Research in Transportation Economics 48 (2014) 166e175

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Research in Transportation Economics

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/retrec

and Cali, Colombia e Facing

Public transport integration in Bogota
transition from semi-deregulated services to full regulation citywide
Dario Hidalgo*, Robin King
EMBARQ, Transport Program of the WRI Ross Center for Sustianble Cities, USA

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: Several Latin American cities are replacing their semi-deregulated and dispersed public transport ser-
Available online 14 October 2014 vices by integrated public transport systems to overcome quality of service issues and multiple negative
externalities. Cities can choose to implement their reform quickly e like Santiago, Chile e or gradually, as
Keywords: has been the case in the Colombian cities of Cali, since 2003, and Bogot
a, since 2008. This paper reviews
Public transport the experience of these two cities in an effort to help in understanding the impacts and issues behind the
Latin America
gradual implementation of integrated public transport systems, as they advance in cities of the devel-
Integrated systems
oping world. Particular attention is given to the pace of implementation. The two cities present signif-
Cali, Colombia
Bogota
, Colombia icant progress, despite the complexity of the process and protracted, yet-to- be completed, execution.
Planning The two case studies indicate that a very gradual approach may result in difficulties, resulting from
Implementation discontinuities in political leadership and weak institutional capacity.
Operations © 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

JEL classification:
O220 (Project analysis)
O380 (Technological change: government
policy)
Y8 (Related disciplines)

1. Introduction
Public transport in most Latin American countries is character-
ized by semi-deregulated services by private providers (Flores
Dewey, 2013; Orrico Filho, Guilherme de Araga ~o, & Medeiros dos
Santo, 2007). Individual vehicle owners affiliate their vehicles to
co-operatives or firms owning route permits, which are subject to
insufficient supervision by the public authorities granting those
permits. The result has been ample supply, especially in high de-
mand routes with relative low costs, but with high externalities e
congestion, pollution, safety, and poor quality of service, low
vehicle maintenance standards, inequitable access for the low in-
come population, and bad labor conditions for drivers
(Vasconcellos, 2001).
The advent of Bus Rapid Transit e BRT e in Latin America has
been coupled with new relationships between government and
private providers, which are now fleet owners, and subject to
stricter supervision by special purpose government agencies
* Corresponding author. EMBARQ, Transport program of the WRI Ross Center for
Sustainable Cities, 10 G Street NE, Washington DC, 20002, USA. Tel.: þ1 202
7297600.
E-mail address: dhidalgo@embarq.org (D. Hidalgo).
(Hidalgo & Carrigan, 2010). This brought important service im-
provements in selected corridors in cities like Bogota
, Guayaquil,
Mexico, Guadalajara, Leo
n and Lima. Nevertheless, city areas
without BRT have been kept under the semi-deregulated schemes.
As a reaction to the limited scope of the BRT systems, the current
trend in several of the cities is to expand the concept of concession
contracts developed for BRT corridors to citywide transport ser-
vices, following the example of Brazilian cities and Santiago, Chile.
Yet while cities seek to expand these concession contracts, un-
certainties remain around the best manner, sequencing, and pace of
how to do so successfully (Flores Dewey, 2013). Emerging econo-
mies in and beyond Latin America are facing similar challenges as
public financing is insufficient, yet private sector actors are not
organized in a way to provide sufficient high quality public services,
including in transport, and consequentially are interested in
learning about existing experiences (Vandycke & Wright, 2012).
This paper attempts to help fill this void. How can we best move
towards citywide integrated transport systems in conditions of a
smaller state? What is the optimal timing and sequencing of such
policies?
This paper reviews the transition process from dispersed oper-
ation into citywide integration of public transport with enhanced
regulation in two cities: Cali and Bogot
a, Colombia. The authors

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.retrec.2014.09.039
0739-8859/© 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
 D. Hidalgo, R. King / Research in Transportation Economics 48 (2014) 166e175 167

review the process by collecting official and media reports, and Table 2
conducting interviews with officials and consultants participating Cali MIO-SIT integrated system plan.

