ULPIANO P. SARMIENTO III and JUANITO G.
ARCILLA,  1935- all presidential appointments required
petitioners, vs.
SALVADOR MISON, in his capacity as
COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF CUSTOMS,
AND GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET,
respondents,
COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS, intervenor
PADILLA, J.
NATURE: Petition for prohibition.
SUMMARY: Petitioners, who are taxpayers, lawyers,
members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
professors of Constitutional Law, seek to enjoin the
respondent Salvador Mison from performing the
functions of the Office of Commissioner of the Bureau
of Customs and the respondent Guillermo Carague, as
Secretary of the Department of Budget, from effecting
disbursements in payment of Mison's salaries and
emoluments, on the ground that Mison's appointment
as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is
unconstitutional by reason of its not having been
confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. The
respondents, on the other hand, maintain the
constitutionality of respondent Mison's appointment
without the confirmation of the Commission on
Appointments.
DOCTRINE: Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs
(a bureau head) is not one of those within the first
group of appointments where the consent of the
Commission on Appointments is required. Sec. 601 of
Republic Act No. 1937, otherwise known as the Tariff
and Customs Code of the Philippines, which was
enacted by the Congress of the Philippines on 22 June
1957, the President is expressly authorized by law to
appoint the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs.
ISSUE/S:
WON the appointment of Salvador Mison III is
constitutional. YES
RATIO:
Section 16 article vii of the constitution, is readily
apparent that there are four (4) groups of officers
whom the President shall appoint.
These four (4) groups, to which we will hereafter refer
from time to time, are:
 First, the heads of the executive departments,
ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, officers of the armed forces from the
rank of colonel or naval captain, and other
officers whose appointments are vested in him
in this Constitution;
 Second, all other officers of the Government
whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law;
 Third, those whom the President may be
authorized by law to appoint;
 Fourth, officers lower in rank whose
appointments the Congress may by law vest in
the President alone.
By following the accepted rule in constitutional and
statutory construction that an express enumeration of
subjects excludes others not enumerated, it would
follow that only those appointments to positions
expressly stated in the first group require the consent
(confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.
Manner on Appointments in 1935 and 1973 and 1987
constitution:
the consent (confirmation) of the Commission
on Appointments.
 1973- the 1973 Constitution, consistent with
the authoritarian pattern in which it was
molded and remolded by successive
amendments, placed the absolute power of
appointment in the President with hardly any
check on the part of the legislature.
 1987-the framers of the 1987 Constitution and
the people adopting it, struck a "middle
ground" by requiring the consent
(confirmation) of the Commission on
Appointments for the first group of
appointments and leaving to the President,
without such confirmation, the appointment of
other officers, i.e., those in the second and
third groups as well as those in the fourth
group, i.e., officers of lower rank.
It is, therefore, clear that appointments to the second
and third groups of officers can be made by the
President without the consent (confirmation) of the
Commission on Appointments. "He (the President) shall
also appoint all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law
and those whom he may be authorized by law to
appoint" With particular reference to the word "also,"
implies that the President shall "in like manner"
appoint the officers mentioned in said second sentence.
In other words, the President shall appoint the officers
mentioned in said second sentence in the same
manner as he appoints officers mentioned in the first
sentence, that is, by nomination and with the consent
(confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.
Third group- in the case of lower-ranked officers, the
Congress may by law vest their appointment in the
President, in the courts, or in the heads of various
departments of the government. In short, the word
"alone" in the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII of
the 1987 Constitution, as a literal import from the last
part of par. 3, section 10, Article VII of the 1935
Constitution, appears to be redundant in the light of
the second sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII. And, this
redundancy cannot prevail over the clear and positive
intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution that
presidential appointments, except those mentioned in
the first sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII, are not subject
to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
Appointment on Bureau of Customs - In 1935
Constitution includes "heads of bureaus" among those
officers whose appointments need the consent of the
Commission on Appointments, the 1987 Constitution
on the other hand, deliberately excluded the position of
"heads of bureaus" from appointments that need the
consent (confirmation) of the Commission on
Appointments. Moreover, the President is expressly
authorized by law to appoint the Commissioner of the
Bureau of Customs under section 601 of RA No. 1937.
Therefore, the appointment of Mison is within the
constitutional power of the president, hence, valid.
DISPOSITIVE: Petition dismissed.
August 5, 1986
FELIMON LUEGO, petitioner-appellant, vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSIONand FELICULA TUOZO,
respondents-appellees.
CRUZ, J.:
NATURE: Petition to review CSC’s order on petitioner’s
removal from his permanent appointment.
1
SUMMARY:Petitioner was appointed Administrative
Officer II, Office of the City Mayor, Cebu City by Mayor
Florentino Solon. The appointment was described as
"permanent" but the Civil Service Commission
approved it as "temporary," subject to the final action
taken in the protest filed by the private respondent and
another employee. CSC found private respondent to be
better qualifiedthan the petitioner for the contested
position and, accordingly, directed "that FeliculaTuozo
be appointed to the position of Administrative Officer II
and revoked Luego’s appointment.
DOCTRINE/S:
 The Civil Service Commission is not
empowered to determine the kind or nature of
theappointment extended by the appointing
officer, its authority being limited to approving
orreviewing the appointment in the light of the
requirements of the Civil Service Law. Whenthe
appointee is qualified and all the other legal
requirements are satisfied, theCommission has
no choice but to attest to the appointment in
accordance with the CivilService Laws.
ISSUE/s:
1. W/N the CSC is authorized to disapprove
apermanent appointment on the ground that
another person is better qualified than
theappointee. NO.
RATIO:
1. The appointment of the petitioner was not
temporary but permanent and was therefore
protected by Constitution. The appointing
authority indicated that it was permanent, as
he had the right to do so, and it was not for the
respondent Civil Service Commission to reverse
him and call it temporary. The stamping of the
words "APPROVED as TEMPORARY" did not
change the character of the appointment,
which was clearly described as
"Permanent".The Civil Service Commission is
not empowered to determine the kind or
nature of the appointment extended by the
appointing officer, its authority being limited to
approving or reviewing the appointment in the
light of the requirements of the Civil Service
Law. When the appointee is qualified and all
the other legal requirements are satisfied, the
Commission has no choice but to attest to the
appointment in accordance with the Civil
Service Laws.
DISPOSITIVE: Petition is granted. Resolution of the
respondent CSC is set aside, and the petitioner is
hereby declared to be entitled to the office in dispute by
virtue of his permanent appointment.
October 14, 1949
ANTONIO LACSON, petitioner, vs.
HONORIO ROMERO, ET AL., respondents.
MONTEMAYOR, J.
NATURE: Quo Warranto proceeding
SUMMARY: Petitioner Lacson was appointed by the
President of the Phils., as provincial fiscal of Negros
Oriental on July 25, 1946. but on May 17, 1949,
Lacson was nominated for the same position, this time,
as provincial fiscal of Tarlac. On the same date,
respondent Romero was appointed as provincial fiscal
of Negros Oriental (previous post of Lacson). However,
Lacson neither accepted nor assumed the office in
Tarlac, hence the current dispute as to the legitimacy
and effectivity of Lacson’s appointment as provincial
fiscal of Tarlac, as well as the effectivity of Romero’s
appointment as provincial fiscal of Negros Oriental. The
Court ruled that Lacson should still be the provincial
fiscal of Negros Oriental and that Romero’s
appointment to the said post is not effective. Mainly
because Lacson did not accept his appointment to
Tarlac, and considering that under the Constitution a
provincial fiscal may not be arbitrarily removed from
his office except for causes provided by law.
DOCTRINE/S:
 The appointment to a governmental post like
that of provincial fiscal is not only made by the
President, with the concurrent confirmation of
the Commission on Appointments, but is
actually completed by the acceptance of the
nominee, in order for such appointment to be
valid and effective. The first two steps of
nomination and confirmation done by the
President and Commission, respectively only
constitutes a mere offer yet to be accepted by
the nominee him/herself.
 As stated under Article XII, Section 4 of the
