Matienzo Felip Bryan D. DECEMBER 19, 2017 1BJD5 PFR Case Digests

MATIENZO FELIP BRYAN D.
DECEMBER 19, 2017

1BJD5 PFR CASE DIGESTS
1. GUTIERREZ VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE
FACTS
22July2010, 4 days before the 15th Congress opened its first session, private respondents Risa Hontiveros-Baraquel,
Danilo Lim and spouses Pestaño (Baraquel group) filed an impeachment complaint against Gutierrez upon
endorsement of Party-List Representatives Walden Bello and Arlene Bag-ao
27July2010, HOR Sec-Gen transmitted the complaint to House Speaker Belmonte who then, on August 2, directed
the Committee on Rules to include it in the Order of Business 3Aug2010, private respondents Renato Reyes Jr.,
Mother Mary John Mananzan, Danilo Ramos, Edre Olalia, Ferdinand Gaite and James Terry Ridon (Reyes group) filed
an impeachment complaint againsta herein petitioner endorsed by Representatives Colmenares, Casiño, Mariano,
Ilagan, Tinio and De Jesus HOR provisionally adopted the Rules of Procedure on Impeachment Proceedings of the
14th Congress and HOR Sec-Gen transmitted the complaint to House Speaker Belmonte who then, on August 9,
directed the Committee on Rules to include it in the Order of Business 11Aug2010, HOR simultaneously referred the
two complaints to the House Committee on Justice (HCOJ for brevity)After hearing, HCOJ by Resolution of
September 1, 2010, found both complaints sufficient in form 2Sept2010, The Rules of Procedure of Impeachment
Proceedings of the 15th Congress was published After hearing, HCOJ by Resolution of September 7, 2010 found the
two complaints, which both allege culpable violation of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust, sufficient in
substance.Petitioner-Ombudsman challenges House Resolutions of Sept. 1 and 7, 2010 finding two impeachment
complaints against the petitioner, simultaneously referred to the House Committee on Justice, sufficient in form and
substance on grounds that she was denied due process and that the said resolutions violated the one-year bar rule
on initiating impeachment proceedings for impeachable officers.
Citing Taada v. Tuvera, petitioner contends that she was deprived of due process since the Impeachment Rules was
published only on September 2, 2010 a day after public respondent ruled on the sufficiency of form of the
complaints. She likewise tacks her contention on Section 3(8), Article XI of the Constitution which directs that
Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this section.
Public respondent counters that promulgation in this case refers to the publication of rules in any medium of
information, not necessarily in the Official Gazette or newspaper of general circulation.
ISSUE:
Whether the belated publication of the Rules of Procedure of Impeachment Proceedings of the 15th Congress denied due
process to the Petitioner?
HELD:
Promulgation must thus be used in the context in which it is generally understoodthat is, to make known. Generalia
verba sunt generaliter inteligencia. What is generally spoken shall be generally understood. Between the restricted
sense and the general meaning of a word, the general must prevail unless it was clearly intended that the restricted
sense was to be used.[49]
Since the Constitutional Commission did not restrict promulgation to publication, the former should be understood
to have been used in its general sense. It is within the discretion of Congress to determine on how to promulgate its
Impeachment Rules, in much the same way that the Judiciary is permitted to determine that to promulgate a
decision means to deliver the decision to the clerk of court for filing and publication.
It is not for this Court to tell a co-equal branch of government how to promulgate when the Constitution itself has
not prescribed a specific method of promulgation. The Court is in no position to dictate a mode of promulgation
beyond the dictates of the Constitution.
2. REPUBLIC OF THE PH V PILIPINAS SHELL
FACTS
On October 10, 1984 the govt created the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF). The office of the Energy Affairs (Now
DOE) informed Pilipinas Shell that their foreign exchange risk charge was insufficient in pursuant to MOF CIRCULAR
NO. 1-85 as amended by DOF 2-94. Remittance of payment to the OPSF as provided for under Section 5 of MOF
Order No. 11-85 shall be made not later than 20th of the month following the month of remittance of the foreign
exchange payment for the import or the month of payment to the domestic producers in the case of locally produced
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MATIENZO FELIP BRYAN D. DECEMBER 19, 2017
crude. Payment after the specified date shall be subject to a surcharge of fifteen percent (15%) of the amount, if
paid within thirty (30) days from the due date plus two percent (2%) per month if paid after thirty
days.[10] (Emphasis supplied.)
Pilipinas shell justified its calculations pursuant to a valid interpretation of the MOF’s but nonetheless paid the
principal amount of its underpayment but not the surcharges.
DOE required shell to pay the surcharges subject to proceeding against Shell’s Irrevocable standby letter of credit.
Shell appealed to the office of the President.
The office of the president affirmed DOE.
CA reversed the office of the president, MOF CIRCL 1-85 as amended was ineffective for failure to comply with the
requirement to file with ONAR.
Even if the circular was issued before the effectivity of the administrative code book 7, chapter 2 sec 3 specifies that
rules already in force at the date of effectivity of the admin code must be filed within 3 months from effect of the
code.
ISSUE:
Whether the MOF CIRC 1-85 was effective?
HELD:
No. Shell did not waive the requisite publication and filing MOF CIC 1-85 by paying the principal amount of its
underpayment.
Publication; Office of National Administrative Register (ONAR); Due Process; The requirements of publication and
filing with the Office of National Administrative Register (ONAR) were put in place as safeguards against abuses on
the part of lawmakers and as guarantees to the constitutional right to due process and to information on matters of
public concern and, therefore, require strict compliance.—Under the doctrine of Tanada v. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 446
(1986), the MOF Circular No. 1-85, as amended, is one of those issuances which should be published before it
becomes effective since it is intended to enforce Presidential Decree No. 1956. The said circular should also comply
with the requirement stated under Section 3 of Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987—filing with
the ONAR in the University of the Philippines Law Center—for rules that are already in force at the time the
Administrative Code of 1987 became effective. These requirements of publication and filing were put in place as
safeguards against abuses on the part of lawmakers and as guarantees to the constitutional right to due process and
to information on matters of public concern and, therefore, require strict compliance. In the present case, the
Certifications dated 11 February 2004 and 9 February 2004 issued by ONAR prove that MOF Circular No. 1-85 and its
amendatory rule, DOF Circular No. 2-94, have not been filed before said office. Moreover, petitioner was unable to
controvert respondent’s allegation that neither of the aforementioned circulars were published in the Official
Gazette or in any newspaper of general circulation. Thus, failure to comply with the requirements of publication and
filing of administrative issuances renders MOF Circular No. 1-85, as amended, ineffective.
3. CO V. CA
FACTS
Petitioner Albino Co delivered to the salvaging firm on September 1, 1983 a check drawn against the Associated
Citizens' Bank, postdated November 30, 1983 in the sum of P361,528.00.
The check was deposited on January 3, 1984. It was dishonored two days later, the tersely-stated reason given by
the bank being: "CLOSED ACCOUNT." A criminal complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 2 was filed by
the salvage company against Albino Co with the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City. The case eventuated in Co's
conviction of the crime charged.
He argued on appeal that at the time of the issuance of the check on September 1, 1983, some four (4) years prior to
the promulgation of the judgment in Que v. People on September 21, 1987, the delivery of a "rubber" or "bouncing"
check as guarantee for an obligation was not considered a punishable offense, an official pronouncement made in a
Circular of the Ministry of Justice.
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ISSUE:
Whether the decision issued by the Court be applied retroactively to the prejudice of the accused.
HELD:
No.
Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony who is not a habitual
criminal.—“Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal
system of the Philippines,” according to Article 8 of the Civil Code. “Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the
contrary is provided” declares Article 4 of the same Code, a declaration that is echoed by Article 22 of the Revised
Penal Code: “Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a
habitual criminal **.”
4. PEOPLE OF THE PH V PATALIN
FACTS
Alfonso Patalin and Alex Mijaque, herein accused were convicted of Robbery with Multiple Rape committed in the
evening of August 11, 1984 against the Aliman family.
They were meted the supreme penalty of death. At the time the crimes charged were committed in 1984, robbery
with rape was punishable by death, however, by virtue of the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, the
death penalty was abolished and all death penalties already imposed were reduced to reclusion perpetua.
The decision for the present case was promulgated on June 14, 1995, after the effectivity of RA 7659 which restored
the death penalty. Appellants now contend that the trial court erred in imposing the death penalty as the same was
suspended upon ratification of the 1987 Constitution.
ISSUE:
When the death penalty was abolished in 1987 and was retroactively applied to herein accused, did they gain a
vested right thereto so that any future law restoring the death penalty would no longer cover them?
HELD:
Although at the time of the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution the present case was still its trial stage, it is clear that
the framers intended the provision to have a retroactive effect on pending cases without any penalty of death
having been imposed yet.
The retroactive effect may be given during three possible stages of a criminal prosecution:
a) when the crime has been committed and the prosecution began;
b) when sentence has been passed but service has not begun; and
c) when the sentence is being carried out.
The abolition of the death penalty benefits herein accused by virtue of Art 22 of the RPC which provides
that penal laws shall have retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of the felony who is not
a habitual criminal. Hence, they are subject to a reduction of penalty from death to reclusion perpetua. A
subsequent statute cannot be applied retroactively as to impair a right that accrued under the old law.
5. ORIENTAL ASSURANCE V SOLIDBANK CORP
FACTS
Petitioner Oriental Assurance Corporation issued Fire Insurance Policy No. F-92/22733-D, insuring the stock of
finished and/or unfinished products including raw materials, machinery and equipment belonging to Wear Me
Garments Manufacturing, Inc. (Wear Me). The policy insured against loss and/or damage by fire from March 20,
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1991 to March 20, 1992. The policy was subsequently renewed for another year from March 20, 1992 to March 20,
1993 under Renewal Receipt No. 40948. A Memorandum stating that the policy was "[m]ade further subject to
MORTGAGEE CLAUSE in favor of SOLIDBANK CORPORATION"' was typewritten on the face of the receipt.
On April 27, 1993, petitioner issued another Fire Insurance Policy (No. F-93-40690-D) insuring the same items of
Wear Me from March 20, 1993 to March 20, 1994.
On July 12, 1993, a fire broke out at the factory of Wear Me, destroying a major portion of the insured properties.
Wear Me submitted to petitioner and its co-insurers[3] a Notice of Loss for the value of the damaged properties. The
claims were denied. As holder of trust receipts over the burned goods, Solidbank Corporation sent an undated
telegram to petitioner, asking the latter to pay the proceeds of Fire Insurance Policy No. F-92/22733-D. Petitioner
refused to comply, because the Policy did not contain a mortgagee clause in favor of Solidbank.
Before the Regional Trial Court of Manila (RTC),[4] respondent then instituted Civil Case No. 94-70505 against
petitioner and Wear Me; as well as Angelita Amparo Go and Arnold A. Go, Leonila Cui, and Prudential Guarantee and
Assurance Inc. Acting favorably on respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment,[5] the RTC rendered a Decision, the
dispositive part of which reads. WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
plaintiff and against the defendants.The CA denied petitioner's appeal and subsequent Motion for Reconsideration
ISSUE:
xxx [W]hether or not the Court of Appeals x x x committed reversible error in giving retroactive effect to Section 1
(c) of Rule 50 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure [dismissing] petitioner's appeal for failure of the petitioner to
pay the appellate court docket and other lawful fees?
HELD:
The retroactive application of procedural rules to pending cases is undoubtedly well-settled.—The retroactive
application of procedural rules to pending cases is undoubtedly well settled. Petitioner even admits this in its efforts
to reason out its case. For this reason alone, the present Petition should be dismissed.
6. BPI VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
FACTS
Rizaldy T. Zshornack and his wife maintained in COMTRUST a dollar savings account and a peso current account. An
application for a dollar drat was accomplished by Virgillo Garcia branch manager of COMTRUST payable to a certain
Leovigilda Dizon. In the PPLICtion, Garcia indicated that the amount was to be charged to the dollar savings account
of the Zshornacks. There wasa no indication of the name of the purchaser of the dollar draft. Comtrust issued a
check payable to the order of Dizon. When Zshornack noticed the withdrawal from his account, he demanded an
explainaiton from the bank. In its answer, Comtrust claimed that the peso value of the withdrawal was given to Atty.
Ernesto Zshornack, brother of Rizaldy. When he encashed with COMTRUST a cashiers check for P8450 issued by the
manila banking corporation payable to Ernesto.
ISSUE:
Whether the contract between petitioner and respondent bank is a deposit?
HELD:
The contract between Zshornack and the bank, as to the $3,000.00, was a contract of deposit defined under Art. 1962
of the New Civil Code.—The document which embodies the contract states that the US$3,000.00 was received by the
bank for safekeeping. The subsequent acts of the parties also show that the intent of the parties was really for the
bank to safely keep the dollars and to return it to Zshornack at a later time. Thus, Zshornack demanded the return of
the money on May 10, 1976, or over five months later. The above arrangement is that contract defined under Article
1962, New Civil Code, which reads: Art. 1962. A deposit is constituted from the moment a person receives a thing
belonging to another, with the obligation of safely keeping it and for returning the same. If the safekeeping of the
thing delivered is not the principal purpose of the contract, there is no deposit but some other contract.
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Void Contracts; The contract between the parties being void, affords neither of the parties a cause of action against
each other.—Hence, pursuant to Article 5 of the Civil Code, it is void, having been executed against the provisions of
a mandatory/prohibitory law. More importantly, it affords neither of the parties a cause of action against the other.
“When the nullity proceeds from the illegality of the cause or object of the contract, and the act constitutes a
criminal offense, both parties being in pari delicto, they shall have no cause of action against each other . . .” [Art.
1411, New Civil Code.] The only remedy is one on behalf of the State to prosecute the parties for violating the law.
7. PNB V NEPOMUCENO
FACTS
Petitioner PNB granted respondents 4 million pesos of credit line to finance a movie project. The loan was secured
by mortgages on respondents™ real and personal properties.
Respondents defaulted in their obligation. Petitioner sought foreclosure of the mortgaged properties. The auction
sale was re-scheduled several times without need of republication of the notice of sale.
Subsequently, the respondents filed an action for annulment of the foreclosure sale claiming that such was void
because, among others, there was lack of publication of the notice of foreclosure sale.
The trail court ordered the annulment and set aside the foreclosure proceedings.
Upon appeal, the CA affirmed the lower court.
ISSUE:
Whether publication of foreclosure sale can be validly waived by agreement of the parties?
HELD:
Petitioner and respondents have absolutely no right to waive the posting and publication requirements of Act No.
3135.—Petitioner, however, insists that the posting and publication requirements can be dispensed with since the
parties agreed in writing that the auction sale may proceed without need of re-publication and re-posting of the
notice of sale. We are not convinced. Petitioner and respondents have absolutely no right to waive the posting and
publication requirements of Act No. 3135.
The statutory requirements of posting and publication are mandated not for the mortgagor’s benefit but for the
public or third persons; Statutory provisions governing publication of notice of mortgage foreclosure sales must be
strictly complied with and slight deviations therefrom will invalidate the notice and render the sale at the very least
voidable.—The principal object of a notice of sale in a foreclosure of mortgage is not so much to notify the
mortgagor as to inform the public generally of the nature and condition of the property to be sold, and of the time,
place, and terms of the sale. Notices are given to secure bidders and prevent a sacrifice of the property. Clearly, the
statutory requirements of posting and publication are mandated, not for the mortgagor’s benefit, but for the public
or third persons. In fact, personal notice to the mortgagor in extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings is not even
necessary, unless stipulated. As such, it is imbued with public policy considerations and any waiver thereon would be
inconsistent with the intent and letter of Act No. 3135. Moreover, statutory provisions governing publication of
notice of mortgage foreclosure sales must be strictly complied with and slight deviations there from will invalidate
the notice and render the sale at the very least voidable.
8. BERNARDINO P. BARTOLOME V. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM
FACTS
In ECC-related death benefit claims, dependent parents as beneficiaries include biological parents in case the
decedent was adopted.
Petitioner Bernardina P. Bartolome initiated a claim for death benefits under PD 626 with the Social Security System
(SSS) at San Fernando City, La Union, over the death of her son John Colcol (John), who she gave up for adoption,
and alleged that she was the sole remaining beneficiary. Previously, John was employed as electrician by Defendant
Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc., on board the vessel Maersk Danville. He was covered by the government’s
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Employees’ Compensation Program (ECP). Unfortunately, he met an accident on board the vessel wherein steel
plates fell on him resulting in his death.
When petitioner filed her claim, the SSS denied it stating that she was no longer the parent of John as he was legally
adopted by Cornelio Colocol based on the documentary evidence submitted by petitioner herself. On appeal, the
Employees’ Compensation Commission (ECC) affirmed the SSS ruling through a decision dated 17 March 17 2010
citing Rule XV, Sec. 1(c)(1) of the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner was entitled to receive the claim for death benefits?
HELD:
YES.
The Court held that Cornelio’s adoption of John, without more, does not deprive petitioner of the right to receive
the benefits stemming from John’s death as a dependent parent given Cornelio’s untimely demise during John’s
minority. Since the parent by adoption already died, then the death benefits under the Employees’ Compensation
Program shall accrue solely to herein petitioner, John’s sole remaining beneficiary.
Administrative regulations must always be in harmony with the provisions of the law because any resulting
discrepancy between the two will always be resolved in favor of the basic law.—This Court held in Commissioner of
Internal Revenue v. Fortune Tobacco Corporation, 559 SCRA 160 (2008) that: As we have previously declared, rule-
making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceedings in order to carry into effect the
law as it has been enacted, and it cannot be extended to amend or expand the statutory requirements or to
embrace matters not covered by the statute. Administrative regulations must always be in harmony with the
provisions of the law because any resulting discrepancy between the two will always be resolved in favor of the
basic law. (Emphasis supplied) Guided by this doctrine, We find that Rule XV of the Amended Rules on Employees’
Compensation is patently a wayward restriction of and a substantial deviation from Article 167(j) of the Labor Code
when it interpreted the phrase “dependent parents” to refer to “legitimate parents.”
Dependent Parents; Words and Phrases; Plainly, “dependent parents” are parents, whether legitimate or illegitimate,
biological or by adoption, who are in need of support or assistance.—The term “parents” in the phrase “dependent
parents” in the aforequoted Article 167(j) of the Labor Code is used and ought to be taken in its general sense and
cannot be unduly limited to “legitimate parents” as what the ECC did. The phrase “dependent parents” should,
therefore, include all parents, whether legitimate or illegitimate and whether by nature or by adoption. When the
law does not distinguish, one should not distinguish. Plainly, “dependent parents” are parents, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, biological or by adoption, who are in need of support or assistance.
9. DE MESA ET AL V PEPSI PRODUCTS
FACTS
Pepsi Cola launched a promotional program. Due to security code problems, they erroneously announced “349” as
winning number instead of the numbers submitted to the DTI, and deposited in the safety deposit box in a bank.
Pepsi Cola revoked and dishonored the claim of the frustrated winners, which moved the petitioners to file breach of
contract.
Meanwhile, similar cases, Mendoza and Rodrigo, are pending with the Court of Appeals. The petitioners then filed a
motion for leave in December 2000 to adopt the testimonial and documentary evidence in Mendoza and Rodrigo
cases or archive the case until final resolution of the said two cases.
RTC granted the motion in Jan. 2001.Unfortunately; Mendoza and Rodrigo cases were both dismissed. Consequently,
De Mesa et al. case was dismissed by the RTC under the principle of stare decisis which is contemplated as well in
Art. 8 of the New Civil Code.
ISSUE:
The applicability of stare decisis et non quieta movere.
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HELD:
Judgments; Stare Decisis; The doctrine of stare decisis is based on the principle that once a question of law has been
examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further argument.—The principle of stare decisis et
non quieta movereis entrenched in Article 8 of the Civil Code, to wit: ART. 8. Judicial decisions applying or
interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines. It enjoins adherence
to judicial precedents. It requires our courts to follow a rule already established in a final decision of the Supreme
Court. That decision becomes a judicial precedent to be followed in subsequent cases by all courts in the land. The
doctrine of stare decisis is based on the principle that once a question of law has been examined and decided, it
should be deemed settled and closed to further argument.
10.REYES V LIM
FACTS
Petitioner David Reyes filed a complaint for annulment of contract and damages against respondents. The complaint
alleged that Reyes as seller and Lim as buyer entered into a contract to sell a parcel of land located along F.B.
Harrison Street, Pasay City with a monthly rental of P35,000.
The complaint claimed that Reyes had informed Harrison Lumber to vacate the Property before the end of January
1995. Reyes also informed Keng and Harrison Lumber that if they failed to vacate by 8 March 1995, he would hold
them liable for the penalty of P400,000 a month as provided in the Contract to Sell. It was also alleged that Lim
connived with Harrison Lumber not to vacate the Property until the P400,000 monthly penalty would have
accumulated and equaled the unpaid purchase price of P18,000,000.
Keng and Harrison Lumber denied that they connived with Lim to defraud Reyes, and that Reyes approved their
request for an extension of time to vacate the Property due to their difficulty in finding a new location for their
business. Harrison Lumber claimed that it had already started transferring some of its merchandise to its new
business location in Malabon.
Lim filed his Answer stating that he was ready and willing to pay the balance of the purchase price. Lim requested a
meeting with Reyes through the latter’s daughter on the signing of the Deed of Absolute Sale and the payment of
the balance but Reyes kept postponing their meeting. Reyes offered to return the P10 million down payment to Lim
because Reyes was having problems in removing the lessee from the Property. Lim rejected Reyes’ offer and
proceeded to verify the status of Reyes’ title to the Property. Lim learned that Reyes had already sold the Property to
Line One Foods Corporation Lim denied conniving with Keng and Harrison Lumber to defraud Reyes.Reyes filed a
Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint due to supervening facts. These included the filing by Lim of a
complaint for estafa against Reyes as well as an action for specific performance and nullification of sale and title plus
damages before another trial court.
The trial court granted the motion.
In his Amended Answer Lim prayed for the cancellation of the Contract to Sell and for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary attachment against Reyes. The trial court denied the prayer for a writ of preliminary attachment.
Lim requested in open court that Reyes be ordered to deposit the P10 million down payment with the cashier of the
Regional Trial Court of Parañaque. The trial court granted this motion.
Reyes filed a Motion to Set Aside the Order on the ground the Order practically granted the reliefs Lim prayed for in
his Amended Answer. The trial court denied Reyes’ motion.
The trial court denied Reyes’ Motion for Reconsideration. In the same order, the trial court directed Reyes to deposit
the P10 million down payment with the Clerk of Court.
Reyes filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals and prayed that the orders of the trial court be set
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aside for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. But the Court of
Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition for review.
ISSUE:
Whether the equity jurisdiction is an applicable law on the matter?
HELD:
Equity Jurisdiction; Purpose; The rationale of the exercise of equity jurisdiction in this case is to prevent unjust
enrichment and to ensure restitution.—The purpose of the exercise of equity jurisdiction in this case is to prevent
unjust enrichment and to ensure restitution. Equity jurisdiction aims to do complete justice in cases where a court of
law is unable to adapt its judgments to the special circumstances of a case because of the inflexibility of its statutory
or legal jurisdiction. Equity is the principle by which substantial justice may be attained in cases where the prescribed
or customary forms of ordinary law are inadequate.
11. URSUA V CA
FACTS
In 1989, Cesario Ursua was charged with bribery and dishonesty. His lawyer then asked him to get a copy of the
complaint against him from the Office of the Ombudsman. His lawyer asked him that because the law firm’s
messenger, a certain Oscar Perez, was unable to go to the Ombudsman.
Before going to the Ombudsman, Ursua talked to Perez. He revealed to him that he feels uncomfortable asking for a
copy of the complaint because he is the respondent in the said case. Perez then told him than he can go there as
“Oscar Perez” so that he does not have to reveal his true identity.
At the Office of the Ombudsman, Ursua signed the logbook there as “Oscar Perez”. When he was handed a copy of
the complaint, he signed the receipt as “Oscar Perez”. However, a staff of the Ombudsman was able to learn that he
was in fact Cesario Ursua. The staff then recommended that a criminal case be filed against Ursua. Eventually, Ursua
was sentenced to three years in prison for violating C.A. No. 142, as amended, otherwise known as “An Act To
Regulate The Use Of Aliases”.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT CESARIO URSUA’S CONVICTION IS PROPER?
HELD:
No.
Ursua should be acquitted. The Supreme Court ruled that a strict application of C.A. No. 142, as amended, in this
case only leads to absurdity – something which could not have been intended by the lawmakers.
Under C.A. No. 142, as amended, save for some instances, a person is not allowed to use a name or an alias other
than his registered name or that which he was baptized. Under the law, what makes the use of alias illegal is the fact
that it is being used habitually and publicly in business transactions without prior authorization by competent
authority. In this case, Ursua merely used the name “Oscar Perez” once, it was not used in a business transaction,
the use of the name was with the consent of Oscar Perez himself, and even if he used a different name, in this
instance, he was not even required to disclose his identity at the Office of the Ombudsman. When he was requesting
a copy of the complaint, he need not disclose his identity because the complaint is a public record open to the
public.
In short, the evils sought to be avoided by the C.A. No. 142 was not brought about when Ursua used a name other
than his name. A strict application of the law is not warranted. When Ursua used the name of Oscar Perez, no fraud
was committed; there was no crime committed punishable under C.A. No. 142. The purpose of the law is to punish
evils defined therein so when no such evil was produced by Ursua’s act, said law need not be applied.
12. CIR V AICHI