in the projects (people interviewed is acknowledge). Plan 2002 Updated Plan 2005
It is important to note that, as opposed to Santiago, Cali and BRT 49 km 39 km
Bogota
adopted very gradual implementation approaches. The full Priority Buslanes 78 km 243 km
success of the schemes is still to be realized as the implementation Complementary Corridors 116 km
is still incomplete and many issues are outstanding. Nevertheless, Expected Coverage 62% 90%

the new systems in the two cities have not experienced the chaos
experienced by Santiago commuters after the “Big-Bang” Trans-
antiago implementation in February 2007 (Mun ~ oz, Ortúzar, &
Gschwender, 2009).
The following sections describe the initial situation, the plan-
ning process, and the current status in the two cities. The paper
provides a preliminary assessment of planning, implementation
and operational issues. The paper closes with a summary of the
main lessons drawn from these cases, and the opportunities for
other cities facing similar reforms.
2. MIO-SIT in Cali, Colombia
2.1. Situation before the system was implemented
Source: Conpes 2002 and Conpes 2005
vehicle control and user information, with a capital cost of USD 374
million (Metro Cali, 2013a).
Infrastructure is funded by the municipality, with support from
the national government (70%). Vehicles and systems are privately
provided under long term concession contracts (Metro Cali, 2013a).
Demand has reached 502,139 passengers per weekday (April,
2014, personal communication Metro Cali S.A.). The system has also
progressed in terms of user satisfaction, environment, and road
safety.
Nevertheless, the process has faced multiple difficulties (ANDI,
2013):

Cali is a city in western Colombia with 2.3 million inhabitants
(Invest in Colombia, 2011). Before the system implementation there
were multiple routes and dispersed ownership (Table 1). Public
transport had great spatial coverage, but was considered unreliable
and unsafe. Excessive fleet resulted in congestion and air pollution,
and labor conditions for drivers were considered appalling (Conpes
1997).
To overcome its public transport service limitations, in 1995 the
city proposed a plan for the introduction of a high quality mass
transit corridor using an abandoned north-south railway corridor
(Conpes, 1997). The relatively high cost and limited impact of this
project prevented its implementation. In 2002 the city got approval
for advancing a Bus Rapid Transit BRT network to cover 62% of the
public transport demand in the city (Table 2). The city started
implementation with national government support under the Na-
tional Urban Transport Policy (Conpes, 2002, Conpes, 2003). Three
years later the project was changed, with the objective of covering
90% of the public transport demand needs within the city (Conpes,
2005).
The planning process was led by the city agency Metro Cali with
the support of the National Planning Department and the Minis-
tries of Transport and Finance. The city retained consultants for the
preparation of the different system components: infrastructure,
operations, technology contracts, etc. The planning and imple-
mentation activity has been mainly concentrated in infrastructure
aspects: busways, stations, and terminals, rather than operational
and institutional issues (Hidalgo & Díaz, 2014).
 Delays in infrastructure implementation;
 Opposition from incumbent operators (both formal and
informal, including violent stand-offs);
 Postponements in the elimination of legacy routes and obsolete
vehicles;
 Delays in fleet acquisition and cash flow difficulties by the pri-
vate operators; and lack of user information.
The process has advanced but has still not been completed after
a decade of planning, construction, and implementation (Table 4).
2.3. Issues in implementation
The most difficult issue in Cali was the transition from the
existing semi-regulated services – one-bus-one-owner– into an
organized and strongly regulated system citywide. The bidding
process for the new operation faced strong opposition from the
incumbents (Arias, 2012) The decision by the local administration,
with national support, was to create conditions in the bidding
process for incorporating existing private providers (companies
and vehicle owners) into the new scheme of operations, and also to
have long term contracts (25 years). This created both an incentive
and a strong pressure for incumbents to participate in the bidding
process. The existing operators had a strong advantage, but if a
given operator decided not to participate in the bidding process, it
ended up self-excluded from operating in the city for at least 25
years (personal communication, Metro Cali).