Constitution, no officer or employee in the civil
service shall be removed or suspended except
for causes provided by law.
FACTS:
 On July 25,1946, Lacson was appointed by the
President of the Phils., as the provincial fiscal
of Negros Oriental, the same was confirmed by
the Commission on Appointments on August
6, 1946, and Lacson took his oath of office on
August 10, 1946 and performed his duties.
 On May 17, 1949, upon recommendation of
the Secretary of Justice, Lacson was now being
appointed for the same office, but this time in
the province of Tarlac. On the same date,
Romero was appointed as the provincial fiscal
of Negros Oriental. Both nominations were
confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments on May 19, 1949.
 Lacson neither accepted his nomination in
Tarlac nor assumed his duties.
 Romero, on the other hand, took his oath and
notified the Solicitor General of the fact, and
proceeded to perform his duties.
 Upon Romero’s arrival in Negros Oriental, he
notified Lacson of his intention to take over the
office, but Lacson objected.
 On June 24, 1949, Romero appeared in
criminal case no. 4433 (as provincial fiscal).
However, Lacson filed his objection and asked
that Romero’s appearance as provincial fiscal
be stricken from the record. However, the
presiding judge denied Lacson’s petition and
recognized Romero as the provincial fiscal of
Negros Oriental.
 On June 27, 1949, Romero again appeared in
Special Proceedings No. 630 as provincial
fiscal, Lacson again filed his objection, but was
overruled.
 When Lacson requested the payment of his
salary for the period from June 16 to June
1949 as the provincial fiscal of Negros
Oriental, the Provincial Auditor (Angel Paguia)
and Provincial Treasurer (L.J. Alfabeto) turned
down his claim and instead paid respondent
Romero the salary for the position of provincial
fiscal from June 16, 1949 up to the present.
 The aforesaid events now has become the basis
for this quo warranto proceedings aimed at
establishing the petitioner Lacson’s right to the
2
 post of provincial fiscal of Negros Oriental and
to hold the respondent Romero guilty of
usurpation, unlawful holding and exercise of
the functions and duties of provincial fiscal of
Negros Oriental, which will result to his ouster
from the office.
ISSUE:
1. W/N Lacson’s subsequent appointment as
provincial fiscal of Tarlac is valid and efffective.
NO (relevant to topic)
2. W/N Lacson’s effective removal from his office
in Negros Oriental is valid. NO (relevant to
topic)
RATIO:
1. The appointment to a government post like
that of provincial fiscal to be complete involves
several steps. First, comes the nomination by
the President. Then to make that nomination
valid and permanent, the Commission on
Appointments of the Legislature has to confirm
said nomination. The last step is the
acceptance thereof by the appointee by his
assumption of office. The first two steps,
nomination and confirmation, constitute a
mere offer of a post. They are acts of the
Executive and Legislative departments of the
Government. But the last necessary step to
make the appointment complete and effective
rests solely with the appointee himself. He may
or he may not accept the appointment or
nomination. As held in the case of Borromeo
vs. Mariano, 41 Phil., 327, "there is no Power
in this country which can compel a man to
accept an office." Consequently, since Lacson
has declined to accept his appointment as
provincial fiscal of Tarlac and no one can
compel him to do so, then he continues as
provincial fiscal of Negros Oriental and no
vacancy in said office was created, unless
Lacson had been lawfully removed as Such
fiscal of Negros Oriental.
2. The next question arises as to whether the
President even with the concurrence or
consent of the Commission on Appointments
may remove a provincial fiscal without cause.
The Constitution itself denies said right. Article
XII, section 4 of said instrument provides that
"no officer or employee in the civil service shall
be removed or suspended except for cause as
provided by law.”
DISPOSITIVE: The Court rules in favor of Petitioner
Lacson’s retention of his office as provincial fiscal of
Negros Oriental and the respondent Romero, not being
entitled to the said post, is ordered to surrender to the
petitioner all the records or papers appertaining to said
office that may have come into his possession. The
respondent provincial auditor and provincial treasurer,
are hereby ordered to pay to the herein petitioner his
salary from June 16, 1949, and as long as said
petitioner continues to be the legal incumbent to the
office in question.
January 27, 1983
MARCIAL COSTIN, petitioner, vs.
HONORABLE LOPE C. QUIMBO, respondent.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.
NATURE: Petition to review the decision of the Court of
First Instance of Leyte.
DOCTRINE:
 A promotional appointment not yet attested by
the Civil Service Commissioner is not yet final
and complete.
o The incoming mayor must first
await the action of the Provincial
Treasurer and the Civil Service
Commissioner on the promotional
appointment made by the former
mayor before appointing his own
protégé.
FACTS:
 Petitioner EstanislaoLajer was a member of the
municipal police force of Abuyog, Leyte since
January 1, 1949. He was extended a
promotional appointment as sergeant of police
on October 15, 1958.
 On November 25, 1959, the outgoing
municipal mayor of Abuyog accorded Lajer
another promotional appointment as chief of
police. This last appointment was not attested
and approved as required by law.
 On January 14, 1960, the new municipal
mayor dismissed Lajer and eight other
members of the police department. The
municipal mayor then extended to respondent
HiginioVerra a permanent appointment as
Chief of Police of Abuyog, who immediately
took over the position. The appointment was
eventually approved permanent under Section
24(b) of Republic Act 2260 by the
Commissioner of Civil Service.
 Lajer and the eight members of the police force
filed an action for mandamus, contesting their
separation from service.
o While this petition was pending, there
was again a change in the municipal
administration of Abuyog, Leyte as a
result of the 1963 local elections. The
newly elected municipal mayor
dismissed respondent Verra from
office.
o VictorianoSilleza, acting as officer-in-
charge, replaced Verra, until petitioner
MarcialCostin was appointed chief of
police.
 On December 29, 1964, Verra filed a civil case
against the petitioner, the municipal mayor,
and the municipal treasurer, questioning the
legality of his separation alleging that he could
not be dismissed as chief of police because he
was a civil service eligible and in possession of
an appointment to the position of chief of
police duly attested as permanent by the Civil
Service Commission.
 On January 22, 1966, the case filed by Lajer
and his companions was decided by the Court
of Appeals.
o The Court found Lajer and his
companions were illegally removed
from office and are, therefore, entitled
to reinstatement to their respective
positions with payment of the salaries
they failed to receive.
o As a result of the abovementioned
decision, Lajer was reinstated as chief
of police, which prompted Vera to
amend his petition, impleading Lajer
as an additional respondent.
 On December 2, 1969, respondent judge
rendered his decision, declaring that Verra is
entitled to reinstatement with salary to be paid
to him for the whole period of his illegal
separation to the date of his reinstatement. He
also ordered the municipal mayor to reinstate
3
 Verra immediately and the municipal treasurer
to pay his salary.
 Hence, the present petition.
ISSUE:
1. W/N the appointment of respondent
HiginioVerra to the position of Chief of Police of
Abuyog, Leyte, was valid and consequently his
removal therefrom illegal. NO
RATIO:
1. Appointment
 When Verra was appointed chief of police
on January 14, 1960, Lajer had just been
dismissed from office with several other
members of the police force. The validity of
Verra’s appointment, therefore, hinges on
the legality of Lajer’s removal.
 It is elementary in the law of public officers
what no person, no matter how qualified
and eligible he is for a certain position may
be appointed to an office, which is not
vacant. The incumbent must first be
legally removed or his appointment validly
terminated.
 The respondent is correct in asserting that
when the promotional appointment was
made in 1959, it could not be considered
final or complete. Under Section 2(a) of
Rule VI, the Civil Service Rules
implementing Section 16(g) of Republic Act
2260, an appointment extended by an
officer duly empowered to make it is not
final and complete until after the
Commissioner of Civil Service has certified
that such an appointment may be made.
 Section 20 of the abovementioned Act
which, in part, provides:
o “’SEC. 20. Delegation in the Civil
Service Commission and to the
Agencies.—x xx Appointments by x
xx municipal mayors shall become
effective upon issuance of such
appointments and upon
attestation by the provincial
treasurer in the case of
appointments made by x xx
municipal mayors x xx. All
appointments made by the x xx
municipal mayors x xx shall, after
being attested to by the respective
provincial treasurer x xx be
forwarded within ten days to the
Commissioner of Civil Service for
review pursuant to Civil Service
law and rules. If within one
hundred eighty days after receipt
of said appointments, the
Commissioner of Civil Service shall
not have made any correction or
revision, then such appointments
shall be deemed to have been
properly made. x xx.’”
 The attestation by the provincial treasurer of
Leyte was necessary to make the appointment
of Lajer effective. However, these requirements
could not be complied with because Lajer was
replaced by the new mayor of the municipality
who appointed Verra in his stead.
 The incoming mayor should have awaited the
action of the provincial treasurer and later, the
Commissioner of Civil Service, before
appointing his own protégé to a position with
