all other members in the same Compliance Group.
SEC. 5. Proof of exemption. Applications for exemption from or modification of the MCLE
requirement shall be under oath and supported by documents.
 Rule 8. STANDARDS FOR APPROVAL OF
EDUCATION ACTIVITIES

SECTION 1. Approval of MCLE program. Subject to the implementing regulations that

may be adopted by the MCLE Committee, continuing legal education program may be granted
approval in either of two (2) ways: (1) the provider of the activity is an accredited provider and
certifies that the activity meets the criteria of Section 2 of this Rule; and (2) the provider is
specifically mandated by law to provide continuing legal education.
SEC. 2. Standards for all education activities. All continuing legal education activities must
meet the following standards:
(a) The activity shall have significant current intellectual or practical content.
(b) The activity shall constitute an organized program of learning related to legal subjects and the
legal profession, including cross profession activities (e.g., accounting-tax or medical-legal)
that enhance legal skills or the ability to practice law, as well as subjects in legal writing and
oral advocacy.
(c) The activity shall be conducted by a provider with adequate professional experience.
(d) Where the activity is more than one (1) hour in length, substantive written materials must be
distributed to all participants. Such materials must be distributed at or before the time the
activity is offered.
(e) In-house education activities must be scheduled at a time and location so as to be free from
interruption like telephone calls and other distractions.

Rule 9. ACCREDITATION OF PROVIDERS

SECTION 1. Accreditation of providers. -- Accreditation of providers shall be done by the

MCLE Committee.
SEC. 2. Requirements for accreditation of providers. Any person or group may
be accredited as a provider for a term of two (2) years, which may be renewed, upon written
application. All providers of continuing legal education activities, including in-house providers,
are eligible to be accredited providers. Application for accreditation shall:
(a) Be submitted on a form provided by the MCLE Committee;
(b) Contain all information requested in the form;
(c) Be accompanied by the appropriate approval fee.
SEC. 3. Requirements of all providers. -- All approved accredited providers shall agree to the
following:
(a) An official record verifying the attendance at the activity shall be maintained by the provider
for at least four (4) years after the completion date. The provider shall include the member on
the official record of attendance only if the members signature was obtained at the time of
attendance at the activity. The official record of attendance shall contain the members name
and number in the Roll of Attorneys and shall identify the time, date, location, subject matter,
 and length of the education activity. A copy of such record shall be furnished the MCLE
COMMITTEE.
(b) The provider shall certify that:

(1) This activity has been approved BY THE MCLE COMMITTEE in the amount of
________ hours of which ______ hours will apply in (legal ethics, etc.), as
appropriate to the content of the activity;

(2) The activity conforms to the standards for approved education activities prescribed
by these Rules and such regulations as may be prescribed by the MCLE
COMMITTEE.

(c) The provider shall issue a record or certificate to all participants identifying
the time, date, location, subject matter and length of the activity.

(d) The provider shall allow in-person observation of all approved continuing
legal education activity by THE MCLE COMMITTEE, members of the IBP
Board of Governors, or designees of the Committee and IBP staff Board for
purposes of monitoring compliance with these Rules.

(e) The provider shall indicate in promotional materials, the nature of the activity,
the time devoted to each topic and identity of the instructors. The provider shall
make available to each participant a copy of THE MCLE COMMITTEE-
approved Education Activity Evaluation Form.

(f) The provider shall maintain the completed Education Activity Evaluation
Forms for a period of not less than one (1) year after the activity, copy
furnished the MCLE COMMITTEE.

(g) Any person or group who conducts an unauthorized activity under this
program or issues a spurious certificate in violation of these Rules shall be
subject to appropriate sanctions.

SEC. 4. Renewal of provider accreditation. The accreditation of a provider may be renewed

every two (2) years. It may be denied if the provider fails to comply with any of the requirements
of these Rules or fails to provide satisfactory education activities for the preceding period.
SEC. 5. Revocation of provider accreditation. -- the accreditation of any provider referred to
in Rule 9 may be revoked by a majority vote of the MCLE Committee, after notice and hearing
and for good cause.

Rule 10. FEE FOR APPROVAL OF ACTIVITY AND ACCREDITATION OF PROVIDER

 SECTION 1. Payment of fees. Application for approval of an education activity or
accreditation as a provider requires payment of the appropriate fee as provided in the Schedule of
MCLE Fees.

Rule 11. GENERAL COMPLIANCE PROCEDURES

SECTION 1. Compliance card. -- Each member shall secure from the MCLE Committee a
Compliance Card before the end of his compliance period. He shall complete the card by attesting
under oath that he has complied with the education requirement or that he is exempt, specifying
the nature of the exemption. Such Compliance Card must be returned to the Committee not later
than the day after the end of the members compliance period.
SEC. 2. Member record keeping requirement. -- Each member shall maintain sufficient record
of compliance or exemption, copy furnished the MCLE Committee. The record required to be
provided to the members by the provider pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 9 should be a sufficient
record of attendance at a participatory activity. A record of non-participatory activity shall also be
maintained by the member, as referred to in Section 3 of Rule 5.

Rule 12. NON-COMPLIANCE PROCEDURES

SECTION 1. What constitutes non-compliance. The following shall constitute non-

compliance:
(a) Failure to complete the education requirement within the compliance period;
(b) Failure to provide attestation of compliance or exemption;
(c) Failure to provide satisfactory evidence of compliance (including evidence of exempt status)
within the prescribed period;
(d) Failure to satisfy the education requirement and furnish evidence of such compliance within
sixty (60) days from receipt of non-compliance notice;
(e) Failure to pay non-compliance fee within the prescribed period;
(f) Any other act or omission analogous to any of the foregoing or intended to circumvent or
evade compliance with the MCLE requirements.
SEC. 2. Non-compliance notice and 60-day period to attain compliance. -Members failing to
comply will receive a Non-Compliance Notice stating the specific deficiency and will be given
sixty (60) days from the date of notification to file a response clarifying the deficiency or otherwise
showing compliance with the requirements. Such notice shall contain the following language near
the beginning of the notice in capital letters:

IF YOU FAIL TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE PROOF OF COMPLIANCE WITH

THE MCLE REQUIREMENT BY (INSERT DATE 60 DAYS FROM DATE OF
NOTICE), YOU SHALL BE LISTED AS A DELINQUENT MEMBER AND
 SHALL NOT BE PERMITTED TO PRACTICE LAW UNTIL SUCH TIME AS
ADEQUATE PROOF OF COMPLIANCE IS RECEIVED BY THE MCLE
COMMITTEE.

Members given sixty (60) days to respond to a Non-Compliance Notice may use
this period to attain the adequate number of credit units for compliance.
Credit units earned during this period may only be counted toward compliance
with the prior compliance period requirement unless units in excess of the
requirement are earned, in which case the excess may be counted toward meeting
the current compliance period requirement.

Rule 13. CONSEQUENCES OF NON-COMPLIANCE

SECTION 1. Non-compliance fee. -- A member who, for whatever reason, is in non-

compliance at the end of the compliance period shall pay a non-compliance fee.
SEC. 2. Listing as delinquent member. -- A member who fails to comply with the
requirements after the sixty (60) day period for compliance has expired, shall be listed as a
delinquent member of the IBP upon the recommendation of the MCLE Committee. The
investigation of a member for non-compliance shall be conducted by the IBPs Commission on Bar
Discipline as a fact-finding arm of the MCLE Committee.
SEC. 3. Accrual of membership fee. -- Membership fees shall continue to accrue at the active
rate against a member during the period he/she is listed as a delinquent member.

Rule 14. REINSTATEMENT

SECTION 1. Process. -- The involuntary listing as a delinquent member shall be terminated

when the member provides proof of compliance with the MCLE requirement, including payment
of non-compliance fee. A member may attain the necessary credit units to meet the requirement
for the period of non-compliance during the period the member is on inactive status. These
credit units may not be counted toward meeting the current compliance period requirement.
Credit units earned during the period of non-compliance in excess of the number needed to satisfy
the prior compliance period requirement may be counted toward meeting the current compliance
period requirement.
SEC. 2. Termination of delinquent listing is an administrative process. The termination of
listing as a delinquent member is administrative in nature AND it shall be made by the MCLE
Committee.

Rule. 15. COMMITTEE ON MANDATORY CONTINUING

LEGAL EDUCATION
 SECTION 1. Composition. The MCLE Committee shall be composed of five (5) members,
namely, a retired Justice of the Supreme Court as Chair, and four (4) members respectively
nominated by the IBP, the Philippine Judicial Academy, a law center designated by the Supreme
Court and associations of law schools and/or law professors.
The members of the Committee shall be of proven probity and integrity. They shall be
appointed by the Supreme Court for a term of three (3) years and shall receive such compensation
as may be determined by the Court.
SEC. 2. Duty of committee. The MCLE Committee shall administer and adopt such
implementing rules as may be necessary subject to the approval of the Supreme Court. It shall, in
consultation with the IBP Board of Governors, prescribe a schedule of MCLE fees with the
approval of the Supreme Court.
SEC. 3. Staff of the MCLE Committee. Subject to approval by the Supreme Court, the
MCLE Committee shall employ such staff as may be necessary to perform the record-keeping,
auditing, reporting, approval and other necessary functions.
SEC. 4. Submission of annual budget. The MCLE Committee shall submit to the Supreme
Court for approval, an annual budget [for a subsidy] to establish, operate and maintain the MCLE
Program.
This resolution shall take effect on the fifteenth of September 2000, following its publication
in two (2) newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines.
Adopted this 22nd day of August, 2000, as amended on 02 October 2001.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Pardo,
Buena, Ynares-Santiago, De Leon, Jr., and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
Kapunan, J., on official leave.

Bongalonta v. CAstillo 240 SCRA 310

CBD Case No. 176 January 20, 1995

SALLY D. BONGALONTA, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. PABLITO M. CASTILLO and ALFONSO M. MARTIJA, respondents.