2.2. Integrated system description Table 3

MIO-SIT detailed characteristics.

The MIO-SIT project combines BRT with complementary corri- Physical 39 km BRT
dors and integration stations (Table 3, Fig. 1, Fig 2) with total capital infrastructure 243 km bus priority lanes and complementary corridors
56 trunk line stations
cost of USD 308 million (Metro Cali, 2013c). Operations include
655 bus shelters
multiple routes and supportive technologies for fare collection, 17 pedestrians overpasses
10 non-at-grade intersections
7 terminals
Table 1 4 intermediate integration stations
Cali public transport before system implementation. Operations 11 trunk routes (7 local and 4 express)
10 arterial routes with bus priority
Fleet (buses and minibuses) 4400
936 buses (199 articulated, 523 conventional, 214 small)
Private Companies (No.) 25 Electronic fare collection
Routes (No.) 230 Automated vehicle control
Owners (No.) 3499 User information systems

Source: El País, 2004 Source: Metro Cali (2013a and 2013c)

168 D. Hidalgo, R. King / Research in Transportation Economics 48 (2014) 166e175
Fig. 1. A MIO trunk bus and station.

n (Creative Commons)
Source: David A. Rinco
The process was very contested and received strong support
from the Ministry of Transport (El País, 2006). As a result of the
process there were four concessionaries, with the responsibility of
acquiring the new fleet, hiring the drivers and support personal,
maintaining and replacing the buses after 1 million km, and elim-
inating obsolete existing vehicles, among other responsibilities.
Another large contract involved the technology components:
automatic fare collection with smart cards; fleet dispatch and
control eusing automatic vehicle location and on-line operations
control; and user information systems e both web-based and in
stations.
Implementation took 5 years from the project approval to the
start of operations (Table 4). The delay stemmed from a combina-
tion of factors. For example, the construction of infrastructure such
as the busway, stations and terminals, had difficulties due to the
relocation of utilities, land acquisition, and lack of funding. Addi-
tional delays were caused by the slow advances on old vehicle
scrapping and elimination of legacy bus routes (El País, 2010).
2.4. Issues in operation
Operations started gradually in March 2009. Progress over time
is indicated in Table 5. Fleet and passenger demand increased 13
times over a 60 month period (2 percent per month).
Despite the large increase in demand, the system has faced
financial difficulties. Public transport demand has been less than
originally expected, mainly as a result of rapid motorization in
Colombia e motorcycles and automobiles. The system has reached
83% of the predicted demand of 605,561 passengers per workday
(Metro Cali, 2013d). At the same time, the user fare was constant
between 2009 and 2012, despite increases in fuel and labor costs
(Fig. 3, ANDI, 2013). The result has been lower net revenues, which
have caused financial stress to the system operators, with some of
them facing bankruptcy (Varela Marmolejo, 2013).
2.5. Current status, impacts and expectations
The main impact of the MIO-SIT has been a relative stability in