an incumbent occupying it. Verra cannot rely
on the absence of an attestation and a
certification from the Civil Service
Commissioner insofar as Lajer’s appointment
is concerned because by the fact of Verra’s
appointment, these requirements could no
longer be fulfilled.
DISPOSITIVE: Petition granted.
February9, 1989
SALVACION A. MONSANTO, petitioner, vs.
FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., respondent.
FERNAN, C.J.:
NATURE: Petition for review of an order issued by the
respondent Executive Secretary.
SUMMARY:The petitioner, Monsanto was charged with
the crime of the complex crime of Estafa thru
falsification of public documents and was sentenced to
imprisonment of four years to two months and one day
of prisioncorreccional as minimum, to ten years and
one day of prision mayor as maximum, and to pay a
fine of Php3,500. They were also ordered to indemnify
the government in the sum of Php 4,892.50
representing civil indemnities to the government. The
petitioner filed her appeal on her conviction to the
Supreme Court, which affirmed her conviction, to
which the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration.
While the motion was pending, President Marcos
extended an absolute pardon to her which she
accepted. By reason of the pardon, the petitioner
demanded from the Calbayog City Treasurer (which
referred the question to the Ministry of Finance; since
they are the proper body to decide on appointments of
treasurers) that she be reinstated to her former post as
assistant city treasurer (as if she was never suspended
from her post) and that she be given her backpay for
her wages due while she was suspended from her post.
The Ministry of Finance referred the question to the
Office of the President to which the respondent issued
his reply stating that the petitioner should first secure
a reappointment before she can reassume her former
position, and that the civil indemnity must first be
satisfied. Hence this petition for review filed by the
petitioner. The Court affirmed the order issued by the
respondent stating that absolute pardon is not a
reason for automatic reinstatement and does not leave
the petitioner guiltless.
DOCTRINE/S:
 Pardon cannot mask the acts constituting the
crime. These are “historical” facts which,
despite the public manifestation of mercy and
forgiveness implicit in pardon, “ordinary,
prudent men will take into account in their
subsequent dealings with the actor.”
 A pardon looks to the future. It is not
retrospective. It makes no amends for the past.
It affords no relief for what has been suffered
by the offender. It does not impose upon the
government any obligation to make reparation
for what has been suffered.
ISSUE/s:
1. W/N Monsanto’s absolute pardon carries with
it her automatic reinstatement to her previous
post.NO (relevant to topic)
2. W/N Monsanto should not be liable anymore
for civil indemnities by reason of her absolute
pardon. NO
RATIO:
1. As observed in the case of State v. Hazzard,
“To assume that all or even a major number of
pardons are issued because of innocence of the
recipients is not only to indict our judicial
system, but requires us to assume that which
4
 we all know to be untrue. The very act of
forgiveness implies the commission of wrong,
and that wrong has been established by the
most complete method known to modern
civilization. Pardons may relieve from the
disability of fines and forfeitures attendant
upon a conviction, but they cannot erase the
stain of bad character, which has been
definitely fixed… Pardon cannot mask the acts
constituting the crime. These are “historical”
facts which, despite the public manifestation of
mercy and forgiveness implicit in pardon,
“ordinary, prudent men will take into account
in their subsequent dealings with the actor.”
2. As also explicitly stated by the Supreme Court
in this case, “The rationale is plainly evident
Public offices are intended primarily for the
collective protection, safety and benefit of the
common good. They cannot be compromised to
favor private interests… A pardon, albeit full
and plenary, cannot preclude the appointing
power from refusing appointment to anyone
deemed to be of bad character, a poor moral
risk, or who is unsuitable by reason of the
pardoned conviction.
3. With regard to Monsanto’s demand for
exemption from civil indemnities, the Court
said “Civil liability arising from crime is
governed by the Revised Penal Code. It
subsists notwithstanding service of sentence,
or for any reason the sentence is not served by
pardon, amnesty or commutation of sentence.
Petitioner’s civil liability may only be
extinguished by the same causes recognized in
the Civil Code, namely: payment, loss of the
thing due, remission of the debt, merger of the
rights of creditor and debtor, compensation
and novation.
DISPOSITIVE: Petition is dismissed. The assailed
resolution of former Deputy Executive Secretary
Factoran, Jr., is affirmed.
February 22, 1991
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, petitioner, vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, respondent.
FERNAN, C.J:
NATURE: Petition to declare the unconstitutionality of
Executive Order No. 284 issued by President Corazon
C. Aquino.
SUMMARY:2 petitions were consolidated both seeking
a declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive
Order No. 284 issued by President Corazon C. Aquino.
This Executive Order which, in effect, allows members
of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant
secretaries to hold other government offices or
positions in addition to their primary positions, albeit
subject to the limitation therein imposed, runs counter
to Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitutionwhich
provides that the President, Vice-President, the Members
of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall
not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold
any other office or employment during their tenure.
DOCTRINE/S:
 In the light of the construction given to Section
13, Article VII in relation to Section 7, par. (2),
Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution,
Executive Order No. 284 dated July 23, 1987
is unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting the
number of positions that Cabinet members,
undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may
hold in addition to their primary position to
not more than two (2) positions in the
government and government corporations,
Executive Order No. 284 actually allows them
to hold multiple offices or employment in direct
contravention of the express mandate of
Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
prohibiting them from doing so, unless
otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution
itself.
ISSUE/s:
1. W/N thethe prohibition in Section 13, Article
VIIof the 1987 Constitution insofar as Cabinet
members, their deputies orassistants are
concerned admit of the broad exceptions made
for appointiveofficials in general under Section
7, par. (2), Article IX-B (Unless otherwise
allowed by law or by the primary functions of
his position, no appointive official shall hold any
other office or employment in the Government.).
NO
RATIO:
1. The qualifying phrase "unless otherwise
provided in thisConstitution" in Section 13,
Article VII cannot possibly refer to the broad
exceptions provided under Section 7, Article
IX-B of the 1987 Constitution. Toconstrue said
qualifying phrase as respondents would have
us do, would rendernugatory and meaningless
the manifest intent and purpose of the framers
of theConstitution to impose a stricter
prohibition on the President, Vice-
President,Members of the Cabinet, their
deputies and assistants with respect to
holdingother offices or employment in the
government during their tenure. Section 7,
Article IX-B is meant to laydown the general
rule applicable to all elective and appointive
public officials andemployees, while Section
13, Article VII is meant to be the exception
applicableonly to the President, the Vice-
President, Members of the Cabinet, their
deputiesand assistants.
It bears repeating though that in order that
such additional duties or functions may not
transgress the prohibition embodied in Section
13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, such
additional duties or functions must be required
by the primary functions of the official
concerned, who is to perform the same in an
exofficiocapacity as provided by law, without
receiving any additional compensation
therefor.Only the additional functions and
duties "required," as opposed to "allowed," by
the primary functions may be considered as
not constituting "any other office.
In the light of the construction given to Section
13, Article VII in relation to Section 7, par. (2),
Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution,
Executive Order No. 284 dated July 23, 1987
is unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting the
number of positions that Cabinet members,
undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may
hold in addition to their primary position to
not more than two (2) positions in the
government and government corporations,
Executive Order No. 284 actually allows them
to hold multiple offices or employment in direct
contravention of the express mandate of
Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
prohibiting them from doing so, unless
5
 otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution
itself.
Finding Executive Order No. 284 to be
constitutionally infirm, the court hereby orders
respondents to immediately relinquish their
other offices or employment, as herein defined,
in the government, including government-
owned or controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries. During their tenure in the
questioned positions, respondents may be
considered de facto officers and as such
entitled to emoluments for actual services
rendered.
DISPOSITIVE: Petition is granted. The assailed
Executive Order No. 284 was declared
unconstitutional.
