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Worth a Shot: On the

Explanatory Power of
Bandwagoning in Transatlantic
Relations
Lorenzo Cladi & Andrea Locatelli
Published online: 29 Jul 2013.

To cite this article: Lorenzo Cladi & Andrea Locatelli (2013) Worth a Shot: On the
Explanatory Power of Bandwagoning in Transatlantic Relations, Contemporary Security
Policy, 34:2, 374-381, DOI: 10.1080/13523260.2013.808072

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2013.808072

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 Worth a Shot: On the Explanatory Power
of Bandwagoning in Transatlantic Relations

LORENZO CLADI AND ANDREA LOCATELLI

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Realist scholars have been challenged by the growing European integration in defence issues.
In a previous article we argued that realism is still relevant, but we also criticized recent
attempts to explain the ESDP/CSDP as a form of balance of power. In turn, we suggested
that – coherently with realism’s core propositions – the European efforts to forge a
common security and defence policy can be explained as an example of bandwagoning.
Writing from a liberal perspective, Benjamin Pohl contends that focusing on the role of
states’ relative power in foreign policy behaviour is misleading. As a result, for Pohl European
integration is driven by European states’ consensus on the American liberal international order.
While conceding that liberalism is an important alternative approach, in this article we stress
our main point: simply put, bandwagoning is a better explanation for ESDP/CSDP. Drawing
on Pohl’s remarks, we refine our argument by discussing how the concept of bandwagoning can
be used for both alliance formation and alliance management. Finally, we conclude with a dis-
cussion on whether (and eventually how) it is possible to get to a synthesis of our positions.

In ‘Bandwagoning, Not Balancing: Why Europe Confounds Realism’, we advanced

the argument that realism continues to be relevant to explain EU defence integration
in the post-Cold War era. However, we contended that it is necessary for scholars to
return to the concept of bandwagoning which is better suited than balancing to
explain transatlantic security cooperation.1 Writing in this same journal, Benjamin
Pohl argues that the role of states’ relative power in foreign policy behaviour is mis-
leading, since neither balancing nor bandwagoning are useful concepts to explain
Europe’s security policy in the post-Cold War period. As Pohl asserts, ‘EU govern-
ments have followed an inductive and experimental approach’, thus emphasizing the
liberal basis of his counter-argument.2 While being an important alternative approach
(which we also acknowledge as such in our article), liberalism tends to emphasize
cooperative practices and ideologies. However, in doing this, it can overlook the
role played by international competition in shaping ESDP/CSDP.3
In defence of our argument, we will start by discussing the main points that Pohl
raises to dismiss the bandwagoning hypothesis. In particular, we will challenge his
critique of anarchy as a causal factor, as well as the central position that motivations
play in his theory. Secondly, we will draw on Pohl’s remarks to refine our argument
on bandwagoning; while conceding that the traditional focus on threat and rewards is
hard to apply in the context of US – European relations, we will claim that it still
makes sense to label European efforts to forge a common security and defence
Contemporary Security Policy, Vol.34, No.2, 2013, pp.374– 381
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2013.808072 # 2013 Taylor & Francis
 EXPLANATORY POWER OF BANDWAGONING 375

policy as such. Finally, our concluding section will present some considerations on
why we differ from liberals – and how we believe we could mend fences.

Anarchy, Unipolarity, and the Liberal/Realist Debate

Pohl confutes our bandwagoning thesis by focusing on the inaccuracy of the concept
of international anarchy. Specifically, he asserts that international anarchy is mista-
ken by realists ‘for an assumption or even a universally valid description of
reality’.4 Admittedly, the argument we presented in our article stems from research
carried out by the neorealist camp. As such, we agree with neorealist scholars that
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international anarchy is a key assumption for international relations; the anarchic