mo Vamos?,
modal shares between 2008 and 2013 (Fig. 4, Cali ¿Co
2013). As in any rapidly developing city, use of private modes
(motorcycle and automobile) is expected to rise with the increase in
incomes and economic activity, as was the case between 2006 and
2008. Nevertheless, since the implementation of MIO-SIT, total
public transport use has stabilized around 48%, private modes (car
and motorcycle) around 36% and walking and biking around 15%.
By December 2013, the MIO-SIT system spatial coverage has
reached 91% (Metro Cali, 2013e). The total fleet is 936 vehicles
(exceeding the planned 911 buses). Demand reached 530,000 per
weekday. The city has also made progress on controlling informal
transport and reducing the legacy routes and traditional buses e
83% of the old buses have been scrapped (Metro Cali, 2013e). These
critical advances have helped in reducing the operational deficits.
User satisfaction is currently below expectations (Table 6). The
main causes of these low ratings are insufficient supply of buses,
which led to bus delay and high occupancy, and insufficient
coverage. The city has focused its efforts on improving reliability.
The percent of buses meeting a headway threshold has increased
from 41% in January 2013 to 49% in August 2013 (Metro Cali, 2013b).
Commercial speeds have increased from 16.5 km/h in 2012 to
18.3 km/h in 2013.
Despite the incomplete implementation and relative low user
perception ratings, the MIO-SIT system has achieved important
benefits for the users and the society at large. An ex-post socio-
economic evaluation estimates the internal rate of return at 14.9%,
and the net present value of USD 216 million (12% discount rate).
The positive socio-economic indicators are mainly the result of
travel time savings (estimated in 8 min per trip) and operational
cost savings (DNP, 2010).
The system has also achieved positive environmental impacts.
The carbon dioxide savings have been estimated in 602,720 Tons in
2013 (Metro Cali, 2013e). The project has been registered for carbon
reduction certificates, as a Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)
at the United Nations Convention for Climate Change (UNFCCC).
The city also reports planting 3100 trees (Metro Cali, 2013a).
In addition, the system has been important in reducing traffic
fatalities and injuries. Its internal statistics indicate a reduction
from 85.1 incidents per million kilometers in 2012 to 72.2 incidents
per million kilometers in 2013 (Metro Cali, 2013e).
Fig. 2. MIO system map.
Source: Metro Cali (2013c)
170 D. Hidalgo, R. King / Research in Transportation Economics 48 (2014) 166e175

Table 4 the city had 8 different mayors, with three of them suspended the
Cali MIO-SIT timeline. cloud of allegations of mismanagement or criminal charges
2002 System Plan Approved (Montero, 2011). The changes in the city administration have
2004 Construction Started resulted in continuous changes in project leadership. Only in 2012,
2006 Operational Contracts Signed when Mayor Rodrigo Guerrero took full responsibility for the
2007 Operations Launched
2014 83% of the expected demand achieved
project and coordinated the efforts of several agencies, did the
project advance towards the original stated objectives.
The complexity of the project has also surpassed the planning
and management capacity of the local administrators, as was also
Table 5
MIO Cali implementation process 2009e2012. observed in Santiago, Chile (Coeymans et al., 2008). The project has
faced infrastructure and operational challenges. There has been
Month-Year Fleet Passenger demand per month
cost escalation in the public works, common in large-scale infra-
March 2009 77 1,002,092 structure projects (Flyvbjerg, Bruzelius, & Rothengatter, 2003). This
September 2009 239 3,049,016
could be a result of optimism bias in planners, combined with
March 2010 435 5,168,306
September 2010 470 6,632,509 municipal officials seeking access to national funds. The main effort
March 2011 470 8,111,419 was also concentrated on infrastructure, when the truly critical
September 2011 573 9,065,680 issues were the transformation of incumbent operators and the
March 2012 631 10,625,738 service quality of the new system.
September 2012 849 11,682,764
March 2013 892 12,075,253
In summary, the city of Cali seemed to have adopted the right
September 2013 936 12,798,694 strategy in trying to implement a citywide reorganization, rather
March 2014 936 13,001,222 than a corridor-by-corridor approach. Nevertheless, the project
Source: Metro Cali (2013a for 2009e2012, 2013d for 2013e2014) faced difficulties arising from lack of political leadership, technical
capacity, and funding. The overall impacts are quite positive, not
There is an ongoing effort to complete the system infrastructure just for the users but the city at large; but additional effort is
and improve its operations and service quality. Regarding infra- required to fulfill the project's promise and bring even more ben-
structure, the city has identified 16 projects with a total cost of USD efits to users and citizens.
253 million to help increase coverage and vehicle speeds, improve
integration, and solve bottlenecks that are affecting system per- 3. The introduction of the integrated public transport system
formance (Metro Cali, 2013b). In September 2013 the city has in Bogota
received additional support from the national government (Conpes
2013). A very positive development is that while the Metro Cali 3.1. Situation before the system was implemented
agency changed leadership in August 2013, there has not been a
change in priorities (Metro Cali, 2013d). This is some of the very Bogot
a is the capital of Colombia with 7.5 million inhabitants.
consistency that was missing in previous years. There is also a plan Since 2000, the city has advanced public transport through the
to complement the system with a green corridor ea complete street implementation of the TransMilenio BRT system, which has been
project with a linear park, BRT and bike-path, with integrated land recognized as a global good practice in sustainable mobility (see for
use, using an abandoned railway track (Metro Cali, 2013b). example Gwilliam, 2002; ITDP, 2013; C40 News Team, 2013).
TransMilenio has completed three out of six phases, and has
2.6. Main lessons from the Cali process achieved coverage of 26% of the public transport trips. The
remaining 76% public transport trips remained in traditional public
Cali used central government support to advance its citywide transport, which is characterized by the same issues observed in
transport reform. Rather than focusing on one or two mass transit Cali: dispersed ownership, excessive fleet, unreliable and low
corridors, local planners realized this was an opportunity for the quality services, high air pollutant emission levels, and many ac-
creation of an integrated system for the whole city, to replace the cidents. To overcome these issues, the city started the imple-
low quality traditional system. mentation of a citywide integrated system SITP in 2008
The implementation has encountered many challenges and (Transmilenio, 2013).
consequently has been very slow. Main barriers have been insti-
tutional: the city has faced several political crises over the last 15
years, partially as a result of corruption. Between 1995 and 2012, 3.2. Integrated system description