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FACTS
Petitioner filed a claim of refund/credit of input vat in relation to its zero-rated sales from July 1, 2002 to September
30, 2002. The CTA 2nd Division partially granted respondent’s claim for refund/credit.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, insisting that the administrative and the judicial claims were
filed beyond the two-year period to claim a tax refund/credit provided for under Sections 112(A) and 229 of the
NIRC. He reasoned that since the year 2004 was a leap year, the filing of the claim for tax refund/credit on
September 30, 2004 was beyond the two-year period, which expired on September 29, 2004. He cited as basis
Article 13 of the Civil Code, which provides that when the law speaks of a year, it is equivalent to 365 days. In
addition, petitioner argued that the simultaneous filing of the administrative and the judicial claims contravenes
Sections 112 and 229 of the NIRC. According to the petitioner, a prior filing of an administrative claim is a “condition
precedent” before a judicial claim can be filed.
The CTA denied the MPR thus the case was elevated to the CTA En Banc for review. The decision was affirmed. Thus
the case was elevated to the Supreme Court.
Respondent contends that the non-observance of the 120-day period given to the CIR to act on the claim for tax
refund/credit in Section 112(D) is not fatal because what is important is that both claims are filed within the two-
year prescriptive period. In support thereof, respondent cited Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Victorias Milling
Co., Inc. [130 Phil 12 (1968)] where it was ruled that “if the CIR takes time in deciding the claim, and the period of
two years is about to end, the suit or proceeding must be started in the CTA before the end of the two-year period
without awaiting the decision of the CIR.”
ISSUE:
Whether or not the claim for refund was filed within the prescribed period?
HELD:
Yes.
As ruled in the case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Mirant Pagbilao Corporation (G.R. No. 172129,
September 12, 2008), the two-year period should be reckoned from the close of the taxable quarter when the sales
were made.
13. DEL SOCORRO V VAN WILSEM
FACTS
Petitioner Norma A. Del Socorro and respondent Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem contracted marriage in Holland
on September 25, 1990.[2] On January 19, 1994, they were blessed with a son named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem,
who at the time of the filing of the... instant petition was sixteen (16) years of age. Unfortunately, their marriage
bond ended on July 19, 1995 by virtue of a Divorce Decree issued by the appropriate Court of Holland.[4] At that
time, their son was only eighteen (18) months old. Thereafter, petitioner and her son... came home to the
Philippines. According to petitioner, respondent made a promise to provide monthly support to their son in the
amount of Two Hundred Fifty (250) Guildene. However, since the arrival of petitioner and her son in... the
Philippines, respondent never gave support to the son, Roderigo. Not long thereafter, respondent came to the
Philippines and remarried in Pinamungahan, Cebu, and since then, have been residing thereat. To date, all the
parties, including their son, Roderigo, are presently living in Cebu City. On August 28, 2009, petitioner, through her
counsel, sent a letter demanding for support from respondent. However, respondent refused to receive the
letter.Because of the foregoing circumstances, petitioner filed a complaint-affidavit with the Provincial Prosecutor of
Cebu City. Respondent submitted his counter-affidavit. Upon motion and after notice and hearing, the RTC-Cebu
issued a Hold Departure Order against respondent.[16] Consequently, respondent was arrested and, subsequently,
posted bail. Petitioner also filed a Motion/Application of Permanent Protection Order. Subsequently, respondent
filed a Motion to Dismiss. On February 19, 2010, the RTC-Cebu issued the herein assailed Order,[21] dismissing the
instant criminal case against respondent. Thereafter, petitioner filed her Motion for Reconsideration. On September
1, 2010, the lower court issued an Order[25] denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration
9
ISSUE:
Whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child under Philippine law?
HELD:
We find the petition meritorious. Nonetheless, we do not fully agree with petitioner's contentions.
We agree with respondent that petitioner cannot rely on Article 195[34] of the New Civil Code in demanding support
from respondent, who is a foreign citizen
The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls under family rights and duties. Since the respondent is
a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we agree with the RTC-Cebu that he is subject to the laws of his country, not
to Philippine law, as to whether... he is obliged to give support to his child, as well as the consequences of his failure
to do so.
It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that the respondent is not obliged to support petitioner's son under Article 195 of
the Family Code as a consequence of the Divorce Covenant obtained in Holland.
14. BELLIS V BELLIS
FACTS
Amos Bellis, born in Texas, was a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States. He had 5 legitimate children
with his wife, Mary Mallen, whom he had divorced, 3 legitimate children with his 2nd wife, Violet Kennedy and
finally, 3 illegitimate children. Prior to his death, Amos Bellis executed a will in the Philippines in which his
distributable estate should be divided in trust in the following order and manner:
a. $240,000 to his 1st wife Mary Mallen;