international system influences how states behave. We depart, however, from main-
stream realism in the reading of the structural effects on hegemonic alliances in a uni-
polar system. In particular, as Pohl also recognizes, we contest the enduring emphasis
of realist scholars on balancing.5 For this reason, while acknowledging the contri-
bution of alternative theoretical schools, we oriented our research question towards
intra-paradigmatic debate.6
We are aware, as Pohl states, that anarchy may not necessarily be a ‘universally
valid description of global reality’.7 This argument, albeit in different terms, has
perhaps been made by Alexander Wendt, writing from a social constructivist stand-
point and notoriously arguing that ‘anarchy is what states make of it’.8 In addition, we
acknowledge that Euro-American relations in the post-Cold War era pose a great
challenge to neorealist thinking in that the anarchic international system has not
resulted in a security competition between European states and the USA. Third, we
also approve the validity of alternative approaches that have emerged to explain
the lack of security competition between the Atlantic allies. In particular, the
effects of anarchy are tamed in that the European states and the USA have created
a community in which war is simply unthinkable. Karl Deutsch, along with a
number of scholars, introduced in 1957 the concept of security community to
explain the ‘possible ways in which men someday may abolish war’.9 While Pohl
does not refer to Deutsch in his analysis, his reference to the European states’ good-
will to support the liberal international order seems to match Deutsch’s thinking and
that of several other scholars who also saw the applicability of the concept of security
community in the post-Cold War era.10
That said, we contend that there is still a huge difference between arguing that
anarchy is not a realistic assumption and observing a peaceful environment in trans-
atlantic relations. Once again, we can rely on well-known realist contributions to
challenge Pohl’s critique. With a few exceptions – almost exclusively in the camp
of offensive realism – most realists accept that international competition may vary
significantly across time and space.11 In other words, the mere fact that war seems
to be out of the question does not rule out the anarchical nature of US – European
relations. So, although we are currently experiencing one of the most durable
periods of peace in European history, security considerations and relative power cal-
culations cannot be plausibly forsaken on both sides of the Atlantic. These problems
are made easier (or less critical) by the evident asymmetry in the alliance, but they
 376 CONTEMPO RA RY SECURITY POLICY

are there to stay – at least until anarchy is replaced by hierarchy as an ordering

principle.
The second issue raised by Pohl concerns the purported superiority of his liberal
account of CSDP operations. While plausible as an alternative explanation, we
believe that our hypothesis remains valid. We do not dispute that liberal values
have been underpinned by the Atlantic allies, but we believe that liberal values are
secondary to the importance of the distribution of power within the alliance (and
in international relations in general). For this reason, in our previous work we
opted for a parsimonious selection of variables: we traced the need to study the
dependent variable as bandwagoning rather than balancing, albeit within the systemic
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neorealist approach. Admittedly, the end result of parsimony is a sharp loss of infor-
mation and precision in explaining single facts. This has been widely recognized in
the literature.12 We would therefore not be surprised if a detailed account of the ESDP
process showed other factors shaping the EU states’ strategies beyond security con-
siderations. But this does not falsify the core proposition of our argument.
On the contrary, we might challenge an important part of Pohl’s liberal argument
in the same way we criticized balance of power theories: when Pohl calls European
allegiance to Washington in the post-Cold War era ‘goodwill’ (as opposed to band-
wagoning), he founds his empirical account on actors’ motivations. This strategy is
not compatible with our approach for at least two reasons. Firstly, as discussed in
our previous work, we specifically criticize realist attempts to bring intentions in to
explain why European states have defied the expected behaviour of balancing
towards the USA.13 Likewise, in Pohl’s analysis, intentions may prove useful to
understand single operations, but are of little value in explaining the broader
ESDP/CSDP process.14 Secondly, while admitting that motivations are important,
Pohl fails to provide an adequate explanation why bandwagoning should not be
taken seriously.15
The weakness we find with Pohl’s approach based on ‘goodwill’ is that the impor-
tance of the relative distribution of power in the post-Cold War era is almost comple-
tely neglected. Pohl does not engage with the debate regarding the reasons why
European states have furthered rather than countered American foreign policy prefer-
ences. Pohl concedes that ‘structural realists are probably right to point out, if ex post,
that structural pressures impacting on European states made CSDP possible’.16 With
that being true, however, it remains unclear as to where the importance of goodwill or
the underpinning of liberal values really lies in Pohl’s argument.
Finally, Pohl asserts that ‘EU governments sought to demonstrate to Washington
their goodwill and relevance for supporting the international liberal order, albeit
under the condition of not having to take domestic political risks’.17 The second
part of this statement is disputable: if European allegiance to the USA was based
on goodwill and support for the liberal international order, what kind of risks
would European states take in supporting Washington? During the Cold War era,
the liberal international order, along with the idea of ‘Atlantic community’, rested
on the Americans’ willingness to commit to the military defence of Europe in light
of the Soviet threat. The USA, in order to uphold the liberal international order,
was eager to make sure that successive Western European governments would
 EXPLANATORY POWER OF BANDWAGONING 377