The SITP integrates seven existing BRT corridors (Figs. 5 and 6),
with a network of bus routes on arterials and feeder zones. In the
future the SITP is expected to incorporate new transport modes
currently in planning stages (Metro, Regional Rail, Cable Cars).
The new system is expected to run with 70% of the number of
buses currently operating in the city, and implies a gradual
modernization of the fleet (around 2800 new vehicles every year
replacing obsolete buses). The integrated system is operated
through 13 concession contracts and one contract for the fare
collection and control. Service quality is expected to improve, with
designated bus stops, information, driver training and stricter
controls on performance. Demand is estimated to be around 7
million trips per day (Transmilenio, 2013a, 2013b).
Fig. 3. Technical and user fare MIO-SIT. Implementation started in June 2012, with the expansion of
Source: ANDI (2013) trunk bus routes in two new BRT corridors, and a few routes of the
 D. Hidalgo, R. King / Research in Transportation Economics 48 (2014) 166e175 171

Fig. 4. Modal shares in Cali 2006e2013.

mo Vamos?, 2013
Source: Cali ¿Co

Table 6  Contractual difficulties with existing operators;

User satisfaction Cali MIO-SIT  Lack of user information.
2012 2013

Metro Cali Survey 67% 52%

The system was planned with little input of the community and
Cali Como Vamos 60% 52% is not necessarily expected to improve service quality to the users

mo Vamos?, 2013
(Kash & Hidalgo, 2012). However, benefits to the city are expected
Sources: Metro Cali, 2013a, 2013e; Cali ¿Co
to be large in terms of air quality, greenhouse gas emissions, and
integrated system. As of April 2014, implementation was road safety (Transmilenio, 2013a, 2013b; Universidad de los Andes
advancing, but yet to be completed. and Clean Air Institute, 2011).
As in Cali, the SITP in Bogot

