Pelayo v Lauron | January 12, 1909 | Torres Plaintiff: Arturo Pelayo policy.
olicy. Under the law, marriage is not merely a private contract
Defendants: Marcelo Lauron, Juana Abella
Brief: Physician demands payment for medical assistance rendered to
the defendants’ daughter-in-law. Court ruled that the obligation to
pay for this is meted upon the husband, as arising from the mutual
obligation of the spouses to each other by way of mutual support.
FACTS 1. Arturo Pelayo was requested by Marcelo Lauron and Juana
Abella to render medical assistance to their daughter-in-law who was
about to give birth. 2. On account of the difficult birth, Pelayo had to
remove the fetus. His services amounted to P500, which the
defendants refused to pay. 3. The defendants allege that a) their
daughter-in-law died as a consequence of the childbirth; and b) that
when she was alive, she and her husband lived together
independently of them. She only gave birth in their house due to
fortuitous circumstances.
ISSUE: WON the defendants should shoulder the bill – NO, the
husband should
RATIO:
1. Art 1089 of the Civil Code: obligations are created by law, by
contracts, by quasi-contracts, and by illicit acts and omissions or by
those in which any kind of fault or negligence occurs. a. Obligations
arising from law are not presumed. Demandable ones are those ones
expressly determined in code/special laws. b. Obligations from
contracts have legal force only between the contracting parties and
must be fulfilled in accordance with their stipulations. 2. Art. 142 and
143: The rendering of medical assistance in case of illness is one of
the mutual obligations of spouses to each other by way of mutual
support. 3. The liability to pay for the medical expenses arises from
the mutual obligation which the law established between the married
couple.
* The defendants were not under any obligation or contract to pay
the fees claimed. Within the meaning of the law, they are strangers
with respect to the obligation of the husband to provide support.
Graham v Graham
PLAINTIFF: Sidney Graham DEFENDANT: Margrethe Graham
FACTS: Sidney Graham sues his former wife based on an agreement
they had when they were still married. Said agreement stipulated
that Margrethe is to pay Sidney a sum of $300 per month until they
no longer want said agreement to continue. Sidney alleges that the
reason for said agreement was Margrethe’s plea to have him quit his
work in a hotel so he could accompany her in all her travels.
Margrethe denies Sidney’s allegations and asserts, among others,
that the contract was not within the power of a married woman
under Michigan law to make.
ISSUES: WON the contract is valid and binding
RULING: The judge ruled that the contract is void.
RATIO DECIDENDI: Regardless of WON the woman is competent to
enter into the alleged contract
under Michigan law, which states that married woman have no
general power to contract, but can contract only in relation to her
separate property, the contract is VOID because it contravenes public
between the parties, but creates a status in which the state is vitally
interested and under which certain rights and duties incident to the
relationship come into being, irrespective of the wishes of the
parties. As a result of the marriage contract, for example, the
husband has a duty to support and to live with his wife and the wife
must contribute her services and society to the husband and follow
him in his choice of domicile. Any private agreement between
persons married or about to be married which attempts to change
the essential obligations of the marriage contract as defined by the
law is contrary to public policy and unenforceable, as is the case
when the wife releases the husband from his duty to support his wife
in a contract between married persons.
Bradwell v Illinois
FACTS: The statute of Illinois on the subject of admissions to the bar
enacts that no person shall be permitted to practice as an attorney or
counsellor-at-law without having previously obtained a license for
that purpose from some two of the justices of the Supreme Court.
Mrs. Myra Bradwell applied to the judges of the Supreme Court of
Illinois for a license to practice law. With this petition are a certificate
from an inferior court of her good character, and that on due
examination she had been found to possess the requisite
qualifications. Pending this application, she also filed an affidavit,
stating that “she was born in the State of Vermont; that she was (had
been) a citizen of the State; that she is now a citizen of the United
States, and has been for many years past a resident of the city of
Chicago, in the State of Illinois.” She also filed a paper asserting that
she was entitled to the license prayed for by virtue of the second
section of the fourth article of the Constitution of the United States,
and that of the 14th article of amendment of that instrument. Her
application was denied, and it was stated as a sufficient reason that
under the decisions of the SC of Illinois, the applicant—“as a married
woman would be bound neither by her express contracts nor by
those implied contracts which it is the policy of the law to create
between attorney and client.” The decision also states that admitting
women would mean that the courts would be exercising the
authority conferred upon them in a manner that was never
contemplated by the legislature. Plus, God designed the sexes to
occupy different spheres of action, and that it belonged to men to
make, apply, and execute the laws.