maintain an Atlanticist orientation. This certainty waned in the post-Cold War era, as
the USA was no longer able to justify intervention in the domestic affairs of the Eur-
opeans in order to protect them from a common foe. Hence, it is no wonder that in
several European governments anti-American elites that would no longer take the
importance of the Atlantic community for granted would enter the foreign policy
arena. The Iraq war in 2003 represents a classic example showing that backing US
foreign policy presented risks for the European capitals.

Let us Give Bandwagoning a Chance

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The above discussion aims to show that we differ from Pohl not just on substantial
issues, but also on the ontological dimension. Pohl’s critique, however, seems
more penetrating and constructive when it addresses the main problems with bandwa-
goning. In short, his core argument is that the definition we used of bandwagoning (in
its simplest form, siding with the strongest) is misplaced. This is well displayed in the
example we make of the EU as exhibiting a kind of lamb-style behaviour.18 Since
Schweller’s remains the most articulated discussion on the topic, we borrowed the
type of bandwagoning that better fitted our argument. However, it was an uneasy
fit, which admittedly opens up some tricky questions.
First and foremost, as Pohl argues, the lamb image that we discuss is based on (a)
protection from a direct threat and (b) the promise of reward. Neither of these evi-
dently seems to hold in the case of the transatlantic partnership: the USA is not a
threat to the EU and the EU does not necessarily back the USA to share spoils of
victory. Secondly, the balancing/bandwagoning dichotomy is reductive, and Euro-
pean alignment with the US can be better explained in a liberal framework.
The first point is well taken. The lamb type of bandwagon is not a good example.
In fact, Schweller’s contribution differs from ours in at least one significant respect.
As other authors before and after him, Schweller is interested in the process of alli-
ance formation, which is a far cry from alliance management.19 In our argument we
depart from this conceptualization in two ways. The first concerns the expected out-
comes of the policy we investigate. For Schweller, bandwagoning implies the for-
mation (or not) of an alliance. For us the point is keeping the alliance alive (or
not). As a result, the empirical observation that can be used to support or dismiss
Schweller’s hypothesis is the signing (or not) of a formal commitment (or, in
limited cases, a ‘distancing’ behaviour).20 For us, since the alliance is already in
place (and it is also clearly formalized in NATO’s treaty and institutional setting),
the point is to show how the asymmetry in the relationship may lead smaller states
to make a costly effort in order to consolidate the alliance (as opposed to free-
riding or the search for alternatives to the alliance). To put it differently, in our
terms, for EU states bandwagoning implies increasing their commitment to the alli-
ance, so getting closer to (as opposed to distancing themselves from) the USA.
As a result, the fact that the lamb image cannot be taken literally in this context
should be straightforward. As we stated in our previous article, what matters is the
mix of structural pressures and foreign policy orientation: ‘As lambs [. . .] European
states bandwagon with the US for two reasons: firstly, as a consequence of power
 378 CONTEMPO RA RY SECURITY POLICY