August 1, 1989
RAMON LABO, JR., petitioner, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTION, respondent.
CRUZ, J.
NATURE: Petition to review the decision of the
Commission on Elections.
DOCTRINE:
 The qualifications for an elective office are
continuing requirements, once any of them is
lost during incumbency, title to the office itself
is deemed forfeited.
FACTS:
 The petitioner was proclaimed mayor-elect of
Baguio City on January 20, 1988. Private
respondent Luis Lardizabal filed a petition for
quo warranto on January 26, 1988, but no
filing fee was paid on the said date.
 The filing fee was paid on February 10, 1988,
or twenty-one days after his proclamation. As
the petition by itself alone was ineffectual
without the filing fee, it should be deemed filed
only when the fee is paid. The petitioner is of
the position that the respondent lacks
jurisdiction because the petition for quo
warranto against him was not filed on time in
accordance with Section 253 of the Omnibus
Election Code.
 The private respondent argues that during the
period when the COMELEC regarded his
petition as a pre-proclamation controversy, the
time for filing an election protest or quo
warranto proceeding was deemed suspended
under Section 248 of the Omnibus Election
Code.
 The Court agreed that the fee was paid during
the ten-day period as extended by the
pendency of the petition when it was treated by
the COMELEC as a pre-proclamation
proceeding, which did not require the payment
of a filing fee.
 The Court now took note of the sole issue of
citizenship, and decided to directly address it
in the present petition.
 Two administrative decisions on the question
of the petitioner’s citizenship was rendered by
the respondent on May 12, 1982, and found
the petitioner to be a citizen of the Philippines.
The second was rendered by the Commission
on Immigration and Deportation (CID) on
September 13, 1988, and held that the
petitioner was not a citizen of the Philippines.
o In the proceeding before the
COMELEC, there was no direct proof
that the petitioner had been formally
naturalized as a citizen of Australia.
The conjecture was merely inferred
from the fact that he had married an
Australian citizen, obtained an
Australian passport, and registered as
an alien with the CID.
o On the other hand, the decision of the
CID took into account the official
statement of the Australian
Government dated August 12, 1984,
through its Consul in the Philippines,
that the petitioner was still an
Australian citizen as of that date by
reason of his naturalization in 1976,
and this was affirmed later by a letter
addressed to the private respondent by
the Department of Foreign Affairs.
 The petitioner does not
question the authenticity of
the evidence. Neither does he
deny that he obtained an
Australian passport, which he
used in coming back to the
Philippines in 1980, when he
declared before the
immigration authorities that
he was an alien and registered
as such.
 The petitioner later asked for
change of his status from
immigrant to a returning
former Philippine citizen and
was granted an Immigrant
Certificate. He also
categorically declared that he
was a citizen of Australia in a
number of sworn statements
voluntarily made by him and
even sought to avoid the
jurisdiction of the barangay
court on the ground that he
was a foreigner.
 The petitioner argues that his alleged lack of
citizenship is a “futile technicality” that should
not frustrate the will of the electorate of Baguio
City who elected him by a “resonant and
thunderous majority.”
ISSUE:
1. W/N the petitioner a citizen of the Philippines
on the day of the local elections on January
18, 1988. NO
RATIO:
1. Citizenship
 Under CA No. 63 as amended by PD No.
725, Philippine citizenship may be
reacquired by direct act of Congress, by
naturalization, or by repatriation. It does
not appear in the record, nor does the
petitioner claim, that he has acquired
Philippine citizenship by any of these
methods.
 He does not point to any judicial decree of
naturalization as to any statute directly
conferring Philippine citizenship upon him.
Neither has he shown that he has
complied with PD No. 725.
 The petitioner is not now, nor was he on
the day of the local elections, a citizen of
the Philippines. In fact, he was not even a
qualified voter under the Constitution itself
because of his alienage. He was therefore
ineligible as a candidate for mayor of
Baguio City under Section 42 of the Local
Government Code.
 The qualifications for an elective office are
continuing requirements, once any of them
is lost during incumbency; title to the
office itself is deemed forfeited.
6
  In the case at bar, the citizenship and
voting requirements were not subsequently
lost but were not possessed at all in the
first place on the day of the election. The
petitioner was disqualified from running as
mayor and, although elected, is not now
qualified to serve as such.
DISPOSITIVE: Petition dismissed.
ANTONIA A. YEE, petitioner-appellee, vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC SCHOOLS, The Division
Superintendent of Schools of Antique,
HON. SECRETARY OF EDUCATION, and Hon.
COMMISSIONER OF CIVIL SERVICE, respondents-
appellants.
PADILLA, J.
NATURE: Petition for mandamus for the reinstatement
of the petitioner.
SUMMARY: Petitioner Antonia Yee is a public school
teacher of Buhang Elementary School, Buhang,
Antique, having been passed the Juniors Teach
Examination and civil service eligible for regular
teacher. She was married to a Chinese citizen Mr. Ng
Foo alias Pio Chet Yee. She was removed from teaching
by virtue of special order 296 series of 1957 issued by
the Division Schools Superintendent of Antique and
pursuant to Circular Number 40 Series Of 1947.
Petitioner wrote several times to the respondent for her
reinstatement but it was dismissed and denied and on
appeal concurred and affirmed by the civil service.
DOCTRINE: An applicant for admission to examination
for entrance into the civil service must be a citizen of
the Philippines and after he had qualified himself to be
eligible for appointment to a civil service position and
had been appointed to such position, he must continue
to be such citizen. A voluntary change of citizenship or
a change thereof by operation of law disqualifies him to
continue holding the civil service position to which he
had qualified and had been appointed.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether the removal of Petitioner is lawful. YES
2. Whether petitioner has a cause of action against the
appellants and by mandamus proceedings may secure
reinstatement to her former position. NO
RATIO:
1. Section 671 of Revised Administrative Code
enumerates the officers and employees constituting the
unclassified service, teaching in the public schools is a
classified service, a public function which may be
performed by Filipino citizen only. An applicant to a
civil service examination must be a Filipino citizen
Section 675 Revised Administrative Code. And after he
had qualified himself to be eligible for appointment to a
civil service position and had been appointed to such
position, he must continue to be such citizen. A
voluntary change of citizenship or a change thereof by
operation of law disqualifies him to continue holding
the civil service position to which he had qualified and
had been appointed. Such being the case, upon the
appellee's marriage on 10 August 1957 to Ng Foo alias
Pio Chet Yee, a Chinese citizen, the appellee ceased to
be a citizen of the Philippines, and for that reason she
is no longer qualified to continue holding the civil
service position to which she had qualified and had
been appointed. There is, however, no doubt that her
removal as a public school teacher because of loss of
Filipino citizenship is legal.
2. A cause of action exists if upon the facts alleged in a
complaint admitted by the adverse party or proved by
admissible and credible evidence a valid judgment may
be rendered by a competent court. In her petition for
mandamus the appellee alleges that she was illegally
removed from her teaching position. If that allegation
be established or proved, a valid judgment may be
rendered reinstating her to her position. Hence, a
cause of action exists against those responsible for her
removal from her position and the remedy of
mandamus is available to secure her reinstatement
thereto. However, in this case, the removal of petitioner
is legal and hence her cause of action for mandamus
cannot prosper.
DISPOSITIVE: Petition denied.
LAUREL VS DESIERTO
FACTS:
Petitioner is the Chair of the National Centennial
Commission (NCC), tasked to “take charge of the
nationwide preparations for the National Celebration of
the Philippine Centennial of the Declaration of
Philippine Independence and the Inauguration of the
Malolos Congress.”
Subsequently, a corporation named the Philippine
Centennial Expo ’98 Corporation (Expocorp) was
created and Petitioner was elected Expocorp Chief
Executive Officer.
An investigation of the anomalies in the construction
and operation of the centennial projects was effected
and the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee filed with the
Secretary of the Senate its Committee Final Report
recommending for “the prosecution by the
Ombudsman/DOJ of Dr. Salvador Laurel, chair of NCC
and of EXPOCORP for violating the rules on public
bidding, in violation of the anti-graft law.”
The Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau
issued a resolution finding “probable cause to indict
petitioner before the Sandiganbayan for conspiring to
violate Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, in
relation to Republic Act No. 1594.”
Petitioner assails the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman
on the ground that he is not a public officer because
he, both as chairman of the NCC and of the
EXPOCORP was not a “public officer.”
ISSUE/S:
WON petitioner, as Chair of the NCC, is a public officer
RATIO:
Yes. A public office is the right, authority and duty,
created and conferred by law, by which, for a given