a has faced several hindrances:
3.3. Planning for the system integration
 Infrastructure delays (TransMilenio Phase III, availability of
space for deptos) There have been multiple efforts to advance mass transit in the
 Difficulties in integrating the legacy fare collection system with city of Bogota
since the 1950s (Ardila-Go
mez, 2004). In the early
the new system, due to contractual barriers 1990s the city implemented busways to improve the operations of
 Difficulties in removing existing bus routes and scrapping the main public transport corridor Av. Caracas. The corridor used
existing old vehicles existing fleet and the traditional bus operations, and resulted in
 Lack of clarity in the financial conditions such as subsidies chaotic operations, with high emissions and fatalities and a very
bad image (Ardila & Rodríguez, 2000). Efforts to develop the first
metro line as part of a larger scale integrated system with busways
advanced to the point of approval of funding by the national gov-
ernment (Conpes, 1998), but financial difficulties and lack of a
support coalition hampered the progress of this initiative (Ardila-
Go
mez, 2004).
The local government, under Mayor Enrique Pen ~ alosa, initiated
the planning of the integrated system TransMilenio in 1998, and got
national government support to complete the system infrastruc-
ture (Conpes 2000). The initial plan called for the construction of
388 km of BRT with a total investment of USD 1970 million in
infrastructure and USD 960 million in buses and fare collection
systems (privately provided, remunerated with the user fare). The
system was then expected to be completed by 2016, with 85%
spatial coverage (Conpes, 2000).
The ambitious goal was revised by the city over time. In 2003
the implementation of the completion of the system was extended
until 2030, and cost revised upward from USD 7 million per kilo-
meter to USD 12 million (Transmilenio, 2003). This extension in
time and cost reflected the experience of the first two phases:

.
Fig. 5. TransMilenio BRT corridor on the NQS Expressway, Bogota greater cost and greater implementation time than initially ex-
Source: Hidalgo pected. In 2006 the plan was revised again, as part of the Mobility
172 D. Hidalgo, R. King / Research in Transportation Economics 48 (2014) 166e175

.
Fig. 6. TransMilenio BRT Network Map in operation in 2014, Bogota
Source: TRANSMILENIO S.A.
Master Plan (Alcaldía Mayor de Bogot
a, 2006). In this revision, the
implementation strategy changed from a corridor-by-corridor
approach with investment in BRT infrastructure to a citywide
reorganization of bus services. The reorganization does not require
large investments in BRT, with most services operating in mixed
traffic.
The city formed a special group inside TransMilenio to prepare
the technical components (infrastructure and operations), the
bidding process and the contracts. The legal structure for the
project was formalized in 2009 (Alcaldía Mayor de Bogot
a, 2009).
The city was divided in thirteen operational areas plus a “neutral”
zone (extended downtown). Each of the thirteen zones was
assigned to a private operator selected through a competitive bid-
ding process. The operators serve routes within the zone (feeder,
zonal and special services), and routes connecting to other zones
(urban and BRT trunk services). A 14th operator is in charge of the
integrated fare collection system, and providing the technology for
control and user information services.
In 2011 the city released a revised strategic public transport plan
prepared internally by the mass transit agency (Transmilenio,
2011). It included the results of studies to define the alignment of
the first metro line and a plan for expansion and upgrades of the
trunk system and integration terminals. This proposal was partially
adopted in the city development plan 2012e2016 (Alcaldía Mayor
de Bogot
a, 2012).
A review of the SITP planning process in 2011, which included
interviews with local experts and a survey of potential users, in-
dicates that the planning process was sound from the technical
point of view, but did not necessarily address user needs (Kash &
Hidalgo, 2012). The review identified awareness, expectations,
and aspiration gaps between users and planners, as well as equity
concerns.
3.4. Implementation process
The city of Bogota
decided to adopt a gradual implementation
process for the SITP to avoid issues observed in Santiago, Chile
with the “big-bang” implementation (Mun ~ oz et al. 2009). The
plan was to implement the operation within 18 months starting
in November 2011 (Transmilenio, 2011). Implementation
depended partially on finalizing the infrastructure of the Phase III
of TransMilenio (20 km) whose contracts were signed on
December 2007. These contracts had large difficulties, including a
corruption scandal (see for example,El Tiempo, 2011; Go
mez,
2012).
Initial operations of the SITP started in June 2012, 8 months after
the goal established in the implementation plan set forth in January
2011. Operations included part of the infrastructure for Trans-
Milenio Phase III and some new integrated routes. These compo-
nents used the new fare collection system, which was not
integrated with the one used in TransMIlenio Phases I and II. There
have been contractual issues in making the integration possible
(Redaccio
n Bogota
, 2013a) and only in November 2012 were the
fare cards from Phase I usable in Phase II, but not in the “integrated”
buses outside TransMilenio.
Another implementation difficulty has been the Carrera Septima
corridor, one of the expected components of TransMilenio Phase III
(Mojica and Go
mez-Iban ~ ez, 2011; Table 7). The project for this
 D. Hidalgo, R. King / Research in Transportation Economics 48 (2014) 166e175 173