asymmetry, balancing would be both costly and eventually pointless; secondly, as

long as Europe does not advance revisionist ambitions, siding with the US is the
best strategy to uphold the status quo’.21 Even if the context is different (while
Schweller is interested in alliance formation, we focus on alliance management),
the lamb logic seems to apply quite well to the US – European relationship.
The second point that marks a difference is the fact that Schweller uses the pres-
ence of a direct threat and the promise of reward as an independent variable – that is,
as a main explanation for behaviour. Following Schweller, Fritz and Sweeney also
note that bandwagoning can be a rational strategy for powers with an interest in
gains as well as for security reasons.22 As Marco Cesa argues, however, drawing a
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clear line between threat and reward as well as between offensive and defensive alli-
ances is empirically difficult.23 Subsequently, assessing whether bandwagoning is the
result of fear or interest is difficult. Biased by this approach, many see bandwagoning
as the option of the poor, one of the few alternatives left to smaller states unwilling to
pay high costs and generally satisfied with the status quo.24
As previously mentioned, while this definition of bandwagoning may effectively
be used to explain alliance formation, it does not make much sense for alliance man-
agement. To recall the terms we used in our previous work, we framed the allies’
main problem in terms of a power dilemma; both sides wish to avoid the counterpart
becoming too strong to tame, or too weak to serve any purpose. In the European per-
spective, this involves ‘keep[ing] the American involvement whilst keeping some
bargaining power at the same time’.25 In our view, bandwagoning is the term that
better represents the European response to this problem. It is in a broad sense a
status quo strategy, as it is aimed at protracting the current partnership as long as
possible. It is clearly aimed at keeping the stronger state as close as possible – or,
in other terms, avoiding abandonment. Independently from personal and contingent
motivations, it is also easily explained as a response to external pressures (although
not necessarily in terms of direct security threats). Finally, and contrary to the
current vision, it is not necessarily a cheap strategy. It can involve costs (and actually
has done so), either in terms of expenses, missed opportunities, or domestic
contestation.
Therefore, in a nutshell, while in our previous article we tried to anchor our argu-
ment on mainstream literature, we believe we should not stick to it, but should rather
take it as a point of departure for our explanation of ESDP. Pohl’s critique, then, is a
welcome reminder of the complexity of the issue and consequently offers an oppor-
tunity to fill the gaps and to elaborate a little on the terms of our argument.

Conclusion
Pohl’s liberal account of CSDP missions is in sharp contrast to our realist explanation
of European defence integration. Apart from the common conclusion that balance of
power explanations are not fit for the EU, the arguments presented in our essays seem
to confirm that there is little room for a synthesis of our positions. As a result, it is
worth discussing in conclusion why we are in sharp disagreement, and whether it
is possible to find a common ground for a constructive dialogue.
 EXPLANATORY POWER OF BANDWAGONING 379

The origins of our different views have already been anticipated: our ontologies
are different. While we assume that (regardless of the high levels of cooperation)
competition is still an inescapable part of the transatlantic partnership, Pohl takes
for granted the unifying role of shared values and interests across the Western
world. But there is also a second fundamental difference, which is related to the
units of analysis we consider for empirical observation. As mentioned, in our
works we opted for the main European initiatives in the ESDP process, as well as
the French military policy in the past two decades, while Pohl focused on CSDP oper-
ations and British, French, and German approaches to these. Although all these cases
can be used to elaborate observable implications within a coherent theoretical frame-
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work, there remains a fundamental difference. We focused on what the EU has done
in terms of defence initiatives, thus on outcomes to explain the lack of balancing be-
haviour at the international level, while Pohl sought to explain why balancing/band-
wagoning is misleading with reference to the actual process of using military means
by the EU and opening space for domestic variables.
To conclude, we believe that regardless of our diverging perspectives, there is still
the possibility of finding a common ground for future research avenues. This comes
down to Pohl’s suggestion that realists should consider the importance of domestic
calculations in foreign policy. On this matter, we pointed out in our article that
‘the rationale driving EU integration in foreign and defence policy is consistent
with realism’s conceptual toolbox’.26 Our intention was not to delve into an analysis
of domestic politics, but this is not incompatible with our approach. It seems that
while we consider risks as originating from abroad, Pohl focuses on risks as perceived
within the domestic arenas. It makes sense, then, to answer Pohl’s question: ‘how
much contemporary foreign policy behaviour can relative external power as
opposed to domestic calculations actually explain?’.27 In our article we contended
that relative external power can be considered the primary variable to explain the be-
haviour of the EU states towards the USA in the realm of defence. That said, we could
still expand our range of explanatory variables within a realist framework. This is pre-
cisely what neoclassical realism aims to do.28 Starting from the premise that power
asymmetry should be considered the main independent variable, we could also
observe how domestic variables (different political systems, national interests, and
strategic cultures, to name only a few) can account for different behaviours among
EU states.29