ISSUE: WON the decision violates a provision of the Federal
Constitution.
HELD: No--the decision of the Illinois court upheld, and Mrs. Bradwell
still cannot practice law. There are privileges and immunities
belonging to citizens of the United States, and that it is these and
these alone which a State is forbidden to abridge. However, the right
to admission to practice in the courts of a State is not one of them.
The SC here, referring to the opinion in the Slaughter-House Cases,
says that the power of a State to prescribe the qualifications for
admission to the bar of its own courts is unaffected by the 14th
amendment, and that they cannot inquire into the reasonableness or
propriety of the rules it may prescribe. The Supreme Court also
dismissed any claim under the privileges and immunities clause of the
unamended Constitution—Article IV, Section 2, Clause 1. Bradwell
argued that because she had been born in Vermont but later moved
to Illinois, Illinois' denial of a law license was inter-state
discrimination. But the Court noted that under the recently-enacted
Fourteenth Amendment, "All persons born or naturalized in the
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of
the United States and of the State wherein they reside." Because
Bradwell had been a resident of Illinois for several years, she was
now a citizen of Illinois, and the interstate provision of Article IV did
not apply.
Silverio v Republic
FACTS: Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio underwent sex reassignment
surgery in Bangkok, Thailand. The doctor ISSUEd a medical certificate
proving the same. Silverio filed a petition for the change of his first
name and sex in his birth certificate. In his birth certificate, it is
indicated that his name is “Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio” and his
sex was registered as “male”. He alleges that he is a male transsexual.
He seeks to have his name changed from “Rommel Jacinto” to “Mely”
and his sex from “male” to “female” PROCEDURAL: Trial Court:
Grant petition – in consonance with the principles of justice and
equity. Petitioner’s misfortune to be trapped in a man’s body is not
his own doing and should not be in any way taken against him. CA:
Reverse – No law allowing the change of either name or sex in the
certificate of birth on the ground of sex reassignment through
surgery. ISSUES: WON a person’s first name can be changed on the
ground of sex reassignment [NO]
The state has an interest in the names borne by individuals and
entities for purposes of identification. A change of name is a
privilege, not a right. Art. 376 (NCC) – No person can change his
name or surname without judicial authority. RA 9048 amended the
provision. Section 1 of RA 9048 provides – Authority to Correct
Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or
Nickname. No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected
without a judicial order, except for clerical or typographical errors
and change of first name or nickname which can be corrected or
changed… Sec 4: Grounds for Change of First Name – (1) the
petitioner finds the first name to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor,
or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (2) the new first name
has been habitually and continuously
used by the petitioner and he has been publicly known by that first
name or nickname in the community and; (3) the change will avoid
confusion. Changing petitioner’s first name for his declared purpose
(to make his name compatible with the sex he transformed himself
through surgery) may only create grave complications in the civil
registry and the public interest. Petition should have been filed with
the local civil registrar concerned, assuming it could be legally done.
(Rather than filing first in the trial court) A law does not exist which
allows the change of entry in the birth certificate as to sex on the
ground of sex reassignment. Under the Civil Register Law, a birth
certificate is a historical record of the FACTS, as they existed at the
time of birth. Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually
done by the birth attendant by examining the genitals of the infant.
Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment,
the determination of a person’s sex made at the time of his or her
birth, if not attended by error, is immutable.
WON the entries in the birth certificate as to first name or sex can be
changed on the ground of equity [NO]
Petitioner wishes to change his name and sex since this is the first
step of marrying his fiancé. However, marriage, one of the most
sacred social institutions, is a special contract between a man and a
woman. One of the essential requisites is the legal capacity of the
contracting parties who must be a male and a female. To grant the
changes sought by petitioner will substantially reconfigure and
greatly alter the laws on marriage and family relations. Following will
be affected: Allowing the union of a man with another man who
has undergone sex reassignment. Treatment on provisions of the
Labor Code directly applicable to women.