period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure
of the creating power, an individual is invested with
some portion of the sovereign functions of the
government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of
the public. The individual so invested is a public
officer.
The most important characteristic which distinguishes
an office from an employment or contract is that the
creation and conferring of an office involves a
delegation to the individual of some of the sovereign
functions of government, to be exercised by him for the
benefit of the public; – that some portion of the
sovereignty of the country, either legislative, executive
or judicial, attaches, for the time being, to be exercised
for the public benefit. Unless the powers conferred are
of this nature, the individual is not a public officer.
Certainly, the law did not delegate upon the NCC
functions that can be described as legislative or
judicial. We hold that the NCC performs executive
7
functions. The executive power “is generally defined as
the power to enforce and administer the laws. It is the
power of carrying the laws into practical operation and
enforcing their due observance.” The executive
function, therefore, concerns the implementation of the
policies as set forth by law.
The Constitution provides in Article XIV (Education,
Science and Technology, Arts, Culture, and Sports)
thereof:
Sec. 15. Arts and letters shall enjoy the patronage of
the State. The State shall conserve, promote, and
popularize the nation’s historical and cultural heritage
and resources, as well as artistic creations.
In its preamble, A.O. No. 223 states the purposes for
the creation of the Committee for the National
Centennial Celebrations in 1998:
Whereas, the birth of the Republic of the Philippines is
to be celebrated in 1998, and the centennial presents
an important vehicle for fostering nationhood and a
strong sense of Filipino identity;
Whereas, the centennial can effectively showcase
Filipino heritage and thereby strengthen Filipino
values;
Whereas, the success of the Centennial Celebrations
may be insured only through long-range planning and
continuous developmental programming;
Whereas, the active participation of the private sector
in all areas of special expertise and capability,
particularly in communication and information
dissemination, is necessary for long-range planning
and continuous developmental programming;
Whereas, there is a need to create a body which shall
initiate and undertake the primary task of harnessing
the multi-sectoral components from the business,
cultural, and business sectors to serve as effective
instruments from the launching and overseeing of this
long-term project;
Hence, the NCC performs sovereign functions. It is,
therefore, a public office, and petitioner, as its Chair, is
a public officer.
September 11, 2009
CAROLINA R. JAVIER, petitioner, vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, respondent.
PERALTA, J.
NATURE: Petition for certiorari against the previous
order of the Sandiganbayan.
SUMMARY:As part of petitioner’s function as member
of the Governing Board, she was authorized by the
President to attend the Madrid International Book Fair
in Spain on October 8-12, 1997. She was given
Php139,199.00 as her travelling expenses.
Unfortunately, petitioner was not able to attend the
scheduled international book fair. As a result, she was
asked to refund the amount paid to her for her
supposedly travel expenses, the petitioner failed to
refund such amount and was subsequently charged
with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as
amended, and violation of Art. 217 of the Revised Penal
Code (Malversation of Public Funds). The petitioner
filed a motion to quash, arguing that the
Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over her since she
was not a public officer, the Sandiganbayan denied
such motion, hence the present petition for certiorari.
The Court ruled against the petitioner, finding that the
petitioner, under the law is a public officer, in fact
categorized as a “Board Member II, Salary Grade 28”,
which the Sandiganbayan has full exclusive
jurisdiction over.
DOCTRINE/S:
 The fact that an individual does not receive a
regular monthly salary from the Government
does not dispute the categorization of such
person as a “Public Officer”, what is controlling
is the fact that such person was elected or
appointed into office, and was invested with
some portion of the sovereign functions of the
government, to be exercised by him for the
benefit of the public.
FACTS:
 On February 26, 1996,petitioner Javier was
appointed as a member of the Governing Board
of the National Book Development Board
(NBDB), during that same time, she was also
the President of the Book Suppliers
Association of the Phils. (BSAP).
 As part of petitioner’s function as member of
the Governing Board, she was authorized by
the President to attend the Madrid
International Book Fair in Spain on October 8-
12, 1997.
 She was given Php139,199.00 as her travelling
expenses.
 However, she was not able to attend the
scheduled international book fair, and was
asked to refund the amount given for her
travelling expenses.
 The petitioner failed to refund, and was
charged with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A.
No. 3019 (Criminal Case no. 25898), and
violation of Art. 217 of the RPC (Criminal Case
no. 25867).
 The petitioner filed a motion to quash the
information on both of the charges on account
that the Sandiganbayan did not have
jurisdiction over her since she was not a public
officer, and also argued for Crim. Case No.
25898, litispendentia.
 The Sandiganbayan denied her motion to
quash, afterwards, the petitioner filed a motion
for reconsideration which was also denied.
 The petitioner now files this present petition
for certiorari arguing that the Sandiganbayan
has committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction for not
quashing the two informations. She argued
that first, she is not a public officer, and
second, she was being charged under two
informations, which is in violation of her right
against double jeopardy.
ISSUE/s:
1. W/N Javier is a public officer. YES (relevant to
topic)
2. W/N TheSandiganbayan has jurisdiction over
Javier. YES
RATIO:
1. The NBDB is a government agency mandated
to develop and support the Philippine book
publishing industry. It is a statutory
government agency created by R.A. No. 8047,
which was enacted into law to ensure the full
development of the book publishing industry
as well as for the creation of organization
structures to implement the said policy. To
8
 achieve this end, the Governing Board of the
NBDB was created to supervise the
implementation. A perusal of the Governing
Board’s powers and responsibilities would lead
to the conclusion that they partake of the
nature of public functions. Moreover, the
petitioner was authorized to travel to Madrid to
represent the Philippines in the International
Book Fair in Spain.
2. As explicitly provided by the Department of
Budget and Management the members of the
Governing Board of the NBDB, while not
receiving any salary, are, for purposes of
determining the rank equivalence of said
position, is equated to “Board Member II, SG-
28”. Being as such, the petitioner, as member
of the Governing Board, is included in the
Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction, particularly in
the phrase “all other national and local officials
classified as Grade 27’ and higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act
of 1989.
DISPOSITIVE: Petition is dismissed. The questioned
resolutions and orders of the Sandiganbayan are
affirmed.
June 16, 2015
ATTY. CHELOY VELICARIA-GARAFIL, petitioner, vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, respondent.
CARPIO, J.
NATURE: Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the
decisions of the Court of Appeals.
DOCTRINE:
 Acceptance is indispensable to complete an
appointment. Assuming office and taking the
oath amount to acceptance of the
appointment.An oath of office is a qualifying
requirement for a public office, a prerequisite
to the full investiture of the office.
FACTS:
 The present consolidated cases involve four
petitions:
o G.R. No. 203372 with Atty. Cheloy E.
Velicaria-Garafil (Atty. Velicaria-
Garafil), who was appointed State
Solicitor II at the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), as petitioner;
o G.R. No. 206290 with Atty. Dindo G.
Venturanza (Atty. Venturanza), who
was appointed Prosecutor IV (City
Prosecutor) of Quezon City, as
petitioner;
o G.R. No. 209138 with Irma A.
Villanueva (Villanueva), who was
appointed Administrator for Visayas of
the Board of Administrators of the
Cooperative Development Authority
(CDA), and Francisca B. Rosquita
(Rosquita), who was appointed
Commissioner of the National
Commission of Indigenous Peoples
(NCIP), as petitioners; and
o G.R. No. 212030 with Atty. Eddie U.
Tamondong (Atty. Tamondong), who
was appointed member of the Board of
Directors of the Subic Bay
Metropolitan Authority (SBMA), as
petitioner.
 Prior to the May 2010 elections, then President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued more than 800
appointments to various positions in several
government offices.
 The ban on midnight appointments in Section
15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution reads:
o Two months immediately before the
next presidential elections and up to
the end of his term, a President or
Acting President shall not make
appointments, except temporary
appointments to executive positions
when continued vacancies therein will
prejudice public service or endanger
public safety.
 Thus, for purposes of the 2010 elections,
March 10, 2010 was the cutoff date for valid
appointments and the next day, March 11,
2010, was the start of the ban on midnight
appointments. None of the petitioners claim
that their appointments fall under the
exception on the ban on midnight
appointments.
 On June 30, 2010, President Benigno S.