NOTES

1. Lorenzo Cladi and Andrea Locatelli, ‘Bandwagoning, Not Balancing: Why Europe Confounds
Realism’, Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 33, No. 2 (2012), pp. 264– 88.
2. Benjamin Pohl, ‘Neither Bandwagoning nor Balancing: Explaining Europe’s Security Policy’, Con-
temporary Security Policy, Vol. 34, No. 2 (2013), pp. 353 –73.
3. For a recent liberal-based explanation of the EU’s role in the world vis-à-vis realism, see Michael
E. Smith, ‘A Liberal Grand Strategy in a Realist World? Power, Purpose and the EU’s Changing
Global Role’, Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 18, No. 2 (March 2011), pp. 144– 63.
4. Pohl, ‘Neither Bandwagoning nor Balancing’ (note 2).
5. In so doing, our critiques are levelled at related concepts of balancing for autonomy and soft balancing.
See, among others: Barry Posen, ‘European Union Security and Defence Policy: Response to
 380 CONTEMPO RA RY SECURITY POLICY

Unipolarity?’, Security Studies, Vol. 15, No. 2 (April– June 2006), pp. 149–86; Christopher Layne,
‘The Unipolar Illusion Revisited: The Coming End of the United States’ Unipolar Moment’, Inter-
national Security, Vol. 31, No. 2 (Fall 2006), pp. 7– 41; Seth Jones, The Rise of European Security
Cooperation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Robert Pape, ‘Soft Balancing against
the United States’, International Security, Vol. 30, No. 1 (Summer 2005), pp. 7 –45; T.V. Paul,
‘Soft Balancing in the Age of U.S. Primacy’, International Security, Vol. 30, No. 1 (Summer
2005), pp. 46–71. While useful as additions to the literature which sought to refine Kenneth
Waltz’s seminal balance of power theory, we found theoretical and empirical flaws in both arguments.
6. This analytical purpose is actually far from being a novelty, as shown by Mastanduno’s seminal work
on US grand strategy. Michael Mastanduno, ‘Preserving the Unipolar Moment. Realist Theories and
U.S. Grand Strategy after the Cold War’, International Security, Vol. 21, No. 4 (Spring 1997),
pp. 49– 88.
7. Pohl, ‘Neither Bandwagoning nor Balancing’ (note 2).
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8. For a social constructivist challenge to neorealism’s emphasis on the concept of anarchy, see Alexan-
der Wendt, ‘Anarchy is What States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics’, Inter-
national Organization, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Spring 1992), pp. 391–425; and Alexander Wendt, Social
Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); for a post-structur-
alism critique, see Richard Ashley, ‘Untying the Sovereign State: A Double Reading of the Anarchy
Problematique’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 17, No. 2 (June 1988), pp. 227– 62;
the centrality of anarchy in international relations has also been contested by proponents of the English
School of international relations. See, for example, Barry Buzan, Charles Jones, and Richard Little
(eds), The Logic of Anarchy: Neorealism to Structural Realism (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1993).
9. Karl Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in
the Light of Historical Experience (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957).
10. See, among others, Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (eds), Security Communities (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1998).
11. Waltz himself apparently holds this position when he uses competition (in conjunction with socializa-
tion) as process variable in his book. A similar point is also made by Grieco in his well-known discus-
sion of relative gains. See Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw Hill,
1979), p. 74; Joseph M. Grieco, ‘Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the
Newest Liberal Institutionalism’, International Organization, Vol. XLII, No. 4 (1988), pp. 485–
507. For a tentative treatment of this issue, see Andrea Locatelli and Pier Domenico Tortola,
‘Taking Waltz beyond Waltz: Socialization as an Intervening Variable in Structural Realism’, Paper
presented at the Annual Conference of the Italian Political Science Association, Rome, 17–19 Septem-
ber 2009.
12. Glenn H. Snyder, ‘Process Variables in Neorealist Theory’, in Benjamin Frankel (ed.), Realism. Resta-
tements and Renewal (London: Cass, 1996), pp. 167–92.
13. Cladi and Locatelli, ‘Bandwagoning, Not Balancing’ (note 1), p. 70.
14. We feel that we should spell out, however, that our empirical evidence drawing on EU military initiat-
ives and French strategic adjustment focused both on process and outcomes as well.
15. In other words, this leads to the paradoxical result that the same empirical evidence that for us qualifies
as bandwagoning for Pohl justifies his liberal argument. To give an example, Pohl writes: ‘the British
government was highly preoccupied across all four operations with CSDP’s impact on the transatlantic
relationship . . . London took an American-supportive stance almost by default, except when it came to
contributing personnel . . . does it imply that London was bandwagoning? . . . When we look purely at
British positioning, the answer might be affirmative . . . This logic of staving off domestic threats is,
however, hardly equivalent to the image that the notion of bandwagoning invokes’. Pohl, ‘Neither
Bandwagoning Nor Balancing’ (note 2).
16. Pohl, ‘Neither Bandwagoning nor Balancing’ (note 2).
17. Ibid.
18. Randall Schweller, ‘Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In’, International
Security, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Summer 1994), pp. 101–3.
19. Stephen Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987); John Mearshei-
mer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2001).
20. Schweller, ‘Bandwagoning for Profit’ (note 18), pp. 101– 3.
21. Cladi and Locatelli, ‘Bandwagoning, Not Balancing’ (note 1), p. 282.
22. Schweller, ‘Bandwagoning for Profit’ (note 18); Kevin Sweeney and Paul Fritz, ‘Jumping on the Band-
wagon: An Interest-Based Explanation for Great Power Alliances’, The Journal of Politics, Vol. 66,
 EXPLANATORY POWER OF BANDWAGONING 381