b. P120,000 to his 3 illegitimate children at P40,000 each;
c. The remainder shall go to his surviving children by his 1st and 2nd wives, in equal shares.
Subsequently, Amos Bellis died a resident of San Antonio, Texas, USA. His will was admitted to probate in the
Philippines. The People’s Bank and Trust Company, an executor of the will, paid the entire bequest therein.
Preparatory to closing its administration, the executor submitted and filed its “Executor’s Final Account, Report of
Administration and Project of Partition” where it reported, inter alia, the satisfaction of the legacy of Mary Mallen by
the shares of stock amounting to $240,000 delivered to her, and the legacies of the 3 illegitimate children in the
amount of P40,000 each or a total of P120,000. In the project partition, the executor divided the residuary estate
into 7 equal portions for the benefit of the testator’s 7 legitimate children by his 1st and 2nd marriages.
Among the 3 illegitimate children, Mari Cristina and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective opposition to the
project partition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimates as illegitimate children.
The lower court denied their respective motions for reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether Texan Law of Philippine Law must apply.
HELD:
It is not disputed that the decedent was both a national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the time of his death. So
that even assuming Texan has a conflict of law rule providing that the same would not result in a reference back
(renvoi) to Philippine Law, but would still refer to Texas Law. Nonetheless, if Texas has conflict rule adopting the situs
theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the application of the law of the place where the properties are situated, renvoi
would arise, since the properties here involved are found in the Philippines. In the absence, however of proofs as to
the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not be presumed different from our appellants.
10
15. ZALAMEA V CA
FACTS
pouses Cesar and Suthira Zalamea, and their daughter, Liana Zalamea, purchased three (3) airline tickets from the
Manila agent of respondent TransWorld Airlines, Inc. (TWA) for a flight from New York to Los Angeles on June 6,
1984. The tickets of the spouses were
purchased at a discount of 75% while that of their daughter was a full fare ticket. All three tickets represented
confirmed reservations.
While in New York, on June 4, 1984, the spouses Zalamea and their daughter received a notice of reconfirmation of
their reservations for said flight. On the appointed date, however, the spouses Zalamea and their daughter checked
in at 10:00 am, an hour earlier than the scheduled flight at 11:00 am but were placed on the wait-list because the
number of passengers who checked in before tem had already taken all the seats available on the flight.
Out of the 42 names on the wait-list, the first 22 names were eventually allowed to board the flight to Los Angeles,
including Cesar Zalamea. The two others, on the other hand, being ranked lower than 22, were not able to fly. As it
were, those holding full-fare ticket were given first priority among the wait-listed passengers. Mr. Zalamea, who was
holding the full-fare ticket of his daughter, was allowed to board the plane; while his wife and daughter, who
presented the discounted tickets were denied boarding. Even in the next TWA flight to Los Angeles, Mrs. Zalamea
and her daughter, could not be accommodated because it was full booked. Thus, they were constrained to book in
another flight and purchased two tickets from American Airlines.
Upon their arrival in the Philippines, the spouses Zalamea filed an action for damages based on breach of contract of
air carriage before the RTC of Makati which rendered a decision in their favor ordering the TWA to pay the price of
the tickets bought from American Airlines together with moral damages and attorney’s fees. On appeal, the CA held
that moral damages are recoverable in a damage suit predicated upon a breach of contract of carriage only where
there is fraud or bad faith. It further stated that since it is a matter of record that overbooking of flights is a common
and accepted practice of airlines in the United States and is specifically allowed under the Code of Federal
Regulations by the Civil Aeronautics Board, neither fraud nor bad faith could be imputed on TWA.
ISSUE
Whether PH law applies?
HELD:
The law of the place where the airline ticket was issued should be applied by the court where the passengers are
residents and nationals of the forum and the ticket is issued in such state by the defendant airlines.—Even if the
claimed U.S. Code of Federal Regulations does exist, the same is not applicable to the case at bar in accordance with
the principle of lex loci contractus which requires that the law of the place where the airline ticket was issued should
be applied by the court where the passengers are residents and nationals of the forum and the ticket is issued in
such State by the defendant airline. Since the tickets were sold and issued in the Philippines, the applicable law in
this case would be Philippine law.
16. VAN DORN vs. HON. ROMILLO and RICHARD UPTON
FACTS
Petitioner Alice Van Dorn is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent Richard Upton is a citizen of the
USA. They were married in Hongkong in 1972 and begot two children. The parties were divorced in Nevada, USA in
1982. Alice has then re-married also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.
In 1983, Richard filed suit against Alice in the RTC-Pasay, stating that Alice’s business in Ermita, Manila is conjugal
property of the parties, and asking that Alice be ordered to render an accounting of that business, and that Richard
be declared with right to manage the conjugal property.
11
Alice moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce
proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had “no
community property” as of June 11, 1982. The Court below (presiding judge: Judge Romillo) denied the MTD in the
mentioned case on the ground that the property involved is located in the Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has
no bearing in the case. The denial is now the subject of this certiorari proceeding.
ISSUE:
What is the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their alleged conjugal property in the Philippines?
HELD:
Petition is granted, and respondent Judge is hereby ordered to dismiss the Complaint…
For the resolution of this case, it is not necessary to determine whether the property relations between Alice and
Richard, after their marriage, were upon absolute or relative community property, upon complete separation of
property, or upon any other regime. The pivotal fact in this case is the Nevada divorce of the parties.
The Nevada District Court, which decreed the divorce, had obtained jurisdiction over petitioner who appeared in
person before the Court during the trial of the case. It also obtained jurisdiction over private respondent who
authorized his attorneys in the divorce case to agree to the divorce on the ground of incompatibility in the
understanding that there were neither community property nor community obligations.
As explicitly stated in the Power of Attorney he executed in favor of the law firm of KARP & GRAD LTD. to represent
him in the divorce proceedings:
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no
standing to sue in the case below as petitioner’s husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is
bound by the Decision of his own country’s Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision
he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the
alleged conjugal property.
17. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III,
FACTS
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Regional Trial Court of Molave,
Zamboaga del Sur, Branch 23, granting respondent’s petition for authority to remarry invoking par. 2 of Article 26 of
the Family Code.
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III and Lady Myros Villanueva were married in Lam-an, Ozamis City and were
blessed with a son and a daughter. In 1986, Lady Myros left for the U. S. bringing along their son and after a few
years she was naturalized as an American citizen.
Sometime in 2000, respondent Orbecido learned from his son – who was living with his wife in the States – that his
wife had remarried after obtaining her divorce decree. Thereafter, he filed a petition for authority to remarry with
the trial court invoking par. 2 of Art. 26 of the Family Code.
Having no opposition, on May 15, 2002, the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del Sur granted the petition of the
respondent and allowed him to remarry.
12
The Solicitor General’s motion for reconsideration was denied. In view of that, petitioner filed this petition for review
on certiorari of the Decision of the Regional Trial Court. Herein petitioner raised the issue of the applicability of Art.
26 par. 2 to the instant case.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER THE ARTICLE 26 OF THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES.
HELD:
Respondent Orbecido who has the burden of proof, failed to submit competent evidence showing his allegations
that his naturalized American wife had obtained a divorce decree and had remarried. Therefore, the Petition of the
Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution of the RTC Br. 32 of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur
is hereby SET ASIDE.
Article 26 par. 2 of the Family Code only applies to case where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the
parties are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The instant case is one where at the time the marriage was solemnized,
the parties were two Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife was naturalized as an American citizen and subsequently
obtained a divorce granting her capacity to remarry, and indeed she remarried an American citizen while residing in
the U. S. A. Therefore, the 2nd par. of Art. 26 does not apply to the instant case.
However, the legislative intent must be taken into consideration and rule of reason must be applied. The Supreme
Court ruled that par. 2 of Art. 26 should be construed and interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the
time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of then becomes naturalized as a
foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other
party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be sanction
absurdity and injustice. Were the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to
mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit
and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law. A stature may therefore be extended to case not
within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its spirits or intent.
18. ALFONSO T. YUCHENGCO, Petitioner, v. THE MANILA CHRONICLE PUBLISHING CORPORATION,
FACTS
The present controversy arose when in the last quarter of 1993, several allegedly defamatory articles against
petitioner were published in The Manila Chronicle by Chronicle Publishing Corporation.
Petitioner filed a complaint against respondents before the RTC of Makati City under three separate causes of action,
namely: (1) for damages due to libelous publication against Neal H. Cruz, Ernesto Tolentino, Noel Cabrera, Thelma
San Juan, Gerry Zaragoza, Donna Gatdula, Raul Valino, Rodney P. Diola, all members of the editorial staff and writers
of The Manila Chronicle, and Chronicle Publishing; (2) for damages due to abuse of right against Robert Coyiuto, Jr.
and Chronicle Publishing; and (3) for attorneys fees and costs against all the respondents.
13
On November 8, 2002, the trial court rendered a Decision in favor of petitioner.
Aggrieved, respondents sought recourse before the CA. The CA rendered a Decision affirming in toto the decision of
the RTC. Respondents then filed an MR. The CA rendered an Amended Decision reversing the earlier Decision.
Subsequently, petitioner filed the present recourse before this Court. On November 25, 2009, this Court rendered a
Decision partially granting the petition. Respondents later filed a MR dated which the Court denied.
Meanwhile, respondent Coyiuto, Jr. also filed a Motion for Leave to File Supplemental MR with Attached
Supplemental Motion. On April 21, 2010, this Court issued a Resolution grant Coyiuto, Jr.s motion for leave to file
supplemental motion for reconsideration, and require petitioner to comment on the motion for reconsideration and
supplemental motion for reconsideration. Petitioner filed his Comment.
It is apparent that the MR of respondents generally reiterates the arguments previously advanced by respondents.
However, from the supplemental motion for reconsideration, it is apparent that Coyiuto, Jr. raises a new matter
which has not been raised in the proceedings below. This notwithstanding, basic equity dictates that Coyiuto, Jr.
should be given all the opportunity to ventilate his arguments in the present action, but more importantly, in order
to write finis to the present controversy.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioners cause of action based on Abuse of Rights warrants the award of damages.
HELD:
AWARD OF DAMAGES BASED ON ABUSE OF RIGHT,PROPER