Aquino III took his oath of office as President of
the Philippines. A month later, he issued
Executive Order No. 2 (EO 2) recalling,
withdrawing, and revoking appointments
issued by President Arroyo, which violated the
constitutional ban on midnight appointments.
 Atty. Velicaria-Garafil reported for work on
August 9, 2010 without any knowledge of her
termination. She was made to return the
office-issued laptop and cellphone, and was
told that her salary ceased as of August 7,
2010. She was then informed that her former
secretary at the OSG received a copy of a
memorandum on her behalf. The said
memorandum bore the subject
“Implementation of Executive Order No. 2
dated July 30, 2010” and was addressed to the
OSG’s Director of Finance and Management
Service.
 Atty. Velicaria-Garafil filed a petition for
certiorari before the Supreme Court on
September 1, 2010. The petition prayed for the
nullification of EO 2, and for her reinstatement
as State Solicitor II without loss of seniority,
rights and privileges, and with full backwages
from the time that her salary was withheld.
 The Court of Appeals ruled that EO 2 is not
unconstitutional, hence the present petition.
ISSUE:
1. W/N the petitioners’ appointments violate
Section 15, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution. YES
2. W/N EO 2 is constitutional. YES
RATIO:
1. Midnight appointments
 None of the petitioners have shown that
their appointment papers and transmittal
letters have been issued and released
before the ban. The dates of receipt by the
Malacañang Records Office (MRO), which
in these cases are the only reliable
evidence of actual transmittal of the
appointment papers by President Arroyo,
are dates clearly falling during the
appointment ban.
2. Constitutionality of EO 2
 A well-settled rule in our jurisprudence is
that an appointment is a process that
begins with the selection by the appointing
power and ends with acceptance of the
appointment by the appointee. The
acceptance by the appointee is the last act
needed to make an appointment complete.
 The following elements should always
concur in the making of a valid
appointment:
9
o Authority to appoint and evidence
of the exercise of the authority;
 Appointment involves an
exercise of discretion of
whom to appoint; it is not
a ministerial act of issuing
appointment papers to the
appointee. Hence, when
Congress clothes the
President with the power
to appoint an officer, it
cannot at the time limit
the choice of the President
to only one candidate.
o Transmittal of the appointment
paper and evidence of transmittal;
 It is not enough that the
President signs the
appointment paper. There
should be evidence that
the President intended the
appointment paper to be
issued. For purposes of
verification of the
appointment paper’s
existence and
authenticity, the
appointment paper must
bear the security marks
and must be accompanied
by a transmittal letter
from the MRO.
 The MRO’s exercise of its
mandate does not prohibit
the President or the
Executive Secretary from
giving the appointment
paper directly to the
appointee, provided that
the latter prove that the
appointment paper was
directly given to him.
 In the case of Atty.
Velicaria-Garafil, her
appointment paper dated
March 5, 2010, with its
corresponding transmittal
letter, was merely turned
over to the MRO on May
13, 2010. The transmittal
letter that was turned over
to the MRO was already
stamped "released" by the
Office of the Executive
Secretary, but the date
and time as to when it was
actually received were
unusually left blank.
 The possession of the
original appointment
paper is not indispensable
to authorize an appointee
to assume office. If it were
indispensable, then a loss
of the original
appointment paper, which
could be brought about by
negligence, accident,
fraud, fire or theft,
corresponds to a loss of
the office.However, in case
of loss of the original
appointment paper, the
appointment must be
evidenced by a certified
true copy issued by the
proper office, in this case
the MRO.
o A vacant position at the time of
appointment; and
 Paragraph (b), Section 1 of
EO 2 considered as
midnight appointments
those appointments to
offices that will only be
vacant on or after March
11, 2010 even though the
appointments are made
prior to March 11, 2010.
 EO 2 remained faithful to
the intent of Section 15,
Article VII of the 1987
Constitution: the outgoing
President is prevented
from continuing to rule
the country indirectly after
the end of his term.
o Receipt of the appointment paper
and acceptance of the
appointment by the appointee who
possesses all the qualifications
and none of the disqualifications.
 Acceptance is
indispensable to complete
an appointment.
Assuming office and
taking the oath amount to
acceptance of the
appointment.An oath of
office is a qualifying
requirement for a public
office, a prerequisite to the
full investiture of the
office.
 The inclusion of
acceptance by the
appointee as an integral
part of the entire
appointment process
prevents the abuse of the
Presidential power to
appoint.
 The petitioners have failed to raise any
valid ground for the Court to declare EO 2,
or any part of it, unconstitutional.
Consequently, EO 2 remains valid and
constitutional.
DISPOSITIVE: Petition dismissed.
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 2
RECALLING, WITHDRAWING, AND REVOKING
APPOINTMENTS ISSUED BY THE PREVIOUS
ADMINISTRATION IN VIOLATION OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL BAN ON MIDNIGHT
APPOINTMENTS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
WHEREAS, Sec. 15, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution provides that "Two months immediately
before the next presidential elections and up to the end
of his term, a President or Acting President shall not
make appointments, except temporary appointments to
executive positions when continued vacancies therein
will prejudice public service or endanger public
safety.";
WHEREAS, in the case of "In re: Appointments dated
March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo Valenzuela and Hon.
Vallarta as Judges of the Regional Trial Court of
Branch 62 of Bago City and Branch 24 of Cabanatuan
City, respectively" (A.M. No. 98-5-01-SC Nov. 9, 1998),
the Supreme Court interpreted this provision to mean
that the President is neither required to make
appointments nor allowed to do so during the two
months immediately before the next presidential
elections and up to the end of her term. The only
known exceptions to this prohibition are (1) temporary
appointments in the executive positions when
continued vacancies will prejudice public service or
endanger public safety and in the light of the recent
Supreme Court decision in the case of De Castro, et al.
10
vs. JBC and PGMA, G.R. No. 191002, 17 March 2010,
(2) appointments to the Judiciary;
WHEREAS, Section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code
provides that:
"Section 261. Prohibited Acts. -The following shall be
guilty of an election offense:
(g) Appointments of new employees, creation of new
position, promotion, or giving salary increases. -
During the period of forty-five days before a regular
election and thirty days before a special election.
(1) Any head, official or appointing officer of a
government office, agency or instrumentality, whether
national or local, including government-owned or
controlled corporations, who appoints or hires any new
employee, whether provisional, temporary or casual, or
creates and fills any new position, except upon prior
authority to the Commission. The Commission shall
not grant the authority sought unless it is satisfied
that the position to be filled is essential to the proper
functioning of the office or agency concerned, and that
the position shall not be filled in a manner that may
influence the election.
As an exception to the foregoing provisions, a new
employee may be appointed in the case of urgent need:
Provided, however, that notice of the appointment shall
be given to the Commission within three days from the
date of the appointment. Any appointment or hiring in
violation of this provision shall be null and void.
(2) Any government official who promotes or gives any
increase of salary or remuneration or privilege to any
government official or employee, including those in
government-owned or controlled corporations.";
WHEREAS, it appears on record that a number of
appointments were made on or about 10 March 2010
in complete disregard of the intent and spirit of the
constitutional ban on midnight appointment and which
deprives the new administration of the power to make
its own appointment;
WHEREAS, based on established jurisprudence, an
appointment is deemed complete only upon acceptance
of the appointee;
WHEREAS, in order to strengthen the civil service
system, it is necessary to uphold the principle that
appointments to the civil service must be made on the
basis of merit and fitness, it is imperative to recall,
withdraw, and revoke all appointments made in
violation of the letter and spirit of the law;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, BENIGNO S. AQUINO III, by
virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution
as President of the Philippines, do hereby order and
direct that:
SECTION 1. Midnight Appointments Defined. - The
following appointments made by the former President
and other appointing authorities in departments,
agencies, offices, and instrumentalities, including
government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be
considered as midnight appointments:
(a) Those made on or after March 11, 2010, including
all appointments bearing dates prior to March 11,
2010 where the appointee has accepted, or taken his
oath, or assumed public office on or after March 11,
2010, except temporary appointments in the executive
positions when continued vacancies will prejudice
public service or endanger public safety as may be
determined by the appointing authority.
(b) Those made prior to March 11, 2010, but to take
effect after said date or appointments to office that