RESOLUTION

MELO, J.:

In a sworn letter-complaint dated February 15, 1995, addressed to the Commission on Bar
Discipline, National Grievance Investigation Office, Integrated Bar of the Philippines, complainant
Sally Bongalonta charged Pablito M. Castillo and Alfonso M. Martija, members of the Philippine Bar,
with unjust and unethical conduct, to wit: representing conflicting interests and abetting a scheme to
frustrate the execution or satisfaction of a judgment which complainant might obtain.
The letter-complaint stated that complainant filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Criminal
Case No. 7635-55, for estafa, against the Sps. Luisa and Solomer Abuel. She also filed, a separate
civil action Civil Case No. 56934, where she was able to obtain a writ of preliminary attachment and
by virtue thereof, a piece of real property situated in Pasig, Rizal and registered in the name of the
Sps. Abuel under TCT No. 38374 was attached. Atty. Pablito Castillo was the counsel of the Sps.
Abuel in the aforesaid criminal and civil cases.

During the pendency of these cases, one Gregorio Lantin filed civil Case No. 58650 for collection of
a sum of money based on a promissory note, also with the Pasig Regional Trial Court, against the
Sps. Abuel. In the said case Gregorio Lantin was represented by Atty. Alfonso Martija. In this case,
the Sps. Abuel were declared in default for their failure to file the necessary responsive pleading and
evidence ex-parte was received against them followed by a judgment by default rendered in favor of
Gregorio Lantin. A writ of execution was, in due time, issued and the same property previously
attached by complainant was levied upon.

It is further alleged that in all the pleadings filed in these three (3) aforementioned cases, Atty.
Pablito Castillo and Atty. Alfonso Martija placed the same address, the same PTR and the same IBP
receipt number to wit" Permanent Light Center, No. 7, 21st Avenue, Cubao, Quezon City, PTR No.
629411 dated 11-5-89 IBP No. 246722 dated 1-12-88.

Thus, complainant concluded that civil Case No. 58650 filed by Gregorio Lantin was merely a part of
the scheme of the Sps. Abuel to frustrate the satisfaction of the money judgment which complainant
might obtain in Civil Case No. 56934.

After hearing, the IBP Board of Governors issued it Resolution with the following findings and
recommendations:

Among the several documentary exhibits submitted by Bongalonta and attached to the records is a
xerox copy of TCT No. 38374, which Bongalonta and the respondents admitted to be a faithful
reproduction of the original. And it clearly appears under the Memorandum of Encumbrances on aid
TCT that the Notice of Levy in favor of Bongalonta and her husband was registered and annotated in
said title of February 7, 1989, whereas, that in favor of Gregorio Lantin, on October 18, 1989.
Needless to state, the notice of levy in favor of Bongalonta and her husband is a superior lien on the
said registered property of the Abuel spouses over that of Gregorio Lantin.

Consequently, the charge against the two respondents (i.e. representing conflicting interests and
abetting a scheme to frustrate the execution or satisfaction of a judgment which Bongalonta and her
husband might obtain against the Abuel spouses) has no leg to stand on.

However, as to the fact that indeed the two respondents placed in their appearances and in their
pleadings the same IBP No. "246722 dated
1-12-88", respondent Atty. Pablito M. Castillo deserves to be SUSPENDED for using, apparently
thru his negligence, the IBP official receipt number of respondent Atty. Alfonso M. Martija. According
to the records of the IBP National Office, Atty. Castillo paid P1,040.00 as his delinquent and current
membership dues, on February 20, 1990, under IBP O.R. No. 2900538, after Bongalonta filed her
complaint with the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline.

The explanation of Atty. Castillo's Cashier-Secretary by the name of Ester Fraginal who alleged in
her affidavit dated March 4, 1993, that it was all her fault in placing the IBP official receipt number
pertaining to Atty. Alfonso M. Martija in the appearance and pleadings Atty. Castillo and in failing to
pay in due time the IBP membership dues of her employer, deserves scant consideration, for it is the
bounded duty and obligation of every lawyer to see to it that he pays his IBP membership dues on
time, especially when he practices before the courts, as required by the Supreme Court.

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that Atty. Pablito M. Castillo be SUSPENDED from

the practice of law for a period of six (6) months for using the IBP Official Receipt No. of his co-
respondent Atty. Alfonso M. Martija.

The complaint against Atty. Martija is hereby DISMISSED for lack of evidence. (pp. 2-4, Resolution)

The Court agrees with the foregoing findings and recommendations. It is well to stress again that the
practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they
possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such
privilege. One of these requirements is the observance of honesty and candor. Courts are entitled to
expect only complete candor and honesty from the lawyers appearing and pleading before them. A
lawyer, on the other hand, has the fundamental duty to satisfy that expectation. for this reason, he is
required to swear to do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court.

WHEREFORE, finding respondent Atty. Pablito M. Castillo guilty committing a falsehood in violation
of his lawyer's oath and of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND
him from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months, with a warning that commission of the
same or similar offense in the future will result in the imposition of a more severe penalty. A copy of
the Resolution shall be spread on the personal record of respondent in the Office of the Bar
Confidant.

SO ORDERED.

Feliciano, Bidin, Romero and Vitug, JJ., concur.

Cayetano vs Monsod 201 SCRA 210

G.R. No. 100113 September 3, 1991

RENATO CAYETANO, petitioner,

vs.
CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENT, and
HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and
Management, respondents.

Renato L. Cayetano for and in his own behalf.

Sabina E. Acut, Jr. and Mylene Garcia-Albano co-counsel for petitioner.

PARAS, J.:
We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching proportions. While ostensibly only legal issues
are involved, the Court's decision in this case would indubitably have a profound effect on the
political aspect of our national existence.

The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C:

There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who
shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-
five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective
position in the immediately preceding -elections. However, a majority thereof, including the
Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for
at least ten years. (Emphasis supplied)

The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section l(l), Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution which
similarly provides:

There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and eight

Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their
appointment, at least thirty-five years of age and holders of a college degree. However, a majority
thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in
the practice of law for at least ten years.' (Emphasis supplied)

Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what constitutes practice of law as a

legal qualification to an appointive office.

Black defines "practice of law" as:

The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and
technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or
advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and
other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal
instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients
and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the law. An attorney engages in the practice
of law by maintaining an office where he is held out to be-an attorney, using a letterhead describing
himself as an attorney, counseling clients in legal matters, negotiating with opposing counsel about
pending litigation, and fixing and collecting fees for services rendered by his associate. (Black's Law
Dictionary, 3rd ed.)

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title Abstract and Trust Co.
v. Dworken,129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650) A person is also considered to be in the practice of law
when he:

... for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms, associations or
corporations as to their rights under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an advocate
in proceedings pending or prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body,
committee, or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies and there, in such
representative capacity performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or defending the rights
of their clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engages in
the business of advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so engaged performs any
act or acts either in court or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law.
(State ex. rel. Mckittrick v..C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852)
This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v.Agrava, (105 Phil. 173,176-177) stated:

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the
management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in
addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in
matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services
contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of
a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as
do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the determination
by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263).
(Emphasis supplied)

Practice of law under modem conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of any
court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the
giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal
instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and other affairs. Although
these transactions may have no direct connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to
become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide
experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations.
These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the
administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth
in the order, can be drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer which involves appearance in
court and that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance
to the welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions be performed by persons
possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times under the
heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of
Court, Vol. 3 [1953 ed.] , p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of the Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E. 313,
quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A. 139,144). (Emphasis
ours)

The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation briefing for new lawyers
(1974-1975) listed the dimensions of the practice of law in even broader terms as advocacy,
counselling and public service.

One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment in the profession. If what he
does exacts knowledge of the law and is of a kind usual for attorneys engaging in the active practice
of their profession, and he follows some one or more lines of employment such as this he is a
practicing attorney at law within the meaning of the statute. (Barr v. Cardell, 155 NW 312)

Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those
acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render
any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or
skill." (111 ALR 23)

The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that it has adopted a liberal
interpretation of the term "practice of law."
MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I make a manifestation which I forgot to do during
our review of the provisions on the Commission on Audit. May I be allowed to make a very brief
statement?

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).

The Commissioner will please proceed.

MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications of the members of the Commission on Audit. Among
others, the qualifications provided for by Section I is that "They must be Members of the Philippine
Bar" — I am quoting from the provision — "who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least
ten years".

To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in excluding members of the Bar who are now
employed in the COA or Commission on Audit, we would like to make the clarification that this
provision on qualifications regarding members of the Bar does not necessarily refer or involve actual
practice of law outside the COA We have to interpret this to mean that as long as the lawyers who
are employed in the COA are using their legal knowledge or legal talent in their respective work
within COA, then they are qualified to be considered for appointment as members or commissioners,
even chairman, of the Commission on Audit.

This has been discussed by the Committee on Constitutional Commissions and Agencies and we
deem it important to take it up on the floor so that this interpretation may be made available
whenever this provision on the qualifications as regards members of the Philippine Bar engaging in
the practice of law for at least ten years is taken up.

MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one question.

MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.

MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in the COA by a lawyer is equivalent to the
requirement of a law practice that is set forth in the Article on the Commission on Audit?

MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of COA, although it is auditing, will necessarily
involve legal work; it will involve legal work. And, therefore, lawyers who are employed in COA now
would have the necessary qualifications in accordance with the Provision on qualifications under our
provisions on the Commission on Audit. And, therefore, the answer is yes.

MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to this is that this is equivalent to the practice of law.

MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.

MR. OPLE. Thank you.

... ( Emphasis supplied)

Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, provides, among others, that the Chairman and
two Commissioners of the Commission on Audit (COA) should either be certified public accountants
with not less than ten years of auditing practice, or members of the Philippine Bar who have been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. (emphasis supplied)
Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and which is in many ways synonymous with the
word "lawyer." Today, although many lawyers do not engage in private practice, it is still a fact that
the majority of lawyers are private practitioners. (Gary Munneke, Opportunities in Law Careers [VGM
Career Horizons: Illinois], [1986], p. 15).