A right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of
some illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19
and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held
responsible. But while Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct for the government of human relations and for the
maintenance of social order, it does not provide a remedy for its violation. Generally, an action for damages under
either Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper. Here, it was found that Coyiuto, Jr. indeed abused his rights as
Chairman of The Manila Chronicle, which led to the publication of the libelous articles in the said newspaper, thus,
entitling petitioner to damages under Article 19, in relation to Article 20.
Coyuito, Jr.'s supplemental MR is partially granted.
19. BAKSH vs. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS
Petitioner Gashem Shookat Baksh was an Iranian citizen, exchange student taking a medical course in Dagupan City,
who courted private respondent Marilou Gonzales, and promised to marry her. On the condition that they would
get married, she reciprocated his love. They then set the marriage after the end of the school semester. He visited
Marilou’s parents to secure their approval of marriage. In August 1987, he forced her to live with him, which she
did. However, his attitude toward her changed after a while; he would maltreat and even threatened to kill her,
from which she sustained injuries. Upon confrontation with the barangay captain, he repudiated their marriage
agreement, saying that he was already married to someone living in Bacolod.
14
Marilou then filed for damages before the RTC. Baksh denied the accusations but asserted that he told her not to go
to his place since he discovered her stealing his money and passport. The RTC ruled in favor of Gonzales. The CA
affirmed the RTC decision.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not breach of promise to marry is an actionable wrong.
2. Whether or not Art. 21 of the Civil Code applies to this case.
3. Whether or not pari delicto applies in this case.
HELD:
The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong.
This, notwithstanding, Art. 21 is designed to expand the concept of torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdictions by
granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to
specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books.
Art. 21 defines quasi-delict:
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence is obliged to pay for
the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is
called quasi-delict and is governed by the (Civil Code).
It is clear that petitioner harbors a condescending if not sarcastic regard for the private respondent on account of
the latter’s ignoble birth, inferior educational background, poverty and, as perceived by him, dishonorable
employment. From the beginning, obviously, he was not at all moved by good faith and an honest motive. Thus, his
profession of love and promise to marry were empty words directly intended to fool, dupe, entice, beguile and
deceive the poor woman into believing that indeed, he loved her and would want her to be his life partner. His was
nothing but pure lust which he wanted satisfied by a Filipina who honestly believed that by accepting his proffer of
love and proposal of marriage, she would be able to enjoy a life of ease and security. Petitioner clearly violated the
Filipino concept of morality and so brazenly defied the traditional respect Filipinos have for their women. It can even
be said that the petitioner committed such deplorable acts in blatant disregard of Article 19 of the Civil Code which
directs every person to act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith in the exercise of
his right and in the performance of his obligations.
No foreigner must be allowed to make a mockery of our laws, customs and traditions.
She is not in pari delicto with the petitioner. Pari delicto means in equal fault. At most, it could be conceded that
she is merely in delicto.
Equity often interfered for the relief of the less guilty of the parties, where his transgression has been brought about
by the imposition of undue influence of the party on whom the burden of the original wrong principally rests, or
where his consent to the transaction was itself procured by fraud.
15
20. NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN AND RUBY LIM VS. ROBERTO REYES a.k.a. “AMAY BISAYA”
FACTS
In the evening of October 13, 1994, while drinking coffee at the lobby of Hotel Nikko, respondent was invited by a
friend, Dr. Filart to join her in a party in celebration of the birthday of the hotel’s manager. During the party and
when respondent was lined-up at the buffet table, he was stopped by Ruby Lim, the Executive Secretary of the hotel,
and asked to leave the party. Shocked and embarrassed, he tried to explain that he was invited by Dr. Filart, who was
herself a guest. Not long after, a Makati policeman approached him and escorted him out of her party.
Ms. Lim admitted having asked respondent to leave the party but not under the ignominious circumstances painted
by Mr. Reyes, that she did the act politely and discreetly. Mindful of the wish of the celebrant to keep the party
intimate and exclusive, she spoke to the respondent herself when she saw him by the buffet table with no other
guests in the immediate vicinity. She asked him to leave the party after he finished eating. After she had turned to
leave, the latter screamed and made a big scene.
Dr. Filart testified that she did not want the celebrant to think that she invited Mr. Reyes to the party.
Respondent filed an action for actual, moral and/or exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. The lower court
dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the trial court, consequently
imposing upon Hotel Nikko moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. On motion for reconsideration, the
Court of Appeals affirmed its decision. Thus, this instant petition for review.
ISSUES:
Whether or not Ms. Ruby Lim is liable under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the
party as he was not invited by the celebrant thereof and whether or not Hotel Nikko, as the employer of Ms. Lim, be
solidarily liable with her.
HELD:
The Court found more credible the lower court’s findings of facts. There was no proof of motive on the part of Ms.
Lim to humiliate Mr. Reyes and to expose him to ridicule and shame. Mr. Reyes’ version of the story was
unsupported, failing to present any witness to back his story. Ms. Lim, not having abused her right to ask Mr. Reyes
to leave the party to which he was not invited, cannot be made liable for damages under Articles 19 and 21 of the
Civil Code. Necessarily, neither can her employer, Hotel Nikko, be held liable as its liability springs from that of its
employees.
When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in
damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be responsible. Article 21
states that any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
Without proof of any ill-motive on her part, Ms. Lim’s act cannot amount to abusive conduct.
The maxim “Volenti Non Fit Injuria” (self-inflicted injury) was upheld by the Court, that is, to which a person assents
is not esteemed in law as injury, that consent to injury precludes the recovery of damages by one who has knowingly
and voluntarily exposed himself to danger.
16
20. St. Louis Realty Corp. vs. CA133 SCRA 179
FACTS
Dr. Conrado Aramil, a neuropsychiatrist and member of the faculty of UE Ramon Magsaysay Medical Center, seek to
recover damage for a wrongful advertisement in the Sunday Times where St Louis Realty Corp. misrepresented his
house with Mr. Arcadio.
St. Louis published an ad on December 15, 1968 with the heading “where the heart is”. This was republished on
January 5, 1969. In the advertisement, the house featured was Dr Aramil’s house and not Mr. Arcadio with whom
the company asked permission and the intended house to be published. After Dr Aramil noticed the mistake, he
wrote a letter to St. Louis demanding an explanation 1 week after such receipt. No rectification or apology was
published despite that it was received by Ernesto Magtoto, the officer in charge of the advertisement. This
prompted Dr. Aramil’s counsel to demand actual, moral and exemplary damages. On March 18, 1969, St Louis
published an ad now with Mr. Arcadio’s real house but nothing on the apology or explanation of the error. Dr Aramil
filed a complaint for damages on March 29. During the April 15 ad, the notice of rectification was published.
ISSUE:
Whether St. Louis is liable to pay damages to Dr. Aramil.
HELD:
St Louis was grossly negligent in mixing up residences in a widely circulated publication. Furthermore, it never made
any written apology and explanation of the mix-up. It just contented itself with a cavalier "rectification ".
The trial court awarded Aramil P8,000 as actual damages, P20,000 as moral damages and P2,000 as attorney's
fees. When St. Louis Realty appealed to the Court of Appeals, CA affirmed the judgement for the reason that “St.
Louis Realty committed an actionable quasi-delict under articles 21 and 26 of the Civil Code because the questioned
advertisements pictured a beautiful house which did not belong to Arcadio but to Doctor Aramil who, naturally, was
annoyed by that contretemps”.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed. Costs against the petitioner.
21. Jose B. Ledesma vs Court of Appeals 160 SCRA 449 (1988)
FACTS
A student, Violeta Delmo, was not able to graduate as Magna Cum Laude, because the president, herein petitioner
Jose Ledesma, of the West Visayas College neglected his duty to inform the student on the result of a case against
the student which has, as its punishment, the removal of awards or citations of the student.
Said case was the extension of loans to students, which the president contends to be against the school rules and
regulations, and which the student innocently performed in her capacity as the treasurer of the Student Leadership
Club and in accordance to the Constitution and By-Laws of the club, on the belief that said constitution was
presented and approved by the president.
The student appealed to the Director of the Bureau of Public Schools after being denied for reconsideration by the
president, where upon investigation, it was found out that the student acted in good faith and that her awards be
reinstituted. The president, upon receiving said decision, delayed action and even e-mailed the director to reverse
his decision. The student therefore graduated as a plain student and without honors and her award as Magna Cum
Laude was only entered on the scholastic records weeks after the receipt by the president of the decision and after
the graduation.
17
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is liable for damages under Article 27 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
HELD:
Yes.
The president’s failure to graduate a student with honors and blatant disregard of the student’s rights on the
account of him being embarrassed shows neglect of duty without just cause, rendering him liable for damages under
Article 27 of the Civil Code. Undoubtedly, the student and the student’s parents went through a painful ordeal
brought about by such neglect. Thus, moral and exemplary damages under Article 27 are but proper.
22. RIVERA V CA
FACTS
In deciding this appeal, the Court relies on the rule that a party who has the burden of proof in a civil case must
establish his cause of action by a preponderance of evidence. When the evidence of the parties is in equipoise, or
when there is a doubt as to where the preponderance of evidence lies, the party with the burden of proof fails and
the petition/complaint must thus be denied. On July 19, 1990, petitioner filed complaints for ejectment against
private respondents Amy Robles Peregrino Mirambel, and Merlina Mirambel, docketed as Civil Case Nos. 5740, 5741
and 5742, respectively, before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Valenzuela, Branch 81.
On August 8, 1990, movant Jose Bayani A. Salcedo filed an urgent motion for intervention on the ground that he has
a legal interest in the subject for he applied for title of the public land under MSA No. (11-6) 131 (now MII [131-1]
33-D), which was denied on January 2, 1991.
On August 8, 1990, private respondents filed their answers, respectively.
After submission of their position papers, the (Metropolitan Trial Court) rendered joint judgment in favor of the
petitioner and against the private respondents on March 18, 1993, the dispositive portion of which herein-below
quoted: In fine, by evidence plaintiff has preponderably established his cause of action.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff
respondent filed an appeal before the (Regional Trial Court) which rendered the assailed judgment on September 21,
1993 reversing and setting aside the decision of the (Metropolitan Trial Court)
Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for failure of petitioner, as plaintiff before the trial court, to prove a cause of
action.
ISSUE:
whether private respondents houses lie inside petitioners land, and whether petitioner was able to prove that
fact.[11] Put differently, the issue for resolution is whether or not petitioner proved his cause of action.
HELD:
Basic is the rule in civil cases that the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of
evidence.[12] By preponderance of evidence is meant simply evidence which is of greater weight, or more convincing
than that which is offered in opposition to it.[13] In the present ejectment case, petitioner (as plaintiff) has the burden
of proving that the houses of private respondents were located within his titled land. To justify a judgment in his
favor, petitioner must therefore establish a preponderance of evidence on this essential fact.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED, with costs against petitioner.
18
23. URBANO V. IAC
FACTS
On October 23, 1980, petitioner Filomeno Urbano was on his way to his ricefield. He found the place where he
stored palay flooded with water coming from the irrigation canal. Urbano went to the elevated portion to see what
happened, and there he saw Marcelino Javier and Emilio Efre cutting grass. Javier admitted that he was the one who
opened the canal. A quarrel ensued, and Urbano hit Javier on the right palm with his bolo, and again on the leg with
the back of the bolo. On October 27, 1980, Urbano and Javier had an amicable settlement. Urbano paid P700 for the
medical expenses of Javier. On November 14, 1980, Urbano was rushed to the hospital where he had lockjaw and
convulsions. The doctor found the condition to be caused by tetanus toxin which infected the healing wound in his
palm. He died the following day. Urbano was charged with homicide and was found guilty both by the trial court and
on appeal by the Court of Appeals. Urbano filed a motion for new trial based on the affidavit of the Barangay Captain
who stated that he saw the deceased catching fish in the shallow irrigation canals on November 5. The motion was
denied; hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the wound inflicted by Urbano to Javier was the proximate cause of the latter’s death
HELD:
A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is... "that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken
by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred."And
more comprehensively, "the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or
by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close
causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a
natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for
the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the
moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom."
If the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already infected by tetanus germs at the time, it is more
medically probable that Javier should have been infected with only a mild cause of tetanus because the symptoms of
tetanus appeared on the 22nd dayafter the hacking incident or more than 14 days after the infliction of the wound.
Therefore, the onset time should have been more than six days. Javier, however, died on the second day from the
onset time. The more credible conclusion is that at the time Javier's wound was inflicted by the appellant, the severe
form of tetanus that killed him was not yet present. Consequently, Javier's wound could have been infected with
tetanus after the hacking incident. Considering the circumstance surrounding Javier's death, his wound could have
been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days before he died.
24. GEORGE MANANTAN, petitioner vs. COURT OF APPEALS, defendant
FACTS
In the evening of September 25, 1982, at the National Highway of Malvar, Santiago, Isabela, George Manantan was
driving a Toyota car going home. At that time, he was with Fiscal Ambrocio, Miguel Tabangin and Ruben Nicolas.
Suddenly, a jeepney, coming from the opposite direction hit the driver side of the car, driven by
Manantan. Consequently, Manantan, Ambrocio and Tabangin were injured while Nicolas died. Trial followed.
19
The lower court acquitted the accused of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to homicide. The respondents
filed their notice of appeal on the civil aspect of the lower court’s judgment. Even if the accused was acquitted from
his criminal liability, the Appellate Court held him civilly liable and ordered him to indemnify the aggrieved party for
the death of Nicolas.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the acquittal of petitioner extinguished his civil liability.
HELD:
The acquittal was based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused. Article 29 of the Civil Code provides that a
civil liability is not extinguished in criminal cases. Therefore, the accused cannot be exempted from paying civil
damages which may only be proven by preponderance of evidence.
Manantan claimed that he was placed on double jeopardy but the courts did not give merit to this contention. The
following elements must be present for double jeopardy to exist: (1) A first jeopardy must have attached prior to the
second; (2) The first jeopardy must have terminated; and (3) the third jeopardy must be for the same offense as the
first.
In the case at bar, the initially put into jeopardy but he it was terminated by his discharge. When the case was
elevated to the Court of Appeals, the issue was about the civil aspect of the criminal case. Thus, there could be no
double jeopardy.
25. PIMENTEL V. PIMENTEL
FACTS
On 25 October 2004, Maria Pimentel y Lacap(private respondent) filed an action for frustrated parricide against
Joselito Pimentel (petitioner) before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
On 7 February 2005, petitioner received summons to appear before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City for the
pre-trial and trial of a civil case (Maria Pimentel v. Joselito Pimentel) for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity.
On 11 February 2005, petitioner filed an urgent motion to suspend the proceedings before the RTC Quezon City on
the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question. Petitioner asserted that since the relationship between
the offender and the victim is a key element in parricide, the outcome of the civil case would have a bearing in the
criminal case filed against him before the RTC Quezon City.
The RTC Quezon City held that the pendency of the case before the RTC Antipolo is not a prejudicial question that
warrants the suspension of the criminal case before it.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with application for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary
restraining order before the Court of Appeals. However, The Court of Appeals ruled that even if the marriage
between petitioner and respondent would be declared void, it would be immaterial to the criminal case because
prior to the declaration of nullity, the alleged acts constituting the crime of frustrated parricide had already been
committed.
ISSUE:
Whether the resolution of the action for annulment of marriage is a prejudicial question that warrants the
suspension of the criminal case for frustrated parricide against petitioner.
20
HELD:
NO. Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that elements of a prejudicial question
are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the
subsequent criminal action and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action
may proceed.
In the case at bar, the civil case for annulment was filed after the filing of the criminal case for frustrated parricide.
As such, the requirement of Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure was not met since the civil
action was filed subsequent to the filing of the criminal action.
The relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in the crime of parricide, which punishes any
person “who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants or
descendants, or his spouse.” However, the issue in the annulment of marriage is not similar or intimately related to
the issue in the criminal case for parricide. Further, the relationship between the offender and the victim is not
determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
26. Tenebro v. CA
FACTS
Veronico Tenebro contracted marriage with private complainant Leticia Ancajas on April 10, 1990. Tenebro and
Ancajas lived together continuously and without interruption until the latter part of 1991, when Tenebro informed
Ancajas that he had been previously married to a certain Hilda Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Tenebro showed
Ancajas a photocopy of a marriage contract between him and Villareyes. Invoking this previous marriage, petitioner
thereafter left the conjugal dwelling which he shared with Ancajas, stating that he was going to cohabit with
Villareyes. On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage, this one with a certain Nilda Villegas.
When Ancajas learned of this third marriage, she verified from Villareyes whether the latter was indeed married to
petitioner. In a handwritten letter, Villareyes confirmed that petitioner, Veronico Tenebro, was indeed her husband.
Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner. Villegas countered that his marriage with
Villareyes cannot be proven as a fact there being no record of such. He further argued that his second marriage, with
Ancajas, has been declared void ab initio due to psychological incapacity. Hence he cannot be charged for bigamy.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Tenebro is guilty of bigamy.
HELD:
Individual who contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage is criminally
liable for bigamy notwithstanding the declaration of the second marriage as void ab initio on the ground of
psychological incapacity.
21
27. GRACE POE vs. COMELEC
FACTS
Grace Poe was found abandoned as a newborn infant in the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo by Edgardo Militar in 1968.
Parental care and custody over her was passed on by Edgardo to his relatives, Emiliano Militar and his wife. Emiliano
reported and registered Grace Poe as a foundling with the Office of the Civil Registrar of Iloilo City. Fenando Poe, Jr.
and Susan Roces adopted Grace Poe.
· 1991 – Poe went to the US to be a permanent resident therein
· 2001 – She became a naturalized US citizen
· First quarter of 2005 – she came back to the Philippines to permanently reside herein
· February 14, 2006- she went back to the US to dispose family belongings
· July 18, 2006 – she re-acquired Filipino citizenship
According to Poe in her 2013 COC for Senator, before the May 13, 2013 election, she has been a resident of the
Philippines for 6 years and 6 months (reckoned from year 2006 when she re-acquired her Filipino citizenship under
RA 9225).
Poe filed her COC for Presidency for the May 9, 2016 elections (hence, computing from May, 2013, she has been a
resident in the Philippines for 9 years and 6 months only)
However, in her COC, Poe declared that she is a natural born and her residence in the Philippine up to the day before
election would be 10 years and 11 months counted from May 24, 2005(when she returned from the US to the
Philippines for good).
ISSUE AND HELD:

Poe is qualified to be a candidate for President in the National and Local Election on May 9, 2016.
1) Is Poe, a foundling, a natural-born citizen? Yes, based on:
a) Circumstantial evidence
b) Legislation
c) Generally accepted principles of international law
Circumstantial evidence
There is more than sufficient evidence that Poe has Filipino parents and is therefore a natural-born Filipino. xxx.
[T]here is a high probability that her parents are Filipinos. The Solicitor General offered official Statistics from the
Philippine Statistics office that from 1965 to 1975, the total number of foreigners born in the Philippines was 15,985.
While the Filipinos born in the country were more than 10 Million. On this basis, there is a 99% chance that the child
born in the Philippines would be a Filipino which in turn, would indicate more than ample probability that Poe’s
parents are Filipinos.
Other circumstantial evidence of the nationality of Poe’s parents are the fact that:
1. She was abandoned in a Roman Catholic Church in Iloilo
2. She has typical Filipino features.
There are disputable presumptions that things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature. On this
basis, it is safer to assume that Poe’s parents are Filipinos. To assume otherwise is to accept the absurd.
Legislation
Foundlings are as a class, natural born citizens.
The amendment to the Constitution proposed by constitutionalist Rafols to include foundlings as natural born
citizens was not carried out, not because there was any objection to the notion that persons of unknown parentage
are not citizens, but only because their number was not enough to merit specific mention. There was no intent or
22
language that would permit discrimination against foundlings. On the contrary, all three Constitutions guarantee the
basic right to equal protection of the laws.
Ø Likewise, domestic laws on adoption support the principle that foundlings are Filipinos. These laws do not
provide that adoption confers citizenship upon the adoptee, rather, the adoptee must be Filipino in the first place to
be adopted.
Ø Recent legislation all expressly refer to “Filipino children” and include foundlings as among Filipino children who
may be adopted.
Generally accepted principles of international law
The common thread of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention on the Rights of the Child and
the International Convent on Civil and Political Rights obligates the Philippines to grant nationality from birth and to
ensure that no child is stateless. The principles stated in the:
1. Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relation to the Conflict of Nationality laws (that a foundling is
presumed to have the nationality of the country of birth)
2. Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness (foundling is presumed born of citizens of the country where he
is found)
bind the Philippines although we are not signatory to these conventions.
Poe’s evidence shows that at least 60 countries in Asia, North and South America and Europe have passed legislation
recognizing foundlings as its citizens. 166 out of 189 countries accept that foundlings are recognized as citizens.
Hence, there is a generally accepted principle of international law to presume foundlings as having been born and a
national of the country in which it is found.
2) After renouncing her American citizenship and after having taken her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines, has Poe re-acquired her status as a natural-born Filipino citizen? Yes, Poe’s repatriation resulted to
reacquisition of natural born citizenship.
A natural born citizen before he lost his Philippine nationality will be restored to his former status as natural born
Filipino after repatriation (Benson v. HRET, Pareno v. Commission on Audit etc).
3) Has Poe satisfied the 10 year residency requirement? Yes, she will have been a resident for 10 years and 11
months on the day of the election.
[T]here is overwhelming evidence that leads to no to other conclusion that Poe decided to permanently abandon her
US residence and reside in the Philippines as early as May 24, 2005.
Poe presented voluminous evidence showing that she and her family abandoned their US domicile and relocated to
the Philippines for good. These evidence include former US passport showing her arrival on May 24, 2005 and her
return to the Philippines every time she travelled abroad, email correspondences with freight company to arrange
for the shipment of household items as well as with the pet Bureau; school records of her children showing
enrolment in the Philippine to the Philippine schools starting on June 2005 etc. xxx These evidence, coupled with her
eventual application to reacquire Philippine citizenship is clear that when she returned in May 2005, it was for good.
Poe was able to prove that her statement in her 2013 COC was only a mistake in good faith. As explained by Grace
Poe, she misunderstood the date required in the 2013 COC as the period of residence as of the day she submitted
that COC in 2012. She said that she reckoned residency from April-May 2006 which was the period when the U.S.
house was sold and her husband returned to the Philippines. In that regard, she was advised by her lawyers in 2015
that residence could be counted from 25 May 2005. Such a mistake could be given in evidence against her but it was
by no means conclusive considering the overwhelming evidence submitted by Poe.
23
28. ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS vs. COMELEC and MONTEJO]
FACTS
Petitioner Imelda Marcos filed a Certificate of Candidacy (COC) in the First district of Leyte in order that she will be
able to run for Congress of that district in the 1995 elections. Her COC stated that she was a resident of Leyte
for seven months. Private Respondent Montejo, a rival candidate filed a petition to cancel the COC and to disqualify
Marcos on the ground that she did not meet the one year residency requirement as provided for in the
Constitution. In response, Marcos amended her COC changing the entry "seven" months to "since
childhood". Marcos claimed that "she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence." She
further claimed that she is entitled to the correction of her COC on the ground that her original entry of "seven
months" was the result of an "honest misinterpretation or honest mistake".
The COMELEC granted the petition to cancel the COC and to disqualify Marcos. It held that the animus revertendi of
Marcos was not Tacloban, but San Juan, Manila, because that where she chose to live after she went back to the
Philippines after her well-publicized exile in the US. It explained that while Petitioner grew up in Tacloban, after her
graduation, however, she moved to Manila where she became a registered voter, became a member of the Batasang
Pambansa as a representative of Manila and eventually became Governor of Manila. This, according to the
COMELEC debunks her claim that she was a resident of Leyte 1st District "since childhood".
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Petitioner is a resident of Leyte for election purposes.
HELD:
1. YES. The Supreme Court declared in this case that for purposes of election law, residence is synonymous with
domicile. The decision of the COMELEC however, shows that they confused the concept of "Domicile" with "actual
residence".
Domicile versus Residence
Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that "[f]or the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations, the
domicile of natural persons is their place of habitual residence." In a past case, the Court took the concept of
domicile to mean an individual's "permanent home", "a place to which, whenever absent for business or for
pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on facts and circumstances in the sense that they disclose
intent." Thus, domicile is composed of the two elements of:
1. The fact of residing/physical presence in a fixed place; and
2. Animus manendi - the intention of returning permanently
Residence on the other hand merely refers to the factual relationship of an individual to a certain place. It is mere
physical presence. Residence involves the intent to leave when the purpose for which the resident has taken up his
abode ends. If a person's intent be to remain, it becomes his domicile; if his intent is to leave as soon as his purpose
is established it is residence. Domicile is residence coupled with the intention to remain for an unlimited time.
A person can have different residences in various places, but he can only have a single domicile. Note however, that
a person may abandon a domicile in favor of another.
Domicile of Petitioner is in Tacloban
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29. SILVERIO V RP
FACTS
Petitioner was born and registered as male. He admitted that he is a male transsexual, that is, “anatomically male
but feels, thinks and acts as a “female” and that he had always identified himself with girls since childhood. He
underwent psychological examination, hormone treatment, breast augmentation and sex reassignment surgery.
From then on, petitioner lived as female and was in fact engaged to be married.
On November 26, 2002, Silverio field a petition for the change of his first name “Rommel Jacinto” to “Mely” and his
sex from male to female in his birth certificate in the RTC of Manila, Branch 8, for reason of his sex reassignment. He
alleged that he is a male transsexual, he is anatomically male but thinks and acts like a female. The Regional Trial
Court ruled in favor of him, explaining that it is consonance with the principle of justice and equality.
The Republic, through the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals alleging that there is no law
allowing change of name by reason of sex alteration. Petitioner filed reconsideration but was denied. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Rommel's first name and sex be changed on the ground of sex reassignment.
HELD:
No. There is no law authorizes the change of entry as of sex and first name through the intervention of sex
reassignment surgery. Article 376 of the Civil Code as amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law), together with Article
412 of the same Code, change of name or sex in the birth certificate is allowed by the courts so long as clerical or
typographical errors are involved.
Changes sought by Silverio will have serious legal and public policy consequences. To grant this petition filed by
Silverio will greatly alter the laws on marriage and family relations. Second, there will be major changes in statutes
that underscore the public policy in relation to women.
Article 376 of the Civil Code provides that no person can change his name or surname without judicial authority
which was amended by RA 9048 – Clerical Error Law which does not sanction a change of first name on the ground
of sex reassignment. Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or reasonable cause
or any compelling reason justifying such change. In addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced by the use of
his true and official name. In this case, he failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as a
result of using his true and official name. Article 412 of the Civil Code provides that no entry in the civil register shall
be changed or corrected without a judicial order. The birth certificate of petitioner contained no error. All entries
therein, including those corresponding to his first name and sex, were all correct. Hence, no correction is necessary.
Article 413 of the Civil Code provides that all other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be
governed by special laws. However, there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment and its
effects. Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed at the time of
birth. Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or midwife)
by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the
determination of a person’s sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error is immutable
For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance through the
intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that reason.
Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the correction or change of the entries in his birth certificate. The
remedies petitioner seeks involve questions of public policy to be addressed solely by the legislature, not by the
courts. Hence, petition is denied.
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30. REPUBLIC V CAGANDAHAN
FACTS
Jennifer Cagandahan filed before the Regional Trial Court Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna a Petition for Correction of
Entries in Birth Certificate of her name from Jennifer B. Cagandahan to Jeff Cagandahan and her gender from female
to male. It appearing that Jennifer Cagandahan is suffering from Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which is a rare
medical condition where afflicted persons possess both male and female characteristics. Jennifer Cagandahan grew
up with secondary male characteristics.
To further her petition, Cagandahan presented in court the medical certificate evidencing that she is suffering from
Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which certificate is issued by Dr. Michael Sionzon of the Department of Psychiatry,
University of the Philippines-Philippine General Hospital, who, in addition, explained that “Cagandahan genetically is
female but because her body secretes male hormones, her female organs did not develop normally, thus has organs
of both male and female.”
The lower court decided in her favor but the Office of the Solicitor General appealed before the Supreme Court
invoking that the same was a violation of Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court because the said petition did not
implead the local civil registrar.
ISSUE:
The issue in this case is the validity of the change of sex or gender and name of respondent as ruled by the lower
court.
HELD:
The contention of the Office of the Solicitor General that the petition is fatally defective because it failed to implead
the local civil registrar as well as all persons who have or claim any interest therein is not without merit. However, it
must be stressed that private respondent furnished the local civil registrar a copy of the petition, the order to
publish on December 16, 2003 and all pleadings, orders or processes in the course of the proceedings. In which case,
the Supreme Court ruled that there is substantial compliance of the provisions of Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of
Court. Furthermore, the Supreme Court held that the determination of a person’s sex appearing in his birth
certificate is a legal issue which in this case should be dealt with utmost care in view of the delicate facts present in
this case.
In deciding the case, the Supreme Court brings forth the need to elaborate the term “intersexuality” which is the
condition or let us say a disorder that respondent is undergoing. INTERSEXUALITY applies to human beings who
cannot be classified as either male or female. It is the state of a living thing of a gonochoristic species whose sex
chromosomes, genitalia, and/or secondary sex characteristics are determined to be neither exclusively male nor
female. It is said that an organism with intersex may have biological characteristics of both male and female sexes. In
view of the foregoing, the highest tribunal of the land consider the compassionate calls for recognition of the various
degrees of intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright denial.
26
30.CHI MING TSOI vs. COURT OF APPEALS, GINA LAO-TSOI
FACTS
Ching married Gina on May 22, 1988 at the Manila Cathedral, Intramuros, Manila as evidenced by their marriage
contract. After the celebration they had a reception and then proceeded to the house of the Ching Ming Tsoi’s
mother. There they slept together on the same bed in the same room for the first night of their married life.
Gina’s version: that contrary to her expectations that as newlyweds they were supposed to enjoy making love that
night of their marriage, or having sexual intercourse, with each other, Ching however just went to bed, slept on one
side and then turned his back and went to sleep. There was no sexual intercourse between them that night. The
same thing happened on the second, third and fourth nights.
In an effort to have their honey moon in a private place where they can enjoy together during their first week as
husband and wife they went to Baguio City. But they did so together with Ching’s mother, uncle and nephew as they
were all invited by her husband. There was no sexual intercourse between them for four days in Baguio since Ching
avoided her by taking a long walk during siesta time or by just sleeping on a rocking chair located at the living room.
They slept together in the same room and on the same bed since May 22, 1988 (day of their marriage) until March
15, 1989 (ten months). But during this period there was no attempt of sexual intercourse between them. Gina claims
that she did not even see her husband’s private parts nor did he see hers.
Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical examinations to Dr. Eufemio Macalalag. Results were that
Gina is healthy, normal and still a virgin while Ching’s examination was kept confidential up to this time.
The Gina claims that her husband is impotent, a closet homosexual as he did not show his penis. She said she had
observed him using an eyebrow pencil and sometimes the cleansing cream of his mother. She also said her husband
only married her to acquire or maintain his residency status here in the country and to publicly maintain the
appearance of a normal man
Ching’s version: he claims that if their marriage shall be annulled by reason of psychological incapacity, the fault lies
with Gina. He does not want their marriage annulled for reasons of (1) that he loves her very much (2) that he has no
defect on his part and he is physically and psychologically capable (3) since the relationship is still very young and if
there is any differences between the two of them, it can still be reconciled and that according to him, if either one of
them has some incapabilities, there is no certainty that this will not be cured.
Ching admitted that since his marriage to Gina there was no sexual contact between them. But, the reason for this,
according to the defendant, was that everytime he wants to have sexual intercourse with his wife, she always
avoided him and whenever he caresses her private parts, she always removed his hands.
ISSUE:
Whether Ching is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage
HELD:
The Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the trial court and Court of Appeals in rendering as VOID the marriage
entered into by Ching and Gina on May 22, 1988. No costs.
The Supreme Court held that the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is
considered a sign of psychological incapacity. If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform
his or her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals
attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is
equivalent to psychological incapacity.
One of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is “to procreate children basedon the universal
27
principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage.” Constant non-
fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the
senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill this marital obligation is equivalent to psychological
incapacity.
While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observer mutual love, respect and
fidelity, the sanction therefore is actually the “spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and not
any legal mandate or court order (Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno, 120 Phil. 1298). Love is useless unless it is shared with
another. Indeed, no man is an island, the cruelest act of a partner in marriage is to say “I could not have cared less.”
This is so because an ungiven self is an unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing but himself. In the natural order, it is
sexual intimacy that brings spouses wholeness and oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and a participation in the
mystery of creation. It is a function which enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures the continuation of family
relations.
31. KALAW V FERNANDEZ
FACTS
In the case at bar, Kalaw presented the testimonies of two supposed expert witnesses who concluded that
respondent is psychologically incapacitated. Petitioner’s experts heavily relied on petitioner’s allegations of
respondent’s constant mahjong sessions, visits to the beauty parlor, going out with friends, adultery, and neglect of
their children. Petitioner’s experts opined that respondent’s alleged habits, when performed constantly to the
detriment of quality and quantity of time devoted to her duties as mother and wife, constitute a psychological
incapacity in the form of NPD.
However, the Supreme Court in its September 19, 2011 decision dismissed the complaint for declaration of nullity of
the marriage on the ground that there was no factual basis for the conclusion of psychological incapacity.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage was void on the ground of psychological incapacity.
HELD:
YES. The Court in granting the Motion for Reconsideration held that Fernandez was indeed psychologically
incapacitated as they relaxed the previously set forth guidelines with regard to this case.
Note: Molina guidelines were not abandoned, expert opinions were just given much respect in this case.
Guidelines too rigid, thus relaxed IN THIS CASE

The Court held that the guidelines set in the case of Republic v. CA have turned out to be rigid, such that
their application to every instance practically condemned the petitions for declaration of nullity to the fate of certain
rejection. But Article 36 of the Family Code must not be so strictly and too literally read and applied given the clear
intendment of the drafters to adopt its enacted version of “less specificity” obviously to enable “some resiliency in
its application.” Instead, every court should approach the issue of nullity “not on the basis of a priori assumptions,
predilections or generalizations, but according to its own facts” in recognition of the verity that no case would be on
“all fours” with the next one in the field of psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage; hence,
every “trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible,
avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the Motion for Reconsideration; REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision
promulgated on September 19, 2011; and REINSTATES the decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court declaring
the marriage between the petitioner and the respondent on November 4, 1976 as NULL AND VOID AB JN/TIO due to
the psychological incapacity of the parties pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code.
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32. Almelor v. RTC-Las Pinas
FACTS
Petitioner Manuel G. Almelor (Manuel) and respondent Leonida Trinidad (Leonida) were married on January 29,
1989 and had three children. Manuel and Leonida are both medical practitioners, an anesthesiologist and a
pediatrician, respectively. After eleven (11) years of marriage, Leonida filed a petition with the RTC in Las Piñas City
to annul their marriage on the ground that Manuel was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital
obligations.
Leonida that in the public eye, Manuel was the picture of a perfect husband and father but this was not the case in
his private life. At home, Leonida described Manuel as a harsh disciplinarian, unreasonably meticulous, easily
angered. Manuel’s unreasonable way of imposing discipline on their children was the cause of their frequent fights
as a couple.
Leonida complained that this was in stark contrast to the alleged lavish affection Manuel has for his mother. She also
alleged that her husband has concealed from her his homosexuality. She caught him in an indiscreet telephone
conversation manifesting his affection for a male caller. She also found several pornographic homosexual materials
in his possession. And she saw Manuel kissed another man on the lips. The man was a certain Dr. Nogales. When she
confronted Manuel, he denied everything. At this point, Leonida took her children and left their conjugal abode.
Since then, Manuel stopped giving support to their children. Dr. Valentina del Fonso Garcia, a clinical psychologist,
was presented to prove Leonida’s claim. She testified that she conducted evaluative interviews and a battery of
psychiatric tests on Leonida. She also had a one-time interview with Manuel and face-to-face.
She concluded that Manuel is psychologically incapacitated and such incapacity is marked by antecedence; it existed
even before the marriage and appeared to be incurable. Manuel countered that the true cause of Leonida’s hostility
against him was their professional rivalry. The trial court nullified the marriage, not on the ground of Article 36, but
Article 45 of the Family Code. CA denied the appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage between the two can be declared as null and void due to fraud by reason of Manuel’s
concealment of his homosexuality.
HELD:
Concealment of homosexuality is the proper ground to annul a marriage, not homosexuality per se.
Evidently, no sufficient proof was presented to substantiate the allegations that Manuel is a homosexual and that he
concealed this to Leonida at the time of their marriage.
The lower court considered the public perception of Manuel’s sexual preference without the corroboration of
witnesses. Also, it took cognizance of Manuel’s peculiarities and interpreted it against his sexuality.
Even granting that Manuel is indeed a homosexual, there was nothing in the complaint or anywhere in the case was
it alleged and proven that Manuel hid such sexuality from Leonida and that Leonida’s consent had been vitiated by
such.
29
33. ANTONIO V REYES
FACTS
Antonio and Reyes first got married at Manila City Hall and subsequently in church on December 8, 1990. A child was
born in April 1991 but died 5 months later.
In 1993, Leo filed a petition to annul their marriage due to the alleged psychological incapacity of Reyes. Leonilo
claimed that Marie persistently lied about herself, the people around her, her occupation, income, educational
attainment and other events or things. She would claim that she is a psychologist but she is not. She’d claim she is a
singer with the company Blackgold and that she is the latter’s number 1 money maker but she’s not. She’d also
spend lavishly as opposed to her monthly income. She fabricates things and people only to serve her make-believe
world.
He attempted reconciliation but since her behavior did not change, he finally left her for good in November 1991.
Only after their marriage that he learned about her child with another man.
He then filed a petition in 1993 to have his marriage with Reyes declared null and void under Article 36 of the Family
Code.
Leonilo presented an expert who testified to Reyes’s psychological incapacity. Reyes denied all of Leonilo’s
allegations and she also presented an expert to prove her case. The RTC ruled against Reyes and declared their
marriage void. Meanwhile, The Matrimonial Tribunal of the church also annulled the marriage and was even
affirmed by the Vatican’s Roman Rata.
However, Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision. It held that the totality of evidence presented was
insufficient to establish Reyes' psychological incapacity. It declared that the requirements in the 1997 Molina case
had not been satisfied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Antonio has established his cause of action for declaration of nullity under Article 36 of the Family
Code and, generally, under the Molina guidelines.
HELD:
Yes. The petitioner, aside from his own testimony, presented a psychiatrist and clinical psychologist who attested
that constant lying and extreme jealousy of Reyes is abnormal and pathological and corroborated his allegations on
his wife's behavior, which amounts to psychological incapacity.
The factual findings of the trial court are deemed binding on the SC, owing to the great weight accorded to the
opinion of the primary trier of facts. As such, it must be considered that respondent had consistently lied about
many material aspects as to her character and personality. Her fantastic ability to invent and fabricate stories and
personalities enabled her to live in a world of make-believe. This made her psychologically incapacitated as it
rendered her incapable of giving meaning and significance to her marriage.
The case sufficiently satisfies the Molina guidelines.
30
34. Villanueva vs. Court of Appeals
FACTS
In April 1988, Orlando Villanueva married Lilia Canalita- Villanueva before a trial court judge in Puerto Princesa. In
November 1992, Orlando filed before the trial court a petition for annulment of his marriage. He claimed that
threats of violence and duress forced him to marry Lilia who was then pregnant.
Orlando anchored his prayer for the annulment of his marriage on the ground that he did not freely consent to be
married to Lilia. He cited several incidents that created on his mind a reasonable and well-grounded fear of an
imminent and grave danger to his life and safety, to wit: the harassing phone calls from Lilia and strangers as well as
the unwanted visits by three men at the premises of the University of the East after his classes thereat, and the
threatening presence of a certain Ka Celso, a supposed member of the New People’s Army whom appellant claimed
to have been hired by Lilia and who accompanied him in going to her home province of Palawan to marry her.
On the other hand Lilia denied Orlando’s allegations and she said that Orlando freely cohabited with her after the
marriage and she showed 14 letters that shows Orlando’s affection and care towards her
.
ISSUE:
Whether the subject marriage may be annulled on the ground of vitiated consent under Article 45 of the Family
Code; and
HELD:
No. The court ruled that vitiation of consent is not attendant in this case.Therefore, the petition for annulment,
which is anchored to his allegation that he did not freely give his consent, should be dismissed.
The SC ruled that Orlando’s allegation of fraud and intimidation is untenable. On its face, it is obvious that Orlando is
only seeking to annul his marriage with Lilia so as to have the pending appealed bigamy case [filed against him by
Lilia] to be dismissed.
Thus, the petition for annulment was granted, but the award of moral and exemplary damages is deleted for lack of
basis.
35. REPUBLIC V CA MOLINA
FACTS
Roridel Olaviano was married to Reynaldo Molina on 14 April 1985 in Manila, and gave birth to a son a year after.
Reynaldo showed signs of “immaturity and irresponsibility” on the early stages of the marriage, observed from his
tendency to spend time with his friends and squandering his money with them, from his dependency from his
parents, and his dishonesty on matters involving his finances. Reynaldo was relieved of his job in 1986, Roridel
became the sole breadwinner thereafter. In March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and proceeded to
Baguio City. Reynaldo left her and their child a week later. The couple is separated-in-fact for more than three years.
On 16 August 1990, Roridel filed a verified petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina.
Evidence for Roridel consisted of her own testimony, that of two of her friends, a social worker, and a psychiatrist of
the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center. Reynaldo did not present any evidence as he appeared only during
the pre-trial conference. On 14 May 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void. The
Solicitor General appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals denied the appeals and affirmed in toto the
RTC’s decision. Hence, the present recourse.
31
ISSUE:
Whether opposing or conflicting personalities should be construed as psychological incapacity
HELD:
The Court of Appeals erred in its opinion the Civil Code Revision Committee intended to liberalize the application of
Philippine civil laws on personal and family rights, and holding psychological incapacity as a broad range of mental
and behavioral conduct on the part of one spouse indicative of how he or she regards the marital union, his or her
personal relationship with the other spouse, as well as his or her conduct in the long haul for the attainment of the
principal objectives of marriage; where said conduct, observed and considered as a whole, tends to cause the union
to self-destruct because it defeats the very objectives of marriage, warrants the dissolution of the marriage.
The Court reiterated its ruling in Santos v. Court of Appeals, where psychological incapacity should refer to no less
than a mental (not physical) incapacity, existing at the time the marriage is celebrated, and that there is hardly any
doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of ‘psychological incapacity’ to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence, and
incurability. In the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the psychological defect spoken of is an
incapacity; but appears to be more of a “difficulty,” if not outright “refusal” or “neglect” in the performance of some
marital obligations. Mere showing of “irreconcilable differences” and “conflicting personalities” in no wise
constitutes psychological incapacity.
The Supreme Court granted the petition, and reversed and set aside the assailed decision; concluding that the
marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid.
36. PANA V. HEIRS OF JUANITE