COURT’S FINAL REMARKS: Petitioner pleads that “the unfortunates
are also entitled to a life of happiness, contentment and the
realization of their dreams. No argument about that. The Court
recognizes that there are people whose preferences and orientation
do not fit neatly into the commonly
recognized parameters of social convention and that, at least for
them, life is indeed an ordeal. However, the remedies petitioner
seeks involve questions of public policy to be addressed solely by the
legislature, not by the courts.
Dunn v Palermo
PPELLANTS: Winfield Dunn, et al. APPELLEE: Rosary Palermo
FACTS: Rosary Palermo, a Nashville lawyer, married Denty Cheatham,
also a Nashville lawyer. She has continued to use and enjoy her
maiden name, Palermo, professionally, socially and for all purposes.
Subsequent to her marriage, she lodged with the Registrar a change
of address form listing her name as Palermo. She was advised that
she was required to register anew under the surname of her
husband, or have her name purged from the registration records.
Upon her refusal to so register, her name was purged from the
registration list. Thus this action, wherein appellee seeks a
declaratory judgment declaring that the defendants' interpretation of
Sec. 2-206, is erroneous, or in the alternative that this statute be
declared violative of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of
the Fourteenth Amendment, and of the Nineteenth Amendment to
the Constitution of the United States.
ISSUES: WON it is mandatory for a married woman to assume the
name of her husband repute RULING: The Court ruled in favour of
the appellee.
RATIO DECIDENDI: There is no constitutional question that needs to
be answered as regards the Texas statute as it does not mandate any
change of name by a woman upon marriage. It merely recognizes the
prevalence of the virtually universal custom under which a woman
normally adopts the surname of her husband. We hold that in this
jurisdiction a woman, upon marriage, has a freedom of choice; she
may elect to retain her own surname or she may adopt the surname
of her husband. So long as a person's name remains constant and
consistent, and unless and until changed in the prescribed manner,
and absent any fraudulent or legally impermissible intent, the State
has no legitimate concern.
Tolentino v CA
PETITIONER: Constancia Tolentino RESPONDENT: Court of Appeals
FACTS: Contancia Tolentino is the present legal wife of Arturo
Tolentino; they were married in April 1945 Consuelo David was
legally married to Arturo in Feb. 1931, they had children, but the
marriage was terminated pursuant to law during the Japanese
occupation in September 1943, by decree of absolute divorce
granted by Court of First Instance of Manila Divorce on ground of
desertion and abandonment by the wife, on finding that Arturo was
abandoned by Consuelo David for at least three continuous years
Arturo married again: first a Pilar Adorable, who passed, then
Constancia in April 1945 Consuelo kept using the surname Tolentino
after divorce and up to the time of the complaint Third party
defendant (Arturo) admitted that the use of the surname “Tolentino”
by Consuelo was with his family’s consent. Constancia Tolentino filed
complaint against Consuelo David to enjoin her by injunction from
using the surname “Tolentino” Consuelo file an answer: admitted to
using the surname and stated she will continue to use the surname
Trial Court granted Constancia’s action for a writ of preliminary
injunction: Consuelo David was enjoined from
using/employing/applying in any manner the surname “TOLENTINO”
Consuelo David filed a motion for leave to file a third party complaint
against her former husband; it was granted, and Arturo Tolentino,
third party defendant, filed his answer Trial Court then confirmed the
preliminary injunction in making the same permanent and perpetual-
restraining and enjoined Consuelo David from using the surname
“Tolentino” Consuleo appealed to the CA on the following grounds:
plaintiff Constancia Tolentino’s cause of action had prescribed and
the absence of the monopolistic proprietary right of Constancia to
the use of the surname “Tolentino”
CA: reversed decision of trial court
ISSUES: W/N Constancia’s cause of action had already prescribed
(YES) W/N Constancia can exclude by injunction Consuelo David
from using the surname of her former husband from whom she was
divorced (NO) W/N a woman who has been legally divorced from
her husband may be enjoined by the latter’s present wife from using
the surname of her former husband (NO)
RULING: Constancia’s cause of action has prescribed. Use by
respondent Consuelo David of surname is NOT a continuing
actionable wrong The use of a surname by a divorced wife for a
purpose not criminal in nature is not a crime
Art. 1150 of the Civil Code on prescription:
“the time for prescription for all kinds of actions, when there is no
special provision which ordains otherwise, shall be contained from
the day they may be brought”