At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as commonly understood,
means "an individual or organization engaged in the business of delivering legal services." (Ibid.).
Lawyers who practice alone are often called "sole practitioners." Groups of lawyers are called
"firms." The firm is usually a partnership and members of the firm are the partners. Some firms may
be organized as professional corporations and the members called shareholders. In either case, the
members of the firm are the experienced attorneys. In most firms, there are younger or more
inexperienced salaried attorneyscalled "associates." (Ibid.).

The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of law practice is essentially
tautologous, unhelpful defining the practice of law as that which lawyers do. (Charles W.
Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics [West Publishing Co.: Minnesota, 1986], p. 593). The practice of law
is defined as the performance of any acts . . . in or out of court, commonly understood to be the
practice of law. (State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 140 A.2d 863, 870
[1958] [quoting Grievance Comm. v. Payne, 128 Conn. 325, 22 A.2d 623, 626 [1941]). Because
lawyers perform almost every function known in the commercial and governmental realm, such a
definition would obviously be too global to be workable.(Wolfram, op. cit.).

The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at once the most publicly familiar role
for lawyers as well as an uncommon role for the average lawyer. Most lawyers spend little time in
courtrooms, and a large percentage spend their entire practice without litigating a case. (Ibid., p.
593). Nonetheless, many lawyers do continue to litigate and the litigating lawyer's role colors much
of both the public image and the self perception of the legal profession. (Ibid.).

In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the public mind reflects history, not reality. (Ibid.).
Why is this so? Recall that the late Alexander SyCip, a corporate lawyer, once articulated on the
importance of a lawyer as a business counselor in this wise: "Even today, there are still uninformed
laymen whose concept of an attorney is one who principally tries cases before the courts. The
members of the bench and bar and the informed laymen such as businessmen, know that in most
developed societies today, substantially more legal work is transacted in law offices than in the
courtrooms. General practitioners of law who do both litigation and non-litigation work also know that
in most cases they find themselves spending more time doing what [is] loosely desccribe[d] as
business counseling than in trying cases. The business lawyer has been described as the planner,
the diagnostician and the trial lawyer, the surgeon. I[t] need not [be] stress[ed] that in law, as in
medicine, surgery should be avoided where internal medicine can be effective." (Business Star,
"Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

In the course of a working day the average general practitioner wig engage in a number of legal
tasks, each involving different legal doctrines, legal skills, legal processes, legal institutions, clients,
and other interested parties. Even the increasing numbers of lawyers in specialized practice wig
usually perform at least some legal services outside their specialty. And even within a narrow
specialty such as tax practice, a lawyer will shift from one legal task or role such as advice-giving to
an importantly different one such as representing a client before an administrative agency.
(Wolfram, supra, p. 687).

By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the relatively rare
types — a litigator who specializes in this work to the exclusion of much else. Instead, the work will
require the lawyer to have mastered the full range of traditional lawyer skills of client counselling,
advice-giving, document drafting, and negotiation. And increasingly lawyers find that the new skills of
evaluation and mediation are both effective for many clients and a source of employment. (Ibid.).

Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in litigation work that is constrained in very
important ways, at least theoretically, so as to remove from it some of the salient features of
adversarial litigation. Of these special roles, the most prominent is that of prosecutor. In some
lawyers' work the constraints are imposed both by the nature of the client and by the way in which
the lawyer is organized into a social unit to perform that work. The most common of these roles are
those of corporate practice and government legal service. (Ibid.).

In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily, herein below quoted are emerging trends in
corporate law practice, a departure from the traditional concept of practice of law.

We are experiencing today what truly may be called a revolutionary transformation in corporate law
practice. Lawyers and other professional groups, in particular those members participating in various
legal-policy decisional contexts, are finding that understanding the major emerging trends in
corporation law is indispensable to intelligent decision-making.

Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of today requires an accurate understanding of

the nature and implications of the corporate law research function accompanied by an accelerating
rate of information accumulation. The recognition of the need for such improved corporate legal
policy formulation, particularly "model-making" and "contingency planning," has impressed upon us
the inadequacy of traditional procedures in many decisional contexts.

In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be processed, the sorting and weighing of
significant conditional factors, the appraisal of major trends, the necessity of estimating the
consequences of given courses of action, and the need for fast decision and response in situations
of acute danger have prompted the use of sophisticated concepts of information flow theory,
operational analysis, automatic data processing, and electronic computing equipment.
Understandably, an improved decisional structure must stress the predictive component of the
policy-making process, wherein a "model", of the decisional context or a segment thereof is
developed to test projected alternative courses of action in terms of futuristic effects flowing
therefrom.

Although members of the legal profession are regularly engaged in predicting and projecting the
trends of the law, the subject of corporate finance law has received relatively little organized and
formalized attention in the philosophy of advancing corporate legal education. Nonetheless, a cross-
disciplinary approach to legal research has become a vital necessity.

Certainly, the general orientation for productive contributions by those trained primarily in the law
can be improved through an early introduction to multi-variable decisional context and the various
approaches for handling such problems. Lawyers, particularly with either a master's or doctorate
degree in business administration or management, functioning at the legal policy level of decision-
making now have some appreciation for the concepts and analytical techniques of other professions
which are currently engaged in similar types of complex decision-making.

Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate finance problems would require the services of an
astute attorney because of the complex legal implications that arise from each and every necessary
step in securing and maintaining the business issue raised. (Business Star, "Corporate Finance
Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is assiduously referred to as the "abogado de
campanilla." He is the "big-time" lawyer, earning big money and with a clientele composed of the
tycoons and magnates of business and industry.

Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers, many people could not explain what it is that a
corporate lawyer does. For one, the number of attorneys employed by a single corporation will vary
with the size and type of the corporation. Many smaller and some large corporations farm out all
their legal problems to private law firms. Many others have in-house counsel only for certain matters.
Other corporation have a staff large enough to handle most legal problems in-house.

A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a lawyer who handles the legal affairs of a
corporation. His areas of concern or jurisdiction may include, inter alia: corporate legal research, tax
laws research, acting out as corporate secretary (in board meetings), appearances in both courts
and other adjudicatory agencies (including the Securities and Exchange Commission), and in other
capacities which require an ability to deal with the law.

At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume responsibilities other than the legal affairs of the
business of the corporation he is representing. These include such matters as determining policy
and becoming involved in management. ( Emphasis supplied.)

In a big company, for example, one may have a feeling of being isolated from the action, or not
understanding how one's work actually fits into the work of the orgarnization. This can be frustrating
to someone who needs to see the results of his work first hand. In short, a corporate lawyer is
sometimes offered this fortune to be more closely involved in the running of the business.

Moreover, a corporate lawyer's services may sometimes be engaged by a multinational corporation

(MNC). Some large MNCs provide one of the few opportunities available to corporate lawyers to
enter the international law field. After all, international law is practiced in a relatively small number of
companies and law firms. Because working in a foreign country is perceived by many as glamorous,
tills is an area coveted by corporate lawyers. In most cases, however, the overseas jobs go to
experienced attorneys while the younger attorneys do their "international practice" in law libraries.
(Business Star, "Corporate Law Practice," May 25,1990, p. 4).

This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the lawyer in the realm of finance. To borrow the lines
of Harvard-educated lawyer Bruce Wassertein, to wit: "A bad lawyer is one who fails to spot
problems, a good lawyer is one who perceives the difficulties, and the excellent lawyer is one who
surmounts them." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

Today, the study of corporate law practice direly needs a "shot in the arm," so to speak. No longer
are we talking of the traditional law teaching method of confining the subject study to the Corporation
Code and the Securities Code but an incursion as well into the intertwining modern management
issues.

Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily with three (3) types of learning: (1)
acquisition of insights into current advances which are of particular significance to the corporate
counsel; (2) an introduction to usable disciplinary skins applicable to a corporate counsel's
management responsibilities; and (3) a devotion to the organization and management of the legal
function itself.

These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting circles, with a shared area linking them.
Otherwise known as "intersecting managerial jurisprudence," it forms a unifying theme for the
corporate counsel's total learning.
Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences affect the counsel's role. For that matter, the
corporate lawyer reviews the globalization process, including the resulting strategic repositioning that
the firms he provides counsel for are required to make, and the need to think about a corporation's;
strategy at multiple levels. The salience of the nation-state is being reduced as firms deal both with
global multinational entities and simultaneously with sub-national governmental units. Firms
increasingly collaborate not only with public entities but with each other — often with those who are
competitors in other arenas.

Also, the nature of the lawyer's participation in decision-making within the corporation is rapidly
changing. The modem corporate lawyer has gained a new role as a stakeholder — in some cases
participating in the organization and operations of governance through participation on boards and
other decision-making roles. Often these new patterns develop alongside existing legal institutions
and laws are perceived as barriers. These trends are complicated as corporations organize for
global operations. ( Emphasis supplied)

The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with governmental policies toward the promotion
and management of technology. New collaborative arrangements for promoting specific
technologies or competitiveness more generally require approaches from industry that differ from
older, more adversarial relationships and traditional forms of seeking to influence governmental
policies. And there are lessons to be learned from other countries. In
Europe, Esprit, Eureka and Race are examples of collaborative efforts between governmental and
business Japan's MITI is world famous. (Emphasis supplied)

Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office of the Corporate Counsel comprises a
distinct group within the managerial structure of all kinds of organizations. Effectiveness of both long-
term and temporary groups within organizations has been found to be related to indentifiable factors
in the group-context interaction such as the groups actively revising their knowledge of the
environment coordinating work with outsiders, promoting team achievements within the organization.
In general, such external activities are better predictors of team performance than internal group
processes.