FACTS
Efren Pana (Efren), herein petitioner, his wife Melecia, and another person, were charged with murder before the
RTC of Surigao City. On July 9, 1997, the RTC rendered its Decision acquitting Efren of the charge but finding Melecia
and another person guilty as charged and sentenced them to the penalty of death. The RTC also ordered those found
guilty to pay civil indemnity and damages to the heirs of the victim.
On appeal to the Supreme Court, it affirmed the conviction of both accused but modified the penalty to reclusion
perpetua. With respect to the monetary awards, the Court also affirmed the award of civil indemnity and damages
with modification.
Upon motion for execution by the heirs of the deceased, the RTC ordered the issuance of the writ, resulting in the
levy of real properties registered in the names of Efren and Melecia. Hence, Efren and his wife Melecia filed a motion
to quash the writ of execution, claiming that the levied properties were conjugal assets, not paraphernal assets of
Melecia. The RTC denied the motion. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the CA dismissed the petition.
Thus, Efren filed the instant petition arguing that his marriage with Melecia falls under the regime of conjugal
partnership of gains, given that they were married prior to the enactment of the Family Code and that they did not
execute any prenuptial agreement. On the other hand, the heirs argued that the regime of absolute community of
property governs the marriage of Efren and Melecia since the transitory provision of the Family Code gave its
provisions retroactive effect if no vested or acquired rights are impaired, and that the property relation between the
couple was changed when the Family Code took effect in 1988.
32
ISSUE:
Whether or not the conjugal properties of spouses Efren and Melecia can be levied and executed upon for the
satisfaction of Melecia’s civil liability in the murder case?
HELD:
Art. 122. The payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall
not be charged to the conjugal properties partnership except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family.
Neither shall the fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed upon them be charged to the partnership.
The payment of fines and indemnities imposed upon the spouses may be enforced against the partnership assets if
the spouse who is bound should have no exclusive property or if it should be insufficient.
Since Efren does not dispute the RTC’s finding that Melecia has no exclusive property of her own, the above applies.
The civil indemnity that the decision in the murder case imposed on her may be enforced against their conjugal
assets after the responsibilities enumerated in Article 121 of the Family Code have been covered.
37. GO-BANGAYAN V. BANGAYAN
FACTS
Benjamin Bangayan, Jr. (Benjamin) alleged that he was married to Azucena Alegre (Azucena), where they had three
children. However, Benjamin developed a romantic relationship with Sally Go-Bangayan (Sally) who was a customer
in the business owned by Benjamin’s family. Sometime after Azucena left for America, Benjamin and Sally lived
together as husband and wife. They sign a purported marriage contract even though Sally knew of Benjamin’s
marital status. Sally assured him that the marriage contract would not be registered. Benjamin and Sally’s
cohabitation produced two children.
When the relationship ended, Sally went to Canada bringing with her their 2 children. She then filed criminal actions
for bigamy and falsification of public documents against Benjamin, using their simulated marriage contract as
evidence. Benjamin, in turn, filed a petition for declaration of a non-existent marriage and/or declaration of nullity of
marriage before the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether Benjamin and saly’s wedding valid?
HELD:
No. At the time Benjamin and Sally entered into the purported marriage, the marriage between Benjamin and
Azucena was still valid and subsisting. Benjamin’s marriage to Azucena was duly established before the trial court,
evidenced by a certified true copy of their marriage contract.
Furthermore, the purported marriage of Benjamin and Sally had no valid marriage license because the Local Civil
Registrar confirmed that the Marriage License of Benjamin and Sally did not match the Marriage License series
issued for the month of February 1982. The Civil Registrar also said that it did not issue Marriage License No.N-07568
(the alleged Marriage License of Benjamin and Sally) to the couple. Such certification from the local civil registrar is
adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license and absent any suspicious circumstance, the certification
enjoys probative value, being issued by the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the
issuance of a marriage license.
Under Article 35 of the Family Code, a marriage solemnized without a license, except those covered by Article 34
where no license is necessary, "shall be void from the beginning. “
33
38. LAVADIA V. HEIRS OF JUAN LUCES LUNA
FACTS
ATTY. LUNA, a practicing lawyer, was at first a name partner in the prestigious law firm Sycip, Salazar, Luna, Manalo,
Hernandez & Feliciano Law Offices at that time when he was living with his first wife, herein intervenor-appellant
Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (EUGENIA), whom he initially married ina civil ceremony conducted by the Justice of the
Peace of Parañaque, Rizal on September 10, 1947 and later solemnized in a church ceremony at the Pro-Cathedral in
San Miguel, Bulacan on September 12, 1948. In ATTY. LUNA’s marriage to EUGENIA, they begot seven (7) children,
namely: Regina Maria L. Nadal, Juan Luis Luna, Araceli Victoria L. Arellano, Ana Maria L. Tabunda, Gregorio Macario
Luna, Carolina Linda L. Tapia, and Cesar Antonio Luna. After almost two (2) decades of marriage, ATTY. LUNA and
EUGENIA eventually agreed to live apart from each other in February 1966 and agreed to separation of property, to
which end, they entered into a written agreement entitled "AGREEMENT FOR SEPARATION AND PROPERTY
SETTLEMENT" dated November 12, 1975, whereby they agreed to live separately and to dissolve and liquidate their
conjugal partnership of property.
On January 12, 1976, ATTY. LUNA obtained a divorce decree of his marriage with EUGENIA from the Civil and
Commercial Chamber of the First Circumscription of the Court of First Instance of Sto. Domingo, Dominican Republic.
Also in Sto.Domingo, Dominican Republic, on the same date, ATTY. LUNA contracted another marriage, this time
with SOLEDAD. Thereafter, ATTY. LUNA and SOLEDAD returned to the Philippines and lived together as husband and
wife until 1987.
Sometime in 1977, ATTY. LUNA organized a new law firm named: Luna, Puruganan, Sison and Ongkiko (LUPSICON)
where ATTY. LUNA was the managing partner.
On February 14, 1978, LUPSICON through ATTY. LUNA purchased from Tandang Sora Development Corporation the
6th Floor of Kalaw-Ledesma Condominium Project(condominium unit) at Gamboa St., Makati City, consisting of
517.52 square meters, for ₱1,449,056.00, to be paid on installment basis for 36months starting on April 15, 1978.
Said condominium unit was to be usedas law office of LUPSICON. After full payment, the Deed of Absolute Sale over
the condominium unit was executed on July 15, 1983, and CCT No. 4779 was issued on August 10, 1983, which was
registered bearing the following names:
"JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna (46/100); MARIO E. ONGKIKO, married to Sonia P.G. Ongkiko
(25/100); GREGORIO R. PURUGANAN, married to Paz A. Puruganan (17/100); and TERESITA CRUZ SISON, married to
Antonio J.M. Sison (12/100) x x x" Subsequently, 8/100 share of ATTY. LUNA and 17/100 share of Atty. Gregorio R.
Puruganan in the condominium unit was sold to Atty. Mario E. Ongkiko, for which a new CCT No. 21761 was issued
on February 7, 1992 in the following names:
"JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna (38/100); MARIO E. ONGKIKO, married to Sonia P.G. Ongkiko
(50/100); TERESITA CRUZ SISON, married to Antonio J.M. Sison (12/100) x x x"
Sometime in 1992, LUPSICON was dissolved and the condominium unit was partitioned by the partners but the same
was still registered in common under CCT No. 21716. The parties stipulated that the interest of ATTY. LUNA over the
condominium unit would be 25/100 share. ATTY. LUNA thereafter established and headed another law firm with
Atty. Renato G. Dela Cruzand used a portion of the office condominium unit as their office. The said law firm lasted
until the death of ATTY. JUAN on July 12, 1997.
After the death of ATTY. JUAN, his share in the condominium unit including the lawbooks, office furniture and
equipment found therein were taken over by Gregorio Z. Luna, ATTY. LUNA’s son of the first marriage. Gregorio Z.
Luna thenleased out the 25/100 portion of the condominium unit belonging to his father to Atty. Renato G. De la
Cruz who established his own law firm named Renato G. De la Cruz & Associates.
34
The 25/100 pro-indiviso share of ATTY. Luna in the condominium unit as well as the law books, office furniture and
equipment became the subject of the complaint filed by SOLEDAD against the heirs of ATTY. JUAN with the RTC of
Makati City, Branch 138, on September 10, 1999, docketed as Civil Case No. 99-1644. The complaint alleged that the
subject properties were acquired during the existence of the marriage between ATTY. LUNA and SOLEDAD through
their joint efforts that since they had no children, SOLEDAD became co-owner of the said properties upon the death
of ATTY. LUNA to the extent of ¾ pro-indiviso share consisting of her ½ share in the said properties plus her ½ share
in the net estate of ATTY. LUNA which was bequeathed to her in the latter’s last will and testament; and thatthe
heirs of ATTY. LUNA through Gregorio Z. Luna excluded SOLEDAD from her share in the subject properties. The
complaint prayed that SOLEDAD be declared the owner of the ¾ portion of the subject properties;that the same be
partitioned; that an accounting of the rentals on the condominium unit pertaining to the share of SOLEDAD be
conducted; that a receiver be appointed to preserve ad administer the subject properties;and that the heirs of ATTY.
LUNA be ordered to pay attorney’s feesand costs of the suit to SOLEDAD
HELD:
Divorce between Filipinos is void and ineffectual under the nationality rule adopted by Philippine law. Hence, any
settlement of property between the parties of the first marriage involving Filipinos submitted as an incident of a
divorce obtained in a foreign country lacks competent judicial approval, and cannot be enforceable against the
assets of the husband who contracts a subsequent marriage.
Atty. Luna’s subsequent marriage to Soledad was void for being bigamous, on the ground that the marriage between
Atty. Luna and Eugenia had not been dissolved by the Divorce Decree rendered by the CFI of Sto. Domingo in the
Dominican Republic but had subsisted until the death of Atty. Luna.
Given the subsistence of the first marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, the presumption that Atty. Luna
acquired the properties out of his own personal funds and effort remained. It should then be justly concluded that
the properties in litis legally pertained to their conjugal partnership of gains as of the time of his death.
Consequently, the sole ownership of the 25/100pro in diviso share of Atty. Luna in the condominium unit, and of the
law books pertained to the respondents as the lawful heirs of Atty. Luna.
39. NOVERAS V. NOVERASG.R. NO. 188289