would be vacant only after March 11, 2010.
(c) Appointments and promotions made during the
period of 45 days prior to the May 10, 2010 elections in
violation of Section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code.
SECTION 2. Recall, Withdraw, and Revocation of
Midnight Appointments. Midnight appointments, as
defined under Section 1, are hereby recalled,
withdrawn, and revoked. The positions covered or
otherwise affected are hereby declared vacant.
SECTION 3. Temporary designations. - When
necessary to maintain efficiency in public service and
ensure the continuity of government operations, the
Executive Secretary may designate an officer-in-charge
(OIC) to perform the duties and discharge the
responsibilities of any of those whose appointment has
been recalled, until the replacement of the OIC has
been appointed and qualified.
SECTION 4. Repealing Clause. - All executive
issuances, orders, rules and regulations or part thereof
inconsistent with the provisions of this Executive Order
are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
SECTION 5. Separability Clause. - If any section or
provision of this executive order shall be declared
unconstitutional or invalid, the other sections or
provision not affected thereby shall remain in full force
and effect.
SECTION 6. Effectivity. - This Executive order shall
take effect immediately.
DONE in the City of Manila, this 30th day of July, in
the year Two Thousand and Ten.
By the President:
(Sgd.) PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.
Executive Secretary
(Sgd.) BENIGNO S. AQUINO III
Tayko vs Capistrano
FACTS:
The petitioners allege that Capistrano was appointed
judge of the CFI of Oriental Negros, to hold office
during good behavior and until he should reach the
age of 65 years; that he now has reached that age and,
therefore, under the provisions of section 148 of the
Administrative Code as amended, is disqualified from
acting as a judge of the Court of First Instance.
The petitioners further allege that in view of the many
election protests and criminal cases for violation of the
election law filed in the CFI of Oriental Negros arising
in the from the last election, de la Costa was duly
designated and acted as auxiliary judge. There was an
understanding that de la Costa would hear and take
cognizance of all election protests and criminal actions
then pending or to filed arising from the said last
general election, and that Capistrano would try and
hear the ordinary cases pending. Notwithstanding the
understanding, Capistrano tried and is still trying to
take cognizance of the election protests an criminal
actions in said court; declared in open court that he
will try the criminal cases for the reason that de la
Costa refused to try the same on the ground that the
preliminary investigations were held before him, when,
in truth and in fact, the d la Costa did not make the
statement imputed to him and was and is still willing
to try the election protests and criminal cases for
violation of the election law pending in the court.
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Additionally that Capistrano, in spite of the fact that he
was holding and is now pretending to hold the office of
judge took great interest and active part in the filing of
criminal charges against the petitioners to the
unjustifiable extent of appointing a deputy fiscal, who
then filed the proper information, when the provincial
fiscal refused to file criminal charges against the
petitioners for violation of the election law for lack of
sufficient evidence to sustain the same
Finally, that Capistrano is neither a judge de jure nor
de facto , but that he continues to hold the office of
judge and pretends to be duly qualified and acting
judge of the said province; and that he has tried, and
continues to try, to act as such judge. Hence this
petition.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not Capistrano, upon reaching the age of
65, can still continue public office? Is heconsidered a
de facto judge?
RATIO:
Briefly defined, a de facto judge is one who exercises
the duties of a judicial office under color of an
appointment or election thereto (Brown vs. O'Connell,
36 Conn., 432). He differs, on the one hand, from a
mere usurper who undertakes to act officially without
any color of right, and on the other hand, from a judge
de jure who is in all respects legally appointed and
qualified and whose term of office has not expired
(State vs. Carroll, 38 Conn., 449; Denny vs. Matton, 2
Allen [Mass.], 361; VanSlyke vs. Farmers' Mut. Fire
Ins. Co., 39 Wis., 390).
Apart from any constitutional or statutory regulation
on the subject there seems to be a general rule of law
that an incumbent of an office will hold over after the
conclusion of his term until the elction and
qualification of a successor (22 R. C. L., pp. 554-5).
When a judge in good faith remains in office after his
title has ended, he is a de facto officer (Sheehan's Case,
122 Mass., 445). Applying the principles stated to the
facts set forth in the petition before us, we cannot
escape the conclusion that, on the assumption that
said facts are true, the respondent judge must be
considered a judge de facto . His term of office may
have expired, but his successor has not been
appointed, and as good faith is presumed, he must be
regarded as holding over in good faith. The contention
of counsel for the petitioners that the auxiliary judge
present in the district must be considered the regular
judge seems obviously erroneous.
Accordingly, it is a well established principle, dating
from the earliest period and repeatedly confirmed by an
unbroken current of decisions, that the official acts of
a de facto judge are just as valid for all purposes as
those of a de jure judge, so far as the public or third
persons who are interested therein are concerned. The
principle is one founded in policy and convenience, for
the right of no one claiming a title or interest under or
through the proceedings of an officer having an
apparent authority to act would be safe, if it were
necessary in every case to examine the legality of the
title of such officer up to its source, and the title or
interest of such person were held to be invalidated by
some accidental defect or flaw in the appointment,
election or qualification of such officer, or in the rights
of those from whom his appointment or election
emanated; nor could the supremacy of the laws be
maintained, or their execution enforced, if the acts of
the judge having a colorable, but not a legal title, were
to be deemed invalid. As in the case of judges of courts
of record, the acts of a justice de facto cannot be called
in question in any suit to which he is not a party.
Petition is sustained.
EULOGIO RODRIGUEZ, SR., Plaintiff-Appellant, v.
CARLOS TAN, Defendant-Appellee.
Ponente: Justice Bautista-Angelo
Nature: Petitioner seeks to collect from defendant
the salaries and emoluments received being a de
facto officer plus damages.
Doctrines: 1. senator who had been proclaimed and
had assumed office, but was later on ousted as a result
of an election protest, is a de facto officer during the
time he held the office of senator, and is entitled to the
compensation, emoluments and allowances which our
Constitution provides for the position. This is the policy
and the rule that has been followed consistently in this
jurisdiction.
2. Where the Senate Electoral Tribunal chose to pass
sub silentio, or ignored altogether, an important claim
for damages in connection with an election protest — a
matter incident to the power and authority given to the
Tribunal by the Constitution, whose jurisdiction over
election cases is ample and unlimited — the clear
implication is that it deemed it unjustified. This matter
cannot be passed upon in another action for recovery
of said damages in accordance with the principle of res
judicata.
Facts:
Defendant Carlos Tan was one of the candidates of the
Liberal Party in the elections of November 11, 1947,
and was proclaimed as one of those who had been
elected by the Commission on Elections, and thereafter
he took the oath of office and immediately entered into
the performance of the duties of the position. On the
protest filed by the petitioner in the SET he was
declared to have been duly elected to the office. Hence,
petitioner is now claiming the salaries and emoluments
received by the defendant back when he is discharging
his official function as Senator. Defendant invoked the
principle of res judicata barring the claim of petitioner.
Issue/s:
1. Can the Petitioner collect the salaries and
emoluments received by the defendant and what is the
status of the defendant?
2. Does the principle of res judicata was
rightfully invoked by the defendant?
Rule:
1. NO.
Defendant duly proclaimed as Senator by the
COMELEC and assumed office as required by law is
entitled to the compensation, emoluments and
allowances which our Constitution provides for the
position (article VI, section 14). The emolument must
go to the person who rendered the service unless the
contrary is provided. The right of the persons elected to
compensation during their incumbency has always
been recognized.
2. YES.
It appears that plaintiff had already set up this claim in
the protest he filed against the defendant before the
Senate Electoral Tribunal, but when the case was
decided on the merits the Tribunal passed up this
matter sub silentio. In our opinion, this silence may be
interpreted as a denial of the relief. This is a matter
which can be considered as an incident to the power
and authority given to the Electoral Tribunal by our
Constitution, whose jurisdiction over election cases is
ample and unlimited (Sanidad Et. Al. v. Vera Et. Al.,
Case No. 1, Senate Electoral Tribunal), and when the
Tribunal chose to pass sub silentio, or ignore
altogether, this important claim, the clear implication
is that it deemed it unjustified.
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 Dispositive: Petition is affirmed against
petitioner.