In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of the corporate lawyer vis-a-vis the managerial
mettle of corporations are challenged. Current research is seeking ways both to anticipate effective
managerial procedures and to understand relationships of financial liability and insurance
considerations. (Emphasis supplied)

Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel, three factors are apropos:

First System Dynamics. The field of systems dynamics has been found an effective tool for new
managerial thinking regarding both planning and pressing immediate problems. An understanding of
the role of feedback loops, inventory levels, and rates of flow, enable users to simulate all sorts of
systematic problems — physical, economic, managerial, social, and psychological. New
programming techniques now make the system dynamics principles more accessible to managers
— including corporate counsels. (Emphasis supplied)

Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make better decisions involving complexity and
uncertainty. In the context of a law department, it can be used to appraise the settlement value of
litigation, aid in negotiation settlement, and minimize the cost and risk involved in managing a
portfolio of cases. (Emphasis supplied)

Third Modeling for Negotiation Management. Computer-based models can be used directly by
parties and mediators in all lands of negotiations. All integrated set of such tools provide coherent
and effective negotiation support, including hands-on on instruction in these techniques. A simulation
case of an international joint venture may be used to illustrate the point.

[Be this as it may,] the organization and management of the legal function, concern three pointed
areas of consideration, thus:

Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires special skills that comprise a major part of the
general counsel's responsibilities. They differ from those of remedial law. Preventive lawyering is
concerned with minimizing the risks of legal trouble and maximizing legal rights for such legal
entities at that time when transactional or similar facts are being considered and made.

Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within which are undertaken those activities of the
firm to which legal consequences attach. It needs to be directly supportive of this nation's evolving
economic and organizational fabric as firms change to stay competitive in a global, interdependent
environment. The practice and theory of "law" is not adequate today to facilitate the relationships
needed in trying to make a global economy work.

Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsel's Office. The general counsel has emerged
in the last decade as one of the most vibrant subsets of the legal profession. The corporate counsel
hear responsibility for key aspects of the firm's strategic issues, including structuring its global
operations, managing improved relationships with an increasingly diversified body of employees,
managing expanded liability exposure, creating new and varied interactions with public decision-
makers, coping internally with more complex make or by decisions.

This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing corporate law is not enough to make one a
good general corporate counsel nor to give him a full sense of how the legal system shapes
corporate activities. And even if the corporate lawyer's aim is not the understand all of the law's
effects on corporate activities, he must, at the very least, also gain a working knowledge of the
management issues if only to be able to grasp not only the basic legal "constitution' or makeup of the
modem corporation. "Business Star", "The Corporate Counsel," April 10, 1991, p. 4).

The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench) is to have more than a passing knowledge
of financial law affecting each aspect of their work. Yet, many would admit to ignorance of vast tracts
of the financial law territory. What transpires next is a dilemma of professional security: Will the
lawyer admit ignorance and risk opprobrium?; or will he feign understanding and risk exposure?
(Business Star, "Corporate Finance law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of
Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on
Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does
not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years.

On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as

Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he
assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC.

Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod's

nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition
praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the
Commission on Elections be declared null and void.
Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of
1960 with a grade of 86-55%. He has been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his professional license fees as
lawyer for more than ten years. (p. 124, Rollo)

After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod worked in
the law office of his father. During his stint in the World Bank Group (1963-1970), Monsod worked as
an operations officer for about two years in Costa Rica and Panama, which involved getting
acquainted with the laws of member-countries negotiating loans and coordinating legal, economic,
and project work of the Bank. Upon returning to the Philippines in 1970, he worked with the Meralco
Group, served as chief executive officer of an investment bank and subsequently of a business
conglomerate, and since 1986, has rendered services to various companies as a legal and
economic consultant or chief executive officer. As former Secretary-General (1986) and National
Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL. Monsod's work involved being knowledgeable in election law. He
appeared for NAMFREL in its accreditation hearings before the Comelec. In the field of advocacy,
Monsod, in his personal capacity and as former Co-Chairman of the Bishops Businessmen's
Conference for Human Development, has worked with the under privileged sectors, such as the
farmer and urban poor groups, in initiating, lobbying for and engaging in affirmative action for the
agrarian reform law and lately the urban land reform bill. Monsod also made use of his legal
knowledge as a member of the Davide Commission, a quast judicial body, which conducted
numerous hearings (1990) and as a member of the Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and
Chairman of its Committee on Accountability of Public Officers, for which he was cited by the
President of the Commission, Justice Cecilia Muñoz-Palma for "innumerable amendments to
reconcile government functions with individual freedoms and public accountability and the party-list
system for the House of Representative. (pp. 128-129 Rollo) ( Emphasis supplied)

Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty. Monsod used to be a member.

In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel acts as a team, and which is adequately
constituted to meet the various contingencies that arise during a negotiation. Besides top officials of
the Borrower concerned, there are the legal officer (such as the legal counsel), the finance manager,
and an operations officer (such as an official involved in negotiating the contracts) who comprise the
members of the team. (Guillermo V. Soliven, "Loan Negotiating Strategies for Developing Country
Borrowers," Staff Paper No. 2, Central Bank of the Philippines, Manila, 1982, p. 11). (Emphasis
supplied)

After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country's Constitution; it lays down the law as far as the
loan transaction is concerned. Thus, the meat of any Loan Agreement can be compartmentalized
into five (5) fundamental parts: (1) business terms; (2) borrower's representation; (3) conditions of
closing; (4) covenants; and (5) events of default. (Ibid., p. 13).

In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any debt restructuring program. For aside from
performing the tasks of legislative drafting and legal advising, they score national development
policies as key factors in maintaining their countries' sovereignty. (Condensed from the work paper,
entitled "Wanted: Development Lawyers for Developing Nations," submitted by L. Michael Hager,
regional legal adviser of the United States Agency for International Development, during the Session
on Law for the Development of Nations at the Abidjan World Conference in Ivory Coast, sponsored
by the World Peace Through Law Center on August 26-31, 1973). ( Emphasis supplied)

Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more so than purely renegotiation policies,
demand expertise in the law of contracts, in legislation and agreement drafting and in renegotiation.
Necessarily, a sovereign lawyer may work with an international business specialist or an economist
in the formulation of a model loan agreement. Debt restructuring contract agreements contain such a
mixture of technical language that they should be carefully drafted and signed only with the advise of
competent counsel in conjunction with the guidance of adequate technical support personnel. (See
International Law Aspects of the Philippine External Debts, an unpublished dissertation, U.S.T.
Graduate School of Law, 1987, p. 321). ( Emphasis supplied)

A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract construction is the set of terms and
conditions which determines the contractual remedies for a failure to perform one or more elements
of the contract. A good agreement must not only define the responsibilities of both parties, but must
also state the recourse open to either party when the other fails to discharge an obligation. For a
compleat debt restructuring represents a devotion to that principle which in the ultimate analysis
is sine qua non for foreign loan agreements-an adherence to the rule of law in domestic and
international affairs of whose kind U.S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. once said:
"They carry no banners, they beat no drums; but where they are, men learn that bustle and bush are
not the equal of quiet genius and serene mastery." (See Ricardo J. Romulo, "The Role of Lawyers in
Foreign Investments," Integrated Bar of the Philippine Journal, Vol. 15, Nos. 3 and 4, Third and
Fourth Quarters, 1977, p. 265).

Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of law". particularly the modern
concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction intended by the framers
of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager,
a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both
the rich and the poor — verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement — that he has been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327, the Court said:

Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in which it is
vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee should possess the
qualifications required by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that
there are others better qualified who should have been preferred. This is a political question
involving considerations of wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide. (emphasis
supplied)

No less emphatic was the Court in the case of (Central Bank v. Civil Service Commission, 171
SCRA 744) where it stated:

It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in this case, and all the other legal
requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no alternative but to attest to the appointment in
accordance with the Civil Service Law. The Commission has no authority to revoke an appointment
on the ground that another person is more qualified for a particular position. It also has no authority
to direct the appointment of a substitute of its choice. To do so would be an encroachment on the
discretion vested upon the appointing authority. An appointment is essentially within the
discretionary power of whomsoever it is vested, subject to the only condition that the appointee
should possess the qualifications required by law. ( Emphasis supplied)

The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar, consists of four (4) stages: (1)
nomination; (2) confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; (3) issuance of a commission (in
the Philippines, upon submission by the Commission on Appointments of its certificate of
confirmation, the President issues the permanent appointment; and (4) acceptance e.g., oath-taking,
posting of bond, etc. . . . (Lacson v. Romero, No. L-3081, October 14, 1949; Gonzales, Law on
Public Officers, p. 200)
The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to the nomination of Monsod as
Chairman of the Commission on Elections is mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-Article C, Article IX of
the Constitution which provides:

The Chairman and the Commisioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first
appointed, three Members shall hold office for seven years, two Members for five years, and the last
Members for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the
unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a
temporary or acting capacity.

Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla's separate opinion, suffice it to say that his definition of the practice of
law is the traditional or stereotyped notion of law practice, as distinguished from the modern concept
of the practice of law, which modern connotation is exactly what was intended by the eminent
framers of the 1987 Constitution. Moreover, Justice Padilla's definition would require generally a
habitual law practice, perhaps practised two or three times a week and would outlaw say, law
practice once or twice a year for ten consecutive years. Clearly, this is far from the constitutional
intent.

Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz states that in my written opinion, I
made use of a definition of law practice which really means nothing because the definition says that
law practice " . . . is what people ordinarily mean by the practice of law." True I cited the definition but
only by way of sarcasm as evident from my statement that the definition of law practice by
"traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologous" or defining a phrase by means of the
phrase itself that is being defined.

Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers almost all situations, most
individuals, in making use of the law, or in advising others on what the law means, are actually
practicing law. In that sense, perhaps, but we should not lose sight of the fact that Mr. Monsod is a
lawyer, a member of the Philippine Bar, who has been practising law for over ten years. This is
different from the acts of persons practising law, without first becoming lawyers.

Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even disqualify an elected President of the
Philippines, say, on the ground that he lacks one or more qualifications. This matter, I greatly doubt.
For one thing, how can an action or petition be brought against the President? And even assuming
that he is indeed disqualified, how can the action be entertained since he is the incumbent
President?