FACTS
David and Leticia Noveras are US citizens who own properties in the US and in the Philippines. Upon learning that
David had an extra-marital affair, Leticia obtained a decree of divorce from the Superior Court of California wherein
the court awarded all the properties in the US to Leticia. With respect to their properties in the Philippines, Leticia
filed a petition for Judicial Separation of Conjugal Property before the RTC.
The RTC awarded the properties in the Philippines to David, with the properties in the US remaining in the sole
ownership of Leticia. The trial court ruled that in accordance with the doctrine of processual presumption, Philippine
law should apply because the court cannot take judicial notice of the US law since the parties did not submit any
proof of their national law.
On appeal, the CA directed the equal division of the Philippine properties between the spouses. David insists that the
CA should have recognized the California Judgment which awarded the Philippine properties to him. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the California properties?
35
HELD:
No. Our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign
judgment relating to the status of a marriage, the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts
under our Rules of Evidence, together with the alien’s applicable national law. Even if we apply the doctrine of
processual presumption, the recognition of divorce is entirely a different matter because divorce is not recognized in
the Philippines. Absent a valid recognition of the divorce decree, it follows that the parties are still legally married in
the Philippines.
The Philippine courts did not acquire jurisdiction over the California properties of David and Leticia. Indeed, Article
16 of the Civil Code clearly states that real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country
where it is situated. Thus, liquidation shall only be limited to the Philippine properties.
40. ANTONIO PERLA v. MIRASOL BARING and RANDY PERLA
FACTS
Respondent Mirasol Baring (Mirasol) and petitioner Antonio Perla (Antonio) were allegedly neighbors. Eventually,
they became sweethearts. When Mirasol became pregnant, Antonio allegedly assured her that he would support
her. However, Antonio started to evade her.
Mirasol and her then minor son, Randy Perla (Randy), filed before the RTC a Complaint for support against Antonio.
Mirasol and Randy thus prayed that Antonio be ordered to support Randy. During the trial, Mirasol presented
Randys Certificate of Live Birth and Baptismal Certificate indicating her and Antonio as parents of the child. Mirasol
testified that she and Antonio supplied the information in the said certificates. The RTC rendered a decision ordering
Antonio to support Randy, which was affirmed by CA.
ISSUE:
Is Randy entitled for support from Antonio?
HELD:
Mirasol and Randy's Complaint for support is based on Randy's alleged illegitimate filiation to Antonio. Hence, for
Randy to be entitled for support, his filiation must be established with sufficient certainty. The Court has ruled that a
high standard of proof is required to establish paternity and filiation. An order for x xx support may create an
unwholesome situation or may be an irritant to the family or the lives of the parties so that it must be issued only if
paternity or filiation is established by clear and convincing evidence.
In the case at bar, Mirasol and Randy failed to establish Randys illegitimate filiation to Antonio. The Certificate of Live
Birth and baptismal certificate of Randy have no probative value to establish Randys filiation to Antonio since the
latter had not signed the same. A certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent
evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of said
certificate. Also, while a baptismal certificate may be considered a public document, it can only serve as evidence of
the administration of the sacrament on the date specified but not the veracity of the entries with respect to the
childs paternity. Thus, x xx baptismal certificates are per se inadmissible in evidence as proof of filiation and they
cannot be admitted indirectly as circumstantial evidence to prove the same.
36
41. ONG VS. DIAZ
FACTS
The Estate of Rogelio Ong opposed on the CA order directing the Estate and Joanne Rodgin Diaz for DNA analysis for
determining the paternity of the minor Joanne. Trial court formerly rendered a decision and declared the minor to
be the illegitimate child of Rogelio Ong with Jinky Diaz, and ordering him to support the child until she reaches the
age of majority. Rogelio died during the pendency of the case with the CA. The Estate filed a motion for
reconsideration with the CA. They contended that a dead person cannot be subject to testing. CA justified that "DNA
paternity testing, as current jurisprudence affirms, would be the most reliable and effective method of settling the
present paternity dispute."
ISSUE:
Whether or not DNA analysis can still be done despite the death of Rogelio.
HELD:
Yes.
The death of Rogelio does not ipso facto negate the application of DNA testing for as long as there exist appropriate
biological samples of his DNA. New Rules on DNA Evidence allows the conduct of DNA testing by using biological
samples--organic material originating from the person's body, ie., blood, saliva, other body fluids, tissues, hair,
bones, even inorganic materials- that is susceptible to DNA testing.
In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily establish or would be difficult to obtain, DNA
testing, which examines genetic codes obtained from body cells of the illegitimate child and any physical residue of
the long dead parent could be resorted to. (People vs Umanito, citing Tecson vs Comelec 424 SCRA 277)
42. HERRERA VS. ALBA
FACTS
14 May 1998, then thirteen-year-old Rosendo Alba, represented by his mother Armi Alba before the trial court a
petition for compulsory recognition, support and damages against petitioner (Rosendo Herrera)
Rosendo Herrera denied that he is the biological father of respondent. Petitioner also denied physical contact with
respondent‘s mother
Respondent filed a motion to direct the taking of DNA paternity. respondent presented the testimony of Saturnina
C. Halos, PhD who testified that the test is 99.99% accurate
Petitioner opposed DNA paternity testing and contended that it has not gained acceptability.Petitioner further
argued that DNA paternity testing violates his right against self-incrimination.
trial court and CA granted the motion to conduct DNA paternity testing.
ISSUE:
Whether or not DNA test is a valid probative tool in this jurisdiction to determine filiation. If yes, what are the
conditions under which DNA technology may be integrated into our judicial system and the prerequisites for the
admissibility of DNA test results in a paternity suit?
37
HELD:
Yes. By 2002, there was no longer any question on the validity of the use of DNA analysis as evidence. The Court
moved from the issue of according ―official recognition to DNA analysis as evidence to the issue of observance
of procedures in conducting DNA analysis.
It all boils down to evidence and it’s admissibility
Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the fact in issue and is not otherwise excluded by statute or the Rules of
Court.[48] Evidence is relevant when it has such a relation to the fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence
or non-existence.[49] Section 49 of Rule 130, which governs the admissibility of expert testimony, provides as
follows.
The opinion of a witness on a matter requiring special knowledge, skill, experience or training which he is shown to
possess may be received in evidence.
This Rule does not pose any legal obstacle to the admissibility of DNA analysis as evidence.
Indeed, even evidence on collateral matters is allowed ―when it tends in any reasonable degree to establish the
probability or improbability of the fact in issue.
43. JUANITA TRINIDAD RAMOS VS. DANILO PANGILINAN
FACTS
Respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against E.M. Ramos Electric, Inc., a company owned by Ernesto M.
Ramos, the patriarch of herein petitioners. The labor arbiter ordered Ramos and the company to pay the
respondents’ back-wages, separation pay, 13th month pay & service incentive leave pay. The decision became final
and executory so a writ of execution was issued which the Deputy Sheriff of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) implemented by levying a property in Ramos’ name situated in Pandacan.
Alleging that the Pandacan property was the family home, hence, exempt from execution to satisfy the judgment
award, Ramos and the company moved to quash the writ of execution. Respondents argued that it is not the family
home there being another one in Antipolo and that the Pandacan address is actually the business address. The
motion was denied and the appeal was likewise denied by the NLRC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the levy upon the Pandacan property was valid.
HELD:
Yes. For the family home to be exempt from execution, distinction must be made as to what law applies based on
when it was constituted and what requirements must be complied with by the judgment debtor or his successors
claiming such privilege. Hence, two sets of rules are applicable. If the family home was constructed before the
effectivity of the Family Code or before August 3, 1988, then it must have been constituted either judicially or extra-
judicially as provided under Articles 225, 229-231 and 233 of the Civil Code. Meanwhile, Articles 240 to 242 governs
extrajudicial constitution.
On the other hand, for family homes constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, there is
no need to constitute extra judicially or judicially, and the exemption is effective from the time it was constituted
and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries under Art. 154 actually reside therein. Moreover, the family home should
belong to the absolute community or conjugal partnership, or if exclusively by one spouse, its constitution must have
38
been with consent of the other, and its value must not exceed certain amounts depending upon the area where it is
located. Further, the debts incurred for which the exemption does not apply as provided under Art. 155 for which
the family home is made answerable must have been incurred after August 3, 1988. In both instances, the claim for
exemption must be proved.
In the present case, since petitioners claim that the family home was constituted prior to August 3, 1988, or as early
as 1944, they must comply with the procedure mandated by the Civil Code. There being absolutely no proof that the
Pandacan property was judicially or extra judicially constituted as the Ramos’ family home, the law protecting the
family home cannot apply thereby making the levy upon the Pandacan property valid.
44. DE MESA V. ACERO
FACTS
Araceli De Mesa is married to Ernesto De Mesa.They purcahsed a parcel of land located in Meycauayan, Bulacan. A
house was contracted in the said property, which became their family home. A year after, Arceli contracted a loan in
the amount of P100,000 from Claudio Acero, which was secured by a mortgage on the said parcel of land and house.
Araceli issued a check for the payment of the loan. When Acero presented the check to the bank it
was dishonored because the checking account was already closed. Acero demanded payment. However, Spouses De
Mesa still failed to pay. Acero filed a complaint for violation of B.P. 22 in the RTC. The RTC acquitted the Spouses but
ordered them to pay Acero P100,000 plus legal interest. A writ of execution was issued to levy on the said property.
The house and lot was sold in the public auction and Acero was the highest bidder. Acero leased the property to
Juanito Oliva, who defaulted payment for several years. Oliva contends that the Acero spouses are not the owners of
the property.
The MTC rendered a Decision, giving due course to Spouses Acero’s complaint and ordering the Spouses De Mesa
and Oliva to vacate the subject property. Spouses De Mesa contend that they are the rightful owners of the
property. The MTC also stated that from the time a Torrens title over the subject property was issued in Claudio’s
name up to the time the complaint for ejectment was filed, the petitioners never assailed the validity of the levy
made by the Sheriff, the regularity of the public sale that was conducted thereafter and the legitimacy of Acero’s
Torrens title that was resultantly issued.
Spouses De Mesa filed an action to nullify the TCT issued to Acero. Spouses De Mesa contend that the subject
property is a family home, which is exempt from execution under the Family Code and, thus, could not have been
validly levied upon for purposes of satisfying the writ of execution. RTC dismissed the complaint. CA affirmed RTC’s
decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject property, as a family home, may be subject to execution in this case.
HELD:
YES, the subject property is family home but is subject to execution. In general, the family home is exempt from
execution. However, the person claiming this privilege must assert it at the time it was levied or within a reasonable
time thereafter.For the family home to be exempt from execution ,distinction must be made as to what law applies
based on when it was constituted and what requirements must be complied with by the judgment debtor or his
successors claiming such privilege. The foregoing rules on constitution of family homes, for purposes of exemption
from execution, could be summarized as follows:
39
First, family residences constructed before the effectivity of the Family Code or before August 3, 1988 must be
constituted as a family home either judicially or extrajudicially in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code in
order to be exempt from execution;
Second, family residences constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 are automatically
deemed to be family homes and thus exempt from execution from the time it was constituted and lasts as long as
any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein;
Third, family residences which were not judicially or extrajudicially constituted as a family home prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code, but were existing thereafter, are considered as family homes by operation of law and
are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the Family Code.
Here, the subject property became a family residence sometime in January 1987 when Spouses De Mesa got
married. There was no showing, however, that the same was judicially or extrajudicially constituted as a family home
in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code. Still, when the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988, the
subject property became a family home by operation of law and was thus prospectively exempt from execution. The
petitioners were thus correct in asserting that the subject property was a family home.
Despite the fact that the subject property is a family home and, thus, should have been exempt from execution,
Spouses De Mesa should have asserted the subject property being a family home and its being exempted from
execution at the time it was levied or within a reasonable time thereafter. They are stopped from claiming the
exemption of the property from execution.
45. PATRICIO V DARIO
FACTS
Perla Patricio and her two sons inherited from her husband several properties including a parcel of land with a
residential house. Marcelino Marc, one of her sons, instituted an action for partition before the RTC which was
granted. Upon a motion for reconsideration ²led by Dario III on appeal, the CA dismissed the complaint for partition
²led by Patricio and Marcelino Marc for lack of merit. It held that the family home should continue despite the death
of one or both spouses as long as there is a minor bene²ciary thereof. The heirs could not partition the property
unless the court found compelling reasons to rule otherwise. The appellate court also held that the minor son of
private respondent, who is a grandson of spouses Marcelino Dario and Perla Patricio, was a minor beneficiary of the
family home.
ISSUE:
Whether partition of the family home is proper where one of the co-owners refuse to accede to such partition
on the ground that a minor beneficiary still resides in the said home.
RULING;
Yes. The rule is that if there are beneficiaries who survive and are living in the family home, it will continue for 10
years, unless at the expiration of 10 years, there is still a minor bene²ciary, in which case the family home continues
until thatbene²ciary becomes of age. Marcelino Lorenzo Dario IV is dependent on legal support not from his
grandmother, but from his father. Thus, despite residing in the family home and his being a descendant of Marcelino
Dario, Marcelino Lorenzo Dario IV cannot be considered as beneficiary contemplated under Article 154because he
did not full the third requisite of being dependent on his grand motherfor legal support. It is his father whom he is
dependent on legal support, and who must now establish his own family home separate and distinct from that of his
parents, being of legal age
40
46. In Re Adoption of Stephanie Garcia, GR No. 148311
FACTS
Honorato B. Catindig filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Astorga Garcia. He averred that
Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994; that Stephanie had been using her mother’s middle name and surname; and
that he is now a widower and qualified to be her adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanie’s middle name be
changed to Garcia, her mother’s surname, and that her surname “Garcia” be changed to “Catindig” his surname.
The RTC granted the petition for adoption, and ordered that pursuant to article 189 of the Family Code, the minor
shall be known as Stephanie Nathy Catindig.
Honorato filed a motion for classification and/or reconsideration praying that Stephanie be allowed to use the
surname of her natural mother (Garcia) as her middle name. The lower court denied petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration holding that there is no law or jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use the surname of his
biological mother as his middle name.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an illegitimate child may use the surname of her mother as her middle name when she is
subsequently adopted by her natural father.
HELD:
For all practical and legal purposes, a man’s name is the designation by which he is known and called in the
community in which he lives and is best known. It is defined as the word or combination of words by which a person
is distinguished from other individuals and, also, as the label or appellation which he bears for the convenience of
the world at large addressing him, or in speaking of or dealing with him. It is both of personal as well as public
interest that every person must have a name.
47. Landingin vs. Republic