Table 7 possible. This is expected to be mitigated with subsidy policies

ptima over time.
Carrera Se targeted to the low income population (Tellez Oliveros, 2013).
Year

2007 Design as full BRT (large stations with passing lanes)

3.6. Main lessons from Bogota's SITP
2008 Scope changed for a lighter intervention
(smaller stations single lane) The implementation of SITP in Bogota
is still in a very early stage.
2009 Infrastructure contracted for the BRT light version The integrated system approach, rather than expansion corridor by
2010 Contract suspended (BRT light version)
corridor, seems a natural evolution after the first phases of the
2011 Concept changed to a “Green Corridor”
(electric buses) TransMilenio system. The expected organizational, environmental,
2012 Light Rail Proposed and safety benefits are expected to be important.
2013 Operations started with dual buses (with doors The city used the experience accumulated in the first two phases
on both sides to operate on a trunkway and on
of TransMilenio to plan the contractual scheme of the new system.
mixed traffic)
2014 Hybrid Diesel-Electric buses introduced (dual buses)
The bidding process had very good technical preparation, and was
run relatively smoothly. The only strong opposition came from

n Bogota
Sources: Lewin, 2011; Lancheros, 2012 and 2011; Redaccio
, 2013b;
small owners; but the city created financial mechanisms to
Transmilenio, 2013b.
compensate them. The cost of the transition from the existing
system to SITP in 2013e2016 is estimated to be USD 400 million
corridor has gone through multiple changes over time, reflecting (Cubillos Murcia, 2013). This figure includes operational support for
the lack of continuity in public policies in the city. the new operators during implementation.
To avoid the problems faced by Santiago, the city adopted a
gradual approach. Nevertheless the implementation process has
3.5. Current status and expectations
been protracted. Implementation started in 2011, early operations
began in mid-2012, and complete operations were projected for an
In April 2014 the overall achievement of the system was 66% of
unrealistic second semester of 2014.
the planned totals (Table 8).
Progress on the BRT has been slowed by debates about different
The current goal of the administration is to have the full system
modes e between BRT, Metro, and Light Rail e that sucked life and
running by August 2014 (Tellez Oliveros, 2014). The city will need to
attention from implementation to debate (Ardila Arrieta, 2013).
complete infrastructure components (bus stops and integration
Expansion and improvement of existing BRT infrastructure has
terminals), and the private operators will need to incorporate the
been delayed, while the quality of service perceived by the users
remaining fleet and bus drivers (Transmilenio, 2013a; 2013b). It is
keeps declining (Bogot