We now proceed:

The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public hearings on Monsod's
confirmation, implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary qualifications as required by
law. The judgment rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is
beyond judicial interference except only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only where such
grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the Commission's judgment.
In the instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court's corrective power, since no
abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion, that would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction
and would warrant the issuance of the writs prayed, for has been clearly shown.

Additionally, consider the following:

(1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by the President, may the Supreme Court
reverse the Commission, and thus in effect confirm the appointment? Clearly, the answer is in the
negative.

(2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee, whom the Commission has confirmed? The
answer is likewise clear.

(3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming body in the U.S. Congress) decides
to confirm a Presidential nominee, it would be incredible that the U.S. Supreme Court would
still reverse the U.S. Senate.

Finally, one significant legal maxim is:

We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that giveth life.

Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once, the procurator of Judea asked Delilah
(who was Samson's beloved) for help in capturing Samson. Delilah agreed on condition that —

No blade shall touch his skin;

No blood shall flow from his veins.

When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured, the procurator placed an iron rod burning
white-hot two or three inches away from in front of Samson's eyes. This blinded the man. Upon
hearing of what had happened to her beloved, Delilah was beside herself with anger, and fuming
with righteous fury, accused the procurator of reneging on his word. The procurator calmly replied:
"Did any blade touch his skin? Did any blood flow from his veins?" The procurator was clearly relying
on the letter, not the spirit of the agreement.

In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., I certify that he voted to dismiss the petition. (Fernan, C.J.)

Sarmiento, J., is on leave.

Regalado, and Davide, Jr., J., took no part.

PLA v Agrava 105 Phil 173

G.R. No. L-12426 February 16, 1959

PHILIPPINE LAWYER'S ASSOCIATION, petitioner,

vs.
CELEDONIO AGRAVA, in his capacity as Director of the Philippines Patent Office, respondent.
Arturo A. Alafriz for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Pacifico P. de Castro for respondent.

MONTEMAYOR, J.:

This is the petition filed by the Philippine Lawyer's Association for prohibition and injunction against
Celedonio Agrava, in his capacity as Director of the Philippines Patent Office.

On may 27, 1957, respondent Director issued a circular announcing that he had scheduled for June
27, 1957 an examination for the purpose of determining who are qualified to practice as patent
attorneys before the Philippines Patent Office, the said examination to cover patent law and
jurisprudence and the rules of practice before said office. According to the circular, members of the
Philippine Bar, engineers and other persons with sufficient scientific and technical training are
qualified to take the said examination. It would appear that heretofore, respondent Director has been
holding similar examinations.

It is the contention of the petitioner Philippine Lawyer's Association that one who has passed the bar
examinations and is licensed by the Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines and who is in
good standing, is duly qualified to practice before the Philippines Patent Office, and that
consequently, the cat of the respondent Director requiring members of the Philippine Bar in good
standing to take and pass an examination given by the Patent Office as a condition precedent to
their being allowed to practice before said office, such as representing applicants in the preparation
and prosecution of applications for patent, is in excess of his jurisdiction and is in violation of the law.

In his answer, respondent Director, through the Solicitor General, maintains that the prosecution of
patent cases "does not involve entirely or purely the practice of law but includes the application of
scientific and technical knowledge and training, so much so that, as a matter of actual practice, the
prosecution of patent cases may be handled not only by lawyers, but also engineers and other
persons with sufficient scientific and technical training who pass the prescribed examinations as
given by the Patent Office; . . . that the Rules of Court do not prohibit the Patent Office, or any other
quasi-judicial body from requiring further condition or qualification from those who would wish to
handle cases before the Patent Office which, as stated in the preceding paragraph, requires more of
an application of scientific and technical knowledge than the mere application of provisions of law; . .
. that the action taken by the respondent is in accordance with Republic Act No. 165, otherwise
known as the Patent Law of the Philippines, which similar to the United States Patent Law, in
accordance with which the United States Patent Office has also prescribed a similar examination as
that prescribed by respondent. . . .

Respondent further contends that just as the Patent law of the United States of America authorizes
the Commissioner of Patents to prescribe examinations to determine as to who practice before the
United States Patent Office, the respondent, is similarly authorized to do so by our Patent Law,
Republic Act No. 165.

Although as already stated, the Director of Patents, in the past, would appear to have been holding
tests or examinations the passing of which was imposed as a required qualification to practice
before the Patent Office, to our knowledge, this is the first time that the right of the Director of
Patents to do so, specially as regards members of the bar, has been questioned formally, or
otherwise put in issue. And we have given it careful thought and consideration.

The Supreme Court has the exclusive and constitutional power with respect to admission to the
practice of law in the Philippines1 and to any member of the Philippine Bar in good standing may
practice law anywhere and before any entity, whether judicial or quasi-judicial or administrative, in
the Philippines. Naturally, the question arises as to whether or not appearance before the patent
Office and the preparation and the prosecution of patent applications, etc., constitutes or is included
in the practice of law.

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and social proceedings, the
management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in
addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in
matters connected with the law corporation services, assessment and condemnation services
contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of
a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice as
do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the determination
by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jur. p. 262, 263).
(Emphasis supplied).

Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of any
court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the
giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal
instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and other affairs. Although
these transactions may have no direct connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to
become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide
experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations.
These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the
administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth
in the order, can be drawn between that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his
office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions be
performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and
acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran,
Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 (1953 ed.), p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of the Justices
(Mass.), 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. vs. Automobile Service Assoc. (R. I. ) 179 A.
139, 144). (Emphasis ours).

In our opinion, the practice of law includes such appearance before the Patent Office, the
representation of applicants, oppositors, and other persons, and the prosecution of their applications
for patent, their oppositions thereto, or the enforcement of their rights in patent cases. In the first
place, although the transaction of business in the Patent Office involves the use and application of
technical and scientific knowledge and training, still, all such business has to be rendered in
accordance with the Patent Law, as well as other laws, including the Rules and Regulations
promulgated by the Patent Office in accordance with law. Not only this, but practice before the
Patent Office involves the interpretation and application of other laws and legal principles, as well as
the existence of facts to be established in accordance with the law of evidence and procedure. For
instance: Section 8 of our Patent Law provides that an invention shall not be patentable if it is
contrary to public order or morals, or to public health or welfare. Section 9 says that an invention
shall not be considered new or patentable if it was known or used by others in the Philippines before
the invention thereof by the inventor named in any printed publication in the Philippines or any
foreign country more than one year before the application for a patent therefor, or if it had been in
public use or on sale in the Philippines for more than one year before the application for the patent
therefor. Section 10 provides that the right to patent belongs to the true and actual inventor, his
heirs, legal representatives or assigns. Section 25 and 26 refer to connection of any mistake in a
patent. Section 28 enumerates the grounds for cancellation of a patent; that although any person
may apply for such cancellation, under Section 29, the Solicitor General is authorized to petition for
the cancellation of a patent. Section 30 mentions the requirements of a petition for cancellation.
Section 31 and 32 provide for a notice of hearing of the petition for cancellation of the patent by the
Director of Patents in case the said cancellation is warranted. Under Section 34, at any time after the
expiration of three years from the day the patent was granted, any person patent on several
grounds, such as, if the patented invention is not being worked in the Philippines on a commercial
scale, or if the demand for the patented article in the Philippines on a commercial scale, or if the
demand for the patented article in the Philippines is not being met to an adequate extent and
reasonable terms, or if by reason of the patentee's refusal to grant a license on reasonable terms or
by reason of the condition attached by him to the license, purchase or use of the patented article or
working of the patented process or machine of production, the establishment of a new trade or
industry in the Philippines is prevented; or if the patent or invention relates to food or medicine or is
necessary to public health or public safety. All these things involve the applications of laws, legal
principles, practice and procedure. They call for legal knowledge, training and experience for which a
member of the bar has been prepared.

In support of the proposition that much of the business and many of the act, orders and decisions of
the Patent Director involve questions of law or a reasonable and correct evaluation of facts, the very
Patent Law, Republic Act No. 165, Section 61, provides that:

. . . . The applicant for a patent or for the registration of a design, any party to a proceeding to cancel
a patent or to obtain a compulsory license, and any party to any other proceeding in the Office may
appeal to the Supreme Court from any final order or decision of the director.

In other words, the appeal is taken to this Tribunal. If the transaction of business in the Patent Office
and the acts, orders and decisions of the Patent Director involved exclusively or mostly technical and
scientific knowledge and training, then logically, the appeal should be taken not to a court or judicial
body, but rather to a board of scientists, engineers or technical men, which is not the case.

Another aspect of the question involves the consideration of the nature of the functions and acts of
the Head of the Patent Office.

. . . . The Commissioner, in issuing or withholding patents, in reissues, interferences, and

extensions, exercises quasi-judicial functions. Patents are public records, and it is the duty of the
Commissioner to give authenticated copies to any person, on payment of the legal fees. (40 Am. Jur.
537). (Emphasis supplied).

. . . . The Commissioner has the only original initiatory jurisdiction that exists up to the granting and
delivering of a patent, and it is his duty to decide whether the patent is new and whether it is the
proper subject of a patent; and his action in awarding or refusing a patent is a judicial function. In
passing on an application the commissioner should decide not only questions of law, but
also questions of fact, as whether there has been a prior public use or sale of the article invented. . .
. (60 C.J.S. 460). (Emphasis supplied).

The Director of Patents, exercising as he does judicial or quasi-judicial functions, it is reasonable to

hold that a member of the bar, because of his legal knowledge and training, should be allowed to
practice before the Patent Office, without further examination or other qualification. Of course, the
Director of Patents, if he deems it advisable or necessary, may require that members of the bar
practising before him enlist the assistance of technical men and scientist in the preparation of papers
and documents, such as, the drawing or technical description of an invention or machine sought to
be patented, in the same way that a lawyer filing an application for the registration of a parcel of land
on behalf of his clients, is required to submit a plan and technical description of said land, prepared
by a licensed surveyor.
But respondent Director claims that he is expressly authorized by the law to require persons desiring
to practice or to do business before him to submit an examination, even if they are already members
of the bar. He contends that our Patent Law, Republic Act No. 165, is patterned after the United
States Patent Law; and of the United States Patent Office in Patent Cases prescribes an
examination similar to that which he (respondent) has prescribed and scheduled. He invites our
attention to the following provisions of said Rules of Practice:

Registration of attorneys and agents. — A register of an attorneys and a register agents are kept in
the Patent Office on which are entered the names of all persons recognized as entitled to represent
applicants before the Patent Office in the preparation and prosecution of applicants for patent.
Registration in the Patent Office under the provisions of these rules shall only entitle the person
registered to practice before the Patent Office.