FACTS
Diwata Ramos Landingin, a US citizen of Filipino parentage filed a petition for the adoption of 3 minors, natural
children of Manuel Ramos, the former’s brother, and Amelia Ramos. She alleged in her petition that when her
brother died, the children were left to their paternal grandmother for their biological mother went to Italy, re-
married there and now has 2 children by her second marriage and no longer communicates from the time she left up
to the institution of the adoption. After the paternal grandmother passed away, the minors were being supported by
the petitioner and her children abroad and gave their written consent for their adoption.
A Social Worker of the DSWD submitted a Report recommending for the adoption and narrated that Amelia, the
biological mother was consulted with the adoption plan and after weighing the benefits of adoption to her children,
she voluntarily consented.
However, petitioner failed to present the said social worker as witness and offer in evidence the voluntary consent
of Amelia Ramos to the adoption. Petitioner also failed to present any documentary evidence to prove that Amelia
assent to the adoption.
ISSUE:
WON a petition for adoption be granted without the written consent of the adoptee’s biological mother.
HELD:
The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is intended to protect the natural parental
relationship from unwarranted interference by interlopers, and to insure the opportunity to safeguard the best
interests of the child in the manner of the proposed adoption.
41
The written consent of the biological parents is indispensable for the validity of a decree of adoption. Indeed, the
natural right of a parent to his child requires that his consent must be obtained before his parental rights and duties
may be terminated and re-established in adoptive parents. In this case, petitioner failed to submit the written
consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption.
Petitioner’s contention must be rejected. When she filed her petition with the trial court, Rep. Act No. 8552 was
already in effect. Section 9 thereof provides that if the written consent of the biological parents cannot be obtained,
the written consent of the legal guardian of the minors will suffice. If, as claimed by petitioner, that the biological
mother of the minors had indeed abandoned them, she should, thus have adduced the written consent of their legal
guardian.
48. Republic vs. Hernandez
FACTS
The RTC granted the petition for adoption of Kevin Earl Bartolome Moran and simultaneously granted the prayer
therein for the change of the first name of said adoptee to Aaron Joseph, to complement the surname Munson y
Andrade which he acquired consequent to his adoption.
Petitioner opposed the inclusion of the relief for change of name in the same petition for adoption objecting to the
joinder of the petition for adoption and the petitions for the change of name in a single proceeding, arguing that
these petition should be conducted and pursued as two separate proceedings.
Petitioner argues that a petition for adoption and a petition for change of name are two special proceedings which,
in substance and purpose, are different from and are not related to each other, being respectively governed by
distinct sets of law and rules. Petitioner further contends that what the law allows is the change of the surname of
the adoptee, as a matter of right, to conform with that of the adopter and as a natural consequence of the adoption
thus granted. If what is sought is the change of the registered given or proper name, and since this would involve a
substantial change of one’s legal name, a petition for change of name under Rule 103 should accordingly be
instituted, with the substantive and adjective requisites therefor being conformably satisfied.
Private respondents, on the contrary, admittedly filed the petition for adoption with a prayer for change of name
predicated upon Section 5, Rule 2 which allows permissive joinder of causes of action in order to avoid multiplicity of
suits and in line with the policy of discouraging protracted and vexatious litigations. It is argued that there is no
prohibition in the Rules against the joinder of adoption and change of name being pleaded as two separate but
related causes of action in a single petition.
ISSUE:
WON respondent judge erred in granting prayer for the change of the given or proper name if the adoptee in a
petition for adoption.
HELD:
Clearly, the law allows the adoptee, as a matter of right and obligation, to bear the surname of the adopter, upon
issuance of the decree of adoption. It is the change of the adoptee’s surname to follow that of the adopter which is
the natural and necessary consequence of a grant of adoption and must specifically be contained in the order of the
court, in fact, even if not prayed for by petitioner. However, the given or proper name, also known as
the first or Christianname, of the adoptee must remain as it was originally registered in the civil register. The
creation of an adoptive relationship does not confer upon the adopter a license to change the adoptee’s registered
Christian or first name. The automatic change thereof, premised solely upon the adoption thus granted, is beyond
42
the purview of a decree of adoption. Neither is it a mere incident in nor an adjunct of an adoption proceeding, such
that a prayer therefor furtively inserted in a petition for adoption, as in this case, cannot properly be granted.
The name of the adoptee as recorded in the civil register should be used in the adoption proceedings in order to vest
the court with jurisdiction to hear and determine the same, and shall continue to be so used until the court orders
otherwise. Changing the given or proper name of a person as recorded in the civil register is a substantial change in
one’s official or legal name and cannot be authorized without a judicial order. The purpose of the statutory
procedure authorizing a change of name is simply to have, wherever possible, a record of the change, and in keeping
with the object of the statute, a court to which the application is made should normally make its decree recording
such change.
Turning now to the present petition, while it is true that there is no express prohibition against the joinder of a
petition for adoption and for change of name, we do not believe that there is any relation between these two
petitions, nor are they of the same nature or character, much less do they present any common question of fact or
law, which conjointly would warrant their joinder. In short, these petitions do not rightly meet the underlying test of
conceptual unity demanded to sanction their joinder under our Rules.
It is necessary to reiterate in this discussion that a person’s name is a word or combination of words by which he is
known and identified, and distinguished from others, for the convenience of the world at large in addressing him, or
in speaking of or dealing with him. It is both of personal as well as public interest that every person must have a
name. The name of an individual has two parts: the given or proper name and the surname or family name. The
given or proper name is that which is given to the individual at birth or at baptism, to distinguish him from other
individuals. The surname or family name is that which identifies the family to which he belongs and is continued
from parent to child. The given name may be freely selected by the parents for the child, but the surname to which
the child is entitled is fixed by law.
y reason thereof, the only way that the name of person can be changed legally is through a petition for change
of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court. For purposes of an application for change of name under Article 376
of the Civil Code and correlatively implemented by Rule 103, the only name that may be changed is the true or
official name recorded in the civil register. As earlier mentioned, a petition for change of name being a proceeding in
rem, impressed as it is with public interest, strict compliance with all the requisites therefor in order to vest the
court with jurisdiction is essential, and failure therein renders the proceedings a nullity.
While the right of a natural parent to name the child isrecognized, guaranteed and protected under the law, the so-
called right of an adoptive parent to re-name an adopted child by virtue or as a consequence of adoption, even for
the most noble intentions and moving supplications, is unheard of in law and consequently cannot be favorably
considered. To repeat, the change of the surname of the adoptee as a result of the adoption and to follow that of
the adopter does not lawfully extend to or include the proper or given name. Furthermore, factual realities and legal
consequences, rather than sentimentality and symbolisms, are what are of concern to the Court.
43
49. IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF THE MINOR, EDWIN VILLA Y MENDOZA vs Republic G.R. No. L-22523
FACTS
Petitioner spouses wish to adopt the minor Edwin Villa. The petitioner wife happens to be the legitimate sister of
Edwin.
The lower court denied the adoption ruiling that said adoption will result to incongruous situation or a dual
relationship between parties.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a sister can adopt her brother?
HELD:
Yes. Article 335 of the Civil Code enumerates those persons who may not adopt, and it has been shown that
petitioners-appellants herein are not among those prohibited from adopting. To say that adoption should not be
allowed when the adopter and the adopted are related to each other, is to preclude adoption among relatives no
matter how far removed or in whatever degree that relationship might be, which in our opinion is not the policy of
the law.
There is no provision in the law prohibiting relatives, by blood or by affinity, from adopting one another. To say that
adoption should not be allowed when the adopter and the adopted are related to each other, except in those cases
enumerated in Article 338 of the Civil Code, is to preclude adoption among relatives, no matter how far removed or
in whatever degree that relationship might be, which is not the policy of the law.
The relationship established by the adoption is limited to the adopting parents and does not extend to their other
relatives, except as expressly provided by law. Thus, the adopted child cannot be considered as a relative of the
ascendants and collaterals of the adopting parents, nor of the legitimate children which they may have after the
adoption, except that the law imposes certain impediments to marriage by reason of adoption. Neither are the
children of the adopted considered as descendants of the adopter.
50.In Re: Adoption of Michelle and Michael Lim
FACTS
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Monina Lim (Petitioner) seeking to set aside the Decision of the RTC
of Gen San, which dismissed without prejudice the consolidated petitions for adoption of Michelle and Michael Jude
Lim. Petitioner is an optometrist by profession. She married Primo Lim and they were childless. Minor children,
whose parents were unknown, were entrusted to them by a a certain Lucia Ayuban. Being so eager to have a child
on their own, Petitioner and Lim registered the child to make it appear that they were the parents of the children.
The spouses reared and cared for the children as if they were their own. They were sent to exclusive schools. They
used the surname Lim in all their school records and documents. Unfortunately, her husband died. Later on,
Petitioner married Angel Olario, an American citizen. Thereafter, petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing
of the amnesty given under RA 8552 to those individuals who simulated the birth of a child. Thus, Petitioner filed
petitions for adoption of Michelle and Michael before the Trial Court. At the time of the filing of the petition, both
Michelle and Michael were already of age. Michelle and Michael, as well as Olario, Petitioner’s new husband
executed an Affidavit of Consent. RTC, however, dismissed the petitions on the ground that P should have filed the
petition jointly with her new husband as she has already remarried citing Sec. 7(c) of Art. III RA 8552 and Art. 185 of
FC. Petitioner on appeal, contends that the rule must be relaxed. She argued that joint parental authority is not
necessary in this case since, at the time the petitions were filed, both Michelle and Michael were already of age.
44
Thus, parental authority is not anymore necessary since they have been emancipated having attained the age of
majority.
ISSUE:
Whether Petitioner, who has remarried, can singly adopt?
HELD:
It is undisputed that, at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, petitioner had already remarried. She filed the
petitions by herself, without being joined by her husband Olario. We have no other recourse but to affirm the trial
court’s decision denying the petitions for adoption. Dura lex sed lex. The law is explicit. Section 7, Article III of RA
8552 reads: SEC. 7. Who May Adopt.—The following may adopt: x x x Husband and wife shalljointly adopt, except in
the following cases: x x x The use of the word “shall” in the above-quoted provision means that joint adoption by the
husband and the wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental authority over the child
which is the ideal situation. As the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to
require the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also insures harmony between the spouses. The law is clear. There is
no room for ambiguity. Petitioner, having remarried at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, must jointly
adopt. Since the petitions for adoption were filed only by petitioner herself, without joining her husband, Olario, the
trial court was correct in denying the petitions for adoption on this ground. Neither does petitioner fall under any of
the three exceptions enumerated in Section 7. First, the children to be adopted are not the legitimate children of
petitioner or of her husband Olario. Second, the children are not the illegitimate children of petitioner. And third,
petitioner and Olario are not legally separated from each other.
The fact that Olario gave his consent to the adoption as shown in his Affidavit of Consent does not suffice. There are
certain requirements that Olario must comply being an American citizen. He must meet the qualifications set forth in
Section 7 of RA 8552 such as: (1) he must prove that his country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the
Philippines; (2) he must have been living in the Philippines for at least three continuous years prior to the filing of the
application for adoption; (3) he must maintain such residency until the adoption decree is entered; (4) he has legal
capacity to adopt in his own country; and (5) the adoptee is allowed to enter the adopter’s country as the latter’s
adopted child. None of these qualifications were shown and proved during the trial. These requirements on
residency and certification of the alien’s qualification to adopt cannot likewise be waived pursuant to Section 7. The
children or adoptees are not relatives within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity of petitioner or of Olario.
Neither are the adoptees the legitimate children of petitioner.
Adoption has, thus, the following effects: (1) sever all legal ties between the biological parent(s) and the adoptee,
except when the biological parent is the spouse of the adopter; (2) deem the adoptee as a legitimate child of the
adopter; and (3) give adopter and adoptee reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent
and child, including but not limited to: (i) the right of the adopter to choose the name the child is to be known; and
(ii) the right of the adopter and adoptee to be legal and compulsory heirs of each other. Therefore, even if
emancipation terminates parental authority, the adoptee is still considered a legitimate child of the adopter with all
the rights of a legitimate child such as: (1) to bear the surname of the father and the mother; (2) to receive support
from their parents; and (3) to be entitled to the legitime and other successional rights. Conversely, the adoptive
parents shall, with respect to the adopted child, enjoy all the benefits to which biological parents are entitled such as
support and successional rights.
45
51.REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V CA
FACTS
James Anthony Hughes, a natural born citizen of the United States of America, married Lenita Mabunay Hughes, a
Filipino Citizen, who herself was later naturalized as a citizen of that country On June 29, 1990 the spouses (jointly
filed a petition with the RTC of Angeles City to adopt cecelia, neil and Maria, all surnamed Mabunay, minor niece
and nephew of Lenita, who had been living with the couple prior to the filing of the Petition. *the minors, as "well as
their parents, gave consent to the adoption.
ISSUE:
Whether they can adopt their nephew and niece under PH law?
HELD:
NO. Because james cannot adopt under art 184 of the family code, neither does he fall to any of the exemption.
As amended by Executive Order 91, Presidential Decree No. 603, had thus made it mandatory for both the spouses
to jointly adopt when one of them was an alien. The law was silent when both spouses were of the same nationality.
The Family Code has resolved any possible uncertainty. Article 185 thereof now expresses the necessity for a joint
adoption by the spouses except in only two instances—(1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate
child; or (2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other.
We are not unmindful of the possible benefits, particularly in this instance, that an adoption can bring not so much
for the prospective adopting parents as for the adopted children themselves. We also realize that in proceedings of
this nature, paramount consideration is given to the physical, moral, social and intellectual welfare of the adopted
for whom the law on adoption has in the first place been designed. When, however, the law is clear and no other
choice is given, we must obey its full mandate.
52.LAHOM V SIBULO
FACTS
A childless couple adopted the wife's nephew and brought him up as their own. In 1972, the trial court granted the
petition for adoption, and ordered the Civil Registrar to change the name Jose Melvin Sibulo to Jose Melvin Lahom.
Mrs. Lahom commenced a petition to rescind the decree of adoption, in which she averred, that, despite the her
pleas and that of her husband, their adopted son refused to use their surname Lahom and continue to use Sibulo in
all his dealing and activities. Prior to the institution of the case, in 1998, RA No. 8552 went into effect. The new
statute deleted from the law the right of adopters to rescind a decree of adoption (Section 19 of Article VI).
These turn of events revealing Jose's callous indifference, ingratitude and lack of care and concern prompted Lahom
to file a petition in Court in December 1999 to rescind the decree of adoption previously issued way back on May 5,
1972. When Lahom filed said petition there was already a new law on adoption, specifically R.A. 8552 also known as
the Domestic Adoption Act passed on March 22,1998, wherein it was provided that: "Adoption, being in the interest
of the child, shall not be subject to rescission by the adopter(s). However the adopter(s) may disinherit the adoptee
for causes provided in Article 919 of the Civil Code" (Section 19).
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject adoption still be revoked or rescinded by an adopter after the effectivity of R.A. No.
8552, and if in the affirmative, whether or not the adopter’s action prescribed.
HELD:
In the early part of the century just passed, the rights of children invited universal attention; the Geneva Declaration
of Rights of the Child of 1924 and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, followed by the United Nations
46
Declarations of the Rights of the Child, were written instruments that would also protect and safeguard the rights of
adopted children. The Civil Code of the Philippines of 1950 on adoption, later modified by the Child and Youth
Welfare Code and then by the Family Code of the Philippines, gave immediate statutory acknowledgment to the
rights of the adopted. In 1989, the United Nations initiated the Convention of the Rights of the Child. The Philippines,
a State Party to the Convention, accepted the principle that adoption was impressed with social and moral
responsibility, and that its underlying intent was geared to favor the adopted child. R.A. No. 8552 secured these
rights and privileges for the adopted. Most importantly, it affirmed the legitimate status of the adopted child, not
only in his new family but also in the society as well. The new law withdrew the right of an adopter to rescind the
adoption decree and gave to the adopted child the sole right to sever the legal ties created by adoption.
It was months after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552 that herein petitioner filed an action to revoke the decree of
adoption granted in 1975. By then, the new law, had already abrogated and repealed the right of an adopter under
the Civil Code and the Family Code to rescind a decree of adoption. Consistently with its earlier pronouncements,
the Court should now hold that the action for rescission of the adoption decree, having been initiated by petitioner
after R.A. No. 8552 had come into force, no longer, could be pursued.
Interestingly, even before the passage of the statute, an action to set aside the adoption is subject to the five-year
bar rule under Rule 100 of the Rules of Court and that the adopter would lose the right to revoke the adoption
decree after the lapse of that period. The exercise of the right within a prescriptive period is a condition that could
not fulfill the requirements of a vested right entitled to protection. It must also be acknowledged that a person has
no vested right in statutory privileges. While adoption has often been referred to in the context of a “right,” the
privilege to adopt is itself not naturally innate or fundamental but rather a right merely created by statute. It is a
privilege that is governed by the state’s determination on what it may deem to be for the best interest and welfare
of the child. Matters relating to adoption, including the withdrawal of the right of an adopter to nullify the adoption
decree, are subject to regulation by the State. Concomitantly, a right of action given by statute may be taken away at
anytime before it has been exercised.
While R.A. No. 8552 has unqualifiedly withdrawn from an adopter a consequential right to rescind the adoption
decree even in cases where the adoption might clearly turn out to be undesirable, it remains, nevertheless, the
bounden duty of the Court to apply the law. Dura lex sed lex would be the hackneyed truism that those caught in the
law have to live with. It is still noteworthy, however, that an adopter, while barred from severing the legal ties of
adoption, can always for valid reasons cause the forfeiture of certain benefits otherwise accruing to an undeserving
child. For instance, upon the grounds recognized by law, an adopter may deny to an adopted child his legitime and,
by a will and testament, may freely exclude him from having a share in the disposable portion of his estate.
47

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MATIENZO FELIP BRYAN D.

DECEMBER 19, 2017

2. REPUBLIC OF THE PH V PILIPINAS SHELL

4. PEOPLE OF THE PH V PATALIN

5. ORIENTAL ASSURANCE V SOLIDBANK CORP

6. BPI VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

8. BERNARDINO P. BARTOLOME V. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM

9. DE MESA ET AL V PEPSI PRODUCTS

12. CIR V AICHI

13. DEL SOCORRO V VAN WILSEM

14. BELLIS V BELLIS

a. $240,000 to his 1st wife Mary Mallen;

The lower court denied their respective motions for reconsideration.

16. VAN DORN vs. HON. ROMILLO and RICHARD UPTON

17. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III,

18. ALFONSO T. YUCHENGCO, Petitioner, v. THE MANILA CHRONICLE PUBLISHING CORPORATION,

On November 8, 2002, the trial court rendered a Decision in favor of petitioner.

AWARD OF DAMAGES BASED ON ABUSE OF RIGHT,PROPER

19. BAKSH vs. COURT OF APPEALS

21. Jose B. Ledesma vs Court of Appeals 160 SCRA 449 (1988)

24. GEORGE MANANTAN, petitioner vs. COURT OF APPEALS, defendant

25. PIMENTEL V. PIMENTEL

ISSUE AND HELD:

Domicile of Petitioner is in Tacloban

30. REPUBLIC V CAGANDAHAN

31. KALAW V FERNANDEZ

Guidelines too rigid, thus relaxed IN THIS CASE

The case sufficiently satisfies the Molina guidelines.

34. Villanueva vs. Court of Appeals

35. REPUBLIC V CA MOLINA

Whether opposing or conflicting personalities should be construed as psychological incapacity

36. PANA V. HEIRS OF JUANITE

37. GO-BANGAYAN V. BANGAYAN

39. NOVERAS V. NOVERASG.R. NO. 188289

40. ANTONIO PERLA v. MIRASOL BARING and RANDY PERLA

42. HERRERA VS. ALBA

43. JUANITA TRINIDAD RAMOS VS. DANILO PANGILINAN

44. DE MESA V. ACERO

45. PATRICIO V DARIO

47. Landingin vs. Republic

48. Republic vs. Hernandez

50.In Re: Adoption of Michelle and Michael Lim

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