All actions, unless an exception is provided, have a prescription
period. Unless made imprescriptible by law, an action is subject to
bar by prescription with a prescription period of five ears from the
time the right cause of action accrues when no other period is
prescribed by law (Civil Code, Art. 1149). Civil Code provides for some
rights which are not extinguished by prescription, but an action as in
this case is not among them; there is no special law providing for
imprescriptibility. Even if supposed violation is a continuous one,
does not change the principle that the moment the breach of right or
duty occurs, the right of action accrues and the action from that
moment can be legally instituted
Whatever the period, the action has long prescribed whether the
cause accrued on April 1945, when Constancia and Arturo were
married, or August 1959 when the present Civil Code took effect or in
1951 when Constancia came to know of the fact that Consuelo David
was still using the surname Tolentino It is the legal possibility of
bringing the action, which determines the starting point for the
computation of the period of prescription Constancia should have
brought legal action immediately against Consuelo David after
gaining knowledge of the use of the latter of the surname of her
former husband Action was brought only on Nov. 1971, after twenty
years CA: “where plaintiff fails to go to Court within the prescriptive
period, he loses his cause, not because the defendant acquired
ownership by adverse possession over his name but because the
plaintif’s cause of action had lapsed thru the statute of limitations
Constancia MAY NOT exclude Consuelo from using the name of her
former husband, from whom she was divorced. To sustain Consuelo’s
use of the surname does not contradict Articles. 370 and 371 of the
Civil Code.
Senator Tolentino’s commentary on Art. 370 of the Civil Code: “the
wife cannot claim an exclusive right to use the husband’s surname.
She cannot be prevented from using it; but neither can she restrain
others from using it.”
Arr. 371: not applicable because it speaks of annulment while the
case at bar refers to absolute divorce where there is a severance of
valid marriage ties. Effect of divorce is more akin to the death of the
spouse where the deceased woman continues to be referred to as
the “Mrs.” of the husband, even if the latter has remarried rather
than to annulment, as if there had been no marriage at all Consuelo
David MAY NOT be enjoined by her former husband’s present wife
from using his surname.
WHY: Consuelo has established that granting an injunction would be
an act of serious dislocation to her. Presented proof of entering into
contracts with third persons, acquired properties and entered into
other legal relations using the surname Tolentino. Constancia failed
to show that she would suffer legal injury or deprivation of legal
rights inasmuch as she can use her husband’s surname and be fully
protected in case Consuelo David uses the surname for illegal
purposes. There is NO USURPATION of Constancia’s name and
surname The mere use by Consuelo of the surname cannot be said to
have injured Constancia Usurpation of identity implies injury to the
interests of the owner of the name; elements of usurpation of a
name i. Possibility of a confusion of identity between owner and
usurper ii. Use is unauthorized iii. Use of another’s name is to
designate personality or identify a person None of these elements
exist in the case at bar; Constancia did not claim that Consuelo had
impersonated her It is public knowledge that Constancia is the legal
wife of Arturo Tolentino; invitations to public functions are always
addressed to her as the wife Consuelo never represented herself
after the divorce as “Mrs. Arturuo Tolentino” but simply as “Mrs.
Consuelo David-Tolentino” Consuelo David has legitimate children
who have every right to use the surname Tolentino She cannot be
compelled to use the prefix “Miss” or use the name of “Mrs. David”
different from the surnames of her children; records do not show
that she has legally remarried
RULING: Use of the surname “Tolentino” by Consuelo David does not
impinge on the rights of Constancia.
Petition dismissed for lack of merit. CA decision affirmed. Writs of
preliminary and mandatory injunction by the trial court, set aside.
Yasin V. Judge, Shari’a District Court
Petition for review of a decision of the Shari’a District Court, Third
Shari’a Judicial District, Zamboanga City
FACTS:
1. Hatima C. Yasin filed a petition to resume the use of her maiden
name stating that she was of legal age, a divorcee, a Muslim Filipino
and a resident of Suterville, Zamboanga City. She was represented by
her elder brother and attorney-in-fact Hadji Hasan S. Centi.
2. She was formerly married to a certain Hadji Idris Yasin, also a
Muslim Filipino in accordance with Muslim rites and customs. They
were granted a decree of divorce by the Mindanao Islamic Center
Foundation, Inc., in accordance with Islamic Law. Yasin contracted
another marriage to another woman.