(a) Attorney at law. — Any attorney at law in good standing admitted to practice before any United
States Court or the highest court of any State or Territory of the United States who fulfills the
requirements and complied with the provisions of these rules may be admitted to practice before the
Patent Office and have his name entered on the register of attorneys.

xxx xxx xxx

(c) Requirement for registration. — No person will be admitted to practice and register unless he
shall apply to the Commissioner of Patents in writing on a prescribed form supplied by the
Commissioner and furnish all requested information and material; and shall establish to the
satisfaction of the Commissioner that he is of good moral character and of good repute and
possessed of the legal and scientific and technical qualifications necessary to enable him to render
applicants for patent valuable service, and is otherwise competent to advise and assist him in the
presentation and prosecution of their application before the Patent Office. In order that the
Commissioner may determine whether a person seeking to have his name placed upon either of the
registers has the qualifications specified, satisfactory proof of good moral character and repute, and
of sufficient basic training in scientific and technical matters must be submitted and an examination
which is held from time to time must be taken and passed. The taking of an examination may be
waived in the case of any person who has served for three years in the examining corps of the
Patent Office.

Respondent states that the promulgation of the Rules of Practice of the United States Patent Office
in Patent Cases is authorized by the United States Patent Law itself, which reads as follows:

The Commissioner of Patents, subject to the approval of the Secretary of Commerce may prescribe
rules and regulations governing the recognition of agents, attorneys, or other persons representing
applicants or other parties before his office, and may require of such persons, agents, or attorneys,
before being recognized as representatives of applicants or other persons, that they shall show they
are of good moral character and in good repute, are possessed of the necessary qualifications to
enable them to render to applicants or other persons valuable service, and are likewise to competent
to advise and assist applicants or other persons in the presentation or prosecution of their
applications or other business before the Office. The Commissioner of Patents may, after notice and
opportunity for a hearing, suspend or exclude, either generally or in any particular case from further
practice before his office any person, agent or attorney shown to be incompetent or disreputable, or
guilty of gross misconduct, or who refuses to comply with the said rules and regulations, or who
shall, with intent to defraud in any matter, deceive, mislead, or threaten any applicant or prospective
applicant, or other person having immediate or prospective applicant, or other person having
immediate or prospective business before the office, by word, circular, letter, or by advertising. The
reasons for any such suspension or exclusion shall be duly recorded. The action of the
Commissioner may be reviewed upon the petition of the person so refused recognition or so
suspended by the district court of the United States for the District of Columbia under such
conditions and upon such proceedings as the said court may by its rules determine. (Emphasis
supplied)

Respondent Director concludes that Section 78 of Republic Act No. 165 being similar to the
provisions of law just reproduced, then he is authorized to prescribe the rules and regulations
requiring that persons desiring to practice before him should submit to and pass an examination. We
reproduce said Section 78, Republic Act No. 165, for purposes of comparison:

SEC. 78. Rules and regulations. — The Director subject to the approval of the Secretary of Justice,
shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations, not inconsistent with law, for the conduct of all
business in the Patent Office.

The above provisions of Section 78 certainly and by far, are different from the provisions of the
United States Patent Law as regards authority to hold examinations to determine the qualifications of
those allowed to practice before the Patent Office. While the U.S. Patent Law authorizes the
Commissioner of Patents to require attorneys to show that they possess the necessary qualifications
and competence to render valuable service to and advise and assist their clients in patent cases,
which showing may take the form of a test or examination to be held by the Commissioner, our
Patent Law, Section 78, is silent on this important point. Our attention has not been called to any
express provision of our Patent Law, giving such authority to determine the qualifications of persons
allowed to practice before the Patent Office.

Section 551 of the Revised Administrative Code authorizes every chief of bureau to prescribe forms
and make regulations or general orders not inconsistent with law, to secure the harmonious and
efficient administration of his branch of the service and to carry into full effect the laws relating to
matters within the jurisdiction of his bureau. Section 608 of Republic Act 1937, known as the Tariff
and Customs Code of the Philippines, provides that the Commissioner of Customs shall, subject to
the approval of the Department Head, makes all rules and regulations necessary to enforce the
provisions of said code. Section 338 of the National Internal Revenue Code, Commonwealth Act No.
466 as amended, states that the Secretary of Finance, upon recommendation of the Collector of
Internal Revenue, shall promulgate all needful rules and regulations for the effective enforcement of
the provisions of the code. We understand that rules and regulations have been promulgated not
only for the Bureau of Customs and Internal Revenue, but also for other bureaus of the Government,
to govern the transaction of business in and to enforce the law for said bureaus.

Were we to allow the Patent Office, in the absence of an express and clear provision of law giving
the necessary sanction, to require lawyers to submit to and pass on examination prescribed by it
before they are allowed to practice before said Patent Office, then there would be no reason why
other bureaus specially the Bureau of Internal Revenue and Customs, where the business in the
same area are more or less complicated, such as the presentation of books of accounts, balance
sheets, etc., assessments exemptions, depreciation, these as regards the Bureau of Internal
Revenue, and the classification of goods, imposition of customs duties, seizures, confiscation, etc.,
as regards the Bureau of Customs, may not also require that any lawyer practising before them or
otherwise transacting business with them on behalf of clients, shall first pass an examination to
qualify.

In conclusion, we hold that under the present law, members of the Philippine Bar authorized by this
Tribunal to practice law, and in good standing, may practice their profession before the Patent
Office, for the reason that much of the business in said office involves the interpretation and
determination of the scope and application of the Patent Law and other laws applicable, as well as
the presentation of evidence to establish facts involved; that part of the functions of the Patent
director are judicial or quasi-judicial, so much so that appeals from his orders and decisions are,
under the law, taken to the Supreme Court.

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for prohibition is granted and the respondent Director is
hereby prohibited from requiring members of the Philippine Bar to submit to an examination or tests
and pass the same before being permitted to appear and practice before the Patent Office. No costs.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L. and
Endencia, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 In re: Albino Cunanan, 50 Off. Gaz. m, 1617, prom. March 18, 1954.

Hernandez vs Atty PAdilla AC No 9387 June 20, 2012

Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
EMILIA R. HERNANDEZ, A.C. No. 9387
Complainant, (Formerly CBD Case No. 05-1562)
- versus - Present:
ATTY. VENANCIO B. PADILLA, CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
Respondent. BRION,
PEREZ,
SERENO, and
REYES, JJ.
Promulgated:

June 20, 2012

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

RESOLUTION
SERENO, J.:

This is a disbarment case filed by Emilia Hernandez (complainant) against her

lawyer, Atty. Venancio B. Padilla (respondent) of Padilla Padilla Bautista Law
Offices, for his alleged negligence in the handling of her case.

The records disclose that complainant and her husband were the respondents in an
ejectment case filed against them with the Regional Trial Court of Manila (RTC).

In a Decision[1] dated 28 June 2002, penned by Judge Rosmari D. Carandang (Judge

Carandang), the RTC ordered that the Deed of Sale executed in favor of complainant
be cancelled; and that the latter pay the complainant therein, Elisa Duigan (Duigan),
attorneys fees and moral damages.

Complainant and her husband filed their Notice of Appeal with the RTC. Thereafter,
the Court of Appeals (CA) ordered them to file their Appellants Brief. They chose
respondent to represent them in the case. On their behalf, he filed a Memorandum
on Appeal instead of an Appellants Brief. Thus, Duigan filed a Motion to Dismiss
the Appeal. The CA granted the Motion in a Resolution[2] dated 16 December 2003.

No Motion for Reconsideration (MR) of the Resolution dismissing the appeal was
filed by the couple. Complainant claims that because respondent ignored the
Resolution, he acted with deceit, unfaithfulness amounting to malpractice of
law.[3] Complainant and her husband failed to file an appeal, because respondent
never informed them of the adverse decision. Complainant further claims that she
asked respondent several times about the status of the appeal, but despite inquiries
he deliberately withheld response [sic], to the damage and prejudice of the spouses.[4]

The Resolution became final and executory on 8 January 2004. Complainant was
informed of the Resolution sometime in July 2005, when the Sheriff of the RTC
came to her house and informed her of the Resolution.

On 9 September 2005, complainant filed an Affidavit of Complaint [5] with the

Committee on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), seeking
the disbarment of respondent on the following grounds: deceit, malpractice, and
grave misconduct. Complainant prays for moral damages in the amount of ₱350,000.
Through an Order[6] dated 12 September 2005, Director of Bar Discipline Rogelio
A. Vinluan ordered respondent to submit an answer to the Complaint. In his Counter-
Affidavit/Answer,[7] respondent prayed for the outright dismissal of the Complaint.

Respondent explained that he was not the lawyer of complainant. He averred that
prior to the mandatory conference set by the IBP on 13 December 2005, he had never
met complainant, because it was her husband who had personally transacted with
him. According to respondent, the husband despondently pleaded to me to prepare a
Memorandum on Appeal because according to him the period given by the CA was
to lapse within two or three days.[8] Thus, respondent claims that he filed a
Memorandum on Appeal because he honestly believed that it is this pleading which
was required.[9]

Before filing the Memorandum, respondent advised complainants husband to settle

the case. The latter allegedly gestured approval of the advice.[10]

After the husband of complainant picked up the Memorandum for filing, respondent
never saw or heard from him again and thus assumed that the husband heeded his
advice and settled the case. When respondent received an Order from the CA
requiring him to file a comment on the Motion to Dismiss filed by Duigan, he
instructed his office staff to contact Mr. Hernandez thru available means of
communication, but to no avail.[11] Thus, when complainants husband went to the
office of respondent to tell the latter that the Sheriff of the RTC had informed
complainant of the CAs Resolution dismissing the case, respondent was just as
surprised. The lawyer exclaimed, KALA KO BA NAKIPAG AREGLO NA
KAYO.[12]

In his 5 January 2009 Report,[13] IBP Investigating Commissioner Leland R.