No. 2 (2004), p. 434; Kevin Sweeney and Paul Fritz, ‘The (de)Limitations of Balance of Power
Theory’, International Interactions, Vol. 30 (2004), pp. 287–8.
23. Marco Cesa, Allies Yet Rivals. International Politics in 18th Century Europe (Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press, 2010), pp. 15–20.
24. Following this line of argument, Mark Beeson raises a sharp critique to the theoretical and empirical
relevance of the concept, mostly showing how in the case of the 2003 war in Iraq the UK and Australia
failed to achieve substantial gains from their bandwagon with the US. Mark Beeson, ‘The Declining
Theoretical and Practical Utility of “Bandwagoning”: American Hegemony in the Age of Terror’, The
British Journal of Politics and International Relations, Vol. 9, No. 4, (2007), pp. 618 –35.
25. Cladi and Locatelli, ‘Bandwagoning, Not Balancing’ (note 1), p. 281.
26. Ibid.
27. Pohl, ‘Neither Bandwagoning nor Balancing’ (note 2).
28. Significant contributions in this direction include Tom Dyson, Neoclassical Realism and Defence
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Reform in Post-Cold War Europe (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010); Adrian Hyde-Price,
‘European Security, Strategic Culture, and the Use of Force’, European Security, Vol. 13, No. 4
(2004), pp. 323–43. For an attempt to explain the foreign policy of a single state with reference to dom-
estic variables, see, for example, Lorenzo Cladi and Mark Webber, ‘Italian Foreign Policy in the Post-
Cold War Period: A Neoclassical Realist Approach’, European Security, Vol. 20, No. 2 (2011),
pp. 205– 19.
29. Incidentally, it seems that Pohl considers external variables the primary cause for behaviour too, when
he asserts that EU governments sought to demonstrate their goodwill to Washington.