3. The respondent court denied her petition because it was not
sufficient in accordance with Sec 2(a) and 3, Rule 103, Rules of Court
regarding residence of petitioner and name sought to be adopted.
The court also denied Hatima’s motion for reconsideration on the
ground that the petition is substantially for change of name and
compliance with the provisions of Rule 103 is necessary if petition is
to be granted. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
1. WoN a petition for resumption of maiden name and surname is
also a petition for change of name
HELD:
1. No. The true and real name of a person is that given to him and
entered in the civil register. The petitioner doesn’t seek to change
her registered maiden name but instead, prays that she be allowed
to resume the use of her maiden name in view of the decree of
divorce granted. Divorce severs the marriage bond.
2. Under Rule 103, Rules of Court, change of name shouldn’t be
applied to judicial confirmation of the right of a divorced woman to
resume her maiden name and surname. Where sufficient facts have
been alleged supported by competent proof as annexes, which appear
to be satisfactory to the court, such petition for confirmation of
change of civil status and/or to resume the use of maiden name must
be given due course and summarily granted as in fact it is a right
conferred by law.
CONCLUSION:
1. The remand of the case to a lower court for further reception of
evidence is not necessary if this Court can already resolve the dispute
on the basis of the records before it. Petition is granted. Orders of
the respondent court are set aside.
PERTINENT RULES:
Article 45. Definition and forms. Divorce is the formal dissolution of
the marriage bond in accordance with this Code to be granted only
after the exhaustion of all possible means of reconciliation between
the spouses. It may be effected by:
(a) Repudiation of the wife by the husband (talaq);
(g) Judicial decree (faskh).
Art. 370. A married woman may use:
(1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband's
surname, or
(2) Her maiden first name and her husband's surname or
(3) Her husband's full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she
is his wife, such as "Mrs."
Art. 371. In case of annulment of marriage, and the wife is the guilty
party, she shall resume her maiden name and surname. If she is the
innocent spouse, she may resume her maiden name and surname.
However, she may choose to continue employing her former
husband's surname, unless:
(1) The court decrees otherwise, or
(2) She or the former husband is married again to another person.
MARIA VIRGINIA V. REMO vs. THE HON. SECRETARY OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS
Carpio, J.
FACTS
Maria, a married Filipino citizen to Francisco R. Rallonza, was to have
her PH passport expire at October 27 2000; she was recognized as
Maria Virginia Remo Rallonza in said document. Prior to the passport’s
expiration of validity Maria applied for a renewal w/ the DFA office in
Chicago w/ a request to revert to her maiden name and surname
despite her marriage subsisting. Upon denial of her request, Maria’s
attorney wrote a letter to then Sec. of FA Domingo Siason expressing
a similar request but this was also denied.
Maria then had the petition appealed to the Office of the President,
w/c dismissed it upon its ruling that S.5(d) of RA 8239 (PH Passport Act
of 1996) offers no leeway for any other interpretation than that only
in case of divorce, annulment, or declaration of nullity of marriage may
a married woman revert to her maiden name for passport purposes;
further held that in case of conflict between a gen. law and a special
law, latter will control regardless of dates of passage (RA 8239> CC).
Maria would then file for review to the CA to w/c it was denied in
affirming the OP’s ruling, as they found no conflict between Art. 370
(CC) and S.5(d) (RA 8239)
ISSUE
W/N Maria can revert to the use of her maiden name in the
replacement passport despite the subsistence of her marriage?
RULING
NO. In the case of a married woman, Art. 370 provides that she may
use: (1) maiden 1st name and surname + husband’s surname, (2)
maiden 1st name + husband’s surname or (3) husband’s full name but
prefixing a word to indicate herself as wife (such as Mrs.). Court also
cited RA 8239 as a determining factor in coming up with their
conclusion that what Maria did was not allowed under law.
Maria invoked Yasin as an applicable precedent however that case
differs from the one at bar, insomuch as the former involved a Muslim
divorcee whose husband is already married to another woman, while
latter does not; furthermore Yasin did not involve a request to resume
one’s maiden name in a replacement passport, but a petition to
resume one’s maiden name in view of the dissolution of one’s
marriage.
CONCLUSION
Petition DENIED