Villadolid, Jr. found that respondent violated Canons 5, 17, and 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (the Code). He recommended that respondent be
suspended from practicing law from 3 to 6 months.

The board of governors of the IBP issued Resolution No. XIX-2010-452 on 28

August 2010. Therein, they resolved to adopt and approve the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. Respondent was suspended
from the practice of law for six months.
Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration.[14] He prayed for the relaxation of
the application of the Canons of the Code. On 14 January 2012, the IBP board of
governors passed Resolution No. XX-2012-17[15] partly granting his Motion and
reducing the penalty imposed to one-month suspension from the practice of law.

Pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, acting Director for Bar Discipline
Dennis A.B. Funa, through a letter[16] addressed to then Chief Justice Renato C.
Corona, transmitted the documents pertaining to the disbarment Complaint against
respondent.

We adopt the factual findings of the board of governors of the IBP. This Court,
however, disagrees with its Decision to reduce the penalty to one-month suspension.
We thus affirm the six-month suspension the Board originally imposed in its 28
August 2010 Resolution.

Respondent insists that he had never met complainant prior to the mandatory
conference set for the disbarment Complaint she filed against him. However, a
perusal of the Memorandum of Appeal filed in the appellate court revealed that he
had signed as counsel for the defendant-appellants therein, including complainant
and her husband.[17] The pleading starts with the following sentence:
DEFENDANT[S]-APPELLANTS, by counsel, unto this Honorable Court submit
the Memorandum and further allege that: x x x.[18] Nowhere does the document say
that it was filed only on behalf of complainants husband.

It is further claimed by respondent that the relation created between him and
complainants husband cannot be treated as a client-lawyer relationship, viz:

It is no more than a client needing a legal document and had it prepared by a lawyer
for a fee. Under the factual milieu and circumstances, it could not be said that a
client entrusted to a lawyer handling and prosecution of his case that calls for the
strict application of the Code; x x x[19]

As proof that none of them ever intended to enter into a lawyer-client relationship,
he also alleges that complainants husband never contacted him after the filing of the
Memorandum of Appeal. According to respondent, this behavior was very unusual
if he really believed that he engaged the formers services.[20]
Complainant pointed out in her Reply[21] that respondent was her lawyer, because he
accepted her case and an acceptance fee in the amount of ₱7,000.

According to respondent, however, [C]ontrary to the complainants claim that he

charged ₱7,000 as acceptance fee, the fee was only for the preparation of the
pleading which is even low for a Memorandum of Appeal: x x x.[22]

Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client relationship and

gives rise to the duty of fidelity to the clients cause.[23] Once a lawyer agrees to
handle a case, it is that lawyers duty to serve the client with competence and
diligence.[24] Respondent has failed to fulfill this duty.

According to respondent, he merely drafted the pleading that complainants husband

asked from him. Respondent also claims that he filed a Memorandum of Appeal,
because he honestly believed that this was the pleading required, based on what
complainants husband said.

The IBP Investigating Commissioners observation on this matter, in the 5 January

2009 Report, is correct. Regardless of the particular pleading his client may have
believed to be necessary, it was respondents duty to know the proper pleading to be
filed in appeals from RTC decisions, viz:

Having seen the Decision dated 18 June 2002 of the trial court, respondent should
have known that the mode of appeal to the Court of Appeals for said Decision is by
ordinary appeal under Section 2(a) Rule 41 of the1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure. In all such cases, Rule 44 of the said Rules applies.[25]

When the RTC ruled against complainant and her husband, they filed a Notice of
Appeal. Consequently, what should apply is the rule on ordinary appealed cases or
Rule 44 of the Rules on Civil Procedure. Rule 44 requires that the appellants brief
be filed after the records of the case have been elevated to the CA. Respondent, as a
litigator, was expected to know this procedure. Canon 5 of the Code reads:

CANON 5 A lawyer shall keep abreast of legal developments, participate in

continuing legal education programs, support efforts to achieve high standards in
law schools as well as in the practical training of law students and assist in
disseminating information regarding the law and jurisprudence.
The obligations of lawyers as a consequence of their Canon 5 duty have been
expounded in Dulalia, Jr. v. Cruz,[26] to wit:

It must be emphasized that the primary duty of lawyers is to obey the laws of the
land and promote respect for the law and legal processes. They are expected to be
in the forefront in the observance and maintenance of the rule of law. This duty
carries with it the obligation to be well-informed of the existing laws and to keep
abreast with legal developments, recent enactments and jurisprudence. It is
imperative that they be conversant with basic legal principles. Unless they faithfully
comply with such duty, they may not be able to discharge competently and
diligently their obligations as members of the bar. Worse, they may become
susceptible to committing mistakes.

In his MR, respondent begged for the consideration of the IBP, claiming that the
reason for his failure to file the proper pleading was that he did not have enough time
to acquaint himself thoroughly with the factual milieu of the case. The IBP
reconsidered and thereafter significantly reduced the penalty originally imposed.

Respondents plea for leniency should not have been granted.

The supposed lack of time given to respondent to acquaint himself with the facts of
the case does not excuse his negligence.

Rule 18.02 of the Code provides that a lawyer shall not handle any legal matter
without adequate preparation. While it is true that respondent was not complainants
lawyer from the trial to the appellate court stage, this fact did not excuse him from
his duty to diligently study a case he had agreed to handle. If he felt he did not have
enough time to study the pertinent matters involved, as he was approached by
complainants husband only two days before the expiration of the period for filing
the Appellants Brief, respondent should have filed a motion for extension of time to
file the proper pleading instead of whatever pleading he could come up with, just to
beat the deadline set by the Court of Appeals.[27]

Moreover, respondent does not deny that he was given notice of the fact that he filed
the wrong pleading. However, instead of explaining his side by filing a comment, as
ordered by the appellate court, he chose to ignore the CAs Order. He claims that he
was under the presumption that complainant and her husband had already settled the
case, because he had not heard from the husband since the filing of the latters
Memorandum of Appeal.
This explanation does not excuse respondents actions.

First of all, there were several remedies that respondent could have availed himself
of, from the moment he received the Notice from the CA to the moment he received
the disbarment Complaint filed against him. But because of his negligence, he chose
to sit on the case and do nothing.

Second, respondent, as counsel, had the duty to inform his clients of the status of
their case. His failure to do so amounted to a violation of Rule 18.04 of the Code,
which reads:

18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall
respond within a reasonable time to the clients request for information.

If it were true that all attempts to contact his client proved futile, the least respondent
could have done was to inform the CA by filing a Notice of Withdrawal of
Appearance as counsel. He could have thus explained why he was no longer the
counsel of complainant and her husband in the case and informed the court that he
could no longer contact them.[28] His failure to take this measure proves his
negligence.

Lastly, the failure of respondent to file the proper pleading and a comment on
Duigans Motion to Dismiss is negligence on his part. Under 18.03 of the Code, a
lawyer is liable for negligence in handling the clients case, viz:

Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.

Lawyers should not neglect legal matters entrusted to them, otherwise their
negligence in fulfilling their duty would render them liable for disciplinary action.[29]

Respondent has failed to live up to his duties as a lawyer. When a lawyer violates
his duties to his client, he engages in unethical and unprofessional conduct for which
he should be held accountable.[30]
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Venancio Padilla is found guilty of violating
Rules 18.02, 18.03, 18.04, as well as Canon 5 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Hence, he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for SIX (6)
MONTHS and STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or a similar
offense will be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Resolution be entered into the personal records of respondent as a
member of the bar and furnished to the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts of the country
for their information and guidance.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
MARIA P. A. SERENO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

ARTURO D. BRION JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

[1]
Rollo, Vol. I, pp. 14-24.
[2]
Id. at 43-44.
[3]
Id. at 1.
[4]
Id.
[5]
Id. at 1-2.
[6]
Id. at 45.
[7]
Id. at 52-56.
[8]
Id at 53.
[9]
Id at 54.
[10]
Id.
[11]
Id.
[12]
Id.
[13]
Rollo, Vol. II, pp. 2-15.
[14]
Id. at 16-20.
[15]
Rollo, Vol. II (page not indicated).
[16]
Id. at.
[17]
See rollo, Vol. I, p. 39.
[18]
Id. at 25.
[19]
Rollo, Vol. II, p. 18.
[20]
Id at 19.
[21]
Rollo, Vol. I, pp. 76-77.
[22]
Rollo, Vol. II, p. 18.
[23]
Fernandez v. Atty. Cabrera, 463 Phil. 352 (2003).
[24]
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Canon 18.
[25]
Rollo, Vol. II, pp. 9-10
[26]
A.C. No. 6854, 27 April 2007, 522 SCRA 244, 255 citing Santiago v. Rafanan, A.C. No. 6252, 483 Phil.
94, 105(2004).
[27]
Rollo, Vol. II, p. 18.
[28]
Sec. 26. Change of attorneys. - An attorney may retire at any time from any action or special proceeding,
by the written consent of his client filed in court. He may also retire at any time from an action or special
proceeding, without the consent of his client, should the court, on notice to the client and attorney, and on
hearing, determine that he ought to be allowed to retire. In case of substitution, the name of the attorney
newly employed shall be entered on the docket of the court in place of the former one, and written notice
of the change shall be given to the adverse party. (Rules of Court, Rule 138, Sec. 26)
[29]
Perea v. Atty. Almadro, 447 Phil. 434 (2003).
[30]
Fernandez, supra note 23.