mo Vamos?, 2012).
a ¿Co
unlikely that the new deadline will be met, based on the experience
The main result of the pro-public transport and pro-NMT
so far.
mobility policies in Bogota
between 1998-2011 has been a rela-
The primary intended user benefit from the SITP is a more
tive stability of the participation of public transport, a small decline
organized transportation system (Kash & Hidalgo, 2012). The
in the share of individual motor vehicles and a slight increase in
reduction in fleet size and retirement of obsolete buses is projected
walking and biking (Fig. 7). This shows that consistent promotion of
to reduce air pollution (Universidad de los Andes and Clean Air
walking and biking, improvements in the public transport system
Institute, 2011). The reduction in bus kilometers, improved
and automobile demand management policies can result in actual
training and shorter working hours for bus drivers and the end of
progress.
competition between them is expected to reduce traffic injuries
Nevertheless, the modal share tendency showed a significant
and fatalities. Nevertheless, the users may not see hoped for re-
shift in 2012: public transport share dropped from 71 to 63 percent.
ductions in travel time and improvements in travel comfort. Buses
At the same time, private vehicle use increased from 15 to 18
outside the BRT corridors are going to operate in mixed traffic,
percent (Bogot
a ¿Como Vamos?, 2012). This tendency continued in
designed occupancies are high to increase productivity, and there
2013 (Fig. 7).
will be an increase in transfers (Kash & Hidalgo, 2012).
Regarding travel cost, the new system will eliminate informal
4. Conclusions
discounts prevalent in the existing system. A fraction of the users of
the traditional system travel with discount after negotiation with
The cities of Cali and Bogota in Colombia have made substantial
the bus drivers e 9% overall and up to 35% for some trips, according
progress in the implementation of their integrated public transport
to a 2011 survey (Kash & Hidalgo, 2012). Under the new system,
systems. The projects are aimed at replacing their semi-
which features validation using smart cards, this will not be
deregulated and dispersed public transport services by organized
services, to overcome quality of service issues and face multiple
Table 8 negative externalities.
Progress in the integrated systems implementation. The two cases also show that implementing citywide integrated
Item Total goal July 2013 April 2014 Progress public transport systems is a very complex undertaking. It requires
a combination of political leadership, technical capacity, and
Routes [No.] 450 88 220 49%
Fleet [No.] 10,550 1713 4786 45%
funding. These three elements have not been always aligned. One
Drivers [No.] 26,715 5967 14,220 53% observed issue in both cities is the constant change in priorities as a
Stations and Terminals [No.] 25 25 25 100% result of political cycles. They also show relative weaknesses in the
Bus Stops [No.] 6737 3820 4979 74% public agencies in charge of the systems and negative impacts of
Depots [Ha.] 120 86.06 72%
cost escalation and allegations of corruption.
Farecards sale and 4600 3102 67%
recharge points [No.] One common issue in the two cities is protracted implementa-
Eliminated Routes (traditional 508 32 178 35% tion. There seem to be a tendency for overly optimistic timetables,
system) [No.] which keep expanding over time. Gradual implementation was the
Overall Progress SITP 66% chosen policy response to the difficulties faced by Transantiago
Sources: Cubillos Murcia, 2013; Transmilenio 2014 with the so called “big-bang” approach. Nevertheless the extended
174 D. Hidalgo, R. King / Research in Transportation Economics 48 (2014) 166e175
Fig. 7. Modal Split in Bogot

a 1995e2013.
Source: Bogot
a ¿Como Vamos?, 2012
time tables also cause difficulties: costs incurred are not reflected in
offsetting benefits and people lose faith in the systems. After
observing the actual implementation in Cali and Bogot
a, it is not
clear that a gradual process is better than a quick one. While Cali
and Bogot
a have not experienced the chaotic situation of Santiago
during the first months of Transantiago, neither have they fully
enjoyed the benefits of integration, and transition costs have been
extensive.
These case studies may help planners in other cities understand
the impacts and issues behind the implementation of integrated
transport systems. Further analysis may be useful for other poli-
cymakers in specific aspects highlighted by these cases, such as the
technical difficulties in infrastructure or advanced information
systems, contractual details, and impacts analysis. Further analysis
on the implementation pace is also required to make recommen-
dations on the preferred approach, and linkages to differing base-
line conditions.
Acknowledgments
Thanks to Pilar Rodriguez (former President of Metrocali), Jua-
nita Concha (Metrocali and former staff of Transmilenio), Fernando
Pa
ez (former General Manager of TransMilenio) and Javier
Herna
ndez (former coordinator of the SITP in Bogota
) for sharing
valuable information and insights.
This research has been supported by the BRT Centre of Excel-
lence (www.brt.cl) financed by the Volvo Research and Educational
Foundations (VREF). This Centre was established in May of 2010
and is working as a consortium of Pontificia Universidad Cato
lica de
Chile (PUC), Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Technical
University of Lisbon, The University of Sydney and EMBARQ e the
transport program of the WRI Ross Centre for Sustainable Cities.
The authors are grateful for the comments of two anonymous
reviewers. Views expressed in the document are the sole re-
sponsibility of the authors.
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