GR No. L-781 November 29, 1946

CEFERINO M. REGALA, recurrent, vs.
THE JUDGE OF THE COURT OF THE FIRST
INSTANCE OF BATAAN, appealed.
Ponente: Justice Pablo

Nature: Petition for certiorari

Doctrine: A judge who discharges his position before

learning of the disapproval of his appointment is a de
facto judge. All their official actions, as de facto judge,
are so valid for all legal purposes and for all kinds of
matters, such as those of a judge dejure.

Facts:

Appellant was accused for the crime of

murder in the CFI of Bataan wherein he was informed
and plead not guilty. On the day of hearing, instead of
submitting evidence, Provincial Prosecutor filed an
amended complaint wherein it was alleged that
between appellant and his two co-accused there was
conspiracy, confederation and mutual aid to commit
the crime. Amended complaint was admitted by the
court. Appellant filed a notice of appeal and motion for
reconsideration but all denied by the court. It was
further alleged by the
complainant/petitioner/recurrent that Judge’s order
was null and void because the judge acted without
jurisdiction for his appointment has not been approved
by the Appointment Committee.

Issue: Whether the Judge’s order is null and

void.

Ruling:

NO.

Records show that the judge does not appear

to be aware of the disapproval of his appointment as
judge by the Appointment Committee. A judge who
discharges his position before learning of the
disapproval of his appointment is a de facto judge. All
their official actions, as de facto judge , are so valid for
all legal purposes and for all kinds of matters, such as
those of a judge dejure.

If the judge acted with an infraction or

not of the Regulation, it was at most a procedural
error, and not an abuse of discretion, or excess or lack
of jurisdiction. Such an error, if it is in fact, can be
corrected on appeal, after a final judgment has been
issued in the first instance, and not in an action
of certiorari.

Dispositive: Petition denied.

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