Sps. Williams vs. Atty Enriquez AC No 6353 Feb 27, 2006

FIRST DIVISION
SPOUSES DAVID and A.C. No. 6353
MARISA WILLIAMS,
Complainants,
Present:
PANGANIBAN, C.J., Chairperson,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR., and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
ATTY. RUDY T. ENRIQUEZ, Promulgated:
Respondent.
February 27, 2006
x--------------------------------------------------x
RESOLUTION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Atty. Rudy T. Enriquez stands charged with unlawful, dishonest, immoral and
deceitful acts in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Canons
of Professional Ethics, and with conduct unbecoming an attorney. The charges are
contained in the Joint Complaint-Affidavit for Disbarment[1] filed by the spouses
David W. Williams and Marisa B. Williams.
It appears that respondent is the counsel of record of the plaintiffs in Civil
Case No. 13443[2] pending before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33, where
complainants are the defendants. According to the complainant-spouses, Marisa
Williams bought the lot subject of the controversy. A Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) was then issued in her favor, stating that she is Filipino, married to David W.
Williams, an American citizen.[3] On , respondent charged her with falsification of
public documents before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Dumaguete City. The
complaint was docketed as I.S. No. 2004-34.[4]
The spouses Williams further alleged, thus:
21. That, in malicious violation of the rules governing the practice of law,
Attorney Rudy T. Enriquez cited outdated material in his complaint-affidavit
(Annex A-1) and in his comments to counter-affidavit (Annex A-2). He then
knowingly applied this stale law in a perverse fashion to argue that Marisa Batacan
Williams automatically lost her Filipino citizenship when she married an
American, and was thus prohibited to own land in the , thereby making her guilty
of falsification in the Deed she executed to buy property in Negros Oriental.

2.2. That in paragraph #1 of her counter-affidavit (Annex A-2) Marisa

cites Article IV, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that she would
not lose her citizenship when she married an American unless she renounced it in
a specific act.

2.3 That, in reply, Attorney Enriquez, quotes more outdated law, declaring
that her act of marrying her husband was equivalent to renouncing her citizenship.
He also doggedly attempts to show that the 1987 Constitution supports his
position, not Marisas (Annex A-4).[5]
Complainants pointed out that the respondent is a retired judge, who knows
that the false charge (that Marisa Williams is an American) will not prevail in the
end.[6]
In his Comments by Way of Motion to Dismiss,[7] respondent enumerated
matters which to his mind were evidence of the acts of falsification of complainant
Marisa Williams. He insisted that the complaint for disbarment was a mere tactic to
divert attention from the criminal charges against the complainants, and that the
charges against him were bereft of any factual basis.
On , the case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.[8] Forthwith, the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline scheduled the case for mandatory conference/hearing. However, only the
respondent appeared. The parties were then directed to submit their verified position
papers.
 In their Position Paper, complainants claimed that respondent had maliciously
and knowingly filed fabricated cases against them and that his acts were forms of
attempted extortion. They also adopted their joint complaint-affidavit by way of
incorporation, along with their other pleadings.
For his part, respondent maintained that complainant Marisa Williams was no
longer a citizen of the Republic of the as a result of her marriage to David Williams.
In her Report and Recommendation dated , Commissioner Rebecca
Villanueva-Maala ruled that respondent was guilty of gross ignorance of the law and
should be suspended for six (6) months. The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline
adopted the foregoing recommendation in its Resolution No. XVII-2005-114 dated ,
with the modification that respondent be reprimanded, with a warning and advice to
study each and every opinion he may give to his clients.

The Court agrees that respondent is administratively liable for his actuations.
As found by the Investigating Commissioner:
There is no evidence shown by respondent that complainant Marisa
Bacatan-Williams has renounced her Filipino citizenship except her Certificate of
Marriage, which does not show that she has automatically acquired her husbands
citizenship upon her marriage to him. The cases cited by respondent are not
applicable in this case as it is clear that they refer to aliens acquiring lands in the .

The Bar has been integrated for the attainment of the following objectives:
(a) elevate the standards of the legal profession, (b) improve the administration of
justice, and (c) to enable the bar to discharge its public responsibility more
effectively (In re: Integration of the Bar of the , 49 SCRA 22). In line with these
objectives of the Integrated Bar, lawyers must keep themselves abreast of legal
developments. To do this, the lawyer must walk with the dynamic movements of
the law and jurisprudence. He must acquaint himself at least with the newly
promulgated laws, the recent decisions of the Supreme Court and of the
significant decisions of the Court of Appeals. There are other executive orders,
administrative circulars, regulations and other rules promulgated by other
competent authorities engaged in the administration of justice. The lawyers life is
one of continuous and laborious study, otherwise, his skill and knowledge of the
law and related disciplines will lag behind and become obscure due to obsoleteness
(Canon 5, Code of Professional Responsibility.)[9]
As pointed out by the Investigating Commissioner, Canon 5 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility requires that a lawyer be updated in the latest laws and
jurisprudence.[10]Indeed, when the law is so elementary, not to know it or to act as if
one does not know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.[11] As a retired judge,
respondent should have known that it is his duty to keep himself well-informed of
the latest rulings of the Court on the issues and legal problems confronting a
client.[12] In this case, the law he apparently misconstrued is no less than the
Constitution,[13] the most basic law of the land.[14] Implicit in a lawyers mandate to
protect a clients interest to the best of his/her ability and with utmost diligence is the
duty to keep abreast of the law and legal developments, and participate in continuing
legal education programs.[15] Thus, in championing the interest of clients and
defending cases, a lawyer must not only be guided by the strict standards imposed
by the lawyers oath, but should likewise espouse legally sound arguments for
clients, lest the latters cause be dismissed on a technical ground.[16] Ignorance
encompasses both substantive and procedural laws.[17]
We find too harsh the recommended penalty of the Investigating
Commissioner. It must be stressed that the power to disbar or suspend must be
exercised with great caution. Only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects
the standing and character of a lawyer as an officer of the Court and member of the
bar will disbarment or suspension be imposed as a penalty. [18] Pursuant to the IBP
Commission on Bar Disciplines Guidelines for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions,[19] and
considering further that this is respondents first infraction, we find that the penalty
of reprimand as recommended by the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, will
suffice.
We likewise note that in their pleadings in this case, the parties repeatedly
invoked their arguments in their pending cases below. Thus, we find it unnecessary
to rule over such arguments, which have yet to be determined on the merits in the
courts a quo.
WHEREFORE, for gross ignorance of the law, Atty. Rudy T. Enriquez
is REPRIMANDED and ADVISED to carefully study the opinions he may give to
his clients. He is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of a similar act shall be
dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Chairperson
CONSUELO YNARES- MA. ALICIA -MARTINEZ Associate Justice Associate
Justice
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

[1]
Rollo, pp. 1-6.
[2]
Entitled Francisco Briones Ventolero, et al. v. David W. Williams, et al. for Declaration for Inexistence/Revocation
of Deed; Declaration of Sole Heir and ; Legal Redemption; Cancellation and Annulment of Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T-35430, No. 2920-D, Psd-07-052555, Reconveyance and Damages.
[3]
Rollo, p. 13.
[4]
at 8-11.
[5]
at 2-3.
[6]
at 5.
[7]
at 104-111.
[8]
at 261.
[9]
Report and Recommendation dated , pp. 3-4.
[10]
CANON 5 A LAWYER SHALL KEEP ABREAST OF LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS, PARTICIPATE IN
CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION PROGRAMS, SUPPORT EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE HIGH STANDARDS
IN LAW SCHOOLS AS WELL AS IN THE PRACTICAL TRAINING OF LAW STUDENTS AND ASSIST IN
DISSEMINATING INFORMATION REGARDING THE LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE.
[11]
Bacar v. De Guzman, Jr., 338 Phil. 41 (1997), citing Uy v. Dizon-Capulong, A.M. No. RTJ-91-766, , 221 SCRA
87.
[12]
Arquelada v. Philippine Veterans Bank, 385 Phil. 1200, 1214 (2000).
[13]
Section 4, Article IV of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 4. CITIZENS OF THE WHO MARRY ALIENS SHALL RETAIN THEIR CITIZENSHIP, UNLESS BY
THEIR ACT OR OMISSION THEY ARE DEEMED, UNDER THE LAW, TO HAVE RENOUNCED IT.
[14]
As aptly put by Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban in his Dissenting Opinion in the Courts Resolution dated in
G.R. No. 119976 (Marcos v. COMELEC), the Constitution is not intended for lawyers to quibble over, nor to define
legal niceties and articulate nuances about, in the ascertainment of its import. Its contents and words should be
interpreted in the sense understood by the ordinary men and women who place their lives on the line in its defense
and who pin their hopes for a better life in its fulfillment.
[15]
Fajardo v. Dela Torre, A.C. No. 6295, , 427 SCRA 125, 131, citing Rabanal v. Tugalde, A.C. No. 1372, June 27,
2002, 383 SCRA 484 and Cuevas v. Bais Steel Corporation, G.R. No. 142689, October 17, 2002, 391 SCRA 192.
[16]
See Intengan v. Court of Appeals, 427 Phil. 293 (2002), where petitioner, through counsel, filed a wrong
information for violation of Republic Act No. 1405. In denying the petition, the Court declared that petitioners were
left with no remedy in law, as the filing of said information did not have the effect of tolling the prescriptive period,
for it is the filing of the complaint or information corresponding to the correct offense which produces that effect.
[17]
Fajardo v. Dela Torre, supra, note 15, at 132, citing Intengan v. Court of Appeals, supra.
[18]
Ramos v. Ngaseo, A.C. No. 6210, , 445 SCRA 529, 537, citing Montano v. Integrated Bar of the Philippines, A.C.
No. 4215, May 21, 2001, 358 SCRA 1, 9.
[19]
According to Standard 3.0 of said Guidelines, the factors to be considered in imposing sanctions include (a) the
duty violated; (b) the lawyers mental state; (c) the actual or potential injury caused by the lawyers misconduct; and
(d) the existence of aggravating and mitigating factors. Under Standard 9.3, the absence of a prior disciplinary record
is considered a mitigating factor.